to the least part thereof in respect again of Extension Intension Duration for example to the smallest momentany pleasure of any one single being which is usually if not always ones self 12. Nor is it less manifest that this is a perfection as it is the common sense of all men for otherwise to illustrate rather than to prove it God would have been equally perfect if he had not as if he had determined to make the Universe and that in such a degree happy as it is nay if his nature had been such as to have been the most delighted with the eternal misery of all his Creatures it would have been equally his perfection to have effected it for his own pleasure as to have made it happy Again the Devil or the most malicious proud revengeful finally the most wicked of all Natures is therefore the most imperfect because he is the most pleased with others evil 13. It hath indeed been taught by some of those who have deduced all our Offices and duties from self-love and interest that this perfection is not competible to any being whatsoever at least not to men that every nature is necessarily carried to its own proper good only that it cannot be in the least moved with the good of another But I contrariwise affirm in the first place that this perfection is a thing possible to a reasonable Nature Next that there is in all men among other innate appetites this also of Universal Beneficence And finally that there is a Capacity in our Souls of being more pleased and delighted therewith than any single Object in the world and consequently it is improveable to a higher degree of strength and force which may be called generosity than any other appetite whatsoever All which because it is of greatest consequence is thus proved 1. That it is a thing possible if it be not it is either because we cannot will anothers good or we cannot apprehend it Not the first of these for the Object of Volition is precisely good or bonum not propriety so that if we separate them two we shall find propriety to have nothing of Eligibility in it if there were then there would be something of Eligibility too in our proper and personal evil as well as good Nor is the second true that we cannot apprehend anothers good For it is most plain that we can in our conception conjoyn pain or pleasure good or evil with any other Soul or Mind as well as our own or we can suppose the same evil we suffer in another person Who is there who hath himself felt the torment of the Stone that doth not well understand the same in another and pity him too when he hears him making grievous outcries or giving other such signs as he did himself when he was under the same pain Nay though he was never in the same condition yet he understands him to be affected with some great evil It is true ordinarily we do not apprehend one anothers evil so clearly as our own but the reason is because the one is a matter of Sense the other of Memory or Imagination the one is usually a present Object the other an absent and even our own absent evil we apprehend not so well as our present Finally all the pity and compassion and friendship we see in the world confutes both these pretences especially where our love to any person is great which makes us to unite it to our selves the first and essential property of love And consider it but as a part of our selves and sometimes much the better as it is in Wives and Children and very dear friends and consequently to be the most truly and inwardly affected with the evil or good they suffer or enjoy And those happy Souls who have had clear and true apprehensions of the most perfect and amiable Nature of God have experienced I doubt not that they have infinitely preferred the felicity of the Divine Nature before their own his Will before theirs and have thought and esteemed themselves not worthy of the least regard in compare with him and which is still most of all could have been content to sacrifice all Being and Happiness to his pleasure if it were absolutely necessary And we see the same frequently amongst Men one toward another when a common Souldier under an apprehension of the greater worth and bravery of his Commander exposeth his own life to certain danger and destruction too to save the others In the next place that there is an innate appetite in all men after this perfection of beneficence and doing good without any self-respect I appeal to Universal Experience Nor is there any man who after he hath performed any such act is not pleased therewith and ready to brag of it It is true the gratification of this Natural Appetite or the possession of such a good cannot but be delightful but even this delight springing therefrom may not be any thing of the End or Object foreseen or proposed but only consequent upon the action as it is true it also may be The pleasure of doing good may be one distinct part of the End and Effect of ones beneficence as well as the good done to others when one takes a view of some particular good things which constitute the whole End and Object Lastly That this delight and pleasure from this perfection of our Volition or from Universal Benevolence and in part consequent Beneficence may be greater than from any other Object and that there is a Capacity in our Souls to be more delighted therewith than any other particular good methinks is hence most evidently proved viz. Because it is certainly the greatest good we can possibly possess greater than our own happiness as much as the whole Universe is greater than ourselves and because we are capable of seeing it to be so Now certainly the Sense and Perception of our actual possession of the greatest good we are capable of and that there neither is nor can be any greater must needs fill the Soul with the most complete intense satisfying delight It cannot be the Nature of the Soul to be pleased as much with thep osse ssion of any other good as with that which only she sees clearly to be absolutely the greatest she or any other Being can obtain It is plain therefore that our duty and our interest our perfection and our happiness are inseparable so long as God continues and preserves our nature such as he hath made it nor can we easily conceive it if at all to be other than it is 14. After this I scarcely need mention so plain a consequence as that if Volition hath any less good for its Object than absolutely the greatest it is a defect therein of which there are indefinite degrees till we come to the lowest which is mentioned before 15. And it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation of Volition actual and habitual inclination to their Object which
nolition of it or the volition of its absence and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good may be called Charity or if there be any fitter Name 3 The third Object causing delight to us is power to do what one pleaseth to make any thing consequent upon ones will of which three degrees Liberty Equality Superiority Now to have pleasure arising from hence the onely Object of our volition is an action of pride the onely Object of our habitual inclination the vice thereof To refuse it as before or will its absence is Humility 4 Mere Activity and Life and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls such as is for example mere Contemplation and Knowledge Sense Imagination strong Passions intense Volitions or Resolutions And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names some kinds of it may 5 Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions or Motions of our Bodies to which our Souls are united suaves Corporis Commotiones as some have called them which I know no common name to signifie them by unless Titillation may be allowed These as Cartes thinks create pleasure to the mind as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body Of this sort are all Sensations amongst which are those of Health Calmness and Serenity other bodily tempers many corporeal passions such as Love Joy Hope Acquiescence c. Nay I may say all perhaps for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres Nerves and Spirits delight and please but also the Sense Perception Life and some kind of action of the Soul So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects one Corporeal t'other Intellectual and indeed most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies the entire Object of our Volition is an act of Sensuality and to be habitually enclined thereto the Vice But to refuse this Self-pleasure or to will its absence is Sobriety or Temperance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 6 The perfection of a mans nature of all his Faculties which may be referred to the first and amongst the rest the Rectitude Honesty Probity of his Actions and Inclinations or his Virtue may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him Now even to have this delight usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience nay let me adde that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward and from the possession of it too I say to have this the entire Object of our Volition Intention Inclination or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought is a sin and vice which wants a name as doth its opposite Virtue Finally not to insist upon this distribution I have made which I brought onely for example of some general Heads as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us and consequently correspondent Appetites which are numberless So many sorts of sins or vices may there be they all may be reduced to some general heads and those heads divided and these again subdivided c. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects usually comprehended under three viz. God All created or finite Beings besides our selves under the name of our Neighbour though we know little of any other or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind and lastly our selves The Volition of the Universal Good our last end therefore may be resolved into three parts viz. The love of God The love of â—ur Neighbour The love of our selves Or Piety Charity and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns And by Love I mean not Gratitude but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved whether the good be an absent or present good To will an absent good and desire it for the person we love can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves not to God who we know cannot want any thing But to will a present good may be to God also We may will approve rejoyce delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature which he always doth and cannot but possess 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually although but one of them may be first regarded As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour we ought at least habitually to will it not onely because thereby we do good to him but also because it pleaseth God and it is our own perfection and will be for our own greater good so to do although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoyned that we may and ought always habitually to believe when we endeavour to effect the one the other will necessarily follow Thus for example to love God the Volition of good to him or the rejoycing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon and flows therefrom from his Being and from his most perfect Nature and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection Comfort Reward So again if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour we may be sure it pleaseth God and is best for our selves And so Lastly our own greatest good truly as to Intension Extension and Duration or our greatest perfection and happiness is in and by loving of God and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour 29. It may be further observed that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever which do effect the Universal good have been used to be called Virtues without any consideration of the end of the Action or the ultimate Object thereof and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual vertues The other sort of Volitions which have their due end or due ultimate Object considered as such having the name of principal or inherent Virtues So for example to apply the mind to attention and consideration pursuit after or love of the Truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are accounted Virtues because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones Such again are to judge rightly and truly especially concerning other men i.e. always onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves not because we imagine so Although the end of
easily to subject it to their Conscience but so violent and impetuous to the latter that they are not to be governed or commanded by their Conscience or a judgement of and habitual inclination to their duty They may be as is usually said perhaps Covetous Vain-glorious Ambitious Proud and Obstinate but not Voluptuous and on the contrary to speak in the received style some may be very insensible of Glory or Greatness but furiously carried to the pleasures of Sense And hence it appears that the Characters which Historians have given of some men may be true namely that there was in them Magnae Virtutes nec minora Vitia great Virtues and as great Vices But it is as plain that it is an ordinary mistake of some persons who say that every man hath the seeds and roots of all particular Vices in his nature if by those words they mean an inordinate and immoderate habitual inclination or appetite And I know not what they can mean else unless it be a bare capacity but then there would be the seeds of all Virtues as well as Vices For there may be so many sins as there are Appetites and so many Appetites as there are Objects and there are some objects from which the Souls of some men have a natural aversion and this is to be understood not only of individual objects but also of some kinds of them and consequently of some kinds of sins 33. But it is a Question of much greater consequence what Virtues and Vices are the greatest and who are the most Virtuous or Vicious persons For according to our right information and judgement herein our Opinions and Actions our Inclinations and Behaviour our Rewards and Punishments towards men ought principally to be directed and governed Now Vices or Sins to take only that part are to be estimated either according to their principle and end or according to their effect and consequence or they are either inherent or eventual as hath been before said In respect of the principle or end there is no one kind or sort of sin universally greater than another for there may be as great an excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self-self-love in one sort as in another and that is the greatest sin in this respect in which there is a greater excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitual inclination to ones proper and personal good above Universal Charity or above the habitual inclination to the Universal good Thus there may be as great excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in sensuality as in pride or malice I say it may be so though more generally it is reasonably believed and supposed that there is more in these two last and that because there are usually more and greater mischievous effects to others visible and known to him that is guilty of them than in the first whence one must needs have a less regard to the good of others compared with his own than the other But in respect of the effect or consequence there is always a great difference between the kinds of sins and one is much worse than another Thus Malice and Ambition are much greater sins than Vain-glory or Sensuality especially some kinds of it such as the immoderate love of Bodily Exercises Divertisements and Pastimes In particular or rather individual sins or ill actions there may be always difference both in respect of the principle and the effect So a particular sin of Malice Spight and Revenge may be much greater and more heinous than a sin of Intemperance or Fornication both in respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self-self-love in opposition to the good of others and in respect of the hurtful and noxious effects and consequences Sometimes a particular sin may be greater in respect of the effect than another but not in respect of the principle Thus one act of Pride or Malice in any man may have many more mischievous consequences upon it than an act of Intemperance or Fornication but yet there may be less of the excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that than in this the man perhaps being ignorant of many of the ill Consequences thereof whereas in this he saw them and yet committed the sin We ought to distinguish between the greatness of a sin and of a sinner He is not always in Gods account who knows the inclinations of the Soul certainly the greatest sinner who commits the greatest sin I mean he is not always the most guilty of an inherent sin who is the most guilty of the greatest eventual sin and on the contrary one man may be inherently or in respect of the principle more sinful and vicious in the commission of a less eventual sin than another in the commission of a greater Thus oft-times he may be a worse man or a greater sinner inherently who is guilty of Vain-glory which seems to have so few more evil than good consequences upon it and therefore to be a less Eventual sin than Fornication or Intemperance than he who is guilty of Fornication or Intemperance 34. So likewise it hath been disputed whether actual inclinations and propensions or as some call them appetites to sin concupiscences without consent of the Will or actual Volition be sinful To which it is to be answered that it is plain they are sinful But withal that the Wills not consenting or rather the actual nilling and refusing them because they are sinful is a certain sign of the Superiority or Prevalency just at that time of its habitual inclination to that which is right and honest as the not regarding at all and not attending whether they be sinful and not checking them if they seem so to be is a sign of the contrary For there may be not onely divers but contrary habitual inclinations in the Soul at the same time But as for mere thoughts or suggestions of what is sinful or unlawful as of Revenge or Lust or Vain-glory there can be no sin in them And when they are assentedto or delighted in the sin is not in those thoughts but in the actual Volition or Inclination of the Will It is not a sin for example for a man to have such a thought as this Mischief thou such a man because he once mischieved you Do such a thing because such persons will speak well of and applaud you for such a performance For such a thought is but an Object of my Understanding and proposed to my Will perhaps it is not in my Will in which onely is sin If it were a sin barely to have such a thought then it would be so if I had it conveyed to me by reading or hearing of such words which no man can think Nevertheless the emerging or springing of such thoughts from our selves is a very probable sign of habitual sinful inclinations in us For it is a sign though not a necessary one of some corporeal Passion of Love or Delight or Desire conjoyned to such Thoughts and Objects or
hankering before there be any express Volition that which is usually signified by such phrases I could find in my heart to do such a thing and that of Foelix to St. Paul Thou hast almost perswaded me to be a Christian And for the fourth this one thing evinces it viz. That there is a great difference between men in the facility readiness and strength to their actual inclinations and Volitions before they actually exist Of this facility in one man which is not in another there must be some present cause in one man which is not in another and this I call an Habitual Inclination or Volition It is most certain there is something in two men accustomed to two things with delight when they have no actual Inclination and Volition in them which upon the proposal of those two different objects doth produce two different or contrary actual Inclinations and Volitions and this not only in the Mechanisms of their Bodies by which those objects excite corporeal passions of love or delight but in the Soul too and most often contracted by the frequent actual inclinations impressed upon the Soul by these passions and sometimes without them But it is enough that it is agreed by all men that there is an actual difference inherent and present in the Soul between a Drunkard and an Ambitious man even when they are asleep or their Volition and actual inclination are employed about other things which then appears when the proper objects of their respective appetites and habitual inclinations are proposed to them As for all other humane Actions which have been called imperate or Actions commanded by and consequent upon Volition except Volition itself for one Volition may have for its object another Volition such as are Attention Consideration Judgment motion of the parts of the Body or Bodily Action in which is Speech or Words I meddle not at present with them only suggest that there is nothing of Moral good or evil of inherent Virtue or Vice in them they are indeed mostwhat though they may be dissembled signs thereof and of its degrees nor are they so much as what in the Twenty ninth Article or Paragraph we term instrumental or eventual Virtues or Vices any further than they include Volition For example there is neither Virtue nor Vice in attention or judgment which are actions of the Mind nor in Speech Gesture Motion which are actions of the body but only in the Volition or act of the Will which commands or effects them 4. Now of these three last viz. Actual Volition Actual and Habitual Inclination the perfection and defect may be considered which perfection and defect of Volition for example and so of the rest can be only in two respects viz. 1. Of the Object 2. Of the Action 5. And first concerning the Object of Volition it is to be noted that at the same time it can be but one though that one may consist of several parts which may be successively regarded For example a man cannot will and regard at the same precise time his Neighbours good and his own Reputation as two distinct separate co-ordinate things but he may will them both together as making up or composing one entire Object like as the Eye can see but one Object at the same time painted at the bottom thereof consisting of many parts the whole it may see together confusedly and but one point distinctly 6. Moreover that the only Object of Volition and so of the rest is bonity or good only not evil is manifest from universal experience All which goodness or what is convenient congruous eligible desirable for by all these may bonity or good be described is of two kinds 1. That of the End 2. That of the Means That of the End hath been usually called jucundum delectable or pleasant good or pleasure delight although this very pleasure hath some further use is likewise a means to excite encourage and fortifie the Operations of the Mind which again mediately and immediately may produce new pleasure That of the means is called bonum utile or profitable good to obtain the end of delectable good of which the kinds are numerous 7. The goodness of the means is nothing but its Conducibility to or Causality of the end which indeed is the goodness of the end in the means it is the same there is nothing eligible in the means to obtain any end but the goodness of the end it self Of this profitable good bonum honestum or honest good is one sort or kind as we shall presently understand 8. And to add this for the present the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or pulchritude and beauty of Virtue in whatsoever it consists talked of so much by Platonists is another sort and is only therefore good because it is so congruous or delectable an object to the Mind or some way or other hath in it some causality of pleasure or delight 9. As for delectable good which is as hath been said the only object of Volition it is better understood by every mans experience than by all the descriptions that can be given of it such as Aristotle's perfection of the Minds Operation and Eudoxus's perfect and grateful assension and acquiescence Plato's passion affection and diffusion of the mind and the repose of the Will in some convenient good and many others some of which are contrary each to other as when some say it is Motion and some say it is the Rest and Repose of the Mind It is more to our purpose to observe that it hath indefinite degrees and that in three respects only and no more viz. 1. In Extension as to Subjects 2. Intension 3. Duration Of which to take the extremes only the lowest degree in the first respect is the good of one single Soul the highest that of all Spiritual Beings existant usually comprehended under God our Neighbour and our selves where by Neighbour we understand all Rational Creatures at least We actually indeed know a most inconsiderable part of Mankind only our own Family Town or Countrey to whose greatest good notwithstanding if we direct our Volition it is a sign we implicitely will that good which is absolutely the greatest and that if any greater good were within our view and comprehension we should will that expresly and actually In the second respect we want both conceits and words for the lowest and highest degree In the third respect the lowest degree is that good which is momentany the highest Eternal 10. Wherefore the greatest delectable good absolutely is that which is so in extension intension duration or the Eternal happiness of the whole Vniverse considered as one thing and as Cartes considered Motion in the Material world 11. After which it is easie to observe that the greatest and first perfection of Volition in respect of the Object is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good or to have it for its Object and contrariwise the greatest defect thereof is to be directed