to be in our Saviour a manhood which he called Jesus begotten by Joseph on Mary and something above a manhood which he called Christ which not untill he was thirty yeares old came into him at his baptisme that Jesus suffered as he speake's a little after but Christ did not being spirituall Thus you see â—renaeus his expression concerning Cerinthus where you may observe that he allowe's our Saviour no being before he was borne of Mary as he terme's her for although he grant's him an additionall after his baptisme by the descending down of Christ unto him yet that person had no being before and that additionall was long after his birth of the blessed Virgin and it is not expressed that he thought that Christ which came into Jesus had any being before that coming down And Tertullian adversus haereticos Num. 312. affirme's of Cerinthus that he say'd Christ was onely a man without Divinity to which that of Irenaeus well enough agree's I quote Tertullian now in Pamelius his edition 1617. So that there it seem's that Cerinthus concerning our Saviour's Divinity had the same opinion with Socinus Well to goe on with the story of Cerinthus he was a man of a most turbulent Spirit Epiphanius saith he was the man that raised the charge against St. Peter at Jerusalem for communicating with the Gentiles Acts 11. in the Case of Cornelius as likewise that he raised the tumult against St. Paul about Circumcision with a whole leafe of such schismaticall practices of his for they say he was a Jew by his Father and so stood still for the priviledges of their Nation and the observation of their Rites upon this ground the loving Spirit of St. John justly abhorred him and therefore as Irenaeus in his third Book and third Chapter there are some who have heard Polycarpus report c. which Polycarpus was constituted Bishop of Smyrna by St. John as Irenaeus Eusebius and all agree and that Angell of the Church of Smyrna which St. John writ to Apocalyps 2.8 he say'd Irenaeus who himselfe had seene Polycarpus reported that St. John goeing to wash himselfe in the Bath at Ephesus saw Cerinthus and presently hasted out againe unwashed saying that he might feare the Bath would fall where was that enemy of the Truth Cerinthus so that here you see two things that the Opinion of Cerinthus was much the same with that of the Socinians that this Cerinthus was abhorred by St. John not as a man but as an enemy to truth so that St. John hating his opinions might be reasonably thought to provide against them and all this evident out of that most ancient Author which Socinus himselfe quote's now let us see de facto what was done The same Author Irenaeus in his eleventh Chapter of his third Book somewhat before the midle of that Chapter affirme's in expresse termes that St. John was willing by his declaring the Gospell to take away the errour of Cerinthus then which we could have nothing more cleare a most Authentique Author affirming it upon most just and reasonable grounds Socinus then say'd too much when he affirmed that it was farre from all reason that Saint John should write against Ebion and Cerinthus here we see the contrary as much as it is possible for story to give but he dispute's againe against it page 7. Deinde versimile non est c. Moreover it is not likely that John would passe over so great a matter so slightly with silence but that he would name the haeretiques or at the least their haeresy either secretly or openly and detest it which since he hath not done why did he not somewhere clearely say that Christ was by nature God and Man or that he existed before he was born of Mary why did he affect to be so obscure and sparing in a thing of so great moment the ignorance whereof bring 's eternall destruction c. thus farre he I will not undertake to understand all the Apostle's reasons but am confident he had abundance of reason for all he did but will answer all he sayth first that the Scripture seldome set's down the haeretiques or haeresyes against which it write's although sometimes it doth Secondly to that he saith the Apostle doth not clearly witnesse that Christ was by nature God and Man or existed before he was born of Mary I shall shew him that he hath in as cleare termes as possibly could be although not in the same and I am confident that had he expressed this Mystery in those very words he set's down he and his Companions would have cavilled at them that those Termes are used otherwise in some places that there was some Copy or other without one of them or all that they did relate to something before or behind and not to Christ which are their usuall evasions but it is a vanity of them to teach the Apostle how he should expresse himselfe he hath done it abundantly and as clearly as those words would doe as we shall see shortly Sect. 2. But he urgeth farther that St. John give 's this and no other reason towards the end of his Gospell John 20.31 Cur Jesu signa I translate it why he writ the Miracles of Jesus or as others would have it his whole history then that we should believe that Jesus is Christ the Sonne of God and believing that we should have life eternall I will not trouble his lection which is very erroneous but let the Reader observe that although St. John say that this was the cause why those things which he writ were written yet he useth not that phrase put upon him by Socinus this non aliam and no other but suppose he had this will serve our designe for all we labour for is to prove that our Saviour is the Sonne of God it is true these troublesome men have brought distinctions of the Sonne into naturall and adopted and the like but that he is such a Sonne as believing of which we may have eternall life can be conceived nothing lesse then that he must be the naturall Sonne of the same nature with his Father all other beliefe I doubt will fall short of that excellency and therefore Beza most genuinely according to the Originall which prepose's an Article both to Christ and the Sonne reade's it thus That ye should believe that Jesus is that Christ that Sonne of God which Emphasis doth exceedingly much elevate the Conceipt of him shewing him to be an extraordinary Christ and an extraordinary not merely an adopted Sonne which all his Servants are here bound to believe so that it seeme's St. John writ this Gospell to shew that our Saviour was in some eminent and peculiar way the Sonne of God that which he adde's that believing in him we might have eternall life is an absolute avoyding a strong Argument to prove his Godhead for although I think by life here is meant eternall life yet in the Originall there
is no word of eternity but it is word for word as it is in our English ye might have life through his name or in his name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is his power his strength which none could grant but the great God and truely I wonder where he got that translation for it is without the Originall nor Beza nor Erasmus nor Montanus nor any that I see but something like it Tremelius his translation out of the Syriacke and yet he reserve's that Emphasis which I make use of and render's it thus and when ye shall believe ye shall have life eternall by his name the force of which last phrase by his name was cleane omitted by Socinus so then it seeme's to me that if St. Iohn did here in these words put down the totall reason of his writing this Gospell which can never be evinced yet in this is clearely taught this Conclusion of our Saviours divinity and that he was the Son of God nor could ever man have understood it in any other sense then we doe untill that foolish conceipt of a created God was introduced of which God willing I entend to treate hereafter Thus I hope I have given a satisfactory answer to his objections against the story of Cerinthus which one thing granted the expressions of the rest would be undoubtedly very perspicuous Sect. 3. So now at the last I will addresse my selfe to my businesse the first Chap. of St. John verse 1. In the beginning was the word c. there is scarce any one word in these fourteen or fifteen verses which I intend God willing to expound that hath not abid some slurre or other to discountenance the true sense of it I shall begin with the first word In the beginning This say they with one consent is understood of the beginning of the Gospell which say they was when John Baptist begun to preach so Socinus where before at the bottome of page 13. and page 14. In principio erat verbum In the beginning was the Word that is Christ the Son of God in the beginning of the Gospell to wit in that time in which John Baptist began to recall the Israelitish people to the right and before that by the preaching of the Baptist he was known to the Jewes he was and he was designed by God to this Office that is of manifesting his will thus far Socinus and by this we see his conceipt to be that in the beginning was in the beginning of the Baptist's preaching then was Christ the word which was man he wonder 's much up and down that men should conceive that St. John should write such mysteries of Christ's essence according to his divinity where indeed we think he make's him write the unreasonable things of his humanity that ever could have been conceived to be expressed by such phrases to understand which I must trespasse a little farther upon the Reader 's patience to consider what these writers meane by this terme Word which Socinus and from him the rest expresse thus Sect. 4. That it is a figurative expression and is mean't of Christ in his Office not his divine nature figurative and so it is either a Metaphor drawn from the similitude Christ hath with our Words for as our Words expresse our minds to those we converse withall so Christ expressed the Will of God to men Secondly by a Metonymy because Christ is the Author of that word which most eminently ought to be called such because it is more profitable and more excellent then all other therefore saith he as Christ sometimes useth a Metaphor calleth himself a vine a Shepheard a gate because he might most fitly be compared to these and now speaking Metonimycally he saith he is the truth the life and the resurrection because he is the Author and cause of these so here c. thus far he in which he and they have taken a greate deale of paines to raise mud in and darken this cleare streame Sect. 5. To which I shall say first that these figures are often used by Christ and such expressions under the notions of Divinity more clearly intelligible but when they are used by him he give 's some intimation to his Auditor how he shall understand them figuratively onely either in that place or some other otherwise a man would hardly assent to him in any but a literal sense There are abundance of other such like names affirmed of our Saviour besides those particularly specified by him in this place all which to handle would require a Volume I will not therefore engage upon them but these he instanceth in now I will touch upon that by them the rest may be discerned First then he call's himself a vine John 15.1 I am the true vine that is I am like a true vine a true not a false vine which look's like a vine but is not a true vine that may be confided in which will bring forth fruit and not deceive the husbandman now that ye may discern the similitude observe he adde's my Father is the husbandman and so go's on with the branches which evidently shew that it is a Similitude For the second John 10.11 I am the good shepheard he explain's it immediately a good shepheard giveth his life for his sheep and so along in that chapter he shew's how his sheep are righteous which make's it apparent that it was a Similitude Again his last Metaphor is used in the same chapter ver 7. I am the Door of the sheep we see he was the shepheard and he is the door in a diverse sense as he is the door he admit's and shut's out now these things are so apparent that the words all about them express them to be Similitudes if not a thousand places of Scripture might teach us that he could not otherwise be a Wooden door or a vine that is a plant or a shepheard such as a countrey shepheard whose sheep were beasts Now let us examine his Metonymy He saith he is the truth life resurrection two of these I find in one sentence in the 14. of this Gospel the 6. I am saith our Saviour the way the truth and the life Truth and Life are his instances our Saviour having told the Disciples ver 4. Whither I go ye know and the way ye know Thomas answered Lord we know not whither thou goest how can we then know the way Jesus answered to this I am the way the truth the life in this word the way no doubt but there may be both those figures he speakes of a Metaphor first for as a way is that Middle place which is between the two Termes à quo and ad quem from whence and whither participating of both and leading whither a man tend's so our Saviour God and man participating of both the extreames heaven and earth and Man walking a long by him shall come to heaven next we may
prosecution of it and to none other Sect. 11. And in this St. John giveth the Son of God no new name but such as men knew him by long before Saint John's time The Philosophers in all ages when their Soules soared so high as to contemplate the essence of God his creation and government of the world they said he had a Son or mind which proceeded from him like Light from the Sun that is a simile they are frequent in and they termed that Son his word and they say that that Word made the world and gave Life and being to all things thus Trismegistus in the first Chapter of his Poemander and Section 4. according to the edition of Flussus he saw in his rapture an indefinite Light then in the fifth Section he enquired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what comes out of the light the answear was made The holy word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the holy word then in the sixth Section when Trismegistus had begg'd an expression of this vision I saith Poemander I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intellectus mens I a Spirit I translate it or as is commonly amongst those Philosophers the Supreme Spirit of God I that Spirit thy God am that light and presently after that bright or resplendent Word which thou didst see come out is the Son of God I could shew much more to this purpose out of him but this is enough to shew that this which St. John deliver's here when he calle's the Son of God the word internall is according to the language of this Philosopher if there could be any farther doubt let any man read that whole Chapter he shall find his expressions extremely full the same may be found up and down in Plato the Sibylls Zoroaster and many more which I need not name because the observations out of them are made by many and as well as this acknowledged by Socinus as I shall shew presently Sect. 12. But this one thing more may be worth the marking that not onely those Philosophers which writ before St. Iohn had these expressions but those who lived after him as Plotinus Porphyrius Iamblicus Proclus but Amelius who lived after him about two hundred years more or less observe's this concordance of St. Iohn with them it is true he call's him a Barbarian as the pride of the Grecians did all that were not Grecians but that by the Barbarian he mean't St. Iohn is evident because he set's down the words of this Text I treat of and some following verses and approve's the Consent of that Barbarian well then this being a language of learned men before St. Iohn to call the Son of God the Word of God in respect of his Divine nature and it being observed by Philosophers who had no by-end but onely the apprehension of this Evangelist I see no reason why we should be forced to give it a violent sense not used by any and most unconsisting as will appear by the examination of every word with the rest Sect. 13. This consent of these Philosophers Socinus foresaw and therefore pag. 37. of this Treatise he handle's this Sentence The word was made flâ—sh he saith Si ea non addâ—dâ—sset If he had not added these words the word was made flâ—sh some man might and that by right have fallen into that errour c. that he should think that word of which Iohn write's to be another thing or sometimes to have been another thing from the man Iesus and perhaps endowed with Platonical Philosophy when he should see him here called God and in the beginning to be wiâ—h God this is pag. 38. to make the world c. he should presently believe that our Evangelist was conformable to Plato who hath writ of God some things out of which this opinion of the Trinity did flow and presently after he saith that other Philosophers had it from Trismegistus and acknowledgeth Iamblichus so that he yield's that some before and some after St. Iohn understood this phrase of St. Iohn's according to our exposition but I think that he can shew me no writer before or after unless Photinians and themselves which are the same that expounded this Text of the humanity of Christ what concern's that verse which Socinus apply's that discourse to I shall meet with in its proper place but what concern's me now I cannot but think it reasonable that when so many learned Authors had philosophized with such learned discourses concerning God his Word and Spirit under that language and notion I cannot but imagine it most congruous to reason that those divine Speculations of theirs so far as true should be countenanced by one Evangelist one infallible Writer of Divine Truths that every man might hear God speaking to him in his own language Sect. 14. I am sure the first fathers almost all because they had to do with philosophical men made use of those conveniencies they had with Scripture and so did Saint Paul and I may say of our Evangelist that he did frequently make use of their language and expressions never bâ—ulking them but chusing them before other where they were fit for his purpose and especially Plato I could instance in very many of this kind which any man who is acquainted with these Authors know's but I will select two or three which have not as I know of been used to such purpose and the first shall be out of Plato's Epistle to Hermias Erastus and Coriscus these three in that Epistle he invite's to have a kindness and friendship one with another and to avoid all differences he adviseth to establish a kind of Covenant and Law one with another and confirm that even by an oath in which Oath they should call God to witness who is the Captain of all things present and future and the Lord who is father of that Captain and cause whom saith he if we truly philosophize we shall know clearly all of us so far as the nature of a happy soul can attain unto in this speech we see he clearly set's down the Son of God to be the cause and governour of all things as in an hundred well-nigh other places then he saith such as are vertuous shall see him clearly as a happy soul can do what is this but which holy Job who was before him too said I know that my Redeemer liveth and that in my flâ—sh I shall see God Job 19.25 26. and the same that St. John relate's our Saviour to express in his prayer this is life eternal that they might know thee the onely true God and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent John 17.3 life eternal that is the felicity Plato speak's of it is true Plato could not say Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent because in his humanity our Saviour was not yet seen in the world but Plato spake of him according to his Divinity that felicity consisted in the clear vision of him and I may truly say I was extremely
delighted with the observations of this place and some other more frequently observed but as I was delighted with this so I did admire to find Plato in his Phoedo or de anima describing the heaven where happy souls shall be when they are departed from thâ—s life by those stones which Saint Iohn doth the heavenly Ierusalem Rev. 21. Plato set's down three of them a Sardius a Iasper a Smaragdos with an c. that there were more St. Iohn in the 19. verse put 's them down in another order a Iasper a Sardius and the third a Chalcedony the fourth an Emerald which fourth in the Greek is Smaragdos now I could not but justly wonder at this Consent and perhaps may think that there is some greater Mystery in it then is yet discovered howsoever this serve 's my turn to shew that St. Iohn never avoided the language and expressions of these preceding Philosophers but used them This Dialogue called Phoedo in Plato contain's that Discourse which Socrates delivered to his friends at the day of his death and his whole Comportment in it amongst other passages having philosophized concerning the immortality of the soul and answered all their objections he fall's to treating how it fared with souls departed which died wicked good better best and therein describing the habitations of those happy souls put 's down these very stones which St. Iohn mention's with an Et caetera This being then apparent that these gallant and great Philosophers both before and after St. Iohn used this Term Word as he doth and that St. Iohn no where avoid's their expressions it is reasonable to think he should not do so here unless we would find some greater violence offered to the sense of the Text by it then is yet discovered or unless by some other interpretation we might discern the meaning more clearly expounded when by their way every term is wrested as will appear Sect. 15. Well to proceed this Word being taken for the Son of God is said according to his Divinity to be in the beginning absolutely without any limitation when things first leaped out of nothing and saith St. John the word was with God Socinus expound's this thus hâ—c est that is Jesus as he was the word of God before he was manifested by the preaching of the Baptist Soli Deo notus erat was onely known to God marke this word onely Therefore Valentinus Smalcius was very much to blame when in the third part of Smiglecius cap. 26. pag. 234. editione Racov. 1613. he saith in expresse termes that Socinus doth not adde Deo soli known to God onely but to God and not to men I shall endeavour to confute both what Socinus and what he saith they both agree and so doth Valkelius and the rest that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is as much as to be seen or known of God that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render with signifye's to be discerned but they are not so elegantly expresse as they were before to tell us by what figure but they insist much upon the negative part first that Christ was not known by any but God before St. John's preaching known he was but not to be the word I have shewed that he was not the word in their sense before he was preached but that they may have all the Scope that may be he was not known that he should be the Word before but onely to God suppose I granted all this would it follow that to be with God is to be known of God it can hardly be deduced for then to be with God should signifie nothing but the common condition which bring 's to all things past present and to come for all are known of him but they seeme to parallel this with the first Epistle of this Evangelist Chap. 1.2 where he speaking of eternall life which was with the Father and was manifested to us there the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used as if it were say they was manifest to the Father take Socinus his own words Quod perinde est which is as much as if he should say we declare to you eternall Life which before this no man knâ—w because it was only known to God who had decreed to give it you this is in his fifteenth page for understanding which place we may observe that it is true that this eternal word of God which is mentioned in St. Johns Gospell was hid with God from all bodily eyes untill the manifestation of it by the incarnation and nativity of our Saviour and that because he was with God in the bosome of the Father as it is expressed John 1.18 but after the birth of Christ in that personall union it was seen and heard as the first verse of this first chap. of his first Epistle expresseth it but in relation to their sense give me leave to expound that second verse of the first chap. of the first Epistle of St. John so much of it as concerne's our businesse which is thus much we declare to you eternall life which was with the Father and is now manifested to us this eternall happy being which we hope to enjoy hereafter so much I find consented unto now saith Socinus this Life was only known to God for was with the Father must be so understood by them I deny this for without doubt the Angels know it which then enjoyed it and those blessed Souls which were admitted into Abraham's bosome the Prophets saw it and taught this eternall Life many Philosophers knew it as I have shewed you and could produce Twenty more if it were needfull nor as they answer concerning the word can they say they did not know the quale or the quantum the quality or the quantity of it for they did know the quality to consist in the beatifical vision they did know the quantity that it was eternall so that then this phrase which was with God cannot be understood of being known to him by being decreed such so that this phrase may if not must thus be expounded in the latter part of the preceding verse the Apostle call's our Saviour the word of life we shall find in the fourth verse of the first chap. of his Gospel in him the word was life in this fiâ—st verse and the words this is applyed to the word was with God this life then must needs be with him because in the word which was with him not onely because known by him but then when our Saviour had divulged the Gospell then this life which was in the word with the Father was manifested to us that is divulged not onely to Prophets by revelation or Philosophers and Wise men by reason and contemplation but even to us men who cannot soare in so high Speculations with our discourse to apprehend it by faith and not only so but to apprehend the way of getting it by the merits of Jesus Christ so that then the Socinian glosse upon
things or the very sensitive in sensitive things for there is necessary to sight and understanding a two-fold Light internall and externall internall which enable's the power to work and externall which render's the object visible this internall light is that life which God preserve's in any living thing that doth see but then apply it to the eternall life inchoate or begun here so those graces which put a man in the State of future happinesse do likewise like light shew him the way to it or for that light perfect in Heaven for thaâ— glory which felicitate's and make 's us happy doth likewise enlighten and shew that blessed object of the most sacred Trinity Here we have no controversy with them I am briefe therefore And the light shined in darknesse and the darknesse comprehended it not To this all that Socinus saith is that Christ is called the light not onely because by heavenly Doctrine he enlighten's men to Life eternall but likewise because that by an irreprehensible and most holy Life he shined before them that they ought to imitate him for so he saye's John 13.15 I have given you an example that as I have done so should ye do likewise the men of this world were this darknesse saith he c. this hath much truth with it but not all that this Text conteyneâ—s for first if we conceive Christ to be this light as he saith we may take him in a two-fold Capacity as the word of which was spoke before the word of God then we may consider that this which was before shined in his humanity which was darknesse in Comparison and that darknesse comprehended it not that is obscured it not so but that some ray or glorious Lustre of his Divinity brake out or else the whole person came into the World which was darknesse and that darknesse laboured to crush and suppresse him but did not comprehend him Sect. 8. There was a man sent from God whose name was John Let me here admonish the Reader of one word to prevent a future objection with which the whole troop of the Socinians are full and boast that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render was signifye's in its proper nature to be born or begotten of another or draw his Originall from another and from thence I conceive the word gigno in Latine to be derived but because amongst all created things there is nothing which is not originated doth not draw its being from some other therefore it is often used to signify to be but I am perswaded no where in the language of this Evangelist and could the Latine or English Language so well beare with the Graecisme they would have rendered it there was a man made sent factus missus but because that sound 's harshly in these languages they choose rather to be contented with saying he was sent then he was made sent this Caution I premit now I meet with the word for the elegancy of the English rendred it so but it was used in its naturall sense where the language would beare it all things were made by him c. for although the sense be the same to say he was made sent as to to say he was sent yet the English or Latine phrase better agree's with the latter then the former and the Evangelist did of purpose as St. Cyrill thought change the phrase from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he had used before In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and the like because the word was not made nor created but when he came to St. John although the sense be much the same he changed the phrase from he was to that he was made such made sent because he was a made creature Sect. 9. The same came for a Witnesse to beare witnesse of that light I find little in these words excepted against by them onely Socinus urgeth that if John Baptist were a Witnesse of Christ he either knew him not to be that great God or else he very weakly performed his trust for he onely testifyed that he was Christ that he was the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the World that he should baptize with the holy Ghost and with fire that he was greater then himself but nothing of his being the great God I put down his sense and first I answer to his last Clause that if he had put it down in the clearest words that he or I could invent they would have found where some of these words had been used to another sense some where or other in Scripture but I am perswaded that he did witnesse enough to satisfy any Conscience that were not absolutely resolved to the Contrary for first consider that place in the 29. of this Chapter Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sinnes of the World Who can take away man's sinnes but God but the great God against whom they were committed and therefore he saye's in the 34. Verse of the same bearing witnesse of it This is the Son of God we mince it in our translation to make the phrase smoothe there is an Article at both Son and God it should be that Son of that God both with an Emphasis which these men stand much upon in other places I know their expositions of these words but I bring them for illustration that a man who is not maliciously benâ— might think this enough to expresse him the God and then looke upon St. Matth. 3.11 he shall baptize you with the holy Ghost and with fire who could do that but the great God then see in the same place whose shooes latchet I am not worthy to untyâ— certainly the meanest man is worthy enough to unty the Shooe-latchet of the greatest King in the World who is onely a man but if he be God likewise the greatest is not worthy of the meanest Office about him Certainly St. John Baptist delivered abundantly enough for the satisfaction of any sober man in this point I proceed That all men through him might believe I find no dispute concerning this businesse out of these words I let them passe therefore nor about the two next Verses I come therefore to the tenth Verse Sect. 10. He was in the World and the World was made by him and the World knew him not Socinus in his Comment upon these Words boast's much pag. 19. that no man which he knowe's expound's them right but himselfe and his exposition is that the New Testament being full of Hebraismes and the Hebrewes having compound Words do therefore use uncompounded words for compounds and so in this place the World was made by him is as much as re-made regenerated made anew and to this purpose he produceth Ephes. 2.10 we are his Workmanship created in Christ Jesus unto good works Certainly if there be no clearer Text then this this Term made need not be wrested to re-makeing for first let the
Reader observe here that the word we render made is the word which hath abid and will abide more dispute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is not in that Sentence to the Ephesians This word hath hard luck it is used to all purposes by them sometimes it signifye's to be sometimes to be re-made but I say alwayes made in St. John so that although they would shew me that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are both used in that place and rendered Workmanship and created may be used for recreation yet it would not follow that this word which is not of kin to them should indure that exposition then let us consider that Text in the Ephes. need not to be forced to his sense for not to stand upon the expositions of learned men which have applyed it to the Creation that by Christ Jesus is mean't our Saviour according to his Divinity and so in him the word we were all created to good works but to take it according to the other sense that this Creation is mean't of creating those saving and justifying graces at which the Apostle seeme's to point and in regard of them we are said to be created those excellent and supernaturall qualities being our perfection so that as a man may be said to be made when his soul is put in him a table or any thing when that worke which give 's it the last complement and degree of perfection is added to it so we in the Text are said to be created but it doth not say men we are created another thing which God by these graces wrought us unto and I thinke is regeneration but this phrase doth not in its nature signify regeneration but it signifye's that which is applyed to men who are fallen from a better to a worse condition to such men it may import a regeneration because it bring 's them backe to their former state and make's them that which was their first condition and so this creation in the Text hath its most genuine and proper sense which making in my Text should not have when it is said that the world was made by him if by it should be understood the world was re-made or regenerated by him Againe consider that if this Text should be understood of regeneration I mean that Text to the Ephesians it must be by vertue of that phrase to good works created to good works for if the Text had barely said we had been his Workmanship created by him no man could have construed it regeneration but now in this Text the world was made by him there is no phrase to expound it to any thing else but the mere sense of the words and yet let us see another violence if this should be granted that this phrase made the world should be understood for regenerating and the world for men all the world that knowe's any thing of Christianity knowe's likewise that not half the world was regenerated then say they it must be understood of our Saviour's endeavour to regenerate the whole so that making must be taken for regeneration regeneration for an endeavour to do it when I dare say he nor they can shew me any place in Scripture where this word make is used for regeneration much lesse meerly for an endeavour to do it nay I do not think that they can shew me any place where make is taken for an endeavour but the very phrase intimating a produced effect is no where used for an ineffectuall endeavour Sect. 11. But I will leave this Comment of Socinus although countenanced by his followers and apply my self to Smalcius in his 13 cap. refutationis libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ pag. 75. upon these words The world was made by him We deny saith he that by the word World is signified the old world that by the word made is signified creation that by the phrase by him is signified a principal agent I shall undertake these in their order as he handle's them but his greatest endeavour is about the first word the world which he and I both first meddle with First he saith this word World hath divers significations it signifie's onely men it signifie's the future world now saith he when Saint John saith the world was made by him may be understood that we are reformed by him in which sense it is said that Christ enlighten's every man which cometh into the world as it is said in the preceding verse now as Christ is said to enlighten every man because he used sufficient means and endeavoured their enlightening so he is said to make the world that is the men in it by endeavouring to reform them This is a cruel thing to impose upon a man such expositions where making must be taken for reforming for although they can shew the same root for these words in Hebrew yet not in Greek nor any place in the New Testament where the word used for making is used for reforming and then that reforming must be understood onely an endeavour not an act as I have shewed His second way is to take this word World for the future World life eternal this is pag. 76. as this Life eternall is revealed and given by Christ see againe the violence of this exposition the world is taken for the future in Heaven this making of it by the word is the revealing of it by Christ then which never were there heard greater falsifications of any Text for illustration of which he bring 's the 17. Verse of this Chapter Grace and Truth is by Jesus Christ when there is nothing in these words which can give any light to any such sense in the other for how can it follow because Christ is the Agent by which his Servants receive grace and truth therefore his making the world should be understood of his revealing or giving eternall Life but Valkelius in his fifth Book de verà religione cap. 10. pag. 445. and 446. give 's other illustrations that this word World should signify the future World Hebrewes 2.5 2 Peter 3.13 these he put 's in the Margin to justify this acception of the World for the other and in all which places it is observable there is no one but the fourth to the Romans which hath this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render World in it and sometimes the word new added which might well expound his sense as in St. Peter and sometimes no such intent as he would have it to signify the future World so in those places to the Hebrews but then for this place to the Romans although there is this very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it as the Hâ—ir of the world yet Christ was Heir of this world and the promise was made to Abraham that all nations in the earth should be blessed in his seed and so his Seed should be Heir Lord of all the world and have kingdom and
bono to what purpose all this learning bestowed not only the foxes have been nibling the fruits and branches but the wild Bore hath been in the Vineyard and hath so far digged at the roots of Religion that the principal Vines hang by little strings and do only live yea would die if not succoured These were my reflexions on those times I therefore thought it necessary for some body and applyed my particular endeavours to cast fresh Earth about those roots of Religion to chase if I could that wild Bore out of the Vineyard into his former Forest of heathenish principles and surely if any one man for some hundreds of years might be called that Bore it is Mr. Hobbes no one man ever writing so destructively to the principles of Christianity as he hath done Upon this reason I bent my study against him and his Books and did heretofore publish two pieces in an unknown name being willing to have the businesse done but not caring if my name were lost in the World the first was meerly Philosophicall against the two first Chapters of his Leviathan which yet because he made that the Introduction and Foundation of his Divinity I thought it necessarily conducing to my intentions against the other to begin with Since my writing that I have found some men of great worth and deserved reputation in Letters that have opined with some things in that piece upon which I thought to have suspended my putting it out again untill I had enlarged my Discourse with them but upon perusal supposing they could not prophesie nor had foreseen by reason what I urged I resolved to publish it as it is and take some other leisure to censure them if God give me life The other piece was against the 12 th 13 th and 14 th Chapter both so falsly printed that when I saw them I could scarce know them for mine own I have writ against most part of his great errours but my condition in those times was such that I was forced upon frequent and sudain searches of inquisitive souldiers to huddle up my papers and throw them I know not where nor can yet find divers of them those which I can find at this present I now print considering how lamely such duties are performed by Executors and my self grown to that Age as I must commit most things to them shortly how soon I know not the rest God willing shall come out as I shall discover them or else can repair what is defective by my memory at such snatches of time as I can recover from my necessary duties who love not my life nor any piece of it but as it shall conduce to the glory of God and the good of Christian men that they may lead a peaceable and godly life in unity and charity which is the whole endeavour of Your brother and servant in and for Jesus Christ Will Lucy Bishop of St. David's A Table of Generall Heads I. OBservations c. Upon the first Chapter of Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan entituled Of Sense Page 1 II. Observations upon the second Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Imagination 53 III. Upon the twelfth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Religion 79 IV. A Transition to some select places in his Element of Philosophy 94 V. A Paraeneticall Digression to Mr. Hobbes 117 VI. Observations upon the thirteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery 137 VII Upon the fourteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of the first and second Naturall Lawes and of Contracts together with the first Chapter in his Book De Corpore Politico 164 VIII Upon the fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of other Laws of Nature 200 IX Upon the sixteenth Chapter of Leviathan entituled Of Persons Authors and things Personated 272 X. Upon some Writings of the Socinians 291 XI A Digression to the Reader preceding the Bishop's Additional Animadversions upon a Latin Apologist for Mr. Hobbes 417 A TABLE To the severall Chapters Sections and Series of the whole Book CHAP. I. Sect. I. SEnse something else beside representation Page 2 II. The cause of sense discussed 3 Not the pressure of the Orgâ—n and consequently the heart or brain ibid. Which implie's sense to be before sense 4 III. Not seeming but some action must be sense ibid. Sight consisteth not in light or colour figur'd 5 Mr. Hobbes's Aphorisme confuted that motion produceth nothing but motion ibid. No motion in Place but to Place 6 Philosophy-Schools and Universities how necessary to Christendom ibid. CHAP. II. I. Whether the subject wherein colour is be the object of sight Colour and Image not the same nor in the same 8 II. His instance of the Sun's appearance by reflexion censur'd ibid. III. Whence it is that we see the same object double ibid. Colour is in the Object Image or species not 9 IV. Where it is by reflexion Mr. Hobbes's fallacie between that and colour 10 CHAP. III. I. His tedious proposition ibid. II. Image what 11 The apparition of the Object not of the Brain much lesse of Motion ibid. III. As is also Colour 12 IV. Mr. Hobbes's inconstancy in the production and seat of sense ibid. V. Sparkes appearing after a stroke upon the eye not from any concussion of the brain 13 Not from the optick nerve but rather from the White or Crystalline humour ibid. The like from a white Cat or white Napkin struck in the dark ibid. Which may be only the strong emission of species 14 The great Axiome upon which Philosophy if not Divinity is founded ibid. VI. Mr. Hobbes illogicall in his proofs ibid. He playe's the Mahomet in arguing 15 VII No Image of Light 16 VIII But as incorporated into some body 17 IX The apparition of Light such as Mr. Hobbes's would make prove's not Image and Colour to be the apparitions of Motion 18 X. Fire move's rather upward then equally every way ibid. XI Not presently extinguished when inclosed and how when it is 19 XII The motion of Fire what It hath no positive contraction 20 XIII No rejection of the contiguous Medium 21 An Instance in two fired Beacons ibid. XIV The apparition of Fire after a stroke is not by any rebound from the Brain to the Optick Nerve 22 The difference great between the apparition of such Fire and the species issuing from any visible Object 23 XV. Improbable that the Sun worketh as Mr. Hobbes fancyeth Fire to do ibid. XVI The indepence of Mr. Hobbes's Illatives 24 XVII Light and Colour two things ibid. CHAP. IV. I. Colour or Image not the apparition of Motion but of the Object the former proved by two Arguments 25 II. The later by three 26 c. III. Colour and Light not the same thing 28 IV. Two Arguments for the negative 30 CHAP. V. I. The first Argument against the reality of Colours answered 32 Wherein the being and nature of things consist's and how they are distinguished ibid. II. The second Argument against
consists in a tract of time It is true time is necessary to warre it is the measure of all rest or actions in the world it is the measure of their existence how long they stay and tarry in the world and so may be reckoned amongst those outward accommodations with which all natural things are fitted but it is no essential part of any To say that the nature of warre or peace a Horse or Tree or Men consists in time were foolish they are in time measured by time but time is not essentiall constitutively as his friends the Schoolmen and University learning teacheth but consecutively they doe not make these things follow them and therefore it was weakly explained by him when he said that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warres Sect. 4. But he illustrates this by foule weather saith he the nature of foule weather lyeth not in a shower or two of raine but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together So the nature of warre consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary His instance by which he illustrates this Conclusion is erronious for foule weather is not an inclination of time as he seemes to speak or else he prove's not that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warre but of the heavens in that time nor is the weather foule if there be onely an inclination to foulnesse as hap's in lowring cloudy weather where is no raine yet it is faire as weather is faire effectively in making the wayes faire and this distinction is often observed by our writers of Almanacks when they will be exact in their Prognostiques of weather they say now it is inclinable to raine then it will be raine and when it doth raine or in such a time as raine hath such a predominance to make the wayes foule we call it a foule day or weeke but if there be only a disposition to raine or so little as allayes the dust only we say for all that it is faire weather not foule Sect. 5. As his Illustration is to blame so is his Conclusion the disposition to warre no not the known disposition to it is warre for that disposition is nothing but an inclination to warre but an actual or habitual hostility not enmity only makes warre a man may hate another one King another and yet not make warre upon him yet that hatred is a disposition to war So that a disposition to war makes not war and then the knowledge of it cannot make it other then it is but then is war when two Nations endeavour the subjugation or assaulting one another or one doth it alone for although true friendship requires a mutual consent of both parties yet a war doth not for war may be and is commonly begun by one party before the other undertakes it and we say often that one Nation makes war and invade's the other unprovided But because he vaunts often of the propriety of speech I may tell him that war is not properly spoke of single men but Kings or Nations for single men hate one another cantend one with another fight one with another are at enmity one with the other but not at war that is proper to publique persons or Nations only Sect. 6. What he writes afterwards of the incommodities of war is ingenious but the application is not rightly made to those men of which he speaks who live without other security then what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withall For let us consider these men either planting neare other men or alone we shall still unlesse war disturbe them find them adopting and fitting their habitations for their own profit and content if a man should in an Hermeticall way live alone he would fit his habitation for such a solitary life if he should live amongst neighbours he would accommodate his affaires the best way he could to have a neighbourly friendship with them The application I cannot see how it can be forced unlesse his conclusion that all men are at war were granted for instance we can have none but of Hermites but for the plantation of families upon the same territories with others we see Abraham and Lot planting amongst the Canaanites who having ground sufficient lived peaceably with them and they fitted themselves with all usefull things for a good time having no warre I goe on with him therefore on the last particle of the 62. Page he there begins CHAP. XXI The conceit of an universal war by nature vain Of the passions and their objects The great Law-maker and his Laws Justice done among the Americans The law of Nature and dictate of Conscience Of militarie valour and prudence The habits of Justice and Injustice Of propriety occupancy c. Sect. 1. IT may seeme strange to some man who hath not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another and he may therefore not wresting to this inference made from the passions desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience It is true the inference from those passions being too weake to prove his conclusion that every man is at war with every man we can hardly assent to such an universal proposition concerning a war with all by all men the practise of whâ—ch was never experimented by any Let us see his instance briefly it consist's in three things that men travel armed they keep their doores locked these two might be spared in my particular who do neither and that in his house he lock's his chests by these saith he this man accuseth mankind as much by his deeds as he doth by his words he saye's so but I say no. For he accuseth not mankind of this wickednesse that all the world and each man naturally is at war one with another but these mistrust that there are some evill and wicked men in the world these know men may be ill by these actions they expresse it but he conclude's they are so for certainly as Love and Friendship are mighty excellencies in the conversation of man with man so hatred and warres the greatest evill which he affirme's to be in every man towards every man Sect. 2. But saith he neither of us accuse nature in it the desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sins no more are the actions which proceed from those desires till they know a Law that forbids them which till lawes be made they cannot know nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it Thus he we agree both that the passions are not sins nor the acts proceeding out of them men may love hate feare hope c. but the misapplication of the act to the wrong objects to love that we should hate
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
be only such things as are honest I think no man ever justified his Conclusion as he understands these termes of profit and right He ends this Sect. with an endeavour to prove his Conclusion For saith he there is little use and benâ—fit of that right a man hath when another as strong or stâ—engtâ— then himself hath right to the same This Argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid which was that every man had right to every thing even in anothers possâ—ssion but that appeares to be a mistake in him and therefore this Argument is weak which is drawne ex non concessis CHAP. XXV Concerning nature's right liberty power Of warre and self-preservation by it For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty c. Sect. 1. THus having finished my discourse upon this subject as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be the liberty every man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature This definition I except against as not cut out even to the thing defined First it is too narrow for this right of nature concernes not himself alone but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life Yea if it have such a liberty which consisteth in to do or not to doe as he expound's it presently after then it is a right of nature to forbeare to use his owne power for the preservation of his life aswell as to use it so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature Secondly like an ill made garment as it is too streight in one place so it is too wide in another the liberty a man hath to use his power as he will himself for the preservation of his owne life is not a right of nature for the right of nature as I have shewed is a result out of the law of Nature which impower's him for that action but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation c. as I have shewed before but only such things as are just and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of Nature to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that Nature which gives him his nature are to be preferred before his life Sect. 2. The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty thus By liberty is understood according to the proper signification of the word the absence of externall impediments This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right for externall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition take away the right to have it especially this natural right for other rights by civill institution and donation do in some manner depend upon outward things because those Nationall lawes which give them these rights are outward although right and title be an inward thing the issue of that outward law but in natural right the very law which give 's a man this right is an internall law a law writ in man's heart and therefore the liberty which attend's this right and which he saith this right is can in no sense be understood to be the absence of externall impediments he adds Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would This is weakly said or most impertinently or both for external impediments can take away no part of natural power which alone is necessary to natural right this may hinder nature in its operations but this cannot take away the power of operating and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him These rights are internal things which are not much concerned in what is outward but remaine and keep their being whatsoever outward things happen Sect. 3. His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this A law of nature Lex naturalis is a precept or general Rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of preserving the same and to omit that by which it may be best preserved He is a most unhappie man in his definitions which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with First for this we may observe that if he had said such a Precept as he seâ—s down had been a law of nature or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature he had spoke truth but saying a law of Nature is such a precept he makes this precepe to be the Predicate as we University-men abused with Universityâ—learning terme it and then it must be as large as the subject A law of nature is what this is not for first he makes this precept to be only a prohibition To a negative law A precept saith he by which a man is forbidden c. when certainly although there are negative precepts yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts no negative which is not supported by an affirmative and this law forbidding must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoyned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned University learning he would have writ more properly and have seduced himself into fewer errors next observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse that he makes Nature aiming in all her intendments at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the universal when indeed the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique and particulars only as they are parts of the publique The latter part of that Section I have shewed erroneous already which affirmes law and right inconsistent Sect. 4. His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus And because the condition of man as hath been declared in the precedent Chap. is a condition of war of every one against every one in which case every one is governed by his own reason He said somewhat like truth when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a
thing no mâ—nner of proof that had shew of reason Posito quolibet sequitur quidlibet if men suppose impossible things they may from thence-argue impossibilities Uno absurdo concesso mille sequuntur an errour in the foundation in the first drawing a line multiplie's its self all the way thus in this instance he goes on And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies it followeth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion First that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature Secondly that as bad of the law of Nature Thirdly That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man without all which this cannot follow that every man hath right to one anothers bodies for certainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world besides that gave every man a propriety in his owne body and none had interest in it but by jus naturae as Parents or by some concession expressed or implyed as in polities yea in warre saith he certainly not so neither for by the law of Armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition there are inhumanities in warres which men have no right to use as perhaps will be shewed hereafter so that then all these Propositions which are all appâ—rently false must be granted or else the Conclusion which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness yet take his Conclusion altogether it hath some likeness of truth with it That in such a Condition every man hath right c. In such a condition which was never knowne which is impossible in such a condition a man may have such a right he proceeds in the same place And consequently it is a Precept or generall rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtaine it that he may seeke and use all helpes â—nd advantages of warre This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it only one terme added to the last clause which is when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it then he may make use of the advantages of warre for without this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace and upon any deniall or pause at the first he might with justice engage in a war which were most unjust Sect. 5. That which followe's is against his own Principles the first branch of which rule saith he containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is to seeke peace and follow it this according to his principles can be but a deduction out of the law of nature for if the law of nature be as he defined it just before in this page a Precept by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive to his life this can be no other but a deduction out of that The second saith he is the summe of the right of nature which is by all meanes we can to defend our selves The second branch is not the summe of this right c. but a branch of it for there are many other meanes to preserve our selves besides war although in a desperate case war may be one What followe's in that Chap. concerning the second law of nature deduced out of this that a man should lay downe his right to all things c. I think it needless to speake of for first there is no man hath by nature right to any person but his owne secondly a man need 's lay down his right to nothing for his right to any thing returnes to him if any thing lack an owner which is not disposed of by such powers which by deduction from the law of nature are authorised to settâ—e them otherwise and therefore all those needless definitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right what renouncing what transferring what obligation duty injustice are which are touched in the 65. Page I let goe at present and for altogether unlesse some just occasion hereafter may make me look back upon them only that require's a censure which he deliver's in the bottome of that Page and the beginning of the next which discourse as I conceive it wicked in its self so it render's all which he spake before exceeding malicious Sect. 6. This discourse begin's thus Whensoever a man transferreth his right or renounceth it it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeth for thereby This I grant so far as the words expresse it but there is something he implies which will render it fit for censure anon his reason likewise I allow which followe's for it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself as for his deduct on which is layd therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signes to have abandoned or transferred this in generall hath some truth for since the end of man is his happiness which he must needs love happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will as colours to the sight or any other yet this applyed to any particular thing will be found erroneous for although good and happiness must needs by the law of nature be desired yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent when that good and happinesse shall be instanced in any particular it will not be universally received Now I will consider his examples As first saith he a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life This is a mistake in him a man can and many men have done it a man can for a man can preferre other things before his life and therefore can exchange hâ—s life for that men ought to preferre their Countries good before their owne both being in its self a greater good and of greater durance men may preferre their souls eternall good beyond this life the hope of which give 's the greatest comfort this life is capable of one may and ought to preferre the glory of God before his own life by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him these men may and ought to preferre who are Christians and as Reason guide's to these actions so Experience of them who have done it for these ends shewe's it may be done but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it those of honour in severall kinds for riches for present pleasures and there is almost no worldly contentment for which some men have not adventured and lost
Sect. 7. He proceed's From such reasoning as this Successeful wickednâ—ss hath obtained the name of vertue Here begin's to confute that conclusion of the foole that there is no such thing as Iustice this sentence is his foundation and he thus argue's If there be no injustice but all men are to doe what is most reasonable that is most conducing to their owne good that is worldly pleasure or profit then succesfull wickednesse may be called Vertue which is abominable and most odious for certainly vertue is not measured by the event but the nature of the act and the naturall tendence of it to that is good This argument of his against the foole is strong but let us examine it doth not this and all he speaks against the foole fight against himself in the 13. Chap. of his Leviathan concerning which I have discoursed before He deliver's that men naturally have a right to all things and any one may rightly doe any thing to any man for the securing of his life or contentment and that men are in a state of war before they are incorporated into a Common-wealth with all the world that in that state fraud and force are the Cardinall vertues so then in this state any successefull wickednesse must needs be called Vertue because a man in such meanes according to his doctrine act's nothing but what he hath right to do and therefore was just and acted according to reason and by such meanes obtain's his end 's which are his own preservation and contentment Againe he hath delivered Chap. 14. that no man can renounce his right of delivering himself from wounds and chaines and imprisonment or indeed of any such thing as may make his life wearisome to him well then let it be considered if a man have naturally right to all those things which may secure and preserve them then let his Compacts or Covenants be whatsoever yet they are invalid which infringe this right which a man hath no power to alien from himself then in order to these whatsoever a man act 's after he hath covenanted himself into a common-wealth be it never so wicked must be cloathed with the specious name of vertue because according to reason and right so that let him say what he will this unlucky foole disputed most unanswerably against his principles and the main hinges upon which his policy move's though nothing against mine Sest 8. He goe's on And some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a Kingdome I doe not remember that I have read the violation of faith for the getting a Kingdome justified by any man but Machiavell who indeed approve's any means to bring a man to what he aime's at but certainly no man esteemed for Christianity or morality It is said of Julius Caesar that he would often repeat out of Euripides that Sentence which he rendred Quod si violandum est jus regnandi gratiâ Violandum est aliis rebus pietatem colas But let the Reader consider that it is here with if if right be to be violated and what Tully saye's of him that he was captus Imperii consuetudine ensnared with the custome or habit of commanding which in his infancy he had coveted and from thence would use that speech and did practise it as unluckily as other usurpers but sure every man who is mastered with any habit of wickedâ—â—sse the fruition of which he viciously covet's will say as much for that as Caesar for governing but none as I know of hath delivered it for a practique conclusion but onely Machiavel therefore that word some might have been spared by Mr. Hobbes Sect. 9. Page 73. He comes to make particular answers which are not satisfactory to the foole 's argument and therefore must be examined in the second line he state 's the question certainly not punctually to the purpose for whereas the fool's conclusion was that there was no such thing as injustice he saith lin 2. that The Question is not of promises mutuall where there is no security of performance on the other side as when there is no civill power erected over the parties promising for such promises are no Covenants This is a most hatefull parenthesis as I have shewed he goe's on but either where one of the partyes hath performed already or where there is a power to make him performe so that here is a great restraint to the fool's conclusion and a limitation of the fool's argument which I am perswaded if he had disputed with Mr. Hobbes he would not have allowed for he was bred up in Mr. Hobbes his principles and dispute's shrewdly out of them but although this be not pertinent to the foole yet let the fool grant that this shall be the question as Mr. Hobbes put 's it Whâ—ther it be against reason that is against the benefit of the other to performe or not Here the poore foole is abused mightily for the fool's conclusion was about justice Mr. Hobbes put 's the question concerning benefit onely certainly many high Injustices have been beneficial as he call's benefit that is profitable for this life's advantages but yet see by what fraudulent steps he steale's into the change of these Tearmes first he hath said that Iustice is not against Reason Reason is not against the Law which looketh onely at the happinesse of this life to that particular man therefore justice is whatsoever any man act 's for his own good all which expressions have beene before shewed not to be depending one upon the other but let us examine his argument I say saith he it is not against reason from Iustice he went to reason from reason to benefit and now from benefit to reason againe for the manifestation of which he hath a long discourse to shew that the wisdome of actions is not to be measured by the events but the forâ—sight and dâ—sign which shall be granted him Secondly in that refuted imagination of every man 's being at war with every man for want of a common power to keep them in awe no man can hope to defend himself by his own power strength and wit c. Therefore he who declare's he think's it reason to deceive those that hâ—lp him can in reason expect no other meanes of safety then what can be had from his own single power This is the force of what he there write's But consider Reader with me that this is not to the purpose for the foole 's Conclusion was concerning the justice and honesty of a thing he onely out-wit's the foole and discourseth of cunning or craft or worldly profit of those actions what is most profitable for the advance of the Agent'â— ease and pleasure but then consider further and see if this answear of his satisfy that doubt The Question according to his own framing is whether it be profitable to deceive or not his answer is
satisfaction of the powers but a curbing them which yield's but a half enjoyment such as may be proper for a Viator a Traveller to it not a possessor of happiness in hope as the Prophet David say'th but God is our portion in the land of the living we are here in the land of the dying where others and we die dayly and our happiness here is God but God in hope when we come to the land of the living God will be our portion and possession to conclude men may have a begun happiness here but noâ— perfect untill hereafter man perhaps may have content here but felicity onely in heaven after life A Traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy Palace where he hope 's for comfort but he is not satisfied untill he come there so it is with us in our Journey to heaven the happiness we have here is our hope of it but hereafter our possession The next Objection may be That this future Felicity is an Article of our Faith the Conclusion of all the Twelve The resurrection of the body and the life everlasting Now if it were demonstrable thus by reason an act of Faith is not necessary to it I can here bring the first and last Articles of our Faith together that which concern's God's creation and this which concern's man's salvation man's beginning and end which are both from God and say That for both of them there is abundance of reason but those Reasons cannot be easily argued by every man and yet though every man cannot Philosophize in high points of learning every man can believe these Conclusions which are proved by learned men and that belief is requâ—red of every man and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they upon good grounds believe no man know's who is his Mother but by his belief of very easie people to deceive and to be deceived and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men so that men dare depose that such a one was this man's Mother and such this man's none of us that are not travelled in those parts know that there is a Constantinople yet we are assured by hear-say and are most confident there is such a City and stronger than all these may our Faith be of this Tâ—uth as I have shewed Faith and Reason doe not destroy but help one the other for it is with our way to heaven as to other places when a man hath shewed us one way we can by that guess at another which hath proportion and convenience to that like lights when you have kindled one Candle you may easily light others at that when the Soul of man is enlightened by Faith it can with much more ease afterwards inlighten Reason which perhaps else it would never have thought upon and Reason sometimes assist's Faith for when the persons we believe deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable it is with comfort swallowed down and entertained and the work of Faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing Thus you see the same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason and therefore although proved in one yet exalted as an Article in the other I could now insist upon the Article of Faith how confirmed by Scripture but that is done by an hundred men before and is evident too to every one that looke's upon the New Testament I could further enlarge upon that I have already touched concerning the Credibility and Fitness to believe those men which delivered it to us that certainly as Festus said to S. Paul not he onely but all the rest were mad with learning or something else who did endure so many afflictions yea death for Religion if there were no reward hereafter and the Story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate Centuryes and continued by the most universally consented Story in the world so that for certainty we have not so much reason to believe any Article of the Faith I speak of reason nor any Conclusion delivered by relation as this one That there is a Blessedness hereafter for God's servants because this is the reason and chief reason why these men durst dye for Religion this made Shadrach Meshach and Abednego Dan. 3. despise the fire for Gods cause the Heroick Sons 2 Mac. 7. contemn Tortures with a most noble Constancy because they looked for a better and happier life so as it is phrased Hebr. 12.1 We are compassed about with a mighty cloud of Witnesses or indeed a cloud of mighty Witnesses to evidence the Truth Mr. Hobbes therefore did not doe this noble heavenly Conclusion right when he say'd It is received onely upon a belief grounded upon other mens saying that know it supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally which was a disgracefull expression and I can justly fear intended to that purpose to disparage this Article for let a man consider his Conclusion which follows Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason or Nature This he saith was opposed by some who held killing of Sovereigns lawfull this seemed out of his premisses to be argued for thus That which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done but the breach of faith in killing of Sovereigns conduceth to future felicity therefore c. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven it might have served his turn much better to have shewed how the God of Truth love's Truth and hate's Falshood how unpossible it is that Error and Falshood should be the way to Truth how inconsistent they are these things would abundantly have served his turn and have contented the Reader but to leave that and fall foule without occasion upon our hope of heaven was very ill done of him CHAP. XXIX Of Covenants and keeping faith Of dammage and injury The exercise of justice in its several kinds Arithmetical proportion is that call'd Commutative What in it and distributive may be due without Covenant The justice of an Arbritratour Mr. Hobbes's mistakes about justice merit c. Bodin's harmonical proportion The old Philosophers unjustly censur'd by Mr. Hobbes Of Epicurus and his Philosophy The Stoicks c. Fortitude and Liberality stated better by them then he pretend's Sect. 1. I Leave this now and on with him Others saith he that allow for a Law of Nature the keeping of Faith doe neverthelesse make exception of certaine persons as hereticks c. I condemn this with him but doe not approve his reason for it which is If any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it I allow not this answer because it destroye's that supposition upon which it was grounded which is that men have made a Covenant now
observe a Metonymy he was the way because by his word he direct's us the way because by his life he hath trod it out for us and by his graces he help 's us to walke in it and this is apparent to any man who shall consider how impossible it is for Christ to be a way a trodden path of ground or how impossible it is for any such way to lead to the Journeyes end which he aimed at The second Terme which is mentioned by Socinus is Truth and for this I may say that I doubt whether there be any figure necessary for Christ as God being Truth it self he must needs likewise be verax true speaking as well as verus and if he should deceive or misguide in the way he should go against his nature and deny himselfe as St. Paul phraseth it 2 Tim. 2.13 now I can justly say that here is no figure or if any it is but this which the context exact's I am the way by directing you to it and that an infallible one which no man can be deceived by for I am truth its self which make's good all I have said and the same I may speake of his last Terme Life I may justly affirme that there needs be no figure in it Christ is the life there is an Article to every Terme life its selfe life in the fountaine all other lives are Peters Pauls a horse's or dog's life but he is life its self life in the fountaine like light in the Sun much more glorious then any other therefore thou who seekest life life eternal which is the journeys end of every man must come by the way which I appoint who am Truth and come to me and thou shalt have it I know as he is life in the fountain and so may be understood so he may be a life to us and called our life the life of men of which hereafter both as an efficient and an object as an efficient producing that life as an object that life of ours consisting in the beatificall vision of the most sacred and blessed Trinity but I see no necessity forcing me to this second exposition but if so the context lead's to it I think I may run through Twenty more and certainly there are Twenty more such speeches but we shall find that there is something in the matter of the discourse or in the Circumstances of the Text which induce to it but in that I have in hand nothing to perswade any man that this Term word should be understood according to any of those figures Sect. 6. Socinus saith it is used now here in Scripture but in the writings of this Evangelist so my search need not be farre in this place of the Gospell in his first Epistle Chapter 1. Verse 1. that which was from the beginning which we have heard which we have seen with our eyes which we have looked upon and our hands have handled of the word of Life c. here is no Circumstance inducing us to search a sense that merely a man should be called the word but rather the contrary something divine to which that humanity was united because as here it was from the beginning and because in the second Verse that life of which this is called the word is termed eternall life which was with the Father and was manifested to us was eternall and with him he must therefore be eternally with him this was afterwards manifested to us A third place is Rev. 19.13 his name is called the word of God where I can find againe nothing to that sense but in each place of these this Term word may most aptly be understood according to the Orthodox Catholick sense for the internal word of God nor indeed can they shew me any thing like it in Scrirture Let a man conceive with himselfe what a strange uncouth phrase it is for a man who speake's to be called the word which he speake's yet so must he in their language Sect. 7. Yea but they have just such another fetch Aaron is is sayd Exodus 4.16 to be Moses his mouth the phrase is cleane otherwise and is excellently rendred by our Translators instead of a mouth because Moses had not a clear utterance the second Instance is that Iohn Baptist is called a voyce for my part I think it a reasonable exposition to say that Iohn Baptist was rather he that made the noise and voyce in the Wilderness then the voyce its self to which purpose let us look upon the 40. of Isaiah verse 3. from whence that Text is made use of by three Evangelists we shall find there that the Prophet like a man in a rapture seeme's to heare this noise or voice in the Wilderness and here utter's what he heard he saw in his vision Iohn Baptist in a Wilderness fitting and preparing men for the Gospell but the voice he heard was the vâ—ice of Iohn Baptist who did preach that Doctrine there specifyed I know but one objection of moment can be framed against this which is that Iohn 1.23 when Iohn had been asked who art thou he answered I am the voice c. as saith the Prophet Isaiah to this first it is memorable that in the Originall it is not I am but onely I it is thought by many that this Word I am ought to be understood but if it be not then he doth not affirme himselfe to be the voice but onely leave 's them to apprehend what he is by the Prophet Isaiah but if it be and that we should read it as it is commonly I am yet since he quote's the Prophet I know no reason why it should be understood in a sense dâ—ffering from the Prophets especially since the two other Evangelists which mention this place have not one word of this I am St. Matthew 3.3 for this is he which was spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah the voice of one crying in the Wilderness so likewise St. Luke 3.4 having before delivered how he preached the Baptisme of Repentance adde's as it is written in the Book of the words of Isaiah the Prophet the voice of one c. well then methinke's it is reasonable to conceive that Iohn was rather he that cryed as he did there then the voice which was cryed but I reverence the Antiquity which expound it otherwise and those heavenly Devotions which the Fathers have deduced from that Metaphor and therefore will no further discusse that interpretation that deliver's Iohn to be the voice but grant it and Aaron the mouth of Moses in Exodus the Case is farre differing betwixt these and the word to be taken for Christ who by them was mere man in this sentence In the beginning was the word for consider Reader if in Exodus it had been said the mouth was in the beginning or midle or latter end of a buisinesse would any man living interpret that of Aaron without that Comment which the Spirit of God
Ark to which St. Peter allude's 1.3.21 the like figure whereunto that is of the Ark spoken of in the 20. Verse is Baptisme well by no meanes could it any way notify the power of God in this shape but his kindness and meekness now likewise that it is a distinct person from the other is evident because in this very Verse the other persons are not intimated onely but expressed the voice from heaven uttering these words thou art my c. manifesting the Father and the person spoken to declaring the Son Sect. 2. But I find another opinion amongst them which is in the Racovian Catechisme Chapter 6. de Christi prophetico munere pag. 162. in that edition I use now at Racovia 1651. where the question being put Quid verò Spiritus Sanctus What is the holy Ghost he answer 's that first in the New Testament the Gospell of Christ is designed by it the Catechisme produceth two places of Scripture to prove this by the first 1 Cor. 2.10 but God hath revealed them that is the things which he hath prepared for them that love him unto us by his Spirit where say those Divines the holy Spirit is said to reveal the Mysteries of Godlinesse to God's Servants the other is 2 Tim. 1.10 where it is said God hath brought life and immortality to light by the Gospell now say they in this latter place the Gospell is said to do that which the Spirit was said to act in the former therefore they are one A most piteous Argument The Fire a Candle and the Sun make us see the same thing therefore they three are one but more closely the internall light in mine eye or whatsoever it is that fit 's the Organ for discerning and the externall light of the Sun which illuminate's the object both make me perceive the same visible object therefore by their Logick they are one which is absurd so is it with these two the carnall or naturall man of himself cannot behold the things of the Spirit God therefore infuseth into him the holy Ghost by which he is enabled to discern these Mysterâ—es of Godlinesse bue yet thâ— object lie's in the dark the Gospell therefore reveale's it unto them as the Kingly Prophet most punctually phrasâ—th it Psalm 36.9 in thy light we shall see light in the light of the Spirit we shall see the light of the Gospell and yet these two are very distinct nay my Text confute's all for if there be any thing in this Verse which look's like the Gospell it is the words of the voice thou art my beloved Son c. the apparition of the holy Ghost in the likenesse of a dove hath nothing to do with the Gospell therefore the Spirit here cannot be taken for the Gospell but they urge again that it is called the Gospell of the Spirit 2 Cor 3 6. I say therefore it is not the Spirit it is the Gospell of the Spirit because it reveale's the Spirit unto us and Spiritual Mysteries but nothing is the same with that which it reveale's nay if we say any thing is of another we must in that imply that it is not that other Sect. 3. But they goe farther and say that this phrase the holy Spirit signifie's Dei Donum which is given to certain men and is called the earnest of our inheritance no doubt and he cite's 2 Cor. 1.22 as Ephesians 1.14 all this is granted that the holy Spirit is taken sometimes for the Gifts but by a Metonymie the cause for the effect but that it should never be taken for that Divine person we deny and they cannot prove for as St. Paul dispute's the case at large 1 Cor. 12. The gifts of the spirit are divers but the same Spirit that third person of the Trinity is one so that although the Spirit may be called by the name of those Gifts which proceed from it yet he is distinct from them and here it is evident in my Text he was another thing besides them This is all that I find objected and all this is confuted out of this where the holy Spirit is said to descend upon our Saviour in the likeness of a dove to which none of these extravagant expressions can be applyed And now there needs no more from Scripture Their great defiance to us to produce Reason for what we speak may be defyed by us as unnecessary in a Case of Faith where we have Scripture we must believe beyond yea against reason the Scripture hath been abundantly handled by diverse although in these places which I have handled I have endeavoured to contribute something to the clearing of them The rationall laid aside by all almost as an impossible work Sect. 4. I therefore will adore and admire that high Mystery and shall most humbly thank Almighty God that he hath pleased to reveal such a sacred Truth to our Faith but then shall admire likewise his bounty to such men whose Souls and Reason he hath awakened by his Spirit to such a height as that they have made their Reason attend their Faith and follow it although non passibus aequis yet come up to it and discern that it is most rationall for a man to believe it is so What I have observed in this kind and wherein I can enlarge the Conceipt of others and explain any thing by reason I shall set down having this occasion and impart to the world with all humility to more learned men and to adoration of the Divine Excellencies which are not to be fathomed by man quid sunt what they are although quòd sunt that they are believing that they are by faith humane reason may justly strive to prove them and certainly it is a Godly work as impious to labour against it but I am discouraged mightily by the whole body of the School who almost with one voice Thomist and Scotist cry out that it is impossible to be done CHAP. XXXV Concerning God's enlarging the capacity of Nature and admitting Reason to some discovery of the Holy Trinity Of Lullies Demonstration by Aequiparance Whom the Bishop magnifies and vindicate's against Vasques c. The production of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost by the spiritual acts of the divine Understanding and Will Sect. 1. CArthagena is so impudent that he affirme's impossibile est per Dei potentiam fieri creaturam cui sit naturalis cognitio mysterii Trinitatis in Thomam Quaest. 32. art primo conclusione secunda It is impossible that by the power of God a creature should be made to whom the knowledge of the Trinity should be natural which in my conceipt is little lesse then blasphemy for why cannot â—od make a Creature natural doe that which he can enable him to doe for these Termes naturall or supernatural are only such because God hath confined Nature to such bounds as it cannot goe farther and exalted other things to such an height as is ultra Sphaeram
all the world For else how can the disposure of them to that end a particular man's advantage entitle a man to have right unto them Had this been affirmed by Adam or Noah there had been some reasons for it because they had a right to each piece of the whole world or had it been affirmed of mankind the species of man it had a truth in it because the world is ordered to the service of that species but when applyed to any particular of that species on any other Sons of these Fathers of the world it is of no force for they have onely right to and can onely make use of their shares and particular proportions which are distributed to them by the Law 's and Customs of the world or of those Nations wherein they live nor are other things disposed to those particular ends God hath entitled them no farther I can deny this proposition againe out of my former ground a man hath absolute right to those things which conduce to the last and universall end but not to those things which conduce to any mediate and particular end because that end it self may be uselesse now God require's and Nature require's the more publick to be advanced by the more private and particular end when that second is uselesse the meanes in order to it are so likewise which have only an utility in order to it Sect. 6. His minor he onely suspected to be questioned which is But when I may judge in a right and uncorrupt judgment all the creatures in the world can afford me that use And therefore he labour's with divers arguments to confirme it which I shall examine because I think them very erroneous his first reason is page 99. because saith he singuli homines is his Phrase single men do lawfully use single creatures neither is there any thing which is forbid their use now saith he that which single men enjoy any man may enjoy alone neither out of the creâ—â—tures part is there any contradiction These are Mr. Hobbes his own manner of disjoynted Discourses the proposition to be proved was I can judge with a right and uncorrupt judgment all the creatures in the world can afford me that use that is the preservation of my life and the contentments of it That he prove's because that single men do lawfully use the single creatures see if this be not just like to Mr. Hobbes his reasonings first he prove's that I have a right to all things because I can judge that they may be usefull to me now he prove's I may judge that they may be usefull to me because single men use single creatures for the inconsequency of the first suppose a Son in prison for debt should judge and truly judge that by the death of his Father his Father's estate would come to him and by that he should be released out of prison had he right to kill his Father by Mr. Hobbes his rules who saith that no man can divest himself of the right to keep himself from such conditions which may render his life miserable he may and by this Author who follow 's him close he may because he can truly judge this is expeâ—â—ent and usefull for himself the same may be said for Wives Children for Kings there may be found reasons why their destructions should conduce to a private man's good hath he then a right to act those horrid villanies the first consequence must needs therefore be erroneous which judgeth of right onely by the right judgment of the usefulnesse which it hath to the particular person and the second no lesse which judgeth the usefulness to me and a right in me to them because other men enjoy them for my part I should argue more truly clean contrary because other men lawfully use them I cannot two single men at the same time cannot lawfully use the same thing with a propriety which imply's a negative to another they may joyn in the same work in using the same Lever to move a great weight they may warm themselves by the same fire but have a right in the same thing they cannot unlesse they be united into some Corporation whereby they are made one civill person which were two naturall but suppose he should mean as he seem's to do that because no particular thing is forbid any particular man therefore a particular man hath right to every thing to this I answer that a particular man may have right to any particular thing yet not to all out of his own principles because all cannot be usefull to him he is not able to make use of all he that hath right to eat any piece of meat at the Table yet hath not right to eat all from other men or to eat all the meat there it would surfet him although he and every one at the table may eat what he like 's and what he can civilly seize upon fit and proper for him It is so with drinks an hundred or more thirsty men come to the same river they can judge with an uncorrupt judgment that it is fit for them to drink and every single man may drink any single part of that water yet no one or single person can judge it fit to drinâ— up the river it is so with Cloathes Medicines any thing that is usefull to man it follow 's not therefore because single men can use these single creatures therefore one single person may use all of them and this impossibility ariseth not onely out of the injustice used to other men of which see disputes afterwards and I shall follow him but out of the disproportion the universe hath to any particular person because it is too large a finite hand can grasp no more then the compass of it can contain and out of the qualities of it every thing is not convenient for every person he who onely is hungry lacke's not cloths c. he who is warm lacke's not a fire and the like I know it may be objected against this that although they are not usefull now yet they may be hereafter and out of this forecast a man may enjoy all the creatures usefull and profitable for him now or which shall be hereafter I answer they cannot by a right judgment think so first because no man know's them not the hundreth nor the hundred thousandth part of the single creatures in the world therefore he cannot judge they may be usefull to him secondly there are many things the very kinds and species of which are not known to any man many fishes in the seas of the world birds of the air and the like many things we know would be hurtfull to us the scorching heates of the torrid Zones to us Inhabitants in cold Countries and our colder would be as offensive to them these cannot judge those other usefull to them or that they will be usefull to them at any time which are averse to their
if he have deserted the use of them any man may use them not else yet let a man consider these two instances he shall find that they are exceeding short to entitle any man to the interest of the whole world or all the creatures in it And yet I may adde further that in both those instances a man hath but a temporal use of those things not a full interest and estate in them untill his extremity be relieved or untill the right owner laid claim to them A man hath found a ring he wear's it the use of it is his but the ring is the right owner 's still and when he find's and claim 's it the use likewise must be the old owner's it was never the finder's more then the use so is it with these the extremity supplied the Commonwealth restored he hath no longer use of them he cannot justly sell or alien any of those things from the true owner which he may do with any thing is his own and therefore he had no right interest and title in them He goe's on page 102. Sect. 10. But you may object a certain portion is not allotted to every single man but any part of the world neither is it lawful for one to subdue the whole for then it would be lawful for one man if he had power to deprive others of the necessaries for life yea to kill another which seem's to oppose what he had said before when God decreeing to man the use of this life did decree likewise to bestow upon him the use of these things usefull to his life which saith he one man cannot take from another unless in extreme necessity but he doth subvert the end which God intended in the creation of another To this he adde's another objection concerning the birthâ—right of the Eldest Son who he saith hath title to his Father's estate without compact this second I esteem very weak and so meddle not with what he write's concerning it but the first I am perswaded is of invincible force and his answer to it is miserable his answer is page 103. we answer saith he not onely in extreme necessities a man may subdue the world such a necessity being granted such a necessity is impossible say I because the world cannot be necessary to relieve any man's extreme necessity but onely very little parts of it but also if any profit or commodity may be promised to arise thence as any Lord may use his good neither can he offend against that justice by which he is bound to render to his neighbour that which is his the rest in that Paragraph is but flourished to this purpose now let a man consider how this satisfies the preceding argument that argument was drawn from the end which God intended in the creating of both these the preservation of either was equally intended doth not then that man violate that justice which ought to be used towards his neighbour when for his commodities even in superfluities he shall deprive his Brother of necessaries In his discourse there is no semblance of satisfaction to this objection when in his answer he only affirm's that a man hath right to all thingâ— for his commodity but never set's down God's end is preserved in that right I mean to urge this Argument stronger hereafter Sect. 11. In the 104. page he undertake's boldly that he will prove by most efficacious Arguments there is a right to the whole world belonging to every man Page 105. he begin's his proof first saith he because in extreme necessity a man's ancient right doth revive he prove's that because saith he my calamity cannot produce a right in me to such things to which I had no right before my first answer to this is that it is no more then what was said before secondly I answer as before that no man can have such an extremity as may need the whole world he cannot eat drink or clothe himself with the whole but parts onely thirdly I answer his calamity revive's no title in the miserable man but onely reduceth him to be the object of mercy and what inconsiderable title he hath is a capability of a passive right to acts of humanity by which every man who look's upon that wretched spectacle is bound to relieve him and when extremity give 's not leave to any man to stay for the convenience of asking he take's that out of a supposall that it will not be denyed His second Argument begin's in the last line of Page 105. and is thus framed the most Learned part of Divines and Lawyers consent that in a moderation of a Lawful defence the defendant is not made a publick person but doth use his ancient right which God hath granted to every man I will not trouble the Reader with every word the sense of the Argument consist's in this that a man may defend himself against violence that in that defence he may Lawfully kill another And this ariseth not out of that that he hath done me wrong or injury but out of that regard that God would have me defend my self Now saith he if it be lawfull to kill another much rather to take his goods in defence of my self To understand the force or invalidity of this Argument let us look back to what hath been said how far my life is to be cared for and preserved by me one rule of which is when a more publick concernment will not be obtained by the losse I am not to preserve my life by the ruine of multitudes of my Nation or Kingdom of which I am a member again since he in this Discourse supposeth that men believe there is a God and that this God is a just judge punishing vice and rewarding vertue therefore I am to forsake this life and resign it rather then commit such sinnes which are of a greater moment and esteemed so by him of which nature are Regicides Paricides nor ought a man in rescue of himself to kill his King or his Father I am perswaded there is none that think 's there is a God which doth not think that such things are an abomination to him then we will suppose two men private persons the one assaulting the other surely if a man can safely avoid the danger he ought to do it but if he cannot he may kill rather then be killed because there is no reason why a man should not think himself of as usefull a condition as another private man to the publick state or glory of God but my killing this man is not because I have a right over his person but because I have a right to defend mine own person from the injuries which are offer'd to it by another private person who hath no more right to kill me then I him which is none but in my own defence for of two evils the Less is to be chosen either are evils in se but this the Less to me and