20. There is Ira Paterna Castigans as well as Ira Hostilis Exterminans Davenant in Col. 3. 6. Where those words of yours are which you say I almost repeat I do not know I expressed mine own sence in mine own words and my scope was only to correct that Opposition which you make betwixt Love and Anger though I see that Aphor. p. 71. you speak of a mixture of Love and Anger and say That there is no Hatred though there be Anger My chief design in those Animadversions was That in your Second Edition which you promised you might have occasion if not to confirm your Assertions yet to clear your Expressions I know you oppose their sence that so distinguish but their distinction simply considered you seem to admit if you say that you do not I am satisfied Your words were of Affliction as Affliction therefore of Affliction in general You say Aphor. p. 70. The very nature of Affliction is to be a loving punishment c. But you confess now that you should have said Chastisement and so I have my desire in this Particular viz. your better expression God is not the Father of the Unregenerate though Elect in respect of Actual Adoption But you know that Ephes 1. 5. Having predestinated us to the Adoption of Sons c. God having loved such with an everlasting Love viz. Benevolentiae though not Complacentiae no marvel if he afflict them in Love before their Conversion viz. in order to their Conversion But you know I speak of Reprobates and that it is written Jacob have I loved but Esau have I hated Whether that import the Election of Jacob and the Reprobation of Esau I now dispute not but I think it doth import God's love of the Elect and his hatred of the Reprobate Deus omnes homines diligit inquit Aquinas etiam omnes Creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum non tamen quadcunque bonum vult omnibus In quantum igitur non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna dicitur eos odio habere reprobare Sanctified Suffering I hold to be malum in se suâ naturâ and so I think do they against whom you dispute in your Aphorisms but though Suffering as Suffering be evil yet as Sanctified it is not evil It is good for me that I was afflicted Psal 119. 71. Afflictions were then indeed to be loved if they were good of their own Nature but being only good as sanctified we are not simply to desire them but a sanctified use of them and in that respect to rejoice in them Jam. 1 2 3. Rom. 5. 3 4 5. Whereas you advise me to take heed of arguing thus That which worketh for our good c. Where do I argue so Rather thus That which is sanctified to us doth work for our good and so though it be evil in it self yet it is good to us But Affliction is sanctified c. I am apt to oversee but neither I nor they I think whom you first opposed deny Sin to be the meritorious cause of Affliction if that were all you aimed at in your Question What I mean by Comformity unto Christ you might set by Rom. 8. 17. which I cited I may also add 1 Pet. 4. 17. In these places the Scripture speaks of suffering for well-doing which is acceptable with God 1 Pet. 2. 19. Yet I grant sin is the Root of all suffering so it was of Christ's suffering though not his sin but ours Only I thought it meet to put you in mind that God in sending Affliction hath other ends than to punish sin which the places alledged do shew and so other places The Object of Love is not only present Good There is a Love of Desire as well as of Delight The Spouse wanting Christ was sick of Love Cant. 5. 8. I did not say That Sanctified Suffering is not Evil but that it is not evil as sanctified Suffering though sanctified is suffering still and so evil but as sanctified it is good and not evil Those Arguments prove nothing against me nor I am perswaded against those Divines mentioned in your Aphorisms It is granted That Death in it self is Evil an Enemy a Punishment to be feared avoided c. Yet as it is sanctified it is good a Friend a Mercy to be desired embraced c. 2 Cor. 5. 6 7 8. Phil. 1. 21 23. It is evil 1. to them to whom it is not managed for their good 2. To them also to whom it is so managed but not as it is so managed Lex abrogata vim nullam habet obligandi saith Grotius Well but we are not always so much to mind the strict propriety of words as what they that use them do mean by them That which you speak of our discharge before believing might have been omitted the question being about Believers and so believing presupposed Why the Justification and Condemnation of Believers doth not depend upon the Law this I think is a sufficient reason Christ hath redeemed them from the Curse of the Law c. Gal. 3. 13. Si quid novisti rectius isto Candidus imperti The Law so concurs to the constitution of Guilt as were there no Law there were no Transgression In the other two Particulars which follow we do accord also 1. Neither did I mean so as if there were no explicit threatning to Unbelievers but only this That pardon of all sin being promised upon condition of believing it implies that death is only threatned in case of unbelief And tho there be an express threatning to Unbelievers viz. Mark 18. 16. yet not only to Unbelievers The threatning of death only to Unbelievers is I think only implyed in the promise of Liâ—e made to Believers 2. Neither did my words hold out any other meaning of 2 Thess 1. 7 8. than what you express 3. The new Law or Gospel requiring Faith the Fruit whereof is Obedience it will condemn the disobedient i. e. it will leave them to the condemnation of the Law while they remain in that estate though it hold out Mercy upon condition that they believe and bring forth Fruit meet for repentance Mr. Lawson I know for an able Scholar but his reasons for that Position I do not know If no Law no sin for sin is a transgression of the Law 1 John 3. 4. Your saying Aphor. p. 89. Whosoever will believe to the end shall be justified may seem to imply That though a Man â—elieve yet he remains unjustified as well as unglorified until he go on and hold out unto the end otherwise I suppose all will yeeld That a Man must believe unto the end that he may be justified unto the end 1. Though you deny that which I say your words seem to imply
be for it must be present by way of Enjoyment but the offer of a thing can only make it to be hoped for so that the thing though it be offered yet until it be accepted it is absent because it is not enjoyed The thing offered must be desirously and in that respect lovingly accepted but it must first be accepted and then loved so as to joy and delight in it 3. We look at Christ as enjoyed when we love him with the Love of Complacency and Delight of which Love I speak Gaudium oritur ex hoc saith Raimundus de Sebundae quòd aliqua res scit se habere id quod habet non ex hoc duntaxat quod habet There must both be the Having of a thing and also the Knowing that we have it that we may rejoyce in it 4. As Assent must go before Acceptance so must Acceptance go before that Love of which I speak 1. I did not say or think that you thought so of all Love viz. that it considereth its Object as present or enjoyed for there is no distinguishing here of these as I have shewed before the Object is not present except it be enjoyed You grant that Amor Complacentiae doth so consider its Object and I thought you had meant that kind of Love because you did distinguish Love from Desire Therefore I said Love as you take it considereth its Object as present and enjoyed viz. Love as distinguished from Desire I know not I confess what to make of Love but either a Desire if the Object be absent or a Delight if the Object be present 2. That which you say concerning Acceptance Election and Consent is nothing to me who do not enquire whether they be divers acts or no but only shew that they go before Enjoyment and so differ from Love as I take it viz. Love of Complacency which doth follow Enjoyment I take the Love of Desire to go before Acceptance and the Love of Complacency to follow after it Although Amare velle bonum be one and the same yet this velle bonum vel est cum desiderio si objectum absit vel cum Complacentiâ si adsit Aquinas doth not satisfie me when he saith Nullus desiderat aliquid nisi bonum amatum neque aliquis gaudet nisi de bono amato if he mean that a thing is amatum prius quà m desideratum The very Desiderare I think is Amare and so is Gaudere also but the one is Amare quod abest the other Amare quod adest So you in the next Section say Desire is Love and Complacency is Love 1. I did not doubt much less deny that there is Amor Desiderii as well as Amor Complacentiae only I shewed that your words there must be meant of the former in which sense I did not oppose you but as it is taken in the other sense and so you seemed to take it before because you did expresly distinguish it from Desire Neither is your second any thing against me 3. The Scripture is not so much to be interpreted according to the most comprehensive sense as according to the most proper sense viz. that which doth best agree with the Context and other places of Scripture Your fourth containeth nothing but a Sarcasm very unworthily used of such a worthy Man as Calvin was 1. The places which you alledg John 16. 27. and 14. 21. do not prove that Love viz. our Love is an antecedent Condition of God's Love and Christ's Love to us so that we must first love God and Christ before we can be reconciled unto God in Christ For because we are reconciled unto God in Christ therefore we love God and Christ 1 John 4. 19. The meaning of those other places as Calvin notes is this That they that love God insculptum habent in cordibus Paterni ejus amoris restimonium To which may be added That God will still manifest his Love to them more and more 2. Not only Love but Obedience also must go before Glorification but it doth not therefore follow That they must go before Justification as your self hold that Obedience doth not as we are at first justified That there is any other Condition of Justification at last than at first is more than I can find in Scripture 1. What some have answered and what you have read in others I know not you cite none whose Works are extant but only Mr. Ball and him at large On the Covenant but where in that Book you do not shew I find there that he doth use the words Instrument and Condition promiscuously The Covenant of Grace saith he exacteth no other thing inherent in us as a Cause viz. instrumental of Justification or a Condition N. B. in respect of which we are justified but Faith alone This is point-blank against that which you say of him And again It is saith he the sole Instrumental or Conditional N. B. Cause required on our part to Justification As I shewed before in the Animadversions ad pag. 243. our Divines say Fides sola justificat sed Fides quae justificat non est sola but they mean that Love and Obedience follow as the fruits and effects of Faith Thus Stapleton somewhere I cannot now cite the place testifyeth of them saying Omnes adunum Protestantes docent Fidem justifcantem esse vivam operantem per charitatem atque alia bona opera 2. I grant That Amor Concupiscentiae is prerequisite if you will call it so as I see not but you may though Amor Concupiscentiae is usually opposed to Amor Amicitiae and so you speak of it p. 58. And if you speak not of Amor Complacentiae then neither do I speak against you For of that do I speak and had reason I think to understand you as speaking of it because you spake of Love as distinct from Desire Perhaps you speak of it only in respect of its Generical Nature abstracting from the consideration of either Desire or Complacency which are the Species of it but surely these two taking up the whole nature of Love that Love which is not the one of these must needs be the other We accept or chuse a thing because we first Love i.e. desire it or as we use to say have a mind to it and having accepted and chosen it we further love it so as to delight in it except our Love turn into Hatred as Amnon's unchast Love did but the very Accepting or Chusing of a thing is not that I see properly a Loving of it 3. I grant that all Love doth not presuppose Acceptance Consent c. the Love of Desire doth not but the Love of Complacency doth This is all that I have desired and so much you have yeelded 1. The distinction of Fides quae and Fides quà as it is frequently used by our Learned Writers so it doth hold good
EXCEPTIONS Against a VVRITING OF Mr. R. BAXTERS In Answer to some ANIMADVERSIONS Upon his APHORISMS By Mr. Chr. Cartwright of York LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons and Jonath Robinson at the Princes-Arms and Golden-Lion in St. Pauls Church-yard 1675. Exceptions against a Writing of Mr. R. Baxters in Answer to some Animadversions upon his Aphorisms HOw Relations should be inter Entia Nihil I cannot see For Nihil is Non ens inter ens non ens non datur medium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is indeed for most part so taken as to include Love and Good-will yet it seems to be otherwise taken Matth. 11. 26. and Luke 10. 21. as Dr. Twisse observeth And it is true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beneplacitum express one the other yet if we consider the propriety of the words both of them may well signifie the Will and Pleasure of God concerning any thing whatsoever It is observed that the Lxx Interpreters devised the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express the Hebrew Ratsa which is as much as Velle though it be often used for Benevolum esse The Members of that distinction Gratia gratum faciens gratia gratis data fall one into another as well as the Members of this Voluntas Beneplaciti Voluntas Signi yet the distinction though not so exact may be useful 1. What you intended I know not but you seem to speak alike of all the Signs mentioned Aphor. p. 3. 2. I find Aquinas express for this that Voluntas Signi is but Signum Voluntatis so that according to him Voluntas Beneplaciti seems indeed to signifie the whole Will of God properly so called and Voluntas Signi the whole Will of God also so far forth as there is any signification of it But however I see not how you can hence infer then impletio voluntatis beneplaciti de eventu non est signum voluntatis beneplaciti de jure This seems but a meer evasion it sufficeth that Impletio is Signum Voluntatis de eventu as Praeceptum is Signum Voluntatis de Officio 1. When you say that God doth permit and more than permit the Wicked to amend I suppose you mean he doth command them But is not this to take the word permit morally Yet pag. 5. you say That you speak all the while of Permission Natural not of Moral Permission 2. Permission is only made Signum Volintatis Dei de malo Thus Aquinas Permissio ad malum refertur operatio autem ad bonum And Maccovius Objectum Voluntatis Permissivae Des est peccatum Ita quidem est Nam bonum quod vult vult Voluntate effectivâ non permissivâ 3. That Permissio Mali is certum signum voluntatis Dei de malo quoad eventum I think is not to be denied The Permissive Decree saith Bp Davenant concerning Sinful Actions implyeth an infallibility of the Events so permited And he cites Ruiz saying Positâ permissione certissima est futuritio peccati quod permittitur omnium circumstantiarum quae permittuntur in illo So Dr. Twisse Posito decreto permittendi peccatum non potuit homo à peccato abstinere haec tamen necessitas exhypothesi cum libertate convenit Camero makes this the reason why God doth foreknow evil because he doth decree to permit it which were no reason if the Event did not certainly follow Permission Stat igitur sententia mea Deus novit peccatum fore quia decrevit permittere peccatum And he speaks divers times to this purpose So Maccovius Deus praescit futura peccata Ergo decrevit permittere Nam quae Deus praescit fore ea praescit fore ex eo quia decrevit The same Author also gives another reason Permissionem necessario sequitur eventus hoc est quod permâ—â—tit Deus necessario evenit Ratio etiam hoc ipsum evincit Nam si Permissio nihil aliudest quam gratiae Dei substractio sive privatio quâ posita peccationi impediretur ut à nobis antè ostensum est fieri non potest ut Creatura nâ—n labatur ubi Deus eam non sustentat in Deo enim Movemur vivimus sumus And again Non agitur de Permissione Ethicâ quae nihil aliud est quà m Concession sed de Physicâ hoc est de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-impedire Quid verò sit disquiritur Nos cum Whitakero dicimus quòd sit privatio auxilii divini quo posito peccatum impediretur Necessariò ergò sequitur Permissionem Lapss interim tamen Permissio non est causa Lapsus sed antecedens solùm 4. Austins saying which I cited seems to hold out thus much That as well God's Permittere as his Facere is a sure sign of his Will concerning the Event 5. I see not that the Opinion of the necessity of Physical Efficient Predetermination doth deny God's Permission seeing that Predetermination is de Bono or de Actione quà tali but Permission is de Malo or de obliquitate Actionis Dr. Twisse in that very Digression which you mention after a tedious Dispute against that Proposition grants as much as I think Perkins did or any need desire For he grants Manifestò sequi peccati existentiam ex permissione ejus Divinâ He adds indeed Nequaquam sequitur ex naturâ Permissionis in genere quod non paucis Theologis visum est ut in superioribus accepimus sed ex peculiari modo permissionis divinae constante sc negatione gratiae quippe sine quà peccatum à nemine vitari potest But this is that Permission which Divines speak of as I have shewed What he further adds de peccato definitè sumpto viz. that a bare Permission doth not infer the existence of it seems little to the purpose To his Instance about Formation I Answer There is a Restraining Grace as well as a Renewing God vouchsafes the one to many to whom he doth not vouchsafe the other see Gen. 20. 6. I grant that besides a meer Permission there must be as he speaks aliqua alia rerum administratio secundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur quae sit proxima materia talis deformitatis and that quoties juxta Permissionem Divinam res aliqua sortitur effectum toties Dei permissio non est solitaria sed aliam Divinam Providentiae gubernationem concomitantem obtinet But I suppose that Perkins and others comprehend all under the name of Permission that being it upon which Sin indefinitely considered as Twisse himself confesseth doth follow though for the specification of the sin something more be required The reason is because malum is privatio and so in alieno fundo habitat therefore there cannot be Permissio Mali but there must also be Effectivus Concursâ—â—â— ad id in quo Malum existit But for the thing
accepted of God as Philosophers deny the Sun to be formally hot because it hath no form of heat inherent in it but only produceth heat in other Bodies Thus there is difference among our Divines about the term but they agree in the thing Some would have no formal Cause of Justification at all some would have such a Cause but would not have Christ's Righteousness imputed but the imputation of Christ's Righteousness to be it yet both the one and the other do indeed hold the Righteousness of Christ to be the formal Cause of Justification in that sense as Davenant and Ames do explain it 1. As Faith alone is the Condition of our Justification so also Faith alone as continued though it is not continued alone is the Condition of our Continued Justification Neque etiam saith Calvin sic putemus commendari post gratuitam justificationem opera ut ipsa in locum justificandi hominis posteà succedant aut ejusmods officium cum Fide N. B. partiantur Nisi enim perpetuò maneat solida Fidei justificatio illorum immundities detegetur Nihil autem absonum est sic Fide hominem justificari ut non ipse modo justus sit sed opera quoque ejus supra dignitatem justa censeantur So Mr. Ball Faith doth not begin to apprehend Life and then leave it to works that we might attain the accomplishment by them but it doth ever rest upon the Promise until we come to enjoy it 2. I know no accusation but of the Law of Works though in case of unbelief and impenitency that Accusation be aggravated by the Law of Grace Though Calvîn thinks not that Joh. 5. 45. Do not think that I will accuse you to my Father there is one that accuseth you even Moses c. to be to this purpose as some do yet he grants That it is Legis proprièreos peragere infideles To question whether he spake of the Law of Works were to question whether the Sun shineth at noon-day When any is accused to be an Infidel or finally impenitent or a sinner against the Holy Ghost as it is a sin that he is accused of so the Accusation is from the Law but as Unbelief or Impenitency for why you bring in the sin against the Holy Ghost I do not know doth import a want of the Condition required in the Gospel so as I have said before it is no new accusation but only a re-inforcing of a former accusation and so the refelling of this Accusation by shewing the fruits of Faith and Repentance is not properly a justifying of our selves by any thing in our selves but only a proving and manifesting that we are indeed justified by the Righteousness of Christ imputed to us 3. The imperfection of our Faith and Obedience doth prove that it is no Righteousness by which we can be justified consider always that I speak of absolute and universal Justification Si per se saith Calvin vel intrinsecâ ut loquuntur virtute justificaret fides ut est semper debilis imperfecta non efficeret hoe nisiex parte sic manca esset justitia quae frustulum salutis nobis conferret So Davenant Ad justificationem efficiendam non sufficit justitia suo quodam modo perfectae aliqu◠modo imperfecta sed necesse est eam esse legali modo perfectam omnibus suis numeris absolutam And again Nulla justitia coram Deo justificat sed quae ad amussin Legis perfecta est Sed nostra inhaerens non est talis c. Thus also Maccovius Quod nobis imputatur ad justitiam nempe propriè per se seu respectu sui i◠debet esse perfectissimum ut consistere possit cum judicio Dei Rom. 2. 2. At Fides non est perfectissima 1 Cor. 13. 9. To me it seems not hard to be certain of the meaning of that place Luke 7. 47. Many sins are forgiven her for she loved much It appears as I noted plainly enough by the Context what the meaning is viz. not that her love was the cause of the forgiveness of her sins but the forgiveness of her sins the cause of her love And you see how sharply Calvin whose words I cited censures those that interpret it otherwise The Parable going before those words are so clear That Maldonate is forced to say Videtur ex hac parabolâ non fuisse colligendum quod Christus colligit multa peccata illi mulieri remitti quia multum dilexisset sed contrà proptereà eam multum dilexisse quòd multa illi peccata remissa essent Quae res speciosam Calvino caeteris haereticis errandi occasionem praebuit negantibus huic mulieri propter praecedentia charitatis opera remissa peccata illa verò verba quoniam dilexit multum sic interpretantibus ut dictio illa quoniam non causam sed effectum consequentiam significet quod utinam nemo Catholicorum secutus esset And see how poorly and pittifully he comes off viz. either thus Vt Christum in versà parabolâ usum fuisse deceremus q. d. Sicut ille dilexit multum quia multum illi remissum fuerat ita huic mulieri è contrario quia dilexit multum remissa sunt peccata multa Or which he rather inclines unto thus Quod Christus hoc loco rogat Quis ergo eum plus diliget etsi futurum tempus est tamen ex consuetudine loquendi vim praeteriti habere puto q. d. Quem tu judicas ex effectu conjecturam faciens plus antè Dominum suum delexisse Vtrùm illi magis amicum fuisse cum amicitiae causâ faenerator debitum utrique remiserit What straits was this acute Man driven to because he was resolved to hold the Conclusion and yet saw how ill it did suit with the Premises 1. What others of whom you speak do I know not they may answer for themselves 2. I take affiance which is a Believing in or Relying on to be an Act of Faith it self the Act of Faith being as well Credere in as simpliciter Credere But internal Obedience or Love for these you make both one though indeed Believing it self is inward Obedience as well as Love the one being commanded as well as the other is not the Act of Faith though caused by Faith not actus elicitus though actus imperatus therefore this is not so immediate a product of Faith as the other 3. I conceive Affiance to be a part of Justifying-Faith and not only a Fruit of it To believe in Christ which is as much as to rely on him and to have affiance in him is requisite unto Justification He that believeth on him is not condemned John 3. 18. 1. As Justification is begun upon sole Believing so is it also continued and consummated The Scripture so far as I see makes Justification simply and absolutely to depend