of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into self-Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
into the same Errors because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power and are fitter to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortifie it against Temptation whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences CHAP. IX of Love and Aversion and of their principal kinds LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us or to something that we Love The object that we Love and to which consequently we are united by Love being almost always present to us as well as that which we actually admire our Mind without any pain or great reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other and to us or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency And then the motion of Love we have for our selves and the object that we Love extends it self unto that we admire if the relation that it immediately has with us or with any thing we are united to appears advantagious to us either by Knowledge or Sensation Now this new motion of the Soul or rather motion of the Soul newly determined being joined to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Love But if we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the union or relation of the object we admire is disadvantageous to us or to any thing we are united to Then the motion of Love that we have for our selves and for what is united to us is limited in us or carried towards it and follows not the sight of the Mind nor employs it self on the object of our Admiration But as the motion towards good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul carries us towards what we know and feel to be so because what is intelligible and sensible is good in it self We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joyned to that of the Spirits and Blood That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Aversion This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love yet is never without Love It is wholly contrary because this separates I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it to satisfie some difficult Persons and that unites The former has Nothingness for its object and the latter always some Being whereby 't is excited Aversion refists natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas Love yields to it and makes it victorious But it is never separated from Love for if evil which is its object is taken for a privation of good to fly evil is to fly the privation of good that is to incline towards good and so that to hate the privation of good is to love good it self But if evil is taken for Pain and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure it is not therefore the privation of it but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery we should not have this aversion if we had not love Indeed evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us or deprives us of good and then aversion depends upon the love of our selves or of something to which we wish to be united Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions and opposite to each other but Love is the first chief and most Universal Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to we may in one Sense say that the motion of Love which we have to all things is only a consequence of Self-Love We love Honours because they raise us above others Riches because they defend and preserve us Our Relations Prince and Country because we are interested in their preservation The motion of love that we have for our selves extends to every thing that relates to us and to whatever we are united For 't is even this motion which unites and diffuses if I may so say our Being into those which encompass us in proportion as we discover by Reason or discern by Sensation that 't is advantageous to be united to them So that we must not think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love For when we say a Man loves a new object we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him he loves himself in that object and by a motion of Love as old as himself For indeed without Grace there is only self-Self-Love in the Heart of Man For the love of Truth Justice and even of God himself and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love We doubt not nevertheless but the most wicked and barbarous Men as Idolaters and even Atheists themselves are united to God by a Natural Love and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause By Love they are united to Truth Justice and Virtue They praise and esteem good Men and 't is not because they are Men that they love them but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable Thus we love something else besides our selves but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves Men abandon Truth and Justice for triffling Interests and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency or any other occasion They are induced by little else than Vanity and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reverences They love Virtue and Justice but never when 't is against themselves They may love them when they agree but never when they are opposite to their Interest for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love There are also many other natural
Man might Glory in himself and that he leaves even Concupiscence in the most holy and most perfect that they may have no vain Satisfaction in themselves For when we consider the Perfection of our Being Aug. in Tul. lib. 6. c. 9. it is difficult to despise our selves unless at the same time we see and love Soveraign Good in the presence of which all our Perfection and Grandeur vanishes in a moment I own that Concupiscence may prove the Subject of our Merit and that it is reasonable the Mind should for a time follow Order difficultly to deserve to be Eternally submitted to it with pleasure I grant that it may be upon this account that God has permitted Concupiscence after having foreseen Sin But Concupiscence not being absolutely necessary to our Meriting if God permitted it it was because Man might be able to do no good without the assistance which Jesus Christ has merited for us and that he might have no reason to Glory in his own power for it is plain that Man cannot sight against and overcome himself unless he be animated by Jesus Christ who as the Head of the Faithful inspires them with such Sensations as are directly opposite to the Concupiscence they derive from the first Man XVI Supposing then that Children are Born with Concupiscence it is evident that they are really Sinners since their heart is set upon Bodies as much as it is capable There is as yet but one love in their Will and that love is irregular So there is nothing in them that God can love since God cannot love disorder XVII But when they have been Regenerated in Jesus Christ that is when their Heart has been turn'd towards God either by an actual motion of love or by an inward disposition like unto that which remains after an Act of Loving God then Concupiscence is no longer a Sin in them for it inhabits no longer alone in the Heart it has no longer any dominion there The habitual Love which remains in them by the Grace of Baptism in Jesus Christ is freeer or stronger than that which is in them by the Concupiscence they have in Adam They are like the Just who in their Sleep follow the Motions of Lust yet lose not the Grace of Baptism for they do not freely consent to these Motions XVIII And it should not be thought strange if I believe it possible for Children while they are Baptizing to love God with a free Love For since the second Adam is contrary to the first why should he not at the time of Regeneration deliver Children out of the servitude of their Bodies to which they are only subjected by the first Adam so that being enlightned and excited by a lively and effectual Grace to love God they may love him with a free and reasonable love without being hindered by the first Adam It is not observable some may urge that their Bodies ceases one moment from acting over their Mind But should Men wonder at their not seeing that which is not visible That Act of Love may be produced in one Instant And whereas that Act may be formed in the Soul without making any Traces in the Brain we need not wonder if even those who are come to Men's estate when they are Baptiz'd do not always remember it for we have no remembrance of those things of which the Brain keeps no traces XIX St. Paul teaches us that the Old Man or Concupiscence is Crucified with Jesus Christ and that we are dead and buried with him by Baptism It is not that we are then delivered from the warring of the Body against the Mind and that Concupiscence is as it were dead that moment It is true it revives but having been destroy'd and thereby left the Children in a state of loving God it can no longer harm them though it revives in them For when there are two Loves in the Heart the one Natural and the other Free Order wills that only that should be regarded which is free And if Children loved God in Baptism by an Act no wise free loving Bodies afterwards by several Acts of the same kind God perhaps could not according to Order have more regard to one only Act than to many which are all natural and constrained Or rather if those contrary Loves were equal in force he must have regard to the last by the same reason that when there have been successively in a Heart two free Loves contrary to one another God ever has regard to the last since Grace is lost by one Mortal Sin XX. However it cannot be denied that God may without suspending the Dominion of the Body over the Childs Mind make it Just or turn its Will towards him by infusing into its Soul a disposition like unto that which remains after an Actual motion of Love towards God But that way of proceeding does not perhaps appear so natural as the other for we do not conceive clearly what those dispositions may be which would remain Indeed we need not wonder at it for having no clear Idea of the Soul as I have proved elsewhere * See the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part of the said Book with its Explanation we must not wonder if we do not know all the Modifications it is capable of But the Mind cannot be fully satisfied with things it does not conceive clearly In my Opinion it requires an extraordinary Miracle to give those dispositions to the Soul without a preceding Act. Surely it cannot be done by the most simple means Whereas the second Adam producing for a moment in the Mind of the Child which is Baptis'd the contrary of what the first did produce there before it is sufficient to regenerate it that God should act in it by the usual means according to which he sanctifies the Adult for the Child not having at that moment any sensations or motions to divide its capacity of thinking and willing nothing hinders it from knowing and loving its real Good I say no more because it is not necessary to know precisely how the regeneration of Children is perform'd provided we admit a real regeneration in them or an inward and real Justification caused by the Acts or at least by the habits of Faith Hope and Charity If I propose an Explanation so contrary to received Prejudices it is to satisfie even those who will not admit spiritual habits and to prove to them the possibility of Children's Regeneration for Imputation seems to me to include a down right contradiction since God cannot repute as just and actually love Creatures who are actually in disorder the he may for the love of his Son design to restore them to order and love them when they are restor'd OBJECTIONS Against the Proofs and Explanations of Original Sin Objection against the First Article GOD Wills Order it is True but it is his Will which makes it It does not suppose it Whatever God Wills is in Order from this only reason that
reason that we believe all Men receive the same Sensations of the same Objects as we do we think that all Men are acted with the same Passions as we are upon the same subjects provided we believe they are capable of being moved by them We imagine they love what we love or desire what we desire from whence proceed Jealousies and secret Aversions if the good we are in pursuit of cannot be wholly possessed by many but if several Persons can possess it without dividing it as they may the soveraign Good Science Vertue c. then 't is quite of another matter We likewise think they hate shun and fear the same things as we do and from thence comes Associations and secret Conspiracies according to the nature of the thing we hate by this means hoping to deliver our selves from our Miseries We attribute therefore the Emotions of our Passions to those Objects that produce them in us and believe that all other Men and even sometimes that Beasts are agitated like us besides we judge yet more rashly that the cause of our Passion which is often only imaginary is really in some Object When we have a Passionate Love for any one we think every thing is amiable in them His Grimaces are Charming his Ugliness is not displeasing his Irregular Motions and Unhandsom Gestures are Just or at least Natural If he never speaks 't is because he is Wise if he talks much he is very Witty if he speaks upon every thing his Knowledge is universal if he continually interrupts others it proceeds from his Quickness Vicacity and Fire In short if he would be chief in all Company 't is because he Merits it Thus our Passion after this manner hides or disguises the Defects of our Friends and on the contrary magnifies the least good Quality in them But if this Love is only founded upon the agitation of the Blood and Animal Spirits like the rest of the Passions in time it cools for want of heat or proper Spirits to maintain it and if interest or any other false relation change the disposition of the Brain hatred will succeed this love and will not fail to make us imagine in the Object of our Passion all the defects that can cause a just Aversion In the same Person we shall see such Qualities as are directly contrary to what we admired before and be ashamed that ever we loved them and the Predominant Passion will be sure to justifie it self and make that it succeeds ridiculous The power and injustice of the Passions are not limited to what we have already said they are infinitely farther extended Our Passions do not only disguise their principal Object but likewise whatever has any relation to it They not only make all the Qualities of our Friends agreeable but also the greatest part of the Qualities of our Friends Friends And even go farther in those that have a great and strong Imagination for their Passions have so vast a dominion and extension that it is impossible to determine their limits What I have already mentioned are such general and pregnant Principles of Errors Prejudices and Injustices that 't is impossible to remark all the Consequences of them Most of the Truths or rather Errors of certain Places Times Commonalties and Families have their rise from them What is approved in Spain is rejected in France what is Orthodox in Paris is condemned at Rome what the Dominicans espouse the Franciscans disapprove and what is undoubted to the one is erroneous to the other The Dominicans think it their Duty to follow Sr. Thomas and why because he was one of their Order and on the contrary the Franciscans embrace the Opinions of Scotus because he belonged to theirs There are also Truths and Errors peculiar to certain times The Earth moved about Two thousand years ago and from thence it has continued fix'd till our days and now begins to turn again Aristotle has been formerly burnt and a Provincial Council approved of by a Pope has wisely forbidden the teaching of his Physics ever since he has been admired and now begins again to be despised There are some Opinions now received in the Schools which have formerly been look'd upon as Heresies and those who maintained them have been Excommunicated as Hereticks by some of the Bishops Because Passions causing Factions these Factions produce such Truths or Errors as are as inconstant as the Cause which produces them For instance Men may be indifferent in respect to the stability of the Earth or the essence of Bodies but continue no longer so Concil Angl. per Spelman An. 1287. when they are maintained by such as they hate Thus Aversion upheld by a confused Sense of Piety produces an indifferent Zeal which kindles by little and little and at last causes such Events as appears so strange to every one a long time after they happen We can scarcely think that the Passions should go so far but 't is because we don't consider they extend to whatever can satisfie them Haman it may be would have done no harm to the Jews if Mordecai had saluted him but he being a Jew and refusing it the whole Nation must perish that his revenge might be the more magnificent When there is a dispute between two Persons who has a right to an Estate they ought only to bring their Titles and speak what relates to their Case or can best set it off yet they fail not to use all manner of reproaches one against another to contradict each other in every thing and to introduce a thousand unnecessary Accusations and perplex their Suit with an infinite number of Accessory Circumstances which confound the Cause And indeed all Passions extend as far as the prospect of their Mind who are moved with them since there is nothing that we take to have any relation with the Object of our Passions to which the motions of these Passions do not extend which is done as follows The Traces of Objects are really so connected one with another in the Brain that 't is impossible the course of the Spirits should violently stir up any of them without affecting the rest at the same time The chief Idea therefore of what we think of is necessarily accompanied with a great number of accessory Idea's which are so much the more increased as the impression of the Animal Spirits are more violent And this impression of the Spirits seldom fails to be violent in the Passions because the Passions continually and powerfully force into the Brain an abundance of these Spirits that are proper to preserve the Traces of the Idea's which represent their Object Thus the motion of Love or Hatred extend not only to the principal Object of the Passion but likewise to whatever we discover to have any relation to this Object because in the Passion the motion of the Soul follows the perception of the Mind even as the motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain follow the Traces of
those of which we actually think I suppose nevertheless that our Sensations do not fill all the capacity of our Mind for that we may be free with the liberty I speak of it is necessary not only that God should not invincibly impel us towards particular goods but also that we may make use of the impression we have towards good in general to love some other thing than that we actually love Now as we can love no Object but those we may think of nor actually think of any other but those that cause too quick Sensations in us it is evident that the dependance we have upon our Body lessens our liberty nay does on many occasions take away the use of it So our Sensations destroying out Ideas and the union we have with our Body by which we only see or rather feel our selves weakening that which we have with God by which all things are present to us the Mind must not suffer it self to be divided by confused Sensations if it be willing always to have the principle of its determinations to be free It appears from all this that God is not the Author of Sin and that Man does not give himself new Modifications God is not the Author of Sin since he continually imprints a motion to go farther on him who Sins or stops at a particular good and he gives him the power to think of other things and to apply himself to other goods than that which actually is the Object of his thought and of his love that he commands him not to love those things which he can forbear loving without being troubled by any remorses and he continually calls him to himself by the secret reproaches of his Reason Is is true Gob does in one sense impel the Sinner to love the Object of his Sin if this Object appears to be good to the Sinner for as most Divines say all that is positive in Sin or what there is of act or motion proceeds from God But it is only through a false judgment of our Mind that the Creatures appear good to us that is capable of acting in us and making us happy The Sin of a Man lies in this that he does not refer all the particular Goods to the Soveraign Good or rather in that he does not consider nor love the Severaign Good in the particular Goods and so does not regulate his Love according to the Will of God or according to the essential and necessary order of which all Men have a knowledge and which is so much the more perfect as they are more strictly united to God and are less sensible of the impressions of their Senses and Passions See the Explanations upon the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book towards the end where I explain my thoughts more distinctly For our Senses diffuse our Souls through our whole Bodies and our Passions transport them if I may so say into those Objects which are about us they remove us from the light of God which enlightens us Neither does Man give himself new Modifications for the motions of love that God continually imprints upon us increases or diminishes not whether we actually love or not I mean although this natural motion of love be or be not determined by any Idea of our Mind This motion does not cease even by its acquiescence in the possession of Good as the motion of Bodies ceases by their rest 'T is probable that God always impels us with an equal force towards him for he inclines us towards good in general as much as we are capable of and we are at all times equally capable of it because our Will or Natural capacity of Willing is always equal in it self Thus the impression or Natural motion which carries us towards good neither increases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor even any internal Sensation of this equality of impression or natural motion towards Good But 't is because as I have elsewhere proved that we know not our selves by a clear Idea not are we conscious of our own Faculties whilst they don't actually operate we do not feel in our selves what is natural common and always the same as we are not sensible of the heat and motion of our Hearts We are not likewise sensible of our Habits and whether we are worthy of the Love or Wrath of God There is perhaps in us an infinite number of Faculties which are absolutely unknown to us for we have no internal Sensation of what we are but only of what we feel If we had never felt Pain nor a desire for particular Goods we could not by the internal Sensation we have of our selves discover whether we should be capable of feeling Pain or willing such Goods 'T is our Memory and not our internal Sensation that teaches us we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel or of being agitated by Passions which at present we feel no motions of Thus there is nothing which hinders us from believing that God always inclines us towards him with an equal force although after a very different manner He always preserves in our Souls an equal capacity of willing or one and the same will as in all matter he preserves an equal quantity of motion But although it were not certain I don't see how we can say that the encrease or diminution of the natural motion of our Souls depends upon us since we cannot be the cause of the extension of our own Will It is however certain by what I have said before that God produces and also preserves whatsoever is real and positive in the particular determinations of the motions of our Souls whether Ideas or Sensations For 't is he who determines our motions for a general Good towards particular Goods but not after an invincible manner since we have a tendency to go farther So that all we do when we sin is that we do not all that we are able to do by means of the impression we have towards him who includes all Goods For we can do nothing but by the power that we receive from our Union with him who does all things in us Now what chiefly makes us Sin is because we choose rather to enjoy than to examine because of the Pleasure we feel in enjoying and the Pain we find in examining We cease to make use of the motion that is given us to enquire after Good and examine it and we stop in the enjoyment of such things as we ought only to make use of But if we narrowly observe we shall see there is nothing real on our part but a defect and cessation from enquiry which if we may so say corrupts the action of God in us but which however cannot destroy it Thus What do we when we do not Sin We do then whatever God does in us for we limit not to a particular or rather to a false Good the love that God imprints on us for the true
show hereafter Now this immutable Order which has the force of a Law in respect to God himself has visibly the force of a Law in relation to us For this Order is known to us and our natural Love suits it self to it when we look into our selves and when our Senses and Passions leave us free In a word when our self-Self-love does not corrupt our natural Love Being made for God from whom we can never be absolutely separated we see this Order in him and are naturally inclined to love him For it is his Light which lightens us and his Love which animates us though our Senses and Passions obscure that Light and determine against Order the impression which we receive to love according to Order But though Concupiscence conceals Order from us and hinders us from following it yet it is still an Essential and Indispensible Law in respect to us And not only in respect of us but to all created Intelligences and even in respect of the Damned For I do not think they are so far remov'd from God but that they still preserve some small Idea of Order still find some Beauty in it nay more are still ready to conform to it in some particular occasions which do not oppose their Self-love The Corruption of the Heart consists in an opposition to Order Therefor the Malice or Corruption of the Will not being equal even among the Damned it is evident that they are not equally opposed to Order nor hate it in all things unless in Consequence of the hatred they bear to God For as no Man can hate Good considered barely as such so none can hate Order unless it proves contrary to their Inclinations But though it seems contrary to their Inclinations nevertheless it is a Law which condemns them and which even punishes them everlastingly We now see what Order is and how it has the force of a Law by the necessary Love God has for himself We conceive how this Law is General for all Spirits and even for God himself How it is necessary and absolutely indispensible In fine We either do or may easily conceive in general how it is the principle of all Divine and Humane Laws and that it is according to this Law all Intelligences are Judged and all Creatures disposed in their respective Classes that are proper for them I own it is no easie Task to explain all this in particular neither will I venture to undertake it For should I attempt to show the relation particular Laws have to the General Law and the Connection between certain Proceedings and Order I should be obliged to enter into such difficulties as perhaps I should not be able to solve and which would also lead me far from my Subject Nevertheless if we consider that God neither has nor can have any Law but his Wisdom and the necessary Love he has for it we shall easily conclude that all Divine Laws must be grounded on it And if we observe that he has only made the World in relation to that Wisdom and Love since he only Acts for himself we shall no longer doubt but that all Natural Laws must tend to the preservation and perfection of this World according to indispensable Order and by their dependance on necessary Love For all things are governed by the Wisdom and Will of God There is no necessity for me to inlarge any further on this Principle at this time What I have said is sufficient to draw this Consequence That in the first Institution of Nature it was impossible that Spirits should have been subjected to Bodies For as God can never Act without Knowledge and involuntarily so he has made the World according to his Wisdom and by the Morion of his Love He has made all things by his Son and in the Holy Ghost as the Scripture teaches us Now in the Wisdom of God Spirits are more perfect than Bodies and by the necessary Love which God has for himself he prefers the most perfect to the least perfect Therefore it is impossible that Spirits should have been subjected to Bodies in the first Institution of Nature Otherwise we should be obliged to say That when God made the World he followed not the Rules of his Eternal Wisdom nor the Motions of his natural and necessary Love Which is not to be conceived but rather implies a direct Contradiction It is true at present a created Mind is subject to a material and sensible Body but it is because Order considered as a necessary Law requires it It is because God loving himself by a necessary Love which is alwayes his inviolable Law cannot love Spirits which are contrary to him nor consequently prefer them to Bodies in which there is no ill nor any thing that God hates See the fifth Dialogue of The Christian Conversations For God loves not Sinners in themselves they only subsist in the Universe by Jesus Christ God only preserves and loves them that they may cease to be Sinners by Grace in Jesus Christ Or that if they remain Sinners eternally they may eternally be condemned by the immutable and necessary Order and by the Judgment of Jesus Christ through whose Power they subsist for the Glory of Divine Justice for were it not for Jesus Christ they would be annihilated I say this by the by to remove some difficulties which may remain about what I have said elsewhere concerning Original Sin or the general Corruption of Nature It is in my Opinion very useful to consider that the Mind only knows External Objects after two manners By Knowledge and by Sensations It sees things by Knowledge when it has a clear Idea of them and consulting this Idea can discover all the properties they are capable of It sees things by Sensation when it cannot thus discover the properties of them clearly When it only knows them by a confused Sensation without Light and Evidence It is by Knowledge and ' a clear Idea the Mind sees the Essences of Things Numbers and Extension It is by a confuted Idea or by Sensation it judges of the existence of Creatures and that it knows its own The Mind perceives those things perfectly which it perceives by Knowledge and a clear Idea and moreover it sees clearly that if there be any obscurity or imperfection in its Knowledge it proceeds from its weakness and limitation or from want of application on its part and not for want of perfection in the Idea which it perceives But what the Mind perceives by Sensation is never clearly known to it Not for want of application on its part for we alwayes apply our selves carefully to what we feel but by the defect of the Idea which is very obscure and confused From hence we may judge that it is in God or in an immutable Nature that we see whatever we know by Light and a clear Idea not only because by Knowledge we see Number Extension and the Essence of Beings which depend not on a first
Jesus Christ or the Word of God of his Divinity does not yet so throughly darken the Mind as to hide from it this Truth that God Wills Order Thus whether the Wills of God make Order or suppose it we clearly see when we examine our selves that the God whom we worship cannot do that which evidently appears contrary to Order So that Order willing our Time or duration of Being should be for him who preserves us that all the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it upon us that all the Powers of our Soul should only labour for him by vertue of whom they act God cannot dispense with the Commandment which he gave us by Moses in the Law and which he repeated by his Son in the Gospel Mark 12.30 Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind and with all thy strength But because Order wills that every righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner unhappy that every Action conformable to Order and every Motion of love towards God be recompenced and on the contrary it is evident that every one who will be happy must continually tend towards God and with horrour reject every thing that would stop his Course or diminish his Motion towards his True Good 'T is not necessary that for this he consult a Spiritual Guide for when God speaks Men should be silent and when we are absolutely certain that our Senses and Passions have no part in the Answers which we hear inwardly we must alwayes hearken respectively to these Answers and submit to them Would we know whether we should go to a Ball or a Play Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the day at Gaming or unprofitable Entertainments Whether certain Businesses Studies Employments are conformable to our Obligations Let us enter into our Selves let us silence our Passions and Senses and see the Light of God if we can for his sake do such an Action Let us interrogate him who is the Way the Truth and the Life to know if the Way we follow does not lead to Death and whether God being essentially Just and necessarily obliged to punish every Thing that is contrary to Order and to recompence every Thing that is conformable thereto we have reason to believe we go to encrease or assure our felicity by the Action we are about If it be our Love to God that carries us to the Ball let us go thither if we should play to gain Heaven let us play Day and Night if we have in sight the Glory of God in our Employ let us encrease it let us do all Things with Joy for our Recompence will be great in Heaven But if after having carefully examined our Essential Obligations we discover clearly That neither our Being nor duration are of us that we do an Injustice which God cannot but punish when we endeavour to spend our Time in vain If our Master and Lord Jesus Christ who has purchased us by his Blood reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude after a very clear and intelligible manner for living after the Flesh and the World for leading a Soft and Voluptuous Life and for following Opinion and Custom let us obey his voice and not harden our Hearts let us not seek for Guides that soften these Reproaches embolden us against these Menaces and who obscure this Light with agreeable Clouds which hurt and penetrate our very Soul When the blind lead the blind they both fall into the ditch sayes the Gospel but if the Blind Man who suffers himself to be lead fall with him that leads him if God does hot excuse him will he excuse him who sees clearly and yet suffers himself to be lead by the Blind because this Blind Person leads him agreeably and entertains him in the way according to his inclinations These voluntary Blind ought to know that God who never deceives does sometimes permit these Seducers to punish corrupted Hearts who seek Seducers that Blindness is a punishment of Sin although 't is often the Cause thereof and that 't is just that he who would not hearken to Eternal Wisdom which only speaks to him for his good should leave him at length to be corrupted by Men who deceive so much the more dangerously as they flatter him more agreeably It is true 't is difficult to enter into ones self to silence ones Senses and Passions and to discern whether 't is God or our Body who speaks to us for we often take the Proofs of Sensation for evident Reasons and then 't is necessary to consult Guides but 't is not alwayes necessary to consult them For we see our Duty on many occasions with the utmost evidence and certainty and then it is even dangerous to consult them if it be not done with an entire Sincerity and a Spirit of Humility and Obedience for these Dispositions oblige God not to permit us to be deceived or at least in no very dangerous manner When 't is necessary to consult a Guide we must choose one who understands Religion who reverences the Gospel and who knows Man We must take care that the Converse of the World has not corrupted him that Friendship has not made him too Complaisant so that he may either fear or hope any thing from us We must choose one among a thousand sayes St. Theresia who as she relates of her self had like to have been lost by the defect of an ignorant Guide The World is full of Deceivers I say Religious Deceivers as well as others Those who love us seduce us through Complaisance those who are below us flatter us through Respect or Fear those who are above us consider not our Necessities either through Contempt or Negligence Besides all Men counsel us according to the relation we give them of what passes in us and we are never wanting to flatter our selves for we insensibly cover our Sore when we are ashamed of it We often deceive those who direct us that we may deceive our selves for we suppose our selves safe when we follow them They guide us whither we have a mind to go and we endeavour to perswade our selves in spight of our Light and the secret reproaches of our Reason that 't is our Obedience which determines us We deceive our selves and God permits it but we never deceive him who examines our Hearts and though we shut our Ears as much as we can against the voice of inward Truth we sufficiently feel by the reproaches of this soveraign Truth which leaves us to our selves that it inlightens our darkness and discovers all the subtleties of self-self-love 'T is therefore evident that we must consult our Reason for the Health of our Soul as our Senses for that of our Body and when Reason answers not clearly we must necessarily have recourse to Guides as we would to Physicians when our Senses fail us but this must be done with discretion for Guides
Conversations towards the end The Stoics who had but a confused knowledge of the disorders of original Sin could not confute the Epicureans their happiness being but barely Ideal since there is no felicity without Pleasure and they could not relish Pleasure in the meer persuit of vertuous actions 't is true they might find some satisfaction in following the Rules of their imaginary Virtue because it is a natural consequence of the knowledge our Soul has that she 's in the most eligible condition she can be in This joy of the Mind might maintain their Resolutions for some time but it was not strong enough to resist Pain and conquer Pleasure 'T was secret Pride and not Joy that made them keep their Countenance for when no one was present they soon lost all their Power and Wisdom like Kings upon the Theatre whose Grandeur vanishes in a moment It is very different with those Christians who exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they most certainly know they are in the happiest condition they can possibly be at present Their Joy is also great because the Good they taste through Faith and Hope is infinite For the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a sensible Joy and this Joy is so much the more vigorous as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces that Joy and sensible Pleasure which always accompanies the presence of Good Nor is their Joy uneasie because it is founded upon the promises of God by the Blood of whose Son it is confirmed and maintain'd by the inward Peace and inexpressible sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost diffuses in their Hearts Nothing can separate them from the true Good when they taste and are pleased with it through the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Enjoyments are not so great as those they feel in the love of God rather than quit them they choose Contempt and Pain they are not affrighted at Reproaches and Disgrace and the Pleasures they find in their Sufferings or to speak more properly those they meet with in God when they contemn every thing to be united to him are so violent that they transport them and makes them speak a new Language and with the Apostles boast of the Miseries and Injuries they suffer The Scripture tells us That when the Apostles departed from the Council they were filled with Joy that they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS And this is the disposition of Mind in true Christians when they have received the greatest Affronts for defending the Truth JESVS CHRIST being come to reestablish that Order that Sin had overthrown and Order requiring that the greatest Goods should be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to happen after the manner we have related But besides Reason Experience confirms it for a Person no sooner takes a resolution of contemning every thing for God but he is commonly so affected with a Pleasure or inward Joy that he as sensibly feels God to be his Good as before he evidently knew him to be so True Christians assure us every day that the Joy they have in the Love and Service of God is inexpressible and 't is very reasonable to believe them concerning what passes in themselves The wicked on the contrary are perpetually tormented with mortal Disquiets and such as are divided betwixt God and the World partake also of the Joys of the Righteous and Dissatisfactions of the Wicked They complain of their Miseries and 't is likewise just to believe their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the very quick when they make choice of any other object for their chief Good but himself and 't is this wound that makes them really miserable But fills the Mind of those with excessive Joy who only unite themselves to him and 't is this Joy which gives the true Felicity The abundance of Riches and possession of Honours and Dignities being external cannot cure the wound God makes And as Poverty and Contempt are also without us so they cannot hurt us when the Almighty protects us It is evident by what has been said that the objects of our Passions are not our Good and that we must only follow their Motions for the preservation of our Lives That sensible Pleasure in respect of our Good is what our Sensations are in relation to the Truth and even as we find our Senses deceive us in matters of Truth so our Passions deceive us concerning our Good That we must submit to the Delectation of Grace because it evidently enclines us to love the true Good nor is followed with the secret reproaches of Reason like the blind instinct and confused pleasure of the Passions but is always attended with a secret Joy agreeable to the condition we are in And last of all since God only can act upon our Mind we can find no Felicity out of God except we would suppose that God rewards none but the Disobedient or Commands us to love that most which least deserves our love CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Vnion with God by the knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue And that on the contrary its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependance on the Body because of the disorder of its Senses and Passions THE least reflexion is enough to discover to us that the good of the Mind must necessarily be something Spiritual for Bodies are much inferior to the Mind and cannot act upon it by their own strength They are not able immediately to unite themselves to it nor are they intelligible of themselves and therefore cannot be its good On the contrary Spiritual Things are intelligible from their own Nature and may unite themselves to the Mind consequently be its good if we suppose them superior to it for that a thing may be the good of the Mind it is not enough to be Spiritual like that it must be above it that it may be able to act upon it instruct and recompence it otherwise it cou'd neither make it more happy nor more perfect and therefore cou'd not be its good Of all things both Intelligible and Spiritual there is none but God that is thus superior to the Mind from whence it follows that nothing but he is or can be its true good nor can we therefore become more perfect or more happy but in the enjoyment of God Every one is convinced that the knowledge of the Truth and love of Virtue makes the Mind more perfect and that the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Inclinations renders it more imperfect The knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue then can be nothing else but the union of the Mind with God and even a kind of possessing of him And the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Heart can likewise be nothing else but the separation
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that self-Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
loves We Naturally love our Prince our Country our Relations and those that we find conformable to our Humours Designs Employments but all these loves are very weak as well as the love of Truth and Justice and Self-Love being the most violent of all loves it always overcomes them without finding any other resistance than what it makes it self Bodies which strike one another lose their motion in proportion as they communicate it to those they meet and they may at last lose it all if they shock many other Bodies But 't is not so with Self-Love it determines all other loves by the impression it gives them yet its motion diminishes not On the contrary it acquires new Powers by its new Victories and as its motion goes not out of the Heart it is not lost although it is continually communicated self-Self-Love is then the commanding and universal Love since it is found every where and reigns where-ever it is found So that all the Passions have no other motion than that of Self-Love we may also say that Self-Love is the most extensive and strongest of all Passions or that 't is the commanding and universal Passion For even as all Virtues are only kinds of the first Virtue that we call Charity as St. Augustine has shown so all Vices and even all Passions are likewise only consequences or kinds of Self-Love or proceed from this general Vice we call Concupiscence We often distinguish in Morality the Virtues or Kinds of Charity by the difference of its Objects but that sometimes confounds the true Idea we ought to have of Virtue which rather depends upon its own motive than on any thing else and therefore we shan't follow this method in treating of the Passions We will not here distinguish them by their objects because one object alone may excite them all and yet ten thousand objects must excite but one For altho' objects differ amongst themselves they are not always different in relation to us and they excite not different Passions in us A promised Marshal's Staff differs from a promised Bishop's Crosier yet these two marks of Honour excite very near the same Passion in Ambitious Persons because they stir up a like Idea of Good in the Mind But the same Mareschal's Staff when promised granted enjoyed or taken away excites very different Passions since it raises in the Mind different Ideas of Good We must not therefore multiply the Passions according to the different Objects which cause them but only admit so many of 'em as there are accessary Ideas which attend the principal Idea of Good or Evil and considerably change it in relation to us For the general Idea of Good or the Sensation of Pleasure which is a good to him who tastes it agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits it produces the general Passion of Love And the accessory Ideas of this Good determine the general agitation of the Soul and the course of the Animal Spirits after a particular manner which puts the Mind and Body into the disposition it ought to be in relation to the Good we perceive and thus they produce all particular Passions Thus the general Idea of Good produces an indeterminate Love which is only an extension of Self-Love The Idea of the Good which we possess producs a a love of Joy The Idea of a Good that we do not yet but hope hereafter to possess that is which we judge we may be able to possess produces a love of Desire In fine the Idea of a Good which we possess not nor have any hopes of possessing or which is the same the Idea of a Good that we have no hopes of possessing without the loss of some other or such an one as we cannot preserve when we possess it produces a love of Sorrow These are the three simple or primitive Passions which have Good for their object for the hope which produces Joy is not an emotion of the Soul but a simple Judgment But we must observe that Men limit not their being in themselves but extend it to ail things and Persons to whom it may appear advantagious to be united So that we must conceive that they in some manner possess a good when their Friends enjoy it although they do not immediately possess it themselves Thus when I say that the possession of Good produces Joy I mean not only of the immediate union or possession but of all others for we naturally feel Joy when any good fortune happens to those we love Evil as I have before said may be taken in three different ways either for the privation of Good or for Pain or in fine for the thing which causes the privation of Good or produces Pain In the first Sense the Idea of Evil being the same with the Idea of a Good that we possess not it is plain this Idea produces Sorrow or Desire or even Joy For Joy is always excited when we feel our selves deprived of the privation of Good that is when we possess Good So that the Passions which regard evil taken in this Sense are the same with those which regard Good because in effect they have Good likewise for their object But if by Evil we mean Pain which only is always a real Evil to him who suffers it whilst he suffers it then the sensation of this Evil produces the Passions of Sorrow Desire and Joy which are kinds of Hatred and not Love for their motion is absolutely opposite to that which accompanies the sight of Good this motion being only the opposition of the Soul which resists the natural impression The actual Sensation of Pain produces ah aversion of Sorrow Pain which we do not actually suffer but are afraid of suffering produces an aversion of Desire In fine the Pain that we do not suffer nor are apprehensive of suffering or which is the same the Pain that we do not foresee we shall suffer without some great Recompence or the Pain which we feel our selves delivered from produces an aversion of Joy These are the three primitive or simple Passions which have Evil for their object for fear which produces Sorrow is not an emotion of the Soul but a simple Judgment Lastly if by Evil we mean the Person or thing which deprives us of Good or makes us suffer Pain the Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together or simply a motion of Aversion The Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together when the Evil is what deprives us of a Good For 't is by the same motion that we encline towards Good and remove our selves from what hinders our possession of it But this Idea only produces a motion of Aversion when 't is the Idea of an Evil which makes us suffer Pain for 't is by the same motion of Aversion that we hate Pain and whatever produces it Thus there are three simple or primitive Passions which respect Good and as many others which regard Pain or which causes it
such things as others wou'd or wou'd not do in such occurrences by what they wou'd do themselves for they very well know that all men are not equally sensible of the same things nor equally susceptible of involuntary emotions so that 't is not by consulting the Sensations which the Passions excite in us but by hearkning to Reason that we must speak of the Judgments which accompany the Passions lest we shou'd only discover our selves instead of showing the Nature of the Passions in general CHAP. XI How all the Passions justifie themselves and of the judgments they cause us to make in their vindication IT will not be necessary to bring many Arguments to demonstrate that all the Passions justifie themselves This Principle is evident enough by the internal Sensation we have of our selves and the conduct of those whom we see agitated with any Passion it will be sufficient to expose it that we may afterwards take heed of it The Mind is such a slave to the Imagination that it always obeys it when it is heated by it It dares not answer it when 't is incens'd because it treats it ill if it makes any resistance and always recompences it with some pleasure when it acquiesses in its designs Those even whose imagination is so irregular that they believe themselves transformed into Beasts find some reasons to prove that they ought to live like them walk upon all four feed upon Grass and imitate all the actions which agree only to Beasts They find a great deal of pleasure in following the impressions of their Passions and feel themselves inwardly afflicted when they resist them and 't is enough if reason which accommodates it self and is commonly serviceable to pleasure argues after such a manner as is proper to defend the cause of it If therefore it be true that all Passions justifie themselves it is evident that desire of it self inclines us to judge advantageously of its Object if it is a desire of love and disadvantageously if 't is a desire of aversion The desire of love is a motion of the Soul excited by the Spirits to will the enjoyment or use of such things as are not in our power for if we desire the continuation of our enjoyment 't is because future things are not in our power It is therefore necessary to justifie desire that the Object which produces it should be judged good in it self or in relation to some other and we must think the contrary of that desire which is a kind of aversion It is true we cannot judge a thing to be good or bad if there is not some reason for it but there is no Object of our Passions which is not good in some sense If we can say that there is some of them which include no good and which consequently cannot be perceived as good by the sight of the Mind yet it cannot be said but they may be relished as good since we suppose our selves to be agitated by them and this taste or sensation is sufficient to incline the Soul to judge advantageously of an Object If we judge so easily that Fire contains in it self the heat we feel and Bread the savour we taste because of the sensations that these Bodies excite in us although it be wholly incomprehensible to the Mind since that can only conceive heat and savour to be the manners of being of a Body there is no Object of our Passions how vile and contemptible soever it appears to be that we do not judge to be good when we feel pleasure in the enjoyment of it For as we imagine that heat goes our of Fire when we feel it we blindly believe that the Object of the Passions cause the pleasure that we taste when we enjoy them and that therefore they are good since they are capable of doing us good the same may be said of those Passions which have evil for their Object But as I have just before said there is nothing which is not worthy of love or aversion either in it self or something else to which it has relation and when we are agitated by any Passion we soon discover the good or evil in its Object which favours or opposes it Thus by reason 't is easie to find out what Judgments these Passions whereby we are agitated form in us For if 't is a desire of love which acts us we soon apprehend that it will not fail to justifie it self by the advantageous judgments it will make upon its Object We easily see these Judgments will be so much the more extended as the desire is more violent and that they will be often full and absolute although the thing appears only good in part without we easily conceive that these advantageous Judgments will extend to every thing which has or seems to have any connection with the principal Object of the Passion and that so much the more as the Passion is stronger and the Imagination more extensive But if it be a desire of aversion the quite contrary will happen for Reasons as easily apprehended Experience sufficiently proves these things and therein it perfectly agrees with Reason but we will make these Truths more sensible by some Instances All Men naturally desire Knowledge for every Mind is made for the Truth But the desire of knowing how just and reasonable soever it may be in it self often becomes a very dangerous Vice through the false Judgments which attend it Curiosity often offers to the Mind the main Objects of its Meditations and Cares It often affixes false Ideas of greatness to these Objects It elevates them by the deceitful lustre of rarity and represents them so charming and attractive that 't is difficult to contemplate them without too much pleasure and application There is no trifle whatever but some Persons are wholly taken up about and their employment is always justified by the false judgments their vain curiosity induces them to make Those for instance who are curious about words imagine it to be a knowledge of certain terms wherein all Sciences consist They find a thousand Arguments to perswade themselves of it and the veneration paid them by those who are confounded by unknown terms is none of the weakest although it be the least reasonable Some Men are learning all their lives to speak who yet perhaps ought to be silent as long as they live for 't is evident we should hold our Tongues when we have nothing to say that is worth the hearing but they don't learn to speak to remain silent They do not sufficiently consider that to be able to speak well 't is requisite to think well have an exact judgment to discern truth from falsehood clear Ideas from those which are obscure and distinguish those of the Mind from such as proceed from the Imagination They think themselves uncommon and curious Wits because they know how to satisfie the Ear by an exact measure flatter the Passions by figures and agreeable motions and delight the
Truth ought to be very careful to shun as much as possible all strong Sensations as a great Noise too brisk a Light Pleasure Pain c. and continually to stir up the Purity of their Imagination and prevent its making in their Brain such deep Traces as continually disquiet and dissipate the Mind And above all to put a Stop to the Motions of their Passions which cause such powerful Impressions in the Body and Soul that 't is generally impossible the Mind shou'd think of any thing else For although the pure Idea's of Truth are always present to us we cannot consider them when the Capacity we have of thinking is filled with these Modifications which possess us However as it is impossible that the Soul shou'd exist without Passion Sensation or any other particular Modification We must make a Virtue of Necessity and even draw from these Modifications some Helps to render us more attentive Yet must we make use of much Artifice and Circumspection in the applying these Helps to gain some Advantage from them The need we have of them must be well examined and we must only make use of 'em so far as the Necessity of rendring our selves attentive constrains us to CHAP. III. Of the use that may be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the Attention of the Mind THE Passions which it is necessary for us to make use of to excite us to an Enquiry after Truth are those that give us Strength and Courage enough to surmount all the Trouble we may meet with in endeavouring to render our selves attentive some of which are good and some bad of which the good are a Desire to find the Truth to acquire a sufficient Knowledge to conduct our selves to render us useful to our Neighbour and some others of the like Nature But the bad or dangerous ones are such as a desire to acquire Reputation to make some Establishment of our Fortune to raise our selves above our Neighbours and some others that are yet more irregular of which it is not necessary to speak In the unhappy Estate we now are in it often happens that the most unreasonable Passions do most powerfully excite us to search after the Truth and give us a more agreeable Satisfaction for all the Pains we take in our Pursuit than the most just and reasonable Passions do Vanity for instance excites us much more than the Love of Truth and we every Day see some continually applying themselves to Study when they find Persons to whom they may relate what they have learnt but who intirely abandon their Studies when they have not an Opportunity to discover their Acquirements The confused Prospect of some Glory they gain when they put off their Opinons maintains their Courage in the most barren and tiresome Studies But if by Chance or Necessity of their Affairs they find themselves far distant from their little flock of Admirers their Ardour is soon cooled and even the most solid Studies cannot attract them Disgust Wearisomness and Chagriu seizes them and they quit all Vanity triumphs over their natural Laziness but Laziness in its turn triumphs over the Love of Truth for Vanity sometimes resists Idleness but Idleness is generally victorious over the Love of Truth Yet the Passion for Gloty may be subservient to a good End since we may make use of it for the Glory of God and the Profit of others Some Persons may be permitted on several Occasions to make use of this Passion as an Help to make the Mind more attentive but we must take great Care to use it only when those reasonable Passions we have already mentioned are not sufficient and when our Duty obliges us to apply our selves to such Subjects as we are discouraged from First because this Passion is very dangerous in respect of the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly engages us in unprofitable Studies which have a more tempting Appearance than either Usefulness or Truth in them In fine because this Passion is very difficult to be moderated we are often abused by it and while we believe our Mind is illuminated by it we often strengthen our Concupiscence which not only corrupts the Heart but disperses such a Darkness through the Mind as is morally impossible to be dissipated We ought to consider that this Passion is insensibly encreased fortified and established in the Heart of Man and that when it is too violent instead of assisting the Mind in a Search after Truth it strangely blinds it and makes it believe things even as it wishes them to be Without doubt we shou'd not have met with so many false Inventions and imaginary Discoveries if Men had not suffered their Brains to be disordered by their Zeal of appearing Inventers For the firm and obstinate Perswasion many Men have had that they have found for instance the perpetual Motion the squaring of the Circle and Duplication of the Cube by common Geometry has apparently proceeded from the great Desire they had of appearing to have effected what many Persons had unsuccessfully attempted It is therefore better to excite those Passions in us which are so much the more useful in the Search after Truth as they are more strong and in the Excess of which there is least to be feared as the Desires of making a good use of our Wit of delivering our selves from Prejudices and Errors of acquiring so much Wisdom as will enable us to conduct our selves through whatsoever Condition we are in and other the like Passions which engage us not in unuseful Studies nor incline us to make too precipitate Judgments When we begin to taste the Pleasure that is found in the Exercise of the Mind discover the Advantage that recurs from it destroy those violent Passions and disdainfully reject those sensible Pleasures which whilst we imprudently permit them to tyrannize over our Reason we have no need of any other Passions than those we have before mentioned to make us attentive upon whatsoever Subject we wou'd consider But the Generality of Mankind are not in this Condition They have no good Relish of any thing but only what touches the Senses Their Imagination is corrupted with an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which only stir up false Idea's For they are united to every thing that falls under the Senses and Imagination and judge always according to the Impression they have received from them in Relation to themselves Pride Debauchery Engagements unquiet Desires to raise their Fortune so commonly obscure the Discovery of Truth in the Men of this World that it stifles in them the Sentiments of Piety because they separate them from God who only can enlighten us as he only can govern us For we cannot encrease our Union with sensible things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truths Since in the same Time we cannot be so strictly united to things that are so different and opposite Those therefore who have a pure and chaste Imagination I mean
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
Consequence We must therefore not answer him at all but only endeavour to make him re-enter into himself that he may receive the same Idea's as we do of him who is only capable of enlightening him 'T is also a Question which appears difficult enough to resolve viz. Whether Beasts have a Soul or not Yet when we take away the Equivocation it seems no longer difficult and the Generality of those Men who think they have do not know the Opinions of those who think they have not We may take the Soul for something Corporeal diffused through the whole Body which gives it Life and Motion or else for something Spiritual Those who say Animals have no Soul understand it in the Second Sense for no Man ever denied but that there was in Animals something Corporeal which was the Principle of their Life and Motion since they cannot even deny it to Watches Those on the contrary who affirm Animals have Souls mean it in the first Sense for there are few who believe Animals have a Spiritual and indivisible Soul so that the Peripateticks and Cartesians do both believe that Beasts have a Soul viz. a Corporeal Principle of their Motion and both of them believe they have none viz. That they have nothing in them Spiritual and indivisible Thus the Difference that is between the Peripateticks and Cartesians is not in that the first believe Beasts have Souls and the last believe it not But only in that the first think Animals capable of feeling Pain Pleasure seeing Colours hearing Sounds and generally of having all the Sensations and Passions that we have and the last doubt it The Cartesians distinguish the Word Sensation to take away the Equivocation of it For instance they say that when we are too near the Fire the Particles of Wood strike against the Hand and shake the Fibres that this shaking is communicated to the Brain that it determines the Animal Spirits which are there contained to diffuse themselves through the External Parts of the Body in a proper manner to make them retire They agree that all these things or the like may meet in Animals and that they certainly meet there because these are the Properties of Bodies and the Peripateticks grant this The Cartesians further say that in Man the shaking of the Fibres of his Brain is accompanied with a Sensation of Heat and that the Course of the Animal Spirits to the Heart or Bowels is followed with the Passion of Hatred or Aversion But deny that these Sensations or Passions of the Soul is in Beasts The Peripateticks on the contrary affirm that Beasts feel Heat as well as we that like us they have an Aversion for whatever incommodes them and generally that they are capable of all the Sensations and Passions that we are The Cartesians do not think that Beasts feel Pain or Pleasure or that they love or hate any thing because they admit nothing but what is material in Beasts and they do not believe that Sensations or Passions are Properties of Matter whatever it may be Some Peripateticks on the contrary think that Matter is capable of Sensation and Passion when it is as they say Subtilized that Beasts may feel by the means of Animal Spirits viz. by the means of a Matter extreamly fine and delicate and that even the Soul is not capable of Sensation and Passion but only as it is united to this Matter Thus to resolve the Question whether Beasts have a Soul we must re-enter into our selves and consider the Idea we have of Matter with all the Attention we are capable of And if we conceive that Matter Figured after such manner as Square Round Oval c. is capable of Pain Pleasure Heat and Cold Colour Smells Sound c. we may affirm that the Souls of Beasts how material soever they are may be capable of Sensation If we conceive it not we must not assert it is for we must only affirm what we conceive So if we conceive that Matter agitated up and down in a Circular Spiral Parabolick Eliptick Line c. be capable of Love Hatred Joy Sorrow c. we may say that Beasts have the same Passions with us If we see it not we must not say it at least without confessing we speak what we do not know But I think it may be affirmed that we never believe any Motion of Matter can be capable of Love or Joy provided we think Seriously of it So that to resolve this Question if Beasts feel we need only take away the Equivocation as Cartesians do for this way we reduce it to a Simple Question that an indifferent Attention of Mind will suffice to resolve it It is true that St. Austin supposing according to the common Prejudice that Beasts have Souls or at least I have not read in his Works that he ever Seriously examined it or called it in Question and perceiving well the Contradiction of saying that a Soul or Substance that thinks feels desires c. should be Material he believed that the Souls of Beasts were certainly Spiritual and Indivisible He has proved by evident Reasons L 4. de anima ejus origine c. 23. l. 5. de quantitate animae and elsewhere that all Souls that is whatever feels imagines fears doubts desires c. are necessarily Spiritual but I have not observed that he had any Reason to say that Beasts had Souls He does not give himself the Trouble to prove it because 't is very probable that in his Time there was hardly any one that doubted of it Now there are some who endeavour wholly to deliver themselves from their Prejudices and who call all Opinions in Question that are not maintained upon clear and demonstrative Reasons who begin to doubt whether Animals have a Soul capable of the same Sensations and Passions as ours but they always find many prejudiced Defenders who pretend to prove that Beasts feel will think and reason as we do although in a much more imperfect manner Dogs say they know their Masters they love them suffer patiently the Blows they receive from them because they judge it advantageous for them not to abandon them But for Strangers they hate them so violently that they cannot so much as suffer themselves to be caressed by them All Animals have a Love for their Young Ones and those Birds that make their Nests in the Extreme Branches of a Tree make it plainly appear that they fear certain Animals that would devour them They think these Branches are too weak to bear their Enemies and yet strong enough to support their Little Ones and Nests too There is amongst the Spiders and the most vile Insects something that looks like an Intelligence which Animates them For we cannot forbear admiring the Conduct of an Animal which although blind finds a means to catch others in its Snares that have both Eyes and Wings and are bold enough to attack the greatest Animal that is It is true that all the
merited for us and in another place I call it absolutely the Grace of Jesus Christ it is not that there is no other Grace but that or that there is any which Christ has not purchased for us But I call it the Grace of Jesus Christ to distinguish it from the Grace that God gave to the first Man when he Created him which is commonly call'd the Creator's Grace For the Grace by which Adam might have preserved his Innocence was chiefly a Grace of Light as I have explained in the preceding Remark because that Adam having no concupiscence he stood in need of no Pre-ingaging Pleasures to oppose it But the Grace which we now stand in need of to keep us within the bounds of our Duty and to produce and maintain Charity in us is Pre-ingaging Delectation For as Pleasure produces and maintains the Love of those things which occasion it or seem to occasion it the Pre-ingaging Pleasures we receive in relation to our Bodies produce and maintain Cupidity in us So that being directly contrary to Charity unless God were pleased to produce and maintain Charity in us by Pre-ingaging Delectations it is plain that the Pre-ingaging Pleasures of Concupiscence would weaken it proportionably as Cupidity should be strengthned What I say here supposes that God permits our Concupiscence to Act in us and that he does not weaken it by inspiring us with horror against all sensible Objects which as a result of Sin must needs tempt us I speak of things as they commonly happen But supposing that God diminishes Concupiscence instead of increasing the Delectation of Grace that may produce the same Effects We are sensible that there are two ways of putting Scales in Equilibrio when one of them is over-charged not only in adding Weights to the other side to even it but also in removing some of the other weights which bear it down Neither do I pretend that Men can do no good Actions without Pre-ingaging Delectation I have sufficiently explained my self upon that subject in the 4th Chapter of the 3d Book And it appears so evident to me that a Man who has the Love of God in his Heart may by the force of his Love and without Pre-ingaging Delectation give for Example a Penny to the Poor or bear some small injury with patience that I can not apprehend how any body can question it In my opinion Delectation is only necessary when the Temptation is Strong or Love Weak If however it may be said that it is absolutely necessary to a righteous Man whose Faith I think may be firm enough and his Hopes strong enough to overcome great Temptations The joy or fore-tast of Eternal Happiness being capable to resist the sensible Charms of Transitory Pleasures It is true that Delectation or Actual Grace is necessary for all good Actions if by the Word Delectation or Grace is understood Charity as St. Austin commonly takes it for it is evident that what ever is not done for God is no wise good But removing the Equivocation and taking the Word Delectation in my sense I do not think any body can question what I have said But this is the Case It is supposed that Pleasure and Love are one and the same thing because the one seldom goes without the other and St. Augustin does not always distinguish them And this being supposed Men are in the right in saying what they say We may conclude with St. Austin Quod amplius nos delectat secundum id operemur necesse est for Men certainly Will that which they Love and we may also say that we can do nothing good or meritorious without Delectation or without Charity But I hope to shew in an Explanation I shall give upon the Treatise of the Passions that there is as much difference betwixt Pleasure and Deliberate or Indeliberate Love as there is betwixt our Knowledge and our Love or to express that difference sensibly as there is between the Figure of a Body and its Motion AN EXPLANATION OF What I have said at the beginning of the 10th Chapter of the First Book and in the 6th of the Second Book of Method That it is very difficult to prove that there are Bodies Which must be understood of the the Proofs that are alledged of their Existence IT is very usual among Men to be perfectly ignorant of what they think they understand best and to understand certain things pretty well which they fancy they have not so much as Ideas of When their Senses have some share in their Judgments they yield to what they do not apprehend or to things they have but a very imperfect knowledge of and when their Ideas are purely Intellectual I desire the like Expressions may be allowed me they unwilling receive Indisputable Demonstrations For Example What can the generality of Men think when the major part of Metaphysical Truths are proved to them When the Existence of God is demonstrated to them the Power of his Will the Immutability of his Decrees That there is but one God or one real Cause which does all in all things That there is but one soveraign Reason of which all Intelligences participate That there is but one necessary Love which is the Principle of all Created Wills They think Men speak Words absolutely void of Sense that they have no Ideas of the things they advance and that they would do well to hold their Tongues Metaphysical Truths and Proofs having nothing that is sensible in them Men are not moved and consequently not convinced by them Nevertheless it is most certain that abstracted things are the most distinct and Metaphysical Truths are the clearest and the most evident Men say sometimes that they have no Ideas of God and that they have no knowledge of his Will and moreover think often as they say but 't is only because they fancy they do not know that which perhaps they know best For where is the Man who hesitates to answer when he is ask'd Whether God is Wise Just Powerful whether he is or is not Triangular Divisible Moveable Lyable to any Alteration Nevertheless it is impossible to answer without fear of being deceived whether certain qualifications agree not to a subject if one has no Ideas of that subject So likewise Where is the Man who dares say that God does not Act by the Plainest Means That he is Irregular in his Designs That he makes Monsters by a positive direct and particular Will and not by a kind of necessity In a Word That his Will is or may be contrary to the Order of which there is no Man but has some knowledge But if we had no Idea of the Will of God we might at least question whether he acts according to certain Laws which we clearly conceive he must follow supposing he will Act. Therefore Men have Ideas of things that are purely Intelligible and these Ideas are much clearer than those of sensible Objects Men are more certain of the Existence of
credit to the testimony of our Senses or of some Men who dare speak to us as our Masters Experience whatever Men may say does not countenance Prejudices For our Senses as well as our Masters according to the Flesh are only occasional causes of the instruction which the Eternal Wisdom gives us in the most secret part of our Reason But whereas that Wisdom teaches us by an operation which is no wise sensible we fancy that it is our Eyes or the Worlds of those who strike the Air at our Ears which produce that Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us 'T is for that Reason as I have said elsewhere that Jesus Christ was not only satisfied with instructing us after an intelligible manner by his Divinity he thought fit also to instruct us after a sensible one by his Humanity He would show us that he was our Master in all things And because we cannot easily look within our selves to consult him as Eternal Truth Immutable Order and Intelligible Light he has made Truth sensible by his Words Order lovely by his Example Light visible by a Body which diminishes the splendour of it and yet we are still so ingrateful so injust so stupid and sensless as to look not only upon other Men as our Masters contrary to his express prohibition but perhaps even upon the most despicable and vile Bodies SECOND OBJECTION The Soul being more perfect than Bodies why should it not contain that in it self which represents them Why should not the Idea of Extension be one of its Modifications God only acts in it and modifies it We grant it But why should it see Bodies in God if it can see them in its own substance It is not material it is true But God though a pure Spirit sees Bodies in himself Why then should not the Soul see them in beholding it self though it be Spiritual ANSWER Do we not see that there is this difference between God and the Soul of Man that God is an Unlimited Universal and Infinite Being and that the Soul is a particular Species of Being 'T is one of the Properties of Infinity to be at once one and all things composed as it were of an Infinity of Perfections and so simple that every Perfection it possesses includes all others without any real distinction for as every Divine Perfection is Infinite it constitutes the whole Divine Being But the Soul being a Limited Being it cannot have Extension in it self without becoming Material Therefore God includes in himself all Bodies after an intelligible manner He sees their Essences or Ideas in his Wisdom and their Existence in his Love or in his Will It is necessary to say so since God made Bodies and knows what he has made even before any thing was made But the Soul cannot see that within it self which it does not include Moreover it cannot clearly see that which it does include it can only feel it confusedly But to explain this The Soul does not include intelligible Extension as one of its manners of Being because Extension is not a manner of Being it is really a Being We conceive Extension alone or without thinking on any thing else but we cannot conceive manners of Being without perceiving the Subject or Being whereof they are the manners We perceive that Extension without thinking on our Mind besides we cannot conceive Extension can be a Modification of ones Mind Extension being limited makes some figure and the limits of the Mind cannot be figured Extension having parts may be divided at least in some sense and we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible Therefore Extension which we see is not a manner pf the Minds Being and therefore cannot see it in it self How is it possible to see in one kind of Being all sorts of Beings and in one particular and finite Being a Triangle in general and an infinite number of Triangles For in fine the Soul perceives a Triangle or a Circle in general though it implyes a contradiction that the Soul could have a Modification in general The Sensations of Colour which the Soul ascribes to Figures make them particular because none of the Modifications of a particular Being can be general Certainly we may affirm what we conceive clearly We clearly conceive that Extension which we see is a thing distinct from us Therefore we may say that Extension is no Modification of our Being and it is really something that is distinct from us For we must observe that the Sun for instance which we see is not that which we behold The Sun and whatever is in the material World is not visible in it self I have proved it elsewhere The Soul cannot see the Sun to which it is immediately united Now we clearly see and plainly feel that the Sun is something distinct from us Therefore we speak against our Knowledge and our Conscience when we say that the Soul sees all Bodies which surround it in its own Modifications Pleasure Pain Taste Heat Colour all our Sensations and Passions are Modifications of our Soul But though they are so do we know them clearly Can we compare Heat with Taste Odour with Colour Can we distinguish the affinity there is between Red and Green and even between Green and Green It is not so with Figures we compare them one with another we exactly know their proportions we precisely perceive that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square is double to that Square What affinity can there be between those intelligible Figures which are very clear Ideas and the Modifications of our Soul which are only confused Sensations And why should we pretend that those intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul unless they are Modifications of it since the Soul knows nothing of what happens to it by clear Ideas but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation as I have proved elsewhere and shall prove it again in the following Explanation If we could only see the Figure of Bodies in our selves they would on the contrary be unintelligible to us for we know not our selves We are only darkness to our selves and must look out of our selves to see our selves and we shall never know what we are until we consider our selves in him who is our Light and in whom all things become Light For it is only in God that the most material Beings are perfectly intelligible but out of him the most Spiritual Substances become absolutely invisible The Idea of Extension which we see in God is very clear But as we do not see the Idea of our Soul in God we feel indeed that we are and what we actually have But it is impossible for us to discover what we are or any of the Modifications whereof we are capable THIRD OBJECTION There is nothing in God that is moveable there is nothing in him that is Figured if there be a Sun in the intelligible World that Sun is always equal to it self and the visible Sun appears
Second Causes which I have just now Refuted Or perhaps it might be concluded That The Search after Truth is a Book full of visible and gross Contradictions as some Persons do who it may be have not equity or penetration enough to make them fit Judges of the Works of others The Holy Scripture the Fathers and most good Men oftener speak of sensible Goods Riches and Honours according to the common Opinion than according to the true Ideas they have of them JESVS CHRIST introduces Abraham speaking to the wicked Rich Man Fili recepisti BONA in vita tua Thou hast received thy good things in thy life time that is Riches Honours What we through prejudice call good our good that is our Gold or our Silver is in an hundred places in the Scripture called our Maintenance or our Substance and even our Honesty or that which honours us Pawpertas honestas á Deo sunt But must this manner of speaking used by the Holy Scripture Eccl. 11.14 and most Pious Persons make us think they contradict themselves or that they look upon Riches and Honours as real goods and that therefore we ought to love and seek after them No without doubt because these wayes of speaking complying with prejudices signifie nothing And we see in other places JESVS CHRIST has compared Riches to Thorns has told us we must renounce them because they are deceitful and that whatsoever is great and alluring in this World is an abomination before God We must not therefore collect the passages of Scripture or of the Fathers to judge of their Opinion by the greatest number of them except we would continually attribute the most unreasonable prejudices to them This once supposed Matth. 6.28 29 30. we see that the Holy Scripture positively sayes That 't is God who has Created every thing even the grass of the field That 't is he who cloaths the Lillies with such ornaments as our SAVIOVR prefers before the Glory of Solomon There is not only two or three but an infinite number of passages which ascribe to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes and which destroy the Nature of the Peripatetics Besides we are carried by a kind of Natural Prejudice not to think on God in common Effects and to attribute Power and Efficacy to Natural Causes and seldom any thing but Miracles induce us to think on him as the Author of them And the sensible impression ingages us in favour of Second Causes Philosophers hold this Opinion because say they the Senses convince us of it and this is their strongest Proof Lastly This Opinion is received by all those who follow the Judgments of the Senses Our common Language is formed from this prejudice and we as generally say that Fire has a power to burn as we call Gold and Silver our good Therefore the passages drawn from the Holy Scriptures or the Fathers for the Efficacy of Second Causes prove no more than those that an Ambitious or Covetous Man shall choose to justifie his own Conduct But 't is quite different with those passages we may bring to prove that God does all things For this Opinion being contrary to Prejudice these passages must be understood in their utmost rigour for the same Reason that we ought to believe that 't is the Sentiments of the Cartesians that Beasts are insensible although they have said it but two or three times and continually say to the contrary in all familiar Discourses affirming they feel see and understand In the First Chapter of Genesis God commands the Earth to produce Plants and Animals and likewise the Waters to bring forth Fish And consequently sayes the Peripatetics Water and Earth have received a Power capable of producing these Effects I don't see the certainty of this Conclusion And although we were even obliged to explain this Chapter by it self without having any recourse to other passages of Scripture there would be no necessity to receive this consequence This way of explaining the Creation is accommodated to our conception of things therefore 't is not necessary to take it literally nor ought we to make use of it to maintain Prejudices As Animals and Plants are upon the Earth Fowls live in the Air and Fish in the Water so God to make us apprehend 't is by his Order they are in these places has produced them there 'T is from the Earth that he formed Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of generating them or that God to that end gave it a Power or Vertue which it still keeps for we all agree that the Earth does not produce Horses or Oxen but because from the Earth the Bodies of these Animals were formed as is declared in the following Chapter Formatis igitur Dominus Deus de humo cunctis animantibus Terrae Ver. 19. universis volatilibus Coeli Animals were formed out of the Earth formatis de humo and not produced by the Earth Also after Moses has related how Beasts and Fish were produced by vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that 't was God himself who made them that we might not attribute their production to the Earth and Water CREAVIT quae DEVS cete grandia omnem animam viventem atque notabilem quam PRODVXERVNT aquae in species suas omne volatile secundùm genus suum And a little lower after having spoken of the formation of Animals he adds Et FECIT DEVS bestias terrae juxta species suas jumenta omne reptile terrae in genere suo We may observe by the by that where the Vulgar reads it Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET For as it clearly appears by the passage I related from the Second Chapter this word omitted shows that Fowls were not produced from the Water and that the design of Moses is not here to prove that the Waters had received a true Power to bring forth Fish and Fowl but only to denote the place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or be produced in And volatile VOLITET super terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only design to show that it supplyed them with the Water and Salt which is necessary for their Germination and Growth But I will stay no longer to explain the other passages of Scripture which literally taken favour Second Causes for we are not obliged Besides 't would be very dangerous to understand such expressions literally as are maintained upon common Opinions agreeably to which the Language is formed the Vulgar speaking every thing according to the impression of the Senses and prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which obliges us to take such passages of the Scripture in the Letter as are directly opposite to Prejudices still gives us just cause to believe that the Fathers never
and gives us Motion and Life nor is it that which covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers and which supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy teaches us with the Scripture that it is God only who gives Rain and regulates the Seasons who gives Nourishment to the Body and fills the Heart with Joy Acts 14.15 16. Ergo nihil agis ingratissimè Mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec natura sine Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod à Seneca accipisses Annoeo te diceres debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Seneca l. 4. Of Benefits c. 8. Ego Dominus non est alter formans lucem creans tenebras faciens pacem creans malum Ego Dominus ficiens omnia haec Isa 45.7 Amos 3.6 That he only is capable of doing us good and thereby has given us a perpetual Testimony of what he is although in Ages passed he has permitted all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say That it is Nature that fills us with Good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Equivocation that we may not deceive the Simple For we must distinctly acknowledge him the onely Cause of our Happiness if we would make him the onely Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undoubted Truth That we ought to fear such Things as are able to hurt us and fear them in proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy tells us That it is God alone that can do us Evil that it is he as Isaiah says who creates Darkness as well as Light who makes peace and creates Evil and even that no Evil happens but from him according to the Prophet So that it is him alone we ought to fear We must not fear either Plague or War Famine our Enemies nor even Devils themselves but God alone We ought to fly a Sword when ready to wound us shun Fire and avoid a House that is likely to fall upon us yet must not fear these Things We may fly such Bodies as are Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear only God as the True Cause of all Evils and Misfortunes and only hate Sin which necessarily provokes the Cause of all our Happiness to become the Cause of all our Evils And in short all the Motions of our Minds ought to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to it and the Motions of our Body may relate to those about it This is what we learn from that Philosophy which admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being supposed I cannot see but we have some reason to fear and love Bodies And that to regulate our Love according to Reason it is enough to prefer God above every Thing else the First and Universal to Second and Particular Causes Then it is not necessary to love God with all our strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex tota anima ex totis viribus at the Scripture says Yet when we content our selves with preferring God to all other Beings and adore him with a Love of Esteem and Preference without continually endeavouring to honour and love him in all Things it often happens that we deceive our selves that our Charity is dissipated and lost and that we are more taken up with Sensible than the Soveraign Good For if the greatest Sinners and it may be even Idolaters were asked If they preferred not the universal to particular Causes They would not perhaps be afraid in the midst of their Debauches and Extravagancies to Answer That they failed not in so Essential a Duty and knew very well what they owed to God I confess they would deceive themselves but take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they will have no probable pretext to Justifie their Conduct And if it be supposed they may say this for themselves when their passions blind them and they listen to the Testimony of their Senses Since I am made to be happy I neither can nor ought to forbear loving and respecting whaterver may be the Cause of my Happiness Why therefore should I not love and respect Sensible Objects since they are the True Causes of the Happiness I receive in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Supream Being is alone worthy of our highest Adoration and I prefer him to every Thing but not seeing that he requires any Thing of me I enjoy the Goods he has given me by the means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me and I pay no Acknowledgments to him which perhaps would dishonour him As he does me no good immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of the Creatures it is a sign he does not require my Mind and Heart should be immediately applied to himself or at least he is willing that the Creatures should divide with him the Acknowledgments of my Heart and Mind Since he has communicated a part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has surrounded him with Brightness and Majesty Established him Supream over all his Works and 't is by the Influence of this Great Luminary that we receive all the Necessary Goods of Life Why should we not then employ a part of this Life in enjoying his Light and testifying the sense we have of his Greatness and Benefits Would it not be the utmost Ingratitude to receive the Abundance of all Things from this Excellent Creature and have no Sentiment of Gratitude for it And would it not likewise be an unaccountable blindness and stupidity to have no Motion of respect and fear for him whose absence freezes us to death and who by approaching too near us may burn up and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all Things that we must esteem and love him infinitely more than the Creatures but that we must also love and fear them For thereby we honour Him who made them merit his Favours and oblige him to bestow New Benefits upon us It is plain he approves of the Honour we pay his Creatures since he has communicated his Power to them and all Power merits Honour But as Honour ought to be proportioned to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all Sensible Objects is such that from them we receive all sorts of Goods it is just we should honour them with all our strength and next to God consecrate our whole Being to them Thus we naturally reason when we follow the Prejudice we have received from the Efficacy of Second Causes 't is probably after this manner that the first Authors of Idolatry reasoned Here is what he thought of it who is esteemed the most Learned of the Jews He thus begins a Treatise he
alledged on either side about certain Opinions 't will perhaps be useful to show here by some particular instance that much use may be made of the Principle that we have established viz. That God alwayes acts by the most simple means Let us suppose for instance that I am desirous to know whether I ought every day to take certain stated times to examine my self to represent to my self my weakness and miseries to consider my Duty in the Presence of God and to beseech him to assist me in conquering my Passions Or else whether I ought to stay till the Spirit of God who blows where and when it pleases should take me from my self and from my ordinary imployments to unite me to himself for very probable Reasons may be given both for and against these Opinions and Men are very often satisfied with Probabilities in such like cases And this even makes some Pious Persons to follow different wayes which are not alwayes very sure I consider therefore that if I stay for the particular Motions of the Spirit of God I shall never pray to him if to that end I don't receive either particular Revelations Illuminations or preventing Delectations Now these Illuminations or Delectations being produced by God by more particular Wills than are those general Wills which constitute the Order of Nature they are kind of Miracles so that this is to pretend that God impells Men to Prayer through means that are not the most simple Nay to expect those Graces which are not alwayes necessary is in some measure to tempt God But if I accustom my self to appear or endeavour to present my self before God at certain Hours the sound of a Clock will be enough to remember me of my Duty without its being necessary that God should have a particular Will of inspiring me with the thought of Praying The general Laws only of the Union of the Soul with the Body will make me think of my Duty when the time that I have chosen shall present it self by some sensible mark But as Self-Examination and Prayer is necessary and as we can't pray without having some thoughts of it nor have these thoughts unless God gives them 'T is some step towards Salvation to have these thoughts without obliging God to give them us by particular Wills which are kinds of Miracles or rather in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace whereby God would save all Men through his Son Perhaps the want of the first thought of Prayer and of considering our obligations before God is the cause of the blindness of many Men consequently of their Eternal Damnation For God acting alwayes by the most simple wayes ought not by particular Wills to give those thoughts which might be obtained by vertue of his general Wills if once persons were accustomed to pray regularly at particular hours Therefore as God would save Men by the most simple wayes it is evident that as much as possible we ought to make the Order of Nature subservient to that of Grace and as I may say to reconcile Gods Wills together by regulating a time which may at least supply us with the thoughts of Prayer 'T was for these Reasons probably that God formerly commanded the Jews to write his Commandments upon the Doors of their Houses and alwayes to have some sensible Mark which might put them in mind of them This spar'd God if I may so say thoughts For Miracles of Grace were very rare amongst the Jews the time being not yet come wherein God design'd to ingrave his Law and infuse his Spirit and Charity into the Heart of Man I confess that whatever we do by a mere Natural Power cannot of it self meritoriously dispose us for Grace and yet without it all external Religion can only serve to maintain our Pride and self-Self-love The Pharisees grew vain from their bearing the sensible Signs and Memorials of the Law of God as our Saviour reproached them And Christians often make use of Crucifixes and Images out of Curiosity Hypocrisie or some other motive of Self-love Yet since these things may put us in mind of God it is requisite to make use of them for we must as much as possible make Nature subservient to Grace that God may save us by the most simple wayes For although we cannot Naturally fit our selves for Grace we may often contribute to the rendering it efficacious because we can lessen the eagerness of a Passion by removing those Objects from us which cause it or by presenting to our selves contrary Reasons to those which inspire it Those who most carefully watch the purity of their imagination and suffer it not to be so much corrupted by the continual use of sensible Pleasures and Commerce with the World make Grace efficacious by removing that resistance it finds in others In this sense even a Disease a shower of Rain or any other accident that keeps us at home may render Grace efficacious for such a degree of Grace as would be too weak to make us resist the sensible impression of the presence of an agreeable Object is strong enough to make us with horrour reject the impure thought or imagination of this same Object This is enough to show clearly that the Counsels of the Gospel are necessary that God may save us by the most simple wayes For 't is advantageous to follow them not only because when we follow them by the Motion of Gods Spirit they determine it by vertue of immutable Order or of the general Laws of the Order of Grace to increase in us our love to him but also because the practising these Counsels may often render Grace efficacious though we are induced to it only by Self-love as it may happen on many occasions FINIS A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth AGAINST The Accusation OF Monsieur de la Ville Wherein is shown That if every one was permitted to call in Question the Faith of others upon a good or bad deduction of Consequences from their Principles none could be secure from the Imputation of Heresie LONDON Printed in the Year MDCXCV A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth Against the ACCUSATION OF Monsieur de la Ville SOmetimes since there was Published a Treatise whose Title surprized many Persons and stir'd up their Passions Several wished I would interest my self in the Quarrel which the Author had with the Cartesians for as on one hand Monsieur de la Ville for that was his Name had done me the honour to list me among those Philosophers but with what design I know not and on the other hand diverted himself by Travestying me in Ridicule They assured me that if I was willing to pass for a Rash Ignorant and Extravagant Person for a Visionary nay even an Heritick yet I could not in Conscience desert the Cause of Truth and leave the Enemies of the Faith the Advantages he granted to them I must be Just to
abases it towards sensible Objects which seem to cause it It is Evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently deserve to be punish'd rather than rewarded to oblige God in pursuance of his Primitive Will to recompence us with agreeable Sensations In a word for I will not repeat here what I have already said it is Evil because God now forbids it since it alienates the Mind from him for whom it was made and preserv'd for that which God ordain'd to preserve the Righteous Man in his Innocence now establishes the Wicked Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely ordain'd as the easiest and most obvious expedient to teach Man without diverting his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the Bodies about him these Sensations I say at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fix him on Objects incapable of acting and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he occasionally enjoys from them THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE First Chapter of the First Book Where I say That the Will cannot differently determine the Impession it has towards good but by Commanding the Understanding to represent some particular Object to it WE must not imagine that the Will commands the Understanding otherwise than by its desire and motions for the Will has no other Action Neither must we believe that the Understanding obeys the Will in producing in it self the Ideas of those things which the Soul desires For the Understanding does not Act It only receives the Light or the Ideas of Objects by the necessary union it has with him who includes all Beings after an intelligible manner as we have explained it in the Third Book See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book This then is the whole Mystery Man participates of the Soveraign Reason and Truth discovers it self to him proportionally as he applies himself to it and prays it The desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer which is always granted for it is a Natural Law that the Ideas should be so much the more present to the Mind as the Will desires them with the more fervency Thus provided the Capacity we have of thinking or our Understanding be not filled with the Confus'd Sensations we receive by means of what passes in our Body we never desire to think on any Object but the Idea of the said Object is immediately present to us and as experience it self teaches us the said Idea is the more present and clear according as our desire is stronger and that the confused Sensations we receive by the Body are weaker and less sensible as I have already observ'd in the preceding Remark Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to present some particular Object to it I only meant that the Soul which would consider that Object with attention draws near unto it by its desire because this desire pursuant to the efficacious Will of God which is the inviolable Law of Nature is the cause of the presence and clearness of the Idea which represents that Object I could not express my self otherwise nor explain my self as I do now since I had not as yet proved that God alone is the Author of our Ideas and that our particular Wills are the Occasional Causes of it I spoke according to the common Opinion and I have often been forced so to do because all things cannot be said at one and the same time Readers must have Equity and trust for some time in order to be satisfied for none but Geometricians can always pay in ready Coin AN EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER Where I say That it is no Wonder we have no Evidence of the Mysteries of Faith since we have not so much as Ideas of them VVHen I say that we have no Ideas of the Mysteries of Faith Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur De Trinitate B. 7. Ch. 4. Cum quoeritur quid tres Magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium Dictum est tamen tres Personae non ut illud diceretur sed non taceretur In the same place B. 5. Ch. 9. it is visible by what precedes and what follows that I speak of the clear Ideas which produce Light and Evidence and by which we have a Comprehension of the Object if I may so speak I grant for Instance that a Peasant could never believe that the Son of God was made Man or that there are Three Persons in the Godhead unless he had some Idea of the union of the Word with our Humanity and some notion of Person But if those Ideas were clear we might by applying our selves to them perfectly apprehend those Mysteries and explain them to others they would no longer be ineffable Mysteries The Word Person according to St. Augustin has been spoken of the Father of the Son and of the Holy Ghost not so much clearly to explain what they are as not to be silent upon a Mystery which we are oblig'd to speak of I say here that we have no Ideas of our Misteries as I have said elsewhere that we have no Ideas of our Soul because the Idea we have of our Soul is not clear no more than that of our Mysteries Thus this Word Idea is Equivocal I have sometimes taken it for whatever represents to the Mind any Object whether clearly or confusedly I have taken it yet more generally for whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind But I have also taken it for that which represents things to the Mind in so clear a manner that a Man may discover at first fight whether such or such Modifications belong to them Therefore I said sometimes that we had an Idea of the Soul and sometimes I have denied it It is difficult and often tiresom and disagreeable to keep too rigorous an exactness in our Expressions since it is sufficient to make our selves understood When an Author only contradicts himself in the Mind of those who Criticise upon him and who are desirous he should contradict himself he needs not much value it and if he should undertake by a tedious Explanation to solve whatever the malice or ignorance of some Persons might urge against him he would not only make an ill Book but moreover the Readers would be displeased at his Answers to his Objections that would be contrary to a certain Equity which all Men pretend to For Men hate to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance and commonly Men are not allowed to answer weak and malicious Objections until they are actually made whereby the Readers are secured against the reproach which such Answers seem to charge those with who exact them AN EXPLANATION OF These Words of the First Chapter This being granted we must say that Adam was not induced to the Love of God
and to perform his Duty by pre-ingaging Pleasures seeing that the knowledge he had of his Good and the Joy which possessed him continually as a necessary consequence of the prospect of his happiness in uniting himself to God might suffice to engage him to perform his Duty and to make him Act with more merit than if he had been as it were determined by Pre-ingaging Pleasures TO apprehend all this distinctly it is necessary to understand that nothing but knowledge and pleasure determine Men to Act. For when we begin to love an Object it is either because we know by Reason that it is good or because we find by our selves that it is agreeable Now there is a great deal of difference between Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge enlightens our Mind and makes us distinguish good without inducing us actually and forcibly to love it Pleasure on the contrary induces and determines us forcibly to love the Object which seems to occasion it Knowledge does not induce us of it self it only makes us freely and of our own accord incline our selves towards that Good which it offers us it leaves us wholly to our selves Pleasure on the contrary anticipates our Reason it hinders us from consulting it It does not leave us wholly to our selves and it weakens our liberty Therefore as Adam before the Fall had a time appointed to merit Eternal Happiness and in order thereunto a full and absolute Liberty and as his Knowledge was sufficient to keep him strictly united to God whom he already loved by the Natural motion or tendency of his Love he was not to be induced to his Duty by Pre-ingaging Pleasures which would have lessened his Merit in lessening his Liberty Adam would have had reason in some measure to complain of God had he hinder'd him from meriting his Reward Fortissimo quipped dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet Aug. de corrupt grat cap. 12. as he ought to have merited it that is by Actions perfectly free God would have injured his free Will in some measure in giving him that kind of Grace which is now only necessary for us upon the account of the Pre-ingaging Pleasures of concupiscence Adam being endued with whatever was necessary for his perseverance to prevent him would have look'd like a diffidence of his Virtue and like a reproach of Infidelity He would have had some reason to magnifie himself had he not been sensible of the necessity he might be liable to and of the Weakness into which he was also subject to fall In fine that which is yet infinitely more considerable is that it would have rendered the Inclinations of Jesus Christ in relation to us Look upon the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the latter end of the Impression of Brussels indifferent though it was certainly his first and greatest design who suffered Men to be involved in Sin in order to shew Mercy to them all in Jesus Christ to the end that he who glories should only glory in the Lord. Therefore it is evident to me that Adam felt no Pre-ingaging Pleasure in his Duty but I am of opinion that it is not altogether certain that he felt Joy though I suppose it in this place because I think it very probable But to explain my self There is this difference between Pre-ingaging Pleasure and the Pleasure of Joy that the first anticipates Reason and the latter follows it for Joy naturally results from the knowledge we have of our Happiness or of our Perfections since we can never look upon our selves as happy or perfect without being immediately joyful at it As we may be sensible of our Happiness by Pleasure or discover it by Reason so there are two sorts of Joy But I do not speak in this place of that which is purely sensible I speak of that which Adam could feel as a necessary consequence of the knowledge he had of his happiness in uniting himself to God And there is some reason to question whether he really had that Joy The chief is that this Joy might have taken up his Mind to that degree as to deprive him of his Liberty and would have united him to God after an invincible manner For we may believe that as this Joy must be proportionable to the happiness Adam possessed it must needs be excessive But I answer to this first That the Joy which is purely Intelectual leaves the Mind absolutely free and has but little influence over its capacity thinking therein it differs from sensible Joy which commonly disturbs our Reason and lessens our Liberty I answer in the second place That Adam's Happiness at the first instant of his Creation did not consist in a full and entire possession of soveraign Good he was liable to lose it and to become unhappy His Happiness chiefly consisted in that he felt no pain and that he was in his favour who was to make him perfectly happy had he persevered in his Innocence Therefore his Joy was not excessive moreover it was or ought to have been mix'd with a kind of fear for he had reason to be diffident of himself Finally I answer That Joy does not always apply the Mind to the real Cause which produced it As we feel Joy at the sight of our Perfections it is natural to believe that the said sight occasions it for when one thing always follows another we naturally look on it as one of its Effects So we look upon our selves as the Authors of our present Felicity We have a secret Complaisance in our Natural Perfections We love our selves We do not always think on him who operates in us after an Imperceptible manner It is certain that Adam knew more distinctly than the best Philosopher that ever was that God only was capable to act in him and to occasion that Sensation of Joy which he felt in himself at the sight of his Happiness and Perfections He knew that clearly by the light of Reason whenever he applied himself to it but he did not feel it He felt on the contrary that the said Joy was a Consequence of his Perfections and he always felt it without any application on his part Therefore that Sensation might induce him to consider his own Perfections and to delight in himself in case he forgot or any wise lost the sight of him whose Operations are not sensible So that Joy was so far from rendring him Impeccable as it is pretended that on the contrary his Joy perhaps proved the occasion of his Pride and Ruin And therefore I say in this Chapter that it behov'd Adam to take care not to suffer the Capacity of his Mind to be filld with a presumptuous Joy excited in his Soul upon the sight of his Natural Perfections AN EXPLANATION OF The Fifth Chapter Where I say That the Pre-ingaging Delectation is the Grace of Jesus Christ THough I say in this Chapter that the Pre-ingaging Delectation is the Grace which Jesus Christ has particularly