better understood It seems to me that what I have hitherto said of Nature and Grace is sufficient to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons concerning an infinite number of Difficulties which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by themselves For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being of a general Cause of an infinite Wisdom and if the Principles I have establish'd of this Idea be granted I believe none will be surprized or offended with God's Conduct and that instead of condemning or murmuring at it Men will not forbear to admire and adore it The Third Discourse Of Grace and the Manner by which it Acts in us The First Part. Of Liberty I. THere is nothing more uncomely than the substance of Spirits if they are separated from God For what is a Mind without Understanding and Reason without Motion and Love In the mean time the Word and Wisdom of God is the Universal Reason of Spirits it is the Love by which God loves himself which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happiness The Mind cannot know the Truth but by its natural and necessary union with Truth its self it cannot be reasonable but by reason in short it cannot in some sence be a Mind and Understanding but because its Substance is enlightned penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself I have elsewhere explain'd these Truths Book III. of the Searchafter Truth and in the Explication of the Nature of Ideas As the substance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good but by its natural and necessary union with the eternal and substantial Love of the Soveraign Good so it moves not towards that which is good but so far forth as God carries it it is not Will but by the motion which God continually imprints upon it it lives not but by charity it wills not but by the love of good which God imparts unto it tho' it abuses it For in truth as God neither makes nor preserves Minds but for himself so he carries them towards himself as long as he preserves their being he communicates the love of happiness to them as far as they are capable Now this natural and continual motion of the Soul towards good in general towards good undetermined that is towards God is that which I here call the Will because it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods II. This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible for it is not in our power to chuse not to be happy We necessarily love that we clearly know and sensibly feel to be the true good All minds love God by the necessity of their nature and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will it is not because they do not seek after God or the cause of their happiness but because having a confused sence that Bodies about them make them happy they look upon them as their Goods and by a natural and ordinary consequence love them and unite themselves to them III. But the love of all these particular goods is not naturally invincible Man considered as God made him may hinder himself from loving those goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving Seeing there is a good which contains all others Man may sacrifice to the love of this good all other loves for God having made minds for himself he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himself or with relation to himself The inward sentiment which we have of our selves teaches us that we may for example refuse any fruit tho we are inclin'd to receive it Now this power of loving or not loving particular goods this non-invincibility which is in that motion which carries the minds to love that which does not seem to them to contain all goods this power this non-invincibility is that which I call liberty Thus by putting the definition in the place of the thing defin'd this expression Our will is free signifies that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general is not invincible in respect of any particular good We do also to this word free joyn the Idea of voluntary but hereafter I shall take this word in the sense which I have observ'd because this is most natural and most ordinary IV. The word good is equivocal it may signifie either pleasure which makes Men formally happy or else the true or apparent cause of pleasure I shall in this Discourse always take the word good in the second sense because in truth pleasure is imprinted upon the Soul to the end that she may love the cause of her happiness that by the motion of her love she may be carried towards it and be straitly united thereunto and so be continually happy When the Soul loves nothing but her pleasure she truly loves nothing but her self for pleasure is only a condition or modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy Now since the Soul cannot be to her self the cause of her happiness she is unjust she is ungrateful she is blind if she loves her pleasure without paying that love and respect which is due to the true cause which produces it in her Since there is none but God who can immediately and by himself act upon the Soul and make her feel pleasure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will there is none but he who can be truly good Nevertheless I call the creatures which are the apparent causes of those pleasures which they occasion in us by the name of goods For I would not avoid the ordinary way of speaking but as far as it is necessary clearly to express my self All the creatures tho good in themselves and perfect in respect of God's designs are not good in respect to us I mean they are not our good because they are not the true causes of our pleasure or our happiness V. The natural motion which God continually imprints upon the Soul to engage it to love him or to use a term which expresses several Ideas and which can neither be equivocal nor confused after the definition I have given thereof the will is determined towards particular goods either by clear and distinct knowledge or by a confused sentiment which shews us these goods If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good the motion of the Soul continues as it were undetermin'd it tends towards good in general But this motion receives a particular determination as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her VI. Now when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses does not altogether fill these two faculties when it appears under the idea of a particular good which does not contain all
the first had caused and there is such a relation between the Sinful and Earthly Adam and the Innocent and Heavenly Adam that St. Rom. V. 14 17 18 19. 1 Cor. 15 48. Paul looks upon the first communicating sin to his Ofspring by his disobedience as the figure of the second giving to Christians by his obedience righteousness and holiness XXVI Order requires that the soul should govern the body and that she should not be distracted whither she will or no with all those sentiments and all those motions which turn her to sensible Objects Thus the first man before sin was so much Master of his sences and his passions that they were silent whensoever he desired it nothing was able to turn him from his duty against his will and all the pleasures which then prevented his reason did only respectfully after a gentle easie manner advertise him of what he was to do for the preservation of his life But after sin he lost all at once the power he had over his body so that not being able to stop the motions nor effuse those traces which sensible Objects made in the principal part of his brain his soul by the Order of Nature and as a punishment of his disobedience became miserably subject to the Law of Concupiscence to that Carnal Law which continually fights against the mind and every moment inspires it with the Love of sensible goods and rules over it by passions so strong and lively and yet at the same time so sweet and agreeable that it cannot nay will not make all necessary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it For the infection of sin is communicated to all the Children of Adam by an infallible consequence of the Order of Nature as I have else where Explained XXVII The Heart of Man is always a slave to pleasure and when Reason teaches us it is not convenient to enjoy it yet we do not avoid it but that we may find another more sweet or solid We willingly sacrifice lesser pleasures to greater but the invincible impression which we have for our own happiness permits us not all our lives long to deprive our selves of that sweetness which we taste when we suffer our selves to follow our passions Additions In the third discourse you will see how this ought to be understood XXVIII It is certain that pleasure makes him happy who enjoys it at least while he does enjoy it Thus men being made to be happy pleasure always gives a touch to the will and moves it towards that object which causes it or seems to cause it The contrary must be said of grief Now Concupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments motion which prevent reason which are not subject thereunto of pleasures which coming from the objects about us inspire us with the love of them of griefs which making the exercise of vertue harsh and painful give us an abhorrence of them It therefore became the second Adam that he might cure the disorders of the first to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of concupiscence pleasures with respect the true goods and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the occasional cause and which as Head of the Church he continually bestows upon us is not the Grace of knowledge tho he has merited this Grace and tho he may sometimes communicate it as I shall shew by and by but it is the Grace of sentiments It is this previous delectation which produces and entertains the love of God in our hearts for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects which cause or seem to cause it It is likewise the horror which sometimes accompanies sensible objects which gives us an aversion to them and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge XXIX The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence pleasure to pleasure horror to horror that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man The remedy that it may cure the disease must be contrary thereto For the Grace of knowledge cannot heal an Heart wounded with pleasure to this end this pleasure must either cease or another succeed in its room Pleasure is the weight of the soul which naturally enclines it towards it self sensible pleasures weigh it down towards the Earth That the soul may determine it self either these pleasures must be dissipated or the delectation of Grace raise her towards Heaven and put her almost in Equilibrio 'T is thus that the new Man opposes the old that the influences of our Head resists the influences of our Father Adam that J. C. overcomes all our domestick Enemies Since Man had no concupiscence before his sin it was not necessary he should be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation He clearly knew that God was his good it was not necessary that he should feel it There was no need that he should be drawn by pleasure to love him whom to love nothing hindred and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love but after sin the Grace of delectation was necessary to him to counter-ballance the continual effort of concupiscence Thus knowledge is the Grace of the Creator delectation the Grace of the Redeemer Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as Eternal Wisdom Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature Delectation was always pure Grace Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In short Knowledge is sent down upon our minds according to our different desires and applications as I shall Explain But the Delectation of Grace is not shed upon our Hearts but according to the various desires of the Soul of J. C. Additions That the Healing Grace of J. C. consists in a preventing Delectation is a thing so much out of doubt with St. Augustine that F. Deschamps who has so Learnedly confuted Jansenius and is so opposite unto him agrees with him in this Point tho they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us See Jansenius de Grat. Chr. Lib. IV. c. 1. and Deschamps Lib III. Disp III. c. 16. 19. I cannot perswade my self to continue the Explication of those things which to me seem clear of themselves Insomuch that what follows either needs it not or is not particular to me My Principles are sufficiently confirm'd by what has been said and if they be clearly understood I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows XXX It is true that pleasure produces Knowledge because the soul gives more attention to the Objects from which she receives more pleasure Since the generallity of men dispise or neglect the truths of Religion because these
good as he ought to love it he then merits by the good use which he makes of his Liberty XXIV It is true that the delectation of Grace considered in its self and without respect to the pleasures of Concupiscence which are contrary thereunto is always invincible because this Holy Pleasure being agreeable to the light of Reason nothing can hinder its effect in a Man perfectly free When the Mind clearly sees by the light of Reason that God is its happiness and has a lively sense thereof by the taste of pleasure it is impossible but that it should love him For the Mind desires to be happy and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable motions of its love it suffers no remorse opposite to its present happiness and is not restrain'd by pleasures contrary to that which it enjoys The delectation of Grace therefore is not invincible The love also which it produces is not Meritorious if it be not greater than this delight I mean the love which is meerly the natural or necessary effect of the delectation of Grace has nothing Meritorious in it tho this love be always good in its self For he that goes no faster than he is driven or rather no further than he receives present pay for has no right to be rewarded When a Man loves God no farther than he is drawn or only because he is drawn he does not love him by reason but by instinct he does not love him as he desires and ought to be beloved But when he loves God by Choice by Reason by the Knowledge which he has of his Amiableness then he Merits He Merits when he advances as I may say towards the true good after pleasure has only determined the motion of love XXV This reason alone demonstrates either that the first Man was not carried to the love of God by the blind instinct of pleasure or at least that this pleasure was not so lively as that which he felt from the sight of his natural perfections or in the actual use of sensible goods For 't is evident that this pleasure would have rendred him impeccable this pleasure would have put him into a state like to that of the Blessed who do no longer Merit not because they are not now in the Condition of Travellers for Spirits always Merit when they do Actions in themselves Meritorious and God being just it is necessary they should be rewarded for them but they Merit no more because the pleasure which they find in God is equal to their love because they are altogether wrap't up in him and because being delivered from all kind of grief and every motion of Concupiscence they have no longer any thing to sacrifice to God XXVI For that which renders a man impeccable does not altogether make him incapable of Meriting J.C. was impeccable yet nevertheless he Merited his own glory and that of the Church of which he is the Head Since he was perfectly free he loved the Father not by the instinct of Pleasure but by Choice and Reason he loved him because he saw by intuition how lovely he was For the most perfect Liberty is that of a Mind which has all possible Knowledge and is not determined by any Pleasure For all Pleasure preventing or other naturally produces some love and if Pleasure be not resisted it efficaciously determines the motions of the soul towards the agreeable object But Knowledge how great soever it be conceived leaves the mind perfectly free supposing that this Knowledge be considered singly and without any Pleasure XXVII Seeing J.C. is nothing but the Word or Reason Incarnate certainly he ought not to love the true good with a blind love with the love of instinct with the love of sentiment he ought to love him with reason He must not love a Being infinitely Amiable and which he knows to be perfectly worthy of his love as Men love those goods which are not Amiable and which they cannot know to be worthy of their love He ought not to love the Father with a love any wise like unto that by which Men love the vilest Creatures by which they love Bodies His love that it may be pure or at least perfectly Meritorious shou'd by no means be produced by preventing Pleasures For Pleasure may and ought to be the reward of lawful love as it really is at present in the Saints and in J.C. himself But it cannot be the principle of Merit it should not prevent Reason if it be not very much weakned Now Reason in J.C. was no wise weakned Sovereign Reason in him supported Created Reason J.C. not being subject to the motions of Concupiscence he had no need of preventing delectation to counter-ballance the sensible pleasures which surprize us perhaps he would not taste even the Pleasure of joy or the Pleasures which naturally follow'd the knowledge which he had of his Virtue and Perfections to the end that being deprived of all sorts of Pleasures his Sacrifice might be more Holy more Pure and more dis-interested Lastly it may be besides the privation of all preventing Pleasures and others he inwardly suffered those Horrible desertions which souls filled with Charity cannot better express than by being forsaken of God according to those words of J.C. upon the Cross My God my God why hast thou forsaken me But if you will have J.C. to be carried on even by preventing Pleasures to the love of the Father it is necessary to say according to the Principles which I have laid down either that he loved him with more zeal than he tasted Pleasure since natural love which the instinct of Pleasure produces is not at all Meritorious or at least that he Merited by the sensible griefs and by the continual Sacrifice he freely and voluntarily offered unto God Luke 24.26 Acts 17.3 For it became him to Suffer that he might enter into his Glory as the Scripture teaches us XXVIII If the delectation of Grace without respect to any contrary Pleasure infallibly turns the Consent of the Will the same cannot be said of the Pleasures of Concupiscence These Pleasures considered in themselves and without respect to actual Pleasures are not always invincible The light of Reason Condemns them remorse of Conscience gives us an Horror of them a Man may ordinarily suspend his Consent Thus the Grace of J.C. is stronger than Concupiscence It may be called Victorious Grace because it is always Master of the Heart when its Impression is equal to that of Concupiscence For when the Ballance of our Heart is in Equilibrio by the equal weights of two contrary Pleasures the most solid and most reasonable always turns it because Knowledge always favours its efficacy and Remorse of Conscience opposes the action of False Pleasure XXIX From all which has been said it may be concluded that we always Merit when we love the true-good by Reason and we do not Merit at all when we love it by Instinct We always Merit when we
love the true good by Reason because Order requires that the true good should be loved after this manner and because Knowledge alone does not transport or invincibly carry us towards the good which it discovers We do no wise Merit when we love the true good by Instinct or so far as Pleasure invincibly transports or determines the Mind because Order requires that the true good or the good of the Mind should be loved by Reason by a Free love by a love of Choice and Discretion and because the love which Pleasure alone produces is a Blind Natural and Necessary love I confess that when a Man goes further than he is carried by Pleasure he Merits but this is because he acts by Reason and as Order requires he shou'd act for that love which he has above the Pleasure is a Pure and a Reasonable love XXX In like manner it must be Concluded that a Man always demerits when he loves false goods by the instinct of Pleasure provided that he loves them more than he is invincibly engaged to love them For when we have naturally so little Liberty and Capacity of Mind that Pleasure invincibly transports us tho we be irregular and our love be bad and against Order we do not demerit For to demerit I mean to deserve to be punish'd a Man must run after false goods with more earnestness or go farther than Pleasure invincibly carrys him For it must be observed that there is a great deal of difference betwixt a Good action and a Meritorious Action betwixt an irregular action and an action which deserves to be punished the love of a Just Person is often irregular in sleep and yet deserves not to be punished Whatsoever is conformed to Order is good and all that is contrary thereunto is bad but nothing Merits or Demerits but the good or ill use of Liberty or that wherein we have some share Now a Man makes a good use of his Liberty when he follows his Knowledge when he goes on as I may say freely and of himself towards the true good whether he be at first determined by the preventing delectation or by the light of Reason When he sacrifices sensible Pleasures to his duty and conquers grief by the love of Order On the contrary he makes an ill use of his Liberty when his Pleasure is his Reason when he sacrifices his duty to his passions his perfection to his present happiness his love of Order to self-Self-love and does all this at the time when he is not really forced thereunto I shall still explain this more clearly XXXI When two Objects present themselves to the mind of Man and he will chuse one of them I confess that he will never fail to determine himself on that side where he shall find most Reason and Pleasure on that side where he 'll see most good Since the soul cannot will or love but by the love of good the will being nothing but the love of good or the natural motion of the soul towards good she infallibly loves that which has most conformity with that which she loves invincibly But it is certain that when sensible Pleasures or some such like thing does not disturb the Mind a Man may always suspend the judgment of his love and not determine himself especially in respect of false goods for the soul can have no evidence that false goods are true goods nor that the love of these false goods does perfectly agree with the motion which carrys us towards the true good Thus when a Man loves false goods at the time when his senses and passions do not altogether disturb his Reason he demerits because then he may and ought to suspend the judgment of his love For if he had staid a while to have examined what he ought to have done this false good would soon have appeared much the same as it is Remorse of Conscience and perhaps even the delectation of Grace would have changed all the dispositions of his mind and heart For the condition of a Traveller has nothing fixed a thousand different objects present themselves continually to his mind and the life of Man upon Earth is only a continual succession of thoughts and desires XXXII It seems at first that in respect of the true good Man cannot suspend the judgement of his love for we cannot suspend our judgment but when the evidence is not full Now we cannot but see that it is most evident that God is the true good and that also none but he can be good to us we know that he is infinitely more Amiable than we can comprehend But it must be observed that tho we cannot suspend the judgment of our Reason in respect of speculative truths when the evidence is full yet we may suspend the judgment of our love in respect of good what evidence soever there is in our Ideas For when Sentiments fight against Reason when Taste opposes Knowledge when we sensibly find that to be bitter and ungrateful which Reason clearly represents as sweet and agreeable we may chuse whether we will follow our Reason or our Senses We may act and indeed often do act against our Knowledge because when we attend to Sentiment Knowledge is lost if we do not use violence to retain it and because we ordinarily attend more to Sentiment than to Knowledge because Sentiment is more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge XXXIII It is pleasure which makes minds actually happy Upon this account we ought to enjoy Pleasure when we love the true good the mind thinks upon God if it draws near to him by its love and tastes no other sweetness On the contrary God sometimes fills it with bitterness and desolation He forsakes He rejects it as I may say not that it should cease to love him but rather that its love may be more Humble more Pure and more Meritorious In short He commands it to do some things which makes it actually Miserable But if it draws near to Bodies it finds it self happy proportionably happy as it is united to them certainly that is a temptation what Knowledge soever one may have for we invincibly desire to be happy So that a Man Merits very much if fixing upon his Knowledge he denies himself notwithstanding all uncomfortable desertions if he sacrifices his actual happiness to the love of the true good if living by Faith and trusting in the Promises of God he continues inviolably true to his duty It therefore plainly appears that J. C. might Merit his Glory tho he most evidently knew the true good because having a great love for his Father he intirely submitted himself to his orders without being carried thereto by preventing Pleasures Because altogether complying with his Knowledge he suffered very great Asslictions and sacrificed all the most lively and sensible Pleasures to the love of God For he took a Body as we have that he might have a * Heb. 8.3 victim to offer unto God and
of J. C. John 1.17 abundant Graces because says he the Law was given by Moses but true Grace by Jesus Christ. For in truth the Graces which were before J. C. ought not to be compared to those which he distributed after his triumph If they were miraculous it must be thought they were very rare Even the Grace of the Apostles before the Holy Spirit was given to them was not to be compared with those which they received when the Soveraign Priest of good things to come being entred by his Blood into the Holy of Holies by the strength of his Prayers obtain'd and by the dignity of his Person sent the Holy Spirit to animate and sanctifie his Church The strange Blindness of the Jews their gross and carnal Sentiments their frequent relapses into Idolatry after so many Miracles do sufficiently shew they had scarce any love for true goods and the fearfulness of the Apostles before they received the Holy Spirit is a sensible mark of their weakness Thus Grace in this time was very rare because as yet our Nature was not made in J. C. the occasional cause of our Graces as yet J. C. was not fully consecrated a Priest according to the Order of Melchisedech and his Father had not yet given him that immortal and glorious Life Heb. 5.5 10. Heb. 7.16 17. which is the particular character of his Priesthood For it was necessary that J. C. should enter into the Heavens and receive the glory and power of being the occasional cause of all goods before he sent the Spirit according to the words of St. John John 7.39 John 16.7 The Spirit was not yet given because J. C. was not yet glorified And according to these words of Christ himself It is expedient for you that I go For if I go not the Comforter will not come But if I go I will send him unto you Now it is not to be imagined that J. C. considered as God is the Head of the Church He has obtain'd this honour as Man the Head and the Members ought to be of the same nature It is as Man that J. C. interceeds for Men it is as Man that he has received of God soveraign power over his Church For since God does not interceed at all he as God has not received that Name which is above every Name he is equal to the Father and absolute Master of all things by right of his birth These Truths are evident and J. C. himself assures us of them John 5.22 to 27. since he says that his Father gave him power to judge Men because he was the Son of Man Thus we must not think that those Expressions of Scripture which teach us that J. C. is the Author of Grace ought to be understood of J. C. considered according to his Divine Person For if this was so I confess I should not have demonstrated that he is the occasional cause of it he would have been only the true cause thereof But since it is certain that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally the true causes of Grace seeing all the outward Operations of God are common to the three Persons my Arguments cannot be denied since the Holy Scripture says of the Son and not of the Father nor of the Spirit that he is the Head of the Church and that under this character he communicates Life to all the Members which compose it Object II. XIV It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the formation of his Mystical Body So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Causes determine the efficacy of God's general Will on the other hand it is God himself who determines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Father Answer I confess that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of the Father but this is not because the Father has particular wills which answer to those of the Son and determine them This is only because the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general which is necessarily the rule of the divine wills and of those which love God For to love Order is is to love God it is to will what God wills it is to be Just Wise Regular in his love The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the most Sacred Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be Order requires this for nothing can be made too great for God All the divers desires of this Soul ever intent upon the Execution of its design come also to it from God or the Word to which it is united But the occasional causes of all these thoughts most certainly are its divers desires for it thinks on what it will Now these divers desires are sometimes altogether free probably the thoughts which excite these desires do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and resolve to execute them It is equally advantagious to the design of Jesus Christ whether it be Peter or John who does that which the regularity of his work requires It is true that the soul of Jesus Christ is not indifferent as to what respects the glory of his Father or that which Order necessarily requires but it is altogether free in every thing else nothing out of God invincibly determines its love Thus it ought not to be wonder'd if it have particular wills tho there are no such wills in God which determine those of the soul of Jesus Christ But I grant that the wills of Jesus Christ are not free I grant that his knowledge determines him to will and always to will after a certain manner in the construction of his Church But it must be Eternal Wisdom to which his soul is united which determines these wills if it is not necessary for this end to suppose particular wills in God It must be observ'd that the wills of the soul of J. C. are particular or have not any occasional cause which determines their efficacy no not the will of God For the soul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking his knowledge and consequently his wills are limited Thus 't is necessary that his wills be particular since they change according to his divers thoughts and applications For it seems to me that the soul of J. C. otherwise employ'd in contemplating the beauties and tasting the infinite sweetness of the true good ought not according to the rule of Order to think at the same time upon all the Ornaments which it designs to bestow upon his Church and the different means of executing each of his intentions J. C. desiting to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father he desires also to adorn it with infinite beauties and that by such means as are most
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 figure of him who was to come These words who is the figure of him who was to come in the place where they are put it out of doubt that the first Adam represented the second even by Concupiscence it self and the Death which he communicated to all Men together with his Son Hence it is that St Paul makes so many Antitheses betwixt the Earthly Man and the Man from Heaven The first Man was made a living Soul 1 Cor. 15.45.47 the second Adam a quickning Spirit The first Man is of the Earth Earthly the second Man is the Lord from Heaven God by the first Man and Woman did not only represent J. C. and his Church but also by the place into which he put them by their posterity especially those of them whose actions the Scripture doth largely recite The Earthly Paradise represented the Church J. C. keeps and Cultivates it The River divided into Four Streams to water this very Delightful and Fruitful place is the Eternal wisdom which enlightens and animates the Church I also came out as a Brook from a River and as a Conduit * Vulg. Lat. de Paradiso â—ccl 24.30.31 into a Garden I said I will water my best Garden and will water abundantly my Garden-bed It is written of the true Solomon that his wisdom ran down abundantly as the Rivers at the beginning of Harvest Who filleth all things with wisdom Eccl 24.25 26 27 as Physon and as Tygris in the time of the new fruits He maketh the understanding to abound like Euphrates He maketh the doctrine of Knowledge appear as the Light and as Geon in the time of Vintage The Tree planted in the middle of the Garden which brought forth a Fruit able to make Men Immortal is also the Eternal Wisdom according to the words of the Proverbs of Solomon She is a Tree of Life Prov. 3.18 to them that lay hold upon her and happy is every one that retaineth her He who shall overcome the World shall be nourished with this Fruit for certainly these words of St. John To him that overcomes Apoc. 11.7 it shall be given to eat of the Tree of Life which is in the midst of the Paradise of God are to be understood of no other Trees but this As for the other Tree which teaches good and evil and whose Fruits Eve found so Beautiful to the Eye and Pleasant to the Taste it represents sensible objects which at present excite in us such a strong Concupiscence and give Death to those who suffer themselves to be surprized by their Charms 'T is plain that all these relations would not be so exact if they were no more than imaginary EVE had two Sons Cain and Abel Gen. 4. they both offered their Sacrifice God rejected that of Cain's and received that of Abel's Cain was troubled hereat and slew his Brother the blood of Abel which was spilt cryed for Vengeance God declared that Cain should be a Fugitive all his Life and that he would hinder him from being slain Doth not this sufficiently represent the Synagogue who being the Elder yet offered not unto God a Sacrifice acceptable unto him That the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ was only Worthy of GOD That Jesus Christ was slain in Abel by the Jews who were his Brethren according to the Flesh That for their Punishment the Jews should be Vagabonds and Fugitives upon the Earth as Cain was and that God will not quite Destroy them tho their Crime was such that they might say more truely than Cain All they who meet me will slay me If we examine after matters of Fact and those especially whose Circumstances the Scripture more particularly recites we shall see Jesus C. expected and figured every where Expected becanse of the promise which God had made that the seed of the Woman should break the Serpents Head Gen. III. 15. And Figured because the Spirit of God takes pleasure in representing unto Men him who was to be their Mediator and render all the Work of God perfectly worthy of its Author I confess that in these things we may be easily deceived and that none but the Spirit of God can make us distinctly and without fear of error see the reality of these Figures But these Figures are so lively and so express that he must be strangely Stupid who is not Affected with them and very rash who looks upon those as Ridiculous Persons and Visionaries who according to the Example of the Apostles and Holy Doctors seek Jesus Christ in the Scriptures as he himself has Commanded us in these words Search the Scriptures for they are they John 5.39 which Testify of me For in short all that is in the Old Testament relates to Jesus Christ and his Church 1 Cor. 10 11. All these things happened to them in Figures The Third Explication Where 't is prov'd that the chief of Gods design is J. C. and his Church that God truely loves Men that he sincerely desires to save all that his Conduct is worthy of his Wisdom Goodness Immutability and other Attributes What is the order of the decrees which contain the Predestination of the Saints I. BY this Term GOD I understand a Being infinitely Perfect II. A Being infinitely Perfect Perfectly knows himself III. By the knowledge which he has of his Being he sees the Essences of all things he sees all possible Creatures or all that which he is able to Produce He is Wise by Himself alone IV. The Being infinitely Perfect necessarily loves Himself He can will nothing but by his will I mean the love which he bears to himself Therefore he can do nothing but for himself V. The Being infinitely Perfect is Almighty He can do all that he knows supposing he can will it with a practical will VI. By a practical will I mean a decree or will executive of a design concluded upon which supposes in God the knowledge and choice of the ways of acting which are most worthy of himself For there are Simple Fruitful General Uniform and Constant and there are Compounded Barren Particular Irregular and Unconstant Ways of Actions The first are to be preferred before the latter for they shew Wisdom Goodness Constancy Immutability in him that makes use of them The other denotes the want of Understanding Malignancy Inconstancy Lightness of Mind VII It is visible that there is something useless in his action who does that by compounded ways which may be brought to pass by simple and he wants knowledge who hath more Practical wills when one sufficeth VIII The Conduct of a Good Wise Constant and Immutable Being must carry in it Wisdom Goodness Constancy and immutability Order requires this IX The Wisdom of GOD renders him Impotent in this sence that it permits him not to will certain things nor to act after certain ways It permits him not to will certain things for if God had made but one animal he could not have made
proper seasons all these grains are not increased thereby Or if they be the Hail or some other unlucky accident which is a necessary consequence of the same Laws of Nature hinders them from nourishing their Ear. Now because it is God who has established these Laws it might be said that he would that some certain seeds should be fruitful rather than others if we did not know otherwise that the general cause ought not to act by particular wills nor an infinitely wise Being by compounded ways God ought not to take other Measures than those which he has taken to govern the rains according to the seasons and places and desires of the Husbandmen We need to say no more of the order of Nature Let us explain a little more largely that of Grace and above all things let us observe that it is the same wisdom and the same will in a word the same God who has established both the one and the other of these Orders Additions Above all let us observe that it is the same wisdom and the same will in a word the same God who has established both the one and the other of these orders that is to say that of Grace and that of Nature This is of the greatest consequence For God cannot be false to himself or not follow his wisdom in the establishment of the order of Grace It is therefore necessary to the end that Gods conduct may bear the Character of his divine attributes that his ways be simple general uniform and constant Thus we may already see that it will not be impossible to justifie the wisdom and goodness of God tho Grace often falls without effect and tho there be more men who are damned than those who are saved God will appear wise tho Grace should not be always proportioned to our weakness He will be good and love men tho all be not saved because we cannot take it ill that God has greater love for his wisdom which is consubstantial to him than for his work which is only an imperfect Image of his substance THE SECOND PART Of the Necessity of the general Laws of Grace XXIV GOD loving himself by the necessity of his Being and resolving to procure an infinite glory to himself and honour perfectly worthy of him consulted his wisdom about the accomplishment of his desires This divine wisdom filled with love for him from whom he received a Being by an Eternal and ineffable generation seeing nothing in all possible creatures the intelligible Ideas of which he contains that might be worthy of the Majesty of his Father offered himself that he might establish to his Honour an Eternal Worship and as Sovereign Priest offer unto him a victim which by the dignity of his Person might be capable to please him He rerepresented unto him an infinite number of designs for the Temple which he intended to raise to his glory and at the same time all possible ways of performing them That design which at first sight seems Greatest and most Magnificent the justest and most easily understood is that which has most relation to the Person unto whom all the Glory and Holiness thereof must refer and the wisest manner of performing this design is to Establish certain very simple and fruitful Laws to bring it to its perfection This is that which Reason seems to answer to all those who consult it with attention and according to the principles which Faith teaches us Let us examine the circumstances of this Great design and afterwards endeavour to find out the ways of performing it Additions The proof of all this is because God does nothing without his Wisdom or without his Son which Scripture teaches us as well as Reason Joh. I. 3. Heb. I. 2. c. That Jesus Christ is the principle design of God see the first Article and the following That he is the Model of the Elect Rom. VIII 29. And above all that his ways do more than any other bear the Character of the divine Attributes that which I have already proved and which you may see further manifested in the third explication I shall not hereafter stop in the Explication of what is clear enough in its self and of little consequence XXV The Holy Scripture teaches us that it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Beauty the Holyness the Greatness and Magnificence of this Great Work For if it be compared therein to a City it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Splendor thereof The Sun and the Moon does not enlighten it Apocal. XXI 23. but the Brightness of God and the Light of the Lamb. If it be represented as a living body all whose parts have a marvelous relation to one another Col. I. 18. II. 19. Eph. I. 22 23. it is Jesus Christ who is the head thereof it is from him that Spirit and Life is communicated to all the Members that compose it If it be spoken of as a Temple it is Jesus Christ who is the Corner-stone Eph. II. 20 c. upon which all the building is founded it is he who is the Sovereign Priest It is he who is the Sacrifice thereof Heb. IV. V c. X c. None of the Faithful are Priests but because they partake of his Priesthood They are not Sacrifices but because they partake of his Holiness It is only in him and by him that they continually offer themselves to the Majesty of God To conclude it is only by the Relation which they have to him Phil. III. 9 10 11 c. that they contribute to the beauty of this august Temple which always has been and for ever will be the delightful Object of God himself XXVI Reason also teaches us these Truths For what relation is there betwixt creatures how perfect so ever they are supposed to be and the Action by which they are made Every Creature being limited how can it be worth the Action of a God whose price is infinite Can God receive any thing from a pure Creature which may incline him to act But let it be that God hath made man in hopes of being honoured by him Whence is it that the number of those who dishonour him is much the greater Doth not God hereby sufficiently declare that he very much neglects the glory pretended to be received by his work if separated from his well beloved Son that it is only in Jesus Christ that he resolved to produce it and that without him it should not subsist a moment XXVII A man resolves to do somthing because he hath need thereof or because he wou'd see what wou'd be the effect of his work or lastly because he learns by trying his strength what he is able to do But God has no need of his creatures He is not like men who receive new impression from the presence of objects His Ideas are eternal immutable he saw the world before it was form'd as he sees it at present In short being
have neither strength nor even desire to cultivate it LII But if God should act in the order of Grace by particular wills if he should efficaciously cause in all men their good motions and all their good works with a particular design I do not see how it could be maintained that he acts by the most simple Laws When I consider all the turnings by which men come whither God leads them for I doubt not at all but that God often gives to a man more than an Hundred good thoughts in one day Neither can I any more comprehend how his Wisdom and Goodness can be made to agree with all those inefficacious graces which the Malice of men resists For God being good and wise is it not evident that he must proportion his assistance to our needs if he granted them with a particular design of encouraging us Additions It appears by these Articles that my principle does still perfectly well agree with the Counsels of Jesus Christ and that as the Husbandmen ought on their part to Cultivate Plow and Sow their Lands so men on theirs should endeavour to remove the impediments of the efficacy of Grace But that as the labours of men are not the cause of rain so Grace likewise is not given to natural merits since its distribution depends upon certain general Laws like as the ordinary rain is the natural consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions LIII God causes the weeds to grow with the Corn till the day of Harvest he makes it to rain on the just and on the unjust because grace falling on men by general Laws is often given to such as make no use thereof whereas if others had received it they wou'd have been converted by it If Jesus Christ had preached to the Tyrians and Sydonians as well as to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida Corazin they wou'd have Repented in Sackcloath and Ashes If the rain which falls upon the Sands was shed upon well-managed Land it would have rendred it fruitful But whatsoever is regulated by general Laws does not agree with particular designs That these Laws be wisely established it is sufficient that being extreamly simple they bring to perfection the great work for which God appointed them LIV. But tho I do not think that God has infinite particular designs in reference to each of the Elect so that he every day gives a great number of good thoughts and good motions by particular wills Yet nevertheless I deny not but they are all predestinated by the good will of God towards them for which they ought to be eternally thankful See how I explain these things LV. God discovers in the infinite treasures of his wisdom an infinite number of possible works and at the same time the most perfect way of producing each of them Amongst others he considers his Church J. C. who is the Head thereof and all persons who in consequence of certain general laws must compose it In short having in mind Jesus Christ and all his members he established his laws for his own glory This being so is it not evident that J. C. who is the principle of all that glory that comes to God from his work is the first of the predestinated That all the Elect also are truly and freely beloved and predestinated in J. C. because they may honour God in him that lastly they are all infinitely obliged to God who without considering their merit hath established the general Laws of Grace which must sanctify the Elect and bring them to that glory which they shall eternally possess Additions Man is a strange creature he is as full of pride as he is worthy of contempt He is not satisfied with God if God does not go out of his way to please him He looks upon himself as the Centre of the Vniverse he refers all things to his own particular even God himself and his Eternal Attributes God is not good but as he is good to him and even the incarnation of J. C. is a work useless and ill managed if it do not deliver him from his miseries But on Gods side what excess of bounty It seems as if God to render himself Amiable to those who are most in love with themselves favours this prejudice by his way of speaking unto men God so loved the World says J. C. himself that he gave his only begotten Son to the end that all that believe in him shou'd have eternal life What! is J. C. in the eternal designs of God made Man only for mens salvation No doubtless On the contrary men were made for Jesus Christ They are the materials wherewith he is to build the Eternal Temple and this Temple is only for God This is the design of the uncreated Wisdom J. C. is the Head of the Church now the Members are for the Head and not the Head for the Members J. C. is the first in all things In omnibus primatum tenens But he himself is for God Omnia vestra sunt vos autem Christi Christus autem Dei Let us be satisfied that God who has no need of us was pleased to create us in Jesus Christ for his own glory He might have left us in our nothing yet he has loved us in J. C. before the creation of the world But let us not flatter our selves it is because we have J. C. as our Head that we can render unto him divine Honours For God cannot act but for his own glory Omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus But he cannot find it except in himself Because a prophane World a Temple a Worship a Priesthood which is not consecrated by the eternal Spirit has no proportion with the Holiness of God God after sin might have reduced us to nothing and yet on the contrary he hath made us his adopted Sons in J. C. He will give us a part in the inheritance of his well beloved Son How thankful should we be for such an extream kindness It is true that they who shall be thus happy are not chosen by an absolute and rash will it is because the simplicity of the general Laws of the order of Grace is favourable unto them and that herein God acts after such a manner as may be most worthy of him But what shall not God be amiable to men if he does not forsake his wisdom to love them with a blind love Should Nothing exalt its self and not be content with its Creator if he does not without reason prefer it before the rest of his creatures shall he not rather put himself in the condition of so many sinners nations abandon'd to error whom God leaves therein without help he who has sworn by his Prophets that hedesires their Conversion and Sanctification God desires the Salvation of a sinner and yet he suffers him to dye in his sin God searches the hearts and turns them as he pleases and without injuring their liberty and yet all the
World is full of disorders Who can resist God but God himself But on the other hand who can be displeased that God loves his Wisdom more than his Work Let all those who love order adore and love his Conduct who makes it his inviolable Law let them love and adore his goodness who being fully sufficient to himself has vouchsafed to form a design of making them eternally happy LVI It may be said perhaps that these Laws are so simple and so fruitful that God must needs prefer them before all others and that loving only his glory his Son must needs become incarnate that thus he has done nothing only for his Elect. I confess that God hath done nothing only for his Elect 1 Cor. 3.23 for St Paul teaches us that he has made his Elect for Christ and J. Christ for himself If to render God Amiable to men he must be made to act only for us or after such a manner as is not the most wise I had rather say nothing than talk at this rate Reason teaches me to render God Amiable by considering him infinitely perfect and representing him so full of Charity for his Creatures that he hath made none of them with a design to render 'em miserable For if all be not so happy as to enjoy his presence it is because order requiring that so great a good should be merited all men do not merit it for Reasons which I have already mentioned Is not this to render God Amiable to represent him such that even the Reprobate cannot but adore his conduct and repent of their negligence Additions Altho Predestination be not founded but upon the prescience of God and the freedom of grace as may be seen in St Aust de dono Pers. from the 17. C. to the end nevertheless the greatest part of men to the Idea which answers to this word fix a divine decree so absolute that one seems to them to oppose free grace when he maintains that God was obliged by reason of his wisdom which he loves invincibly to choose those whom he hath chosen As the Palagians suppose that the reason of Gods choice is to be found in the natural merits of men and St. Augustine with the whole Church having maintained that this depends upon the will of God many imagine that he opposes predestination who asserts that the choice of the Elect depends upon the will of God tho it be a will enlightned and conducted by eternal Wisdom To say that the reason of Gods choice is in man is to be a Pelagian and maintain that grace is given to merits But to assert that the reason of this choice is in the eternal wisdom which is the Law of God or the rule of his proceedings This is to cry out with St. Paul O altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae Scientiae Dei But many men do not understand these words in this sence they pretend that one is chosen and another reprobated meerly because God wills it and that his will is his only reason and that it is upon this account that the Elect are more especially obliged to God It is in condescension to this disposition of mind which I have observed in a great many honest men that I have composed this Article But they who will Meditate a little may easily see what are my thoughts thereof LVII In the mean time to satisfie those who suppose that God has predestinated every one of the Elect by a particular will it may be said without injuring the sentiment which I have Proposed that God before he created Souls to unite them to bodys foresaw all that should happen to them according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace and all that they should do in all possible circumstances Thus according to this supposition it being in his power to create the Soul of Paul or that of Peter and to unite it to such a body which he foresaw would be the body of one of the predestinated he resolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of Paul thro' the good will he had for him and to predestinate him by this choice to Eternal Life Whereas he creates the Soul of Peter and unites it to another body by a kind of necessity by reason of the Laws of Union of Souls with Bodies which he has very wisely established for as soon as Bodies are made he has obliged himself to unite Souls unto them which was advantageous for all before sin Now the Body of Peter being begotten by an Heathen Father or by a Father who has no care to Educate his Children or lastly Peter by Birth finding himself engaged in times places and employments which led him to that which is evil he will infallibly be amongst the reprobate In the mean time Peter will be useful to the designs of God for tho he himself does not make one of the Predestinated yet some of his posterity may He will promote the Beauty and Greatness of the Church of Jesus Christ by the many relations he will have to the Elect. In short he will not be miserable but proportionably to the ill use which he shall have made of his liberty For God does not punish with grief any but voluntary irregularities This is all I can say to satisfie the inclination of some persons But I do not clearly see that any one ought to stop here LVIII They who pretend that God has particular designs and wills for all the particular effects which are produced in consequence of general Laws do ordinarily make use of the authority of Scripture whereon to found their opinion Now seeing Scripture is made for all the World for the simple as well as for the learned it is full of Anthropologies It gives to God not only a Body a Throne a Chariot an Equipage the passions of Joy of Sadness of Anger Repentance and other motions of the soul but also attributes unto him those ways of acting which are usual among men that it may speak to the Vulgar after the most sensible manner If J. C. was made Man this was partly to satisfie the inclination of men who love that which resembles them and attend to that which affects them It is to persuade them by this true and real kind of Anthropology of those truths which they would not have been able to comprehend Thus St. Paul to accommodate himself to all men speaks of the Sanctification and predestination of the Saints as if God continually acted in them by particular wills And even J. C. himself speaks of his Father as if he did by such wills adorn the the Lilies and preserve even the hairs of the heads of his Disciples because in truth the goodness of God towards his Creatures being extream these expressions give a great Idea thereof and render God amiable even to those minds which are most gross and have most of self love in them Nevertheless since by the Idea which we have of God and by those
abstracted truths do not affect them it may be said that this delectation of Grace doth instruct them for making these truths sensible they learn them more easily by the attention which they bring to them 1 Joh. 11.72 'T is upon this account that St. John says the unction we receive from J. C. teaches us all things and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed It is true that concupiscence such as we feel is not necessary in order to merit Jesus Christ whose sufferings were infinite was not at all subject to it But altho he was absolute Master of his Body he willingly suffered the most troublesome motions and sentiments to be excited therein that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him Of all the sentiments that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy and yet he willingly suffered the most tormenting Pleasure makes him actually happy who actually enjoys it and yet he willingly depriv'd himself thereof Thus as we ought he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints because he willingly excited in himself all those painful sentiments which in the rest of Men are the necessary consequences of sin and that thus these Sacrifices being altogether voluntary in him were more Pure and more Meritorious XXXI Nevertheless it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge it only excites our attention which is the natural or occasional cause of our knowledge Thus we see that they who have the most Charity have not always the most Knowledge All men not being equally capable of attention the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it Thus tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural infusion and it may often be produced by Charity nevertheless this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves For to conclude the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the discoveries we make in any subject whatsoever But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse THE SECOND PART Of the Grace of the Creator XXXII I Know but two Principles which determine directly and by themselves the motions of our Love Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge by which we discern different goods Pleasure by which we taste them But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves it makes no attempt upon our liberty it does not force us to love any thing it does not produce in us a natural or necessary love it only puts us in a condition of determining our selves and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of choice or which is the same thing of fixing the general impression of Love which God continually gives us upon particular goods But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will it transports it as I may say towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it it produces in us a natural and necessary love it diminishes our liberty distracts our reason and does not leave us wholly to our selves A small attention to our inward sentiments may convince of these differences XXXIII Thus Man before sin having a perfect freedom and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the motions of his Love and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation as I have already said nor by other Graces of Sentiment which might have diminished his merit and have engaged him to have loved by instinct that good which ought to be loved only by Reason But since sin besides Knowledge the Grace of sentiment has been necessary that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence For Man invincibly desiring to be happy it is impossible he should continually sacrifice his Pleasure to his Knowledge his Pleasure which renders him actually happy which subsists in himself notwithstanding he never so much resists it to his knowledge which subsists not but by a troublesome application of mind which the least actual pleasure distracts which lastly doth not promise actual happiness till after death which to the imagination seems to be a real Annihilation XXXIV Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man for guiding him in the search after that which is good It is the Effect of natural order It supposes neither the Corruption nor the Restoration of Nature But Pleasure which draws us to true happiness is pure Grace for naturally what is truly good ought only to be loved by reason Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature because it is the Grace of the Creator Let us endeavour to find out these causes XXXV In the order established by Nature I only see two occasional causes which distribute knowledge to Spirits and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator The one in us which in some sort depends upon us the other which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body XXXVI The inward sentiment which we have of our selves teaches us that our desires produce or excite knowledge in us and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us for all who apply themselves to truth discover it proportionably to their attention And if our prayer was not interrupted if our attention was not disturbed if we had any Idea of what we ask and if we asked it with necessary perseverance we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive But our prayers are continually interrupted if they be not preingaged by pleasure Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas and tho the truth we consult answers our request yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers or causes us presently to forget them XXXVII If it be considered that Man before sin was animated with Charity that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righteousness and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward it may easily be apprehended that the various desires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes
goods and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good she may suspend the judgment of her love she need not to rest in the actual enjoyment but may by her desires seek after some new object And seeing her desires are the occasional cause of her knowledge she may by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him who contains the ideas of all goods discover the true good and in the true good a great many other particular goods different from what she saw and tasted before Thus being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods attending to the secret reproaches of reason and to the remorse of her conscience to the complaints and threatnings of the true good who will not that we should sacrifice him to apparent and imaginary goods she may by the motion which God imprints continually upon her after good in general or the soveraign good that is towards himself stop her carrier after any good whatsoever She may resist all sensible perswasives seek and find other objects compare them betwixt themselves and with the indeleble idea of the soveraign good and love none of them with a determined love And if this soveraign good makes it self to be tasted she may prefer it to all particular goods tho the sweetness which they seem to transfer into the Soul be very great and very agreeable These Truths must be further explain'd VII The Soul is carried towards good in general she desires to possess all goods and would never confine her love there is no good which appears so to her that she refuses to love Therefore while she actually enjoys any particular good she has yet a motion to go further she still desires some other thing by the natural and invincible impression God puts into her and to change or divide her love it is sufficient to present unto her another good than that which she enjoys and to make her taste the sweetness of it Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new goods she may also come near and enjoy them For in short these desires are the natural or occasional causes of her knowledge Objects discover themselves to her and approach unto her proportionally as she desires to know them An ambitious person who considers the splendour of some dignity may also think of the slavery of the constraint of the real ills which accompany humane greatness He may calculate weigh and compare all things together if his passion does not blind him For I confess there are times when the passions entirely rob the mind of its liberty and they always do diminish it Thus seeing any dignity how great so ever it may appear is not accounted by a Man free and reasonable as the universal and infinite good and since the will generally reaches to all goods this Man who is perfectly free and reasonable may seek and find others seeing he may desire them for 't is his desires which discover and present them unto him He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys But because he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth he may and ought here below continually and without intermission seek and enquire or rather that he may not change every moment he ought generally to neglect all these transient goods and desire only those which are immutable and eternal VIII Nevertheless seeing Men do not love to search but to enjoy seeing the labour of examination is at present very troublesome but rest and enjoyment always very pleasant the Soul ordinarily stops as soon as she has found any good she fixes upon it that she may enjoy it She deceives her self because by deceiving her self and judging that she has found that she seeks her desire is chang'd into pleasure and pleasure renders her more happy than desire But her happiness cannot last long Her pleasure being ill grounded unjust and deceitful it presently troubles and disquiets her because she would be truly and solidly happy Thus the natural love of good awakens and produces new desires in her These confused desires represent new objects Seeing the Soul loves pleasure she runs after those which communicate it or seems to communicate it and because she loves repose she takes up with them She does not at first examine the defects of the present good whilst it prevents her by its sweetness she considers it rather on the fair side she applies her self to that which charms her thinks of nothing but enjoying it And the more she enjoys it the more she loves it the nearer she approaches to it the more she considers it But now the more she considers it the more defects she discovers in it and since she desires to be invincibly happy she cannot for ever be deceived When she is hungry thirsty and tired with seeking she presently satiates and fills her self with the first good she meets but she presently disgusts the nourishment for which Man was not made Thus the love of the true good still excites in her new desires after new objects and being in continual change all her life and all her happiness upon earth consists only in a continual circulation of thoughts desires and pleasures Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no use of its liberty which suffers its self to be lead at all adventures by the motion which transports her and by the fortuitous impression of objects which determine her This is the condition of one whose mind is so weak that he always takes false goods for the true and a heart so corrupted that he sells and blindly gives himself up to all that affects him or the good which makes him actually feel the most sweet and agreeable pleasures IX But a Man perfectly free such as we conceive Adam immediately after his creation clearly knows that God only is his good or the true cause of the pleasures which he enjoys Tho he feels sweetness by the approach of objects which are about him he does not love them he only loves God and if God forbids him to unite himself to bodies he is ready to forsake what pleasure so ever he finds therein He will not take up but in the enjoyment of the soveraign good to him he will sacrifice all others and how much so ever he desires to be happy or to enjoy pleasures no pleasure is too strong for his knowledge Not but that pleasures may blind him and disturb his reason and fill the capacity which he has of thinking for the mind being finite all pleasure may distract and divide it But the reason is because tho pleasures be under the Command of his Will he was not cautious to keep himself from being intoxicated therewith because the only invincible pleasure is that of the blessed or that which the first Man would have found in God if God would have prevented or hindred
his fall not only because this pleasure fills all the faculties of the Soul without troubling Reason or engaging it in the love of false goods but also nothing opposes the enjoyment of this pleasure neither the desire of perfection nor that of happiness For whilst we love God we are perfect whilst we love him we are happy and when we love him with pleasure we are perfect and happy both together Thus the most perfect liberty is that of minds to which no motion towards particular goods is ever invincible it is that of Man before sin before concupiscence had disturbed his understanding and corrupted his heart And the most imperfect liberty is that of a mind to which every motion after any particular good how little so ever it appears is always and in all circumstances invincible X. Now betwixt these two sorts of liberty there are infinite degrees more or less perfect which is not commonly observed Men ordinarily imagine that liberty is equal in all Men and that it is a faculty essential to their minds the nature of which continues always the same tho its action varies according to the different objects Men who don't reflect suppose a perfect equality in all things where they do not sensibly observe an inequality They comfort and excuse themselves from all application by giving to all things an abstracted form whose essence consists in a kind of indivisibility But they deceive themselves liberty is not such a faculty as they imagine There are no two persons equally free in respect of the same objects Children are less than Men who have the full use of their reason and there are no two Men who have their reason equally firm and assured in respect of the same objects They who have violent passions and are not accustomed to resist them are less free than they who have generously opposed them and are naturally moderate There are no two Men equally moderate equally sensible as to the same objects and who have equally contended for the preservation of their liberty There are also persons so enslav'd to sin that they do less resist and less think of resisting whilst they are awake than good Men do whilst they sleep for according to the Word of Truth He that commits sin is the servant of sin XI It is true according to the institution of nature all Men are equally free for God does not invincibly engage minds to love any particular good But concupiscence corrupts the heart and reason and Man having lost the power of obliterating the traces of sensible pleasures and stopping the motions of his concupiscence this liberty equal in all Men if they had not sinned is become unequal according to the different degrees of their knowledge and their concupiscence which differently acts in them For even concupiscence its self which is equal in all Men as they have lost the power which they had over their bodies is unequal a thousand ways by reason of the diversity which is to be found in the conformation of their bodies in the multitude and motion of the animal spirits and in the almost infinite relations and connexions which are made by their concerns in the World XII Still further to discern more distinctly the inequality which is to be found in different persons it must be observed that any Man who is perfectly reasonable and free and who would be truly happy may and ought when any pleasant object presents its self suspend his love and carefully examine whether this object be the true good or whether the motion which carries him after it do exactly agree with that which carries after the true good Otherwise he would love by instinct and not by reason and if he could not suspend the judgment of his love before he had examined it he would not be perfectly free But if he should clearly see that this pleasant object should be truly good for him and if this evidence joyn'd to the sentiment be such that he could not suspend his judgment then tho perfectly free yet he is not so in respect of this good he invincibly loves it because pleasure and knowledge do agree in recommending it But since there is none but God who can act in us or be our good since the motion which thrusts us forward towards the creatures does not agree with that which carries us towards God any Man who is perfectly reasonable and free may hinder himself from judging that sensible objects are goods he may and ought to suspend the judgment which governs or ought to govern his love for he can never evidently see that sensible goods are true goods because he can never evidently see that which is not XIII This power of suspending the judgment which actually governs the love this power which is the principle of our liberty and by which it is that pleasures are not invincible is much lessened since sin tho not altogether annihilated And that we may have this power when any object tempts us it is necessary besides some love of order to have presence of mind or be sensible of remorse of conscience for a Child or a Man asleep has not actually this power But all Men are not equally inlightned the minds of sinners are full of darkness Consciences are not equally tender the heart of sinners is hardened The love of order and actual graces are unequal in all Men. Therefore all Men are not equally free they have not an equal power of suspending their judgment pleasure determines and carries them towards some objects rather than others Such an one can suspend his judgment or stop his consent tho the present object may make him feel a very lively and sensible pleasure And another has so little a mind and a heart so corrupted that to him the least pleasure is invincible the least affliction insupportable Not being accustomed to withstand sensible invitations his disposition is such that he 'll not so much as think of resisting them So that at this time he has no power of suspending his consent seeing he has not so much as the power of reflecting thereon In respect of this object he 's like a Man that is asleep or one who has lost his mind XIV The weaker reason is the more sensible the Soul becomes and judges more rashly and falsly of sensible goods or evils When a Man is in a slumber if a straw or feather doth but tickle him he instantly awakes as much affrighted as if a serpent had bitten him He looks upon this little uneasiness and judges of it as one of the greatest afflictions to him it seems insupportable His reason being weakened by his slumber he cannot suspend his judgment the least goods or evils are almost always invincible to him The senses act in him and they always judge rashly This must be so for many reasons When reason is not so weak little pleasures are not invincible nor little evils insupportable we do not always pursue after that wherein we find
natural strength or by the ordinary graces for in short Nature may be made serviceable to Grace a thousand ways THE SECOND PART Of Grace XVIII THE inequality which is to be found in the liberty of different persons being clearly understood it will not in my opinion be difficult to comprehend how Grace acts in us if to the word Grace we joyn clear and particular Ideas and if the difference between the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer be observ'd I have already said in the foregoing Discourse that there is this difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure that Knowledge leaves us intirely to our selves but Pleasure makes an attempt upon our Liberty For Knowledge is without us it does not touch or modifie our Souls it does not push us on towards the Objects it discovers it only makes us capable to determine our selves or to consent with freedom and reason to the impression which God gives us towards Happiness The knowledge of our Duty the clear Idea of Order separated from all sentiment the dry abstracted altogether pure and intelligible sight of good that is to say without taste or foretaste leaves the Soul in a perfect liberty But Pleasure is in the Soul it touches and modifies it Thus it lessens our liberty it makes us love good rather by the love of Instinct and unaccountable Passion than by the love of Choice and Reason it transports us as I may say towards sensible Objects Nevertheless this is not to be understood as if Pleasure was the same thing with Love or the motion of the Soul to good but because it produces it or determines it towards the object which renders us happy Since none but those Truths whereof we have clear Ideas can be demonstrated and since we have none such of our inward sentiments it is impossible that I should demonstrate that which I here maintain as the consequences which depend upon common Notions are demonstrated Every one therefore must consult the inward sentiment which he has within himself if he would be convinc'd of the difference there is betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure he must also carefully observe that ordinarily Knowledge is accompanied with Pleasure from which nevertheless it ought to be separated that we may judge solidly thereof XIX If then it be true that Pleasure naturally produces Love and that it is as it were a weight which makes the Soul incline to the good which causes it or seems to cause it it is visible that the Grace of J.C. or the Grace of Sentiment is efficacious in its self For tho the preventing delectation when it is weak may not wholly convert the Hearts of those who have very lively Passions nevertheless it always has its effect in that it always carries Men towards God it is always efficacious in some sense but it has not always all the effect which it might have because concupiscence opposes it XX. For example In one of the Scales of a Balance there is a Weight of ten Pounds and a Weight of six Pounds only in the other this last Weight truly weighs for if enough be put therein or taken out of the other Scale or lastly if the Balance be hung nearer the Scale which has more weight in it this weight of six Pound will turn the Balance But tho this Weight weighs it is plain that its effect always depends upon the Weights which resist it and the manner after which they resist it Thus the Grace of Sentiment is always efficacious in its self it always lessens the effort of Concupiscence because Pleasure naturally excites Love for the cause which produces it or seems to produce it But tho this Grace be always efficacious in its self it depends or rather its effect depends upon the actual dispositions of him to whom it is given The Weights of Concupiscence resist it and sensible Pleasures which tie us to the Creatures which seem to produce them in us hinder the Pleasures of Grace from uniting us strictly to him who is only capable to act in us and render us happy XXI But it is not the same of the Grace of Knowledge or of the Grace of the Creator It is not efficacious of its self it does not transport the Soul it does not give it any motion it leaves it freely to its self But tho it be not efficacious of its self it fails not to be attended with many effects when it is great and animated with some grace of sentiment which gives it vigour and strength or else when it finds no contrary pleasure which do much resist it This is the difference betwixt the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure betwixt the Grace which doth not suppose Concupiscence and the Grace which is given to counter-balance the Pleasures of Concupiscence The one is sufficient to a Man perfectly free and fortified by Charity the other is efficacious in a weak Man to whom Pleasure is necessary that he may be drawn to the love of the true good XXII But the strength and efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the action of Concupiscence with the light of Reason and especially with the degree of Liberty that Person hath to whom it is given And it ought not to be imagined that God dispenses it by particular Wills with a design it should produce in us certain effects and nothing more For when it is said that Grace always produces in the Heart the effect for which God gave it we are deceived if we suppose that God acts like Men with particular designs God dispenses his Grace with a general intention that it may sanctifie all those who receive it or as the occasional cause determines him to dispense it nevertheless he sees very well that in some Persons it will not have all the effect it will have in others not only by reason of the inequality of strength in respect of Grace but also the inequality of resistance in respect of Concupiscence XXIII Since Concupiscence has not altogether destroy'd Humane Liberty the Grace of J.C. as efficacious as it is is not absolutely invincible Sensible Pleasure may be overcome whilst it is weak The judgment of Love may be suspended when a Man is not hurried along by some violent Passion and when he yields to the courtship of this false Pleasure he is to be blamed for the ill use of his liberty In like manner the delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible the good Motions which it inspires and which separate us from the false good we love may be oppos'd This Grace does not so sill the Soul as to draw it along towards the true good without choice without understanding without free consent Thus when a Man resigns himself to its motion when a Man goes faster as I may say than it invincibly drives when he sacrifices the pleasures which lessen its efficacy or in short when he acts by reason or loves the true
by his Body as the occasional or natural cause receiving a great number of divers sentiments he might sacrifice himself as an Holocaust in Honour of the true good by suffering afflictions and the privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV That I may not leave in some Persons an imperfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to say that it doth not consist in delectation alone for all Grace of sentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this sort of Grace there are several kinds and of each kind infinite degrees God sometimes gives disgust and bitterness to the objects of our passions he weakens their sensible perswasives or causes us to have an horror of them and this kind of grace of sentiment has the same effect as delectation It re-establishes and fortifies our Liberty it puts us almost in Equilibrio so that by this means we are in a condition of following our Knowledge in the motion of our love For to put a Ballance in a perfect Equilibrio or to change the inclination it is not necessary to increase the Weights which are too weak it is sufficient to take something from those which weigh too much Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of several kinds and each kind is capable of infinite degrees for there are Pleasures Horrors and Disgusts greater and lesser to infinity That which I have hitherto said of delectation may be easily applyed to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment I only took pleasure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain my self more clearly and without equivocation If there be any other principle of our determinations to good besides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge I confess to me they are altogether unknown and it is upon this account that I have explained the effects which are necessary to the conversion of the heart only by these two Principles lest I should have been accused of having spoken in general terms and such as only excite confused Ideas which I have avoided with all possible care But tho I have explained my self only in such terms as all Men understand since there is no person who knows not that Knowledge and Sentiment of good are the principles of our determinations nevertheless I don't pretend to oppose those who not making use of these clear Ideas say in general that God works in the souls of Men their Conversion by a particular action different perhaps from all that I have said here * First Explicat of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that God doth in us Since I experience nothing in my self but Motion towards good in general and Knowledge or Sentiment which determines this Motion I ought to suppose nothing else if by this alone I can give a reason of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined concerning the subjects of which I treat In a word I am sure that Knowledge and Sentiment are the Principles of our determinations but I declare that I know not whether there may be something else of which I have no knowledge XXXV Beside Grace efficacious in it self and the Grace the effect of which depends intirely upon the good dispositions of the Mind besides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge the Just also have Habitual Grace which makes them agreeable to God and puts them in a condition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation This Grace is Charity the Love of God the Love of Order Love which is not properly Charity if it be not stronger and greater than all other Loves As it is Pleasure which ordinarily produces the love of the object which cause it or seems to cause it so it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God It is the enjoyment of sensible pleasures which encreases Concupiscence It is also the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity Concupiscence diminishes by the privation of sensible Pleasures and then Charity is easily preserved and encreased Charity also diminishes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Concupiscence is easily encreased and fortified For these two loves of Charity and Concupiscence continually engage one another and strengthen themselves by the weakness of their Enemy XXXVI All that proceeds from Charity is agreeable to God but Charity does not always act in the just themselves To the end it may act it ought at least to be enlightned for Knowledge is necessary to determine the motion of Love Thus the Grace necessary for every good work relating to Salvation is the Grace of Sentiment in those who begin their Conversion it is the Grace of Knowledge it is some motion of Faith and Hope in those who are animated by Charity For the Just may do good works without the Grace of delectation yet they have always need of some actual succours to determine the motion of their Charity But tho Charity without Delectation is sufficient to vanquish many temptations nevertheless the Grace of Sentiment is necessary in many occasions For Men cannot without the continual assistance of the second Adam resist the continual action of the first They cannot persevere in righteousness if they be not often assisted by the particular Grace of J. C. which produces augments and sustains Charity against the continual efforts of Concupiscence XXXVII The effects of Pleasure and all the sentiments of the Soul depend a thousand ways upon the actual dispositions of the Mind The same weight has not always the same effects Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applyed with respect to the contrary weights If a ballance be unequally hung the force of the weights being unequally apply'd the weaker may turn the stronger It is the same of the weights of pleasure they act one upon another and determine the motion of the Soul as they are differently applyed Pleasure must have more effect in one who has already a love to the Object which causes the pleasure than in him who has an aversion to it or who loves the opposite goods Pleasure forcibly determines him who clearly sees or lively imagines the advantages of the good which seems to produce it and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confusedly or contemns it In conclusion pleasure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Concupiscence and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attain'd to some habit of suspending the Judgment of his love XXXVIII Now the different degrees of Knowledge Charity Concupiscence and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combin'd after infinite ways with the different degrees of actual pleasures and these pleasures not having their effect but according to the relation which they have to the dispositions of the mind and heart It is plain that no finite mind can judge with any assurance what effect any particular Grace will produce in us For besides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious
He would save all he would sanctifie all he would make a beautiful work he would make his Church as large and perfect as it can be But God loves his Wisdom infinitely more he loves it invincibly he loves it with a natural and necessary love He cannot therefore dispense with himself from acting after the wisest manner and which is most worthy of himself or from following that Conduct which suits best with his Attributes Now God acting by the most simple ways and most worthy of his wisdom his work cannot be more beautiful and more ample than it is For if God by ways equally simple could have made his Church more ample and more perfect than it is he would not acting as he hath done have made a work most worthy of himself he would also have hated Men before he had established his Decrees and consequently before their sin or even their existence was known Therefore the Wisdom of God forbidding him to compound his ways not permitting him to work Miracles every moment and obliging him to act after the most general constant and uniform manner he doth not save all Men tho he truly desires to save all For to conclude tho he loves all his Creatures he doth nothing for them but that which his wisdom permits him to do and tho he would have the most large and most perfect Church that can be yet he doth not make it absolutely the most large and perfect but only the most simple and most perfect that can be with respect to the ways which are most worthy of himself For once more God doth not resolve upon his designs but by comparing his ways with the work which they are to effect For when he sees a greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness betwixt certain ways and their work than all others and their work then I speak after the manner of Men he takes up his Design he chuses his Ways he establishes his Decrees XXIV Thus the Order of the Divine Decrees which include the Predestination of the Saints is not that God first wills to save such and such and afterwards consults his wisdom to find out the ways which may put his designs into execution This is to make God act like Men who often repent of their undertakings because they do not compare all the means with the end God consults his wisdom for all things he wills and designs nothing without his knowledge he wills not that such and such shall be saved rather than others if he did not see in himself some reasons for this in himself I say not in them So that the Principle of Predestination is the Wisdom and Knowledge of God O Altitudo divitiarum sapientiae scientiae Dei 'T is not his will separated from his wisdom for he neither doth nor wills any thing without it that is without his Son Much less is it the Elect which determine him to predestinate them or to form designs which include their predestination This is altogether impertinent and 't is needless for me to spend time in demonstrating it XXV 'T is evident by the Truths which I have laid down that Reason furnishes us with no other means of reconciling Scripture with it self or this Proposition God would save all Men with this All Men are not saved For assuredly God would save all Men even the wicked This he swears by the mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel Now God is the Master of Hearts he can give such Grace to the wicked as will certainly convert him since he knows what degree of Grace and when it ought to be given that it may work the conversion of the sinner Who can hinder him from doing what he will What Creature can resist him Is' t not evident that it is his wisdom which obliges him to act after so simple and so general a manner that Grace is not always given to the sinner so strong and at such seasonable moments as throughly to convert or to contribute to the conversion of him who receives it For if God acts by particular wills since he is wise and wills the conversion of a sinner certainly 't is impossible but that all Grace should be efficacious and have all the effect for which God gave it it could never be resisted never render'd useless For an intelligent Being proportions always the means to the end the action to the work or effect which he undertakes to produce XXVI In short 't is plain that Predestination as I have explained it has nothing harsh in it For no person can take it ill that God should love his wisdom infinitely more than his work for it is altogether his gracious gift seeing it is the greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness which God sees betwixt his ways and his future Church which determines him to form the decrees which include the Predestination of the Saints and not our natural merits which engage him to predestinate us to Grace and Glory It doth not suppose in God any respect of Persons for tho Gods choice proceeds not from our merits yet it is not the effect of an indifferent or rash will of God but of the depth of his Wisdom and Knowledge which governs all his wills Lastly Predestination thus understood doth not lead to despair for God often sends the showers of Grace in such abundance that we frequently render it useless And it will condemn our negligence for it depends on us to avoid many things which resist the efficacy of grace God not giving us his grace by particular wills to the end that it should have such an effect in us and nothing more Objection The Predestination of the Saints is a Mystery The Judgments of God are hidden even to the most enlightned understandings and 't is an insufferable rashness to endeavour to give a reason of them The Fathers upon this subject of God's choice of the Elect always cryed out with St. Paul O the Height We ought to imitate them and hold our peace Answer I Answer that we are permitted to Explain even the Mysteries provided we do it according to the Analogy of Faith and suppose the Doctrines received by the Church as unquestionable The Fathers have done so There is no greater Mystery than of the Trinity and yet St. Augustine has Composed 15. Books upon this subject St. Hilary 12. St. Thomas and all the School Divines were not afraid to speak and write thereof But it is certain that Predestination is not a Mystery in this sence as if the mind of Man can discover nothing thereof for all the Divine Decrees do necessarily agree with Order Reason the Eternal Law of which all Men have some knowledge There 's no understanding all the particulars of the Predestination of the Saints Praedestinatio fine praescientia esse non potest Prospresp ad Cap. XV. Gall. Non tamen Electio praecedit justificationem sed electionem justificatio nemo enim elegitur nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur Unde
Because God might have dispensed with himself from observing the Laws which he hath established for its preservation provided that Order would permit But supposing that God resolved to act I maintain that he will do it after the wisest manner he can or after such a manner as best comports with his Attributes I hold that this is not arbitrary or indifferent to him For God necessarily loves himself he cannot belye himself The immutable Order which consists in the necessary relation which is betwixt his Divine Perfections is his inviolable Law and the Rule of all his wills because God cannot will or act but by the love which he bears unto himself Love in God is not as in us an impression which comes from without or carries him to any thing without himself He is as I may say the Eternal and Necessary Principle of it he is also the end thereof by the necessity of his Being This is clearly seen in the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect which I have consulted and which I think ought to be Consulted least we should speak of the Divine providence too much after the manner of men Thus in this Idea we clearly see that God can neither will nor act but according to order but by the love which he bears to himself and his eternal attributes but according to what he is but after such a manner as best suits with his Wisdom his Immutability his Prerogative of being the searcher of hearts and his other attributes as I have elsewhere explained It is indeed indifferent to him to act or not but by no means to act well or ill He may indifferently chuse his ways of acting when order permits it that is to say when the ways of acting equally agree with his attributes the different relations of which make that order which is his inviolable Law because he necessarily loves himself but he cannot chuse those ways of acting which are less wise or less worthy of his attributes there being an equality in other things because he cannot falsisie himself because he infinitely loves his Wisdom and after such a manner that it renders him happily impotent that is uncapable of making an ill choice which it may blame a choice which may not be worthy thereof which shall not be infinitely wise nor perfectly worthy of his divine attributes See the 50 51 52 53 and 54 Article of the Second Discourse of this Treatise the 3d Explication the 11th Christian Meditation the 1st Chapter of the Treatise of Morality See also the 19 20 and 21 of this Treatise with the Additions It would be to no purpose to send the Reader to other places of my Books to make it appear that they who make this Objection do not take my Sentiments aright It must be observed that God is not free or indifferent as Men are He is free in a quite opposite sense Men are free in the choice of the means of their Happiness They may take the worse This argues a want of understanding And they are not free as to the end They invincibly seek after their Happiness from without This is because they are not self-sufficient But God is fully sufficient to himself it is indifferent to him to act or not outwardly And seeing his Understanding has no bounds and he sees his own Law in himself supposing that he resolves to act he cannot but resolve also to act like himself because he invincibly loves his Wisdom and his other Attributes against which he cannot offend He is not indifferent in his choice but when there is on all sides a perfect equality in the relations of the different ways with their different works When I said That sometimes tho very rarely the general Laws of Motions ought not to produce their effect I gave this reason thereof Because the Order of Grace to which that of Nature ought to be subservient requires that Miracles should be wrought upon some occasions And I only add by way as it were of Subscription Besides that it is expedient Men should know that God is so much Master of Nature that if he submits to the Laws which he hath established 't is rather because he willingly doth so than by any absolute necessity I did not mean by these last words that the observation of the Natural Laws was arbitrary in God in this sense that he could without reason neglect them that he might work Miracles but that it was expedient God should make Nature serviceable to Grace and let Men know that he is superiour to that which they call Nature For Men look upon Nature and its Laws as something necessary and independent The Mind of Man is naturally disposed towards Manichism The reason of which is because natural or occasional Causes are visible whereas the continual Operation of God in them has nothing in it which strikes the Senses Thus when God works Miracles which astonish the World one reason amongst others is to vindicate himself and hinder Men from being deceived and from having a mean Idea of his power as I have said in the Addition to Art 21. This he doth also to teach them who know that the nature of things is nothing but the will of their Author that God is not absolutely necessitated to do what he doth and that if he follows his Laws 't is because he chuses to do so For the only Law which is not arbitrary to God is immutable Order and whether he follows his Laws or dispenses with them it is because Order requires it It is because God always acts after such a manner as most honours his Perfections the intelligible Relations of which make that which I call immutable Order as I have explain'd it in several places Object II. God acts not as Men. He doth not well consult the Idea of God who judges of his Conduct by theirs Men indeed are to govern their Designs according to their Strength they must compare the Means with the End the Ways with the Works but this is because they are weak It is enough for God to will that things may be The Ways of God are his own Wills So that he doth not compare the Ways with the Works that he may determine his choice after he has compared the simplicity of the Ways with the perfection of the Work But he resolved to give to the World what Perfection he pleased without troubling himself about the Ways because his Ways are nothing but his Wills and all his Wills are efficacious To understand this Objection well I desire the Reader to consult the 13th Article of the first Discourse against which it is made Answer I grant that God doth not form his designs as Men do He doth not as they do compare the means with the end through weakness He is not like unto an Architect who has not Money enough to finish his Edifice He compares the designs with the ways in wisdom with respect to his attributes and in that love which he
it monstrous or given it useless or ill proportioned members that being contrary to his wisdom which he loves invincibly It would not permit him also to act after certain ways for supposing that a work equally Perfect might be produced by ways unequally Simple Uniform Constant c. God is impotent in this sence that he cannot chuse the ways of acting which are less worthy of his Wisdom or which less resemble his Goodness his Immutability or his other Attributes X. Thus God is Almighty because he does every thing that he undertakes to do and because there is nothing without him which can resist him or hinder him from executing his design 'T is not because there is nothing how irregular soever which he cannot do or no ways of acting which he cannot observe But let us suppose God to act XI God cannot act but for himself if he will act 't is because he resolves to do something worthy of himself but no Creature can give unto God an Honour worthy of him All the Honour that meer Creatures can give cannot be worth the action by which he produces them It is unworthy of God to maintain that there is any thing in the Creature which can determine him to act God therefore will do nothing for he acts only for himself XII God cannot receive any Honour worthy of himself but from himself No Person can Honour himself God therefore can never be Honoured with an Honour worthy of him XIII Nevertheless I am sensible that I do actually exist Therefore I can give unto God an Honour worthy of him Therefore I am Eternal Uncreated Divine I am not made and God can make nothing XIV Further I know that I offend God and that I cannot satisfie him for my offences Now God would not be offended and would be fully satisfied Therefore I am not the work of god for if I was God only acting for his glory he would have been deceived in his designs XV. Nothing can satisfie God but God himself Now one and the same Person cannot make satisfaction to himself God therefore can never be satisfied for our offences The wicked therefore are not the work of God they subsist whether he will or no they cannot be annihilated Behold consequences altogether false But see them cleared up in two words by my Principles or rather the Principles of Christian Religion XVI God cannot be Honoured with an Honour worthy of himself He cannot be fully satisfied for our offences if he himself does not undertake for them Now no person Honours himself or satisfies himself Therefore there is in God a plurality of Persons This is also that which Faith teaches us XVII I am Created therefore I can render to God an Honour worthy of himself God is offended therefore he may be fully satisfied A Divine Person united to my nature may sanctifie my devotions and render them worthy of God A Divine Person united to a criminal nature may justifie and satisfie for it This is the solution wherewith Faith supplies Reason when she is Non-plus'd for Faith and Reason mutually sustain one another XVIII It is clear therefore that tho Man had not sinned a Divine Person would have been united to the work of God to sanctisie it and render it worthy of its Author since it is necessary it should subsist as I may say in a Divine Person to the end it might be worthy of him XIX Men offend God they cannot satisfie him for their offences God foresaw and permitted this Therefore he had in view the satisfaction of his Son which is full and entire therefore the work of God repair'd is more worthy of God and Honours him more than the same work before its corruption God therefore who acts for his glory must necessarily have permitted sin which he foresaw would come to pass All this is clear and I have proved it elswhere but I speak too much of it for at present 't is sufficient that the first and chief design of God was J. C. and his Church that the present World was for the future that the natural order was for the supernatural And I prove it thus XX. God made all things for his glory He loves that the most which most Honours him Now Jesus Christ Honours him more than all Creatures put together since J. C. is a Victim and a Sovereign Priest who infinitely Honours God Therefore the chief of Gods designs is J. C. and the Church which is his Body which with J. C. offers but one Victim and one Worship For all Creatures have access unto God and pay their Obligations unto him only in J. C. Therefore the Present World is for the Future the Natural Order for the Supernatural this Succession of Generations to supply the living Temple which J. C. raises to the glory of his Father with Materials Every thing passes away every thing tends to destruction every thing vanishes but Gods chief design the Object in which he is well pleased shall remain for ever XXI The great design therefore of God is to build to his own Honour a Spiritual Temple of which J. C. is the chief Corner-stone the Architect the Sovereign Priest and Victim His design is that this Temple should be as Large and Perfect as it can be as far as its greatness and Perfection can consist with one another Thus God wills that all Men should enter into this Spiritual Building for thereby it would become more ample God would that all Men should be saved 1 Tim. II. 4. He hath also sworn by his Prophet that he wills not the Death but the Conversion of the Wicked God also desires that Men shou'd merit the highest degrees of glory His will is our Sanctification 1 Thess IV. 3. His Temple would thus be more Perfect Certainly if God loves Men and the beauty of his work these Truths cannot be denyed Now all Men are not saved there either are none at all or very few Saints but are capable of the highest Rewards and of a more Illustrious Glory than that which they possess and no Creature even Man himself cannot hinder God from Converting and Sanctifying him if God undertakes his Conversion and Sanctification for God is the absolute Master of Hearts Therefore there must necessarily be something in God himself which hinders him from executing his wills or rather from forming certain designs or decrees XXII God in his infinite Wisdom saw all possible works and all possible ways of executing them He doth not blindly resolve upon any design but always compares the means with the end He loves his Wisdom and he consults it always Now there are some ways of acting more Simple more Uniform more Regular than others and the Conduct of a Wise and Immutable Being must carry in it the Character of Wisdom and immutability Therefore the Wisdom of God resists his wills in this sense that all his wills are not Practical wills I do thus further explain my self XXIII God loves all Men.