actual love of God is taken properly only of those aâ—â—s that are terminated immediately unto God and all those that are terminated unto us men for Gods sake are termed the love of God only improperly and by a trope and Dr. Hammond speaks absolutely of the actual love of God and hath nothing to restrain his speech unto the latter sort of acts and therefore he is to be understood of the former those that arâ— immediately terminated on God Secondly If this were a mistake it had been an easie matter for Dr. Hammond to have prevented it in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a clear and distinct explication of his meaning but he hath not done this and therefore if the Refuter be to be blamed Dr. Hammond cannot be altogether excused But I deny that I am guilty of any such mistake as is imputed to me For that Christs actual love of God in Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of all those acts of love that were immediately terminated on us men all duties of the Second Table c. I shall prove by an Argument drawn from the Relation that Dr. Hammonds discourse concerning Christs actual love of God c. hath to the Commandment Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 〈◊〉 and with all thy soul and with all thy might It is brought as an Exemplification and proof of his interpretation thereof and therefore this actual love of God in Christ must be the same with that love of God which is there commanded Now that love of God which is there commanded is that only which is immediatly terminated on God For 1. It must be with all the heart soul might and strength and the Acts of love that are terminated unto the creature immediatly cannot be performed in such an intension without grosse and palpable Idolatry 2. The love of God here commanded is by our Saviour himself distinguished from the love of our neighbour and of our selves and consequently 't is restrained unto the love of God which is terminated immediatly upon God Jesus saith The great Commandement 〈◊〉 the Law is Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind this is the first and great Commanâ—ement and the second is like unto it Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self Matth. 22. vers 36 37 38 39. Here these two Commandements are the two Summaries of the Commandements of both Tables And seeing they are distinguished by our Saviour himself we must not make any confusion betwixt them But they are confounded when the duties of the second Table or this Commandement Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self are ranged under the first Table Or this Commandement Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart soul might and strength Now those acts of charity that are immediatly terminated unto us men for Gods sake are all Duties of the second Table and belong unto that Commandment Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self 3. Unto this let me adde a third Argument which may be reduced unto the first taken from the second Part of Doctor Hammona's Exposition of the place and thus it stands That act of the love of God which transcends all those acts of love that are immediatly terminated on the creature is that high act of the love of God which is immediatly fixed and terminated on God as the only good But the act of the love of God which is commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 transcends all those acts of love which are immediatly terminated on the creature Therefore 't is that act of the love of God which is terminated and fixed immediatly on God himself as the only good The Major is undeniable and if the Minor be not Doctor Hammond's own let the Defendant expound unto us these words of his That Phrase thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul denoteth secondly the loving him above all other things and not admitting any thing into competition with him not 〈◊〉 any thing else in such a degree This argument may briefly be thus also varied No acts of the love of God that are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake can be those very acts that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake for one and the same thing cannot be superiour unto it self But those acts of the love of God that are commanded Deut. 6.5 are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake and so much is evident by Dr. Hammond's exposition of the place And therefore those acts of the love of God that are commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 are not those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake But suppose that Dr. Hammond spake of those acts of holy charity that are terminated on us men for Gods sake yet by what the Defendant saith it will be no injustice to think that he speaks of those actâ—s under this reduplication as terminated immediately on God himself For by the Defendants opinion pag. 234 235 holy charity and it's acts are terminated unto us mea for God's sake onely as a material object and unto God's infinite goodnss alone as the formal object Now things are rather denominated from that which agreeth unto them formally then from that which is ascribed unto them onâ—ly materially for dâ—nâ—minatio fit à pottori Now those acts of charity that are terminated unto us men considered as terminated on God as their formal object ought to be in all and were in Christ alwayes at the height and one equal perfection Our Defendant himself confesses pag. 217. that to English ears this phâ—ase the love of God seems especially to import the prime and more principal love that hath God for its immediate Object but then withal he adds that in Scripture phrase it frequently does not The first place he quotes is Luk. 11.42 Wo unto you Phariseâ—â— saith our Saviour for ye tythe mint and rue and all manner of hâ—rbs and passe over judgement and the love of God these ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone But this place he confesseth to be otherwise expounded by divers and we have saith he no need of doubtfull places But 't is without doubt that the love of God is not there taken in such a latitude oâ— amplitude as to contain the whole duty of man towards God and our neighbour for 't is distinguished from judgement and that compriseth if not all yet a great part of our duty towards our neighbour But the Defendant in the next place alledgeth instances out of the first Epistle of St. John that are he saith beyond all exception The first instance is 1 John 2.5 But who so keepeth his word in him verily is the love of God perfected hereby know we that we are in him But to prove the impertinency of this place we need go no
loving p. 21 22 25 c. usque ad 42 73 74 75 76 77 115 116 117 118 120 121 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 211 212 113 214. But first suppose though not grant that there were such a term of the immanent action of loving yet this cannot be the actual Divine love which Dr. H. speaks of For 1. The actual love which he speaks of is the matter of that Commandement Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart c. Now that the supposed term of the immanent action of love is not in any probability For 1. That is most likely to be the matter of this precept whose being is most undeniable and uncontroverted but the existence of immanent actions is less questioned then that of their terms The existence of these hath been much questioned by many subtil Philosophers and setting aside Philosophers the most of men never so much as dâ—camt of them Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Question An omnis actio habeat terminum and demand of them whether they think that by the immanent actions of their senses their understandings and wills they preduce within themselves certain qualities of the same name with the actions themselves and I am confident that most if not all of them will return a negative answer 2. The matter of this precept is of a very important general an necessary obligation and therefore it must be obvious and evident unt all that have the use of their reason so that the knowledge of it ma be gained without any great difficulty but now the pretended terme of the action of loving is a very dark and abstruse thing and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men understand it Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet strangers to what the Schoolmen say about the nature of it 3. We may and ought to examine the sincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded Deut. 6.5 But it would be new Divinity to say that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love whether they be in us or no men may with some certainty review and reflect upon the habit of love and the immanent actions thereof but their reslex knowledg of the terms thereof can be but conjectural 2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond speaks is by the Defendant such wherein there is exercised that freedome of the will which is usually called a freedome of indifferency But there is no freedome of the will exercised in the supposed terms of the immanent action for they presupposing the actions are supposed to be necessary and unavoidable and therefore the will hath no indifferency unto them the will indeed is a free cause of the action of loving but this action if it be the cause of a terme it is the natural and necessary cause thereof 3. The Terme of the immanent action of loving is called love saith the Defendant for want of sufficient words but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond speaks of is very very ridiculous For of that love saith he love is predicated as a genus and so in primo modâ— dicendi per se the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant cannot be the terme of the immanent action of loving But secondly It is denyed also by many great both Philosophers and Divines that there is any such terme as the immanent action of loving and they say the same of all other immanent actions Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Diffenters but my self and my poor Master Scheibler But this bewrayes his gross ignorance in the School-men many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion and go herein a great deale farther then he Durand is very express for it Lib. 1. dist 27. q. 2. Capreolus l. 1. dist 27. q. 2. quotes also Aureolus Petrus de Pallude Gerar. de Carmâ—lo as of the same judgment unto these I may add Scotus upon the same Dist quaest 3. and two Eminent Scotists Philip. Faber Favâ—ntinus lib. 1. disp 21. and Reda l. 1. Controvers 7. represent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus Unto all these let me farther subjoyn Raphel Aversa Philos tom 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciscus bonae spei in lib. de animâ Disp 2. dub 3. who mentions others of the same perswasion Oviedo though he blame Cajetan and other Thomists for denying actual intellection to have a terme because every action he thinks is productive of some terme or other yet he thinks this opinion may be so interpreted as to be drawn into a good sense and that is done he supposeth by making the terme not to be really distinct but the same with actual intellection Haec opinio jure ab omnibus rejecta si loquendi modum attemperaret mea quidem sententia optime posset defendi Existimo enim tantum in modo loquendi discedere à sententiâ quam poste à omnibus praeferam asserente intellectionem consistere in qualitate immediatè per se-ipsam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanaute vel in actione identificatâ cum termino quod sic ostendo utraque opinio constituit intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimananâ—e per suammet entitatem ex vi cujus intellectûs in actu secundo constituitur formaliter intelligens Ergo tantum differunt hae duae opiniones ex â—o quod una entitatem hanc essentialiter per suam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem nullum distinctum terminum respicientem vocat actionem sine termino altera â—andemmet entitatem vocat actionem â—um termino identificatam Neutra â—nim barum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit vel negat quam altera opinio diverso modo deâ—endat De anima Controv 6. punct 1. S. 1. It were an easie matter to produce many other testimonies But the matter must not be carried by the number of voices but by the weight of Arguments And therefore I shall next propound the Arguments on both sides The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two sorts the first prove that some immanent actions have no terms the second that no immanent actions have any terme The 1. That some immanent actions have no terms Cajetan as it is said determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and such are the Beatifical Vision of the Saints in Heaven the Angels intuitions of themselves And the reason which he giveth is Because the Objects of such intellections are per se present unto them and intimately conjoyned with them But omitting Cajetan I shall insist onely upon the Arguments of Scheibter which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Defendant is pleased in derision to call him my Master But where the wit of the Sarcasme lieth is best if not onely known unto himself If his meaning be that I have no Metaphysicks
Contradiction for they incline unto frequency of their acts loco tempore debitis and incline against sinful omission of their acts This Reason may for the substance of it be collected from what the School-mâ—n usually say to prove that free-will doth not consist in a habit I shall at present content my self only with a Quotation of Aquinas Primâ part q. 83. a. 2. Corp. Habitus dicuntur secundum quos nos habemus ad pâ—ssionâ—s vel ad actus bâ—ne vel male nt dâ—citur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad omcupiscentiâ—s Per intemperantiam a tem male Per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum incellectus dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contearium male Liberum awem arbitrium indifferenâ—er se habet ad bene eligendum vel male unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habiâ—us This mutatis matandis will prove that no habit is formally free Secondly Though habits be not formally free yet I confess they are in regard of their use and exercise subject * Aquinas 1. 2 ae q. 52. a. 3. q. 63. a. 2. q. 71. a. 4. unto the impery of the will So that the will freely useth or not useth them But this will no wayes advantage the Defendant for all men are obliged to act the habit of love as touching its inward acts unto the highest ad extremum virium They are bound to love God with all their might and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength and if their love fall short of this height it is sinâ—ul and defective which cannot without blasphemy be imagined of Christ who was impeccabilis and therefore fulfilled all righteousness and therefore when he loved God he lovâ—d him as much as he could the all-fulness of his actual love was for dâ—grees answerable to the all-fulness of his nabitual As for his Answer to my seconâ— Argument drawn from the beatifical vision in Christ that hath been sufficiently replyed unto in my examination of his distinction of Christs love of God as he was Viator and as he was Comprebenso The third and last Argument was fetcht from Christs impeceability It was impossible for Christ to sin but if the inward acts of his love of God had been less intense at one time than at another he had sinned for he had broken that first and great Commandment Thou shalte love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind with all thy might and strength Deut. 6.5 Mat. 22.37 Mark 12.30 Luke 10.27 In Answer unto this Argument the Defdenant insists from pag. 357. usque ad 520. of examining which his own concession will save the labour for he grants that if we speak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himself we are bound to love God to the utmost height we can and that he who doth not so love him doth not love him so much as he deserveth or as much as man ought and that therefore the acts of Christâ— love as immediately terminated on God were alwayes at the the height and one equal perfection p. 71. Now that Doctor Hammond is to be understood of this eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God I have clearly demonstrated and unlesse the Defendant can answer my arguments his accusation of my third argument as guilty of that Sophisme which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will passe but for an idle and ignorant calumny The Defendants friends may be ready to say that 〈◊〉 decline the examination of that which followeth because 't is unanswerable but alass there 's no such matter for that it is a very â—otten eâ—roneous discourse guilty of complyance with Popâ—ry in a great measure I shall shortly demonstrate in a dâ—stinct Treatise if God grant me life health and liberty The reason then why at present I take no further notice of it is because not only the Stationer but divers good friends have for several reasons much importuned me to contract this Debate as much as I could and I should now forth with put a period to it but that I am desirous to give the Readet in brief a further taste of the inconsâ—qâ—â—â—ncies with which 〈◊〉 work of Doctor Creed is every where fraught First p. 53 54 55 56 57 he concludes that a habit of divine love in Christ was not capable of further degrees because the act and exercise of it was capable of further degrees If Christs love of God in the act and exercisâ— was capable of Degâ—ees more intense at one time than another and had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees one different from another secundâ—m magis minus all them comprehended in because issuing from the habit of Divine Love then this babitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes pray Master Defendant mark the word alwayes in him so fall and so perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees But the Antecedent is true and therefore also the Consequent The evidence of the sequel is supposed and grounded upon two very â—nowâ— Maxims Nihil est in effectu quod non prius erat in causâ and Nihil dat quod non habit This is an argument silly and ridiculous beyond all comparison for mutatis mutandis a man from it may argue against the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were are or shall be on the earth If their love of God in this life in the acts and exercise was capable of Degrees c. then their habitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes in them so full and perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees As for the two known Maxims they will do him no service unlesse he put in the word semper Nihil est in effectu quod non erat prius semper in causa Nihil dat quod non habet semper And if you adde the particle semper every fresh-man will soone discover their notorious falshood Secondly p. 57. he hath another rare consequence The Apostle saith that Christ's being in the forme of God though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God yet made himself of no reputation and took upon him the forme of a servant and was made in the likunesse of man and being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself and became obedient unto death even the death of the Crosse wherefere God also hath exalted him Therefore Christs love viz. actual and inward was more intense at one time than another v.z. iâ— his agony and dying for us more intense than in his suffering nakednesse and hunger for us Thirdly in p. 18 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have these words If this be your meaning I must needs assume the
Pâ—râ—pâ—teticis licet in actibus ad extra pâ—â—â—ant Dâ—um agere necessariò beati in patria sâ—â—undum nos libere diligunt Dâ—â—n tamen necessario licâ—t â—rgo in voluntâ—â—â— creata pro hoc statu couâ—iagentia concomitâ—nter libertatem saepe consunâ—â—ntur tamen propr è loqu 〈…〉 idem ut vidimus ex hoc patet solutâ—o dabâ—tat onis quia licet concedamus Spiritum Sanctum procedere libere non tamen ab hoc sequitur contingerter produci Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sent. disp 37. c 4. p. 224 325. answer that there is no such repugnancy betwixt freedome and necessity as is imagined indeed a natural agent and a free are opposite and so also a necessary agent and cowingent And therefore the same agent in the sane act cannot work naturally and freelâ— wâ—â—ssarily and contingently But now there is no such opposition betwixt natural and contingent and betwixt free and nâ—cessary and hereup on it followeth that a natural agent may work contingently and per accidens as we see in Monsters in casu and soâ—â—wta and so again on the other side a free agent may work necessarily thus God loves himself most freely and yet withal most necâ—ssarily too Rada hath four very shrewd Arguments to prove the coâ—sistency of the highest freedome with the highest necâ—ssity which I shall insert for the Defendant to try his utmost still upon Quod summa necessitas â—star cum summâ libertate probo multipliciter Primòvoluntas divina necessariò vult bonitatem suam ut supra ostendimus tamen in volendo eam est libera igitur libertas stat cum summâ necessitate Consequentia tenet minorem verò probo Voluntas divina refert ad finem alia objecta quae sunt volibilia propter finem igitur ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae est operativa circa utrunque sed circa ea quae sunt ad sinem operatur sub ratione potentiae liberae ut etiam Thomistae concedunt ergo etiam circa sinem ut puta circa bonitatem suam operabitur sub ratione potentiae liberae ergò liberè vult bonitatem suam Prima consequentia hujus argumentationis probatur quia potentia operans circa unum objectum non absolutè sed in ordine ad aliud eadem sub eadem ratione est operativa circa utrunque Quod pater ex Philos 2. de anima tex Com. 146. ubi ait quod potentia illa qua cognoscimus differentiam unius objecti ab alio illamet sub eadem ratione potentiae cognoscit utrunque ergo simâ—liter in proposiâ—o potentia operans circa unum objectum in ordin ad aliud ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae operabitur circa utâ—unque Et câ—nfiâ—matunquia alias oporterer constituere unam potentiam quae versaretur ciâ—ca sinem aliam circa media Secundò probatur Libertas est Conditio intrinseca voluntatis absolute vel in ordâ—ne ad actum volâ—ndi ergo est compossibilis cum conditione perfecta operaâ—ionis perfectae circa perfectâ—ssimum Objectum praesertim illa conditio nâ—n repugnat imâ— otest convenire tali operationi sed talis conditio in operatione perfâ—ctâ—est necessitas Erâ—ò libertas est compossibilis cum necessitate Antecedens est manifestum quia voluntas natura sua intâ—inseca libera est Consequentia probatur quia conditio intrinseca potentiae quae secundum se nullam dicit imperfectionem non potesf esse contraria perfectioni operationis ejusdem potentiae quia tunc prorsus repugnaret hujusmodi potentiae habere perfectam operationem etiam in ente infinito in quo reperitur Sâ—dâ—quod talis conditio perfecta sit necessitas patet quia perfectio voluntatis unde voluntas est est diligere Deum ergo perfectionis est habere illam operationem sirmiter necâ—ssariò Et confirmatur quia posse non habere illam dicit imperfectionem ergò necessariò habere illam perfectionis est maximae rutsus ergo est possibilis illa necessitas in operatione perfectâ— voluntatis ut voluntas est alias enim nec in Deo reperitetur Tertiò probatur Actio circa finem ultimum ut finis est est perfectissima ergo necessitas in tali actione non tollit sed magis ponit id quod ad ejus perfectionem per sepertinet sed libertas maxime eam perficit ergo necessitas quae in tali actione reperitur non tollit sed ponit potius libertatem Probo assumptionem quia actio libera ex natura sua est perfectior cunctis operationibus ut in controversiis quarti Deo favente ostendemus Quarto probatur Qâ—antoactio voluntatis circa finem ultimum est magis necessaria tanto est liberior Ergo summa necessitas est compossibilis cum summa libertate Consequentia est evidens antecedens probo quia secundum Anselmum Augustinum quos suprà citavimus illa voluntas est liberior quae omninò à rectitudine deviare non potest sed illa quae necessariò simpliciter diligit bonum insinitum à rectitudine nullatenus deviare potest ergo illa est liberrima sed talis est divina voluntas respectu dilectionis Dei c. ergo est respectu carum liberrima In 1 â—m lib. Sent. Controv. 13. p. 213 214. The Defendant is pleased to say page 68. That the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely with a freedome improperly taken for a liberty from coâ—action But first the Scotists * Cenditio intrinscca potentâ—e â—â—n repugnot perfâ—ctioni inâ—p rando ip Gus potenâ—ie si 〈◊〉 ab sulatè potâ—mia consideretu siâ— in ordine adâ—actum perfectum sâ—d libertas est coad tio intrinscea essentiatis voluntatis ergo non repugnat pâ—rficiâ—oni â—â—sius vol nâ—aâ—is in operande ei ca actium porfâ—ctissmum Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sâ—nt disp 37. c 3. p. 221. will tell him that freedome is attributed unto their love of God in the greatest propriety For the beatisick love is the greatest perfection incident unto their wills and freedome is an intrinsâ—cal and essential condition of their wills Now say they thâ—â— which is intâ—insâ—cal and esscutâ—â—l unto a power or faculty cannot be repugnant unto the greatest perfect on thereof therefore the beatisick love of God which is accessary and freedome are no wayes inconsistent Secondly In their love of God there is a freedome not only from coact on but also from natural necessity such as that which is in the metion of a stone downward which prelupposeth no act of the understanding The nâ—cessity which is in their love of God is not such anecessity but a voluntary necessity which hath alwayes foregoing anact of intellectual knowledge And this for the first answer unto the difficulty propounded There is by some School-men given another indeed a quite contrary answer and 'c is that Christs love of God was not meritorious and in asserting this they think there is no absurdity
what laws of disputation a Respondent though a School-man is obliged to heap up testimonies out of School-men for the confirmation of every denyal that he makes especially if the proposition denyed be apparently false as this was viz. That the outward expressions and the inward acts of love of God in Christ must of necessity be of equal intension And thus hoping that by the next we shall know why you fell into this fit of wondering I pass on Seventhly In the next place you tell us that in men the inward affection commonly varies according to the intension and remission of the outward expressions and effects and in prosecution of this he spends with a great deal of noise and triumph about 16. pages more p. 155 156 c. â—usque ad 171. But what of all this Sir is this any thing to the matter in hand Can you from any thing in this tedious discourse inferre any thing against my Denyal vlz. that the outward different expressions of love must of necessity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love and if you cannot as undoubtedly you cannot to what end serves all that you say but to waste time pen ink and paper But you tell us often that the Doctor is no wayes engaged to prove that the inward acts of love and the outward expressions are of necessity equal in point of intension But the contrary will appear to every Puâ—sâ—ny in Logick that will but peruse the Doctors sequel as 't is in him at large for thus it runneth and from hence I suppose is unavoidably consâ—queâ—t prâ—y Mr. Defendant mark the word unavoidably that that act of internal love expâ—esâ—ed by Christs dying for us was supeâ—â—â—ur to thâ—se â—oâ—mer act supply in intention which only exprest themselves in his povertie and so the same person that loved sincerely did also love and expresse that love more intensely at one time then at another which was the very thing I said in another instancâ— Now choose unto this consequent what Antecedent you will out of Dr Hammonds words either those that are immedâ—aâ—ely foregoing yet it being â—eâ—â—ain that each of these expresâ—ions had an act of internal love of which they were so many propertionabâ—y different expressionâ— or thâ—se that precede these To this I subjoyne that such as the expression waâ— such was the act of inward love of which that was an expression and from it it is impossible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends to inferre thâ—s consequent But you pretend p â—68 that you have done the feat your self And now because you pâ—â—sesse and it is your third charge that the reason of the Doctâ—rs consequencâ— is to you invisible and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate uâ—til you be dâ—iven thereto by â—educing his Enâ—hymeâ—â—e unto a Syllogisme I shâ—â—l â—nce for your better satisfaction â—â—rsâ—râ—e it Iâ— ordinaâ—iâ—y there iâ— and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of Inâ—erâ—ion and Râ—mission betwixt the inward acts of love and the outward expressions then that act of internal love expressed by Christs dyiâ—g for us was superiour to thâ—se former acts which only exprest themselves in hâ—s Povertie c. But the Antecedent is true as we have shewed from reason and experience and the Authâ—rity of Gregory and the Schoolmen Therâ—fâ—re also is the consequent First for the major of this your Syllogisme I demand concerning the Consequent vvhether you inferre it from your Anteâ—edent necessarily or only probably If you say only probably then your Consequent is none of Dr. Hammâ—nds for he supposeth that his follovveth necâ—ssarily from vvhat he hath said Hence I suppose it faith he unavoidably consequent that is necessarily consequent that that act of internâ—l love expressâ—d by his dying for us was superiour to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his povertie If you say you inferre it necessarily then the consequent is evidently false you must then change in your Antecedent the vvord ordinarily and in the room thereof put in the vvord necessarily or else the consequent vvill not follovv unavoidably As for the assumption that is evidently false too if you supply what is to be supposed for then thus it runs Ordinarily there is and must be in all men and was in Christ a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and remission betwixt the inward acts oâ— the love of God and the outward expressions thereof Now all men are by the commandement of God which Christ fulfilled oblâ—ged to love God when they love him with all their might and consequently with all their habitual might But by the opinion of both Dr. Hamond and the Defendant men are not bound in all expressions of their love of God to performe thenâ— with all their might and therefore 't is false very false that there must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intension and remission betwixt the inward acts of the love of God and the outward expressions thereof And thus you see what a rare Syllogisme you have made both the premises of which are notoriously false By whâ—t hath been said the Reader may as discover the faishood of your Syllogisme so also frame a true Syllogisme against the sequele of Dr. Hammond and 't is as followeth If all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might then that act of hâ—s internal love viz. of God exprest by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his poverty but all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might therefore that act of his interral love of God expressed by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those foâ—mer acts which only expresse themselves in his poverty The Major is undenyable and we may say as much of the Minor because Christ fulfilled the commandement which was to love God with all his might and strength Therefore with all his habitual might and strength and this is confessed by your self touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himself of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be understood Eightly Dr. Hammond saies that if it be proved that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the vulgar translation signifieth Luke 22 44. Prolixiùs theâ—e will yet be place equally for his conclusion viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intense then another But if there be any place for such a conclusion then thus the argument stands Christ in his agony prayed longer then before therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intense then before But this sequele as is evident unto every ordinary Reader is very illogical and irrational and yet the Defendant justifieth it and in vindication of it spends twelve pages p. 253 254 c. usque ad 265. But how unsatistying this hâ—â— vindication is will quickly appear if he please to
cast into Syllegismes what he takes to be argumentative therein But this is a thing that he dates not so much as attempt for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse However in the meane time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument as 't is propounded by himself and as 't is reinforced by the Defendant The conclusion to be proved is that one inward act of Christs love of God was more intense then another Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer for paralel to a greâ—ter length there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer compared with that which is shorter All the proofe that I can finde of this reduced into forme stands thus Where there is a multiplication of Degrees more degrees of the inward actual love of God there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God but in a larger prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love c. more degâ—ee of love c. then there was in a shorter And therefore theâ—e was a greater intension viz. of the actual internal love of God The Major is confirmed from the nature of intension which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject an addition of one Degree unto another And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love viz. inward where there are more acts of love there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love for in every act of love there was some degree of intension but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love mâ—re acts of love then there was in a shorter and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees oâ— love more Degrees of love c. My Answer unto thâ—s Syâ—â—gisme shall be both unto the Major and the Minor First then I answer unto the Major by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees It is either of the same numerical forme or fo foâ—mes numerically different Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical forme there is a greater intension but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical forme The Major then if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees is false but if understood of the former is true But then thâ— Minor if understood answerably of the same will be false And Dr. Hammond's proofe of it will be most impeâ—inent For the several inward acts of Christs love of God are formes numerically different and therefore let them be multiplyed never so much this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees in one act of love then there is in another So that from this it can never be inferred that one inward act of love in Christ was more intense then another But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affiâ—meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and the last act which has the greater number of Degrees in it will be gradually more perfect then the former Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and withall you suppose that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it and here upon you conclude of it that it will be gradually more perfect then the former But good Mr. Defendant instead of saying and supposing you should have proved what you say and suppose but of such proofe there is not in all that you say any the least footsteps Bâ—t â—e this how it will plaine it is you say p. 257. that I do not reâ—ch the Doctor 's meaning and the force of his argument I have made the most of his words that I could but as for any hidden and invisible meaning distinct from that which his words hold forth I know not that I was obliged to search after it And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant who can see further into a Mill-stone then other Mortals But however let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cause thus where thâ— zâ—ale is true and real and not tersonate and counterfâ—it as in Christ without doubt it was most true there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in them argues a greater a denâ—y of inward affection and true zeale And for the truth of this assâ—rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world Here if you supply what is to be supplyed touching the object of this inwaâ—d affection This assertion which you obtrude with such a confidence is apparently untrue I say 't is apparently untrue that a multipâ—cation of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in thâ—m argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God or love â—f him And for the falshood of this assertion I appeale to thâ— bosomes of all experienced either Ministers or Christians who can tâ—ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense in their shorâ—es as it is in their longer prayers and that the shortnesse of their prayers many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God but from regard to the infirmities of such as joyn with thâ—m and for diverse other reasons Mr. Paul Beyne was esâ—eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time and 't is said of him that his prayer in his Family was not usually above a quarter of an hour long as having respect to the weaknesses and infirmities of his Servants and Children and he used to disswade others from tediousnesse in that duty I beleive the Defendâ—nt will not deny but that a man may in putting up the Lord's Prayer have his actual love of God every way as high and intense as in the longest prayer either of a man 's own or anothers composition But not to insist longer on other men It is plaine of Christ that his shortest prayers his shortest eiaculations did proceed from an actual love of God every way as intense as the longest And for the truth of this I appeale unto the Commandement of God that enjoyned Christ and all other men to love God with all their migâ—t and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength Now however other men may transgresse this Commandement Christ did not could not and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually he loved him with all his habitual might and strength ad extremum virium and consequently one inward Act of his love of God was not more intense then another Ninthly
That Christ's love which Dr. Hammond saith is capable of degrees c. is that very love which is commanded Deut. 6.5 a love of God with all the soul heart might and strength c. and that is a love proper and peculiar unto God and not to be communicated unto any creature And pray Sir is not this that high and transcendent act of Divine love you speak of pag. 5. whereby the soul is immediately fixed and knit to God as the onely good and then with what face can you deny it to be the love of God properly and formally taken But however the poor Refuter must be condemned lege falsarii pag. 5. right or wrong For whereas Doctor Hammond spake expresly of Christ's love of God the Refuter is so dull and simple an Animal as to understand him of his love of the Creator whereas alas Doctor Hammond had a profounder conceit which is highly rational in it self and is to be interpreted concerning his love of the Creature And this is enough to clear me from the crime of Forgery with which this shamelesse Defendant asperseth me But his Calumny will be the more apparent if we insist upon those two Tropes One of which he sayes the Doctor makes use of The first is the Metonymie of the effect and that is when the effect is put for the efficient Now do not you by your Discourse plainly insinuate that the efficient is here taken for the effect the love of God for the issues and effects of the love of God If there were then a Metonymie in Doctor Hammond's words it was by you a Metonymie of the efficient and not of the effect And indeed you tell us pag. 217. that all the acts of piety and mercy and charity and vertue are called the love of God by a Metonymie of the efficient because they flow from it And either this is a flat contradiction to what you here say or else the Metonymie of the efficient and of the effect must be confounded and be all one But secondly Dr. Hammond doth not make use of any Metonymie at all either of the efficient or of the effect For that which is termed the love of God only Metonymically is so called only equivâ—cally and that the love of God is here taken by the Doctor for that which is so stiled only equivocally you dare not aver for that which is predicated of a thing equivocally may in propriety of speech be denyed of it that which is the love of God only equivocally may be said not to be the love of God But you may perhaps say that he speaks if not by a Metonymy of the effect yet by a Synecdoche generis But Synecdoche generis as Vossius Alsted and other Rhetoricians have taught me is when the genus is put for the species as creature for man Mark 16.15 But how the love of God is here by Dr. H. taken for any of its species passeth my dull imagination I shall not therefore adventure so much as to guess at your meaning but patiently wait for your own Learned Explication of it And thus the Reader sees how this first Evasion that Dr. Hammond speaks of the love of God only as 't is taken tropically by a Metonymy of the Effect or by a Synecdoche generis fails against both Logick and Rhetâ—rick But it may be objected from pag. 6. That Christs love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is his prayer unto God now prayer is properly an act of Religion and Devotion towards God and improperly and figuratively an act of holy Charity or divine Love For answer 1 Though Prayer considered formally in it self be an act of divine Love only improperly and figuratively yet it implieth the love of God properly and formally taken and 't is undeniable that Dr. H. speaketh of Prayer under this consideration as implying the love of God properly and formally such for he bringeth Christs praying more earnestly as a proof to make good his exposition of those words Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul heart might and strength where the love of God is taken properly and formally Now of this exposition it can be no confirmation if the Doctor do not consider Christs prayer as implying his love of God properly and formally taken Though Prayer considered formally in it self be not properly an act of divine love but only implyedly viz. preposiâ—ivè and concomitantèr yet the reason which the Defendant brings for the confirmation of this because 't is properly and formally an act of Religion is very questionable For 2 According to the language of Protestant Divines one and the same Act may properly be an act of both Religion and holy charity too for they take Religion in so large a sense as that it comprehends all duties of he first Table Thus Ames makes all parts of Gods Worship both natural and instituted to be parts of Religion Now if this acception of Religion be proper it will not be material though it be somewhat different from that of the Schoolmen 2 But proceed we unto his Second Evasion which differs little from the former if at all but in termes and 't is concerning the acts of Christs love of God These saith the Defendant are of two sorts 1 Those that are immediately terminated on God the only good 2 Those that are immediately terminated on us men for Gods sake in whose love as the prime act they are all radicated and founded the one the Schooles call charitas ut finis the other they call charitas propter finem Though then the acts of Christs love as immediately terminated on God were always at the height and one equal perfection as was never yet questioned or denyed by the Doctor yet this nothing binders but that the other acts of this love of which alone the Doctor speaks regarding us for Gods sake might consist in a latitude and gradually differ from one another and fall short of the fervour of those acts that immediately respected God c. See pag. 3 5 22 70 71 216 c. usque ad 248 279. usque ad 291 328 329 335 336 338 343 361 372 373 516 c. Well then the great mistake of the Refuter is That whereas Dr. Hammond spake expresly of Christs actual love of God the Creator and yet meant thereby his actual love of man a creature the Refuter was such a dull Block-head as not to reach this hidden and invisible meaning of Dr. Hammond But first if this were a mistake it should not me thinks be so criminous and unpardonable For First The Refuter in his exposition of the actual love of God went by that common rule Analogum per se positum stat pro faviosiori analogato If a word hath two significations one proper another improper and â—â—opical it must be taken properly if it be put by it self and have nothing added to determine and carry it unto an improper and tropical sense Now the
further then Dr. Hammond's Paâ—aphrase of it But the observing his commands is the onâ—ly sure argument that he that doth so is a perfect lover of God truly so called the appellation being falsely assumed by the Gnosticks and an argument of evidence to himself that be is a branch a member of Christ as the Gnosticks boast that they are and that whatsoever they do it cannot make them cease to be so The observing of God's commandments is an argument of the perfect love of God but it doth not therefore follow that it is the love of God it self The two next places the 1 Joh. 3.17 1 Joh. 4.20 every rational Reader will judge wide from the mark For the utmost that can be gathered from them is that the love of God is inseparably connexed with the love of our Neighbour and hath an influence or impery upâ—n the acts thereof But what is all this unto the purpose The last place the 1 Joh. 5.3 may perhaps be thought to have some colour of an Argument For this is the love of God that we keep his commandments Here 't is plain that the Apostles speech is to be understood Metonymically and the meaning of it is that the love of God is the cause of the keeping his commandments and the keeping of God's commandments iâ— an inseparable effect or fruit of the love of God This meaning of the place is excellently laid down by Estius Sensus idcircò adjecâ— de mandatis ejus servandis quia diligere Deum per consequentiae rationeâ—â— est mandata ejus servare Charitas si quidem erga Deum ait Cajetanus ratio est servandi mandata ejus Unde quamvis praeceptum diligendi Deum ab aliis â—â—us praeceptis diversum sit quicunâ—ue tamen boc dilectionis servat praeceptum ex câ dilâ—ctione ettam caetera Det praecepta servat ut quorum obsâ—rvatio ex dilectione Dei necâ—ssariò depâ—ndeat ac sequatur tanquam effectus ex propriâ causâ Quod etiam significant illa Châ—â—sti verba Jâ—an 14. Qut babet mandata mea servat ea ille est qui diligit mâ— Et iterum Si quis diligit me sermonem meum servabit Et ca. 15. Ves amiâ—s met estis sifeceritis quae ego praecipio vobis Simile est buit loco qued supra capite â— dixit Joannes Qui servat verbum ejus vâ—è in boc charitas Dâ—i perfecta est By what hath been said the Reader may perhaps think that this place seems to be very advantagious for the Defendants turn But upon more serious consideration it will be found to do him no service at all For First though there be a Metonymy in the Apostles words yet it lieth not in the love of God the Metonymy is in the praedicate and not in the subject of the Proposition and the love of God is the subject of the Proposition as is evident from the prefixing of the Greek artâ—cle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and there is nothing hindâ—eth but that it may be taken in the greatest propriety onely the praedicate this that we keep the commandments of God is affirmed of it Metonymically Secondly it is plain that in S. John's words there is a causal predication (a) Praedicatio impropria caâ—salis est quâ unum extremum alteri ad ejus causam designandam nâ—n repugnante loquâ—â—di consuetudine conjungitur e.g. Ira est fervor sanguinis circa cor est oratio vera sensu causali Nee â—nim ira quae est affectio auimi proprie loquendo est servor seu ebullitio sed existit ex illà ebullitione ebullitio illa existit ex irâ sed diversa respectu Huc reser illa hic bolus est mihi mors boc est mortifer Alsted for the love of God is the keeping of his Commandements not formally but causally that is 't is the cause of keeping Gods Commandements Now every one knows that in a causal predication there is ever a Metonymy of either the efficient or effect But noâ— in thâ—s proposition one act of Christs love of God was more intense then another which the Defendant confesseth to be the sense of Doctor Haâ—mond there is no causal predication nor any footsteps of any other argument from which a man may Logically conclude a Metonymy Nay thirdly if any Argument can be drawn from coherence it is as I have already shewen evident that Dr. Hammond cannot be understood of the love of God in a Metonymical acception for he speaks of the same love of God that is commanded Deut. 6.5 and that is undeniably the love of God properly taken In the next place pag. 219 220 c. Usque ad 227. the Defendant endeavouresh to prove by arguments from the Doctors writings that he takes the love of God in such a large sense as to take in all duties to our neighbour The weakness of which arguments it were an easie matter to discover if it were worth the while but indeed we may justly despise them for it being cleared that Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of any other love of God but that which is immediately terminated on God himself if they prove any thing they will conclude that the Dr. contradicts himself and that is a matter wherein I that am none of his Idolaters am no wayes concerned Once it is very apparent that this large acception of the love of Godâ—s very Catachrestical for according to it the lowest and meanest acts of both Charity and Justice towards our neighbour even the Hangmans conscientious performance of his Office may be termed the love of God and most men would judge this to be an unsavoury expression it would sound very harshly unto not only English but all Christian eares And whether so harsh a Catachresis be to be tolerated in Controversal writings may justly be doubted If Dr. Hammonds cause then cannot be upheld but by flying unto such a Catachrestical and abusive acception of the love of God it is a shrewd signe that 't is in a very tottering if not desperate condition From what hath been said the Reader may furnish himself with an answer unto the greatest part of the book But more particularly unto two of those arguments which the Defendant brings to make good this affection that there is and must be in Christ a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of the habit of the love of God As for the third argument p. 244. the confirmation of it may more fitly be referred unto a more proper place The first argument he prosecutes from p. 227 usque ad 236. and 't is by him thus summed up p. 227 228. Where there is and of necessity must be a gradual difference and more in respect of the goodness of the Objects of the habit of charity or the law of God there is and of necessity there must be also a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of this habit of charity or the love
autem est quasi per accidens vel individuale respectu talis actûs Dicâ— autem si aequaliter vel eodem modo talem rationem tendat nam contingit 〈◊〉 eandem rationem tendendi non aequè applicari diversis materiis ideo non eodem modo attingi per actus ut ect v. g. bonitas divina quatenus est in Deo reddit illum amabilem vel quatenus per quendam respectum applicatur proximo ut illum etiam amabilem reddat Nam licet illa bonitas in se una sit non tamen ill is rebus aequè conveâ—t ideò modus tendendi in illan non est idem Et idem est universum de bonicate finis respectu ipsius finis respectu mediorum de similibus in quibus ratio tendendi alteri intrâ—asâ—cè altis vero extrinsècè applicatur I confess Suarez holds that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our Neighbour are but one indivisible habit But this is no hinderancè but that we may make use of his words against himself and the rather because what afterwards may be picked out of him in answer hereunto is very unsatisfying The utmost that he saith is that there is a necessary sonnexion betwixt the acts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour he saith the same of other acts But this connexion of the acts doth not prove an unity of the habits The habits may be connexed as well as the acts and connexion if it be real implieth a real distinction And 't is very observable that Suarez himself infers from the connexion of acts onely a possibility not a necessity of the unity of the habit Tandem quando actus ipsi sunt inter se connexi quasi radicati in aliquo primo tunc etiam possunt habere similem connexionem saltem virtualem in ipso habitu ergo quantum est ex hoc capite si aliud non obstet poterit idem indivisibilis babitus esse principium hujusmedi actuum Disp sect praedict n. 32. But I shall not pertinacioâ—sly contend about this matter but leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader Here I shall digress a little from the Defendant to consider the opinion of some School-men who maintain that 't is alwayes one and the savie act whereby God and our Neighbour are loved and they have of it a pretty illustcation from their tenet of Image-worship Look say they as an Image and its Prototype are worshipped with one and the same worshâ—p so God and our Neighbour are loved with one and the same act of love But the real distinction of the acts of the love of God and the love of our Neighbour I shall prove from four Arguments 1. From their separability there may be an actual love of God when at the same time there is not an actual love of our Neighbour And so again on the other side there may be an actual love of our Neighbour when at the same time there is onely virtual or habitual love of God For at the same time there may not be any actual cogitation of God Now things that may really be separated are qâ—estionless really distinguished 2. From their inequality The love of God ought to be more intense then the love of our Neighbour for it is to be with all the soul heart might and stâ—ength and therefore 't is really distinguished therefrom 3. From the dependency of the love of our Neighbour upon the love of God The actual love of God is the efficient cause of the actual love of our Neighbour and the efficient and the effect are alwayes really distinguished 4. From this may be drawn another Argument proceeding from the posteriority of the actual love of our Neighbour unto our actual love of God For being the effect thereof it must needs be after it and that really à parte rei and not onely in regard of our consideration Now this is an evidence of the real distinction of these acts for if they were one and the same act really then one and the same thing should be really both before and after it self which is a manifest contradiction But I return unto our Defendant and unto his second Argument which he pursues very copiously p. 236 c. usque ad 244. The sum of it is this There are not onely perfect and effectual but also imperfect conditionate and uneffectual acts of Christs will and those are gradually distinguished from these c. But what of all this it will not therefore follow that one act of Christs love of God is more intense then another act unless you can prove that these imperfect and uneffectual acts of Christs will are elicite proper and formal acts of his love of God This is a thing that you all along presuppose but have not proved nor never can prove Not onely Scholastical Dâ—vines but all that have any moderate insight into Practiâ—al Divinity will tell you Master Defendant that to say that Christs actual love of God is imperfect uneffectual conditionate is an ignorant gross and very lewd blaspbemy I shall but remark two things more touching this second Evasion of the Defendant and then proceed unto a third First Christs actual love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is not saith the Defendant frequently the action of loving but a term produced thereby and yet he saith p. 70. that the acts of Christs love of God are some of them terminated immediately on God and others of them on us men c. By this then it seems that the supposed utmost term of the action of loving in Christ is terminated further unto another term if not effective yet objective Now this is a very deep subtilty the clear explication and confirmation of which we shall justly expect from the Defendant 2. The Defendant grants that the outward expressions of love are not love it self and wonders that I can be so uncharitable as to think that Dr. Hammod was a man of so shallow and slendor parts as to take the outward expressions of love for love it self pag. 84 90 95. And yet he tells us that Dr. Hammond takes Christs actual love of God in such a latitude or amplitude as that it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbour whatsoever is good and excellent in him pag. 216 219 c. Now the outward expressions of the love of God are a part of man's duty and therefore by the Defendant are the love of God in Dr. Hammona's sense of the word How the Defendant will reconcile this the event will shew But go we on unto the third Evasion of the Defendant He distinguisheth of a two-fold actual love 1. the action of loving 2. the term of that action a quality produced thereby which for want of words is called love Now Dr. Hammond he saith is to be understood of the latter the term and not of the former the action of
Passe on to the fâ—urth and last Evasion of Dr. Creed I shall from what hath been said in impugning the Pretended Termes of Immanent Actions inferre the impertinency of all that he faith p. 72.73.74.75.76.77.115.116.117.118 In defence of this pro-Position Position in Dr. Hammond the word Love is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species habitual and actual Love or the Acts of Love For Dr. H. by actual Love or the Act of Love understands as hath been shewn the Action of Loving and not as the Defend most vainly pretends any quality Produced by that Action which is its Term and Product His Proposition then notwithstanding all Doctor Creeds Defence is still chargeable with that absurdity which I objected against it viz. that it makes Love as a Genus equally to comprehend as Species primo diveâ—sa things put in several Predicaments For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action For further disproof of Dr. H. his preposition I shall add what I said touching the habit of Love and the sincere and cordial expressions thereof No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect viz. as species but the habit of Love is the efficient and the acts of Love are the effects thereof the habit of Love saith the Defend effectively concurres with the Will to the production of the inward Acts of Love therefore Love as a Genus doth not comprehend habitual Love and actual Love as Species The Major of this Syllâ—gisme the Defendant will say is most ridiculously false as appeares by what he saith to the like Syllogisme that I framed concerning the habit of Love and the Expressions thereof His Answer is very remarkable for the transcendent and matchless both ignorance and impudence of it and therefore I shall crave the Readers patience for a while to consider it Dr. CREED YOur third to begin with that for I shall not tie my self to your Method is most ridiculously falfe You say not to trouble our selves about the Moâ—d and Figure 3 No one word can as a Gerus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect The habit of Love is the efficient cause and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus Your Major Sir your Major by all meanes have a care of your Major For what think yâ—u Sir of all Vnivocal prâ—ductions When Fire produces Fire and Corn brings forth Corn when a Man begets a Man and one Heat makes another does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect And is it not in these a certain maxime thaâ— Qualis est causatalis est effectus such as the Cause is in nature such also is the effect And I hâ—pe you will think it lawfull for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus Nay are not these distinguished from equivocal productions because in these Effectum est ejusdem ratiâ—nis cum efficiente but in the other efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eadem forma sed eminenter illam câ—ntinet Nay does not your own Scheibler as well as Suarez both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor 's perusall tell you that Causa univoca est quae prâ—ducit effectum similem in specie But methinks Sir if since your more noble more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholasticall and Practicall Divinity you had thought sit to neglect such Vulgar Authors and to forget the Common Notions and Maximes delivered by them yet you should at least have observed this in your reading of Aquinas that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine and makes very good use of it And now Sir I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus For where I pray will you rank the several individualls of the self-same Species for such are all Vnivocall Causes and Effects as is plain from Sense and Experience if not under the same Genus I might prove the grosse and palpable falshood of your Major Sir by divers instances drawn from equivocall productions where the Cause and Effect must be placed in the same predicament and consequently under the same remote Genus at least which is sufficient to destroy your Major When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver and Brasse and other Mineralls when they produce Sâ—ones of all sorts and kinds in the Bowâ—lls of the Earth are not the cause and the effect at least as species subalternae placed under the siâ—ne Genus of substantia Corporea When an Asse begets a Mule or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailes and when a Woman brings for mâ—nstrâ—ous births instead of Lâ—gitimate issues as Serpâ—nts Moles and Froggs and other such like of which among Physitians there are maâ—y true stories I pray Sir must not the cause and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum which is Animal So when light produces Heaâ— are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Patible Qualities To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversie The habit of Love effectively concurrs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love and yet I say that love as a Gâ—nas is Equally predicated of the habit and the inwaâ—d Acts of Love as has already been demenstrated and may in due time bâ— further proved notwithstanding any thing you have or can say to the contrary And this is abundantly more than sufficient to shew the faâ—shoâ—d of your Major when you say that no one word can as a Genus whether proximum or remotum sâ—mmum or subalâ—eâ—um for you â—bsâ—lutely deliver it equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect The Major which you say Is most ridiculously false and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry I shall fortifie by three reasons The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non praedicatur aequaliter dae speciebus But now Analogy viz. Attributionis Intriâ—secae consists in dependency from which Effective dependency is not excluded as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists by my Master Scheibler Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art 3. cap. 3. tit 5. art 1. And by Scheibler's Master Suarez Mâ—taphys di p. 28. s 3. disp 32. s 2. n. 11 12 13 14 15. By â—â—enâ—us a Frier Ca melite Discep in Univers Logic. p. 113. Martinus Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Stalio Reg. Philosoph p. 397. And upon this account is it that Ens is made to be Gerus Analogum to Ens creatum and increatum to substantia and accidens And I have read in the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the Vniversity of Oxford that for this reason Qualiâ—as is geâ—us Analogum because of the
p. 268 you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's as guilty of that fallacy which is called petitio principii If this be not say you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know not what your great Master Aristatle mednes But this is a most ridiculous and groundlesse crimination for this as every other fallacy is a sault or defect in arguing not in answering 't is saith my â—â—rtle Master Scheibler dâ—ceptâ—o in syllogizando De Sydogism cap. 17. n. 6. 't is saith my great Master Aristotle Elenchus Sophisticus It hath alwaies been observed for a rule in dâ—sputing that when the Respondent denyes a sequel and gives a reason for it it is the Opponents part to â—â—fute the reason and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it It is then a grosse non-sequitur to conclude me gâ—â—ltie of this faâ—lacie of petitio principii because I do not confirm the reason for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence But Sir if you had not falsifted it by adding must to may be it is a Proposition so plain and evident as that it needs no confirmation and can be denied by no rational man Thus it stands my reason is because in all these inward acts of Christs love of God and we may say the same of the inward acts of other vertues and graces there may be no gradual dissimilitude Mark Sir the word may be and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition in several inward acts of Châ—â—sts love of God there is no gradual dissimilitude it there be pray discover it if there be hot then give me leave to conclude that in the multiplied acts of christs love of God there may be no gradual dissimilitude You say this is the controversie betwixt me and the Doctor But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a faishood for you your self state the controversie to be whether one act of châ—â—sts love of God were actually more intense then another and yet if I had said that in the inward acts of Christs love of God there could be no gâ—adual dissimilitude this I have proved by three reasons unto which you have given but â—orrie answers and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turne for this would quicklie swell my book to such a Volume as yours is Tenthly he hath a passage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the least toundation And will not every man think that our Refuteâ— was a man of great judgment and parts and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes and that he never consulted the Authors he quotâ—s but took them upon trust otherwise mâ—thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived But pray Sir wherein wherein is the â—efuter so strangely deceived in Suarez why 't is clear and evident by Suarez though every act of Christ in respect of the person that performed it was of an infinite and so of an equal in ensive value yet in respect of the moral goodnesse that is intrinsecally inherent in Christs actions nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely persect then another as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater then another And therfore say you the same Suarez even in that very page and columne and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted expressely sayes to this purpose Primum omnium satendum esse opera Christi fuisse inequalia in prepâ—â—â bonitate intrinfecâ— essentiall vel â—â—â—ter inhaerente ipsi actai quia ut dictum est 〈◊〉 hee bonites 〈◊〉 finiâ—a poâ—â—rat ergo esse major 〈…〉 allunde unum â—pus Chrisâ—â— erut metioris objects quam aliud uâ—â—m inâ—thsâ—u's 〈◊〉 sic de 〈…〉 â—â—go 〈…〉 vol poterâ—nt esse inaequalta in hâ—c bonitate c. Why what of all this hâ—â—e I delivered aâ—y thing that contradicts this either expresly or implyedly or doth Suarez here oppose in the least degâ—ee any thing that I have said doth not †Sed haec sententia totâ— objectio procedunt ex falso principio singunt enim esse in eodem acta plures valores seu plura merita juxta varias ejus circumstâ—ntias quod patet esse falsum ex his quae paulò superiùs dicebamus de infinitate sacrisicii ex re oblaâ—a vel person a offerenâ—e sumpta Ostendimus enim reipsa non esse duas neque pertinere ad diversa merita vel satisâ— actiones quia ratio meritâ— vel satisfactionis sieut ratio bâ—nitatis non consu git ex singulis conditientbus actus pâ—rse sumpris sed ex colâ—ecâ—s ne omnâ—â—m Haec enim ratio ettam in praesente proâ—edit nam intensio octus vel obiectum out persona â—pâ—rons per se singâ—la non sâ—fficiâ—nt ad mernum ut ex singaliâ— distinctamerâ—ta in actu orientur sed omnia simuâ— necessaria â—el suâ—t vel suâ— modo concurrunt ad unum meritum quentitate â—eius Aâ—que ita cessat objectio nom stoneritum actus tantum est unum illud est infinitum aequâ—le â—â—hil est meâ—iti in que ceâ—ni possit inaequalitâ— In tertiam part Toom tom 1. disp 4. s â— 49. Suâ—rez all along assert that there is but one meâ—itotious value in one act of Christ and that in respect of meritorious value one act of Christ was not better and more intensively perfect then another Nay do not you your felâ—e p. 271. quote a place out of Suâ—rez where in he affirmuth that the moral goodnesse inherent in the actionâ— of Christ is a thing distinct from their meritorious value Therefore Suaâ—tz say you acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum esse quid distinctumâ—d realt boniâ—ate quae est dâ—ffe entin ipsius actû prout consâ—â—ituitur in esse viâ— tuâ—â—c â—el illi aâ—rquo 〈…〉 instâ—e inhâ—ret Now Dr. Hummond is to be understood only of a meritorious value for he is to be understood of a value that was to be rewarded and that out of debt and such a one is a meritorious value Nay do not you your selfe understand him to speak of a meritoâ—ious value p. 266. And now to shew the appâ—sirnesse of the Proof I must tell him what either he knowes not or will not observe That the Doctor â—gaine a gues à posterâ—ori from the effect to the cause and the necessary releâ—â—â—n betwâ—xt thâ— work and the reward His â—â—gument is funâ—ed upon a Maxune of dâ—sâ—ributive justice not expressed but suppesed and intâ—â—â—ted and it is thâ—â— where the reward does proceed of debt as in Christ certainly it did and is properly wages there must be a proportionable incre sâ— of thereward and the work c. By this then the Roader may sâ—e that all that you have concerning the moral goodnesse in
us what those cogent reasons were that necessitated you unto this complyance with Papists Now from these words of mine the Father of Lyes cannot inferre that proposition which you most injuriously Father upon me viz. that whosoever make use of any argument or Tenent or exposition of Scripture that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish Writers is guilty of complyance with Papists But the Defendant will extort this proposition from my wordâ— whether I will or no. What say you Sir is not this your present argument Can you give us any other proposition to reduce your Socratial Enthymeme into a Syllogisme If you cannot pray tell me then what strength is in your Major and what answer you will give to it when a Socinian an Anabaptist or Ranter or Atheist shal presse you with it c. And so he raves on most furiously as if he were wood not only in this but the next page But to discover to every ordinary Reader that he doth most grossely and palpably calumniate me I shall reduce my words into two Syllogismes and yet leave out that proposition which he so maliciously imputes unto me The proposition to be proved it that it was fit that Dr. H. should acquaint his Readers what those cogent Reasons were that necessitated him unto the answer that he gave and thus 't is proved If this answer were guilty of complyance with Papists then it Was sit that Dr. H. should acquaint us vvhat cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto But this ansvver is guâ—lty of complyance vvith â—apists And therfore it vvas fit that Dr. Hammond should acquaint us vvhat cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto For consâ—â—mation of the Minor the particle this this complyance c. carrieth us to the foregoing vvords and from them vve may cravv this Syllogisme That ansvver vvhich is the shâ—â—t of Papists in several controversies betvveen them and us is guilty of complyance vvith Papists But this ansvver is the shift of Papists in several controversies betvvixt them and us And therefore 't is guilty of complyance vvith Papist And novv my vvords being thus Analyzed the Reader cannot but be astonished a Sâ—hâ—lar a Mâ—n of wiâ—â— and parts a Minister a Christian should so forget himself as to lay at my doores a proposition that hath no bottome at all in my vvords bâ—t is his ovvn meere invention that I say not forgery and I believe hâ— can haâ—dly tell vvhich to vvonder at most the malice or ignorance that is in this crimination of the Defendant But I forget my selfe thus to go beyond the limits that I have prefixed to my selfe in the examination of this Volume and indeed I beleeve 't is very inksome unto the Reader as vvell as unto my self to take in such a Dunghil of Non-seâ—uiturs as this vvork is and therefore I shall trouble the Reader vvith the Examination of but one Argument more and that I am vvilling to inâ—st a little upon because it seems at first blush â—o be of more force and weight then the rest And besides 't is concerning that vvhich is the the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matter in connoversie 't is draâ—â— from Luke 2.52 And Jesus ino eased in wisdom and stature and in grate wiâ—h God and man This Argument the Defendant prosecutes from page 188. usqâ—e aâ— 206.343 344 369 370 572 573. c. usâ—â—eâ—od 596. vvhere he heaps up the â—est monies of a vvorld of Commentators vvhereof many contradict one ano hen st no purpose that I knovv but to distract the unvvary and unlearned Reader and to vvork in hâ—m a belief that our Defendant is a man of vast reading The Argument for better distinction-sake may be branched into tvvo parts First he argueâ—h from Christs increase in vvisdom he increased in wisdome therefore he increased also in the invvard actual love of God The reason of the consequence is because love of necessitie bears propotion unto knovvledge p 60 370 431 512 524. Unto this I shall return several Ansvvers The first is in the first part of my mixture p. 249. The increase in wisdom hâ—ré spoken of is only extensive not inâ—ensive and from an extensive increase in wisdom can never be inferred an intensive increase in the inward acts of the love of God Yea but saith our Defendant p. 191. how you will reconcile this with what followes I will leâ—vâ— any man to judge and so will I too provided that he be a man that und â—stands any thing of an Argument 〈◊〉 for such a one will quickly perceive that there is nothing in that which followeth either in my own words or else in those quoted one of Amos which doth in the least degree contradict what I say Secondly it is only an increase in the knowledge of the formal object of the love of God viz. his infinite goodnesse in himself that will argue and inferre an increase in the inward actual love of God Now that Christ increased in knowledge of the infinite goodnesse of God in himself St. Luke never averred neither will any man averr it but an Arâ—ian or Socinian The Defendant objects often against me that I confesse that the fulnesse of Christs knowledge in the state of humâ—liation was consistent with the nescience of diâ—â—rs things But pray Sir what were those diverse things he knew not as man I say the day of judgment the barrennesse of the figâ—tree c. p. 249. But do I or any Schoolman or any Orthodox Protestant say that Nescience of the tormal object of divine love Gods infinite goodnesse in himself was consistent wâ—th the fulnesse of his know edge If not all that you say is a meer extravagâ—â—ce Thirdly the increase in wisdom that Luke speaks of is by none of all the Authors that you alledge applied unto the beatifical vision and if Christ did not increase in his beatifical vision then neither in his beatifick love and consequently not in his love at all for there was in him at the same time only one inward actual love of God for accidentiâ— numero tantum diversa non pâ—ssunt esse siâ—nal in eâ—dem subjectâ— as for the acts of the infused habit of divine love distinct from the bâ—a ifick love they as I have already shewn are proved by Vasquez to be but a figâ—nent and as much may be said of that love of complaeency that acquisite and experimental love which you ascribe unto Christ p 537. for you make it to arise from Christs acquisite or experimental knowledge And that Vasquez proves to be imposâ—ble because the act of the love of God seeing 't is of a supernatural order ought to arise from a supernatutal knowledge of God and such is not that which is acquisite and experimental Exscientiâ â—cquisitâ nullum actam amoris circa Deum esse posse â—â—nisestum est quia actus charitatis cum sit supernaturalis ordinis oriâ—iâ—dâ—bet exnotitiâ Dâ—â— supernaturali in tertiam â—â—â—tem Thomae tom 1. dâ—sp 73. c. 3.