written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
And many are the objections w ch from hence do take their Rise They allege it is written by St. Paul 1 Cor. 7. 23. Yee are bought with a price be yee not made the Servants of men And agâ—in Gal. 5. 6. Stand firm in that liberty in which Christ hath set you free and be not intangled again with the yoak of bondage And again Col. 2. 16. Let no man judge you in meat or drink c. and other places to the same effect They dispuâ—e also that it is not likely that Christ at last should have freed us so from the positive Laws of God himself which were certainly most just to leave us captivated under the slavish Bondage of the Laws of Men. XXXII I will answer to all these places but I would have you first preadvertised seeing that there are many Texts and heads of Christian liberty that we diligently do take heed not too rashly to confound them neither rudely and unskilfully to wrest and cite those places of Scripture which pertain to one kind of Liberty to another kind to which they do not belong which transition to another kind is not only the perpetual and Solemn vice of the Antinomians and the Anabâ—ptists but of many others who would be esteemed the Reformers of this age and this as they often put in practice in other disputations so most especially in those where the debate is concerning the Rites of the Church having thus preadmonished you of their Errors I now proceed to the solution of their Arguments In that Text to the Corinthians the Apostle would exhort the faithful that in whatsoever place God had constituted them and with whatsoever gifts he had indued them that contented in that Station they would modestly contain themselves within their own limits measuring themselves by the gifts and calling of God and acordingly accommodate their lives and actions whether they be servants or free and not so inslave and emancipate their Consciences to the Judgment and command of any Man as wholly to depend upon his Will and Opinion but being mindfull that he is the servant of God and of the Lord Jesus so to study to please men and to be subservient to their affections and commands as to do nothing unworthy of a man who professeth himself to be the Servant of God and Christ And this being the certain sense of the Apostle in that whole discourse we may most truly conclude from hence that we ought not to be obedient to the pleasures of Masters Parents or Princes or any Mortals whatsoever if they command any thing to be done which is wicked or unlawful for instead of being the Servants of God this were to make themselves the Servants of Men But he who out of Conscience doth obey the just honest and profitable Constitutions of Men is so far from being thought that he is therefore the Servant of Men that by the two chiefest of the Apostles he is expressely said to serve the Lord God and not Men. Eph. 6. 7. Col. 3. 23. and 1. Pet. 2. 16. In this Text To serve the Lord and not Men the particle of Negation as usually in other places is taken comparatively that is to say rather God than Men he serveth God for himself and Men for God He serveth Men as he performeth what is commanded by them and he serveth God as he doth it out of the Conscience of his Duty XXXIII That other place to the Galathians is best of all to be understood by the whole scope of the Epistle Some false Apostles in the Churches of Galatia being either Jews or Judaizing Christians did violently contend contrary to the institution of the Apostles in the Council at Jerusalem that the Gentiles newly converted to the Faith should not only be baptized but circumcized also And those Impostors as their custom is under the pretence of piety and a wicked diligence amongst the credulous vulgar did so wonderfully prevayl that they had drawn many into so great an errour that they thought they could never attain unto everlasting happinesse unlesse they suffered themselves to be circumcized The Spirit of the blessed Apostle not induring this wretched and growing Imposture doth inveigh against the grossenesse of the error of it with more than ordinary Indignation throughout the whole course almost of the Epistle And amongst other Arguments he admonisheth the Galatians of that liberty by which Christ after his comming did free his Church from the unprofitable burden and yoak of the Mosaick Ceremonies and doth exhort them constanly to maintain the liberty obtained by the death of Christ and not to stoop their necks again unto the yoak of slavery which they should altogether do if they should believe the ritual observation of the dead letter of the Law to be necessary Now how incongruously this is by the Anabaptists applyed to the Laws of Men profitable and necessary for the Commonwealth from which the Scriptures do no where tell us that Christ hath freed us he is wilfully blind that doth not discern it XXXIV The third place taken out of the Epistle to the Colossians doth not at all appertain to Humane Laws rightly constituted concerning things of a middle nature but to the Doctrines of Impostors who dogmatically propounded to the people of God some things to be necessary which God never commanded which was the Custom of the Traditionary Pharisees whom Christ Mat. 15. reprehends upon that account for making the Commandements of God of no effect by their Tradition or clean contrary they as dogmatically did forbid other things as unlawful which God never did prohibit injoyning the people as to such and such things Touch not taste not handle not The Apostle admonisheth the Colossians to have a care of such dogmatizing Teachers and not suffer any snare to be thrown upon their Consciences by these Impostors Magistrates therefore in a political Government do not offend who in things of a middle nature do either command or prohibit any thing to the people for Profit Honesty Decency or for Orders sake but without any opinion of necessity on either side which belongeth to the thing it self that is commanded or forbidden Those pittiful Ministers I may more truly call them Magistrates so Magisterially they do pronounce all things do rather offend who so importunately vex and inveigh against the harmlesse Laws of Magistrates and exercise a Tyranny oâ—â—er the Consciences of the people and whatsoever is distastful to them is presently condemned for Impiety or at least for Superstition XXXV That which in the fourth place they do allege thaâ— because Christ hath freed us from the positive Laws of God therefore much more from the Laws of Men is in many respects erroneous and absurd For in the first place it is not truly said that Christ hath freed us from the positive Laws of God by which we never were bound For the positive Laws of God or Men do only oblige those on whom they are imposed Now those Laws of
are grounded which although they do all agree in this that whatsoever power of obligation they have they altogether acknowledge it as proceeding from the Law of God For the first in every kind whatsoever it be is the cause of the rest neither would the Law of God as already it is stated be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience if it should oblige any beyond it self which it did not oblige by vertue of it self yet these things as I have said that do so agree in one do notwithstanding every one of them differ amongst themselves not only in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter but also in the Degree according to the efficacy of the obliging and they chiefly consist in a threefold difference for some of them do oblige constantly of which there are two kinds The one in reference to those things whose obligation doth arise from the power of another as humane Laws the Commandements of Parents Masters and the like The other in reference to those whose obligation doth arise from the free election of the will it self As Vows Oaths Contracts Promises and the like Somthings again do only oblige by accident and as it were cursorily according to Time and Place and the exigence of other circumstances as the Law or Reason of Scandal The privilege and priority of order and method do require that we begin with humane Laws concerning the obligation whereof those things which at this time shall be spoken of may all of them be reduced to these two questions 1. Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences and secondly how far they do oblige them The determining of most of the particular cases do pertain chiefly to the latter Question which God willing shall be the Subject of our following Lecture we shall only at this time touch upon the first Delectus vim in lege ponimus Cicero 1. de legibus which is Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences The Subject of the question needeth not any large exposition Lex or the Law is first so called in an active construction a legendo id est eligendo from choosing as Cicero will have it because the Lawgivers do make choyce of those things which they conceive to be most profitable to the Common-wealth Or secondly as others will have it Lex or the Law is so called a legendo from reading and that in a passive construction because the Laws after they were Enacted were engraven in Tables of Brasse or otherwise legibly written and fastned unto Pillars to be read in publick by the people Aquin 1. 2. quaest 90. Arti 16. Biel. 3. dist Arti 1. Or lastly according to other mens derivation Lex is so called a ligando that is from binding because it doth bind the Subjects to the observation of it but in the Genus of it it is nothing else than a Rule of acting imposed on the Subject by the Superiour being impowered thereunto They are called humane Laws in opposition to Divine for as those Laws are called Divine which immediately are constituted by the authority of God himself whether they be Laws Natural or Laws Positive so those Laws are said to be Humane which although they have an authority derived to them from God yet they are immediately commanded by men and imposed on their Subjects III. The Law of man is thus defined by Aquinas 3. 1 a. 2. ae quaest 90 arti 4. It is the ordination of Reason to a common good promulgated by him who hath the care of the Commonalty His words are Lex humana est Rationis ordinatio ad Bonum Commune ab eo qui curam Communitatis habet promulgata By others it is defined otherwise they differ in the words but almost all of them doe agree in the sense and well so they may for this Definition is very suitable to the publick Law which is the most known and the most usual acceptation of that word And so we use to speak Analogum per se positum pro famosiore significato praesumitur an Analogick being placed by it self is presumed to stand for that which is the most remarkable in the signification But in this present question and to our present purpose Under the Notion and Name of Humane Laws the publick Lawes of Cummonalties are not only to be understood although most chiefly they are and primarily but even the particular Commands of Parents Masters Magistrates and all other Superiors imposed on their Children Servants or their People for when both of them are a kind of Precept in this one thing especially there is a Difference betwixt a Law properly so called and a Mandate for a Mandate or Command is but the Precept of a private person invested with a private Authority but the Law is a publick precept of a person indued with a publick Authority In all other considerations there is but little diversity Certainly as to the effect and force of obliging since it is apparent by the tenth verse of this Chap. that all Legitimate Power whatsoever it be not only publick which notwithstanding I must confess to be the only meaning of the Apostle in that place but also all private power is constituted of God and the Command of a Father to his Son is no lesse a Rule for acting than the Law of the Prince to his Subject all those things which I shall now discourse of concerning the obligation of humane Lawes are so to be understood and let this one premonition suffice that the mandates of private persons be comprehended in the publick Lawes and oeconomical Commands with Politick Constitutions and others of the like nature as far as the Course and Consideration of the Analogy will permit And thus much be spoken of the Subject of the Question The Praedicate followeth V. The Praedicate of the Question is the obligation of the Conscience Now what Conscience is and what is an Obligation in the generality of it hath largely enough been already unfolded by me neither is there any need of repetition When we say the Law doth oblige we mean nothing else than that the Law doth impose on the Subject a Necessity of observing and obeying it You are to know that the Law of its own Nature and as it is a Law doth cary in it self a double force or necessary effect that is the force of directing from whence it is called a Canon or a Rule as it layes open to the Subject the will of the Superiour and sheweth what it is that he would have to be performed by him and a power of obliging by which it differs from Counsel and Admonishment because it commandeth the Subject to obey his will and doth so oblige him to the performance of it that if he doth not obey him he doth sin or erre for Sin is nothing else but an aberration or a receding from that Rule or Law which we ought to follow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so Monsters by receding from the ordinary Law
not on another For by the force of Free will a man is master only of his own will and of his own Acts and not of anothers Now on the contrary he who layes a precept upon or who doth command another if he hath right to command he obligeth by commanding that man whom he commandeth but he doth not oblige himself Because a command is an Act of power and Authority and of right upon another and is fit and proper unless peradventure there be something that hinders it to induce an obligation so the Father with Authority commands the Son the Master the Servant the General the Souldier the King the people and God as a Superior commandeth man to such and such duties and by commanding doth oblige him to the performance of them IV. In the second place I suppose that the Legislative power is a power of publick Jurisdiction for it sufficeth not to the power of making Laws that a man hath a Right and power over others to prescribe unto them what is to be done unless he be invested with an external power to compel them to the performance of it and to afflict punishments on the Refusers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Ethick 10. The Law hath a necessitating power The Schoolmen therefore do distinguish that power which a Superior hath over an Inferior into that power which they call Dominative or the power of Masterdome and the power of Jurisdiction The first whereof is less and more private and not admitting an external Jurisdiction the other greater and of a more inforcing Authority These two powers do not a little differ between themselves and that in a three-fold consideration First in respect of the matter or object for the Power Dominative or of mastery is properly exercised on the more imperfect and private Commonalty as a House a School or a Family but the power of Jurisdiction on the more perfect and publick Commonalty as a City an Army a Common-wealth Secondly in respect of the End for the power Dominative by it self and Primarily is ordinated to the profit of the person indued with that power that is the master and but Secondarily and by Consequence to the good of the Commonalty as it is profitable for a Family that the master of it should grow rich Now the power of publick Jurisdiction is Primarily ordinated to the publick good of the Commonalty it self and but Secondarily and Consequently to the good of the person indued with that power which is the Magistrate himself it being profitable for a Prince that the Common-wealth should flourish Thirdly in the respect of the more effectual Administration which is greater in the power of jurisdiction than in the Power Dominative by reason of a greater coactive Power for examples sake The Master of a Family cannot so efficaciously prevail that his Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons or Servants whom he cannot correct but with a rod or Cudgel as may the civil Magistrate who by his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience by imprisonment or banishment by confiscating their Goods or by Death it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The fatherly Authority hath nothing in it that is enforcing nothing that is necessating saith Aristotle in the place newly quoted Therefore to the making of Laws every superiority is not sufficient but besides that Dominative there is required the power of Jurisdiction so properly called for the Laws cannot be made or established unless by a Person that hath a publick coactive power by this time you understand I believe that I may need no more to admonish you of it that what here hath been spoken by me concerning Laws doth absolutely pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation and not to any others unless analogically after their way the proportion that is due unto them as they come near or are more remote from their perfection V. To these two suppositions which to what sense they tend you shall easily understand from those things which presently I shall represent unto you I in the third place do now adde a responsive position viz. That the power Legislative is a power autocraâ—ical That is the power of making Laws which may oblige the Commonalty doth consist in him alone whether he be a single person as in the state of Monarchical Government or whether they be more as in other Governments who exerciseth the chief power over the whole Commonalty I will in the first place explane this position and afterwards I will confirm it And for the explication of it we are in the first place to understand that for the happiness of humane societies and the more commodious Adminstration of Commonwealths it hath pleased Almighty God the Author of Order not only to constitute a political Government that there may be Magistrates to be set over the people but also in that very Government to constitute a political Order that amongst the Magistrates themselves there might be divers degrees as well of Dignity as of Power And it is likely that the military word of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Apostle useth in the Romans hath a relation to this sence to show that there is not only an ordination of Magistrates from God but a subordination also such as is seen in a military Army VI. In the second place we are to know that in all things in which there is order to avoid a proceeding to an infinitenesse which Nature doth abhor we must at the last come necessarily to something which is the first and chiefest in that Order where we are to make a stand Therefore seeing that Magistrates of the same Commonalty are some of them superiour unto another in Dignity and power it must of necessity so come to passe that some one of them must be transcendent above the rest that the others may depend on him and he on none In the same construction the head is the highest in the body the Admiral in a Fleet and the Emperour in an Army The supreme Magistrate is only less than God himself and in governing the people committed to his charge hath neither a Superiour nor an Equal St. Peter calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Superiour St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power 1 〈…〉 13. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 1. the man in Authority And the Schoolmen 1 Tim. 〈◊〉 2. caput communitatis the head of the Commonalty in whom solely the chief command and the Majesty of the Empire doth consist and to whom all inferiour Magistrates do owe all that power which they do exercise over the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being sent from him 1 Pet. 2. 14. VII In the third place we are to know that this supreme power which we call Majesty or Autocratical that is governing all by it self according to the diverse form of Commonwealths is placed either in some one person or in more In a popular state which is called
Fathers Knights and Common-People for of these three orders after that Kings desisted and there were as yet no Emperors the whole City did consist And in this sence for in the whole duration of that Common-wealth the State was popular the Roman writers are to be understood as often as they make mention of the preserving of the Safety Dignity and Majesty of the people IX I have the more diligently expounded these things not only because the proper significations of many words of this kind do depend on the use of that people from whom the words themselves are derived to us but for another two fold Cause The one that we suffer not our selves to be deceived and circumvented by a lesse proper interpretation of a doubtful word The other that in the bare appellation of the word people there may be no force to the prejudice of him who is Prince of the Commonalty and the head of the people Either of which of what moment they are to our present purpose you shall presently understand by those things which I am to prefer unto you X. I say therefore that this word people as many other words signifying an aggregate multitude may be taken two wayes Either collectively as it signifieth the whole Commonalty of the Republick that is the Prince and Subjects together or discretively and precisely as it signifieth the Subjects only and severed from the King In the very same manner as the Body either implyes the rest of the Members with the Head or the rest of the Members without the Head And the appellation of a Family doth sometimes comprehend all who are within one House Wife Children Servants and the Master of the Family himself who is over them all and sometimes again those only who are under his command and of whom he hath care And in the name of an Army sometimes the General is comperhended with the Souldiers sometimes he is not comprehended And the like is to be observed in the words of Parliament or Kingdom and other words of the same kind which signifie indeed a collection of many but with order and reference to one as their principal or their Head Therefore if not with a malignant intent yet certainly by a most dangerous Error it comes to passe that that which is spoken of the people collectively in the former sense inclusively to comprehend the whole Commonalty that is the Prince with the Subjects should be so wrested that it should be applyed to the people in the latter sense that is to the Subjects alone the King excluded XI But you will say how may it appear to us that the Appellation of people in the first sence may in that Axiom be understood collectively for the King and people and not discretively in the later sence for the common people alone I answer that most manifestly it doth appear by the common use of speaking and the Analogy of other words of the same signification In which the most certain rule of Interpretation is that words collective are alwayes to be taken collectively unlesse the Adjunct which is opposite to it doth require it For examples sake where it is said 1 Col. 1. 18. Christ is the Head of the Body of the Church It is manifest by the Adjunct opposite to it to wit the mention of the Head to which the Body is there relatively opposed that the word Body is there taken discretively for the other Members of the body precisely severed from the Head So if any man should say that the General had advanced with his Army into the Fields or had sent them to their winter quarters or that the Master of a Family had forbad any belonging to him to go out of his doors at twelve of the Clock at night Or what is written of David That whatsoever the King did was acceptable to the people It is manifest by the Adjunct every where opposed that in the word General master and King those collective words of Army Family and Subjects are not to be understood collectively but discretively and exclusively that is by the appellation of the Army the Souldiers are only comprehended and not the General and by the appellation of Family the Servants or Children are comprehended and not the Master himself and by the appellation of people the Subjects are only comprehended and not the King The reason is because the Opposite which is one of the correlatives being adjoyned doth necessarily imply the word collective answering on the other side and relatively opposite unto it to contain precisely its correlative that is the multitude only annexed and conjoyned to the Head and chief and not the whole Commonalty aggregated as it were from both the Terms correlative XII But when an Opposite is not added which may necessarily carry its signification to the other part of the Relation only it were incongruous to sence and reason to take the word collective otherwise than collectively and in its just latitude so that â—t may thereby comprehend both the Terms of the Relations especially when the speech is concerning safety profit or any other good or advantage which is or mat be common to them both for examples sake if it were commanded that tomorrow the camp should march because the Army should not be invironed by the Enemy or that Corn should be bought for the present use of a Family Orectes himself would swear that the man was not of a sober understanding who should apprehend that what was spoken either of the Army or the Family had relation only to the good of the Souldiers and the Servants no account or care being had of the General who commanded the Army nor of the Master who governed the Family which is all one as if a sick man being admonished by the Physician to have a greater care of his body for the future should with a great diligence begin to keep warm his Breast and his Thighs and other members beneath his neck but take no care at all to provide for his head because the Physicitian did only put him in mind of his body but not of his head XIII But I come yet nearer to the point in hand if Peradventure a whole company of common Souldiers should affirm that the safety of the Army was the supreme Law military but they had a General who did put them upon such hard service by his unsufferable commands that unlesse they timely should shake off the yoak of obedience to him the whole liberty of the Army would be in great danger to be lost and thereupon from this Principle of asserting their own liberties by force of Arms they should consult and agree amongst themselves no longer to obey his commands but to take away the life of their General Or if household Servants whom the Apostle 1 Peter 2. 18. would have obedient not only to those who are good and favourable to them but to those also who are rough and rigorous should combine amongst themselves to refuse his commands