Selected quad for the lemma: life_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
life_n	park_n	say_a	stafford_n	88	3	15.9702	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29898	Reports of diverse choice cases in law taken by those late and most judicious prothonotaries of the Common Pleas, Richard Brownlow & John Goldesborough ; with directions how to proceed in many intricate actions both reall and personall ... ; also a most perfect and exact table, shewing appositely the contents of the whole book.	Brownlow, Richard, 1553-1638.; Goldesborough, John, 1568-1618.; England and Wales. Court of Common Pleas.	1651 (1651)	Wing B5198; ESTC R24766	613,604	621

the foundation is of Saint Paul and where it is a person certain but all the name is not so precisely recyted and to that which is sayd by my Brother Williams that no difference between conveiance made to them and by them I agree to him with this difference that is if conveyance be made to them of what by presumption in Law they are knowing and are parties as a Fine levied to them and such like but of a Devise it is not presumed that they have knowledge of that till the Death of the Devisor and he conceived that the Lease is voyd and this Decree shewed hath not changed his opinion but he moved the parties again to an agreement and would not as yet give Judgment Hitcham the Queens Attorney moved the Court for a Prohibition and the case was this two Merchants covenanted by Deed with their Factor to allow him ten pound a Moneth for his Wages and one Merchant sealed the Deed in England and the other sealed that upon the Sea and the Factor came and sued the Merchants in the Admiralty for his wages and by the Court insomuch that one of them sealed it upon the Land this is not any thing done upon the Deepe Sea and for that Prohibition was granted to him Upon a Motion made by Wincolt of the Middle Temple to dissolve a Prohibition granted to the spirituall Court upon a Libel for Tithes there the Court took this rule that when a Consultation is lawfully granted there a new Prohibition shall not be granted upon the same L●bell and yet they qualified that with this difference that is when a Consultation is granted upon any fault of the Prohibition in form by the M●sprision of the Clark or by mis-pleading of any Statute in that or such like there a new Prohibition may be granted upon the same Libell but if Consultation be granted upon the right of the thing in question there a new Prohibition shall not be granted upon the same Libell see the Statute of 5 Ed. 3. Pasch 9. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. BRomehead and Spencer Plaintiffs Rogers Defendant where an Action of Debt was brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant as Administrator during the minority of one J. S. and the Plaintiffs shew in their count that the said J. S. at the time of the Writ brought was and yet is within age of one and twenty years and verdict passeth against the Defendant and Crewe moved in arrest of Judgment that the Declaration was insufficient for they have declared that the Executor was within the Age of one and twenty years and the Administration during the nonage shall cease when the Infant comes to the Age of seventeen years so that he may be of the age of 17. 18. 19. or 20. years and yet the Administration ceaseth and so of Action against Administrator and so was the Opinion of all the Justices and the Judgment was stayed upon that according to the resolution of Piggotts Case 15. Coke 29. a. PLomer against Hockhead the Plaintiff declares in Ejectione firme upon a Lease made to him by three Husbands and their wives and that the Defendant ejected him and at the Issue upon not guilty and in evidence to prove this Lease and the delivery of that was shewed a Letter of Attorney made by the Husbands and their wives and the councel of the Defendant takes exception to the Declaration for they have declared upon a Lease by three Husbands and their Wives with a Letter of Attourney to make delivery and a married Wife cannot make a Letter of Attorney And so this is not a Lease of the Wives and so the Plaintiff had declared upon no Lease And the opinion of all the Court was that a married Wife could not make a Letter of Attorney And Williams Justice compared this to the case of an Infant as if an Infant makes a Feoffment or a lease and delivers that with his hand this is not but voidable But if it be executed by Letter of Attorney that is a disseisin to him but by Flimming and Williams if the Plaintiffs had declared upon a Lease made by the Husbands only this had been very good Thomas Malin Plaintiff in Replevin against Thomas Tully the case was The Queen Mary was seised of a Park called Eestwood Park in her Demesne as of Fee as in Right of her Crown and so being seised by her Letters Patent's let the said Park to two for their lives and after died And the Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents recyting the said Lease for lives and that the said Lessees were alive granted the said Park to Humphrey Lord Stafford and his Wife and to the Heires of the said Lord Stafford of the Body of the said Wife lawfully begotten And by the said Patent the same Queen by these words Ac de Ampliori et Vberiori Gracia Nostris Volumus et Declaramus quod si Predictus Dominus Stafford Solvat seu Solvi faciat prefacto Dominae Reginae 20 s. ad tal●m Diem Tunc Concedimus quod predictus Dominus Stafford habebit revertionem predictam sibi et Heredibus suis And the Lord Stafford paid the said sum of twenty shillings according to the said Letters Patents and if he shall have Fee-simple or not was the question And it was objected that he shall not have it for the words of the Patent are that if the Lord Stafford paies the money Tunc concedimus the which words seeme that the Grant shall take effect in futuro and it was not a present Grant but when the money shall be paid then shee granted but it seemes to the Justice that it was a good Grant immediatly to take effect upon the payment of the money and the condition was precedent till that be performed the reversion remaines in the Queen Eliz. And the Queen might grant by one selfe same Patent as by diverse See 10. Assise 13. 7. Ed. 3. 8. Ed. 2. Feoffments and that the reversion shall not extinguish the Estate Tayl but they may well be together but otherwise it is of an Estate for yeares or for life Warburton Justice that the King is specially favoured in the Law and for that he shall not be inforced to attend in case as other persons ought to make attendance And for that in case where a common person may make a good Grant the King also may make a good Grant and in the case at the Barr if the Grant had been made by a common Person it had been good without question But the first objection that hath been made was that where a man hath made a Lease for life or for years upon condition to have Fee there the particuler Estate shall be drowned upon the increasiing of the Estate but the Statute of Westminster 2. preserves the Estate tayl that it shall not be drowned and that the Fee in this case doth not vest till the condition be performed for if the

of the Lessor But he agreed the case of Littleton that an Assignee of an Estate may perform a condition in preservation of an Estate otherwise of an Assignee of a Reversion in destruction of an Estate so at the Common Law it is clear that the Feoffee cannot perform the condition and by him it is cleerly out of the Statute of 32 H. 8. for this Statute doth not extend to a collaterall condition as it appears by Spencers case 5. Coke and so hath been many times after this adjudged and this is a collaterall condition Ergo c. And so concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Nicholls Serjeant to the contrary and that this Disseisin hath not suspended the condition but that he may pay the Money and make the Estate to cease notwithstanding the Disseisin for-that that the condition is collaterall like to the 20 of Ed. 4. and 20 H. 7. That where a Feoffee upon a collaterall condition takes back an Estate for years yet this shall not suspend the condition but it may be performed or broken notwithstanding the Lease for that that it is collaterall so in our case for suppose that the condition had been if he marry Mistris Holbeam that then his Estate shall cease and as well it shall be upon the Tender of the Money here and he said that this case was late in the Common Bench. This feoffment was made to the use of the Feoffor for life Remainder to another for life the Remainder to the third in tayl the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in fee with power of Revocation and after the Feoffor lets for years and during the Tearm he revokes the mesne Remainders and it seems to the Justices that well he may for that that the Lease for years goes only out of the Estate for life as he sayd and for that the power of Revocation as to the Mesne Remainders was not suspended Quere of the truth of this case in the common Bench for perchance it is not truly collected but so entred and so he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Flemming cheife Justice sayd that the point of the principall case would be if by the wrong of the Lessor the Estate of the Lessee shall be prevented to accrue then he might perform the condition to determine the ancient Estate that is the Lease for years and it is adjourned Pasch 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Kings Bench. Earle of Shrewsbury against the Earle of Rutland IN a Writ of Errour the Earle of Rutland brought an Assise of Novel Disseisin against the Earle of Shrewsbury and four others and the Plaint was of the office of the keeping of the Park of Clepson and of the vailes and fees of the sayd Parke and of the Herbage and Paunage of the same and the Demandant made his title and alledged that the Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepsam Park in fee in right of her Crown and that she being so seised by her Letters Patents under the great Seal granted unto one Markham the keeping of the Park of Clepson with the vailes and fees and the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park for his life after the Queen Eliz. reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive gave and granted by her Letters Patents to the Earl of Rutland the Office of the keeping of the sayd Clepson Parke with the Fees and Wages to that appertaining to have and to hold to him for his life after the death of Markham or after the surrender or forfeiture of his Letters Patents and further granted the Herbage and Paunage to the sayd Earle of Rutland for his life and doth not say when this shall begin after which the Queen Eliz. died and the Eee-simple discended to our Lord the King which-now is as lawfull Heir to the Crown of England which granted that to the Earle of Shrewsbury after which Markham dyed and the Earle of Rutland entered and was seised till the Earle of Shewsbury with four others entered upon him and dissersed him and to that the Tenants alledged no wrong no disseisin and when the Assise was to be taken in the Country the Array was challenged by the Tenants for that that one of the Tenants in the Assise had an Action of Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff and this challenge was not allowed and the Assise being perused at large for the Herbage and Paunage they found that the said Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepson Park as aforesaid and by her Letters Patents as afore is rehearsed granted the Keeping of this to Markham for his life and further by the same Letters Patents granted to him the Fees and Wages to that belonging and further granted by Letters Patents and doth not say Easdem to him the Herbage and Paunage of the sayd Park and that the Queen after the reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive granted to the Earle of Rutland the keeping of the sayd Park and vailes and fees to have and to hold after the death surrender or forfeiture of the Letters Patents of Markham for his life And further by the sayd Letters Patents shee granted the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park to him for his life as more fully appears by the Letters Patents and it was not expressed as to the Herbage and Paunage when that began and they found the death of Markham and that the Earle of Rutland put two Horses into the sayd Park to take seisin of the sayd Herbage and Paunage and they found further the grant of the King to the Earle of Shrewsbury of the fee-simple and of that prayed the advise of the Court and to the keeping of the Park they found the seisin and disseisin of that and of the fees and wages to the Dammages c. And this being adjourned into the Common Bench was remanded into the Country and there Judgment was given for all for the Demandant and after this it came into the Kings Bench by Writ of errour and the Errours assigned by the councell of the Tenants and argued at the Barr were foure The first was that the Earle of Rutland himself between the verdict and the Judgment hunted in the Park and kild a Buck and took a shoulder of that for his fee and so he hath abated his Assise and so the Judgment was given upon a Writ abated and therefore they cannot plead that in abatement insomuch that it was mesne betwixt the Judgment and the verdict they assigned that for errour The second was because the principall challenge was not allowed where that ought to have beene allowed and the challenge was that one of the Tenants had an Action or Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff before the Assise The third was Because the Jury have found the Letters Patents made to Markham and that the Queen granted to him by her Letters Patents the custody of the Parke of Clepson in Clepson And further by the same Letters Patents granted the vailes

and fees c. And further granted the Herbage and Paunage and have not found that this was granted by the same Letters Patents and then if this be not granted by the same Letters Patents then there is not any grant of this to the Earle of Rutland because there is no receitall of the Patent by which the Herbage and Paunage was granted to Markham The fourth errour was that they have erred in point of Law and to that the point is but this the King grants the Herbage and Paunage of a Park to one for life and after reciting that grant and that the Patentee is alive grants that to another and doth not say when that shall begin and it seems to them that the Argument for the Plaintiffes in the Writ of errour that this was a voyd grant and so the Judgment erronious but I have not the Report of the Arguments of the Conncellors at the Barr but only of the Judges which moved two other errours in the case not moved by the councell at the Barr and Crooke Justice rehearsed the case as before And to the first errour he conceived that this is no errour and that for two reasons First He tooke a difference betweene a thing which abates the Writ by Plea as if a man brings an Assise against another and mesne between verdict and Judgment the Plaintiff dies this matter shall abate the Writ without Plea and for that if Judgment be given upon such verdict the Judgment is erronious but in our case an entry doth not abate the Writ without pleading that and now as this case is this cannot be pleaded being between Verdict and Judgment and for that it shall not be assigned for Errour see 19 Assise 8 Where this difference is taken and agreed Secondly Admit that this entry might have abated the Writ in Facto without Plea yet there is no such entry alledged which might abate the Writ in Facto without Plea for the entry is alledged that the Earl of Rutland entred to hunt and kild a Buck and took a shoulder of that for his fee and it seems that this is no such entry that shall abate the writ for he hath now entred to another purpose to hunt the which he could not do but the entry ought to have been alledged that he entred to keep for in every entry the intent of the Entry is to be regarded and to this purpose he cited the case of Assise of Freshforce Com. 92. and 93. Where entring into the Seller hanging the Assise of that to see the Antiquity of the House there was no Entry to abate the Writ and the case of 26 Assise 42. where the Disseisee hanging the Assise comes and sets his foot upon the Land but takes no profits and adjudged that he should recover notwithstanding so in this case the intent is not shewed that is that he entred to keep possession but to hunt nor was it such entry which should abate the writ and to that which is sayd that he kild a Buck and took the shoulder of that for his fee this doth not help for if that had been a Buck which he might to have kild by vertue of his Office he ought to have shewed his warrant for otherwise a Parker cannot kill a Buck if not that it be for his fee and then he shall have the Buck and not a shoulder only also it is alledged that he took a shoulder and doth not say the best shoulder or the right shoulder and this ought to be shewed in certain And so for he first Errour he couceived that this is no cause to reverse the Judgment and to the challenge he sayd that he would speake to that at the last and for that he now spake to the errours supposed in the grant And first to Markhams Grant where the Jury found the Queen Eliz. granted to him the keeping of the Park and by the same Letters Patents grant the fees and Wages and further granted by her Letters Patents and doth not say Easdem the Herbage and Paunage it seems to him that this is very well for two reasons First insomuch that there is a copulative which is this word Et and also a Relative which is this word Vlterius and this word conjoynes the matter precedent with the subsequent and the word Vlterius hath necessary relation to the same Letters Patents and so Ex precedentibus subsequentibus the Iury hath well found the matter Secondly these words are supplied in the second Patent for there the Jury have found that the Queene hath granted that to Marham by the same Letters Patents and so for these two reasons he concluded that this is no Error to reverse the Judgement And to the Patent made to the Earle of Rutland it seemes to him also that this is very good and all that he said in effect was that in construction of the Patents of the King such exposition is to be made that if any reasonable meaning may be conceived they shall not be defeated but shall stand good And so he said in our case that it is necessarily intended that this was also to begin after the Estate of Markham determined and for that good And he said that a man ought not to make a curious and captious interpretation of the Kings Patents for Talis Interpretatio injure Reprobatur And to the challenge that seemed unto him a principall challenge and this not being allowed where it ought to be allowed this is an error as it is said 8. of Assises 23. and for this error it seemes to him that the Judgement shall be reversed and to that he said he relied much upon the book of 11 H. 4. 25. which takes a difference between Debt and Trespasse for battery for the booke saith that a man may demand his Debt without giving occasion of any malice But Battery is an evill Action and there the book is resolved that it shall be a principall challenge and so he saith in Trespasse this being with force and Armes that c. And in 8. H. 5. in a Assise the Tenant challenges the array because he had an Action of Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff And there the array was affirmed because it appeares that the Defendant had brought this Action by Covin against the Sheriff which case proves as he said that if there be not any Covin this is a principall challenge and 38 H. 6. 7. accordingly and the case 28. Assise 11. where the Defendant in Assise challenged a Juror because he had an Action of Trespasse hanging against him and was outed by award and in 21. Ed. 4. 12. it is said where there is an apparent favour or apparent displeasure there shall be principall challenge and certainly though the Law may intend that a man may lawfully demand his right and without malice yet it appeares that the nature of men is perverse and froward and few Actions are begun without apparent displeasure especially