Austin that a rational creature may injoy nothing but God only For we injoy only that which we love for it self wherein our objective happiness consists From this immobile principle it follows 1. That all use of the creature which is not referred unto God is sin 2. That all fruition of the creature no lesse than the love thereof is sin 3. That to use God for the obtaining the creature is sin which perversitie is found in all sin whilest we would injoy things tâ— be used and use things to be injoyed Whence sprang that rule of Austin that all human perversion is when men would enjoy things to be used and use thingâ— to be enjoyed And again all ordination and virtue is to injoy things to be injoyed and to use things to be used For this is commanded not only by Christian Discipline but also by that natural order which the eternal Law has constituted Which order is apparently disturbed when any injoy the means as the end or stick in the way as in the terme or end Hence cap. 21. fol. 164. he adds This the Spirit of God most savingly indicates unto us that there is no trueâ— self-love than that whereby we love God with all the heart and because the most refined and noble love of God consists in a mans being abstracted from the reflexion and consideration of himself it thence followeth that by how much the more a man forgets himself by so much the more noble and exact regard he has unto himself Thus by â—n admirable kind of contention the more 〈◊〉 man denies himself the more he seeks himself the more he is emptied of self â—he more he is filled with God To relinâ—uish God is to embrace nothing Hence Jansenius Tom. 2. lib. 2. c. 19. â—l §. 6. Why love to the creature for it self iâ— irregular 156. gives us a demonstration from because why it is unlawful for a creature 〈◊〉 terminate on himself or on the creaâ—ure as the ultimate object of his love Beâ—ause this is the natural condition of a ratiâ—nal creature to be placed under God but â—bove all corporeous Beings Now this order 〈◊〉 preserved by regular Loves and Weights â—or a weight according to Austin is the â—mpetus or Bent of every thing towards its â—roper place And the weight of a ratiâ—nal creature is his love which is the â—dea and measure of corporeous weights This Pondus or weight of love is infused into a rational creature for the preservation of natural order that so he may be subject to God but Lord of all inferior things For such is the nature of love that it subjugates the person loving to the thing beloved What we love we serve and are inferior unto whence it follows that the Lover is affected with 〈◊〉 the perturbations of the thing be loveâ— Seeing therefore God the first Truth aâ— chiefest Good is alone superior to the râ—â—tional creature to him alone we ougâ— to suâ—ject our selves by the weight 〈◊〉 love which when we do we act raâ—onally and virtuously for virtue whiâ— implies the best state of a rational creâ—â—ture is nothing else but the order of loâ—â— whereby as by a weight the soul keeâ— it self below that which is most supreâ— and above that which is below it in 〈◊〉 middle state according to the obligatiâ— and appointment of the eternal Laâ— Hence the root of all sin is an inordinâ— adherence to the creature c. Thence Jansenius proceeds to demonstrate the pestiferous effects of inordinâ— love §. 7. Seven Pestiferous effects of creature love and fruition which terminates on the creature So Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 20. fol. 159. Thâ— first effect saies he which the love 〈◊〉 the creature produceth in the soul 〈◊〉 amission of libertie Whence also follows incapacitie of judgement 2. Another effect of this inordinate love to thâ— creature is that it transformes us into thâ— â—â—â—enesse of those things we love For all â—ve tends to unitie so far as 't is possiâ—e and albeit it comes short thereof 〈◊〉 it leaves a likenesse For all likenesse 〈◊〉 but a defective Vnity So that by the â—rce of love a man that loves the flesh is â—ereby made flâ—shâ—y 3. Hence follows anoâ—â—er effect of creature love the alligation or â—inding the heart to the things beloved This at first is insensible but yet by freâ—uent acts this inordinate love increasâ—th so that at last from delight there â—riseth custome and from custome necessiâ—ie 4. Whence also follows a difficultie of rending the heart from and grief in parting with beloveds 5. Hence likewise results instabilitie and inquietude of soul. 6. Whence also proceeds defilement of soul for love is a kind of touch yea 't is an intimate ingrâ—sse or entering into the thing beloved which if it be more ignoble than the lover does blemish and contaminate its dignity This Impuritie clouds and darkens the mind obstructing its sâ—renitie of judgement 7. Lastly From this hebetude of mind and alligation to creatures proceeds a perverse use of things which is another pestiferous effect of creature love For we can neâ— use things well till we have spirits 〈◊〉 obliged from them a mind chained the creature by inordinate love 〈◊〉 but abuse it Whence he concludâ— fol. 162. That all things must be referâ— unto God not only in the habitual coâ—â—tution of the soul but also in actual or least virtual intention thereof These things being premised touchiâ— inordinate and ordinate love or fruitiâ— Jansenius proceeds to prove that 〈◊〉 Will cannot be the Parent of any wâ— spiritualy or morally good §. 8. No Free Will to good So Tom. 2. 〈◊〉 3. cap. 14. We judge saith he 〈◊〉 opinion of Austin and his Disciples 〈◊〉 indubitable 1. That no good woâ— no not morally such can be perforâ— by Free Will unlesse it be freed by â—wirdâ— and that not of every kind but of faiâ—â— 2. That the Libertie of abstaining frâ— sin is lost and a necessitie of sinniâ— even in every act introduced becaâ— whatever is not of â—aith is sin Tâ— he farther demonstrates Cap. 17. fol. 2â— Because according to the principle 〈◊〉 Austin there can be no Work 〈◊〉 good but what is referred unto God for himself Whence lib. 4. cap. 11. he proves That the virtues of the Romane and Greek Philosophers were vain and sinful because swollen with pride And cap. 12. he particularizeth in the pride of the Stoicks who held That the Offices of virtue were desireable because consentaneous to reason wherein they made reason their God He farther demonstrates the Pride of the Stoicks and Peripateticks in making virtue to be the chiefest Good which saies he is in Austins sense to live according to the flesh Rom. 8. 5. Hence also he proceeds to demonstrate Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 16. That there are no seeds of virtue naturally in men He grants that if we consider the Office of virtue materially and nakedly without regard to its forme or end there may
Nature to which he replies 1. That God is to be loved by his creature in every state 2. That this love although it be consentaneous to human nature yet it is the effect of supernatural Grace 3. Hence saies he it is most safe to affirme that a rational creature considered without any fore-going sin cannot be created without love to God at least without a sufficient facultie by which he may be inabled to cleave unto God as his Creator for otherwise the will should be void of â—s natural rectitude and so sinful c. Which to impute to God is a note of blasphemie whereby he is made the Author of sin How of Grace Thence Jansenius proceeds cap. 20. fol. 320. to shew how this love to God though a debt due to human Nature proceeds notwithstanding from Grace 1. There are saies he certain debts or decent connaturalities congruencies and equities which spring not from the right of the creature but from the Grace of God For God is oft said to be a debtor to himself his own attributes not only to his Justice but also to his Wisdom and Goodnesse c. 2. Again the very nature of a Rational creature is the gratuitous and free gift of God so in like manner the rectitude of the same nature which though inseparable yet it ariseth not from any merit of the creature but from such arguments or reasons as concerne the attributes of God his Wisdom and Goodnes From the foresaid hypothesis §. 12. There is no natural virtue or happines but what is supernatural that there is no such thing as a state of pure Nature Jansenius rationally concludes against and rejects that usual distinction amongst the Scholemen of virtue and beatitude into natural and supernatural c. So Tom. 2. de Nat. Pura lib. 2. cap. 2. fol. 326. Where he tells us That he has oft wondred how it came to pass that the ancient Philosophers Socrates Plato c. discoursed more accurately and truly of the lapsed state of man than the late Scholemen Neither addes he can I find any other reason hereof than this that the late Scholemen have all followed the pur-blind reasonings of Aristotle who being ignorant of his own imbecillitie and not sensible of any supernatural adjutorie taught men to expect all good from their own virtue c. Hence the Pelagians sucked all their poison which the Scholemen endeavoring to moderate and allay have framed two men in one a Philosopher and a Christian Whence what ever they find in the Philosopher touching free will or natural virtue they apply to their Philosopher and whatever they find in Scripture touching Grace they refer to their Christian. Thus they frame a double virtue and happinesse one natural another supernatural So again Jansen Tom. 2. lib. 4. de Grat. Christi cap. 16. fol. 255. The Scholemen saies he finding the Pelagian Infusions touching seeds of virtue repugnant to the Catholick Doctrine they frame a double man in a single and so double charitie double virtues double works the one natural the other supernatural whereof there is not the least foot-steps in Austin who termes the Philosophers and Scholemens natural virtues but splendid sins So Tom. 2. de pur Nat. lib. 2. c. 5. fol. 332. The Scholemen saies Jansenius confes that man cannot be in a connatural mode created but for some last end hence they are forced to coin a twofold beatitude one natural t'other supernatural c. Then he concludes cap. 8. That as this state of pure Nature derived its original from the error of Gentile Philosophie so likewise this imagination of natural happines c. In brief he demonstrates clearly that these common notions so frequent in the Scholes touching natural and moral virtues and happines as distinct from spiritual or supernatural are but a meer chimera or figment hatcht first in the Gentile Scholes and thence derived by the Pelagians and Scholemen into the Christian Scholes with no small prejudice to the Christian Faith That there cannot indeed be any action or work naturally or morally good but what is such supernaturally and spiritually is very evident because the rule of all good whether natural moral or spiritual is one and the same namely the Will of God revealed in the Moral Law which gives the esse morale the moral Being moralitie or formal constitution to all moral good or virtue whether natural or supernatural Besides all good that is truly such requires an integritie or fulnes of causes a good principle and end as well as matter or duty according to that Theologick Mâ—xime Good consists of all its causes but evil of any defect Hence Jansenius proceeds to prove §. 13. That God cannot but punish sin that there is a kind of necessitie on God for the punishing of sin So Tom. 2. de Pura Nat. lib. 3. cap. 2. That God saies he can permit sin whereby his order is disturbed to go unpunished Austin every where rejects as a Paradoxe irreconcileable with Divine Justice And this necessitie of punishing sin results not hence that God has thus by his peculiar will constituted but from the very sanction of the Eternal Law against which God cannot act any more than against himself seeing it is nothing else but Gods eternal Reason and Will The punishment of sin is sin Then he proceeds cap. 3 4. to shew what those punishments are which are so inseparably and indispensably fastened to sin 1. Horror of Conscience viz. 1. Horror of Conscience which is oft more intolerable than death it self And if there be at any time securitie on sinners yet this ariseth not from any health of conscience but from its sâ—upor Now by how much the more stupid conscience is by so much the more uncurable 't is as in the bodie so in conscience stupidnes is a disease worse than the most torturing dolors or pains 2. Inquietude 2. Another inseparable punishment of sin is a perpetual inquietude 3. Losse of God 3. But another more weightie and intimate punishment of sin is the losse of the chiefest good For although no one sins but with his will yet no one parts with his chiefest good but against his will 4. Adherence to the creature 4. This is followed with another punishment which is adherence to the creature and by how much the more pleasingly and securely the sinner enjoyes the creature by so much the more 't is fastned to it and therefore by so much the more miserable 5. Sin is the worst punishment of it self 5. Sin is an unseparable punishment of it self For though sin precisely as voluntarie is not a punishment but offence yet as it is the offence of a rational creature so it is an evil which none would voluntarily partake of For none chooseth pure sin The greatest punishment of sin saies Seneca is in it self it is no sooner committed but punished by its very act Whence Jansenius cap. 11 c. fol.
next as more remote and all the principles thereof c. Hence Jansenius passeth on to shew how many waies the precepts of God may be said to be possible §. 19. How many waies the Precepts of God may be said to be possible and useful without sufficient Grace without asserting such a sufficient Grace So Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 3. cap. 15 c. That the Possibilitie of Gods commands on which the Libertie of Will and the Reason of sin depends may be more fully explicated it must be observed how many wayes a man may be said to be able c. 1. Most remotely by the flexibilitie of human libertie 2. Somewhat more nearly by faith and love 3. But most compleatly by the Assistance of actual Grace This complete power which actual Grace gives is alwaies joined and that inseparably with an actual will Thus therefore the precepts of God are possible 1. To the just by faith and love 2. To unbelievers by virtue of the flexibilitie of natural libertie neither does the suspension of actual Grace at all excuse their moral impotence of observing the Precepts because this impotence is not antecedent but consequent and voluntary arising from the perverse disposition of the will which by how much the more fixed 't is by so much the more inexcusable 't is so far is it from excusing sin Then cap. 17. Jansenius proves that these Divine Precepts are very useful though impossible to be kept by unbelievers without the vain figment of sufficient Grace and that 1. To discover mens dutie 2. To discover their infirmitie 3. To render them inexcusable 4. As a medium of judicial hardnes 5. But especially as to the Elect these Precepts and Exhortations are useful 1. To teach them 〈◊〉 infirmitie their blindnes and hardnes 〈◊〉 heart c. 2. To make them of 〈◊〉 misse and humble spirits willing to 〈◊〉 saved in Gods way and on termes 〈◊〉 free Grace God commands a duâ—â— beyond our strength thereby to driâ—â— us out of our selves to Christ. 3. Toâ—gether with the Word of Precept 〈◊〉 gives out a word of Power c. Jansenius having discoursed of 〈◊〉 Nature and Necessitie of Efficacious Graâ— he proceeds to treat of the several kinâ— thereof §. 20. The distribution of Grace into Praeventing subsequent operant cooperant excitant adjuvant Thus Tom. 3. lib. 4. de Grâ— cap. 12. to the 19th where having giveâ— the sentiments of Suarez and Vasqueâ— and their defects herein he laies doâ— a division of his own conformable 〈◊〉 the mind of Austin and so distributâ—â— Grace 1. Into Praevenient and subsequeâ— Which names saies he are respeâ—ctive whose terme is not Grace 〈◊〉 though one Grace did precede thâ— other but the acts of the Will Foâ— Grace is said to be praevenient becausâ— it prevents every good motion of thâ— will and subsequent as it follows thâ— foregoing good motion This division had its rise not from the Metaphysick Speculation of the latter Scholemen but from that famous Pelagian Controversie Whether the Will begins the first good moâ—ion so as that Grace follows the good â—otion of the will or whether on the â—â—â—trary Grace praecedes c. Hence Grace operant is the same with praeveâ—ient and Grace co-operant the same with â—bsequent Hence also Grace excitant is â—iled that which begins the first good â—otion in the will and Grace adjuvant is â—hat which assists any good already beâ—un in the will c. Jansenius having finisht his Discourse 〈◊〉 Medicinal Efficacious Grace §. 21. An Virtue consists in love to Goâ— he proâ—eeds to the effect thereof namely to â—irtue which he makes to consist radiâ—ally and principally in Love to God So â—om 3. de Grat. lib. 5. cap. 3 c. Austin saies he teacheth us that the virtue of a Rational creature is no other than love to God Which Doctrine indeed seems very exotick to the Sectators of Aristotles Morals but yet if it be duely weighed it will be found to be most true For mans chiefest gooâ— and virtue consists in adhering to God which is done by love Virtue is nothing else but a rectified will Hencâ— he proves that all the Cardinal Virtueâ— Prudence Temperâ—â—ce Justice Fortitude yea those which they terme supernatural as Faith and Hope have 〈◊〉 their original from Love to God Henâ— also he proves cap. 9. 10. That love 〈◊〉 concupiscence which refers all to self 〈◊〉 respect of God is vitious yet 't is not repugnant to love to God to have an eâ— on the reward for love to God for himself is the only reward of our love to God i. e. consummate love to God is the only reward of our present inchoate love to God Hence Jansenius passeth on to treat of the fear of Hell §. 22. Of 〈◊〉 fear oâ— Hell its causes effects c. its causes properties and effects So Tom. 3. de Grat lib. 5. cap. 21. c. where he shews that the fear of Hell considered in its self is lawfull and profitable because it is an avoiding of evil yea it may be subordinate to our last end And whereas some stick or acquiesce in this fear as 〈◊〉 the term or center this is the fault 〈◊〉 him that fears not of the fear He â—en distinguisheth 'twixt ordinate and â—ordinate fear of Hell Ordinate is that whereby the fault is more feared than the punishment inordinate when the punishment is feared more than the fault which some call servile fear Thence he leads us to the Spring-head of this fear of Hell shewing how it springs not from a spirit of Adoption which inspires coelestial suavities into the heart but from the spirit of bondage or a certain general Grace of of God Yet addes he this fear of Hell is attributed to the Grace of God because 1. It proceeds from a Legal faith of Gods Eternal Judgement which is a gift of God 2. God followes this apprehension of future Judgement with comminations threats and commotions of Conscience c. 3. God works this fear by softening the heart and that either by the immission of temporal tribulations or by the ablation of carnal delights which harden Conscience Thence he shews cap. 25. that this fear of Hell is not from the special grace of Christ 1. Because it produceth a Legal Righteousness 2. It does not sever the heart from sin because the sinner flies not from sin but from punishment he abhors sin not as sin but as dolorifick or painfull there remains still in such a depraved will which is chained by fear of Hell but not mortified or extinguisht Hence cap. 35. he proceeds to Explicate the good effects of this legal fear in order to a thorough conversion and so he concludes that this servile fear of hell as 't is fear so 't is good but as servile so 't is evil Jansenius having discoursed at large of medicinal Grace §. 23. Of Free-will its nature c. its nature and effects he returns again to the
mean time by their Agents Nuncioes Emissaries and Confidents of all sorts abroad they of the Court endeavour to sound the minds of the great and the many where the Controversies are managed and to take a just measure of the Interests of the several Parties engaged in the contest depending before his Holiness If upon search inquiry and mature deliberation it appears that there is any thing looking towards a ballance between the Parties litigant the managers of the Politicks of the Roman See proceed as warily as if they feared a Scorpion under every stone in their way or should tread on deceitful ashes that might burn if not consume them For the most part in such cases his Holiness would be glad on any terms to be freed from making a decision and is oftentimes more than half angry with those whom he most favours that they should bring him into any straits by their importunity to have an interposition of his Authority on their behalf But yet it may be things come at last to that pass that a continued suspence or absolute refusal to determine any thing is judged to be more noxious and dangerous than a determination against the Interest of that Party which the Court is fully satisfied to be ruinable though at present some way considerable In this case a decision shall be made not direct express or absolute in terms and propositions affirming or denying with respect unto the controverted Opinions but in words and terms loose ambiguous and general only with a favourable aspect towards them of that Party to whom the Golden Ball of Conquest is finally intended The use of this forlorn is only to attempt the waters oâ— strife and to try whether they arâ— fordable or no. If the Partie supposed the most numerous and of thâ— most prevailing Secular Interest beâ—fore being now reinforced and enâ—couraged by the noise of the Bullâ— which they bring home in triumphâ— can drive their Adversaries from any of their former Posts and geâ— ground against them that ground shall be firmed to them speedily by new Briefs Orders or Decrees from the Court and so accordingly their whole progress shall be established untill they arrive at a compleat Conquest and Victory But if beyond expectation the adverse party do make a stand and either by their number ability reputation popular favour or Soveraign influence seem probable to keep their ground the Court will not in haste engage into â—ny further process but rather â—eave the first Bull to be reverently â—talled for a further occasion In the mean time it is not imaginable with what crafts subtilties artifices false promises and pretences by what endless Legal intricacies Forms Processes Orders Rescripts those who have conduct of the Roman Court do manage themselves and those with whom they have to do on such occasions all which are laid open and discovered unto the world by men of their own Party and Profession And unto such a full evidence and manifestation are these things arrived that I much question whether any man of tolerable Learning and observation amongst them can be so unhappily and prodigiously stupid as to look upon the Papal determination of Controversies in Religion any otherwise than as a thing utterly forreign to the Gospel of Jesus Christ or a meer Pâ—â—litical Engine introduced by in 〈◊〉 rest managed by fraud for the prâ—â—servation of such an agreemeâ—â— amongst them as may serve the aâ—â—vantage of those that are entrustâ—â— with it Were it not but that 〈◊〉 power and efficacy of prejudice 〈◊〉 love of this present world wiâ—â— other corrupt lusts and affectionâ—â— do continually manifest themselveâ— in the wayes of the Children of men 〈◊〉 a man could not but be astonished thaâ— all rational men should not nauseâ—â— ate this abominable Pageantry 〈◊〉 deciding Controversies in Religioâ— by the Roman Tripos An addreâ—â— made by crafty interested men armâ—ed with Commendatory Letters from great Men and Princes provided with money to gratifie or bribe Officers of all sorts unto an Old Pope who sometimes is so ingenious asâ— to confess that he understands little in Divinity and knows nothing of the matter proposed to his decision He to take care of the interests of the Holy See which comprehends whatever is desirable to the carnal minds of men in power wealth and pleasure commends the matter to the craftiest of his Cardinals and his Courtiers so to manage it as no detriment may arise thereunto Whatever the experience of Rule Diligence Dissimulation false Promises spirited by distance and veneration of greatness pomp and power can enable them to compass these men will not fail to effect so as to secure the concerns of the Court. When this is done and it appears upon advice which way they may steer safely and advantagiously for themselves as to the various Interests of the persons litigant they advise the Pope what he is to determine in a matter that neither he nor they have any tolerable understanding in or comprehension of It may be for the farther solemnity of the business threâ— or four Friers of a side shall be admitted to dispute the matter in conâ—troversie before the Pope himself or some of the Cardinals whereiâ— yet it shall be so provided thâ—â— those on whose side the Conclavâ— is resolved to determine shall havâ— one way or other advantage enough to give countenance to the sentenâ—â— before fixed on When all is concluded and ready a devout Bull 〈◊〉 drawn up in a due form of Laâ— wherein all these preceding juglingâ— and deceits with others innumeâ—rable are Fathered upon the Inspiâ—ration and assistance of the Holâ— Ghost given unto the Pope who haâ— the least hand it may be in thâ— matter I dare not I will not saâ— with that Papal Legat Quoniaâ— Populus vult decipi decipiatur But this I am apt to think that strong delusion doth assuredly possess the minds of those who can believe that such lyes have any footstep or foundation in the Religion of Jesus Christ. And herein consists that great means of agreement amongst themselves whereof they boast which how long it will yield them relief in that kind God only knows its foundation being in the sin and blindness of the world its continuance may be long for ought I know Now Reader that thou maist not suspect thy self imposed on or any thing in the preceding Discourse to be asserted either partially or without due evidence of Truth behold here an Instance in the ensuing Treatise wherein not only everything that I have declared is exemplified to the full but also sundry other ffects of the old mysterious Iniquity the Roman See are plainly discovered This is the Instance of Jansenisme the Rice Progress State and condition whereof the ensuing Treatise giveth an Historical account There are very few I suppose amongst us who so little concern themselves in Religion especially when it once comes to bear a share in the publick and political transactions of the Nations of the world
Dogmatick Idea of Jansenisme The Principles of Jansenisme as laid down by Jansenius 1. Efficacious Grace the first Principle of Jansenisme of habitual and actual adjutorie 2. The traduction of Original sin 3. How far Invincible ignorance is sin 4. Of sinfull Concupiscence 1 Joh. 2. 16. 5. Of the nature of Fruition and that God is its alone object 6. Why love to the creature for it self is irregular 7. The pestiferous effects of creature-creature-love and fruition 8. No free-will to good 9. Indifference not essential to Liberty neither does voluntary Necessitie exclude it 10. The state of pure Nature since the fall is but a philosophick figment 11. Love to God in the state of Innocence both natural and supernatural How love to God is a debt to humaâ— Nature and yet of Grace 12. Therâ— is no natural Grace or Happines bâ— what is supernatural 13. How Gâ— cannot but punish sin Sin the greateâ— punishment of sin 14. No Obligatioâ— on God to give Grace to such as improve Naturals 15. The impotence 〈◊〉 the Law as to salvation and the irrâ—â—tation of sin thereby 16. Of Medicâ—â—nal efficacious Grace and its necessitiâ— 17. The nature of efficacious Grace iâ— Divine suavity 18. There is no sufficient Grace but what is efficaciouâ— 19. How many wayes Gods Precept are usefull and possible without sufficient Grace 20. The Distributions 〈◊〉 Efficacious Grace into preventing anâ— subsequent 21. All Grace in love 〈◊〉 God 22. Of servile fear its causes c. 23. Of Free-will its nature c. 24. The mode of reconciling Free-wiâ—â— with Efficacious Grace 25. Of Preâ—destination its act object motives c 26. Of Reprobation and against Vnâ—versal Grace 27. Against Scholastick Theologie 28. The Jansenists Dâ—gmes of faith touching the perfection of Scriptures efficacious Grace justification by faith c. 29. Their practical Theologie 30. Their Principles as to Church Discipline 1. That there is no humane infallible judge in matters of faith 2. That Churchâ—power is declarative only 3. For liberty of Conscience c. HAving given some Historick account of Jansenisme §. 1. The Principles of Jansenisme its Authors Rise and Progresse together with sundry particularities as to matter of fact we now proceed to its Principles both Dogmatick and Practick wherein we may be more affirmative and peremptory than in former matters of fact The Principles of Jansenisme as of all Religiâ—n have a threefold 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or regard 1. To Faith or Doctrine 1. The Notional Principles of Jansenisme as laid down by Jansenius 2. To Discipline and Worship 3. To Morals or Conversation We shall begin with the first namely the Principles of Jansenisme relating unto Faith which though in themselves more speculative and national yet have they a very soverein influence on practice These national principles of Jansenisme may be considered as laid down by Jansenius the Founder of this Sect or as taken up by his Adhaerents We shall first consider them as they are to be found in Jansenius his Augustinus which is made the source and measure of Jansenisme And here we may not engage so deeply as to extract a perfect Idea of all Jansenius's Doctrine but shall content our selves to cull forth and collect such particular notions of his as carrie in them some note of peculiaritie and remarque whence the denomination of Jansenisme received its Original And in this undertaking we shall follow Jansenius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in his own words translated and method as well as sense so near as we may 1. As 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â— Efficacious Grace the first Principle of Jansenisme the first lie or Idol of Molinisme consists in the asserting of Free-will so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Truth of Jansenisme regards Efficacious Grace This is the first great fundamental notion which I have remarqued in Jansenius and his Adhaerents who indeed are great Advancers of Efficacious Grace but as great Abasers of Corrupt Nature friends of Free Grace but professed enemies of Free-will So Jansenius in his August Tom. 2. fol. 60. distinguisheth of a twofold Adjutorie or Divine Assistance Of a twofold Adjutorie habitual and actual the one he calls an Adjutorie sine quo non without which we cannot act the other he calls an Adjutorie quo by which we act The first he makes to be only habitual preparatory and potential whereby the Powers of the Soul are prepared corroborated and capacitated to act the second he makes to be an actual energetick or influential Adjutorie whence followeth the application and determination of the power to act Habitual Grace The former potential habitual Adjutories he supposeth to be in the same rank with the Power or Facultie for whose corroboration and assistance they are given for out of them and the power which they informe there is constituted one intire complete operative facultie whence the power cloathed with or informed by these habitual Adjutories receives the denomination of an actus primus a first act which gives not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 2. 13. the will Phil. 2. 13. and the doe but only a complete power of willing and doing Amongst thesâ— dispositive potential Adjutories or Assistances he reckons all Habits or Powers as Intelligible species or Ideas and the light of Intelligence commonly stileâ— intellectual Habits as all moral Habits Dispositions and Preparatory Graces seated in the will Of Actual Grace and its necessitie As for the adjutoriuâ— quo the Adjutorie by which we act oâ— actual Assistance he proves by invincible arguments that both the Will and the freeness of the will as to whatever is morally good depends immediately and wholly on the actual Adjutorie or concourse of Efficacious Grace This he proves at large in his Tom. 3. lib. 1. c. 2 3. but especially cap. 4. fol. 6. where he gives this Demonstrative reason from the cause why no Mâ—tion or Act of the Will can be Morally good without the Adjutorie of Efficacious Grace The true root sayes he why no work morally good can be done without Grace freeing or uncaptivating the will is this That which by the bondage of Concupiscence is taken from good works is not some supernaturalitie of the work or the Reason of merit but it is the very formal Reason by which a good work is constituted such so that upon the defect thereof sin ipso facto followeth For the Pondus or weight of Concupiscence with which the soul is possessed wrests it from the love of justice and rectitude which is necessarily and essentially required in every good work and fastens it to some Creature But of this more hereafter 2. Another great Principle §. 2. 2. The traduction of Original sin on which Jansenius does largely discourse in order to the subversion of Molinisme is touching the Traduction or propagation of Original sin c. So Jansen August Tom. 2. lib. 1. cap. 6. fol. 86. I find it sayes he to be the
undubitable opinion of Austin That Original sin is no otherwise propagated from the first man to Posteritie but by the lust or Concupiscence of the flesh that by the magnitude of that sin all humane nature should be vitiated For by this it comes to pass that this Concupiscential Law or evil of Nature being propagated also Original sin should be propagated This he does more fully explicate in what follows cap. 19. of this lib. 1. Where he proves out of Austin that good or evil Qualities are propagated not by Emigration but Afficiencie i. e. by affecting what is produced by reason whereof there is some like Qualitie propagated as lights are propagated by Afficiencie without emigration Jansenius asserts here a Prolifick force in the seed also a great efficacie in the fancie of the Parent for the propagation of original sin concluding that the depraved Imagination and Lust of the Parents have a mighty force and influence on the Morals of their children And whereas it may be demanded how the soul can receive Impuritie from the bodie he replies that the soul by the defilement of the flesh becomes fleshly for the societie of sinful flesh hinders it from savoring any thing that is spiritual as liquors receive a tang from the vessel §. 3. The depravation of the understanding and how far invincible ignorance is sin c. Jansenius proceeds from his Discourse of Original Sin in general to the particular branches thereof and begins with the Depravation of the Vnderstanding So in his Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 5 6. fol. 128. Where that which deserves special remarque is that he proves against the common persuasion of the Scholes that invincible ignorance of what is our duty is both sinful and punishable His words are these Invincible ignorance which flows from necessitie not from the will is not without sin By invincible ignorance he means such as cannot be overcome by any human diligence And first he takes it for granted Jansen Aug. to 2. lib. 2. c. 2 3 4 5. that invincible penal ignorance wherein we are borne wants not sin Then he comes to a distribution of Ignorance into Ignorance of Law and of Fact as for Ignorance of Law 't is either of the Divine Posâ—tive Law or of the natural Law and thence he concludes That the question is not of invincible Ignorance as to matter of Fact or as to the Divine Positive Law both which excuse from sin but of invincible Ignorance as to the Law of Nature or any branch thereof Now that this invincible Ignorance of Natures Law excuseth not from sin he proves 1. Because the knowledge of the said natural Law is câ—nnatural to human Nature 2. If invincible Ignorance of the Law of Nature should excuse sin there is nâ— reason why judicial exâ—â—cation or blindnes should not also excuse sin for both are a sort of ignorance and both are invincible to corrupt nature only but vincible by Divine Grace and Power Thus Jans Aug. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 6. fo 127 c. Hence Jansenius passeth on to the corruption of the Will and Affections §. 4. Of concupiscence and its natural propention unto the creature which he discourseth of under the notion of Concupiscence So Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. fol. 130. Concupiscence saies he which Tullie calls Lust and the Platonists Pleasure or delectation is nothing else than an habitual pondus or weight by which the soul is inclined and bent to the fruition of the creatures For whether this concupiscence be the very sensitive Appetite and Will as destitute of Grace and by their own gravitie and weight prone to the appetition of things created as many will have it or whether it be somewhat superadded to these powers as Austin rather inclines whether one or t'other its still like an inveterate custome pertinaciously propelling to the fruition of Pleasures Whence Austin more than once calls it a natural and as to all human power invincible custome The â—ject of this concupiscence he makes to 〈◊〉 what ever is not God and particuâ—rly all pleasures not only of the bodie â—ut also of the mind Whence he does â—ith Austin reckon not only the Epicuâ—ans but also the Stoicks and other â—hilosophers who placed the chiefest good 〈◊〉 Wisdom or Virtue as sensual voluptuous â—ersons who lived according to the flesh 〈◊〉 Rom. 8. 4 5. Rom. 8. 4 5. The End of this Concuâ—iscence he makes to be the fruition of the creature For all love either terminates on God and so 't is charity or on the creature and so 't is concupiscence which according to Austin is quandoutiâ—ur fruendis ac fruimur utendis an use of things to be injoyed and an injoyment of things to be used Thence in what follows cap. 8. fol. 132 c. he gives us the distribution of Concupiscence according to that 1 John 2. 16. 1 John 2. 16. into 1. The Concupiscence of the sensitive part or the lusts of the flesh which comprehends all the Pravitie of the external senses c. 2. The Concupiscence of knowing or curiositie termed the lust of the eye 3. Tâ—â— Concupiscence of excelling called thâ— pride of life These three Parts of Coâ—cupiscence he makes the roots of 〈◊〉 sin Jansenius having discoursed at large 〈◊〉 the Adherence of the Will to the creature which he calls Concupiscence §. 5. Of the Nature of fruition and that God is the alone object thereof he comeâ— to treat of the Wills Adhesion to God under the Notion of Fruition So Tom. 2 lib. 2. cap. 16. fol. 150 c. Manâ— saies he love those things they know not they love but this their love is discovered by fruition for love without fruition cannot be understood as neither fruition without love seeing love is the â—eginning of fruition fruition the end of love for none injoys any thing but what he loves and none loves any thing but what he would fain injoy Whence it comes to passe that as there is no Fruition but what is seasoned with love so there is no love but what tends to frution Therefore love saies Austin is nothing else but the will desiring or tending to the fruition of somewhat For love as a hidden fountain precedeth fruition and fruition as an open stream or lake wherein love is drowned is more manifest than Love Wherefore there is the greatest vicinitie betwixt fruition and love so that Austin explicating the reason of fruition saies that to injoy any thing is by love to adhere unto it for it self For if we do not adhere unto the thing for it self we do not properly love it but that other thing for which we adhere to it Fruition properly is not love but the fruit effect and end thereof For love when its object is absent breaks forth into desire and when present and possessed into fruition and joy which is the center that terminates its motion These things being thus explicated it evidently follows adds he according to
be said to be some seminal dispositions naturally implanted in human nature whence sprang those heroick acts of the Romans c. But addes he this Office of virtue is but as the matter or corps 't is the End that is the Forme or soul of virtue Then he concludes that this opinion of the seeâ—s of virtue inherent in human nature was traduced by the Semipelagians from the Gentile Philosophers viz. the Peripateticks Stoicks c. whose opinion Tullie lib. 5. de â—inib thus relates Nature induced the elements of virtue but she only begins virtue and no more These Philosophick opinions of the seeds of virtue addes he the Pelagians Semipelagians and Scholemen have brought into the Christian Scholes whence also the Scholemen distinguish virtue into Natural and supernatural which is a distinction not known to former Ages Jansenius having demonstrated the Impossibilitie of Free Will to good §. 9. Necessitie of sin excludes not human libertie neither is Indifference essential thereto with the necessitie of sinning in lapsed nature he goes on to remove that common Pelagian objection viz. that this necessitie of sin destroyes human Libertie For the full solution hereof he gives us an exact Idea of the Libertie of the Will and its combination with some necessitie Thus Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 24. Where he proves at large That Libertie includes not in its formal reason or nature Indifference to good and evil He shewes that this false Idea of Libertie was taken up by the Pelagians from the institution of Gentile Philosophers who fancying nothing more as requisite to good but the meer office or naked matter asserted an Indifference to good and evil in all wherein they placed Libertie as the Pelagians and Scholemen after them But that Indifference to good and evil is not essential or necessary to Libertie Jansenius proves 1. From the Devils who are determined to evil yet freely 2. From the good Angels who are determined to good yet freely 3. From the cognation 'twixt Libertie and Voluntarinesse For as an act of the Will may be voluntary so also free though immobile and necessarily determined and that according to the confession of the Scholes which grant that a desultori us mobilitie or mutabilitie of will is not of the essâ—nce of Libertie but its imperfection He farther proves that Libertie is the same with voluntarines yea the same with the will it self which ceaseth not to be most free when 't is most fixed and necessary Yea this firmitie and necessitie which ariseth from the wills own natural vehemence or voluntary tendence is so far from prejudicing its Libertie as that it does greatly corroborateâ— and confirme the same He tells us also that these false â—dea's of human libertie were derived from Aristotle who measured every thing by his own reason Whereas others of the Ancients had morâ— Orthodoxe notions of human libertie making it the same with rational spontaneitie or voluntarines c. of these things Jansenius discourseth at large in what follows chap. 25. also in his Tom. 3â— lib. 6. cap. 3. 5. 10 25 35 37 c. The Molinists to maintain their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 §. 10. Against a state of pure Nature or great Diana of free will invented a middle state which they call 〈◊〉 state of pure Nature without sin or Grace This Jansenius greatly opposeth as thaâ— which was greatly derogâ—tory to the Wisdome and Grace of God So in his Tom. 2. 〈◊〉 spends two or three whole Books in disproving this state of pure Nature 1. Hâ— tells us that such a state of pure Nature was altogether unknown to Austin and the Primitive Church it having been obtruded upon us by the Gentile Philosophers and Christian Hereticks the Pelagians c. so fol. 278. Then he passeth l. 1. c. 1. fol. 279. to what the latter Scholemen mean by this their state of pure nature viz. a Negative Puritie wherein they suppose a man to be created without Sin or Grace I presume the same with Aristotles rasa tabula which he likened the soul unto Now that there cannot be such a state of pure nature Jansenius proves 1. From the order or regard a rational creature has unto God as his first princâ—ple and last end or good For saies he 't is impossible that a rational creature should be produced by God in a connatural manner without some regard to his last and most connatural end So cap. 3. fol. 282. For the reason of Divine Providence and the connatural order of things require that as things proceed from a first principle so they tend to some last end Yea this flows from the very Institution of Human Nature and is founded in its very Essence that it adhere to God as its supreme principle and last end Which not to do is sin 2. Seeing a rational creature cannot be made without a will regularly inclined to God as Creator hence followeth a necessitie of Grace to inspire this will whereby the possibilitie of a state of pure nature is overturned c. 3. All love terminates either on the creature and so 't is concupiscence or on God and so 't is Divine Charitie or love c. Whence it follows there can be no middle state 'twixt sin and Grace because the will alwayes adheres to God or the creature Hence Jansenius proceeds to demonstrate §. 11. Love to God in the state of Innocence both natural and supernatural That Love to God was in the state of Innocence a gift naturally due to humane Nature and yet of Grace given to it So Tom. 2. de Pur. Nat. l. 1. c. 15. If saies he a rational creature cannot be created without love to God then hence occurs a weighty difficultie whether this love may be stiled natural or supernatural a debt or Grace To which he replies thus It seems to me that both may be affirmed without a contradiction That this love is supernatural is beyond controversie amongst all Catholicks for as eternal blisse so the Love of God which is the way thereto is in like manner supernatural for though one and t'other be the action of a creature yet neither flows from the principles of nature or natural faculties and force This love to God may be called also natural not only as consentaneous unto Nature but 1. On the part oâ— reason as the natural light of reason dictates that God is to be beloved above all and that by the most natural strict and universal obligation than which nothing is more moral essential and eternally obliging to human Nature c. 2. This love of God may be said to be natural in regard of the will as God is the most natural end of its choice according to that of Scotus God is the natural end of man although not to be obtained naturally Whence he starts another difficultie cap. Whether this love to God be a debt to human Nature 17. fol. 312. Whether this love to God be a debt due to human