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A51660 Malebranch's Search after the truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind. Vol. II and of its management, for avoiding error in the sciences : to which is added, the authors defence against the accusations of Monsieur de la Ville : also, the life of Father Malebranch, of the oratory of Paris, with an account of his works, and several particulars of his controversie with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne, and Monsieur Regis, professor in philosophy at Paris, written by Monsieur Le Vasseur, lately come over from Paris / done out of French from the last edition.; Recherche de la vérité. English Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.; Sault, Richard, d. 1702. 1695 (1695) Wing M316; ESTC R39697 381,206 555

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those of which we actually think I suppose nevertheless that our Sensations do not fill all the capacity of our Mind for that we may be free with the liberty I speak of it is necessary not only that God should not invincibly impel us towards particular goods but also that we may make use of the impression we have towards good in general to love some other thing than that we actually love Now as we can love no Object but those we may think of nor actually think of any other but those that cause too quick Sensations in us it is evident that the dependance we have upon our Body lessens our liberty nay does on many occasions take away the use of it So our Sensations destroying out Ideas and the union we have with our Body by which we only see or rather feel our selves weakening that which we have with God by which all things are present to us the Mind must not suffer it self to be divided by confused Sensations if it be willing always to have the principle of its determinations to be free It appears from all this that God is not the Author of Sin and that Man does not give himself new Modifications God is not the Author of Sin since he continually imprints a motion to go farther on him who Sins or stops at a particular good and he gives him the power to think of other things and to apply himself to other goods than that which actually is the Object of his thought and of his love that he commands him not to love those things which he can forbear loving without being troubled by any remorses and he continually calls him to himself by the secret reproaches of his Reason Is is true Gob does in one sense impel the Sinner to love the Object of his Sin if this Object appears to be good to the Sinner for as most Divines say all that is positive in Sin or what there is of act or motion proceeds from God But it is only through a false judgment of our Mind that the Creatures appear good to us that is capable of acting in us and making us happy The Sin of a Man lies in this that he does not refer all the particular Goods to the Soveraign Good or rather in that he does not consider nor love the Severaign Good in the particular Goods and so does not regulate his Love according to the Will of God or according to the essential and necessary order of which all Men have a knowledge and which is so much the more perfect as they are more strictly united to God and are less sensible of the impressions of their Senses and Passions See the Explanations upon the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book towards the end where I explain my thoughts more distinctly For our Senses diffuse our Souls through our whole Bodies and our Passions transport them if I may so say into those Objects which are about us they remove us from the light of God which enlightens us Neither does Man give himself new Modifications for the motions of love that God continually imprints upon us increases or diminishes not whether we actually love or not I mean although this natural motion of love be or be not determined by any Idea of our Mind This motion does not cease even by its acquiescence in the possession of Good as the motion of Bodies ceases by their rest 'T is probable that God always impels us with an equal force towards him for he inclines us towards good in general as much as we are capable of and we are at all times equally capable of it because our Will or Natural capacity of Willing is always equal in it self Thus the impression or Natural motion which carries us towards good neither increases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor even any internal Sensation of this equality of impression or natural motion towards Good But 't is because as I have elsewhere proved that we know not our selves by a clear Idea not are we conscious of our own Faculties whilst they don't actually operate we do not feel in our selves what is natural common and always the same as we are not sensible of the heat and motion of our Hearts We are not likewise sensible of our Habits and whether we are worthy of the Love or Wrath of God There is perhaps in us an infinite number of Faculties which are absolutely unknown to us for we have no internal Sensation of what we are but only of what we feel If we had never felt Pain nor a desire for particular Goods we could not by the internal Sensation we have of our selves discover whether we should be capable of feeling Pain or willing such Goods 'T is our Memory and not our internal Sensation that teaches us we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel or of being agitated by Passions which at present we feel no motions of Thus there is nothing which hinders us from believing that God always inclines us towards him with an equal force although after a very different manner He always preserves in our Souls an equal capacity of willing or one and the same will as in all matter he preserves an equal quantity of motion But although it were not certain I don't see how we can say that the encrease or diminution of the natural motion of our Souls depends upon us since we cannot be the cause of the extension of our own Will It is however certain by what I have said before that God produces and also preserves whatsoever is real and positive in the particular determinations of the motions of our Souls whether Ideas or Sensations For 't is he who determines our motions for a general Good towards particular Goods but not after an invincible manner since we have a tendency to go farther So that all we do when we sin is that we do not all that we are able to do by means of the impression we have towards him who includes all Goods For we can do nothing but by the power that we receive from our Union with him who does all things in us Now what chiefly makes us Sin is because we choose rather to enjoy than to examine because of the Pleasure we feel in enjoying and the Pain we find in examining We cease to make use of the motion that is given us to enquire after Good and examine it and we stop in the enjoyment of such things as we ought only to make use of But if we narrowly observe we shall see there is nothing real on our part but a defect and cessation from enquiry which if we may so say corrupts the action of God in us but which however cannot destroy it Thus What do we when we do not Sin We do then whatever God does in us for we limit not to a particular or rather to a false Good the love that God imprints on us for the true
Man might Glory in himself and that he leaves even Concupiscence in the most holy and most perfect that they may have no vain Satisfaction in themselves For when we consider the Perfection of our Being Aug. in Tul. lib. 6. c. 9. it is difficult to despise our selves unless at the same time we see and love Soveraign Good in the presence of which all our Perfection and Grandeur vanishes in a moment I own that Concupiscence may prove the Subject of our Merit and that it is reasonable the Mind should for a time follow Order difficultly to deserve to be Eternally submitted to it with pleasure I grant that it may be upon this account that God has permitted Concupiscence after having foreseen Sin But Concupiscence not being absolutely necessary to our Meriting if God permitted it it was because Man might be able to do no good without the assistance which Jesus Christ has merited for us and that he might have no reason to Glory in his own power for it is plain that Man cannot sight against and overcome himself unless he be animated by Jesus Christ who as the Head of the Faithful inspires them with such Sensations as are directly opposite to the Concupiscence they derive from the first Man XVI Supposing then that Children are Born with Concupiscence it is evident that they are really Sinners since their heart is set upon Bodies as much as it is capable There is as yet but one love in their Will and that love is irregular So there is nothing in them that God can love since God cannot love disorder XVII But when they have been Regenerated in Jesus Christ that is when their Heart has been turn'd towards God either by an actual motion of love or by an inward disposition like unto that which remains after an Act of Loving God then Concupiscence is no longer a Sin in them for it inhabits no longer alone in the Heart it has no longer any dominion there The habitual Love which remains in them by the Grace of Baptism in Jesus Christ is freeer or stronger than that which is in them by the Concupiscence they have in Adam They are like the Just who in their Sleep follow the Motions of Lust yet lose not the Grace of Baptism for they do not freely consent to these Motions XVIII And it should not be thought strange if I believe it possible for Children while they are Baptizing to love God with a free Love For since the second Adam is contrary to the first why should he not at the time of Regeneration deliver Children out of the servitude of their Bodies to which they are only subjected by the first Adam so that being enlightned and excited by a lively and effectual Grace to love God they may love him with a free and reasonable love without being hindered by the first Adam It is not observable some may urge that their Bodies ceases one moment from acting over their Mind But should Men wonder at their not seeing that which is not visible That Act of Love may be produced in one Instant And whereas that Act may be formed in the Soul without making any Traces in the Brain we need not wonder if even those who are come to Men's estate when they are Baptiz'd do not always remember it for we have no remembrance of those things of which the Brain keeps no traces XIX St. Paul teaches us that the Old Man or Concupiscence is Crucified with Jesus Christ and that we are dead and buried with him by Baptism It is not that we are then delivered from the warring of the Body against the Mind and that Concupiscence is as it were dead that moment It is true it revives but having been destroy'd and thereby left the Children in a state of loving God it can no longer harm them though it revives in them For when there are two Loves in the Heart the one Natural and the other Free Order wills that only that should be regarded which is free And if Children loved God in Baptism by an Act no wise free loving Bodies afterwards by several Acts of the same kind God perhaps could not according to Order have more regard to one only Act than to many which are all natural and constrained Or rather if those contrary Loves were equal in force he must have regard to the last by the same reason that when there have been successively in a Heart two free Loves contrary to one another God ever has regard to the last since Grace is lost by one Mortal Sin XX. However it cannot be denied that God may without suspending the Dominion of the Body over the Childs Mind make it Just or turn its Will towards him by infusing into its Soul a disposition like unto that which remains after an Actual motion of Love towards God But that way of proceeding does not perhaps appear so natural as the other for we do not conceive clearly what those dispositions may be which would remain Indeed we need not wonder at it for having no clear Idea of the Soul as I have proved elsewhere * See the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part of the said Book with its Explanation we must not wonder if we do not know all the Modifications it is capable of But the Mind cannot be fully satisfied with things it does not conceive clearly In my Opinion it requires an extraordinary Miracle to give those dispositions to the Soul without a preceding Act. Surely it cannot be done by the most simple means Whereas the second Adam producing for a moment in the Mind of the Child which is Baptis'd the contrary of what the first did produce there before it is sufficient to regenerate it that God should act in it by the usual means according to which he sanctifies the Adult for the Child not having at that moment any sensations or motions to divide its capacity of thinking and willing nothing hinders it from knowing and loving its real Good I say no more because it is not necessary to know precisely how the regeneration of Children is perform'd provided we admit a real regeneration in them or an inward and real Justification caused by the Acts or at least by the habits of Faith Hope and Charity If I propose an Explanation so contrary to received Prejudices it is to satisfie even those who will not admit spiritual habits and to prove to them the possibility of Children's Regeneration for Imputation seems to me to include a down right contradiction since God cannot repute as just and actually love Creatures who are actually in disorder the he may for the love of his Son design to restore them to order and love them when they are restor'd OBJECTIONS Against the Proofs and Explanations of Original Sin Objection against the First Article GOD Wills Order it is True but it is his Will which makes it It does not suppose it Whatever God Wills is in Order from this only reason that
of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into self-Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
into the same Errors because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power and are fitter to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortifie it against Temptation whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences CHAP. IX of Love and Aversion and of their principal kinds LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us or to something that we Love The object that we Love and to which consequently we are united by Love being almost always present to us as well as that which we actually admire our Mind without any pain or great reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other and to us or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency And then the motion of Love we have for our selves and the object that we Love extends it self unto that we admire if the relation that it immediately has with us or with any thing we are united to appears advantagious to us either by Knowledge or Sensation Now this new motion of the Soul or rather motion of the Soul newly determined being joined to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Love But if we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the union or relation of the object we admire is disadvantageous to us or to any thing we are united to Then the motion of Love that we have for our selves and for what is united to us is limited in us or carried towards it and follows not the sight of the Mind nor employs it self on the object of our Admiration But as the motion towards good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul carries us towards what we know and feel to be so because what is intelligible and sensible is good in it self We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joyned to that of the Spirits and Blood That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Aversion This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love yet is never without Love It is wholly contrary because this separates I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it to satisfie some difficult Persons and that unites The former has Nothingness for its object and the latter always some Being whereby 't is excited Aversion refists natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas Love yields to it and makes it victorious But it is never separated from Love for if evil which is its object is taken for a privation of good to fly evil is to fly the privation of good that is to incline towards good and so that to hate the privation of good is to love good it self But if evil is taken for Pain and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure it is not therefore the privation of it but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery we should not have this aversion if we had not love Indeed evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us or deprives us of good and then aversion depends upon the love of our selves or of something to which we wish to be united Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions and opposite to each other but Love is the first chief and most Universal Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to we may in one Sense say that the motion of Love which we have to all things is only a consequence of Self-Love We love Honours because they raise us above others Riches because they defend and preserve us Our Relations Prince and Country because we are interested in their preservation The motion of love that we have for our selves extends to every thing that relates to us and to whatever we are united For 't is even this motion which unites and diffuses if I may so say our Being into those which encompass us in proportion as we discover by Reason or discern by Sensation that 't is advantageous to be united to them So that we must not think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love For when we say a Man loves a new object we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him he loves himself in that object and by a motion of Love as old as himself For indeed without Grace there is only self-Self-Love in the Heart of Man For the love of Truth Justice and even of God himself and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love We doubt not nevertheless but the most wicked and barbarous Men as Idolaters and even Atheists themselves are united to God by a Natural Love and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause By Love they are united to Truth Justice and Virtue They praise and esteem good Men and 't is not because they are Men that they love them but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable Thus we love something else besides our selves but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves Men abandon Truth and Justice for triffling Interests and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency or any other occasion They are induced by little else than Vanity and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reverences They love Virtue and Justice but never when 't is against themselves They may love them when they agree but never when they are opposite to their Interest for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love There are also many other natural
Good And when we Sin what do we Nothing for we love a false Good that God enclines us not to love by an invincible Impression We cease to seek the true Good and make useless the motion which God imprints on us Now when we love any particular Good only or against Order we receive from God as great an impression of Love as if we stopt not at this Good Moreover this particular determination which is neither necessitated nor invincible is also given us of God Therefore when we Sin we produce no new modification in our selves However I confess when we do not Sin but resist Temptation we may say in one Sense that we give our selves a new modification because we would think of other things than on the false Goods which tempt us But what we then do is produced by the action which God impresses on us that is by our motion towards Good in general or by our Will assisted by Grace or illuminated by a light or impelled by a preingaged Pleasure For in short if 't is pretended that to Will different things is to give our selves different Modifications I grant that in this Sense the Mind can diversly modifie it self by the action it receives from God But it must always be observed that that action that God performs in us depends upon us and is not invincible in respect to particular Goods For when a particular Good is presented to us we have an internal Sensation of our liberty in respect to it as we have of our Pleasure and Pain when we feel it We are even convinced of our Freedom by the same reason that we are convinced of our Existence for 't is the internal Sensation we have of our Thoughts which teaches us that we are And if in the time that we are conscious of our liberty in respect to a particular Good we ought to doubt whether or no we are free because we have no clear Idea of our liberty We must also doubt of our Pain and Existence at the time even when we are very unhappy since we have no clear Idea either of our Souls or of our Pain It is not the same with internal Sensation as with our external Senses These always deceive us in something when we follow their information but our internal Sensation never deceives us 'T is by my external Senses that I see Colours upon the surface of Bodies that I hear sounds in the Air and feel pain in my Hand c. and I am deceiv'd if I judge of these things upon the relation of my Senses But 't is by internal Sensation that I see Colours hear Sounds suffer Pain and I deceive not my self to think I see when I see hear when I hear or suffer when I suffer provided I stay there I explain not these things more at large because they are evident of ' emselves Thus having an internal Sensation of our liberty at the same time that a particular Good presents it self to our Mind we ought not to doubt whether we are free in respect to this Good Yet as we have not always this internal Sensation and sometimes only consult what remains of it in our memory after a very confused manner We may think of the abstracted Reasons which hinder us from feeling our selves persuaded that it is not possible for Man to be free Like a Stoic that wants nothing and who can Philosophise at his ease can imagine that Pain is not an Evil because the internal Sensation he has of it does not actually convince him of the contrary He may prove as Seneca has done by Reasons that in one Sense are true that 't is even a contradiction that a wise Man can be unhappy Yet when the internal Sensation we have of our selves will not suffice to convince us that we are free we may perswade our selves of it by Reason For being convinced by Reason that God only acts for himself and that he cannot give us any motion which tends not towards him the impression towards good in general may be invincible but it is plain the impression he gives us towards particular Goods must necessarily be free For if this impression was invincible we should not have any motion to go to God altho' he gives us motion only for himself and we should be necessitated to stop at particular Goods although God Order and Reason forbid it So that we should not Sin through our own default and God would be truly the cause of our Irregularities since they would not be free but purely natural and absolutely necessary Thus although we should not be convinced of our liberty by the internal Sensation we have of our selves we might by Reason discover that its necessary that Man should be created free supposing that he be capable of desiring particular Goods and that he can desire these Goods only by the impression or motion that God continually gives him for himself which may likewise be proved by Reason But 't is not the same of the capacity we have of suffering any Pain To discover that we have this capacity there is no other way but internal Sensation and yet no one doubts but Man is subject to Pain As we know not our Soul by a clear Idea as I have elsewhere explained 't would be in vain for us to try to discover what it is in us which terminates the action that God imprints on us or what it is in us which is overcome by a determination that is not invincible and that may be changed by our Will or impression towards whatever is good and by its union with him who includes the Ideas of all Beings For as we have no clear Idea of any modification of our Soul there is only an internal Sensation which teaches us that we exist and what we are 'T is this Sensation therefore that we must consult to convince our selves that we are free It answers us clearly enough when we actually propose any particular good to our selves For there is no Man who can doubt that he is not invincibly carried to Eat a Fruit or to shun some inconsiderable Pain But if instead of hearkning to our internal Sensation we give attention to abstracted Reasons which divert us from thinking of our selves it may be we might even lose the sight of our selves and forget what we are and that endeavouring to reconcile the knowledge of God and the absolute power he has over us with our liberty we should fall into an Error which would overthrow all the Principles of Religion and Morality Here is an Objection that is used to be made against what I have said and although it be very trivial it nevertheless is a difficulty to some Men. The hatred of God say they is an action wherein there is no Good Therefore it is perfectly the Sinners and God has no part in it Consequently Man acts and gives himself a new modification by an action which proceeds not from God I Answer That Sinners hate
Jesus Christ or the Word of God of his Divinity does not yet so throughly darken the Mind as to hide from it this Truth that God Wills Order Thus whether the Wills of God make Order or suppose it we clearly see when we examine our selves that the God whom we worship cannot do that which evidently appears contrary to Order So that Order willing our Time or duration of Being should be for him who preserves us that all the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it upon us that all the Powers of our Soul should only labour for him by vertue of whom they act God cannot dispense with the Commandment which he gave us by Moses in the Law and which he repeated by his Son in the Gospel Mark 12.30 Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind and with all thy strength But because Order wills that every righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner unhappy that every Action conformable to Order and every Motion of love towards God be recompenced and on the contrary it is evident that every one who will be happy must continually tend towards God and with horrour reject every thing that would stop his Course or diminish his Motion towards his True Good 'T is not necessary that for this he consult a Spiritual Guide for when God speaks Men should be silent and when we are absolutely certain that our Senses and Passions have no part in the Answers which we hear inwardly we must alwayes hearken respectively to these Answers and submit to them Would we know whether we should go to a Ball or a Play Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the day at Gaming or unprofitable Entertainments Whether certain Businesses Studies Employments are conformable to our Obligations Let us enter into our Selves let us silence our Passions and Senses and see the Light of God if we can for his sake do such an Action Let us interrogate him who is the Way the Truth and the Life to know if the Way we follow does not lead to Death and whether God being essentially Just and necessarily obliged to punish every Thing that is contrary to Order and to recompence every Thing that is conformable thereto we have reason to believe we go to encrease or assure our felicity by the Action we are about If it be our Love to God that carries us to the Ball let us go thither if we should play to gain Heaven let us play Day and Night if we have in sight the Glory of God in our Employ let us encrease it let us do all Things with Joy for our Recompence will be great in Heaven But if after having carefully examined our Essential Obligations we discover clearly That neither our Being nor duration are of us that we do an Injustice which God cannot but punish when we endeavour to spend our Time in vain If our Master and Lord Jesus Christ who has purchased us by his Blood reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude after a very clear and intelligible manner for living after the Flesh and the World for leading a Soft and Voluptuous Life and for following Opinion and Custom let us obey his voice and not harden our Hearts let us not seek for Guides that soften these Reproaches embolden us against these Menaces and who obscure this Light with agreeable Clouds which hurt and penetrate our very Soul When the blind lead the blind they both fall into the ditch sayes the Gospel but if the Blind Man who suffers himself to be lead fall with him that leads him if God does hot excuse him will he excuse him who sees clearly and yet suffers himself to be lead by the Blind because this Blind Person leads him agreeably and entertains him in the way according to his inclinations These voluntary Blind ought to know that God who never deceives does sometimes permit these Seducers to punish corrupted Hearts who seek Seducers that Blindness is a punishment of Sin although 't is often the Cause thereof and that 't is just that he who would not hearken to Eternal Wisdom which only speaks to him for his good should leave him at length to be corrupted by Men who deceive so much the more dangerously as they flatter him more agreeably It is true 't is difficult to enter into ones self to silence ones Senses and Passions and to discern whether 't is God or our Body who speaks to us for we often take the Proofs of Sensation for evident Reasons and then 't is necessary to consult Guides but 't is not alwayes necessary to consult them For we see our Duty on many occasions with the utmost evidence and certainty and then it is even dangerous to consult them if it be not done with an entire Sincerity and a Spirit of Humility and Obedience for these Dispositions oblige God not to permit us to be deceived or at least in no very dangerous manner When 't is necessary to consult a Guide we must choose one who understands Religion who reverences the Gospel and who knows Man We must take care that the Converse of the World has not corrupted him that Friendship has not made him too Complaisant so that he may either fear or hope any thing from us We must choose one among a thousand sayes St. Theresia who as she relates of her self had like to have been lost by the defect of an ignorant Guide The World is full of Deceivers I say Religious Deceivers as well as others Those who love us seduce us through Complaisance those who are below us flatter us through Respect or Fear those who are above us consider not our Necessities either through Contempt or Negligence Besides all Men counsel us according to the relation we give them of what passes in us and we are never wanting to flatter our selves for we insensibly cover our Sore when we are ashamed of it We often deceive those who direct us that we may deceive our selves for we suppose our selves safe when we follow them They guide us whither we have a mind to go and we endeavour to perswade our selves in spight of our Light and the secret reproaches of our Reason that 't is our Obedience which determines us We deceive our selves and God permits it but we never deceive him who examines our Hearts and though we shut our Ears as much as we can against the voice of inward Truth we sufficiently feel by the reproaches of this soveraign Truth which leaves us to our selves that it inlightens our darkness and discovers all the subtleties of self-self-love 'T is therefore evident that we must consult our Reason for the Health of our Soul as our Senses for that of our Body and when Reason answers not clearly we must necessarily have recourse to Guides as we would to Physicians when our Senses fail us but this must be done with discretion for Guides
willed to remedy we may then conclude that the Passions are of the Order of Nature though they cannot be of the Order of Grace It is true if we consider that the Sin of the first Man has deprived us of the assistance of a God that is Omnipresent and always ready to defend us it may then be said that Sin is the Cause of our relation to sensible things because it has separated us from God by whom only we can be delivered from their Slavery But without insisting any longer upon an Enquiry after the full Cause of our Passions let us examine their extention their nature in particular their end their use their defects and whatever relates to ' em CHAP. II. Of the Vnion of the Mind with Sensible Things or of the power or extension of the Passions in General IF all those who read this Work would be at the trouble of reflecting upon what they feel in themselves it would be needless to shew here the dependance we have upon sensible Objects I can say nothing in this matter which all the World does not know as well as my self if they will but think so that I would forbear to say any of it if experience did not teach me that Men are so very forgetful of themselves that they do not so much as think upon what they feel nor enquire into the reasons of what passes in their Mind I thought it necessary to say some things here which may prepare 'em to reflect upon it and I hope that those who know 'em already will not be uneasie at the reading of 'em for although we are not delighted with the bare repetition of what we know already yet we may be pleased with the repetition of what we know and think of at the same time The most honourable Sect of Philosophers and that whose Opinions many Men do now think it their glory to embrace would perswade us that it is in our own power to be happy The Stoics continually tell us of self dependance Jam beatum esse te judica cum tibi in te goudium omne nasc tur cum in his que homines eripiunt optant custediunt nihil inveneris non d●co quod malis sed quod velis Sen. Ep. 124. that we must not be afflicted at the loss of our Reputation Goods Friends or Relations That we must be always of an even temper of Mind and easie whatever happens whether Exile Injuries Affronts Distempers and even Death it self for these are not Evils to be feared In fine they tell us of many such like things which we are enough inclined to believe as well because our Pride makes us in love with Independence as because our Reason tells us that indeed the greatest part of these Evils which really afflict us were incapable of doing it if all things were in order But God has given us a Body and by this Body united us to all sensible things Sin has subjected us to our Body and by our Body has made us dependent upon all sensible things This is the order of Nature this is the Will of the Creator that all Beings which he hath made should be united together thus we are united to all things and 't is the Sin of the first Man which has made us dependent upon all Beings to which God has only allied us Thus is there none that is not now united and wholly subjected to his Body and by his Body to his Relations his Friends his City his Prince his Country his Clothes his House his Lands his Horse his Dog to all the Earth the Sun the Stars to all the Heavens 'T is therefore ridiculous to tell Men that it is in their power to be Happy Wise and Free and they only mock those whom they seriously advise not to be afflicted at the loss of their Friends or Goods 't is even as ridiculous to advise Men not to feel pain when they are beaten or not to be pleased when they eat with an appetite Thus the Stoics are either unreasonable or mock us when they preach to us to be easie under the death of a Father the loss of Goods Exile Imprisonment and such like things and not to rejoyce at the good success of our Affairs for we are united to our Country our Goods our Relations c. by a Natural Tye which now depends not upon our Will Indeed I cenfess that Reason teaches us to suffer Exile chearfully but the same Reason tells us we ought to endure the cutting off an Arm without pain The Soul is above the Body and according to the light of Reason a Man's happiness or unhappiness ought not to depend upon it but Experience sufficiently proves to us that things are not as our Reason tells us they should be and it is ridiculous to Philosophize against Experience Christians dont philosophize after this manner they confess that pain is an evil that it is not without uneasiness that they are ravished from those things to which Nature has united them and that it is a difficult thing to be delivered from the slavery into which Sin has reduced us They grant that it is a disorder that the Soul depends upon the Body yet so as that it may be delivered from this dependence by the Grace of Jesus Christ I feel says St. Paul a law in my Body which fights against the law of my Mind and which enslaves it to the Law of Sin which is in my Members unhappy Man that I am Who shall deliver me from this Body of death it will be the Grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ The Son of God the Apostles and all his true Disciples do recommend patience to us above all things because they knew that he that will live holily must endure affliction In short true Christians or true Philsophers say nothing which is not agreeable to good Sense and Experience but Universal Nature does continually contradict the Opinion or Pride of the Stoics Christians know that to deliver themselves in some manner from the dependance they are in they must labour to deprive themselves of all things which they cannot enjoy without pleasure nor be deprived of without pain that that is the only means to preserve the peace and liberty of Mind which they have received by the Grace of their Saviour The Stoics on the contrary following the false Idea's of their Chimerical Philosophy imagined themselves wise and happy and that there needed no more than to think on Virtue and Independence to become Virtuous and Independant Reason and Experience tells us the best way not to suffer the pain of pricking is to avoid being prick'd But the Stoics say Prick me and by the force of my Mind and help of my Philosophy I will separate my self after such a manner from my Body that I will not feel whatever passes there I can demonstrate that my happiness depends not upon it that pain is not an evil and you shall see by the
enlightened Philosophy 'T is true that Pleasure is good and Pain an evil and that Pleasure and Pain by the Author of Nature have been affixed to the use of certain things to make us capable of judging whether they are good or bad That we must choose the good fly the evil and generally follow the motions of our Passions All this is true but it only relates to the Body to preserve which and long to continue a Life like to that of Beasts we must suffer our selves to be governed by our Passions and Desires The Senses and Passions were only given us for the good of the Body sensible Pleasure is the character which Nature has joined to the use of certain things that without taking the pains to examine them by Reason we might employ 'em for the preservation of the Body but not that we should love them for we ought to love nothing but what Reason most certainly discovers to us to be our good We are Rational Beings and God who is our chief Good requires not of us a blind Love a Love of Instinct or one that is forced but a Love of Choice of Knowledge and such a one as subjects our Mind and Hearts to him He induces us to love him by discovering to us by the light that accompanies the delection of his Grace that he is our Soveraign Good but inclines us to the good of the Body only by instinct and a confused sensation of Pleasure because the good of the Body deserves neither the application of the Mind nor exercise of our Reason But farther our Body is not our selves 't is something that belongs to us without which absolutely speaking we may exist The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our good for Bodies can be only the good of Bodies which we may make use of for the good of our Body but we must not unite our selves to them Our Soul has likewise a Good peculiar to her self viz. that good only that is superiour to her who alone preserves and produces in her the sensations of Pain and Pleasure For in fine all the objects of our Senses are of themselves uncapable of making us perceive them and 't is God alone that can teach us they are present by the sensation he gives us of them which is a Truth the Heathen Philosophers could never comprehend We may and I confess ought to love what is capable of making us feel Pleasure And 't is for that reason we must love none but God because 't is only he who can act in our Souls since sensible objects can only move the Organs of our Senses But perhaps it may be answered by some what matters it from whence these agreeable Sensations come we will enjoy them Ingrateful as they are not to acknowledge the hand that so kindly bestows these Goods They would have a just God give unjust Rewards and recompense them for the Crimes they commit against him at the very time they commit them They would make use of his immutable Will which is the Order and Law of Nature to force undeserved favours from him For by a criminal Artifice they produce such motions in their Bodies which obliges him to make them taste all sorts of Pleasures But Death will corrupt this Body and God whom they have made subservient to their unjust Desires will make them submit to his just Anger and will mock them in his turn 'T is true 't is a very hard thing that the possession of the Goods of the Body should be attended with Pleasure and that that of the Goods of the Soul should often be tied to Pain and Sorrow We may look upon it as a great irregularity because Pleasure being the character of Good as Pain is that of Evil we ought infinitely to take more delight in the love of God than in the use of sensible things since God is the true or rather the only Good of the Mind This will certainly happen one day and 't is very probable 't was so before the Fall at least 't is certain before Sin entered into the World we felt no pain in the exercise of our Duty But God has withdrawn himself from us ever since the Fall of Adam he is no longer our Good by Nature but only by Grace for now we naturally find no satisfaction in loving him and he rather diverts us from then enclines us to love him If we follow him he repulses us if we run after him he smites us if we are constant in our persuit he still treats us ill and makes us suffer very lively and sensible Griefs But when being weary with walking in the hard and painful Paths of Virtue without being incouraged by the relish of Good or assisted by any Nourishment we begin to feed upon sensible things to which he unites us by the taste of Pleasure as if he would reward us for turning aside from him to follow those perishing Goods In short since the first Sin it seems as if God were not pleased that we should love or think upon him or that we should look upon him as our only and chief Good It is only through the Grace of JESVS CHRIST that we are now sensible that God is our Good since 't is by his Grace that we take any pleasure and satisfaction in the love of God Thus the Soul neither discovering her own Good by a clear view or by sensation without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST she takes the Good of the Body for her own She loves it and is more strictly united to it by her Will than she was by the first Institution of Nature For the Good of the Body being the only one left that we are now sensible of it necessarily acts the more powerfully upon Man affects his Brain more livelily and consequently the Soul must feel and imagine it after a more sensible manner And the Animal Spirits being more violently agitated the Will must needs love it with more Ardour and Pleasure Before Sin the Soul was able to efface out of the Brain an over lively image of sensible good and cause the pleasure that attended this image to vanish The Body being thus submitted to the Mind the Soul could in an instant put a stop to the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain and emotion of the Spirits only by the consideration of its Duty But now it remains no longer in its power nor do these traces of the Imagination and motions of the Spirits any longer depend upon it and therefore by a necessary consequence Pleasure which by the order of Nature is affixed to these traces and motions is become the only Master of the Heart Man cannot long resist this Pleasure by his own strength 't is Grace only that can entirely overcome it because none but God as the Author of Grace can overcome himself as the Author of Nature or rather can appease himself as the Revenger of Adam's Disobedience See the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian
Conversations towards the end The Stoics who had but a confused knowledge of the disorders of original Sin could not confute the Epicureans their happiness being but barely Ideal since there is no felicity without Pleasure and they could not relish Pleasure in the meer persuit of vertuous actions 't is true they might find some satisfaction in following the Rules of their imaginary Virtue because it is a natural consequence of the knowledge our Soul has that she 's in the most eligible condition she can be in This joy of the Mind might maintain their Resolutions for some time but it was not strong enough to resist Pain and conquer Pleasure 'T was secret Pride and not Joy that made them keep their Countenance for when no one was present they soon lost all their Power and Wisdom like Kings upon the Theatre whose Grandeur vanishes in a moment It is very different with those Christians who exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they most certainly know they are in the happiest condition they can possibly be at present Their Joy is also great because the Good they taste through Faith and Hope is infinite For the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a sensible Joy and this Joy is so much the more vigorous as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces that Joy and sensible Pleasure which always accompanies the presence of Good Nor is their Joy uneasie because it is founded upon the promises of God by the Blood of whose Son it is confirmed and maintain'd by the inward Peace and inexpressible sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost diffuses in their Hearts Nothing can separate them from the true Good when they taste and are pleased with it through the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Enjoyments are not so great as those they feel in the love of God rather than quit them they choose Contempt and Pain they are not affrighted at Reproaches and Disgrace and the Pleasures they find in their Sufferings or to speak more properly those they meet with in God when they contemn every thing to be united to him are so violent that they transport them and makes them speak a new Language and with the Apostles boast of the Miseries and Injuries they suffer The Scripture tells us That when the Apostles departed from the Council they were filled with Joy that they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS And this is the disposition of Mind in true Christians when they have received the greatest Affronts for defending the Truth JESVS CHRIST being come to reestablish that Order that Sin had overthrown and Order requiring that the greatest Goods should be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to happen after the manner we have related But besides Reason Experience confirms it for a Person no sooner takes a resolution of contemning every thing for God but he is commonly so affected with a Pleasure or inward Joy that he as sensibly feels God to be his Good as before he evidently knew him to be so True Christians assure us every day that the Joy they have in the Love and Service of God is inexpressible and 't is very reasonable to believe them concerning what passes in themselves The wicked on the contrary are perpetually tormented with mortal Disquiets and such as are divided betwixt God and the World partake also of the Joys of the Righteous and Dissatisfactions of the Wicked They complain of their Miseries and 't is likewise just to believe their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the very quick when they make choice of any other object for their chief Good but himself and 't is this wound that makes them really miserable But fills the Mind of those with excessive Joy who only unite themselves to him and 't is this Joy which gives the true Felicity The abundance of Riches and possession of Honours and Dignities being external cannot cure the wound God makes And as Poverty and Contempt are also without us so they cannot hurt us when the Almighty protects us It is evident by what has been said that the objects of our Passions are not our Good and that we must only follow their Motions for the preservation of our Lives That sensible Pleasure in respect of our Good is what our Sensations are in relation to the Truth and even as we find our Senses deceive us in matters of Truth so our Passions deceive us concerning our Good That we must submit to the Delectation of Grace because it evidently enclines us to love the true Good nor is followed with the secret reproaches of Reason like the blind instinct and confused pleasure of the Passions but is always attended with a secret Joy agreeable to the condition we are in And last of all since God only can act upon our Mind we can find no Felicity out of God except we would suppose that God rewards none but the Disobedient or Commands us to love that most which least deserves our love CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Vnion with God by the knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue And that on the contrary its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependance on the Body because of the disorder of its Senses and Passions THE least reflexion is enough to discover to us that the good of the Mind must necessarily be something Spiritual for Bodies are much inferior to the Mind and cannot act upon it by their own strength They are not able immediately to unite themselves to it nor are they intelligible of themselves and therefore cannot be its good On the contrary Spiritual Things are intelligible from their own Nature and may unite themselves to the Mind consequently be its good if we suppose them superior to it for that a thing may be the good of the Mind it is not enough to be Spiritual like that it must be above it that it may be able to act upon it instruct and recompence it otherwise it cou'd neither make it more happy nor more perfect and therefore cou'd not be its good Of all things both Intelligible and Spiritual there is none but God that is thus superior to the Mind from whence it follows that nothing but he is or can be its true good nor can we therefore become more perfect or more happy but in the enjoyment of God Every one is convinced that the knowledge of the Truth and love of Virtue makes the Mind more perfect and that the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Inclinations renders it more imperfect The knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue then can be nothing else but the union of the Mind with God and even a kind of possessing of him And the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Heart can likewise be nothing else but the separation
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that self-Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
loves We Naturally love our Prince our Country our Relations and those that we find conformable to our Humours Designs Employments but all these loves are very weak as well as the love of Truth and Justice and Self-Love being the most violent of all loves it always overcomes them without finding any other resistance than what it makes it self Bodies which strike one another lose their motion in proportion as they communicate it to those they meet and they may at last lose it all if they shock many other Bodies But 't is not so with Self-Love it determines all other loves by the impression it gives them yet its motion diminishes not On the contrary it acquires new Powers by its new Victories and as its motion goes not out of the Heart it is not lost although it is continually communicated self-Self-Love is then the commanding and universal Love since it is found every where and reigns where-ever it is found So that all the Passions have no other motion than that of Self-Love we may also say that Self-Love is the most extensive and strongest of all Passions or that 't is the commanding and universal Passion For even as all Virtues are only kinds of the first Virtue that we call Charity as St. Augustine has shown so all Vices and even all Passions are likewise only consequences or kinds of Self-Love or proceed from this general Vice we call Concupiscence We often distinguish in Morality the Virtues or Kinds of Charity by the difference of its Objects but that sometimes confounds the true Idea we ought to have of Virtue which rather depends upon its own motive than on any thing else and therefore we shan't follow this method in treating of the Passions We will not here distinguish them by their objects because one object alone may excite them all and yet ten thousand objects must excite but one For altho' objects differ amongst themselves they are not always different in relation to us and they excite not different Passions in us A promised Marshal's Staff differs from a promised Bishop's Crosier yet these two marks of Honour excite very near the same Passion in Ambitious Persons because they stir up a like Idea of Good in the Mind But the same Mareschal's Staff when promised granted enjoyed or taken away excites very different Passions since it raises in the Mind different Ideas of Good We must not therefore multiply the Passions according to the different Objects which cause them but only admit so many of 'em as there are accessary Ideas which attend the principal Idea of Good or Evil and considerably change it in relation to us For the general Idea of Good or the Sensation of Pleasure which is a good to him who tastes it agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits it produces the general Passion of Love And the accessory Ideas of this Good determine the general agitation of the Soul and the course of the Animal Spirits after a particular manner which puts the Mind and Body into the disposition it ought to be in relation to the Good we perceive and thus they produce all particular Passions Thus the general Idea of Good produces an indeterminate Love which is only an extension of Self-Love The Idea of the Good which we possess producs a a love of Joy The Idea of a Good that we do not yet but hope hereafter to possess that is which we judge we may be able to possess produces a love of Desire In fine the Idea of a Good which we possess not nor have any hopes of possessing or which is the same the Idea of a Good that we have no hopes of possessing without the loss of some other or such an one as we cannot preserve when we possess it produces a love of Sorrow These are the three simple or primitive Passions which have Good for their object for the hope which produces Joy is not an emotion of the Soul but a simple Judgment But we must observe that Men limit not their being in themselves but extend it to ail things and Persons to whom it may appear advantagious to be united So that we must conceive that they in some manner possess a good when their Friends enjoy it although they do not immediately possess it themselves Thus when I say that the possession of Good produces Joy I mean not only of the immediate union or possession but of all others for we naturally feel Joy when any good fortune happens to those we love Evil as I have before said may be taken in three different ways either for the privation of Good or for Pain or in fine for the thing which causes the privation of Good or produces Pain In the first Sense the Idea of Evil being the same with the Idea of a Good that we possess not it is plain this Idea produces Sorrow or Desire or even Joy For Joy is always excited when we feel our selves deprived of the privation of Good that is when we possess Good So that the Passions which regard evil taken in this Sense are the same with those which regard Good because in effect they have Good likewise for their object But if by Evil we mean Pain which only is always a real Evil to him who suffers it whilst he suffers it then the sensation of this Evil produces the Passions of Sorrow Desire and Joy which are kinds of Hatred and not Love for their motion is absolutely opposite to that which accompanies the sight of Good this motion being only the opposition of the Soul which resists the natural impression The actual Sensation of Pain produces ah aversion of Sorrow Pain which we do not actually suffer but are afraid of suffering produces an aversion of Desire In fine the Pain that we do not suffer nor are apprehensive of suffering or which is the same the Pain that we do not foresee we shall suffer without some great Recompence or the Pain which we feel our selves delivered from produces an aversion of Joy These are the three primitive or simple Passions which have Evil for their object for fear which produces Sorrow is not an emotion of the Soul but a simple Judgment Lastly if by Evil we mean the Person or thing which deprives us of Good or makes us suffer Pain the Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together or simply a motion of Aversion The Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together when the Evil is what deprives us of a Good For 't is by the same motion that we encline towards Good and remove our selves from what hinders our possession of it But this Idea only produces a motion of Aversion when 't is the Idea of an Evil which makes us suffer Pain for 't is by the same motion of Aversion that we hate Pain and whatever produces it Thus there are three simple or primitive Passions which respect Good and as many others which regard Pain or which causes it
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
God only because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil For they cannot hate Good considered as such So that 't is by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good that they Hate him Now they judge that God is not Good because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence that God is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently Hate him We must distinguish two things in Hatred the Sensation of the Soul and motion of the Will The Sensation cannot be bad For 't is a modification of the Soul which Morally speaking has neither Good nor Ill in it For the motion it is not ill neither since it is not distinct from that of Love For external Evil being only a privation of Good it is evident that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to incline towards Good So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God hath nothing bad in it And the Sinner cannot hate God but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence altho' he performs all things in us and 't is only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body Man even before Sin was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods and that every time that certain traces were formed in the chief part of his Brain certain thoughts were produced in his Mind Now these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter This supposed as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated so Man had necessarily a power over his Body that he cou'd hinder the formation of these traces when he wou'd for order requires that the Mind shou'd govern the Body Now this power of Mans Mind over his Body consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power as it had over his own Body I dont see how we can conceive that after any other manner he coud hinder the traces from being formed in his Brain Thus the Will of God or general Law of Nature which is the true cause of the communication of Motion wou'd on certain occasions depend upon Adams Will for God had this respect for him that he produced not new Motions in his Body if he consented not to them or at least in the chief part of it to which the Soul is immediately united Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin Order requires it so and consequently he whose Will is ever conformable to Order Now this Will continuing always the same the Sin of the first Man has overturn'd the Order of Nature because the first Man having Sinned Order woud not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l. I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustain'd as to the power he had over his Body It is not just that the Sinner shoud suspend the communication of Motions that the Will of God shou'd be accommodated to his and that in favour of him there shoud be exceptions in the Law of Nature So that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends upon his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed Thus formal Concupiscence as well as formal Sin is nothing real It is in Man only the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it This loss that Man has sustained is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God which is ever conformable to order and always the same 't is a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice So that we must say that God is not the cause of Concupiscence but only Sin Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence is performed by God Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15 c. for God effects whatever is done but that is no Evil 'T is by the General Law of Nature 't is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul useful for the preservation of the Body or propagation of the Species who dares then say that these things are not good in themselves I know very well that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures we say it but do we know it Can we think that Sin which is nothing shou'd actually produce something Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause However we say it but it may be the reason is because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say or else it is because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say who it may be spoke with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Understanding Sin is the cause of Concupiscence but it is not the cause of Pleasure as Free-will is the cause of Sin without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul The pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its motion or love and there is nothing good that God does not The rebellion of the Body and malignity of Pleasure proceeds from Sin as the inclination of the Soul to or its acquiescence in a particular good comes from the Sinner But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of All Pleasure is good and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it at least whilest he enjoys it But we may say that Pleasure is Evil because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it it happens through the errour of our Mind and corruption of our Heart that it
merited for us and in another place I call it absolutely the Grace of Jesus Christ it is not that there is no other Grace but that or that there is any which Christ has not purchased for us But I call it the Grace of Jesus Christ to distinguish it from the Grace that God gave to the first Man when he Created him which is commonly call'd the Creator's Grace For the Grace by which Adam might have preserved his Innocence was chiefly a Grace of Light as I have explained in the preceding Remark because that Adam having no concupiscence he stood in need of no Pre-ingaging Pleasures to oppose it But the Grace which we now stand in need of to keep us within the bounds of our Duty and to produce and maintain Charity in us is Pre-ingaging Delectation For as Pleasure produces and maintains the Love of those things which occasion it or seem to occasion it the Pre-ingaging Pleasures we receive in relation to our Bodies produce and maintain Cupidity in us So that being directly contrary to Charity unless God were pleased to produce and maintain Charity in us by Pre-ingaging Delectations it is plain that the Pre-ingaging Pleasures of Concupiscence would weaken it proportionably as Cupidity should be strengthned What I say here supposes that God permits our Concupiscence to Act in us and that he does not weaken it by inspiring us with horror against all sensible Objects which as a result of Sin must needs tempt us I speak of things as they commonly happen But supposing that God diminishes Concupiscence instead of increasing the Delectation of Grace that may produce the same Effects We are sensible that there are two ways of putting Scales in Equilibrio when one of them is over-charged not only in adding Weights to the other side to even it but also in removing some of the other weights which bear it down Neither do I pretend that Men can do no good Actions without Pre-ingaging Delectation I have sufficiently explained my self upon that subject in the 4th Chapter of the 3d Book And it appears so evident to me that a Man who has the Love of God in his Heart may by the force of his Love and without Pre-ingaging Delectation give for Example a Penny to the Poor or bear some small injury with patience that I can not apprehend how any body can question it In my opinion Delectation is only necessary when the Temptation is Strong or Love Weak If however it may be said that it is absolutely necessary to a righteous Man whose Faith I think may be firm enough and his Hopes strong enough to overcome great Temptations The joy or fore-tast of Eternal Happiness being capable to resist the sensible Charms of Transitory Pleasures It is true that Delectation or Actual Grace is necessary for all good Actions if by the Word Delectation or Grace is understood Charity as St. Austin commonly takes it for it is evident that what ever is not done for God is no wise good But removing the Equivocation and taking the Word Delectation in my sense I do not think any body can question what I have said But this is the Case It is supposed that Pleasure and Love are one and the same thing because the one seldom goes without the other and St. Augustin does not always distinguish them And this being supposed Men are in the right in saying what they say We may conclude with St. Austin Quod amplius nos delectat secundum id operemur necesse est for Men certainly Will that which they Love and we may also say that we can do nothing good or meritorious without Delectation or without Charity But I hope to shew in an Explanation I shall give upon the Treatise of the Passions that there is as much difference betwixt Pleasure and Deliberate or Indeliberate Love as there is betwixt our Knowledge and our Love or to express that difference sensibly as there is between the Figure of a Body and its Motion AN EXPLANATION OF What I have said at the beginning of the 10th Chapter of the First Book and in the 6th of the Second Book of Method That it is very difficult to prove that there are Bodies Which must be understood of the the Proofs that are alledged of their Existence IT is very usual among Men to be perfectly ignorant of what they think they understand best and to understand certain things pretty well which they fancy they have not so much as Ideas of When their Senses have some share in their Judgments they yield to what they do not apprehend or to things they have but a very imperfect knowledge of and when their Ideas are purely Intellectual I desire the like Expressions may be allowed me they unwilling receive Indisputable Demonstrations For Example What can the generality of Men think when the major part of Metaphysical Truths are proved to them When the Existence of God is demonstrated to them the Power of his Will the Immutability of his Decrees That there is but one God or one real Cause which does all in all things That there is but one soveraign Reason of which all Intelligences participate That there is but one necessary Love which is the Principle of all Created Wills They think Men speak Words absolutely void of Sense that they have no Ideas of the things they advance and that they would do well to hold their Tongues Metaphysical Truths and Proofs having nothing that is sensible in them Men are not moved and consequently not convinced by them Nevertheless it is most certain that abstracted things are the most distinct and Metaphysical Truths are the clearest and the most evident Men say sometimes that they have no Ideas of God and that they have no knowledge of his Will and moreover think often as they say but 't is only because they fancy they do not know that which perhaps they know best For where is the Man who hesitates to answer when he is ask'd Whether God is Wise Just Powerful whether he is or is not Triangular Divisible Moveable Lyable to any Alteration Nevertheless it is impossible to answer without fear of being deceived whether certain qualifications agree not to a subject if one has no Ideas of that subject So likewise Where is the Man who dares say that God does not Act by the Plainest Means That he is Irregular in his Designs That he makes Monsters by a positive direct and particular Will and not by a kind of necessity In a Word That his Will is or may be contrary to the Order of which there is no Man but has some knowledge But if we had no Idea of the Will of God we might at least question whether he acts according to certain Laws which we clearly conceive he must follow supposing he will Act. Therefore Men have Ideas of things that are purely Intelligible and these Ideas are much clearer than those of sensible Objects Men are more certain of the Existence of
alledged on either side about certain Opinions 't will perhaps be useful to show here by some particular instance that much use may be made of the Principle that we have established viz. That God alwayes acts by the most simple means Let us suppose for instance that I am desirous to know whether I ought every day to take certain stated times to examine my self to represent to my self my weakness and miseries to consider my Duty in the Presence of God and to beseech him to assist me in conquering my Passions Or else whether I ought to stay till the Spirit of God who blows where and when it pleases should take me from my self and from my ordinary imployments to unite me to himself for very probable Reasons may be given both for and against these Opinions and Men are very often satisfied with Probabilities in such like cases And this even makes some Pious Persons to follow different wayes which are not alwayes very sure I consider therefore that if I stay for the particular Motions of the Spirit of God I shall never pray to him if to that end I don't receive either particular Revelations Illuminations or preventing Delectations Now these Illuminations or Delectations being produced by God by more particular Wills than are those general Wills which constitute the Order of Nature they are kind of Miracles so that this is to pretend that God impells Men to Prayer through means that are not the most simple Nay to expect those Graces which are not alwayes necessary is in some measure to tempt God But if I accustom my self to appear or endeavour to present my self before God at certain Hours the sound of a Clock will be enough to remember me of my Duty without its being necessary that God should have a particular Will of inspiring me with the thought of Praying The general Laws only of the Union of the Soul with the Body will make me think of my Duty when the time that I have chosen shall present it self by some sensible mark But as Self-Examination and Prayer is necessary and as we can't pray without having some thoughts of it nor have these thoughts unless God gives them 'T is some step towards Salvation to have these thoughts without obliging God to give them us by particular Wills which are kinds of Miracles or rather in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace whereby God would save all Men through his Son Perhaps the want of the first thought of Prayer and of considering our obligations before God is the cause of the blindness of many Men consequently of their Eternal Damnation For God acting alwayes by the most simple wayes ought not by particular Wills to give those thoughts which might be obtained by vertue of his general Wills if once persons were accustomed to pray regularly at particular hours Therefore as God would save Men by the most simple wayes it is evident that as much as possible we ought to make the Order of Nature subservient to that of Grace and as I may say to reconcile Gods Wills together by regulating a time which may at least supply us with the thoughts of Prayer 'T was for these Reasons probably that God formerly commanded the Jews to write his Commandments upon the Doors of their Houses and alwayes to have some sensible Mark which might put them in mind of them This spar'd God if I may so say thoughts For Miracles of Grace were very rare amongst the Jews the time being not yet come wherein God design'd to ingrave his Law and infuse his Spirit and Charity into the Heart of Man I confess that whatever we do by a mere Natural Power cannot of it self meritoriously dispose us for Grace and yet without it all external Religion can only serve to maintain our Pride and self-Self-love The Pharisees grew vain from their bearing the sensible Signs and Memorials of the Law of God as our Saviour reproached them And Christians often make use of Crucifixes and Images out of Curiosity Hypocrisie or some other motive of Self-love Yet since these things may put us in mind of God it is requisite to make use of them for we must as much as possible make Nature subservient to Grace that God may save us by the most simple wayes For although we cannot Naturally fit our selves for Grace we may often contribute to the rendering it efficacious because we can lessen the eagerness of a Passion by removing those Objects from us which cause it or by presenting to our selves contrary Reasons to those which inspire it Those who most carefully watch the purity of their imagination and suffer it not to be so much corrupted by the continual use of sensible Pleasures and Commerce with the World make Grace efficacious by removing that resistance it finds in others In this sense even a Disease a shower of Rain or any other accident that keeps us at home may render Grace efficacious for such a degree of Grace as would be too weak to make us resist the sensible impression of the presence of an agreeable Object is strong enough to make us with horrour reject the impure thought or imagination of this same Object This is enough to show clearly that the Counsels of the Gospel are necessary that God may save us by the most simple wayes For 't is advantageous to follow them not only because when we follow them by the Motion of Gods Spirit they determine it by vertue of immutable Order or of the general Laws of the Order of Grace to increase in us our love to him but also because the practising these Counsels may often render Grace efficacious though we are induced to it only by Self-love as it may happen on many occasions FINIS A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth AGAINST The Accusation OF Monsieur de la Ville Wherein is shown That if every one was permitted to call in Question the Faith of others upon a good or bad deduction of Consequences from their Principles none could be secure from the Imputation of Heresie LONDON Printed in the Year MDCXCV A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth Against the ACCUSATION OF Monsieur de la Ville SOmetimes since there was Published a Treatise whose Title surprized many Persons and stir'd up their Passions Several wished I would interest my self in the Quarrel which the Author had with the Cartesians for as on one hand Monsieur de la Ville for that was his Name had done me the honour to list me among those Philosophers but with what design I know not and on the other hand diverted himself by Travestying me in Ridicule They assured me that if I was willing to pass for a Rash Ignorant and Extravagant Person for a Visionary nay even an Heritick yet I could not in Conscience desert the Cause of Truth and leave the Enemies of the Faith the Advantages he granted to them I must be Just to
may see that what I say is Truth so that I shall not stand to prove it especially since some Stranger has sufficiently done it to my hand And I could only wish whoever he was that he had alledged the Reasons which I had for saying That an Infant at the time of Baptism was justified by an Actual Love as I have shown in the Explanation upon Original Sin Let any one judge then after having honestly and sincerely examined the Advertisement of Monsieur de la Ville if I had not reason to desire the equitable Readers not to credit him upon his Word for if we believe him he is the most Sincere and Honest Man in the World but if he be carefully examined we find not over many marks of his Sincerity and Honesty At the end of his Advertisement he protests he has endeavoured as much as possible to keep all the Moderation he ought That 't is only his Adversaries Errors he opposes but for their persons he has much esteem and respect whilst yet one can't examine that Advertisement without discovering at least the appearances of a bad Faith and of a Malign Temper which surprizes and provokes the Spirit I pray God to pardon his Heat to regulate his Zeal and inspire him with a Spirit of Mildness Charity and Peace towards his Brethren I know not whether he is pleased in treating me so unhandsomely as he does but I can assure him that I am much troubled that the necessity of defending Truth has obliged me to suspect his Honesty and on the contrary I should be glad is he could know how much I honour respect and love him sincerely in Him in whom we are all Brethren Noverit quam eum non contemnam quantum illam in illo Deo timeam cogitem caput nostrum in cujus corpore fratres sumus Aug. ad Fortunianum Epist 111. 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