Cargo and the Master acted accordingly and that 't is the Opinion of those who are learned in the Maritime Laws That where Freighters Goods are equally in danger and a like opportunity for the salvage thereof if the safety of the one be preferred and the other comes to be lost such preference obliges the Goods preserved to contribute to those which are lost it being a General Rule in Causes Maritime That one Man's Interest ought not to suffer for the Safety of anothers On the other side it was argued with the Decree That this Pretence was new that 't was a Notion unpresidented that the Rule of Averidge went only to the cases where the loss of one Man's Goods contributed to the safety of anothers as by Lightning the Vessel c. and not to this Case that here each Man was to undergo the Peril of his own Goods that in case of Damage to Goods within the Vessel other Goods were not contributory but the Owner must endure his own loss and had only his Remedy against the Master if it were occasioned by his Defect or Miscarriage that the reason of Averidge was a meritorious Consideration in the common Case because there the loss of one did actually save the other but here was no such thing The loss of these Oyls did not save the Silk nor did the saving of the Silk lose the Oyls for if the Silk had not been saved the Oyls had been lost for they were so bulky that they could not easily be removed without further time and if part only be saved 't is to the advantage of the Owner and where all cannot be saved at a time the Benefit is accidental to him whose Goods the Master's discretion directs to be saved And in this case here was no such Commodity as could contribute to the loss of a Ship if it had been kept on Board for the Silk if on Board had not assisted to her sinking But besides here were six or eight days between the landing of the Silk and the seizing of the Ship by the French in which time all the Oyls might have been landed and thereby both them and the Ship saved and the apprehension of the Danger could not so soon be removed by losing sight of the Enemy in the Morning and therefore there was no reason for the Master immediately to forbear landing his Oyls Therefore 't was prayed that the Appeal might be dismissed and the same was accordingly done and the Decree of Dismission below affirmed Whitfield Ux ' al' Appellants versus Paylor Ux ' al' Respondents APpeal from a Decree in Chancery The Case was thus Sir Lawrence Stoughton a young Baronet in Surrey having an Estate of near 1000 l. per Annum was a Servant to the Respondent Mary the Daughter of one Burnaby a Brewer reputed to be very rich Upon the first Proposal of Marriage Burnaby did agree to give 5000 l. certain and insisted to have a Jointure of 500 l. per An. settled and that she should have the Inheritance of the Jointure if he died without Issue Sir Lawrence did refuse to agree to this but afterwards he renewed the Treaty himself and accepted of Articles for payment of 5000 l. Portion and made a Settlement of a Jointure of Lands worth 500 l. per Annum and likewise made another Deed in the nature of a Mortgage of all his Estate as well the Reversion of her Jointure as the rest for securing the payment of 5000 l. to her in case Sir Lawrence died without Issue and died within a Fortnight after Marriage without Issue The Lady Stoughton prefers her Bill and prays the Appellants might be fore-closed of the Equity of Redemption on Failure of Payment The Appellants exhibit their Bill to be relieved against this as a Fraud and upon hearing of these Causes before the Master of the Rolls the Appellants were decreed to pay the 5000 l. by the first Day of Hillary Term 1695. without Interest but with Costs And in default the estate to be sold to raise it with Interest from that Day And upon a re-hearing before the Lord Keeper his Lordship confirmed the Decrees and gave a Twelve-months further time for payment And now it was argued for the Appellant That it was proved in the Cause that Sir Lawrence was a sickly weak Man that on his Death-bed he declared he had made no such Agreement but that the 5000 l. was to pay his Debts and no part of it was to return to his Wife and his Wife present and not contradicting it that it did not appear that he had any Counterpart of this Deed or that he ever advised or acquainted any of his own Relations with it and the Draught of the Deed was confessed to be burnt And further that the Agreement in its own nature was unreasonable that she should have both Portion and Jointure and that one was a merit for the other but that both should be vested in the same Person the Portion returned and the Jointure enjoyed was very hard and therefore to be set aside That Equity was to relieve against such pretended Agreements as things done without any Consideration inducing them and therefore void On the other side 't was insisted on for the Decree That the Man was of Age that there were two Treaties of Marriage which shews a deliberation that here was no mis-representation or imposition the Bargain in it self might be upon good reason the Gentleman being sickly and the Money was to be returned only upon a Contingency of his dying without Issue that in case of his having Issue the Agreement was common that perhaps she had the worst on 't under all Circumstances that all Bargains are not to be set aside because not such as the wisest People would make but there must be Fraud to make void their Acts and his forgetting that he had done such an Act when on his Death-bed is no reason for to annul it and the Marriage had been a good Consideration for a Jointure of it self And reasonable or unreasonable is not always the question in Equity if each Party was acquainted with the whole and meant what they did much less is it sufficient to say that 't was unreasonable as it hapned in event for if at the time 't was a tolerable Bargain nay if at the time this Bargain was the meaning of the Parties and each knew what was done and neither was deceived the same must stand And accordingly the Decree was affirmed Thomas Arnold Appellant Versus Mr. Attorney General Respondents Matthew Johnson Esq Respondents Thomas Bedford Gent. Respondents APpeal from a Decree in Chancery The Case was thus One Edmund Arnold Proctor being seized in Fee of the Mannor of Furthoe to the yearly value of 240 l. per Annum and also of some Personal Estate but having no Child or Brother living made his Will in writing and thereby amongst other Legacies to many other Persons he gave to the Appellant by
contra ligeantie sue debitum and as to this it was argued That it was not necessary to use those very Words That they are not Terms of Art such as are absolutely necessary they are not like to the Words Burglariter Felonice Murdravit and the like That proditorie implies it that 't is plainly apparent to be contrary to his Allegiance That all the whole Indictment shews it to be so 't is not weighing his Allegiance 't is against his true natural Liege Lord and Sovereign That it appears he was a natural born Subject That the very Words themselves are only of Aggravation That they may as well be laid precedent to the Fact as in the Conclusion That here is that which is Tantamount That Sir Henry Vane's Indictment was thus Cotton and Messingers Sid. 328. The Scotch Officers in Suffolk Lamberts Hackshams Titchburns and many more That 't is true the Fact in the Indictment ought not to be made good by Intendment or Inference but if there be Words which shew that the Party owed Allegiance it s enough An alien Enemy is not indictable in this manner but here 't is shewn That he is a Person capable of committing Treason and that the Act done was against his Duty and Obedience which he owed as a Subject That many Precedents have been thus That nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur That a Certainty to a common Intent is sufficient Longs case That in 2 Rolls abr 82. contra coron ' et dignitat ' suas is held not necessary wherefore and for other Reasons then urged 't was prayed That the Reversal might be reversed and the King restored c. On the other side it was argued That this Reversal was just That this Arraignment being Joint for want of separatim makes the Proceeding Erroneous That the Precedents do use the Word separatim and abundance of Entries were mentioned as Leach and Ruthford et al' 28 Hen. 8. Dudely Gates and Palmer 1 and 2 Phil. and Mar ' Throgmorton and Weddall 2 and 3 Ph. and M. Peckham and Daniel eodem Anno. Blunt and Danverse 44. Eliz. Earl of Ess and S. eodem Anno. Guy Fawks and Sir Everard Digby 3 Jac. 1. Harrison Scot and the other Regicides 12 Car. 2. 1660. Green Berry and Hill for the Murder of Sir E. Godfrey 1678. Ireland Pickering and Grove 31 Car. 2. rot ' 242. Whitebread Fenwick et al' 32 Car. 2. rot ' 224. Johnson et al' 2 Will. et Mar. num ' 57. and Lord Preston and Ashton Trin. 3 Will. et Mar. n. 16. separatim allocut ' and many more Besides the Nature of the thing is such as requires a several Arraignment because they may plead several Pleas and they are several Offences and tho' they plead in this Case severally that 's not enough for they ought to be askt severally But this was not so much insisted on as the next Error the Omission of secreta in the Judgment 't is part of the Judgment upon the 25 Edw. 3. for compassing c. tho' for coining 't is only to be drawn and hanged according to Morgan's Case Cro. Car. 383 Stamp 182. 3. Inst 15 17. Finch's Law lib. 2. cap. Treason they are all secreta membra abscindant ' as well as interiora all common Books have it as Bolton's Justice of the Peace tit Prefidents of Indictments for High Treason 38 42. Dalton's Justice p. 335. Sheppard's Epitome tit Crown and all those common Abridgments c. Lord Preston and Ashton's was drawn by good Advice Harrison and al' 12 Car. 2. Ireland Pickering and Grove 1678. Whitehread's 1679. Walcott's 1683. Langhorn's 31. Car. 2. Colonel Sidney's 1683. The Earl of Stafford's in 1680. was thus upon Debate and Consultation with all the Judges Dominus Rex versus Owen 1 Rolls Rep 185 186. there 't is mentioned But then it was chiefly insisted on That the Reversal was to be maintained for the Error in the Indictment that contra ligeantie sue debitum was the general Form that all the great Men in all Ages who had been of Counsel for the Crown had inserted it That all the Indictments the first Assizes after Monmouth's Rebellion which were drawn or perused by Sir H. Poll ' had this Conclusion That Ashtons Crosses Gaunts Cornishes Earl of Staffords Batemans Ayliffs Goodenoughs Hone Blague Rowse Armstrong Sir Robert Peyton Langhornes Lord Bellasis Venner Harrisons Faukes Sir Everard Digbyes Patricius Dolphie Pasch 41 Eliz. John Tipping 34 Eliz. are all thus and the Prints are so likewise 3 Inst 214. Fitzh Justiee pag. 218. Plowd 387. Coke's Entries 361. Cro. Car. 120 122 123. and a great number of Particulars more which might be cited Then 't was urged that Reason doth require this for that Treason is punishable as a Breach of Allegiance that that is the very Essence of Treason that if the Fact be not alledged to be against his Allegiance 't is not Treason that 't is by reason of his Allegiance that he can commit Treason and therefore 't is that an Alien Enemy who was never protected can't commit Treason because he owed no Allegiance and there may be many Acts done which look like a levying of War without any Breach of Allegiance and for that was quoted King John's Charter made at Rumney Mead 18 die Junii Anno Regni 17 Rot. Pat. 17. m. 13. a Transcript whereof is in Matthew Paris 245. Anno 1215. which Charter was ratified four times within nine years after The first Confirmation was granted 1 Hen. 3. and probably at his Coronation for there was a Charter dated at Glocester 6 Febr. Rot. Pat. 1 Hen. 3. m. 13. that they should enjoy Libertatibus Regno nostro Anglie a Patre nostro et nobis concessis In the second year of his Reign he sends a Mandate to the several Sheriffs to proclaim this Charter amongst others Rex c. Salutem Mittimus tibi Chartas de Libertatibus c. Mandantes quatenus eas legi facias in pleno comitatu tuo Dat' 22 Febr. Rot. Claus 2 Hen. 3. Then was cited Fox's Acts and Monuments ad Ann. 1218. That after Michaelmas this King held a Parliament at Westminster wherein he confirmed and ratified by his Charter all the Franchises and Liberties which were made and given by King John his Father In the seventh year of his Reign viz. the Sixteenth of his Age he took the Government into his own Hands and then the Archbishop of Canterbury in open Parliament doth mind him of the Oath sworn in his Name by the Earl of Pembroke Rectore Regis Regni and others at the Pacification between him and the Dauphin that he would restore and confirm those Liberties to his Subjects for which the War broke out between his Father and the Barons Then was quoted what Henry the Third promised when he invited Henry de Lucy to come in to him 1 Hen. 3. m. 16. which is in very strange language if his Allegiance had been broken Then was cited Sadler
CASES IN PARLIAMENT Resolved and Adjudged UPON Petitions and Writs of Error Quicquid sum Ego quamvis Infra Lucili censum ingeniumque tamen me Cum Magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque Invida Horat. LONDON Printed for A. and J. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-noster-Row MDCXCVIII TO THE READER NO Collection of Cases adjudged in Parliament having been yet published a Preface seems necessary to bespeak the Reception of that which is now presented to the World To commend or excuse the Collector will not perhaps be a method to introduce it most to advantage what may be spoken in favour of his diligence or capacity will be censured vain and if any excuse be offered for his inability to have done it better some will be ready to take him at his word and think the Performance comes from a careless or unskilful Hand Whatever the Author is there needs no Apology to be made for the nature or design of the Work it self for the Subject Matter will be useful and entertaining to all Ranks of English Men to whom Books are so that is to all such as understand and love Literature Here is our Municipal Law and the reason of it Equity and the Law of Nations interspersed here is the manner of arguing and the language of the Bar briefly toucht here are the Forms of Proceedings sometimes mentioned but then again those Forms are superseded by the Original and Eternal Rules of Justice By the Debates and Arguments here reported you may be acquainted in some measure with the Rights of the Peers and their incapacity to alien such their Rights with the nature of Slander and some Rules concerning it the Course of Equity in respect of Penalties and Costs The Law of Average in the Case of Partial Losses at Sea the Circumstances upon which Relief may be had in Equity against hard or unreasonable Agreements the Construction of Wills to charitable Uses where the Estate intended is greater in value then the particular Bequests amounts unto the Power of a Council of State to commit with variety of Matter concerning Pleading and the Plantations belonging to England and the Priviledges and Birthrights of the English Subject by the Common Law and how far that Law extends The nature of Colledges Hospitals and other Elemosynary Foundations and the Authority and Power of Visitors and the Methods of their Proceedings the Court of Chivalry or Honour the extent and boundaries of its Jurisdiction before whom held and when and in what Cases a Prohibition lyes to it the power of Lords of Copyhold Mannors to refuse Petitions for the Reversal of Recoveries in their Courts and the Judgment of Equity upon such occasions the right of Dower and the efficacy of a Term attending the Inheritance to prevent its enjoyment and the opinion of Equity thereupon The Preference of an Outlawry upon mesne Process to a Judgment not extended and the practise and reason of the practise of the Court of Exchequer in that case the Consideration which a Court of Equity ought to have of Bonds Bills or Promises made or given upon Condition or Consideration of promoting and procuring Matches The dependency which Ireland hath upon England and her subordination to it and the Authority of the House of Peers in This over the Proceedings in the Chancery of That Kingdom the opinion of Equity upon Conditional Limitations and what will be a Performance of such Conditions and to whom the Profits shall go during the intermediate time c. The qualification requisite in a Presentee to a Benefice and the power of the Ordinary to refuse for defect of Knowledge and how that defect is to be tried the Construction of Law upon a Deed leading the Uses of a Fine of the Wives Land to the Heirs of the Husband's Body the Husband dying afterwards before the Wife the right of the half Blood in the distribution of an Intestates Estate and unto what Share the right of nominating to the Office of chief Clerk for inrolling of Pleas in B.R. and to whom it belongs the nature of a Bill of Exceptions and the Proceedings thereupon and in what Cases the same may be refused and if any Authority in the Lords over the Judges in case of such refusal The Punishment of Treason by the English Laws and the Form of Judgments in that case the nature of contingent Limitations after a Fee and if they may be allowed upon Contingencies to happen at any time after the decease of Persons then in being the manner of declaring the Uses of a Fine and by what Deed or Writing the nature of Wills and of the revocations of them and if a Will whereof the Contents are unknown may revoke a former the efficacy of the acts of one that is Non compos mentis and if and how far void what Deeds altering the Estate of a Testator shall revoke a solemn Will The nature of the Office of a Clerk of the Peace and by whom grantable and for what Interest and how removeable the Prerogative of Presenting to Benefices made void by Promotion and if such Prerogative be served or fulfilled by a Commendam and whether it can operate upon a new created Parish or Rectory the formal reason and essence of Treason and wherein it consists and what is necessary to be alledged in Indictments for that Offence the right of Tythes for Herbage or Agistment of Cattle grazed and fed for Sale tho' formerly used to the Plough The Exposition of a Will of a Native of France and by what measures a Judgment ought to be made of the meaning of Phrases used by such Persons in that Language upon such an occasion the Construction of the word Share in a Will concerning the New-River Water the force or validity of a Grant or Assignment of Land in which the Grantor had a very long term to hold from and after the Grantor's decease the Title of Knight if and how part of the Name and what Allegations in a Count in a Quare Impedit are not needful to be answered to and what may be traversed and what Grants of the Crown shall be good notwithstanding some and what Misrecitals These and many other Particulars worthy of most Mens notice are here debated and it may reasonably be supposed that none will be Enemies to the Design and Publication but those who mislike the small Remainders we have left us of the Aristocratical part of our Government the Gentlemen who do so must be unacquainted with the Grecian and Roman Story as well as with our own or else have read it but superficially for even the most perfect of the Grecian Common-wealths were somewhat Aristocratical That which may be called such is Sparta which tho' it had some Laws we cannot account for yet during several Centuries it maintained its own Liberty and assisted its Neighbours to preserve theirs And notwithstanding some Men may think the contrary Democracy was not the only Favourite Model of the
Ancient Legislators The wise Solon who founded that Popular Government of Athens was not so fond of his own Frame as to recommend it to other places tho' he believed that it suited best with the Infirmities of the People And even in Rome before she acquired any great Reputation there was a Senate under Kings it had one nor doth it appear that a Senate was adjudged useless when it became and was called a Common-wealth And as soon as the Senate lost its Authority a Tyranny was set up This may be called their Aristocratical Part and whosoever reads the Lives of those Roman Worthies Cato Vticensis c. that nobly attempted to defend the Liberties of their Country will find That it was for the upholding the Authority of the Senate that they contested fought and died Machiavel indeed in his Discourses upon the Decades of Titus Livius has strained almost every thing in favour of Democracy and with extream Art and Labour hath illustrated a Popular State and made Rome the Example of it and yet even in those Discourses he sometimes shews the Necessity of an Aristocratical Mixture to make a just and regular and happy and lasting Government Nay Algernoon Sydney himself that famous Assertor of Liberty doth almost every where prefer the Aristocracy and he was confirmed in that Sentiment by the Views he had taken of former and present Governments and by the Knowledge he had of what formerly was our own Constitution till Henry the Sevenths Reign For that Prince as the Lord Bacon rightly observes was rather cunning in relation to his own Times then a Person that had a full prospect of what would afterwards be the Consequence of his Measures or that had a due regard to Posterity No Man can wish that the House of Lords should be made Cyphers if they could once again be made the Natural Balance between the King and People There drop even from Mr. Sidney's Pen Expressions enough to prove that a just Composition of the Three Powers Monarchical Aristocratical and Democratical would have been reckoned even by him an equal Government Such a Mixture even our Government was and tho' some perhaps out of meer Ignorance have disputed the Democratical and others the Monarchical part of our Constitution yet no Body ever to this day could pretend that our Barons those Majores Regni had not originally a Share both in the Legislature and Administration within this Kingdom The Fact is not necessary to be proved because 't is not denied and the reasonableness of it is apparent There 's no occasion to Complement them for what their Ancestors did in procuring of Magna Charta which the judicious and indefatigable Antiquary Sir Henry Spelman saith was only an Ascertainment or Recompilement of our Old Laws It would be of Publick Service to have a just State of the true Powers of the House of Lords in their Judicial and Legislative Capacities according to the true English Constitution that we might be familiarized to the almost antiquated Notions of the Aristocratical part of our Government and so may neither be over-run with the Schemes of Absolute Monarchy-Men who would have all Judicial Power even the Dernier Resort lodged in the Crown or in Delegates appointed by it and not in the Parliament nor be crumbled into the Disorders which must follow the Notions of those who aim at a pure Democracy But to write an Exact Discourse upon this Head would require more Lines then can become a Preface The Reader therefore must not here expect an Account of the Growth and Decays of their Power and the true Reasons of Each and the Regulations or Restrictions that will be needful if they ever happen in any degree to be restored to the Preheminence and Authorities which they formerly enjoyed among us It is enough for the present to say That all the Measures taken and used in the Exercise of their Judicature are observed without Doors especially by the Persons concerned their Relations and Friends That the Errors in such Exercise if any are only to be corrected by themselves and no ways proper or fit to be suggested by any private Person much less to be published in Print However it may be hoped that these Reports may probably convince the young Nobles of this Realm and all who are imployed in and about their Education that some general Knowledge of the Laws of England and some Acquaintance with History and other Learning cannot be unworthy the Ambition of every Noble-man's Son who has any hopes to sit as Judge in that August Assembly where the nicest of Questions in Cases of the greatest Consequence and between the greatest of Subjects and many times between the King and his People do frequently come under Consideration And these Papers may likewise remember them what just Liberty of Arguing and Debating hath been allowed to Counsel and with what Candour and Patience they have been heard even in the most tender Points As also shew them what Resolutions were taken upon those Debates and Arguments that the Law may be consistent with it self and remain as it is a certain Rule of doing Right As to the present Performance the Reader is desired to pardon all Mistakes in Grammar and in the Figures of Folio's and Pages and other common Errata of the Press which by reason of multiplicity of other Business could not easily be attended to and observed Omari Res ipsa negat THere will shortly be Printed The Historical Library of Diodorus the Sicilian the whole Fifteen Books Translated from the Greek with all the Fragments And will be Sold by Awnsham and John Churchill in Pater-noster-row Dominus Rex Viscount Purbeck UPON a Petition the Question was in the House of Lords Whether the Dignity of a Viscount could be surrendred to the King by a Fine And it was Argued at the Bar by three Counsel for the Petitioner and by the Attorney General for the King It was urged on behalf of the Petitioner That a Dignity cannot be surrendred to the Crown and that for these Reasons 1. It is a Personal Dignity annexed to the Blood and so inseparable and immoveable See Ratcliff's Case 3 Rep. Rutland's Case 6 Rep. 53. that it cannot be either transferred to any other Person or surrendred to the Crown it can neither move forward nor backward but only downward to Posterity and nothing but a Deficiency or a Corruption of the Blood can hinder the Descent as if the Ancestor be Attainted of Treason or Felony c. For in that Case the Heir conveying no Inheritable Blood cannot make any Claim to that which is annexed to the Inheritable Blood and besides there is a tacite Condition of Forfeiture annexed to those Dignities by the Breach of which Condition the Dignity is determined but by the Act of the Party there can be no Determination of it unless there be an Attainder which corrupts the Blood And he took a difference between Ancient Honours and Dignities which were
and yet ' t is there in the power of the Ancestor by good Pleading to have supported the Patent and by bad pleading to destroy it and therefore when the Foundation which is the Patent fails the Honour and whatever it be that is erected upon it shall fail also Every Estate by the consent of all Persons interested and concerned in the thing may be taken away for the Law is so set against Perpetuities that a Clause intimating it is void and tho' an Honour is not Jones Rep. 109 123. assignable yet it may be extinguished It 's true if a Man hath but a part of an Estate as only an Estate for Life he can't alone pass away the whole Estate but none who hath the Inheritance in Tail or in Fee but he may destroy the whole and tho' any one have but part yet by the concurrence of all that are concerned the whole may be destroyed It is admitted if he commit Treason and is attainted thereof he loseth the Honour for himself and his Posterity now 't was in his power to do this act overt and if by an act unlawful he hath power to defeat the descent of the Intail upon his Issue there is the same reason that by a lawful act he should part with it there are two Acts of Parliament in force which fortifie the Fine it must be granted that those Honours are within the Statute de Donis and then there can be no reason they should not be within the Statutes of Fines 4 Hen. 7. 34 H. 8. which say that Tenant in Tail may levie a Fine of all things that are intailable within the Statute de Donis whatever therefore is within the one is within both and it is not sufficient to alledge that it is inconvenient that it should be within the Statute of Fines for there is an Act of Parliament and without an Act of Parliament to exempt it it can't be exempted It may be proved by great variety of Precedents to have been the practise in former times anciently nothing more frequent than to release Hoours See Selden's Titles of Honours 730. it was as frequent as to grant them In latter times Delaval's Case 11 Rep. 1. it hath been the Judgment of the Lords that Honours may be extinguished which in 1668. was certified by all the King's Counsel Learned in the Law to be good Authority But to go a little higher Andrew Gifford Baron Pomfret in Fee 4 Hen. 3. Rot. 100. surrendred to the King so 23 Hen. 3. Simon Mountford Esq Earl of Leicester having a Mind to take an Honour from his eldest Son and confer it upon his younger and so it was surrendred and regranted accordingly Selden seems to construe this to be by way of Transmission and not Surrender yet others of later Authority as Cambden's Britan. Title Earl of Leicester say expresly that he did Surrender it and Selden himself says it was by Concurrence of the King King Hen. 3. Rot. Cr. 24. men E. 1. created one Earl of Richmond and he surrendred to the King Cambden's Brit. Title Earl of Richmond Roger de Bigod surrendred not only the Office of Earl Marshal but also the Earldom of Norfolk William Duke of Juliers whose Father came in with Edw. 3. was created Earl of Cambridge 40 Edw. 3. m. 21. in Fee his Son surrenders to the King which Record we have here So Edward the Third made his Son John of Gaunt See Cambden's ubi supra Earl of Richmond who surrendred it to the King And lastly in the Years 1639 1679. Roger Stafford whom the King intended to make a Viscount by the Advice of the Learned Men levied a Fine thereof by which 't is now enjoy'd Lastly he argued ab inconvenienti for no Lord in the House will be in safety if it should be other ways there being many sitting in this House by virtue of Surrenders from other Lords in former days and perhaps some of their Heirs are alive and so if these Surrenders be adjudged invalid it would shake your Lordships own Possessions and make it dubitable whether Forreigners and Persons unknown may not come and thrust them out but if not so it may cause Confusion amongst themselves their former Honours having been surrendred to accept of others and perhaps some not thinking their Titles secure will stick to the former and so occasion Dispute and Confusion about Precedency and lastly it will put a great Disgrace upon your Ancestors proceedings who deemed this Course legal and those must show very good Precedents that it hath been disavowed if they will encounter such constant Practises In the next place 't was answered to their Arguments and Objections and as for that first Argument That an Honour is inherent in the Blood he answered That this Inherency in the Blood is not essential to Honours for an Honour may be created for Life and then none of the Posterity or Blood of the Peer is thereby enobled It may be limited to the Heirs Males of the Body so that an Honour may touch and enter far into the Blood and yet not run with it and farther it may be limited to the Heirs by such a Wife there the Issue by the second Venter shall never inherit the Dignity and yet is as near to the Father as those that are by the first so that 't is no true ground that they go upon that Nobility is inherent in the Blood and for what was alledged as to the Inconveniency of Surrendering Dignities he answered That there may be necessary Reasons for the extinguishment of an Honour and it may be for the benefit and advantage of the Party and his Posterity as if it do happen that the Family do fall into Poverty and be not able to support the Honour of Peerage with decency and so this Honour would perhaps be a Disgrace to the rest of the Lords and in a Child's Case it may happen to a Noble Family to have those Afflictions that to continue the Honour would expose the Family to Infamy and therefore some times to prevent the Son of Adultery from his succeeding to the Dignity it may be convenient to surrender it and yet this cannot be without the concurrence of the Prince who being the Source of Honour can best judge of the Reasons for stopping the Stream and it cannot seem an harder Case to disinherit him of the Honour then of the Estate which he may do and if he leave his Honour without his Estate it will be a Burden on his Shoulders which he will be unable to bear and seeing it 's necessary that there be a concurrence of the Prince it is undecent to suppose so vile a thing of the Crown as to comply with the Peevishness and Simplicity of the Parents where there is no reason for it And as for what hath been alledged for the Invalitity of those Precedents that they were in Cases of New Creations and were in nature of Transmissions he answered That when an
Honour is Surrendred and a new Honour granted the former is either extinguished or not before the other takes effect if not then the Party hath both together against the will of the Donor and perhaps the new Honour may be of that Name and Place and those Persons may be concerned in it that will not permit it to be effected and if it be in the power of the Ancestor for the advantage of his Posterity by the Surrender of one Honour to take a greater it may be also in his power to do it for his prejudice As to the Objection That by the same Reason an Honour may be extinguished it may also be Transferred he answered That there was a great disparity betwixt them for as to Alienations of Honours there 's a great reason they should be disallowed for they all flow from the Prince and therefore 't is not fit they should be conferred on any but by the Prince tho' the King 's of England have granted power to a General to give the Honour of Knighthood c. in the Field for the Reward and Incouragement of Valour yet this granting of Nobility is a Prerogative peculiar to the King's Person alone no Man else can ennoble another Time was indeed when the Earls of Chester having Counties Palatine by virtue of their Jura Regalia did create Barons yet they never sate in Parliament as Peers because Peerage being a thing of so high a nature cannot be given by any but a Soveraign and is given as a Trust and Obligation so that common Reason saith they are not transferrable It is said in our Law that where Offices are granted to a Man in Fee See Jones 122 123. he may grant it over yet in some Cases they are so near to the Crown that they cannot be transferred but must descend with the Blood upon the same Reason no Man can ever transfer an Honour for the near Relation which it hath to the Crown but in case of Extinguishment that Relation and Trust ceaseth and so they are different Cases Then lastly as to the great Objection of the Judgment of the House of Lords in Roger Stafford's Case Anno 1640. he answered That notwithstanding that Case their Lordships had given him leave to argue it and therefore they intended not that should be any Impediment 2. That is no Judgment for they being a Court of Judicature do as other Judges judge of the Matter before them only Then the Question was Whether an Honour could descend to the half Blood They refetred it to the Judges who were of Opinion that it should Thereupon ariseth another Question Whether a Man might Convey or Transfer his Honour to another 'T was resolved he might not This drew another Question whereupon they resolved that a Lord could not Surrender his Dignity the Original Cause was about a Descent to the half Blood the Resolution is he cannot Surrender how then can they pretend that to be a Judgment when the Question in point of Judgment was not before them Suppose it had been resolved and it 's a wonder it had not all that time that a Lord could not forfeit and that had been a third step to have made it a perfect Business for considering the times it had been a most convenient Resolution But besides all that the King's Counsel were never heard in the point and the rejecting the Opinions of Learned Men shows it was no Resolution of the whole House tho' entred upon the Journal and therefore he prayed Judgment against the Petitioner The Earl of Shaftsbury spoke in the House for the Petitioner The stress of the Argument for the King in this Case is founded upon these two Assertions 1 That Honours are taken to be within the Statute de Donis c. and the general Rules of that Statute 2. And then secondly That Honours are to be governed as other Inheritances by the Rule of the Common Law As for the first it hath not been proved for the Resolution in Nevil's Case 2 Jac. was Extrajudicial and no Judgment of any Cause before them and in such Cases the Judges do not hold themselves to be upon Oath and if there be two or more of another Opinion they do not refuse to sign the Resolution of the major part and so it goes under the denomination of all the Judges but if it were a Judgment of them altogether they could neither alter nor make new the Law neither could they make that intended within the Statute de Donis c. which was not in being till many Ages after Beauchamp in Richard the Second's time being the first Honour that was entailed by Patent 2. The second Assertion is contrary to the Opinion of the most Learned Men the Honour and Dignity of the House the constant practise of Westminster-hall and the direct Evidence of the thing it self Justice Berkley a very learned Judge declared his Opinion Febr. 6. 1640. as appears by the Records of this House That Honours descend from the first that was seized of them contrary to the Rules of other Inheritances and that Honours are not governed by the Rules of the Common Law Justice Dodderidge in Jones 207. is of opinion That Honours are Personal Dignities which are affixed to the Blood the Lords never yet suffered their Honours to be tried at any Court at Law or any other where save before themselves tho' their other Inheritances are tried there as well as other Mens So possessio fratris holds of Lands but not of a Dignity which is not disposed of as other Inheritances nor will it be guided by the strict Rules of Law The Lord Coke is of Opinion in Bedford's Case That an Honour could not be taken away but by Act of Parliament therefore it will be allowed that the concurrence of all Parties concerned may extinguish this as well as other Inheritances but the Concurrence of all can't be without Act of Parliament for the whole Kingdom have an Interest in the Peerage of every Lord It is a dangerous Doctrine to say our Judicature and Legislature is our own only The House of Lords is the next thing to the Crown tho' that be far above them yet those that reach at that must take them out of the way first they were voted useless and dangerous before the Crown was laid aside and as in Descent of the Crown the whole Kingdom hath such an Interest in it as the King cannot Surrender or alien it so in a proportionable degree tho' far less the King and Kingdom have an Interest in their Lordships and Dignities and Titles It is true they may be forfeited but it doth not follow that they may be extinguished by Surrender There be two Reasons for the Forfeiture 1. There is a Condition in Law that they shall be true and loyal to the Government 2. Honours are inherent in the Blood and when that is corrupted that which is inherent is taken away but in case of a Surrender these Reasons do
not hold there is no Breach of any Condition in Law nor any Corruption of the Blood for these Reasons Felony without Clergy forfeits Honours whereas other Inheritances tho' Fee-simple are lost but for a year and a day and so are Freeholds for Lives which is another clear Instance that Honours are not governed by the Rules of Law It is pressed as a known Law that Honours are grantable for Lives a Point of greater Consequence than the Thing in debate It 's not a fair way of arguing nor to be allowed of As for the Precedents that are Selden 730. is expresly against them for it saith that the Honour of Baronages were in Abbots only in right of their Abbies not inherent in them So that 't is plainly inferred that other Honours are Personal Dignities The Lord Delaware's Case 11 Rep. makes nothing for them for it doth not follow that because he could not Surrender that which was not in him therefore he might Surrender that which was in him As to the other Precedents he gave these three Reasons 1. They were bare Surrenders no Fines 2. All those were made by Persons that had advantage by them having greater Honours granted unto them or such whose Interest was beyond the Seas and therefore were willing to quit their Dependencies here upon good Considerations that pleased them Et volenti non sit Injuria 3. All these Surrenders passed sub silentio and never admitted of any Dispute But as for the sole melancholy Precedent of Roger Stafford 1638. which was condemned in Parliament 1640. 't is to be observed that Resolution can't be condemned because of the Times for the Affront to the Lords in taking such a Fine was in 1638. and when could it be more properly remedied then in 1640. except it be expected there were a Prophetical Spirit of Judgment against a thing not in being there were 94 Lords present and the Vote was Nemine Contradicente which gives it as great an Authority as any Resolution that ever was The King's Counsel were not heard in the Case of Ship-money nor Knighthood-money where they had more right to claim to be heard than in this Case To conclude a Fine is a Judgment in the Common Pleas and your Lordships Honours are not triable in that Court below in Westminster-hall but if this Fine be allowable they must be triable there as well as other Inheritances And as to what has been said That some of your Lordships sit here by Remainders and they are in danger if Honours be not allowed to be intailed it 's denied and if they be intailed it 's not of the same nature with other Inheritances neither doth any Lord sit here by Title of a Remainder but by Virtue of a new Grant in the same Patent 'T was afterwards declared That the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled upon a very long Debate and having heard his Majesty's Attorney General are unanimously of Opinion and do resolve and adjudge that no fine levied or at any time hereafter to be levied to the King can bar a Peer's Title of Honour or the Right of any Person claiming such Title under him that levied or shall levie such Fine Duval versus Price WRit of Error on a Judgment in the Court of Exchequer affirmed on a Writ of Error before the Keeper of the Great Seal c. in an Action of the Case for Slander The Writ was to this Effect Gullelmus Maria c. Thes Baronibus de Scaccario suo salutem quia in recordo processu ac etiam in redditione judicij loquelae quae fuit in Cur ' nostra de Scaccar ' coram Baronibus nostris praed ' de Scaccar ' nostro praed ' per Billam inter Edward ' Price Arm ' debitor ' nostr ' Johan ' Duvall Arm ' de quadam transgression ' super casum eidem Edwardo per praefat ' Johannem illat ' super quo judicium in Curia nostra de Scaccar ' reddit ' fuit pro praefat ' Edwardo versus dict' Johann ' qua quidem record ' process ' causa Erroris intervenient ' in Camera Consilij juxta Scaccar ' vocat ' le Councel Chamber coram Domino Custod ' Magni Sigilli Angliae vobis praefat ' Thes venire facimus jud ' inde versus praefat ' Johann ' coram c. affirmatum est quia in affirmatione judicij praed ' versus praed ' Johannem coram c. Error ' intervenit manifestus ad grave dampn ' ipsius Johannis sicut ex quaerela sua accepimus quos Error ' si quis fuerit modo debito Corrigi eidem Johanni plenam Celarem justitiam fieri volentes in hac parte vobis Mandamus quod si judicium coram praefat ' c. affirmatum est tunc record ' process ' tam judicii quam affirmation ' praed ' cum omnibus ea tangentibus quae coram vobis jam resident ' ut dicitur nobis in Parliament ' nostro viz. 17 die Septembris prox ' futur ' distincte aperte mittatis hoc Breve ut inspectis record ' processu praedict ' ulterius inde de assensu Dominor ' Spiritualium Temporalium in eodem Parliamento Existent ' pro Errore illo Corrigend ' fieri faciamus quod de jure secundum legem consuetudinem Regni nostri Anglie fuerit faciend ' Teste nobis ipsis apud Westm ' 8 Maii Anno 6. Record ' Process ' de quibus in Brevi de Errore huic Schedule annex ' specificat ' fit mentio sequitur in haec verba Placita coram Baron ' de Scaccar ' c. Midd ' Memorand ' quod alias scilicet c. And by the Bill Price complains of Duvall praesent ' hic in Cur ' eodem die de placito transgr ' super casum pro eo viz. quod cum he was a good Subject and free from all Suspicion of Treason and was a Justice of Peace in Radnor and Montgomery-shire and well performed his Duty and well-affected to the King and Queens Government and ready to oppose all their Enemies c. the Defendant maliciously designing to prejudice the Plaintiff and to bring him into the Displeasure of his Prince c. did tali die anno apud Westm ' in Com' Midd ' habens colloquium of the said Plaintiff say these English words of him He meaning the Plaintiff is disaffected to the Government the Government of the King and Queen meaning and having other Discourse of the Plaintiff and of the Government of the King and Queen did say of the said Plaintiff these other words viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is disaffected to the Government the said Government of the King and Queen meaning By pretext of which said words he was injured in his Credit and fell into the Displeasure of their Majesties and his Office aforesaid by reason thereof did totally lose and remain'd hitherto daily
the Sentence given by the Constable and Marshal in the Suit before them concerning a Coat of Arms Rot. Claus 12 Rich. 2. m. 4. Appeal by Bond vers Singleton 't is in a Cause of Arms in our Court before our Constable and Marshal wherein Sentence was given by them 1 pars Pat. 17 Rich. 2. m. 12. Thus it appears by a Commission for the Execution of the Office of Constable of England Committimus vobis officium hujusmodi Constabularii ad querelam Thome Moor in hac parte una cum Edmundo de Mortimore Mareschallo Anglie audiendum secunda pars Patent ' 48 Edw. 3. m. 20. in dorso As also by a Claim at the Coronation of H. 5. before Beauchamp Earl of Warwick then Lord Steward John Mowbray Earl Marshal Son to the then Duke of Norfolk claimed under a Grant in 20th of Rich. 2. of the Office of Earl Marshal of England to hold Court with the Constable and to hold Pleas before them and Copies of these Precedents were said to have been ready in Court Further to prove the joynt Authority were cited several of our Old Books 48 Edw. 3. fol. 3. in a Case of Debt upon an Indenture by which P. was retained by the Defendant with two Squires of Arms for the War in France Belknapp said of such Matter this Court cannot have conusance but 't is triable before the Constable and Marshal In the Case of Pountney and Bourney 13 Hen. 4.4 the Court of King's Bench call it the Court of the Constable and Marshal And in 37 Hen. 6.3 upon another occasion Prisot said this Matter belongs to the Constable and Marshal And Coke 4 Inst 123. says that they are both Judges of the Court and that the Constable sometimes gave Sentence is no Argument that the Marshal was no Judge with him it only proves him the Chief who in most Courts doth usually give the Rule Nor is the Earl Marshal's receiving Writs from the Constable to execute his Commands any Argument that he sits there only as a Ministerial Officer and not as a Judge for he may be both as in many Corporations Mayors are Judges of the Court and yet have the Custody of their Goals too and so have the Sheriffs of London their Compters tho' they strictly are Judges of their several Courts 2. During the Vacancy of the Earl Marshal's Office the Constable alone had the Judicature as in 11 Hen. 7. on Holy-rood-day the Earl of Darby being then Constable of England sate and gave Judgment alone in a Cause between Sir Thomas Ashton and Sir Piers Leigh upon a Coat of Arms but this needs no Proof since 't is contended on the other side that the Court doth belong only to the Constable 3. 'T was argued that the Earl Marshal hath set alone and given Judgment and to prove that it was said this Court was held when there was no Constable before Thomas Howard Duke of Norfolk Lord High Treasurer and Earl Marshal of England who Died 16 Hen. VIII and next after him before Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk then Earl Marshal who Died 37 Hen. VIII after him the Court was held and Sentences given by Thomas Howard Duke of Norfolk who Died in 1512. and after him in the 30 Eliz. the Earl of Essex sat as Earl Marshal and heard and determined Causes judicially and the chief Judge sat then as Assistant with him in Court and then after the Death of the Earl of Essex it was in Commission to my Lord Treasurer Burleigh and others and then the great Oase of Sir F. Mitchell was heard and determined at which several Judges assisted and the Sentence of degradation was executed upon him 26. April 1621. and then was Cited the Case of Pool and Redhead 12 Jac. 1.1 Roll's Rep. 87. where 't was held that the proper remedy for Fees of Knighthood was to sue to the Earl Marshal and Coke says in the same Case the Common-Law does not give remedy for precedency but it belongs to the Earl Marshal And since that in Parker's Case which was 20 Car. II. Syd 353. the Earl Marshal was agreed to have the absolute determination of matters of Honour in the Court of Chivalry as much as the Chancellor hath in matters of Equity And the Error on the other side was occasioned by not distinguishing between the Ancient Jurisdiction of this great Court at the Common-Law and the Jurisdiction given to the Constable and Marshal under those names by Statute for the latter cannot be executed by one alone and that distinction answers the Authority in 1 Inst 74. which grounded the mistake that there is no Court of Chivalry because there 's no Constable whereas the reason why in Sir Francis Drake's Case the not constituting of a Constable silenced the Appeal was from the 1 Hen. IV. Cap. 14. which orders all Appeals of Murder committed beyond Sea to be before the Constable and Marshal by name But the Ancient Jurisdiction of this Court by prescription wherein both the Constable and Marshal were Judges severally or together and which each of them did and could hold alone remains still as much in the Earl Marshal alone as it ever was in him and the Constable Then it was argued that no Prohibition lay to this Court because none had ever been granted and yet greater occasions then now can be pretended by reason of the large Jurisdiction which this Court did in Ancient time exercise many Petitions were frequently preferred in Parliament Complaining of the Incroachments of this Court in Edw. I. Edw. III. Rich. II. Hen. IV. and Hen. VIth's time as appears in 4 Inst. 125. 2 Hen. IV. num 79. and 99. 1 Roll's Abridg. 527. and yet no Prohibition granted or moved for which according to Littleton's Text is a very strong Argument that it doth not lie The Statute of 13 Rich. II. 2. is an Argument against it because after several Complaints of the Incroachments of this Court another remedy is given which had been needless if this had been legal nay it shews the Opinion of the Parliament that there was no other way of relief and soon after the making of this Statute in the same Reign two Privy Seals were sued upon it in the Case of Poultney and Bourney 13 Hen. IV. 4. 5. Besides this might be grounded on the Antiquity and greatness of this Court for as to the subject matter of it 't is by Prescription a Court for determining matters of Honour to preserve the distinction of degrees and quality of which no other Courts have Jurisdiction and the right and property in Honours and Arms is as necessary to be preserved in a Civil Government as that in Lands or Goods Then 't was urged that this Court hath Jurisdiction even of Capital Offences its extent is large 't is throughout the Realm even in Counties Palatine even beyond the Seas its manner of proceeding is different in a Summary way by Petition its trial of Fact may be by Duel as is 4
the Common Law but much more so upon a Statute Besides the latter Statute which gives a Privy Seal doth not Repeal or alter the Law then in being 't is an Affirmative Law and that seldom or never works any change or alteration in what was before any otherwise then by Addition or Confirmation and in truth this is only a further remedy and is far from declaring a Prohibition not to lie the meaning might be to give a Privy Seal immediately even in vacation time the preamble complains so much of the Grievances that it cannot be supposed to Design any thing in favour of them or to prevent the restraint Suppose between the 8 and the 15 Rich. II. an excess of Jurisdiction had been usurped as in this Case will any Man say that a Prohibition would not then have lain and if it would can any Man say that the Statute pleaded doth take it away or Prohibit such Writ of Prohibition And the 11 Hen. IV. 24. ordains that all the Statutes concerning the Court of Constable and Marshal shall be duly observed and if so the 8 Rich. II. as well as the 15 Rich. II. are within that ordinance and if so a Prohibition lies as well as a Privy Seal and both are little enough to keep that Court within its due bounds and limits 2. It was argued That the proceeding upon these Articles was an intermedling with a subject matter properly determinable at Common-Law here 's no contract or deed of Arms no Mis-behaviour in War nothing of that nature which their own Statute says belongs to them Rushworth's II. Vol. 1054. he frequented the Court for four years together he observed no Cases there but for Words and one or two as Delaware's Case about abusing an Honourable Family by assuming to be a branch thereof here 's no such thing but express Articles for exercising of a lawful Trade 't is not causa armorum it doth neither concern Warlike matters nor Honour a Funeral Ceremony can never be within their Power this is a plain Accusation for a wrong to one of their Officers the Articles charge that Sir Henry S. George by his Office within his Province hath the ordering of these matters and the party hath medled therein without his License he says 't is lawful and the exercise of a lawful employment they say 't is otherwise because it belongs to another Man's Office then 't was admitted by the Council for the present to be so that Sir Henry was an Officer by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England which by the way makes the Office and rights of it to be of Common-Law Conusance and the Patent is set forth at large in Prinne on 4 Inst 64 65. and that the King at Arms hath such a right yet if any Man intermeddles or incroaches upon that Office 't is not a breach of the rules of Honour and not relating to Arms but a plain injury at Common-Law and an Action lies for it as it doth for the disturbance of any other Office or Franchise In 4 Inst 126. 't is said that they do upon request Marshal Funerals but supposing they alone ought to do it then an Action lies This is merely a question whether the Letters Patents do carry such a sole priviledge suppose nul tiel record be Pleaded to them when Pleaded or Inrolled and without producing them suppose non concessit Pleaded to them when produced how shall these issues be tried Suppose they awarded a satisfaction to be made to Sir H. S. by the gift of a Summ of Money and he should afterwards bring an Action at Law for the same Cause will the proceeding in the Court of the Earl Marshal be a barr the Fact alledged in these Articles comes within none of those particulars supposed to be belonging to this Court in 1 Inst 391. It matters not whether these were publick Funerals as was questioned in Parker's Case Sid. 352. and in 2 Keble 316.322 but the Query here is if this be a point of Honour or whether it be not about the right of an Office and if it be the latter they have no Power to determine it The Heralds are Officers attendant upon that Court but it doth not follow that that Court can judge of the nature or extent validity or operation of their Letters Patents no more than the Court Christian can try the right or Freehold of a Chancellors or Registers Office The Earl Marshal cannot License the doing this in prejudice of the Heralds or acquit the party if does it for he still stands liable at Law the Herald hath a Freehold in it and may bring his Action notwithstanding Then 3. 'T was argued that admitting that no Prohibition did lie to the Court of Honour or that there was no cause for such Prohibition yet it ought to be granted to this pretended Court which is not within their Statute The true Court is before Constable and Marshal it is a Court by Prescription and cannot be altered but by Act of Parliament All our Books which describe the Court mention it to be before both 4 Inst 125. Crompt Jurisdiction 82. 1 Inst 74. Stamford 65. The Constable is the Chief and so are the Old Books and 37 Hen. 6.20 expresly before the Constable and Marshal The Statutes which mention the Court do all take notice of it as held before both the 8 Rich. 2. and that which they Plead do describe it so and the 1 Hen. 4. Cap. 14. the 13 Hen. 4.4.5 all Attainders are Pleaded to be before both Cambden who was an Herald in his Commentary de Etymologio antiquitate officio Comitis Mareschalli Angliae fol. 87. 't is published at the end of his Latin Epistles which are in 4to Printed for Chiswell 1691. he endeavours to advance the Office of Earl Marshal and searches for the Etymology and after all makes him but an Harbinger and tells us when the Title Mareschallus Angliae was first used and how it hath been enjoyed and by whom and of what Families and afterwards 91. lessens his Character much and derives the Office of Marshal of England from that of Marshal of the Houshold which he describes to disadvantage the same is likewise in Fleta lib. 2. cap. 5. But this is observable which Cambden says that the greatest increase of the Authority of this Office hath been since there were no Constables for the Kings since that time have referred many things to them which in former times were proper for the Constable neither had the Marshal any precedency in respect of his place until King Hen. 8. Anno 31. by Parliament Assigned him place next to the Lord Constable and before the Lord Admiral all which shews that the Earl Marshal never had that Authority time out of mind to hold this Court before himself alone as is pretended during the vacancy of the Office of Constable In November 1640. 't was Voted by the House of Commons upon a report from a Committee of some
Disorder and most Proceedings informal and in the English Tongue in such a mean Court where are few Precedents to guide them where the Parties themselves are not empowered to draw up their own Proceedings as here above but the whole is left to the Steward who is a Stranger to the Person concerned and therefore 't is hard and unreasonable that Mens Purchases should be prejudiced by the Ignorance Unskilfulness or Dishonesty of a Steward or his Clerks that there is scarce one Customary Recovery in England which is exactly agreeable to the Rules of the Common Law that the questioning of this may in consequence endanger multitudes of Titles which have been honestly purchased especially since there can be no aid from the Statutes of Jeofailes for they do not extend to Courts Baron 'T was further urged That there was no Precedent to enforce Lords of Mannors to do as this Bill desired that the Lords of Mannors are the ultimate Judges of the Regularity or Errours in such Proceedings that there 's no Equity in the Prayer of this Plaintiff that if the Lord had received such Petition and were about to proceed to the Reversal of such Recovery Equity ought then to interpose and quiet the Possession under those Recoveries That Chancery ought rather to supply a Defect in a Common Conveyance if any shall happen and decree the Execution of what each Party meant and intended by it much rather than to assist the annulling of a Solemn Agreement executed according to Usage tho' not strictly conformable to the Rules of Law For which Reasons it was prayed that that Appeal might be dismissed and the Dismission below confirmed and ' was accordingly adjudged so The Countess of Radnor versus Vandebendy al. APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery the Case was to this effect The Earl of Warwick upon Marriage of his Son settles part of his Estate upon his Lady for a Jointure and after failure of Issue Male limits a Term for 99 years to Trustees to be disposed of by the Earl either by Deed or Will And for want of such Appointment then in trust for the next in Remainder and then limited the whole Estate in such manner as that a third part of a Moiety thereof came to the Lord Bodmyn the Appellants late Husband in Tail general with the Reversion in Fee to the Earl and his Heirs The Son died without Issue the Earl by his Will appoints the Lands to his Countess for so many years of the Term as she should live and to her Executors for one year after her Death and charges the Term with several Annuities some of which remain in being The Respondent's Father purchased part of these Lands from the Lord Bodmyn after his Marriage and had the Term assigned to him The Lord Bodmyn dyes the Appellant brings her Writ of Dower in C. B. the Respondent pleads the Term for 99 years and she Exhibits her Bill praying that she may after the discharge of the Earls Incumbrances have the benefit of the Trust as to a third of the Profits of this Term and upon hearing the Cause the Lord Chancellor saw no cause to give Relief but dismissed her Bill There were many Particulars in the Case and many Proceedings before both in Law and Equity but this was the whole Case as to the general Question Whether a Tenant in Dower shall have the benefit of the Trust of a Term which is ordered to attend the Inheritance against a Purchaser after the Marriage The Lord Chancellor Jeffryes had been of opinion with the Appellant but the Cause coming to be heard again a Dismission was decreed and now it was argued against the Decree on behalf of the Appellant that Equity did entitle her to the Thirds of this Term that a Tenant by the Curtesie is intitled to it and br the same reason a Tenant in Dower that the Term created by the Settlement was to attend all the Estates limited by that Settlement and in Trust for such Persons as should claim under it which the Appellant doth as well as the Respondents that it was in consequence to attend all the particular Estates carved or derived from the others the Term was never in its creation designed for this purpose to prevent or protect against Dower that in the Case of Snell and Clay the Tenant in Dower had it in Chancery against the Heir at Law and that this was the same Case a Purchaser with notice of that Incumbrance of Dower the Vendor being then married this was an Estate of which the Husband was full Owner and received the whole Profits that in proportion 't is as much a Trust for her for her Thirds during Life as it is a Trust for the Respondents for the Inheritance she claims under her Husband who had the benefit of the whole Trust If there be a Mortgage by an Ancecestor upon the whole Eqinty will permit her to redeem paying her proportion according to the value of her Thirds for Life and the same reason holds in this Case and there 's no Precedent in Equity to the contrary And many Precedents in favour of Tenant in Dower were cited and much Reason well urged from parallel Cases to entitle the Lady to her proportion of the Trust of this Term. On the other side 'T was said that Dower is an Interest or Right at the Common Law only that no Title can be maintained to have Dower but where the Common Law gives it and that is only to have the Thirds of that which the Husband was seized of and if a Term were in being no Feme was ever let in but after the determination of that Term that this is the first pretence set up for a Dower in Equity the Right is only to the Thirds of the Rent reserved upon any Term and 't is a new thing to affirm that there shall be one sort of Dower at Law and another in Chancery that 't is and always hath been the common received Opinion of Westminster-hall and of all Conveyancers that a Term or Statute prevents Dower that if a Purchaser can procure it the same becomes his Defence that this is what the Wisdom of our Forefathers thought fit to use and tho' some Mens reasoning may render it in appearance as absurd yet the consequence of an alteration will be much more dangerous than the continuance of the old Rules that tho' this Lady's Case be unfortunate yet the multitude of Purchasors who have bought upon full consideration and have been advised and still conceive themselves safe under this Law will be more unfortunate if the Law be broken Then ' was argued That there could be no Equity in this Case for it must be not only from the Party Appellant but also against the Respondent and that 't is not because he bought the whole Her Portion her Quality and her being a Wife create no Equity as to the Purchaser 't would perhaps be prevalent against an Heir but
8 Rep. 171. York and Athen's Case Lane's Rep. 20. Hob. 115. 2 Rolls Abridg. 158. Stevenson's Case 1 Cro. 389 390. 'T was argued that nothing could be inferred from Tanfield's Opinion in 2 Rolls Abridg. 159. which is also in Lane's Rep. 65. for there the Debt was not a Debt to the King till after the Death of the Testator but here is a Forfeiture to the King before the Elegit sued and admitting that the King hath only the pernancy of the Profits yet while he hath so no other Person can intermeddle for the King is intituled to all the Profits even to a Presentment to a Church which was void before the Outlawry as is Beverly's Case 1 Leon. 63. 2 Rolls Abridg. 807. and Oland's Case 5 Rep. 116. And Process of Outlawry is to be favoured and encouraged as 't is a Means for the recovery of just Debts and the effects of them by Forfeiture to the King ought to be favoured as a Prerogative wherewith the King is intrusted to that purpose 'T is a Penalty or Judgment upon him to be put Extra Legem because he contemns the Law and will not obey it so that as to him 't is the greatest Justice in the World that he should not enjoy any benefit of his Estate by virtue of the Law during the time that he despises it And as to Baden 't was his own default that he did not extend sooner he trusted the Party longer then he should and for that he may thank himself Wherefore upon the whole 't was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed Hall al' Executors of Tho. Thynne Versus Jane Potter Administratrix of George Potter APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in the Court of Chancery The Case was thus That Thomas Thynne Esq having intentions to make his Addresses to the Lady Ogle gave a Bond of 1000 l. Penalty to the Respondents Husband to pay 500 l. in Ten days after his Marriage with the Lady Ogle the Respondent assisted in promoting the said Marriage which afterwards took effect soon after the said Thynne was barbarously murdered and about six years after Mr. Potter brought an Action upon this Bond against the Appellants as Executors of Mr. Thynne and proving the Marriage recovered a Verdict for the 1000 l. Thereupon the Appellants preferred their Bill in Chancery to be relieved against this Bond as given upon an unlawful Consideration the Defendants by their Answer acknowledge the Promotion of that Marriage to be the Reason of giving the Bond. Upon hearing the Cause at the Rolls the Court decreed the Bond to be delivered up and Satisfaction to be acknowledged upon the Judgment The Respondent petitioned the Lord Keeper for a re-hearing and the same being re-heard accordingly his Lordship was pleased to Reverse that Decree and ordered the Respondents to pay Principal Interest and Costs or else the Bill to stand dismist with Costs And it was argued on behalf of the Appellants That this Bond ought in equity to be set aside for that even at the Common Law Bonds founded upon unlawful Considerations appearing in the condition were void that in many Instances Bonds and Contracts that are good at Law and cannot be avoided there are cancelled in Equity That such Bonds to Match-makers and Procurers of Marriage are of dangerous Consequence and tend to the betraying and oftentimes to the ruin of Persons of Quality and Fortune And if the use of such Securities and Contracts be allowed and countenanced the same may prove the occasion of many unhappy Marriages to the prejudice and discomfort of the best of Families that the Consideration of such Bonds and Securities have always been discountenanced and Relief in Equity given against them even so long since as the Lord Coventry's time and long before and particularly in the Case of Arundel and Trevilian betweeen whom the Fourth of February 11 Car. 1. was an Order made in these or the like words Vpon the hearing and debating of the Matter this present day in the presence of the Counsel Learned on both sides for and touching the Bond or Bill of 100 l. against which the Plaintiff by his Bill prayeth relief It appeared that the said Bill was originally entred into by the Plaintiff unto the Defendant for the payment of 100 l. formerly promised unto the said Defendant by the Plaintiff for the effecting of a Marriage between the Plaintiff and Elizabeth his now Wife which the said Defendant procured accordingly as his Counsel alledged But this Court utterly disliking the Consideration whereupon the said Bill was given the same being of dangerous consequence in precedent upon reading three several Precedents wherein this Court hath relieved others in like Cases against Bonds of that nature thought not fit to give any countenance unto Specialties entred into upon such Contracts It is therefore ordered and decreed That the said Defendant shall bring the said Bill into this Court to be delivered up to the Plaintiff to be cancelled Then 't was further urged That the Appellants had once a Decree at the Rolls to be relieved against the Bond in question upon consideration of the said Precedent in the time of the said Lord Coventry and others and of the Mischiefs and Inconveniences likely to arise by such Practises which increase in the present Age more then in the Times when Relief was given against such Bonds and therefore 't was pray'd that the Decree might be Reversed On the other side it was urged That the Consideration of this Bond was lawful that the assisting and promoting of a Marriage at the Parties request was a good Consideration at Law in all Times to maintain a Promise for payment of Money That this Bond was voluntary and the Party who was Obligor was of Age and sound Memory that here was no Fraud or Deceit in procuring it that Chancery was not to Relieve against Voluntary Acts that here was a great Fortune to be acquired to the Appellant's Testator by the Match that here was Assistance given that the Persons were both of great Quality and Estate and no Imposition or Deceit on either side in the Marriage That it might be proper to Relieve against such Securities where ill Consequences did ensue yet here being none and the thing lawful and the Bond good at Law the same ought to stand that here are no Children Purchasers or Creditors to be defeated that there are Assets sufficient to pay all and consequently there can be no Injustice in allowing this Bond to remain in force that it was the Expectation of the Respondent without which she would not have given her Service in this Matter and that it was the full meaning of the Appellant's Testator to pay this Money in case the Marriage took effect that there was a vast difference between supporting and vacating a Contract in Chancery that tho' Equity perhaps would not assist and help a Security upon such a Consideration if it were defective at Law
tried by a Jury And the Petition is wholly of a new Nature and without any Example or Precedent being to compel Judges who are by the Law of the Land to act according to their own judgments without any Constraint or Compulsion whatsoever and trenches upon all Mens Rights and Liberties tending manifestly to destroy all Trials by Jury And it is further manifest That this Complaint is utterly improper for your Lordships Examination for that your Lordships cannot apply the proper and only Remedy which the Law hath given the Party in this Case which is by awarding Damages to the Party injured if any Injury be done for these are only to be assessed by a Jury And they these Respondents are so far from apprehending they have done any wrong to the Petitioners in this Matter that they humbly offer with your Lordships leave to wave any Priviledge they have as Assistants to this Honourable House and appear gratis to any Suit that shall be brought against them in Westminster-hall touching the Matter complained of in the Petition And they further with all humility offer to your Lordships Consideration That as they are Judges they are under the Solemn Obligation of an Oath to do Justice without respect of Persons and are to be supposed to have acted in this Matter with and under a due regard to that Sacred Obligation and therefore to impose any thing contrary upon them may endanger the breaking of it which they humbly believe your Lordships will be tender of And they further humbly shew to your Lordships That by a Statute made in the 25th of Edw. 3. cap. 4. it is enacted That from thenceforth none shall be taken by Petition or Suggestion to the King or his Councel unless by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful People of the Neighbourhood or by Process by Writ Original at Common Law and that none shall be put out of his Franchise or Freehold but by the Course of the Common Law And by another Statute in the 28th of Edw. 3. cap. 3. it is expresly provided that no Man shall be put out of his Lands and Tenements nor imprisoned or disinherited but by due Process of Law And by another Statute made in the 42 Edw. 3. cap. 3. it is enacted That no Man shall be put to answer without Presentment before Justices or Matter of Record on due Process and Original Writ according to the old Law of the Land And the Respondents further say That inasmuch as the Petition is a Complaint in the nature of an Original Cause for a supposed Breach of an Act of Parliament which Breach if any be is only examinable and triable by the Course of the Common Law and cannot be so in any other manner and is in the Example of it dangerous to the Rights and Liberties of all Men and tends to the Subversion of all Trials by Juries these Respondents conceive themselves bound in Duty with regard to their Offices and in Conscience to the Oaths they have taken to crave the benefit of defending themselves touching the Matter complained of in the Petition by the due and known Course of the Common Law and to rely upon the aforesaid Statutes and the Common Right they have of Free-born People of England in Bar of the Petitioners any further proceeding upon the said Petition and humbly pray to be dismissed from the same Then it was after Debate ordered That Counsel be heard at the Bar of the House on the said Petition And afterwards upon the Day appointed for the hearing of Counsel it was insisted on in the behalf of the Petitioners That here was a Right and a Right proved and no ways to come at it but this that if a Bill of Exceptions be tendred and refused this House can command them to do it that this proceeding of the Judges is to stifle the Matter of Law the Writ upon the Statute must be returnable here and cannot be otherwise that this follows the Judgment into Parliament that this House is to judge of every thing belonging to that Judgment that if this cannot be done there will be a failure of Justice that there have been Writs of Error upon Judgments with the Bill of Exceptions annexed that Damages to be recovered in an Action gives no Reparation for the Office that the Action must be brought before the Judges and so it must be a Dance in a Circle that as to the Judges Oaths the Justices of Peace are upon their Oaths and yet they may be committed that this is not fit for a Jury to try Whether the Judges have done well or ill in refusing to Seal this Bill of Exceptions This Refusal is the way to keep the Law within the Bounds or Walls of Westminster-hall and effectually to prevent its ever coming hither that this was not a Complaint of the Judges that as yet they would not accuse them of a Crime they only said fac hoc vive that the Court of King's Bench below doth the same thing to the Judges in Ireland they command others and ought to be commanded that they themselves send Mandatory Writs as the Cases are in Yelvert ' Cro. Car. That the Lords had directed the Judges in many things and so they did in Jeffrey Stanton's Case that by Command under the Privy Seal things have been done which otherwise would not and my Lord Shaftsbury was remanded to the Tower upon the Authority of that Case 15 Edw. 3. the Statute says that the Peers shall Examine for by great Men are meant the Peers Then were urged certain Cases where the Lords had commanded the Chancery to proceed speedily and to give Judgment c. Earl of Radnor's Case Englefield and Englefield and other like Cases were quoted and from thence they argued the Power of the Lords to command the Judges to do the thing desired 'T was argued on the other side against the Petition to this effect That this was a Cause of great consequence in respect of the Persons concerned as also of the Subject Matter it being the Complaint of a Noble Peeress against three of the Judges before whom she was lately a Suitor and concerning the Jurisdiction of this House That this Petition was the most artificial which could be contrived to hinder the Justice of the Law and to procure a Determination in prejudice of Two hundred thirty five years enjoyment that it is designed to get a Cause to be heard and adjudged on a Writ of Error by the Evidence onone side only or rather by that which was no Evidence at all if the Copy produced at the Trial was true for now upon the return of what they desire nothing of the Defendants Evidence would or could appear When a Bill of Exceptions is formed upon the Statute it ought to be upon some point of Law either in admitting or denying of Evidence or a Challenge or some Matter of Law arising upon Fact not denied in which either Party is over-ruled by the
cum aggravatione pene corporalis somewhat more than Death Then this being a Common Law Punishment and not prescribed by any Statute the knowledge of it must be fetcht from our Law-Books and from Presidents for the General Practise of the Realm is the Common Law 't is describ'd with an ipso vivente in Smith's Republica Anglic. p. 28. lat Edit pag. 245. Stamf. 182. en son view which is tantamount and Stamford wrote 2 Eliz. In Coke's 3 Inst 210. 't is ipsoque vivente comburentur Pulton de Pace Regni 224. and many other Books were cited to the same effect And 't was affirmed that there was no Book which recited the Judgment at large but had this Particular in it Several Books do in short put it That for Treason the Party shall be Drawn and Hanged and Quartered but those are only Hints of the Chief Parts not Recitals of the Judgment it self In the English Book of Judgments printed 1655. pag. 292. 't is mentioned particularly as the Kings Bench have adjudged it should be The Duke of Buckingham's was so 13 Hen. 8. Stow's Chronicle 513. shews that he was the Person Then 't was said they have been thus in every Age without interruption 'till 26 Car. 2. Humfrey Stafford's Case 1 H. 7.24 which was per consensum omnium Justiciariorum tho' quoted on the other side as shortly stated in the Year-Book yet on the Roll which hath been seen and perused 't is with an ipso vivente Plowden 387. and Rastal's Entries 645. the same Case is thus Coke's Ent. 699. is so likewise John Littleton in 43 Eliz. Coke's Ent. 422 423 and 366. is so In the Lord Stafford's Case 33 Car. 2. by the Direction of this House and with the Advice of all the Judges was the Judgment so given by the Earl of Nottingham then Lord High Steward In the Lord Preston's Case 't is so which was drawn by Advice of the then Attorney and Sollicitor the present Keeper and Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. As to the Objection That vivens prosternatur doth imply it and that 's enough It was answered That ipso vivente comburentur implies both but not e contra and all the Presidents shew the latter to be requisite And as to the Case of David Prince of Wales mentioned in Fleta there 's only a Relation of what was the Execution not of what was the Judgment And Coke 2 Inst 195. says That the Judgment was in Parliament and therefore the same can be no President to this purpose and any one that runs over Cotton's Records will find the Judgments in Parliament to be different as the Nature of the Case required No Argument can be drawn from the Acts of the Legislature to govern Judiciary Proceedings however John Hall's Case 1 Hen. 4. Cott. 401. is as now contended for Before the 1 Hen. 7. there were some Erroneous Attainders and the 29 Eliz. takes notice of them as so errneous The Judgments against Benson and Sir Andrew Helsey cited below are plainly erroneous they dispose of the Quarters which they ought not but leave the same to the King's pleasure Sir Andrew's President is a monstrous arbitrary Command by Writ to Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer ordering them to Examine him and to give Judgment in manner as in the Writ is directed that therefore is not to be justified and 't was before 25 Edw. 3. Henry Ropers 21 Rich. 2. doth dispose of the Quarters and hath other Errors in it and so have William Bathurst's and Henry South's which were in 3 Hen. 4. But from that time to 26 Car. 2. there 's none which do omit it The four Presidents at the Old Baily were against Popish Priests and what private politick Reasons or Commands might occasion the omission is unknown and Hampden was not Executed but his Judgment was upon a Confession and his Life saved the reason of which is also unknown So that there have been none Executed upon such Erroneous Judgments And that there are no more Presidents with the Omission is a good Argument that those many which have this Particular in them are good and legal the constant Current having been this way proves the same to be the Common Law And this is the most severe part of the Punishment to have his Bowels cut out while alive and therefore not to be omitted As to the Earl of Essex's Case in Moore and Owen's Case in Roll's Rep. the first is only a Report of the Case and the last a descant upon the Judgment but neither do pretend to recite the whole Judgment Then to pretend that this Judgment cannot be Executed is to arraign the Wisdom and Knowledge of all the Judges and Kings Counsel in all Reigns And Tradition saith that Harrison one of the Regicides did mount himself and give the Executioner a Box on the Ear after his Body was opened c. Then 't was argued That if it be a necessary part of the Judgment and be omitted it is a fatal Error and doth undoubtedly in all Cases give a good reason for the Reversal of such Judgment as in the Common Case of Debt where dampna are omitted in the Judgment tho' for the Advantage of the Defendant as is Beecher's Case and Yelv. 107. Besides if this be legal then all those Attainders in which this Particular is inserted must be illegal for 't is impossible that both the Judgments should be right for either those are more severe than they should be or this is more remiss To say that 't is discretionary is to give the Judges a power which they themselves have disclaimed and to Reverse this Reversal is to tell the Court of Kings Bench that they are not obliged to follow the General Practise of their Predecessors that they are obliged to no form in their Judgment for Treason that nothing but Death and being Drawn to it are essential and according to that Doctrine a Woman might receive the Judgment of Quartering and a Man might be Burnt and both according to Law But the Constitution of this Kingdom hath prescribed and fixed Rules and Forms which the Executive Power is obliged and bound to follow that as nothing can be made or construed to be an Offence at the Pleasure of the Court so no Judgment can be given for any known Offence at Pleasure But the Law either Statute or Common hath established what is an Offence and what is its Punishment and there is nothing of Arbitrary Power allowed in respect of either Wherefore upon the whole it was prayed that the Reversal might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Sir Evan Lloyd Baronet and Dame Mary his Wife and Sidney Godolphin Esq and Susan his Wife Appellants Versus Sir Richard Carew Baronet an Infant the Son and Heir of Sir John Carew Baronet deceased Respondent APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Rice Tannott died seized in Fee of several Lands in the several Counties of Salop
the Alienation even of an Ideot and then after Office the Practise is to Issue a Scire facias to him in possession or to the Alienee and so is Fitzh tit Scire facias pl. 2. 106. All these Methods prescribed by the Law would be useless if the Acts themselves were void Then 't is as certain that the Office must be found during the Parties Life and during the insanity and not afterwards If there had been an Office 't would only avoid it with a prospect as it would be in case of an Heir after death Even after an Office the King cannot have the Profits from the time of the Alienation which shews it not it not void from the beginning If a Suit be against an Ideot after Inquisition the Ideot cannot plead it but the King shall send a Supersedeas to the Judges suggesting the Inquisition so that even then the Party himself cannot avoid it As to the other way of avoiding it by the Heir it must be by Writ or Entry and till Entry or Writ the Act remains good But here 's no Contest with the Party himself or with his Heirs but with a Remainder Man This Act of Surrender was no tortious Act it wrought no discontinuance there was no Trust in him to preserve the Contingent Remainder A Feoffment with livery is allowed not to be void and yet that may do a wrong by discontinuance c. As to the pretence that a Warrant of Attorney to make livery is void that doth not reach this Case for here 's an Act done by himself which would have passed the Estate as by and from himself if he had been of sound Mind Then 't was desired that the other side would shew any such Case as this whereas multitudes of Gifts Grants Releases Bonds and other Specialties sealed and delivered by the Party himself are allowed to be good and the same reason holds for a Surrender made in Person and there 's no difference between a livery made in Person and a Surrender the Act being Personal and not by another under his Authority makes the livery good and so it ought to be here 18 Ed. 4.2 Perkins sect 139. And 't is observable in 39 Hen. 6.42 per Priscott upon the Inquisition 't is reseized and revested into the Interest of the Ideot and consequently of the King and if revested 't was once out of him Now here 's no prejudice to the Man himself by this Opinion he is taken care of and his Acts avoided by the King on his behalf and his Heirs may avoid them But that Strangers should take notice of them as void was denied and therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That this never was a Surrender that 't was against sense and reason to allow the Acts of a Madman a Person distracted to be valid to any purpose that in case of livery it had been allowed to be only voidable by reason of the solemnity and notoriety of the thing but in case of a Deed or a Thing passing only by Deed 't was otherwise and Bracton Britton Fleta and the Register were cited where 't is declared who can take and who can alien and that a Madman cannot alien and Fitzh is of Opinion that the Writ of dum non fuit compos may be brought by himself that there was a notion scattered in the Books that such Acts are only voidable but the reason of the Law is otherwise 39 Hen. 6.42 hath the distinction that Feoffment with livery is good but if livery be by Warrant of Attorney 't is void If it be a Feoffment with Warranty by Deed and possession delivered with his own hands yet the warranty is void because the Deed is void Perk. 5. The Deed of a Mad-man is void if he grants a Rent 't is void If an Infant makes a Warrant of Attorney 't is void so is Whittingham's Case A Deed and a Will are not to be distinguished and by the same reason that the one is void the other is so Finch 102. is general All Deeds of a Man of non sane memorie are null 12 Rep. Shulter's Case 'T is an offence to procure a Deed from him The Civil Law makes all his Acts which he doth without consent of his Curator to be void A Madman is taken pro absente 'T is a Rule unaccountable That a Man shall not stuitifie himself that he shall not be able to excuse himself by the Visitation of Heaven when he may plead Duress from Men to avoid his own Act. 'T is absurd to say That a Deed procured from a Man in a Fever or in Bethlehem shall be valid to any purpose Fitzherbert who was a good Lawyer ridicules the pretence and maintains That he himself may avoid such Act. Then were cited 2 Inst 14. Lloyd and Gregory 1 Cro. 501 502. Perkins tit Grant 13. Then it was said That in this Case there needs not much Argument the Reason of the Thing exposes the pretended Law And the Judges have declared that this Surrender is void the word amens or demens imply that the Man hath no Mind and consequently could make no Conveyance Wherefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and without much debate it was accordingly affirmed Henry Earl of Lincoln by Susanna Countess of Lincoln his Mother and Procheine Amye Appellant Versus Samuel Roll Esq Vere Booth Hugh Fortescue Esq and Bridget his Wife al' Respondents AApeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Edward late Earl of Lincoln who was Son and Heir of Edward Lord Clinton the only Son of Theophilus Earl of Lincoln deceased being seized in Fee of the Mannors of c. after his Mothers decease who is yet living and of other Lands of about 3000 l. per Annum part of the ancient Estate of the Family And designing that in default of Issue-Male by himself his Estate should go with the Honour made his Will 20 Sept. 34 Car. 2. and thereby devised the Premisses to Sir Francis Clinton for Life Remainder to his first and other Sons in Tail-Male with many Remainders over to such Persons in Tail-Male to whom the Honour might descend and directed that his Houshold Goods at ...... should remain there as Heir Loomes to be enjoyed by the next Heir-Male who should be Heir of Lincoln and made the said Sir Francis the Appellants Father and after his Death Earl of Lincoln Executor On the sixth of Novemb. 36 Car. 2. Earl Edward made another Will in writing in like manner with the alteration of some Personal Legacies and afterwards in April 1686. and in Dec. 1690. did republish his Will Then Earl Edward sold part to Richard Wynne Esq for 24491 l. 3 s. 6 d. and mortgaged the Premisses in question to him for 12200 l. Then Earl Edward by Deeds of Lease and Release dated the 27th and 28th of April 1691. conveys his whole Estate to
the Respondents Davenport and Townsend and their Heirs to the use of him and his Heirs till his then intended Marriage should take effect And after such Marriage had then as to part in trust for his intended Wife and her Heirs and Assigns for ever And as to the rest in trust to permit the said Earl to receive the Profits during his Life and after his decease to sell the same for the best price and out of the Money raised by Sale to defray the Funeral Expences and pay his Debts and deliver the surplus as he should by his last Will and Testament in writing attested by three Witnesses or by another Deed in writing so attested appoint and for want thereof to the Executors and Administrators of the Earl with a Proviso That the said Earl by his last will and Testament or any other Deed in writing to be thereafter by him made and executed and attested as aforesaid might alter change determine or make void all or any the Trusts aforesaid and for want of such after to be made will or deed then in trust for the said Earl Edward his Heirs and Assigns for ever Earl Edward died without Issue of his Body and without Marriage The Appellant exhibited a Bill to have the said Deeds of Lease and Release set aside and to have the Will executed The Respondents as Heirs insist upon the Deeds as a Revocation and their Heirship was thus Theophilus Earl had Issue Edward Katharine Arabella and Margaret Edward died in the Life time of Theophilus leaving Issue Edward late Earl of Lincoln Katharine by Sir George Booth had Issue the Respondent Veer Booth Arabella by Robert Roll had Issue Samuel Roll and Margaret married Hugh Buscowen and had Issue the Respondent Bridget Fortescue And the Court assisted with the two Chief Justices and Mr. Justice Powel saw no Cause to relieve the Appellant And now it was argued with the Appeal That the Dismission was Erroneous there being Cause for Relief for that the Marriage never did take effect nor any serious Overture or Treaty was made by the said Earl on that behalf so as the said Earl did continue and at the time of his death was seized of the same Estate in the Premisses he had at the time of making and publishing the Will that if at Law the Deeds of Lease and Release were in strictness a revocation of the Will yet in Equity they ought not to be construed a Revocation of the said Will so often and so solemnly and deliberately made and published and upon so good a Consideration as the support of the Honour that the said Will was the Result of the Earls continued Intentions throughout his Life and the Deeds were only the effect of some sudden Fancy or Passion and even by those Deeds no benefit was designed to the Respondents for the disposition of the Surplus of what should be raised by the Sale was to be to his Executor Sir F. C. the Appellants Father and that did evidence a continued Kindness to him who never had offended him and no regard to the Respondents who tho' they were his Heirs general were related only at a distance and scarcely known by him and very well provided for by great Portions raised out of the Estate for their Mothers Then 't was argued that this Estate was meerly an equitable one and consequently Equity only ought to govern the disposition of it here 's no express Revocation pretended that a Mortgage in Fee is no Revocation for in Equity it doth not make the Estate anothers Here is a Noble Peer who is to sit in the Seat or Place of his Ancestors and therefore no Presumption Intendment or forced Implication ought to be against him or his Interest that this was designed to take effect in case the Marriage was had and not otherwise that here was no intention to revoke but upon the Contingency of his Marriage And there was cited Zouch and Barker's Case 1625. in the Lord Coventry's time Chancery Rep. and the Lord Boucher's Case in Edward the Sixth's time the Case was said to be in Dyer left as a Query and in 1 Rolls Abridg. And for these and many other Reasons and Authorities urged 't was prayed that the Dismission should be Reversed and the Appellant Relieved On the other side 't was insisted That tho' this was not an express Revocation by the use of words declaring it to be such yet 't was a true legal and effectual Revocation that these Deeds of Lease and Release did alter the Estate that here 't was for payment of Debts as well as in consideration of the intended Marriage that here was a manifest change of his Intention that both Will and Deed were voluntary and inconsistent and therefore the latter must stand that here were no Children or Creditors claiming under the Will that tho' the Subject Matter were an equitable Interest yet Equity ought to follow the Rules of Law that the Law made this a good Revocation and Equity ought to judge it the same way unless Fraud were proved to be used in the procuring of the Execution of these Deeds that the reason why a Mortgage even in Fee is not a Revocation is because a Mortgage doth carry upon the face of it a Defeasance 't is not reckoned an Inheritance to the Heir of the Mortgage but shall be Personal Estate and Assets to pay the Mortgagee's Debts This Deed was revocable by an after Will which shews the Party to have no regard for any former Will nor is there any reference to the Will then in being If a Marriage had happened 't would be agreed to have been a Revocation and if so when was the Will revoked by what Act by the Deed or by the Marriage That it was said that it certainly would have been revoked by the Deed and consequently ought to be construed a Revocation tho' no Marriage did ensue Revocations are the same in Equity as at Law and so was it held in the Case of the Earls of Bathe and Mountague The Statute of Frauds never was thought to extend to such Revocations as these Tho' Earl Edward's Intentions were once to support the Honour with the Estate yet it was always in his power to alter it The Lease and Release passed the Equity of Redemption and consequently 't is the same now between the Appellant and Respondents as if there had been no Mortgage in the Case 'T was further urged That a Will is but an imperfect Conveyance inchoate only and ambulatory as the Books term it till the death of the Party and another Will may revoke it and with greater reason may a Deed which alters the Estate and shews a change of the Intention of the Person who was Owner of it There 's no need of a Consideration to warrant the Revocation of a Will there needs no reason to be given for it 't is only the Mind of the Party which both makes and revokes the Will A Will is
yet doth further agree That this Parish-Church was never presented to by any Person at all But he insists upon it That now it is void the King hath a Right to present to it by force of his Prerogative upon this Avoidance tho' the Act saith That the Bishop shall present after the Decease of Dr. Tennison or the next Avoidance The Query is whether the King's Prerogative can operate upon this Vacancy of this Benefice thus filled and thus avoided against the express Words of an Act of Parliament It will be necessary to repeat the Words of the Act and they are to this Effect That all that Precinct or District of Ground within the Bounds and Limits there mentioned from thenceforth should be a Parish of it self by the Name of the Parish of St. James's within the Liberties of Westminster and a Church thereupon built is dedicated by the Act to Divine Service and that there should be a Rector to have the Care of Souls inhabiting there and then after a full Commendation of the Merits and Services of Dr. Tennison in that Place the now Reverend the Bishop of Lincoln It doth Enact and Ordain him to be the first Rector of the same and that the said Doctor and his Successors Rectors of the said Parish should be incorporated and have a perpetual Capacity and Succession by the Name of the Rector of the said Parish Church and by Virtue of that Act should be enabled by the Name aforesaid to sue and be sued to plead and to be impleaded in all Courts and Places within this Kingdom and should have Capacity to hold and enjoy purchase and acquire Lands Tenements and Hereditaments to him and them Rectors thereof for ever over and above what is given and settled by that Act to any Value not exceeding 200 l. per Annum Then it Enacts That the Patronage Advowson or Presentation after the Decease of the said first Rector or Avoidance thereof shall or should belong and appertain and by that Act shall or should be vested in the said Bishop of London for the time being and his Successors and in Thomas Lord Jermyn and his Heirs for ever Then it Enacts That the first Rector after such Decease or Vacancy shall be presented or collated by the Bishop of London for the time being and the next to succeed him shall be presented by the Lord Jermyn and his Heirs and the two next succeeding turns by the Bishop and his Successors and the next turn to the Lord Jermyn and his Heirs and then the like Succession of two turns for one to the Bishop and his Succession and of one turn to the Lord Jermyn and his Heirs for ever after This is the Act. Now 't is to be considered That this Law doth bind the King and would bind him in point of Interest if he had been Patron of St. Martins in Right of his Crown and if a Right or Interest of the Crown shall be bound by an Act of Parliament a Prerogative shall be in no better plight It cannot be said That he shall not be obliged by it because not named for tho' and where he is not named he is bound by Multitudes of Statutes according to the 5 Rep. 14 and 11 Rep. 68. He is bound by all Acts generally speaking which are to prevent a Decay of Religion and so he is bound by Acts which are for further Relief or to give a more speedy Remedy against Wrong It is no Objection that this Law is in the Affirmative for that it is introductive of a new Law in the very Subject that is created de novo Then before this Act the King had no Right over this and if he hath now any over it he can only have it how when and as the Act gives it not contrary to it then the Bishop was Patron of the Place out of which the Parish is created And the Bishop can claim no other Right than what the Act gives him Bro. tit Remitter 49. 't is so agreed 1 Rep. 48. and in 2 Rep. 46. if Lands be given in Fee to one who was Tenant in Tayle his Issue shall not be remitted because the latter Act takes away the force of the Statute de donis Suppose he had been Enacted to be Patron of a Living to which he had a former Right there could be no Remitter because as to particulars the Act is like a Judgment and estops all Parties to claim any thing otherwise than according to the Act and yet Remitter is a Title favoured in the Law then if he have this only by force of this New Act and another Person should present in his turn so given 't would be an Injury if a Subject did it and consequently the King cannot do it for the Prerogative which this Act gives or which the Common Law gives is not yet come to take place Tho' this be an Affirmative Law yet according to the Rule taken and agreed in Slade's and Drake's Case Hob. 298. being introductive or creative of a new thing implies a Negative of all that is not in the purview and many Cases are there put to this purpose Then also it being particular and express it implies a Negative because this and the other are inconsistent But First 'T is observable all Prescriptions and Customs are fore-closed by a New Act of Parliament unless saved Suppose there was an Act of Parliament in Force before this viz. That the King should present yet another Statute Enacting somewhat new and inconsistent will carry a Negative and if so in Case of a former Act there 's almost as much Reason for a Prerogative It must be agreed That a Man may prescribe or alledge a Custom against an Act of Parliament when his Prescription or Custom is saved or preserved by that or another Act but regularly a Man cannot prescribe or alledge a Custom against any Act of Parliament because 't is matter of Record and the highest and greatest Record which we know of in the Law 1 Inst 115. Suppose Money were by the Law payable annually and an Act comes and says it shall be paid Quarterly by even and equal Portions at the four Feasts for the first Year this will certainly alter the Law 'T is true That a consistent Devife or Statute is no Repeal or Revocation but if a new Act gives a new Estate different from the former this amounts to a Repeal Fox and Harcourt's Case The same Rule holds even in Case of the King as in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Case 2 Rep. 46. and agreed to in Hob. 310. the Query was if the Lands came to the King by 31 H. 8. cap. 13. or by the Stat. of Edw. 6. and objected That the latter was in the Affirmative yet held That it came by the latter because tho' they were Affirmative Words yet they were differently penn'd and the last being of as high an Authority as the first and providing by express Words That by Authority of that Parliament
they should be in actual Possession of the King held that they should be in him by force of that last Act and Reason will warrant these Differences because if otherwise Inconsistencies and Contradictions must be allowed Then this is a new Law in the whole 't is a new Parish 't is a new Advowson and in truth 't is no Advowson till the Avoidance nay by the words of the Act if any difference can be in an instant between at and after as our Law in several Cases allows it as per mortem post mortem Devise by Jointenant c. there 's no Patronage fixed 't is no Advowson until after the Avoidance for so are the words after the Avoidance the Advowson Patronage and Presentation shall be vested foret vestit ' in Episcopo Lond ' Domino Jermyn and till then 't is vested in no Body and that which is in no Body is not at all unless it be as some times for necessity sake we say in nubibus or in abeyance but to say that an Advowson shall be in abeyance before 't is created or ordained to exist or be at all must favour somewhat of Absurdity Now the King can have no Prerogative turn upon an Avoidance by a Promotion but when the Patron 's Clerk was promoted and preferred and here is no Patron till that Avoidance happen They say 't is vested immediately tho' to take possession hereafter as a Reversion granted cum acciderit according to 3 Cro. 323. and 1 Saund. 147. But that 's not this Case for there is a present Grant here the words are After the Avoidance shall be vested and not before and being a new thing it may be so as a Rent-charge de novo may be granted to take effect de futuro but cannot be so of an old Rent 2. Dr. Tennison comes not in by the Patron 's Presentation but by Donation of the Parliament and there is not any President for a Prerogative to present to a Donative upon a Promotion The King cannot present to that which the Patron could not have presented to and the Patron could not present to a Donative quatenus a Donative and for the King to present to a Donative is to injure the Patron for 't is to make that Presentative which was never intended by the Patron to be so And yet in Case of a Donative with Cure of Souls as it may be of a Parochial Church tho' exempt from Ordinary's Jurisdiction according to Yelverton 61. 2 Roll. Abridg. 341. the Ordinary may compel the Patron to Collate some body as was held in Case of the Rectory Parochial Donative of St. Burian's in Cornwall and the Tower of London is with Cure of Souls 1 Cro. 330. 2 Roll. Abridg. 331. 1 Inst 144. The same will be void by a Promotion of the Incumbent for 't is not meerly the change of Inferiour into Superiour that makes the Avoidance for then an Incumbent made Bishop of another Diocess or in Ireland would not avoid the Benefice but 't is the Doubleness of the Charge contrary to the Council of Lateran which hath been received here This is more different from the pretended Notion and Reason of this Prerogative then that Case of a Common Donative for in Case of a Donative there 's an Incumbent of the Patron 's own preferring who is further promoted by the King and still in being and the same Patron claiming a Right to fill the same Here 't is an Incumbency by Gift of the King Lords and Commons And then if it be considered what this new Prerogative is for so it must be termed since there 's no footsteps for it in the old times and the Statute of Prerogativa Regis which enumerates most of them and is rather a Collection of old Prerogatives then a new Statute mentions it not 't is a Prerogative to present upon the Promotion of the Patron 's Presentee or incumbent presented in his Right here is no such thing 't is as their Books say when the Patron 's Presentee is advanced to a greater Dignity in the Church and the pretended Reason given for it to avoid the Objection That no Prerogative is to be injurious or to import a Wrong done to the Subject is this That here 's no Injury to the Patron but a Kindness to his Friend because the Person which he chose and preferred is bettered and further preferred to an higher Degree of Honour and State in the Church all this fails here so that there doth not seem to be the same Colour why the King should have it in this Case It is a good Argument according to Mr. Littleton That because no such ever was before that therefore of right it ought not to be And if no Practise hath been to warrant it in Case of a Gift by Act of Parliament there 's no reason it should be allowed in this Case for a Prerogative never used can never be with Propriety called a Prerogative much less reason have they for it if they have no Practise or presidents to warrant their Claim in case of any Donative Prima facie the patron hath the right to evade that right of his Mr. Attorney pretends to a Prerogative then it being of common right with him they ought to demonstrate that there is such a Prerogative to controul that right in this particular Case and the Arguments brought for it ought to be clear convincing and undoubted Now because where a Patron 's Presentee is preferred by being consecrated a Bishop the King shall present that therefore where the Parliament's Presentee is preferred the Patron shall lose the benefit of his Presentation is a non sequitur because the Cases are not the same for the supposed Recompence or Consideration in the one holds not in the other This is not the Case of a Prerogative incident to the Crown from the Necessity of Government nor is it a Prerogative which respects the Continuance or Improvement of the Revenue so as for the benefit of the Kingdom an Extent or Enlargement of it beyond former Practise may seem absolutely needful and therefore the common pretences of Intendment and Presumption are no more on their side then upon this nay 't is rather otherwise because that common right is with the Patron It is no Objection to say That there never was such a Promotion or Avoidance before whether there were or not is not material but that rather turns upon them for that Evinces beyond dispute that there never was such a Prerogative presentation in Fact as they now contend for Argument ' Ã simili is the weakest but they have no Case like this nay they have no Opinion in the Books declaring on their side nay the Book Definition of this Prerogative as was said before is only to present to a Benefice vacant by promotion that was antecedently presentable here the whole Kingdom is Patron and all that they can pretend to is when a Man is dignified by promotion who
came in by Presentation or Collation and not otherwise It is not at present proper to argue when this Prerogative shall begin or commence upon this Church or if ever 't will be time enough to dispute that when another Occasion offers it self when the Doctor or any of his Successors happens to be preferred to the same state as his Predecessor is It suffices to maintain that this turn belongs to the Bishop of London This is not an Advowson created as others usually are First As was observed before no Advowson is fixed or vested or created but in futuro the same Person is made a Pluralist by Act of Parliament tho' the Act it self says the Parish was too great for one Cure Then 't was observed That this is not a Patronage turn it must be admitted that this Act vests the Fee-simple of this Advowson in the Lord Jermyn and the Bishop of London and in their respective Heirs and Successors by turns viz. to the Lord Jermyn one and to the Bishop two successively and so the Succession is enacted to be for ever now this is not one of those Patronage successive turns but it is a particular Presentation which is given to the Bishop of London by express Limitation and the penning is different The first about which the present Contest is is to be by the Bishop of London for the time being then the successive Presentations of one and two are to be one by the Lord and his Heirs and the two by the Bishop and his Successors so that there is no words in the first that looks like the Gift of an Estate but 't is only one first particular Presentation given to the Bishop more then ordinary It is not one of his turns which he is to have as Patron by two to one But first he is to present one before ever it comes into the form and manner of turns prescribed by this Act in perpetual Succession For if otherwise the Patronage would be to the Bishop three turns in four to one of the Lord Jermyns As to their Objection That a Patronage newly created shall be in the same plight and under the same Rules and Circumstances and Incumbrances as another that Objection can never take place before it becomes a Patronage which this was not And 2. with a stronger reason it can never take place till it hath been presented unto 3. It can never take place where a particular Presentation is at first given by express words The words are The first Rector shall be Collated by the Bishop for the time being and then the Succession and it is always to be remembred that 't is an Act of Parliament Now suppose the Act had said that the Patronage after an Avoidance should be vested in A. and B. but that the first Rector upon that Avoidance should be presented by J. S. a third Person this could never be reckoned a common ordinary turn subject to the like Prerogative as others The Bishop here claims not this particular Presentation in right of his Patronage whereby he is to have two turns to one but by express Gift of the Parliament Suppose the King had been Patron of St. Martyns in his own right no Man would say that this Act thus creating of a new Parish a new Rectory and a new Patron would not have bound him Surely the King's Assent as Supream or General Patron is as much implied in this Act as it would have been had he been a particular Patron of the Church of that Parish out of which the new one is taken Here the King himself gives the first Presentation to the Bishop of London for the King and People all together the whole Kingdom are Donors or Grantors of this first Presentation to my Lord of London Suppose such a Right as this is were in a Subject and he were able to prescribe for it he must then have set forth that time out of mind wheresoever any incumbent of anothers Presentation was preferr'd by him to another Living that he should have the Presentation ea vice this is the most that could be made of it Would any Man say That this Case would fall under that Prescription or the reason of it Now tho' a Prerogative be part of the Common Law and not like a Prescription yet every Prerogative hath its Boundaries and its Limits and a Reason for it too or else 't is no Prerogative that our Law allows of Besides there 's good Reason in Fact for this Provision of the first Presentation because the Act takes notice of the Parish of St. Martyns out of which this Parish is taken and the Bishop of London was Patron thereof and at first there 's the same Incumbent of both Dr. Tennison Now the Patronage being formerly in the Bishop and in the Successive Patronage created of this new Church by this Act there 's one turn in three given away from him to a third Person then this Presentation out of turn is at first given to the Bishop of London in Consideration of the third turn given to the Lord Jermyn afterwards Then there 's another thing deserving of notice in this Case and that 's this That one and the same Person being incumbent of both Parishes the King hath had the Effect of his Prerogative upon the promotion of this very Incumbent by presenting to that Church into which he came by Presentation and Induction viz. St. Martyns but here the Prerogative cannot operate because he came into this by Donation not of the Patron but of the Parliament and consequently as was said before of the King himself Besides here 's no Salvoe of the King's Prerogative or other Right and to what end in all private Acts for Sale of Estates paying of Debts docking of Settlements and the like do the King's Council take Care always to insert a saving if the same be not necessary Here 's a new Estate given and that to a particular Person and in a particular manner and no Person can claim a Right to in or over this but as the Parliament hath given it as for instance in an Act where two Churches are united as upon the Rebuilding of the City of London the first Presentation is ordered to be by the Patron of the Living of the greatest Value in the King's Books The King is Patron of the Living of the lesser Value as he is of several of them in London he shall not have his Common Prerogative of the first Presentation which he hath in all other Cases where his Interest is intermixed with others as in Case of Coparceners and the youngest is in Ward he shall present first tho' the eldest by the Common Law is to have the first turn and the King 's Right is in the Place of the youngest but yet in case where that an Act of Parliament gives a new Estate and prescribes a Method tho' in the Affirmative the Method limited shall take place against the King's Prerogative of being