Selected quad for the lemma: master_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
master_n	father_n	king_n	servant_n	3,226	4	6.7708	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A57675	The philosophicall touch-stone, or, Observations upon Sir Kenelm Digbie's Discourses of the nature of bodies and of the reasonable soule in which his erroneous paradoxes are refuted, the truth, and Aristotelian philosophy vindicated, the immortality of mans soule briefly, but sufficiently proved, and the weak fortifications of a late Amsterdam ingeneer, patronizing the soules mortality, briefly slighted / by Alexander Ross.	Ross, Alexander, 1591-1654.	1645 (1645)	Wing R1979; ESTC R200130	90,162	146

into degrees nor do they make them things by themselves but they say that they have no being except in and by their subjects so neither doe they make them indivisible in respect of parts but they hold qualities partible according to the parts of the bodie in which they are And if they did yet it will not follow that therefore they turne bodies into spirits for spirits are not free from divisions nor are qualities bodies as we have already shewed nor can bodies be turned into spirits except you meane such spirits as flie up and downe your nerves and arteries And indeed not Philosophers but the Masse-Priests are guilty of your accusation for they as it were by magicall words ●●rne the bread into a spirit and they make the accidents of the bread to have essence and existence by themselves without their subjects The nature of a thing apprehended is truly in the man Sect. 2. Pag. 356. c. 1. who doth apprehend it and not the similitude because where there is a likenesse there is a dissimilitude which is not in the thing apprehended and therefore no likenesse but the very thing it selfe Then first the thing containing and receiving must be the same with the thing contained and received which is impossible Then secondly there will be no difference between the direct act of the intellect in apprehending things without it selfe by the species or similitudes of these things and that act which is called reflex when the intellect understands it selfe without any species though in this the apprehendent and thing apprehended be the same yet it cannot be so in the outward objects Neither indeed is the intellect every way the same as it apprehends and as it 's apprehended it apprehends as the intellect it 's apprehended as an intelligible object Then thirdly one and the same object may be multiplied in an instant to two or three thousand if there should be so many to look upon an object at the same time Fourthly Tell us how an horned beast passing thorow a mans eie should not hurt it or a stone thorow a looking-glasse and not break it but there must be a breaking of the one and a hurting of the other if the very substance of the thing apprehended is truly and really in the eie or phantasie or mind of the man apprehending or in the glasse Is the very substance of the seale or onely the impression and species of it in the wax Fifthly The intellect is not the same with the thing apprehended essentially and formally but onely subjecti●● as they say for the intellect is the subject of the received species which of an abstract becomes a concrete and which before the reception of the species was intellectus but not informatus till they come Now if the thing received by the intellect be a substance then it cannot be one with the intellect being they are both actuall entities Ex duobus in actu non fit unum per se. Sixtly If the intellect be every thing really which it understands then by understanding or apprehending a horse it becomes a horse and so man must needs be a horse saith Scaliger Seventhly If the intellect be essentially Exerc. 307. 6. the same thing which it apprehends then the thing apprehended cannot be present or absent without the destroying of the intellect but we say accidents may and therefore the species are but accidents because by their coming and going the intellect is not destroyed Eightly There is nothing in the intellect which was not before in the sense but if the substance of the fire be received into the chrystalline humor of your eye before the visory spirits can apprehend or convey that fire to the phantasie thence to the intellect either the fire wil burn up the chrystalline humour or the moisture of the humor extinguish the fire and so the intellect be deprived of its object Ninthly Give me the reason why a man seeth that which sometimes he perceiveth not Our Peripateticks give the reason thus because though the chrystalline humour suffers in receiving the species yet the visory spirits act not by apprehending them because the phantasie imployes them about some other object but this could not be if the substance of a man or horse be received into the eie for it were impossible that such a substance could be received into the eye and not perceived by the spirits in the eye Lastly There is a dissimilitude betweene the thing apprehended and the power apprehending though you deny it for if there be no dissimilitude betweene the fire that is in your chimney and that in your eye then there must be the same coales heat smoak and quantity in your eye that is in the chimney if it were so your braines could not avoid conflagration nor your eyes a totall extinction A respect is no where to be found in its formall subsistence Sect. 3. Cap. 1. p. 359. 360. but in the apprehension of man the likenesse that one white hath to another is onely in man who by comparing them giveth nature and being to respect Then it seems there is no true and reall respect or relation betweene a father and his son a master and his servant a King and his people but a meere notion in our apprehension so that if men did not apprehend such notions there should be no relation at all betweene these So you are no longer a father nor can your son be your son but whilst you are thinking of it and if you think not of it nor dreame of it in your sleep your son hath lost his filiation and consequently his tie of obedience and respect which he oweth to you 2. Our Philosophers were unwise men to place relations in a predicament which is the series of reall entities if respects be meere notions and so they ought not to be handled in Metaphysicks if they be not reall entities 3. What think you of that respect or relation which is betweene the Creator and the creature or those relations which are in the persons of the blessed Trinity are they onely notions and such as have no subsistence but in mans apprehension 4. In relation there is opposition but opposits differ really 5. A respect or relation may be really lost from its subject and therefore 't is a reall entity for when you die the relation ceaseth which you now have to your son or he to you 6. If all respects be notions what distinction do you make betweene those which are called relata realia and relata rationis 7. Relations are so far from being meere notions that in them there is a two-fold reality The one as they are accidentall formes inherent in their subjects the other as they import a respect to another which is called its terminus Lastly they are said to be like which have the same quality to wit of whitenesse or such like but if whitenesse be a reall entity the likenesse which is the identity of it