of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
presently as soon as ever they are published according to the manner of the Country oblige all those Subjects to whose notice they are arrived or where it was not in the fault of the Lawmaker but that they might have come to the knowledge of them For seeing the obligation of the Law dependeth on the will of the Law-giver and not on the notice of the Subject it followeth that the obligation of the Law is of force when the Law-giver hath sufficiently expressed his will to his Subjects by some outward sign whether it were made known to all his Subjects or whether it so fell out that some of them peradventure were ignorant of it For grant but the Law and the obligation is granted which hath its dependency on the Law as it is a Law and necessarily followeth it as every necessary Effect doth follow its proper Cause as already we have often mentioned Therefore there being nothing wanting to a Law that is required to the compleating of its essence after that it is made and sufficiently published it altogether followeth that a Law so made and published ought presently to inferre an obligation neither is it any wayes inconvenient that an obligation be made and become ours by the will only Act of another we not knowing it if the said obligation doth carry with it the nature construction of a moral Debt as the Schoolmen speak it Although from obligations and debts w ch arise from contracts the case is otherwise VII The fourth Doubt How the Law doth reach unto those who though after a sufficient publication of it and the elapse of the time prefixed by the Law have not yet actually any knowledge of it Which is to demand whether he to whom the Law is not actually known be so guilty of the fault that he transgresseth if he doth any thing against it and thereupon deserveth that punishment which that Law inflicteth on the transgressors of it The reason of this Doubt is on the one side because that obligation is vain or rather none at all which obligeth neither to the fault nor to the punishment And on the other side both because it is absurd to be bound to that which is impossible but to observe a Law which we know not is certainly impossible as also because from the two Offices of the Law above specified it is necessary that the power of directing as first by Nature must go before the other power of obliging so that the Law cannot oblige any but whom it directeth and it cannot direct any but those to whom it is known This being laid down in the first place which admits of no scruple viz. that the Subject to whom the Law is known is obliged both to the fault and to the punishment As for those that know not the Law I answer to the propounded doubt and say in the first place that he who by his grosse negligence is ignorant of the Law when it proceeds from his own fault that he is ignorant of it is no lesse or at least not much lesse guilty of the fault and deserveth punishment as well as he who doth know the Law and doth it not For the Ignorance of that thing which every man ought to know and may know doth excuse no man And in the interpretation of the Law there is no great difference betwixt a wilful Ignorance and a fault committed VIII I say in the second place That he who is therefore ignorant of the Law because he was a little more carelesse or negligent than in a businesse of that moment he ought to be although the fault be never so light as the Civilians term it yet because it is manifest it was done by a fault and by his own Fault he is not altogether free from the obligation of the Law My Reason is because that Ignorance was vincible as the Schoolmen speak that is which could be overcome for if the Subject had been so diligent as he ought to have been and as the dignity of the cause required and as wise men use to be in their imployments of greater weight he could not be ignorant it is presumed of the promulgation of the Law Now his Ignorance of that Law according to which every man is bound to direct his Actions being in him an ignorance that might have been helped this Ignorance cannot be but culpable and if culpable in whatoever degree it be it cannot but accordingly be inexcusable It may be argued But by how much the lighter the fault is the Ignorance in both Courts is so much the more excusable and amongst the equal Arbitrators of things doth deserve a more easy pardon It is to be answered that he was before obliged by the Law although he was ignorant of it And it is manifest by this because as soon as ever by the Testimony of some man of Reputation he understood that the Law was published he immediately in his own Conscience judged himself to be obliged by that Law now there could arise no obligation from a new report or by the Testimony of this man neither is there any power of obligation either in himself or in his Testimony therfore without doubt he was obliged before by that Law although he had neither notice of the Law nor any Conscience of the Obligation IX I say in the third place He who in earnest and invincibly either by accident or any other impediment and by no neglect of his own is ignorant of the promulgation of a Law as if any man should be visited with madness or labour under some long or grievous disease or being newly returned from forein Countries should never hear of the publication of such a Law nor indeed could hear of it he is not by that Law obliged either unto the fault or any punishment of the fault so properly named Nevertheless by the same Law which he is invincibly ignorant of he may become so far lyable to a punishment improperly so called that is to some losse to be sustained The first part of this position is thus proved No man committeth a fault or deserveth punishment who doth not Sin but he who keeps not a Law of which he is invincibly ignorant doth not Sin for if he should sin he were obliged to that which is impossible therefore he cannot deservedly be blamed nor justly punished But that he may be obliged to some dammage to be sustained by that Law which is the other part of our assertion shall appear to be most clear by this example Suppose there be a Law prohibiting some certain kind of Trassiquings and Contracts by which Law amongst other things it is decreed that all such contracts made one month after the promulgation of the said Law shall be altogether void and of no effect If any man after that month is run out being in good earnest and invincibly ignorant of the promulgation of that Law shall strike such a bargain which is by the said Law forbidden he will be
person his Conscience doth passe its judgment on every one of them by the light of Reason which is infused and imprinted into his mind And seeing the Rule is the same concerning Acts to come as well as concerning Acts past it followeth that the Conscience as well in those Acts determined to be done as in those which are already done doth make use of the same light of examining judging and dictating as the Rule measure of those Acts. I here shall willingly take no notice of that Text in the fourth Psalm and sixth verse which is commonly produced by the Latin Fathers especially of the latter times and by the Schoolmen for a proof of this Conclusion the words are Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine Thy light O Lord is signed over us because that interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad translation seemeth not to appertain to the mind and scope of the Prophet XIII This is proved again by our common custom and manner of speech for we usually say that the man who acteth according to the light of his mind doth use a good Conscience although peradventure he hath committed or omitted that which was not to be omitted or committed by him and again that he who hath not obeyed those dictates of his mind but hath acted contrary to them hath used a bad Conscience St. Paul the Apostle Acts 2â— 1 doth professe that In all things he served God with a good Conscience even unto that day which words if they are to be extended to the former part of his life before he was made a Christian which interpretation hath been complacent to many and seemeth probable unto me we may conclude by them that although he was an open and a dangerous enemy to Christianity 1 Tim. 1. 13. and as he himself confesseth a persecutor and a blasphemer yet it may be said that even then in all good Conscience he served God because in all that time he acted nothing but what his Conscience according to the measure of that light with which it was then endued did prescribe unto him For indeed he then thought as he himself doth openly and sincerely professe in his Apology before King Agrippa that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he thought in himself Act. 26. 9. that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth But whatsoever may be determined of Paul and of his Conscience at that time most certain it is that God himself gave a testimony to Abimeleck Gen. 20. 6. who ignorantly sent for the wife of Abraham that he did it integritate cordis in the integrity of his heart that is with a good Conscience and for no other reason but for this only by which he did excuse himself for had he known her to have been the wife of another man he would not have sent for her unto his house The Conscience therefore by an ignorance of it self not much to be blamed peradventure erronious may be said to be good and right God himself being Judge not simply and absolutely but as but so far secundum quid as they speak it in the Schooles by reason of the conformity which it hath with the light of the mind thereof as its next and immediate Rule But that the Conscience may be said to be right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is fully and in every respect there must another and a further Conformity be of necessity added unto it which is it must be conformable to its first and supreme Rule which what it is shall most diligently be now discussed XIV This therefore shall be our third Conclusion The holy Scripture or the written word of God is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience Which in the first place is thus proved Beyond the Adaequate Rule of any thing whatsoever it is not necessary that for the same thing there should be any other Rule to be added to it for Adaequation doth exclude the necessity of any Supplement But it is necessary that there should be another Rule of Conscience besides the holy Scripture for otherwise the Gentiles who have not the Scripture should have no Rule for their Conscience which comes quite crosse to reason experience and the expresse testimony of the Apostle in the Text above mentioned Most certain it is that there is a Conscience in all men and that it is under a Law which is a rule to direct it For as the Apostle maketh mention and it is every where extant in History and confirmed by daily experience from whence do proceed those grievous accusations of Conscience those whips those pangs and torments of the Soul those furies expressed by the Tragedians but from the violated Law of Conscience of which if there were no Law at all those people that are most barbarous should be so much the more happy as they are the more far remote from the voice and sound of the Gospel because that then no crime of sin could justly be imputed to them For where there is no Law there is no transgression Rom. 4. 15. Sin being nothing else but the transgression of the Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3. 4. That the power of Conscience is strong in both regards to fear every thing when it is guilty and to be in dread of nothing when it is innocent is not only cryed up by the Schools but by the Theaters of the Heathens who notwithstanding knew nothing of Moses or of Christ nor of the Law or the Prophets and never heard of the Gospel or the Apostles The Scripture therefore is not the sole and Adaequate Rule of Conscience XV. It is confirmed again in the second place from the proper end of the holy Scripture which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 3. 15. To make us wise to everlastâ—â—g Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ For when the light of natural reason could not raise us high enough to those things which do tend to a supernatural end both because of our natural light too much obscured and ecclipsed by the fall of Adam and because we must have supernatural helps to arrive to supernatural ends it pleased Almighty God in pity of our infirmities in his own word to open his own will unto us according to that measure which he himself thought good insomuch that by this gracious and saving Counsel not only those things by divine revelation may be made known unto us which properly do concern our faith and cannot be known by the light of nature but that more perfectly and more savingly we may be instructed in those things also which by nature are known unto us that so those works which nature enjoyneth to be performed taking their rise from a nobler principle which is the love of God and ordained to more noble ends to wit the Glory of God and the salvation of our souls may from moral become spiritual and be grateful and acceptable to God by
performance of them because they did not pertain unto him but were only peculiar to the Israelites and it is known that the Law doth not oblige all men unto whom it is known but all those only to whom it is given XXII In the third place I say the will of God in what way soever it be revealed for the will of God receiveth its authority from it self and not from the manner of revealing it So that the Church of Rome in their controversie concerning Traditions need not to take so much pains to prove That the word of God unwritten is of equal authority with the word of God that is written for this we willingly do grant unto them We only â—ain would understand how we may satisfie our selves that the Tradition unwritten may appear to be the word of God as undoubtedly as the word which is written The will of God therefore in what manner soever it be revealed is the Rule of the Conscience provided it be so revealed that it either actually be made known or may be so made known unto the mind if culpable negligence doth not hinder And it doth oblige the Conscience to acknowledge it and to propound it unto our own will as the will of God to which it is bound to conform it self and not only so but to command the executive potentiaes to bestirre themselves for the fulfilling of this will of God Remarkable is that of Damascene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what God willeth mâ—st of necessity be good for his will is the measure of goodnesse but the Law of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—hat commandment by which 〈…〉 that good will of his he proceeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of God comming to our â—ind doth attract it to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it doth incite instimâ—late and as it were spurs it doth urge our Consciences to the performance of their duties by representing and inculcating into our wills the will of God And this is that most proper and exact obligation of Conscience which we before have spoken of XXIII The force and effect of this obligation is variously expressed by St. Paul Sometimes he confesseth himself a Debator to the Grecians and Barbarians Rom. 1. 14. As if he should say seeing I know by the will of God that I am set apart to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles without difference whether they are Graecians or Barbarians I acknowledge that in this respect I am a Debtor to them And in the 2 Cor. 2. 14. he saith that he is tyed and bound as men are bound with bonds to the performance of this duty And in the first of the Corinthians the ninth Chapter and the sixteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The preaching of the Gospel is intrusted to me so that I have not the leasure to be idle for a great necessity doth presse me and wo unto me if I should neglect it The like necessity to be imposed upon them and not to be shaken off was openly and before St. Pauls time acknowledged by two of the greatest of the Apostles and for a long time individual Companions S. Peter and St. John Acts 4. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we cannot but speak God hath commanded us to speak with authority and you command us to hold our peace Whether it be better to obey him or to obey you Do you judge We are free and can be so from your command for you have no power upon our Consciences but the command of God doth hold us fast and haâ—h such a coercive power over us that unlesse we wil perish we cannot be free nor do any thing but that only which he commandeth XXIV Moreover when it is asserted that the next and immediate Rule of the Conscience is the light of the mind and the primary and the supreme Rule is the written word of God and the proper and the Adaequate Rule of it the will of God by manner whatsoever revealed or which is to the same sence The Law imposed by God on the reasonable Creature That these things may more fully be understood we are to know that the light of the mind is threefold as God in three ways hath manifested his will to the reasonable Creature There is the light innate the light inferred and the light acquired or the light of nature the light of Scripture and the light of Doctrine The first light which I do call the light Innate doth proceed from the Law of nature For in the first creation of the World as God endued brute and inanimate Creatures with a natural instinct by which they are inclined unto those things which are congruous to their natures and the conservatives of it which is as a Law unto them as it is so expressed by David Psal 148. 6. Thou hast given them a Law which they may not transgresse So a certain natural Law is given unto man and proportionated to his nature as he is a reasonable Creature that is more sublime and noble and if I may so speak it more Divine than what is given to other Creatures of this inferiour Oâ—h And this Law doth incite him to the performance of those things which are agreeable to his nature as he is a man that is to say a living Creature indued with reason or to live according to reason Now this Law is natural impression and as it were a figure of that eternal Law which is in the mind of God and it is a part of that Divine Image after which man at the first was said to be made Gen. 1. by which knowing of a certainty that there are some things in our reasonable nature that are congruous to the will of God the Creator and other things which are not so we do conclude that the one is good and ought to be performed by us and the other evil altogether to be abhomined The light proceeding from this law is extremely obscured by that grievous ruine which folowed the fall of Adam and from hence arise those thick clouds of Ignorance and Error in which all his posterity whilst we live in this World are invelopped But the providence of God hath so most wisely ordered it that in the common wrack it hath come off more unhurt than many other of the Faculties for it hath pleased God that certain propositions and practical principles Quae animis imprimuntur inâ—â—â—atae intelligentiae Cic. 1 de leg which the Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Basilius most acutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spark of the Divine Fire which in the great conflagration was preserved in the ashes of it should still remain that so in our breasts and most inward parts Haec tamen exigua lucis scintillula râ—mansit Calvin Instit 10. Sect. 5. he might have the Preachers of his will These 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These common Notions are that Law of God which the Apostle Rom. 1. doth say is
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
are grounded which although they do all agree in this that whatsoever power of obligation they have they altogether acknowledge it as proceeding from the Law of God For the first in every kind whatsoever it be is the cause of the rest neither would the Law of God as already it is stated be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience if it should oblige any beyond it self which it did not oblige by vertue of it self yet these things as I have said that do so agree in one do notwithstanding every one of them differ amongst themselves not only in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter but also in the Degree according to the efficacy of the obliging and they chiefly consist in a threefold difference for some of them do oblige constantly of which there are two kinds The one in reference to those things whose obligation doth arise from the power of another as humane Laws the Commandements of Parents Masters and the like The other in reference to those whose obligation doth arise from the free election of the will it self As Vows Oaths Contracts Promises and the like Somthings again do only oblige by accident and as it were cursorily according to Time and Place and the exigence of other circumstances as the Law or Reason of Scandal The privilege and priority of order and method do require that we begin with humane Laws concerning the obligation whereof those things which at this time shall be spoken of may all of them be reduced to these two questions 1. Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences and secondly how far they do oblige them The determining of most of the particular cases do pertain chiefly to the latter Question which God willing shall be the Subject of our following Lecture we shall only at this time touch upon the first Delectus vim in lege ponimus Cicero 1. de legibus which is Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences The Subject of the question needeth not any large exposition Lex or the Law is first so called in an active construction a legendo id est eligendo from choosing as Cicero will have it because the Lawgivers do make choyce of those things which they conceive to be most profitable to the Common-wealth Or secondly as others will have it Lex or the Law is so called a legendo from reading and that in a passive construction because the Laws after they were Enacted were engraven in Tables of Brasse or otherwise legibly written and fastned unto Pillars to be read in publick by the people Aquin 1. 2. quaest 90. Arti 16. Biel. 3. dist Arti 1. Or lastly according to other mens derivation Lex is so called a ligando that is from binding because it doth bind the Subjects to the observation of it but in the Genus of it it is nothing else than a Rule of acting imposed on the Subject by the Superiour being impowered thereunto They are called humane Laws in opposition to Divine for as those Laws are called Divine which immediately are constituted by the authority of God himself whether they be Laws Natural or Laws Positive so those Laws are said to be Humane which although they have an authority derived to them from God yet they are immediately commanded by men and imposed on their Subjects III. The Law of man is thus defined by Aquinas 3. 1 a. 2. ae quaest 90 arti 4. It is the ordination of Reason to a common good promulgated by him who hath the care of the Commonalty His words are Lex humana est Rationis ordinatio ad Bonum Commune ab eo qui curam Communitatis habet promulgata By others it is defined otherwise they differ in the words but almost all of them doe agree in the sense and well so they may for this Definition is very suitable to the publick Law which is the most known and the most usual acceptation of that word And so we use to speak Analogum per se positum pro famosiore significato praesumitur an Analogick being placed by it self is presumed to stand for that which is the most remarkable in the signification But in this present question and to our present purpose Under the Notion and Name of Humane Laws the publick Lawes of Cummonalties are not only to be understood although most chiefly they are and primarily but even the particular Commands of Parents Masters Magistrates and all other Superiors imposed on their Children Servants or their People for when both of them are a kind of Precept in this one thing especially there is a Difference betwixt a Law properly so called and a Mandate for a Mandate or Command is but the Precept of a private person invested with a private Authority but the Law is a publick precept of a person indued with a publick Authority In all other considerations there is but little diversity Certainly as to the effect and force of obliging since it is apparent by the tenth verse of this Chap. that all Legitimate Power whatsoever it be not only publick which notwithstanding I must confess to be the only meaning of the Apostle in that place but also all private power is constituted of God and the Command of a Father to his Son is no lesse a Rule for acting than the Law of the Prince to his Subject all those things which I shall now discourse of concerning the obligation of humane Lawes are so to be understood and let this one premonition suffice that the mandates of private persons be comprehended in the publick Lawes and oeconomical Commands with Politick Constitutions and others of the like nature as far as the Course and Consideration of the Analogy will permit And thus much be spoken of the Subject of the Question The Praedicate followeth V. The Praedicate of the Question is the obligation of the Conscience Now what Conscience is and what is an Obligation in the generality of it hath largely enough been already unfolded by me neither is there any need of repetition When we say the Law doth oblige we mean nothing else than that the Law doth impose on the Subject a Necessity of observing and obeying it You are to know that the Law of its own Nature and as it is a Law doth cary in it self a double force or necessary effect that is the force of directing from whence it is called a Canon or a Rule as it layes open to the Subject the will of the Superiour and sheweth what it is that he would have to be performed by him and a power of obliging by which it differs from Counsel and Admonishment because it commandeth the Subject to obey his will and doth so oblige him to the performance of it that if he doth not obey him he doth sin or erre for Sin is nothing else but an aberration or a receding from that Rule or Law which we ought to follow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so Monsters by receding from the ordinary Law
and their fortunes And from hence is the first necessity of obedience which our Apostle therefore doth not so much urge as suppose because that every man is endued with the sense thereof by Nature Rom. 13. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only for wrath as if it were not the part of a discreet man rashly to provoke his wrath who hath the power of the Sword in his own hand and by his contumacy to incurre his displeasure upon no occasion It should become him for the advantage of his own safety to endure many affronts to obey Laws and as much as can be without Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to submit to the present powers and thus though he cannot shake off the yoak yet by well enduring it to make it more gentle and more easy XVIII But he whosoever he is who from a Politick Government shall diligently observe with himself what good from thence may be derived to his Country shall find himself bound to the performance of this with another and a stronger obligation and which more properly pertaineth to the Conscience and so indeed St. Chrysostome in this place doth interpret those words of the Apostle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if the Apostle chiefly attended to the benefit received by that protection which a Civil Government conveyeth to the Subject As if he should have said Seeing that every Citizen is conscious to himself how many benefits he doth enjoy under a politick Government he must know that for the requital of so many and so great favours he is bound by a certain Law of gratitude to pay due obedience to him who is invested with the highest Authority 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Chrysostome there speaks in a sense not much incommodous 〈◊〉 unsuitable to the meaning of the Apostle as by 〈◊〉 by we shall represent unto you I acknowlâ—dge the truth of that which by Tacitus is observed Raro fieri ut quis imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exerceat It seldom comes to passe that any man with good Arts doth exercise the ruling of an Empire which he hath obtained with wicked artifices for with what Arts that Empires have been gained by the same for the most part they are preserved and wickedness is to be defended by wickednesse Neverthelesse that it may be done the examples of Hiero the Sicilian and of Edgar King of England and of many others do sufficiently declare who modestly have mannaged the Government of a Nation which not so rightly they had obtained But howsoever a Prince doth mannage his affairs he can never so abuse his power as 〈◊〉 in the mean time to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Minister of God for good as the Apostle â—â—â—aketh in the fourth verse of that Chapter for there cannot be so great a Tyranny which doth not retain some shew of a just Government and doth not at least a little conduce to maintain the society of men as Calvin rightly on this Text observeth it Seeing therefore that we are Masters of our own Estates and do live safe from slaughter and rapine seeing that even that we live is a Debt we do owe to the chief Powers without which there would be no defence or remedy against the lusts fury and injuries of wicked persons a most reasonable and righteous thing it is that at least we should return somthing for so many benefits The old form of Trafficking an excellent Law of good and right doth exact the same of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Give something and take something And certainly it argueth a most perverse mind to be willing to live under the protection of his Government whom you are unwilling to obey and to refuse his commands under the umbrage of whose patronage you do find your safety XIX Moreover since no man is born only for himself but for publick profit and for mankind in general there ariseth from hence a third necessity of obeying the present power although it hath been procured by never such indirect means From hence also it may in some manner appear what measure and what bounds are to be given to that obedience which by the duty of Conscience is to be given to him who uniustly sits in the throne of supremacy For whatsoever is to be done in a peculiar reference to its end ought so to be done as shall appear most necessary and profitable for the obtaining of that end Now the end of Civil Government and of the obedience due unto it is the tranquillity and safety of Humane society As far therefore as the peace and safety of that society of which that Citizen is a Member doth require so far he is bound to obey the commands of that person who de facto is the chief Magistrate in that society Now for the preservation of Humane societies there are three things very necessary The first the defence of our Country against all Forein force and endeavours of our Enemies Secondly the administration of right that due rewards may be given to deserving Citizens and punishments to the bad which is the office of distributive Justice Thirdly the care of Commerce and Merchandize concerning buying selling exchangeing and all manner of contracts which belongs unto Justice Commutative In these three the safety of mankind is so contained that unless they be executed it cannot be but all things presently will run to ruine all things and all places will be filled with Plunder Slaughter Deceit and Injuries the lives of the most innocent Citizens their Wives and Fortunes will become a prey and a sport unto the lusts of our armed Superiours to prevent which calamity and that the petulancy of wicked men may timely be restrained the only remedy is for good Citizens to remember that it belongs unto them in all things pertaining to the publick safety to be obedient to their Laws and Commands by whose Sword authority they are defended from the injuries the violence of the Spoylers XX. But that no man may give a false interpretation to what here is spoken they are to pay only such an obedience that at the same time they are to remember that they are no further obliged to it than either the account of gratitude or the safety of the publick do require And the Laws of an Usurper are to be observed not as obligatory by any right of the Commander 1. a 2. ae quaest 96. art 4. but as Aquinas rightly hath it to avoid offence and the trouble of the Common-wealth In which case he saith we ought to depart from our own right and he proves it out of the words of Christ Mat. 5. 40 41. Ei qui vult tecum litigare et tunicam tuam capere dimitte et pallium Et qui te angariabit ad miliare unum abi cum eo duo If any man will sue thee at the Law and take away thy coat let him have thy cloak also And whosoever shall compell thee to go a mile
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
certain pay of some Tribute and thus houses of Incontinence are permitted at Rome XIX This distinction being permised In the first place I affirm That privatively many Evils are necessarily tolerated in all Common-wealths for it is impossible that the Laws should extend themselves to all the Species and kinds of vitious Acts or that all kind of Sin should be restrained by humane Laws The Law of God hath this only which is admirable and peculiar to it self that it alone commandeth all things that are to be done and forbiddeth all things that are to be avoyed Now in this permission there is no place for obligation for it is necessary that every obligation should arise from some Act and not by the privation of an Act or a Non-Act I say in the second place That the negative permission of evil may be lawful For if there be some evils that cannot be quite taken away without some great Inconvenience to the publick it pertaineth to the political prudence of Government so to moderate the use of it and circumscribe it within certain bounds as to make it subservient to the Publick profit And this by the Example of God himself who permitted the Divorce of Wives to the people of Israel to that purpose as Christ the most excellent Interpreter of the Law expounds it Mat. 19. â— Lest by the hardnesse of their hearts and the unbridled roughnesse and cruelty of Husbands to their Wives there should arise more grievous inconveniences I say in the third place That by this Law there is no man notwithstanding obliged to perform that which this Law permitteth for the end of permission is not that that be done which by this Law is permitted but that nothing be done beyond that which the said Laws permit Therefore as the permission it self is only negative so it induceth only a negative obligation That is the Subject is obliged to do if he pleaseth what the Law permitteth and not to exceed the bounds which that Law prescribeth I say in the fourth place That the positive permission of Evil is not lawful if there be more or more grievous Evils which follow that permission than those are for the remedy whereof it was pretended especially if to the permission and imposition of a filthy thing there is added a suspition of filthy lucre I say in the fifth place That by such a Law no man is bound to the performance of that which is permitted nay for all the permission of that Law every man is obliged to a non-performance My Reason is as to the former part Because it is against the Nature of a permission to oblige for a permission granteth Liberty and every obligation is a kind of a Bond. As to the latter part Because we suppose that what by the Law of man is so permitted is of it self evil and by the Law of God we are obliged not to do Evil The permission therefore of Evil as it is a bare permission doth oblige no man to the performance but as it is the permission of Evil it doth oblige every man not to do that which is permitted XX. But it hath often heretofore been spoken that every Law hath a power obligative which so individually doth accompany it as but to grant the Law the obligation must necessarily follow and take away the obligation you take away also the Law with it It may therefore be objected that we must hereupon either deny the permissive Law to be a Law or acknowlege it doth oblige To answer to this objection we need not fly so far as to deny the Law permissive to be a Law which we do acknowledge not only to be a Law but a Law properly so called Certainly that Mosaical Law of Divorce mentioned Mat. 19. Though it comes by name of permission 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the eighth verse yet in the seventh verse of the same Chapter it is called a command 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What is not the very name of a Law every where given to it is not the Definition of that name as congruous to it as to a Law either commanding or forbidding something to be done so that it cannot be denyed but that the Law is predicated of them all univocally and as a Genus in reference to its Species it is not then to be granted that the Subject by this Law is obliged I do so conceive it altogether to be granted which that it may more rightly be understood to be not incohaerent with those things which have been already spoken of a permissive Law I say in the sixth place That every Law permissive as it is a Law doth oblige the Subject in his Conscience to the observation of it The reason is manifest for an obligation as often it hath been already spoken is a necessary effect of the Law and not to be severed from it Which that it may not seem to be quite contrary to what now hath been delivered these two things are to be observed which therefore the more remarkably I shall give unto you The first that I said the permissive Law doth oblige to the observation of it Now it is one thing that the Subject is obliged to the observation of the Law which I still affirm and another thing that the Subject is oâ—liged to do that which the Law permitteth which I have before denyed and do deny it still The second that I said the permissive Law as a Law doth oblige which is true but I did not say it did oblige as it was permissive for that is false because we are to know that the force of a permissive Law as it is a Law doth not consist in the permission it self which being differentaa divisiva but a divisive difference of the Law it must needs come in order after it as every difference divisive is by nature in a posterior place to the Genus which doth divide it and presuppose it but is for the most part expressely or at least virtually contained in that praeception which is as it were the constitutive and formal difference of the Law and in the very words of the Law it self For this preception is that from whence the obligation of the Subject doth first arise and to which his obedience is ultimately terminated I will make it manifest unto you by example By reason of the necessity of borrowing of money the maker of the Law permitteth of Usury in a moderate proportion amongst the Citizens a punishment being denounced to those who shall exceed by taking more use than the Law allowes I will not here define whether Usury be simply and in every kind of it unlawful or not neither doth it belong to my present purpose nevertheless this is certain that were it never so lawful no man by that permissiou is obliged to the exercising of it But in this Law besides this permission which obliges no man there are two things which belonging to the Precept of the Law have thereupon
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end
of the Laws is the good of the Commonalty or the publick peace and tranquillity This is proved first from those very words of the Apostle that we may live a quiet a peaceable life The Apostle doth here exhort that both privately but especially in publick Congregations for so I conceive this place to be understood and the best Interpreters are of the same opinion with me Requests Prayers and Supplications with thanksgivings may be made as first for all men in general out of Charity and in order to a Spiritual end viz. Eternal happiness in the life to come as they are men and either in Act or in Power Members of the mystical Body of Christ so more especially for Kings and others invested with supreme Authority and this out of Prudence and in order to a Temporal end to wit external felicity in this present life as they are the chief Members of the body politicks from whose legislative and executive power accordingly as they have administred it whether rightly or unjustly either the chief happiness or unhappiness of the rest of the Members and by consequence of the whole Body doth depend Therefore the making of Laws being the chief Act of the supreme political Jurisdiction that which is the supreme End of that supreme Jurisdiction is also the supreme End of the making of Laws to wit the good of the Commonalty It is proved secondly from the Nature of the End as by a Demonstration a priori That in its order is the ultimate End of everything to which all the Acts of that thing are reduced 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 8. Ethic. 11. as to their first regulative principle and to which they are referred as to that for whose sake they are ultimately ordained Therefore the Final Cause is commonly called by Aristotle That for which But all the Acts of Laws are regulated by the Common good as by their first Rule and Principle and are referred to the Common good as to that for whose sake they are made as may appear by running over the several Acts Therefore c. For wherefore are good things commanded or evil ones forbidden and things indifferent and of a middle Nature permitted Or wherefore are Rewards decreed to men that have deserved well of the Common-wealth or wherefore are punishments appointed to the Violators of Laws or wherefore are the Laws in the Courts indifferently pleaded unto both of which those are the first Acts of Laws and by the way of Form and the other more remote and by the way of Effect Is it not for that end that the Common-wealth may flourish in peace and safety and that private men according to their measure and degrees may partake rejoyce in the publick happinesse in a word that they may be all inservient to the Common good Thirdly it is proved a posteriori from the posterior by the sence and consent of all men For the Law-makers who do decree just judgements do indeed appear and those who meditate on Evil as a Law do notwithstanding desire to seem to have an Eye to the Common good and profit in the making of their Laws and to preferr the publick interest above their own Whether they sincerely intend or craftily pretend they all professe that in the making of their Laws their chiefest Intention was the publick Good II. This foundation of the present discourse being laid to wit That the End of Laws is the good of the Common-wealth I proceed to the Doubts whereof let this be the first Whether there be any necessary use at least of Humane Laws And indeed we should not have needed to have made any Doubt of it did not the mad errors of the Anabaptists and some others of their faction make this businesse for us from whose Principles seeing they affirm it is not lawful for a man that is a Christian to be a Magistrate or to contend by war or by sutes in Law to swear or to administer an oath to any one it seems to follow that there is no need at all of Humane Laws For take away but Jurisdiction there will be no man to make Laws and take away the Seats and Courts of Justice there will be no man that will fear them What need sad complaints if the offence be not redressed by punishment what will vain Laws profit without the execution of them The Directive power of the Law must of necessity fall unto the ground if the Coactive power doth not assist it The reason of this Doubt is for the Law of Nature may suffice to leave the Gentiles inexcusable which dictates to them to eschew all Sins and trespasses to injure no man and the like But if that be defective the Christian hath at hand a more sublime and a more perfect Law to wit the Law of Faith Justice and Charity made by our Saviour Jesus Christ whom St. James acknowledgeth to be the only Judge and Law-giver James 4. 12. This place in my Judgement doth neerly touch our Innovatours who have derived and drawn most of their opinion from the unclean wells of the Anabaptists whilst they collect from that place of the Apostle that it is lawful for no man besides Christ alone to make Ecclesiastical Laws for it no wayes appeareth either by the force of the words or by the scope and order of the whole perioch that the Apostle hath spoke more there of Ecclesiastical Laws then of Civil And unless they had rather deal unfaithfuly and deceitfuly with us than be ruled by reason they must do one of these two things which they please either turn absolute Anabaptists and take away altogether from mankind all the power of making Laws or grant unto supreme Magistrates as it is fit they should the power of making Ecclesiastical Laws III. But how these our Brethren can disintangle themselves from the snares of the Anabaptists it doth not much concern us let them look unto it themselves We easily do answer that the Law of Nature is written in our hearts and the Law of Christ is revealed in the Gospel and that both of them in their kind are most perfect but so that for all that it is most manifest that the profit of humane Lawes is very great and their use as necessary Because those divine Laws do contain only general Principles of things to be done From which as Conclusions from their Principles more special Rules are to be deduced accommodated to the right Institution of publick Societies of the manners of single persons Neither is it any way to be feared that it may derogate at all from the perfection of the Law of God For the makers of humane Laws do not go about to add any new stock to the most rich Treasure of the divine Law but they rather take from thence what they judge most profitable to themselves and to their people and the good of the Common-wealth Humane Laws therfore if they are just are nothing else but the Relicts of
the Law of God that is particular determinations of the general Rules which the Law of Nature and the word of God have exhibited indeterminatly wisely accommodated to the Condition Utility of certain people according to the consideration of Times and Places For Examples sake The Law of Nature doth teach in general that we are to offer an Injury to no man and he who doth so is bound to make restitution but to descend to the specialty what injury he hath done unto his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge and let in his Cattel into his Grounds and what is the restitution to be made for such an Injury is not determined by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law And the Scripture doth openly hold forth that wicked men are to be punished by the Magistrate Rom. 13. 4. and in other places But what kind of wickednesse the Magistrate is to punish what punishment to afflict and after what proportion is no where defined in the Law of God Power being transmitted to Princes Law-makers by God to define of themselves by Laws well constituted what accordting to their wisdome they shall find most safe and profitable to the Common-wealth The Rights therefore and the Laws of God and of a Legislator and a Judge are distinct and proper to themselves and disposed in so excellent an order that the Precepts and Commandments of God which are general and indeterminate are by the Law-maker determined and accommodated to certain Species of persons and actions and being so determined by the Laws the Judge doth effectually apply them to the particular causes of persons actions so that if a Legislator should make a Law which is not complacent to the Law of God he is to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law and if a Judge in any particular Cause shall pronounce Sentence which is not congruous to the Law constituted by the Prince he is to be judged himself to have pronounced an unjust Sentence IV The second Doubt is whether a Law-maker be obliged if possibly he can effect it to command all the acts and offices of all Virtues and to forbid all Sins of whatsoever nature they are or if he cannot all whether he be bound to command and forbid as many of both kinds as possibly he can The Reason of the Doubt is because there is nothing more conducing to the proper end of the Law which is the common good than as much as possibly may be that all the Citizens may be good and none of them evil Therefore it is the part of a Law-maker who always is to have before his eys this end which is the common good to take all possible care he can to command the practice of all Acts of all Vertues that so all his Citizens may be good to forbid all Sins whatsoever that there be no unrighteousnesse amongst them and the two chief of the Apostles doe seem to require this of the political Magistrate Rom. 13. 3 4. St. Paul hath these words Do good and thou shalt have Praise but if thou dost evil fear for the Magistrate is a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil that is on him who doth any manner of evil And St. Peter in his first Epistle second Chapter and fourteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the punishment of evil doer◠but the Praise of them that do well that is of all well-doers and of all evil-doers For that which is pronounced indefinitely is equipollent to an universal it is consonant to the Rule of the Logicians in a necessary matter and to the will of God who forbiddeth the Magistrate the acceptation of Persons V. For answer I say first and generally that the Law-maker is bound to use his utmost Indeavour that his Citizens be all of them good men and none of them evil and by consequence to command all Acts of Vertues and to forbid all Vices so far as the Reason of the Beginning from whom and the End for which he worketh doth require but beyond that he hath no obligation at all For the Beginnining and the End in the operations of all work they naturally or work they freely are the adaequate measure of all Intermedial Acts so far as those Acts are proportionate conformable with the Beginning from whence they proceed with the End to which they tend The Acts therefore of Commanding and Forbidding and others in which the Exercise of the legislative Jurisdiction doth consist must be proportionated both to their Beginning in whose Vertue they are done to wit the Higher Powers granted by God and to their End for whose sake they are done to wit the Common Good A Law-maker therefore ought so far to command prohibit permit and to perform all other Dutyes as they are agreeable to the power granted to him by God and is expedient for the Commonalty which God hath committed to his change VI. But these considerations are general and indefinite To satisfie therefore the Doubt propounded we must descend to something which is more particular but which howsoever may rely on this general foundation I say therefore in the second place the acts of Virtues and Vices some of them being internal of which nature are the freer acts of the Will as to will and not to will and the movings of the affections to love to hate to grieve and if there be any other cogitations and intentions of the heart and mind and some of them being external of which sort are all the commanded acts of the will and the indeliberate motions of the affections which are exercised by bodily Organs as to see to speak to strike to plunder and innumerable others the Legislative power is only exercised on the outward acts but not on the inward A Law-maker may therefore command the payment of a debt the restitution of stollen goods and the outward worship of God He also may forbid Theft Adultery Manslaughter Blasphemy and the like But he cannot command the loving of his Neighbour the confidence to be had in God the contempt of the world nor prohibit the coveting of his Neighbours goods unchast cogitations the hate of his Neighbour and the Atheism of the heart The reason is because to determine of internal actions is neither proportionate to the beginning from which nor to the end for which the Legislator worketh For Almighty God hath only permitted to the Magistrate the Government of the external man and hath reserved to himself alone the knowledge and judgment of the inward actions and the inspection into the hearts of men for the Legislator and the Judge is the same as we have already proved by the testimony of St. James and the Legislative power would be altogether ineffectual to obtain its proposed end if it were only directive and coactive First therefore seeing an external Court cannot understand nor judge of inward actions And secondly seeing it were a vain thing to command or prohibit that
by a Law which when it is committed we are not able to punish And thirdly seeing the external operation of good works and the external declination of evil ones doth suffice to the outward felicity of a Republick it followeth that a Legislator or a Law-maker neither wisely can nor rightly ought either to command or to forbid the internal actions of Virtues or Vices In which regard as in many others the Law of God and Christ which requireth Truth Purity Sincerity in the inward parts and restraineth and checketh the highest and first inordinate motions of the Will and punisheth as well Sins thought on as Sins committed doth most infinitely excell the most excellent Laws of men And therefore David in the 19 Psalm saith that the Law of God is perfect and undefiled and the Law of Christ is as the maker of it is described to be in the fourth of Hebrews A word lively and mighty in operation and sharper than a two-edged Sword and entreth through even to the dividing asunder of of the heart and Spirit and of the Joynts and Marrow and is a Discerner of the thoughts and intention of the hearts VII I say in the third place that Humane Laws may de Jure or by Right command all the outward Acts of all Vertues and forbid all the outward works of sin but they cannot do it de facto The Reason of the first member is because there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice in the whole Nature and in every Species of it so disposed but that the commanding or the forbidding of it according to the Condition of Affairs and Times may be ordinated to the publiek good Therefore not only the Acts of Justice properly so called as some will have it but the acts also of all other Vertues whatsoever may become the due object and matter of the Law And this I remember to be the observation also of Aristotle and if I be not much mistaken he giveth Instances of it in the Acts of Fortitude and Temperance As if by a military Law it were ordained that none of the Souldiers should run from his Colours or from his ingaging with the Enemy or throw away his Arms or as if by another a Law of frugality or moderation the excess in banquetting were prohibited or as if there were a Command that none should exceed in the bravery of his habit or in the greatness of his retinue or in the Ornaments of his House The Reason of the latter member is because there is so great a variety even of the Species themselves much more of the Degrees both of the Offices of Vertues and the Acts of Sin that if the Law-makers should provide a Caution for every one of them the very multitude of the Laws would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to be endured VIII I say in the fourth place that a Law-maker is not obliged to this viz. To forbid all the evil that he can forbid or to command all the good It will suffice that the greatest and most remarkable of both kinds are to be contained in the Laws and which are so conjoyned with some extraordinary publick profit that unless somthing were determined of them there must necessarily follow some great and grievous Evil which would prove extremely incommodious to the Common-wealth for amongst the lusts of the Flesh the Allurements of the world the temptations of the Devil and the diâ—positions of men so fruitful of all manner of Iniquities may we so much as dream of a Platonick or an Eutopian Commonwealth we are to think we have done well enough if we stick not too deep in the mire For it is necessary that in every Common-wealth some evils should not be prohibited but tolerated and many good things not commanded but left to every mans discretion and that many things of both kinds should be passed by by the Laws lest being too unseasonably active to remove one evil we peradventure make way for more and greater to arise IX The third Doubt is concerning the Intention of the Law-giver whether and how far it is required to the effect of obliging Which is to demand If a Prince out of no foresight or intent to Justice or to the publick good at all being either carryed away by hatred or ambition and the meer lust or ruling or by avarice or any other depraved desire of an impotent mind should give a Law to his Subjects whether they are bound in Conscience to obey it The answer is easy they are obliged to obey it if there be no other impediment that is if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power and the Law it self be otherwise just and according to the Law of the Nations duely debated and sufficiently promulgated I say therefore in the first place that as in Artificials the End of the work and of the person wotking is not always the same as in the building of a House the End of the work that is of the House is that it may be a commodious habitation for the master of it but the End of the Carpenter is that he may get some gain thereby Just so in a Common-wealth it may come to passe that the Law-maker may intend his own advantage and yet the Law it self may tend to the publick Good X. Peradventure you will object that an indirect End or Intention doth always corrupt the work and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker doth vitiate the Law which was his work To answer this objection I say in the second place that an evil intention doth always blemish the work as the work speaketh the action of the person working but it doth not always blemish the work as it is the effect of the operation These two therefore the Action it self and the Perfection of it differ not a little amongst themselves although they are commonly called by the same Name In the same manner as the Effecting and the Effect it self The building of the House and the House builded are both of them called the work of the Carpenter although the one of them is but an action transient and the other after the house is finished an action permanent A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work of the Lawmaker that is his own Act which makes the Law and which for the defect of a good end is not without fault but it corrupts not the work of the Legislator that is the Law made by him if that which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the Common good So for all the evil intention of the Judge a Sentence pronounced by him either for favour or for hatred is firm and valid if the said sentence in it self considered appeareth not to be unjust For as rightly St. Augustine hath it potest ex libidine imperantis sine libidine obtemperari We may without any lust obey the lust of the Commander XI I say in the third place Suppose that a Law be not only made with an evil
and thou knowest that most basely thou hast done it The sence and knowledge of a particular fact either committed or to be committed comming in this manner to the universal knowledge of Law and Right which is in the mind and being conjoyned and applyed and wholly reflecting on it there ariseth from thence all that which we call Conscience The words which by way of Reciprocation are expressed and are most frequent in this kind do confirm this derivation of the name of Conscience Isocrat ad Dem. of which nature is that of Isocrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Although you lye hid from others yet you your self will be Conscious to your self Horace 1. and that of Horace Hic murus abeneus esto Epist 1. Nil conscire sibi This is as a Wall of Brasse to be conscious of no offence And that of Virgil Virgil Mens sibi conscia recti A Mind which is conscious to it self of its own uprightnesse Anaead 1. And to conclude all of the same sence is that of St Paul 1 Cor. 4. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I am conscious to my self of nothing VII I do believe that it is now manifest to you from whence the word Conscience is derived and it is left to your choyce to preferr the one acceptation or the other or to receive them both with an equal approbation The other Reasons which the common Schoolmen according to their own capacities do produce are too weak to stop the progresse of this discourse of which there are many things that are yet remayning to be spoken I proceed therefore to open to you the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the cognomination of the word from whence there ariseth amongst grave Authors so wonderful a difference in the definition that as yet the controversy is high and difficult concerning the very first Term of the definition to find out what is the Genus of it To remove therefore all Ambiguity it is in the first place observable that there is such an affinity by nature of the Indowments of the mind viz. of Potentia's Habits and Acts and so near a conjunction so close a connexion according to the use and exercise of them that not only the appellations of words but the offices and real proprieties of every one of them are promiscuously and without any distinction attributed to one another and that not only in the Rhetorical expressions of the Poets and Orators and others the Professors of Humane Literature to whom a Liberty was permitted but even in the Dogmatical positions of the Philosophers and Schoolmen themselves who were denyed that happy elegancy Neverthelesse although it was alwayes accounted a great task in their own certain bounds to define and distinguish of things so united by Use and Nature yet as to the word Conscience which is a kind of Science and so named from it it will be no little advantage to us in this place a little more precisely to explain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or cognomination of this word Science that so by the manifold use of the single word the ambiguity of the compounded may more rightly and more throughly be understood VIII In the first place therefore as the Names of Habits do familiarly passe into their Objects Science is taken in a double consideration formally and objectively And as the Divines do distinguish of Faith that Faith by which we do believe which is a Habit of Faith existing in the mind is one thing and that the Faith which we do believe which is no more than a thing believed by Faith and but the object of the former and extrinsical to it is another thing the first whereof may be called Faith formally and the or the but objectively so in the same manner we may distinguish of Science and consequently of Conscience that they are taken either properly and formally for the very Habit of the Mind by which we know something our selves or acknowledge it with others or improperly and objectively for that thing it self which we know and know that others do know it with us In which latter and improper sence the Law which is written in our Hearts and is as it were a rule of well living may be called Conscience And in this sence is that to be understood which is so often repeated in the Schools of Damascene that Conscience is the Law of the Mind when indeed Conscience is not properly and formally the Law of the mind but rather an object of the Conscience either adaequate or in part IX Secondly Seeing these three things Potentiaâ—'s Habits and Acts are pertaining to the Soul and although distinct in themselves they are yet ordinated to one another Potentia's as the natural vertues of the soul it self Habits as formes perfecting those Potentia's enabling them for the more ready the more pleasant exercising of their Acts and Acts which are the exercisings as much as the Potentia's as the Habits as the names of Science and of Conscience doe in some measure extend it self to all these For as the Carpenter is said to cut or hew first with his Axe as his Instrument secondly with the edge of the Axe as the formal disposition of the instrument and thirdly with the cutting or hewing it self as the use and action of the Instrument in the same manner the mind of man may be said to know First with the Potentia of knowing as the Instrument Secondly with the Habit of knowing as a disposition that brings that Potentia to perfection and thirdly with an actual consideration as with the use operation of the Potentia the Habit Science hereupon is taken in threefold respect Subjectively formally effectively First Subjectively for the Poteâ—tia in whom it is and which it is apt to bring to perfection as every form in some measure doth perfect its Subject For example when we say that the mysteries of Faith do exceed our understanding the meaning is that they exceed the measure of our cognitive power Secondly Formally the most usual signification of this word for the Habit of knowledge either innate or acquisite in the same sence we are said to know principles known by themselves and conclusions by a legitimate discourse of reason deduced from them and universally all things of which by the assistance of sence and reason we have any certainty Thirdly Effectively for the actual consideration of things before known In which sence to touch upon it by the way the words of St. Paul the Apostle in the 23 of the Acts and the 5 verse in the expounding whereof Interpreters have wonderfully perplexed themselves are absolutely to be understood Brethren saith he I knew not that it was the high Priest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is I did not think I did not diligently enough consider of it As if he should have said Brethren pardon my just indignation if transported by the heat of a troubled Spirit I have spoken something more liberally
it it seemeth that the goodnesse of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodness of the Intention that adaequately so that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwise good the same power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good which otherwise is evil for a good or a single eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body as an evil eye is to infuse darkness on it To adde more strength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines of this nature is that in the Glosse As much good as you do intend so much you do perform And that verse in the mouth of every Scool-boy Quicquid agunt homines Intentio judicat illud It is th' Intention judgeth true Of whatsoever things we do XI But in the way of answer as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the first place that some learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers and not consonant to that we have now in hand But in reverence to those antient Doctors be it granted that those words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men I make answer that the intention when it is a motion of the Will tending to some ends by certain mediums is taken into a twofold consideration first whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and precisely carryed being taken from all consideration of the mediums to attain it As if a man should say he intends the glory of God or his own profit and pleasure or secondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progresse of the work from the beginning of the work unto the end including also the mediums or the means to attain it As if a man should say that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple or staining an Idolater or that he intends his own profit by getting riches by his honest labour or by theft and plunder And as he may be said that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither and hath not yet resolved with himself which way or upon what accounts he will go as well as he who hath resolved with himself when to go which way and upon what occasions We speak in this whole discourse of the Intention taken the first way viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end and not on the means which is so taken in the common use of speaking but those words of the Fathers and other Divines which seem by the intention alone to measure the goodness or the badnesse of mens actions and which are grounded on those words of our Saviour in relation to a single eye and to an eye that is evil do receive their intention in the latter signification as they include the means with the end observable is that of St Bernard That the eye saith he be single two things are necessary viz. that truth be in the election and Charity in the intention That is that our intention be absolutely right both are required that so we may not propound unto our selves such an end which is averse unto the love of God and of our neighbour and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honesty righteousness In every work therefore we must not only look to propound unto our selves a good end but we must withall endeavour to the end so propounded by apt lawful honest means for seeing that the election of the means or the mediums do arise from the intention of the end is so necessarily joyned to it that in the respect thereof it hath the place of an accident inseperable or a necessary circumstance Animum laudô Consilium reprehendâ—â— Cic. 9. ad Attic 11. the School-men do almost all of them conclude that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwise good by rendring that evil which before was good in the very same manner as evil circumstances do corrupt those Actions to which they are retayners XII The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God For there is a Law propounded from God to men a most perfect Law which commandeth things to be done and forbiddeth those things which are not to be done It hath shewed unto thee O man what is good what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we must obey if we will fulfil our duties by this Law we are commanded as the Scriptures every where do declare to do good and to eschew evil But if we on the contrary without the least regard to the law of God shall measure out unto our selves things to be avoyded or performed according to our own profit and as we shall think good and shall either omit those good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of some following evil or shall commit those evil things which God forbiddeth for the vain hope of some good to come what is this but worms as we are to preferre our own Counsels above the expresse will of Almighty God and the wisdome of the flesh above the Authority of the most holy Spirit Farre otherwise did that holy man David By thy precepts saith he have I gotten understanding therefore have I hated all unjust wayes Psal 119. 104. As if he should say being instructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart my mouth before mine eyes I do plainly understand what I have to do and what I have to eschew wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not consentaneous to thy Law whither soever it may seem to lead me Therefore since every sin is forbidden by the Law of God and that Law of his containeth not the least exception of any good Intention or Event and we ought not to distinguish where the Law maketh no distinction nor to except where the Law maketh no exception it is most manifest that he whosoever he is who for what Intention or what cause soever it be doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil he doth sin against the Law of God XIII The fifth argument followeth drawn from the examples of those who under the pretence of a good end being so bold as to disobey the express Commandment of God have satisfied his anger by the just punishment of their rashness and disobedience The Prophet Samuel being sent to Saul the King of Israel who saved some of the cattle of the Amalekites which God had commanded should be totally destroyed for no other end as he pretended than by the bulk and fatness of his sacrifice to make it the more acceptable the said Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievousness of his sin and for the punishment of so great a disobedience did prophesy
prove being now as I conceive sufficiently confirmed I hope it will not be inconsonant nor ungratefull certainly not unprofitable to you to derive some corallaries from it which may be usefull to us all for the institution of our lives and manners It followeth therefore in the first place from that which is already spoken that all pious men must take heed least being transported by a zeal to the glory of God they be carryed away to unlawfull Acts. There is no true Christian will deny but that the glory of God is the supreme and ultimate end of all our actions Whether we eat or drink or whatsoever we do it must be all done to the glory of God 1 Cor. 10 31. But being transported with too hasty and too prepostrous a zeal to the glory of God what contumelies what slaughters did not those men of that faction amongst the people of the Jews commit who peculiarly were called Zelots And amongst Christians in the memory of our Fathers the same things have been recorded by men worthy of belief and who were no ways ignorant of the transactions of the affairs of their times to have been done in Germany and other places by the Anabaptists in whose Chronologies such horrid acts and so far from all humanity are reported that we should hardly have given any belief unto them if we had not of late seen the same tragedies every day to be prodigiously acted to the life by their unhappy off-spring the dismal scene being translated into our Britannies XVI That none of you may be deceived therefore with so splendid a deceit and that you may not deceive others Consider with your selves in the first place that all Seducers the ministers of Satan and instructed by Satan himself the chief Seducer 1 Cor. 11. 14. who is accustomed to transform himself into an Angel of light have not more advanced themselves by any artifice nor imposed more upon the belief of the common people of Christendom nor more vigorously troubled the peace of our Churches and Common-wealths than under the pretence of the glory of God and of the reformation of Religion and of the propagation of the Gospell and of rooting out superstition and of the exalting of the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ The most eminent of the Protestant Ministers in the preceeding age as Calvin Bucer Zuinglius and others have all along in their writeings grievously complayned of this Amongst whom Jerome Zanchius a man second unto few in learning modesty and piety hath this expression Ego non intelligo istam reformatorum mundi Theologiam Zanchius I do not understand this divinity of the new Reformers of the world I would to God that the experience of what is dayly acted amongst us did not confirm too much the truth of that vulgar Proverb In nomine Domini incipit omne malum Secondly Consider with your selves with how great and how perverse a heat of Spirit the glory of God is pretended to all wars tumults quarrelling contentions and unprofitable disputations of which the holy Apostles of our Lord Jesus did hardly ever make mention of and full often they have mentioned it but in order to peace and brotherly-love and that sweet deportment in things indifferent which especially becommeth Christians that so no man might abuse that liberty which we do by the benefit of Christ to be an offence or a stumbling-block unto his Brother In the third place consider that the man who doth propound unto himself the glory of God to be his End must also propound unto himself the Law of God to be the Rule of all his actions Ad Legem Testimonium to the Law and to the Testimony Isa 8. 20. Grant that the respect unto the glory of God is the final cause of thy acting as it is fit it should be so but the Rule and as it were the formal Reason of thy acting is not to be the glory of God but his revealed Will In the whole course of our lives the glory of God is to be looked upon as the mark or the Gole to which we run but we must look upon the Rule also that so we may go the right way which doth bring us to it lest that deservedly be objected to us which is commonly spoken Benè curritis sed extrà viam You run well but you run out of the way Lastly consider that the glory of God in the respect of singular actions hath the estimation of an end transcendental Now it is manifest that to a Transcendent no Individual can immediately be subjected so not of any singular Ens or being whether it be substantial or accidental is immediately subjected to the summum Ens or the chief being Therefore as Ens transcendentale the transcendental being is verified of every very being which is in one of the ten praedicaments whether it be universal or singular so the glory of God is the end of all duties of all acts thereto pertaining which expressly and virtually are contained in any praecept of the Decalogue God is to be worshipped our Parents honoured our Neighbours beloved our promises performed Justice Truth and Chastity preserved and other duties of Piety and Charity performed to the honour and glory of God Now as nothing hath truly the condition of an Ens or being which may not aptly be reduced to some species of it in some one of the ten praedicaments so no particular action let men that mind their own ends say what they will to the contrary can ever truly and properly be referred to the glory of God as to its end which is not reducible to some duty of piety and charity grounded in some one of the ten Commandments of the Law of God He but deludes you therefore whosoever he is who obstreperously cries out the glory of God the glory of God and yet is not able to tell you by what commandment in the Law of God he can maintain that which he vainly professeth that he performeth for the glory of God XVII From the Conclusion above named it followeth in the second place that they are in a great error who think it is lawfull for them to commit a lesse sin that a greater sin might be avoyded many things are alledged to maintain this error as in the first place that common saying which is in the mouth of every man * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 2. Ethic. 9. Of evils we must choose the least and to give a reason for what they say they alledge that of Aristot that a †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. 5. Ethic. 7. lesse evil being compared with a greater may be taken for a good To which is added that of Gregorius magnus Dum mens inter minora et maxima peccata constringitur si nullus omninò sine peccato evadendi aditus pateat minorà semper elegantur When the mind is perplexed betwixt less sins and those of a higher nature if there be no possibility
same Gesture at the Sacred Table Can a Custom changed without any publick Authority sensibly so prevail that what before was not un-decent or un-lawful must now no longer be decent and no longer lawful Cannot a Law inacted by Publick Authority and established by an expresse consent of the people and allowed of by dayly use prevail that what upon no lawful reasons was ever found to be ever unlawful should be esteemed lawful again for the time to come Indeed where these two things Law and Conscience do fight between themselves as hardly they do in this case there is no man of a sober understanding but will acknowledge that Custome should give place to Law and not Law to Custome In the third place I demand of them do they seriously believe or do they not believe that he sinneth immediately in that Act who receiveth the Communion with bended knees If they shall say that he Sinneth seeing that every Sin is a transgression of the Law of God let them shew me some precept in that Law against which he that so doth Sinneth If they shall acknowledge that it may be done without Sin then by their own confession they will level their own Rise and overthrow all the force of their Arguments In the fourth place suppose that the said tricliniary gesture had been abolished before the first institution of the Holy Supper and that Sitting or Standing did succeed it so that Christ and his Apostles must have eaten either Standing or Sitting both of which could not be used at one time I demand if they had eaten Standing whether it were so necessary for us to stand also that we should have sinned if we had sate and on the contrary or whether we might have been free to have used which we would If they should say that we are free for both the Argument taken from the Example of Christ will be of no power and will fall to the Ground for he used only but one of the said Gestures and not both of them If they shall say again that we are precisely bound up to the observation of that posture which is supposed was used by our Saviour wherefore do these so severe Dictators and Controulers of the Liberty of every Church admit unto them an Indulgence of Standing or Sitting at the Holy Supper but not of kneeling or of that posture which it is most probable that our Saviour used In the fifth place I demand If the Example of Christ doth oblige us to the Imitation of it why is this obligation precisely determined in that posture which is but a subalternate Species and hath no reference to some higher Genus or why doth it not fall lower to some more inferiour Species To make it more obvious to your understandings seeing those three things are to be considered The gesture or Posture it self as a superior Genus the Posture at the Table as a Species subalternate to it And the Posture of lying along and leaning as the lowest Species And it is probable that Christ used the last according to the custom and practice of those Times and Climates why must the posture only at the Table which is but an intermedial and a subalternate Species be accounted necessary and sufficient to the true Imitation of Christ and not any other posture sufficient in the Genus of it or why may not the posture of Leaning and lying along be as necessary in the Species Lastly I demand Is the posture of leaning and lying along practised by our Saviour and the Apostles at the first institution of the Holy Supper to be imitated or not I am confident they will not deny that it is to be imitated for indeed they cannot deny it because from thence they do derive the chiefest ground and foundation of their Cause For thus they do propound the examples of Christ of necessity to be imitated by us that is to say not every example simply in it self but every example that may be practised by us I Only therefore in this argumentation take that which they of their own accord do grant which is 1st the proposition That every imitable example of Christ doth oblige a Christian to the imitation of it And 2ly the assumption that the posture in the Species of it which Christ used in the holy Supper whatsoever it was is imitable From these premises I infer this conclusion By the force therfore of this example say I Christians of the next age unto our Saviour were obliged to the same posture in the same Species which he used And in the same manner were Christians of the second and third age ever since unto these present times And it must accordingly be acknowledged that the Church of Christ even at this time also is obliged to the practice of the tricliniary or leaning posture if indeed Christ did use it or at least it must be shown at what time and on what account and by what Author and Authority the force of this obligation is made void XXII By these things which have been spoken it is manifest that all the force of their Argument which with so much pompe is dressed and held forth by them doth come to no more than this that it cannot more rightly or more commodiously be propounded for their own purpose than under this form The example of Christ and his Apostles doth so farre oblige as we think it expedient that it shall oblige but we think it expedient that it shall oblige to the not bending of the knee in the receiving of the Sacrament no further therefore so farre only and not a jot further is the extent of the obligation I am ashamed I confesse to furre your ears with the repetition of these vanities for it becomes not this place nor my age or manners to provoke to laughter in so serious a Subject But what shall we do with these men A bad cause indeed doth need such a Patronage and it cannot but come to pass that oftentimes they are enforced to speak many vain and incongruous things and if throughly they be examined very absurd ones whosoever they are who like unto those men do suffer themselves to be governed by affectation rather than truth I do speak from my heart and as indeed it is although in their writings we do meet with many things not solidly argued and sometimes not sincerely yet I do not remember that I have any where observed meer trifles to be carryed on with so much animosity and contention or the swelling Hills to bring forth a more miserable and ridiculous production than when the bare examples of good men in the holy Scriptures are so importunately urged either to excuse those acts which by the law of God do seem to be prohibited or to induce an obligation upon the Consciences of men for the observation of those things which do not appeare by any law of God to be commanded But I return from whence I have digressed if have transgress'd at all
exclusively that is to say one and but one only The Apostle otherwise had made use of a very uneffectual argument to prove what he had propounded For he rebuketh those who unadvisedly did pass their judgments either on the persons or the deeds of other men as the invaders of their Rights Who art thou saith he who Dost judge another As if he should have said dost thou know thy self what thou art and what thou dost It doth not belong to thee to thrust thy sawcy Sicle into the harvest of another man much less boldly to fling thy self into the Throne of Almighty God If already thou are ignorant of it then know that it belongeth to him alone to judge of the Consciences of men to whom alone it doth belong to impose Laws upon the Consciences of men which none can do but God alone 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is but one Law-giver It is observable that the Apostle doth ascribe unto God alone the power of saving and destroying from whence we frame the second Argument He only hath power over the Consciences of men either for command or prohibition who hath power with unmerited Rewards to crown the well-doers and with just punishments to torment the transgressors but it is in the power of God alone the onely Law-giver to give Rewards and Punishments according to the quality of every conscience Therefore he alone hath a right and privilege over the Consciences of men X. It is thus proved again in the second place He who alone knoweth the internal motions of the Conscience he only hath the power of prescribing a Law unto them for the Law doth neither determine or judge of things unknown But unto God alone the searcher of the heart the internal motions of hearts and Consciences are discovered Therefore he alone hath the power of imposing a Law upon the Consciences which may oblige them From hence it is that the Laws of men do only bind the external motions of the body to an external Conformity from the knowledge and command whereof all internal motions and several hammers that strike upon the clocks of the mind and Conscience are altogether to be exempted And upon this account it was that not only holy men and endued with the knowledge of the true God such as were the three Captive young men amongst the Babylonians in the third of Daniel and the seven brethren of Maccabeus but many wise men amongst the Heathens did deride the threatnings and torments of Tyrants as exercising their violence not so much upon themselves as upon the outsides only and on the subburbs of them But let us consider what our Saviour Jesus Christ did think himself of these thing◠and what Counsels he prescribed to his Disciples concerning them Fear not them saith he that kill the body and after that have no more that they can do upon you but fear him who after he hath killed hath power to cast into Hell yea I say unto you fear him Luke 12. 3 4. As if he should have said Tyrants by the permission of God have power upon the Bodies but upon the Souls and Consciences of men they have no power no right at all the Laws can neither ordain nor afflict any punishment which doth belong to the inward man God hath only the prerogative of the Soul and Body and for the neglect of their duties can afflict punishments on both and condemn the whole man to everlasting torment XI In the third place it is proved by the condition and natural estate of the Conscience it self which as before I have expressed is so placed as it were in the middle betwixt God the Will of man as that which is usually and truly spoken of Kings and Emperours may as truly be verified of the Consciences of every man Solo Deo minores esse nec aliquem in terris superiorem agnoscere They are lesse than God only and on Earth do acknowledge no Superior That speech of the Emperour Maximilian the first is very memorable Conscientiis dominari velle est arcem coeli invadere To exercise a domination over Consciences is to invade the Tower of Heaven He is a plunderer of the glory of God and a nefarious invader of the power that is due unto him whosoever he is that shall claim a right to the Consciences of men or practice an usurpation over them Let the Bishops of Rome and the Canonists and the Jesuits who do flatter and cringe unto him all others take heed that they be not guilty of this so great a Sacrilege I would also have those admonished who do so submit their Consciences to the power of any creature which ought only to be subjected to God himself to be carefull lest whiles they conferre the Honour of that service to the creature which is due unto God alone they make a God of the Creature which at least is interpreted to be Idolatry From this first Conclusion thus proved there followeth this remarkable position That the proper Rule of Conscience is that which God the supreme Law-giver hath prescribed to it and besides that Rule there ought no other to be admitted XII The second Conclusion followeth which is That the next and most immediate Rule of Conscience although it be neither the Adaequate or the supreme Rule is that light with which the mind at that instant is endued 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Socrat ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Joh. 1. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazian Orat 15. And this is the same light which some do call the light of Reason others the Law of the mind and which the Schoolmen following the Philosophers do call right or rectified Reason This is first proved by some places out of the word of God as Luke 12. 57. Wherefore even of your selves do you not judge that which is right They are the words of our Saviour as if he should have said You have the light within you infused into your minds from that true light which enlightneth every man comming into this world by the help whereof unlesse you will be wanting to your selves you can distinguish what is straight from what is crooked and what is just from that which is unjust The Text Rom. 2. verse 14. and 15. is very remarkable Quum Gentes quae legem scriptam scilicet non habent naturâ ea quae sunt legis faciunt Seeing the Gentiles who have not the Law viz. the written Law do by natue perform those things which are of the Law to wit they practice the Acts of Justice Prudence Fortitude and Temperance and of all other Virtues These men having not the Law are a Law unto themselves for they show the works of the Law written in their hearts their Consciences giveing witnesse thereunto and their thoughts either accusing or defending them By which words it is manifest that in the particular Acts of Testifying accusing and defending and in whatsoever Acts that already are committed by any
Christ The Scripture therefore as supernaturally it is to be believed is the only and Adaequate Rule of our faith and according to our actions and performances so far as they are spiritual and pertain to a spiritual end it is to be the only and Adaequate Rule of our Manners and by consequent the principal and as I may so speak it the Architectonical Rule of all our actions But seeing it doth belong to Conscience to look back on things that are done not only upon this account as they are spiritual that is to say whether they are done out of Charity and directed to a supernatural end but as they are moral that is whether they be good or evil lawfull or unlawful free or necessary that a right judgment may be passed on these things we are not only to seek unto the holy Scriptures but to make our seasonable addresses unto other helps XVI In the third place this is proved again by the Form the Character and the Temperature of the Scripture which seeing it containeth in it very many precepts but not all of one kind some of them pertayning to Manners some to Rites and some indifferently common unto all and some peculiar only to some Nation and some again to some one order or person Some of them induring only for a time and others of a perpetual obligation some by way of Counsel of things expedient according as the exigence of the affairs requireth and some again in the way of mandate or command of things simply or absolutely necessary in themselves if there were not some other rule besides the Scriptures for the discerning of moral from ritual precepts and of things temporary from perpetual and of things peculiar from common the Conscience would oftentimes labour in a Labyrinth of doubts and know not which way to turn especially when precepts of diverse kinds being delivered as it were in one the same breath in the same Phrase and in continued connexion of words do immediately follow and tread on the heels of one another For examples sake Levit. 19. 18. An example is there given to love thy neigbour as thy self And in the verse immediately following there is a command that two Beasts of a several kind might not be suffered to mingle in generation with one another and that one Field be not sowen with diverse sorts of seeds nor any garment made of Linnen thread interwoven with Woollen The first command herein is moral and universal the other but Ceremonial and judicial and peculiar only to the Nation of the Jews But when these things are read in the Churches it cannot by the Text appear what so great a difference there is betwixt them And in the 30th verse of the same Chapter the Sanctification of the Sabbath the reverence of the Sanctuary are equally commanded and in a continued course of words and even in the very same solemn sanction of the Law given Ego Jehovah I the Jehovah yet I doubt not but that most men are of opinion that in one of the Precepts the Consciences of men are at this day obliged to the performance of it and that in the other they are not Now what the reason is that their opinion is such the precepts in the Text being all alike and no distinction nor the least apparence of so great a difference there can certainly no other reason be given but that it proceedeth from the judgment of reason and prudence which being excluded obligatory precepts cannot so be known from those which are not obligatory but that the Conscience will be oftentimes in a suspence and not able to know or judge what is commanded to be done or what to be left undone XVII It is proved in the fourth place by an argument drawn from the inconvenicies which do arise from the contrary opinion that is from the most grievous calamities which have a long time afflicted the church of Christ by reason of the misunderstanding of the perfection of the holy Scriptures from whence a most dangerous error hath possessed some men of great estimation that they have declared that nothing can be lawfuly done or commanded which is not authorized by God in the Scripture or at least there approved by some laudable example This foundation being once laid not a few men of a hot spirit being transported to judge charitably of them with a zeale to God but not according to knowledge did begin to raise unnecessary strifes and disputation concerning the Ceremonies of the Church they did declare that all Ceremonies not expressly mentioned in the word of God were to be thrust out and for ever to be banished from the Church of Christ that Laws ordained by men concerning things Indifferent were to be cancelled that all the Churches throughout Europe were to be reformed all things to be reduced to the Evangelical purity and Simplicity The unruly rage of these men did hete for a while make a stand but it did not stand here long but as commonly it commeth to passe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one absurdity being granted a thousand will insue their boldnesse derived from his fountain did flow at last into an open rage and brake forth into an Anabaptistical fury And although the growing mischief hath gon so far that it can scarce rise higher yet every day it swels and more and more doth inlarge it self by bringing into the world new monsters of opinions that were we not assured by the word of God that the foundation of God doth continue firm and that the Gates of Hell shall never be able to prevail altogether against the Church it were much to be feared lest the universal Church of Christ overwhelmed with a Deluge of Atheism should utterly be swallowed up by it throughout the world XVIII And let no man think that in vain Rhetorick I do complain of this with more enuy than truth for I am most confident that he whosoever he is that is strongly prepossessed and infected with this errour shall never be able in his daily controversies any ways to satisfie the importunate arguments of the Anabaptists Socinians and other Sectaries whose names I am ashamed to mention For to passe by the established form of Ecclesiastical Government which now adays our Political Divines would either referr to the Civil Magistrate or quite take them away upon no other account but this only that they think it is no where expressed in the word of God they must take away with it the observation of the Lords day the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel the Baptism of Infants the Sprinkling of water in Baptism for the dipping of the whole body the Sacramental reverence and many other things with all Ecclesiastical Rites and Laws or else having reformed their judgements they must confesse they may all of them be retained without or sin or scandal XIX But this you will say is to derogate from the perfection of the Scriptures which all the Divines of the reformed
assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
the duties of Divine worship but at what hour the people shall meet and in what place what form of words are to be used and what must be the gesture of the body the several parts of the service and other things of the same nature are all of them to be determined by Humane constitutions In the same manner the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertised against with such a punishment and what with another punishment is from the Laws of man From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God the Law of man hath this privilege that it can induce a new obligation on the Conscience of the Subject not only different from the first obligation in number and in respect of the Term because it is of another dependency but also diverse in the Species and in respect of the matter because it is exercised on another object for the first obligation which ariseth from the Law of God is to the thing it self as it is a substance but this obligation which the Lawes of men do super-induce is to the manner of the thing or to the circumstance of it X. The fourth Doubt is of a thing that is foul and unlawful which is indeed a Doubt of great moment and containeth many cases for almost all the Conditions which are required to the right Constitution of Lawes a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Justice alone And not only for that reason that universal Justice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues but especially for this reason that particular Justice and more specifically that Justice which is called Legal Justice is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies Concerning this Doubt In the first place it is questioned Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel who affirmed that the due matter of Laws whether just or unjust was that which was most commodious for the preserving the encreasing of a politick State for when in his opinion the end of Civil Power is the preservation of it self and the encrease of Soveraignty which Power cannot vigorously be preserved much less the Soveraignty enlarged if all the Lawes and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Justice and Honesty It concerned those who sate at the Helm so to bend as occasion should require the Rule of Honesty as to make it subservient to the publick advantage for the end in all things is to know how best to measure those things that are of a middle nature what so ever was the opinion of Machiavel this was certainly the Judgment of a personage of great account amongst the Lacaedemonians who openly pronounced that was most honest to the Spartans which was most profitable to them To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged Ipsa utilitas justi propè mater et aequi Hor. 1 â—aâ—yr 3. Profit almost the very mother of Justice and Equity And how thriving a Principle this is may be proved by the Example and successe of the Turks who relying on this Foundation most happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Asia Africa and Europe And to speak the truth had not some men who above all others do professe themselves to be Christians nay the only Christians and delight to be called the Reformers and the Restorers oâ— the purer Religion made a great use of this most wicked principle the Christian World had not every where groaned under so many Sacrileges Perjuries Seditions Warrs Tumults and Tyrannies XI But on the other side Princes on earth ought not to abuse that power which they have received from God against his will or otherwise than he intended for this power is not given them so much as to Lords as it is intrusted to them by God as his Ministers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 4 6. It is intrusted to them upon that account that they should work righteousnesse and not exercise Tyranny and an unjust Domination And this is manifest by the very words of the Text By me Kings Reign and Princes decree just things As if to Reign and truly to be a Prince were nothing else but to decree those things which are just and righteous And the Prophets do every where denounce the most severe anger Esai 10. 1. and vengeance of God against those Kings Princes who had decreed unjust Judgements Psal 94. 20. and had meditated iniquity as a Law Neither is the inlargement of Empire the â—nd of Civil Power as the Politicians of this world do affirm but the preservation of the people in Tranquillity and peace with all Godlinesse and Honesty 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Justice if there be any other is the best preserver of the publick peace And as the Righteousness of Faith doth procure and conserve the inward peace of the Conscience so legal Justice doth preserve the outward peace of the Common-wealth Esai 32. 17. the fruit of Justice saith the Prophet Pindaâ— shall be Peace and the Theban Poet calleth Quietnesse the Daughter of Justice Neither is that the meaning of Horace as if Honesty were meerly to be measured by profit the scope of his sense is far otherwise to wit that men wild at first and wandring by the observation of the publick profit and the common good were brought at the last to draw together into one Body and maintain Societies and by just Laws and Punishments to restrain injuries and wickednesse The Arguments drawn from the Turks whom it appears that God especially had raised up and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiousnesse and other Sins of the Christians or from any others to maintain a bad Cause by the prosperous successe that did attend it do favour rather of the Alcoran of some abhominable miscreant than of the Purity of the Gospel of our Saviour Christ XII The second Question is Whether an unjust Law though it ought not to be made yet being made may oblige the Conscience of the Subject so far as to be bound to observe it For many things there are which ought not to be done yet being done are valid And it may so come to passe that what could not without sin be commanded yet without sin may be performed as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going Lectures The reason of this doubt is Because that true obedience is no Disputresse for the practice of obedience doth properly consist in this to subject ones self to the will of another without the least murmur or dispute Nimis delicata est obedientia saith Bernard quae transit in genus causae deliberativum That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be so deliberate as to inquire after the Cause thereof But I answer briefly the Conscience of the
Subject is not bound by that Law It was my first Conclusion in the former Lecture and confirmed by many Arguments and if any man be yet unsatisfied it may be further proved For no inferior power can oblige against the will of the superior power therefore the power of God being above all the power of Men there is no power of any man whatsoever that can oblige against the will of God who by his Law hath forbidden all wicked and filthy things from whence is that of Saint Augustin There can be seen no Law which is not just And by this reason the Argument drawn from that of obedience is answered by granring that the Subject ought to submit himself without dispute to the will of his Superior to wit the supreme superior into whose will all obedience is ultimately resolved Quod jubet homo prohibet Deus ego audiam hominem surdus Deo Beâ—nard Epist 7. and not of the subordinate Superior if it appeareth that his will is averse to the supreme superior Now God is absolutely the chief Commander the bare signification of whose will is sufficient to induce an obligation of Obedience especially since it is most certain that his will cannot be unjust Therefore Abraham obeyed God commanding those things which if God himself had not given him the charge might seem not only to be hard and unjust but impious and full of wickednesse To wit that his Father his Country and kindred being all abandoned he should become a poor banished Man and travel into a remote and an unknown Country nay that with his own hand he should cut the throat of his own Son in whom alone was not only all the Comfort and the Succour of his Age but all the Hope of the Promises of God and that he should lay him on the Altar and offer him as a Sacrifice to that God who commanded of him such cruel things He did rightly indeed and as it became a man who deserved to be called the Father of the Faithful and to be the singular Example of an unshaken Faith to all the world without the least haesitation and with a most willing obedience he made himself ready to put in Execution the Commands of God But as for the Commandments of men seeing that every man is lyable to Errour and sin and his Will may be depraved it is very lawful nay where there is a just Cause of suspition it is needful also to examine and to try them That admonition of the Apostle 1. Thess 5. 2. Try all things and keep that which is good may with great right and as fitly be applyed to the commands of the Superiors as to the Instructions of Teachers of whom notwithstanding St. Paul in that place doth especially speak Away then with the haughtiness and proud commands of over-lording Spirits sic volo sic jubeo This will I have This I do command Away with the base flattery of the Papists who think it a sin for any man in any manner whatsoever to suspect the Dictates of their Lateran Jove Away with their blind obedience by which those that enter into their Religious Houses do by a vow oblige themselves to obey their Superiors in every thing and in all things without distinction XIII In the third place it is propounded Whether it be Lawful for a Subject to depart from his own right Pura mala ut nunquam justè juberi sic nec licite possunt fieri Bernard Epist 7. and although he be not obliged yet of his own accord to obey such an evil Law I answer it is not lawful for the law of God doth simply oblige to the not doing of any thing that is evil or unlawful Therefore an unjust Law I understand unjust in that sense in which we now speak as unjust in relation to the matter cannot lawfully be kept because God cannot lawfully be offended For whatsoever is repugnant to the Law of God or to the light of Nature known and written in our hearts or revealed in the written word is not to be admitted by a Christian either to avoyd any particular detriment whatsoever or the scandal of our Neighbours or to promote the favour or to decline the hatred of our Superiors Daveniam Imperator tu Carcerem ille Gehennam were the words of the primitive Christians Excuse us Emperor you can only condemn us to prison but God unto Hell And so before them said the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ Whether it be right in the sight of God Act. 41. 9. to hearken unto you rather than unto God judge yee And before them the three young men of the Hebrews in the third of Daniel Dan. 3. 18. Be it known unto thee O King that we will not serve thy Gods nor worship the Golden Image which thou hast set up XIV In the fourth place it is demanded What Law is to be thought so unjust that it is not only not obliging but moreover it is unlawful to obey it I answer a Law may be said to be unjust for manifold considerations First if it be made by one who is not invested with a lawful power and so it is unjust Proper defectum Justitiae Commutativae for the defect of Justice commutative because the Lawgiver assumeth more than is due or by right doth belong unto him it doth not therefore oblige the Subject to obedience neverthelesse the Subject if it seems expedient to him and he be not otherwise hindred may depart from his own right and obey that Law Secondly in consideration of the Final cause if it doth not tend to the publick good nor preserve the rights due unto the Commonalty And this Law is unjust by reason of the defect of that Justice which they call Legal which alwayes intendeth the common good and that the republick may receive no detriment a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer 〈◊〉 ad â— But this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige the Subject for the Subject is no competent nor fit Judge of Legal Justice and if by his obedience any thing doth follow which is either incommodious or noxious to the Commonwealth it is not to be imputed to him who performed his part well enough but to the Supreme Magistrate whose duty it was to provide for the preservation and advancement of the publick good Thirdly in consideration of the Formal Cause if the Law by an unequal proportion and not by merit of the Citizens doth dispence and distrbute Burdens and Favors Pâ—nishments and Rewards This Law is unjust by reason of the defect of Justice distributive which commandeth to give all things by equity to every one as every one hath deserved And this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige as well as that of which but now I spoke of and for the same Cause for the dispensation of these things doth not belong to the office of a Subject but of the Supreme Magistrate Fourthly in consideration of
jurisdiction do wholy attribute the universal right of the external Government of the Church to the Civil Magistrate And moreover as for these our own Disciplinarians at home Good God! what Monsters of names and opinions as full of Deformity as of Difformity have these last seven years fruitful of prodiges brought forth and nursed under the pretence of Reformation XXX I have neither the leisure nor resolution unless I should appear too troublesom to you to grapple at this time with both these Adversaries But in these as in many other Debates that opinion seemeth to be the truer and is truly the safer which is lodged in the middle betwixt the two extremes and I am confident you will be so much the more willing to imbrace it by how much it is more agreeable to the Doctrine of the English Church as also to the Laws of the Kingdom which is That the Right of making Ecclesiastical Laws is in the Power of Bishops Elders and other Persons duely elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom But so nevertheless that the Exercise of the same Right and Power in all Christian Common-wealthâ— ought to depend on the Authority of the supreme Magistrate both a Parte ante as the Schoolmen have it a parte post on the part precedent on the part subsequent to wit that they ought not of themselves to assemble for the making of Ecclesiastical Canons Laws unless they be called to it by his Mandate or Command or at least defended by his Authority a fâ—ll free leave being both asked obtained and being thus called and warranted their Laws or Canons to which they have consented are not ratified not have any Power of obliging untill the Assent of the supreme Magistrate be obtained by whose approbation and Authority as soon as they are confirmed they are presently to pass for Laws and do oblige the Subject And these things may suffice to be spoken of the Cause Efficient THE EIGHTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws from the Formal Cause where Of 1 The Promulgation of Laws 2 Of Laws Penal Ezra 10. 7 8. 7. And they made proclamation throughout Judah and Jerusalem unto all the Children of the Captivity that they should gather themselves together unto Jerusalem 8. And that whosoever would not come within three days according to the Counsel of the Princes and the Elders all his substance should be forfeited OF the obligation of humane Lawes as to their material and efficient Causes we have spoke enough and as much as conduceth to our present purpose in those points which have already been handled by us In this place we are to speak of such as may be reduced to the Formal kind of Causes and although peradventure not so properly if examined according to the acurate and exact Method yet in my Judgment not altogether incongruous to our Discourse on this present Subject They may all of them be reduced to two Heads The one of the publication of Lawes and the other of the penalty adjoined to them to be inflicted on Delinquents Both of which as they are expressly contained in the Text above cited The Publication of the Law in the seventh verse and the penalty of it in the eighth verse so the use of them is very necessary both by the Nature of the Law it self and to obtain the Effect of the Law For seeing the Law by its own Nature and as it is a rule of things to be done ought to have a double Power viz. A Power of Directing by shewing unto the Subjects what is to be done and what is not to be done and a Power of obliging by suggesting into their minds a necessity of obeying The Law could not duely and effectually exercise this twofold Power unless the Subject were informed what is the will of the Prince which is done by publication and understood withall by the penalty annexed to it how much it doth concern him to perform it II. Concerning the Publication of the Law the first Doubt is Whether this publication be meerly on the Account of and as it were intrinsecal to the Law That is to enquire Whether that as the Law hath the Power of directing and obliging the promulgation of it be so necessary that it wanteth of that Power unless it be promulgated Now in all this Discourse you are to understand that I take not this word Promulgation as it is used in Cicero other Roman writers but according to the received manner of speaking amongst the Schoolmen the Canonists of the latter Ages for in that Promulgation of the Antients the Law not yet established or fully made was propounded to the people publickly on three Market days of their approbation of it But the Publication of which we now speak is the Promulgation of a Law already made that the People may take notice of it I therefore shall briefly answer to the Doubt proposed and say That this Publication is so necessary and so intrinsecal to the Law that in some manner it may be called the Form of it and thereupon amongst many Authors it is a part of the Definition of it and indeed it is absolutely necessary to this that the Law may exercise the Office of a Law which is to direct and to oblige the Subjects whom it cannot direct much less oblige although made by never so just and undoubted Authority unless it be known to them and it cannot be known unless it be published For that which properly induceth the obligation is the Will and Authority of the Prince or Governor not as a single but as a publick Person and the Head of the Commonalty But unless by some publick means he shall cause his Will to be propounded and made known unto the People it cannot by any Law be manifest at least according to the interpretation of the Law that it is his Will and proceedeth from his Authority as he sustaineth a publick Person Dist 4. Sect. In isâ—is And from hence is that of the Canon Law Leges constituuntur cùm promulgantur Lawes are constituted when they are published And that also of the Civil Law Leges quae constringunt vitas hominum ab omnibus intelligidebent The Laws which do bind the lives of men ought to be understood by all which being approved by the Common Consent of all Doctors and the Dictates of Reason we need not here for the confirmation of iâ— to instance the Example of God him self solemnly pronouncing his Law unto the Israelites from the Mount of Sinai or the Practice of the most flourishing Common-wealths and Cities in the whole world who as soon as their Laws were made did in the most publick places expose them to the observation of the people engraven in Tables of Brass or Wood the words are most known which every where we meet with amongst antient Authors and to this classis pertain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifie nothing
else but the Tables in which the Athenians wrote their Laws Of the same nature were the twelve Tables of the Romans and others of other Nations concerning which let those men who have the leisure to be curious of such antiquities consult with the Philologers and the writers of Dictionaries of both languages we must proceed to other things III. The necessity of the publication of Laws being thus granted and determined there ariseth a second Doubt What this promulgation of the Law ought to be that it may pass for lawfull and inferre an obligation In answer to which I say in the first place that the manner and the reason of publishing a Law as to the particular Rites and Circumstances may be varyed according to the Customs of diverse Nations But all do agree in this and by common use it is required that the Law-giver take caâ—e to have his will so propounded and manifested to his Subjects by some external sign that it may publickly be known unto them all so that none of those who are bound to observe the Law maybe ignorant that the said Law is extant and this is therefore required because the power of directing is intrinsecal and essential to the Law Subjects cannot direct their actions according to the will of their Prince unlesse they know what his will is how can they know it unlesse by proclamation or by writing or insculpture or some other outward sign it be sufficiently exposed and manifested to them IV. I say in the second place To the publication of a Law to oblige the Subjects it is not only required that the Lawgiver doth publickly signifie his will unto them but he is to proceed further that is to have it done in a solemn manner or at least that it be so done which is even as much as a solemn Right that it may be sufficiently testified and made known unto his Subjects that the Law-giver intended that this will of his may have the power of a Law and that it may oblige them the reason is because not every will of the Superiour although known unto the Subject doth presently and in ipso facto oblige him unless withall it be manifest that the Superiour had an intention that it should oblige him For every Superiour endued with a Legislative power and sustaining a double person the one private as a single man the other publick as a Lawful Superiour doth come under a double consideration In the midst of these late tumults the unhappy caprichiousness of some wits did put me to this new distinction concerning the personal and political Capacity of a King The Distinction in my judgment is something more proper to our present business than to the Subject then in hand It is this the will of a Prince if a Prince be considered as in his personal capacity that is as he is a single and as it were a private person carries not with him the respect of a Law and obligeth not his Subjects to direct their Actions according to it Therefore to oblige the Subjects It is not enough for a Prince any way to signify unto them that he will have this or that done unlesse upon some other account it be manifest that it is his will to have it so done as he is in his Political Capacity that is as he is a Prince and the Head of the Commonalty and as he sustaineth a publick person with a Legislative Power which seeing it cannot be made manifest enough by the bare signification of his Will it is needful that by some more publick and solemn Ceremony it should be attested unto those whom it concerns to have the knowledge of it lest any man for the excuse of his Disobedience might pretend that rotten and that vulgar one I had not thought of it V. I say in the third place In large Empires which contain many Provinces it is requisite that the publication of a new Law be made in every Province of the Empire Some there are who think this to be simply necessary and to be required from the nature of the Law which doth not oblige unlesse it be received of the people And therefore if be only published in a Princes Court or in the Metropolis of the whole Kingdom or some chief Cities thereof the promulgation of it is no way sufficient to oblige those who do live in the more remote places and provinces But although this be not absolutely necessarily neither doth the nature of the Law seem to require it and the common opinion of the Doctors as well as the common practice of most Nations are of another Judgment yet it is profitable that it should be done that so the Law to which all men are bound as much as may be may come to the knowledge of all men which by how much the more easily it may be done in our times than in Ages heretofore before the Art of printing was found out by so much the more inexcusable is the neglect But to make no digression The manner of publishing our Laws which is received amongst us doth not only seem to be the most sufficient but the most easy and commodious of all others viz. that the Laws signed and passed by the King by the consent of the Representatives of the whole Kingdom in the Houses of Parliament the Parliament being dissolved be committed to the presse and printed by the Kings Printer and in a known Character that no man may doubt but that the said Laws are lawfully made and sufficiently published VI. The third Doubt It being supposed that the Law is sufficiently published When doth iâ— begin to oblige the Subjects presently after the publication of it or some time afterwards I answer in the first place that it is beyond all controversie that those Laws in which a certain time of obligation is defined As soon as that time is arrived the said Laws begin presently to oblige and the obligation of them is perpetual unless there be a time for the obligation of them which in the same Laws is expressed or they become to be abrogated by a new Law or by a contrary custome And hence it is that according to the common consent of the Civil Lawyers the Laws of the Emperour being newly made do not oblige the Subjects of the said Empire unless after the space of two months after the promulgation of them because that this time by some Authority in the Novels as in all other of their Laws is to be observed is universaly prefixed defined for this intent that it is presumed that in the space of two months the knowledge of the said Law may easily be brought unto all the Subjects I say in the second place That in the Kingdoms and Common-wealths where nothing of any certainty is either defined by Law or received by custome concerning the time in which Laws new made do begin to oblige the said Laws having no certain time of obligation affixed to them do
clear indeed from the fault by reason of his invincible Ignorance which was impossible to be helped and consequently he ought to be free from the punishment which justly is due to no man but for the fault neverthelesse he shall not only sustain the Dammage by reason of the nullity of the Contract which he entred into but he is bound also to sustain it according to Conscience both by the force of obedience which is due unto the Law and by his reflection on the publick profit The like is to be determined in many other Laws of the like nature For examples sake In those Laws by which persons are disabled by which privileges are revoked In those Laws by which Usury is moderated and in those by which certain prices of things to be sold are constituted and in the like of which the Canonists and the Divines do treat at large Neither ought this seem to be unjust to any man for although a Dammage be sometimes called a Punishment it is only analogically and very improperly for otherwise there is a great difference betwixt a Dammage and a Penalty or punishment properly so called If an innocent person be punished a great injury is done unto him but often it comes to passe that an innocent person may be dammaged and yet no great injury done unto him And thus much as conduceth to our present purpose may suffize to be spoken of the promulgation of the Law X. In the next place we are to speak of the penal Law in which many things being omitted which unprofitably are accustomed to be disputed by many of the Casuists and which pertain rather to the external and pleading Courts as that of the Canonists and Papists than to the internal Court of Conscience we shall be contented to give a view unto you of some few and the most remarkable of them and which most neerly we conceive do conduce to the Government of Conscience In this kind we meet first of all with this doubt Whether the Constitution of the punishment doth any wayes pertain to the Essence of the Law I answer It seemeth that it doth not as something that is extrinsecally requisite to compleat the Essence of it so that the Law were not a Law if the penalty were not annexed to it but only consequently as something necessary to this that the Law may effectually obtain the end which it intended For the Form and Essence of the Law consisteth in the Precept of it I here understand Precept as it is largely taken to comprehend a prohibition with it as in the Scriptures are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and amongst the Divines as well Negative Commandments as Affirmative are commonly called Precepts And from this Precept alone both the powers do depend which we have said to be in the Law viz. the power of directing the Action and of obliging the Consciences of the Subjects For the Subject hath a sufficient Rule according to which he ought to direct his Actions and to the observation whereof unlesse he will be wanting in his duty he is bound in Conscience as soon as he understands that his lawful Superior hath commanded this or that by Law whether there be any punishment annexed to that Law or not Therefore this necessity of annexing the punishment doth not arise from the Nature of the Law it self which consisteth in the meer Precept but that the Precept which of it self would not barely suffice Tatitè permittitur quod sâ—ne ultiâ—ne prohibetur Tert. 1. contra Marcion 26. may with the greater vigour obtain its effect from another double Hypothesis the one of the Subject the other of the End For it is expedient that the Laws should be most religiously observed which is the Hypothesis in respect of the End neverthelesse the inbred Depravity of mans heart being supposed w ch is another Hypothesis in respect of the Subject it can very hardly or almost never come to passe but that the most profitable Laws will be despised either by the negligence or the perversenesse of most men unlesse by fear they are contained within their bounds Qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt solo metu continentur Quintil. 12. Instit who make but a mock of the Dictates of Conscience From this double Hypothesis it comes to passe that the wisest Law-makers have alwayes judged it necessary and saving to the Common-wealth to add more force to the observation of the Laws by the fear of punishments and that after the example of God himself who pronounced not the first Law which he gave to man without the threatning of a punishment Gen. 3. Some good Citizens peradventure whose number are but few induced only by the Conscience of their Duty and their Love unto Virtue and their Country would render Obedience unto the Laws although there were no punishment propounded but the Turba or the greatest number are inforced only by the fear of punishment to the performance of their Duties It is manifest hereby that the Constitution of punishments in the making of Laws is necessary XI The second Doubt is concerning the obligation of the penal Law as to the extension of it whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the penalty or whether it obligeth unto the fault also Which is to demand if a Subject may so satisfie the Law and his Duty if being prepared to undergoe and by undergoing the penalty constituted by the Law he may be no longer guilty of the Delinquency although he observeth not the command of the Law Or whether for all that he is not bound in Conscience to the performance of that which is by the is Law commanded That more clearly and distinctly we may answer to this doubt it being a Question of great Moment and of which in the Common Lives of Men there is a most frequent use It will not be amisse the better to unfold it to premise some things which are very profitable before hand to be known We are to understand therfore in the first place that that positive Humane Law ought only to be called Penal which by the will of the Legislator doth expresly determine some temporal punishment for the Transgressors of it And in all this discourse as often as mention is made of punishment you are to understand no other but only a Temporal punishment This word Temporal punishment is taken in a twofold Consideration either as 't is opposed to the Spiritual or as it is opposed to Eternal punishment And for the most part in common discourse they are taken as Members contradistinct to one another sometimes Spiritual opposed to Temporal and sometimes Eternal unto Temporal there are therefore three kinds of punishments or if you will you may call them Species or manners of punishments or degrees of punishments For whatsoever comes under the name of punishment is first Either a spiritual punishment as the losse or the deprivation of Grace
of the friendship of God or of that inward joy and consolation which ariseth from the sence of his Grace and Love Or secondly it is â—n Eternal punishment which consisteth partly in the Eternal Deprivation of the beatifical vision of God and Christ and partly in the eternal Torments of Hell Or thirdly it is a temporal punishment distinguished from both the former which pertaineth to the state of this present life and hath relation only to the body and external things neither doth it take away of it self and necessarily either the sence of the Grace of God or the Hope of everlasting life Temporal punishments of this nature are the losse of money Banishment Imprisonment or Fines set on the head of any one courgings and many of the like and lastly death it self Those punishments which are the chiefest and of most frequent use may be reduced to these heads Death Banishment Confication of goods and Imprisonment XII In the second place we are to understand that punishment as it is opposed to the fault is taken again two wayes For sometimes it is taken largely and materially as it is opposed to it in a contrary opposition that is as it is another Species condividing the same Genus And so every Evil that befalleth any man which is not malum culpae the Evil of the fault is called a punishment or malum Poene the Evil of punishment although it be not inflicted on him who indureth it for any fault going before but casually or by injury it may happen to him so a suddain Disease mony taken away by theft a Wound given by a thief goods lost by fire or Shipwrack and all kind of Hurt or Dammage which is grievous to indure is to be numbred amongst things penal and to come under the name of punishment Sometimes the word punishment is taken more strictly and as it were formally as it is opposed to the fault in a relating opposition that is as it is inflicted on a man for a preceding fault As if a man should be mulcted fourfold for the goods of another taken away by Theft or should be banished for sedition And this is the proper the former the improper signification of the word penalty or punishment for punishment is improperly so called when no fault did go before it From hence proceeded that most known Definition of punishment that it is Supplicum quo quis proper delictum afficitur It is a punishment with which any man is inflicted for a fault Secondly in this present disputation we intend to debare on both the significations of the word as the nature of the discourse shall require But the last is the chiefest for it is called a penal Law not so much in the respect of the DaÌ„mage or the Hurt w ch can come unto any man by occasion of the Law that peradventure justly â—hough without any fault of his as in respect of the punishment w ch by the determination of the Law is appointed for those who do trangress it XIII In the third place we are to know That in penal Laws some are purely penal and others mixed A Law purely penal is when in the simple ordination of it it only appoints the punishment and neither by commanding or forbidding doth expressly enjoyn any thing For examples sake suppose there be a Law which giveth power to the Inhabitants of any City or Town to choose every year one of the most remarkable of the Citizens to be their Mayoâ— or Bayliff this clause being added to the find Law The Citizen who is chosen and shall refuse the place shall be fineà one hundred pounds This Law is purely penal because it ordains a punishment for those who shall refuse to undertake that office nevertheless it commandeth no man to undertake it nor forbiddeth any man to refuse it A penal Law that is mixed is when it commandeth any thing to be done or forbideth any thing the penalty being added that is to be inflicted on the Transgressors For Examples sake let us suppose a Law to be declared in this or the like Form Let no man presume to transport any of the Merchandize of this Nation into a forain Kingdom or to sell any forain Merchandize in any place of this Kingdom unless be paeyeth the accustomed Tribute he who shall 〈◊〉 otherwise shall suffer the loss of the Merchandize he vendeth This is a penal Law because it hath a penalty annexed to it nevertheless it is not purely penal but mixed for under that penalty it commandeth the Customs to be paid and forbiddeth the exportation or the selling of Wares the Customs not payed Some there are who think that there is a third kind of a penal Law to be added to these two which containeth at once both the command and the punishment but neither of them positively and specially but both of them disjunctively and indifferently For examples salte let there be a Law under this Form Being chosen by the Commonalty of the City either undergoe the Office of the Mayor or chief Magistrate or pay a hundred pound There needs not for this cause that any new Species should be added For the Species of things are not to be multiplyed without necessity And this disjunctive Form of propounding the Law ought to be referred to that which is purely penal for in it self it containeth no absolute command if you allege Of these two things though neither of them is commanded definitely yet both of them are commanded indefinitely I easily may reply to command indefinitely and under a disjunction to speak properly is no more to command than to say that the picture of a man iâ— a man This disjunctive Law therefore as I have said is purely penal which is manifest by the compared Form of the examples For if the Law-maker shall put forth the Edict in this manner He who being elected shall refuse the Mayoralty shall pay one hundred pound or in this manner being elected either be Mayor or pay one hundred pounds it is all one There is in both the same sence the same force of the words and one the same obâ—igation XIV In the fourth place we are to know that between an obligation to the fault and an obligation to the temporal punishment there is no necessary Connexion or certainly not so neeessary that it may be also reciprocal There is a necessary Consequence indeed from a Temporal punishment properly so called to the fault And this Argument therefore is of force Peter is to be punished by the Law therefore Peter hath committâ—d a fault But from a temporal punishment properly so called suppose any dammage or the like the fault is not necessarily inferred For a man without any fault of at all his own may be obliged to a losse as already we have said Neither is the Consequence reciprocal from the fault to the temporal punishment For it may so come to passe that a man may be obliged to the fault and yet not be
intention but unprofitable to the publick nay in some sence obnoxious yet the Subject is bound to obey it provided it be made by just Authority and the matter of the Law or the thing commanded be such that it may be done without Sin The reason is because every man ought to be careful and diligent in the performance of that which belongs to his own part Gal. 6. 5. and not too scrupulous of what concerns another For every man shall bear his own Burthen If a Law-giver shall be wanting in his Duty what is that to you Do you perform your Office howsoever As for his intentions whether they be right or not let himself look to it for he must give to God an account of all his actions and intentions And do you look to your self for if you shall refuse to obey him you shall give to the same God an account of your disobedience XII The fourth Dout of the Changing of Laws if they seem to be unprofitable or obnoxious to the Common-wealth whether and how far the Change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be required and urged by the People The reason of the Doubt in one respect is because in a body Civil as in a body natural every change especially if it be sudden and great is dangerous and on the other side because it concerns the Common-wealth that the Laws be accommodated to the Times and Customes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 4. Phys text 128. and if the one doth change that the other be changed with them For answer to this I say in the first place it is certain that the Laws may be changed yea and sometimes that they ought to be changed for they have heretofore been changed with great profit to the Common-wealth therefore they may now be changed again and may be so in all future times if occasion shall require it shall be found profitable to the Commonwealth And why may not that be lawful to be done again which hath been lawful heretofore There are every day new emergencies new inconveniencies new evils and if there are not new Laws made to redresse them there will be no remedy Arist 2. And all men saith Aristotle seek not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 8. And if heretofore it were expedient that a Law should be made because it was profitable to the Commonwealth it being found afterwards by the change of the conditions of Times and manners to become unprofitable why is it not expedient that it should be taken away again XIII I say in the second place That the change of particular Laws is not without danger and therefore not to be attempted unlesse it be upon some great and urgent necessity Aristotle acutely and briefly as his custom is produceth divers reasons 2. Poli. 8. These three are the chiefest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These often changes do very much derogate from the authority of the Law and the Law-giver As we conceive that person to be of a very slender and weak judgement who for no sound or evident reason is easily enduced to change his Opinion Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It maketh the people wanton and petulant This is true enough we not long since have had the experience of it and apt to fly at any thing if they shall find their Law-giver easy on this account and departing from his own right to humour the Votes and unsatisfied desires of the people Therefore the chief Philosopher most gravely and deservedly doth reprove the Law of Hippodamus a Law-maker of Miletum viz. That whosoever had discovered or found out something profitable to the City should be recompenced for his good service with a publick reward This Law was specious enough at the first sight and plausible to the people but look throughly into it and you will find nothing in it either of prudence or safety or Advantage For what could be found more dangerous to disturb the publick Peace than that factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit under the shaddow of a publick good should not only occasion the subversion of the Laws but also call in question the Form of the whole Civil Government and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of Government according to the humour of their own Invention Do you hear I beseech you a Philosopher famous in his times or rather a Prophet and a foreteller of the manners and the times in which now we live Gravâ—ora inserre vulnera dum minoâ—â—bus medeâ—i defidâ— amus Ambros 2. Oâ—sic 2. Thirdly the Innovation of Laws being ordained for the removing of some present Inconvenience and being it may come to passe and oftentimes it doth so come to passe that from this suddain Immutation many and more grievous Inconveniencies may arise though not peradventure at the first discovered the most grave Philosopher did judge it to be far safer to tolerate endure some Inconveniencies and those not slight ones neither in a Common wealth which may be avouched of the Church also which is a kind of a Common-wealth than in pretence of Reformation either Ecclesiastical or Political to cancel old Laws Statutes turn all things upside down Of a far different judgment to those of our times were the wise men of former Ages whose Rules Principles were as are here these folowing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Malum benè positum non est movendum Imperiti medici est pejus malo remedium adhibere an Evil well placed is not to be removed It is the part of an unskilful Physician to apply a Remedy worse than the disease XIV I say in the third place That although the changing of Laws may seem to be necessary by reason of some great and evident Cause yet it is not to be attempted by the people without the consent of the Prince but modestly they are to crave and patiently to expect it of him and this may aptly be collected from the Analogy of the Head and the Members for how like a monster were it and destructive to the whole body if the Arms the Breast or the Feet should assume unto themselves the office of the Head This is abundantly enough demonstrated in those things which not long since we declared to you when we spake of the efficient Cause of Laws viz. That the principal Act of Jurisdiction cannot be exercised but by him only who is the Head and chief of the whole Commonalty Therefore the Constitution the abrogation and any Immutation of Laws whatsoever which are all of them the principal Acts of the chiefest Jurisdiction cannot pertain unto the people unless where the people are Prince as in a State Democratical but to him only who doth exercise a Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Commonalty in a State Monarchical and who hath the undoubted power of a transcendent Command by himself In a businesse of so great an importance the duties of the people are these
which is spoken of the people in the first sence to be accommodated to them in the latter There is no sober man will deny that the safety of the people that is of the whole Commonalty as that word comprehends the King together with the Subjects is the supreme Law But that the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects the King being excluded is the supreme Law there is no man will affirm it unless he be a fool or an Imposter A fool if he doth believe what he himself saith and an Imposter if he doth not believe it But if any man will seriously look into the original of this Aphorism I do believe he will more easily grant that it ought more precisely to be understood of the safety of the Prince than of the safety of the Subjects This saying so tossed up and down in the mouths of all men came to us from the Romans and was then used by them when their Republick did flourish most of all under a popular State And there is no great Reason that any man should wonder that the peoples Safety was the supreme Law with them with whom the people themselves were the supreme Power In the Judgment therefore of those wise Antients who were the first Authors of this Aphorism the safety of the supreme Power was the supreme Law of the people indeed in a Democracy but of a King in Monarchy XVIII I say in the second place it being admitted but not granted that this Aphorism is properly understood of the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects it is nevertheless perversly wrested to the prejudice of Regal Dignity which even so doth render its Power more ample and illustrious In this sence A King that gives Lawes and Statutes to his people will not be so bound up by his Laws that it shall not be lawful for him the Safety of the Common-wealth being in an apparent danger to provide for the Safety of Kingdom and people committed to him by God even against the words of the Law Not that it is lawful for Subjects under the pretence of the defence of their liberty to break all the bonds of Laws and fidelity and by an intollerable presumption to trample on the Authority of their King but that it is lawful for the Prince in the preservation of his own his Subjects Safety to lay aside for a while all strict observance of the Laws to make use a little of an arbitrary Right lest by a too unseasonable and superstitious Reverence of the Laws he may suffer both his own person and his people that are subject to him and even the Laws themselves to fall into the Power of his Enemies XIX I say in the third place it being again admitted but not granted that by this Aphorism some licence were indulged to the Subjects themselves as necessity so requiring to lay by the Laws to provide for the publick Safety yet from hence that cannot be inferred which may would conclude For it is not lawful for the Subjects when they find their liberty in any thing to be injured or when they cry out they are sensible of it to break through all Bars of Laws and Duty and without the knowledge of their Prince to have immediately their recourse to Arms and to fill all things with tumults seditions But when the defence of their Princes their own liberties against all forein or domestick Enemies upon an urgent necessity doth so call them to it that a pious a prudent man would make no doubt of it but if the Law-maker himself was present he would dispense with his own Laws it is then lawful for the Subjects to have a greater regard of the Common safety which is the supreme Law and the end of all Laws than to be fearful to prejudice any particular Laws which were therefore made to be subservient only to the publick safety XX. The sum of all is The safety of the Common-wealth that is to say of the Prince and of the Subjects is the supreme Law to which all inferiour Laws are so to submit that present necessity so requiring it is lawful for the Prince by the prerogative of his own power yea and it is lawful for the Subjects the consent of their Prince being according unto reason presumed to recede sometimes from the words of particular Laws to assist their indangered Country and to be careful of its safety as the supreme Law but so that unless the will and consent of the supreme power be expresly obtained or according unto reason presumed they are not to attempt any thing under the pretence of the publick safety and liberty but what the Laws do permit them to XXI There are not a few Doubts that are yet remaining which in some manner do pertain to this Final Cause as concerning Privileges and Dispensations and the Relaxation of the obligation in the danger of life and others of the same nature which unto some may peradventure appear not altogether to agree with the End of Humane Laws The Solution whereof I have thought it more expedient for to deferre unto another time although never so long than by too much prolixity to tire and to torment so attentive and so courteous an Auditory THE TENTH LECTURE In which that most vulgar Speech The safety of the People is the Supreme Law is more largely examined and unfolded that it may more rightly be understood 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and Holiness I At this time and place if peradventure you do remember it Courteous Readers did intend to finish compleat this Treatise concerning both the obligations of Conscience to wit the Passive and the Active In the unfolding of the former having in first place and in a Scholastical manner excussed the Definition of Conscience I was as elabourate as I could be in examining and discovering that proper and Adequate Rule of Conscience from the directions whereof it ought to exercise all and every one of its Acts both of Dictating and Judging It was then represented to you that the Holy Scripture was the principal part of that Rule we held forth but the Adaequate part was that Will of God which the School-men call the Will of the sign in some degree made manifest to every man whether first by an inbred light by Practical Principles preserved in the Synteresis and known by themselves which the Philosophers 〈◊〉 Common Notions and the Apostle the Law of God written in our hearts Or secondly by an inferred Light by some external Revelation partly extraordinary and private to some single persons by visions dreams c. at sundry times and in sundry manners Partly ordinary and made publick to all mankind in the written word Or lastly by an acquired light by conclusions rightly and duely drawn from those practical principles or from the written word of God or
some suddain and unexpected Emergencies those Laws may be defective in some particular cases not foreseen And in this Case if there be not a person orsome persons to exercise a kind of an arbitrary Power there will be no other effectual Remedy to relieve the endangered Country and provide for the publick safety And this is the reason why wise men have always determined and Reason also perswadeth to it that in exigent points of necessity Legal Justice ought to give place to Equity Equity according unto Aristotle being nothing else then the rectifying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist ibâ—d or the correcting of legal justice or even of the Law it self as presently afterwards he explains that Definition by supplying its defect in particular cases in which it comes to pass that by too much generality it falls short of either Justice or the publick Profit For it is necessary that Laws should be constituted generally out of a respect to those things which generally and for the most part are done but not out of a respect to all those things which may be contingent in particulars in many of which if Laws were strictly and by a praesâ—ript of words accommodated they must necessarily be defective also and fall short of either moral Justice or of Common Profit or of both of them XVII This being then granted that the safety of the People that is the publick profit doth require that there be some Authority in the Common-wealth which is to be above the Laws and to supply the defects thereof it will necessarily follow by Consequence Aistot 3. which Aristotle asserteth in his politicks Polit II. that this supreme Authority cannot appertain to any one else than to him alone who is set over the whole Commonalty and invested with the chiefest Power Whether he be a single person as in a monarchial Government or many as in other Forms of Common-wealths Shall it be lawful therefore now for Subjects under pretence of of publick liberty and safety to break all the Bonds Ordinances Laws and Fidelity and by an intolerable rage of Pride 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to tread under their Feet the Authority of Laws and Princes and for the Defence of so great a Villany impudently to abuse and pervert that Aphorism which thoâ—e factious men are always boasting of and repeating to one another viz. Salus populi est suprema Lex Homer Illiad â— The safety of the people is the supreme Law How comes it to pass that on the contrary they will not understand that even by the very same Axiom it is acknowledged that the Prince hath a Power even over the Laws themselves so that it is lawful for him out of the fulnesse of his Power if necessity compels and the Affairs admit of no delay for the defence of his own and his Peoples safety against forein or domestick Enemys to lay aside for awhile the stricter observation of the Laws lest by a too superstitious and too unreasonable Reverence of them he suffers both himself and his people and at last the Laws themselves to fall into the power of his Enemies XVIII As to that Question whether a Ptince be free himself from the Laws he hath made which are confirmed and approved by the Consent of the People received by common Use and how far he is bound ordinarily to observe them I shall hereafter God willing give you my Judgement therein It is now only here demanded whether it be lawful for him without order and in case of necessity for the defence of his Country to do some thing either besides or against the Law it self That it is lawful for him so to do and that in good Conscience he may do it it is first proved by the Examples of the best Kings and by the Histories of all Nations that have been remarkable throughout the world And secondly Reason it self doth dictate it from the defect of the Laws in respect of the whole and from the uncertainty and multiplicity of particular events both which but even now I mentioned And thirdly those things do sufficiently prove it which are allâ—ged by Sam. on the Right of Kings 1. Sam. 6. which cannot well be interpreted otherwise although many in vain have attempted so to do But that the least scruple may not arise nor remain from any thing which hath here been spoken and is misunderstood Give me leave I pray you to call back this so divulged an Axiom to its first Original And if I shall not so perform it that you your selves may confesse that the Care of the publick safety the Laws somtimes laid aside doth according to the meaning and sence of the Axiom it self depend wholly on the will of the Prince and nothing at all on the will of the People proclaim me to grow dark in the cleareâ— light and that I have hitherto been not the Defendor but a Prevaricator and Betrayer of the best of Causes XIX I have declared already that this Axiom was derived from the Romans unto us I shall now add that which first of all as I know of is written in the first Book of Marcus Cicero de Legib. But by himself as he affirmeth taken out of the antient Laws of that Nation and described by him in the very word of the Law it self Having therefore in the former explained the Laws belonging to Religion and the worship of the Gods in his third Book he proceeds to give an account of those which belong to the Magistrates and Common-wealth Where amongst other things he hath these words I must beseech you to give due attention to them Regio Impereo duo sunto iique praecundo judicando consulendo Praetores Judices Consules appellantor Militiae summum jus habento Nemini parento Ollis Salus Populi suprema Lex esto Let there be two in the Soveraign Command and for their going before Ruling or Judging and Counselling let them be called Praetors Judges and Consuls Let the chief Right of the Militia be theirs let them be under none Let the Safety of the People be a supreme Law unto them To them that is to them that are invested with the soveraign Command who had the chiefest Power of the Militia and acknowledged not any Power above their own to which they were to be obedient That is to the two Consuls who although by the Constitution of that Common-wealth did exercise only a yearly Magistracy yet for that time they had the chiefest Power over the City the greatest part of the world which was in Subjection to the Roman Empire Come hither all you whosoever you are who amongst these or other Nations are assertors and Patrons of popular Licence Read andâ— read overagain every period weigh every sentence clause and point Examine every word syllable and tittle Where will you find the Prince being unwilling the least sign of any Power granted to the Subject either of judging of the safety of the People or of
of that of St. Paul 1 Cor. 2. 11. which is the Theme and foundation of this present discourse What man knoweth the things of a man but the Spirit of man which is in him That is his own Conscience IIII. But most certain it is that the Latin word Conscientia Conscience and the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in all things is most responsible to the Latin did both of them receive their deâ—ivations a sciendo from knowing but a praeposition being added to both the words in the pronunciation of them doth seem to imply more then can hereby be contained in the single word Science but several Authors do give a several signification of it To omit those two allusions that by many are alleadged which if we look on the nature of the thing it self may peradventure be retained as altogether not improper but if brought to the exactness of a lawfull examination will presently appeare but vain and not worthy to be insisted on viz. that Conscientia est quasi cordis scientia Conscience is no more than the hearts consciousnes And Conscientia quasi concludens scientia Conscience is as it were a concluding Science It is most certain that those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Conscientia beyond the bare notion of a Science have a certain order and relation of that science to another for such is the force of the two particles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Con that in their composition they imply a certain conjunction and an association of many things so that this word Conscientia or Conscience may be said to be conjuncta multorum scientia a conjoyned science of many things which two ways may be understood For it may be said to be the science of many things in respect of the subjects as the science or the knowledge of many men that do know as when many persons do know the same thing or in respect of the objects when it is the knowledge of many things that are known as when the same person knows many things alike Let the word Conscience be taken either in the one sence or the other the account of the word neither much borrowed nor incongruous may be given whether we look on the thing it self or the use and manner of speaking amongst approved Authors V. For in the first place when many men know the same thing they may be said to be conscious of it and to know it altogether So those whom Catiline had chosen into the society of his wickedness and were made partakers of his counsels were said to be conscious of that conspiracy And he is said to be conscious of the Kings secrets to whom his privy counsels are intrusted Ascitus in conscientiam facinoris saith Tacitus Drawn in into the conscience of the villany Mrrtial 12. 24. O si conscius esset hic Avitus saith Martial in his Epigrams Juven Sat. 14. O that this man were conscious of it and Conscia Matri Virgo fuit the Daughter was conscious to what the Mother did And Meorum omnium consiliorum periculorumque testis conscius et adjutor saith Cicero in his orations A Conscious witness and a helper to me in all my counsels and dangers I should here be infinite if I should collect whatsoever to this purpose I every where do meet with in the Authors of greatest reputation But that may serve which already is alledged unless peradventure you exact of me to produce something from the puddle of the Grammarians which may conduce to this purpose I will do it not that the authority of those men is so much to be valued but because in these things they seem as it were by right to arrogate a kind of preâ—eminence to themselves In the first place hear Nonius In hoc differunt saith he Scius conscius scius secum conscius cum alio scius est That is the knowing or scious man doth differ in this froÌ„ the conscious the scious knows by himself the Conscious is scious with another From this original of the word they who thought that Conscience was so called as one Science with another doe give this reason for their opinion that man not only knows what things he hath committed but he hath God who searcheth the heart and the reins to be a conscious witness and an inspector into all his works nay into his most secret thoughts And this is most certain though words be tongue-tyed and the Voyce be dumb Behold my witnesse is in the Heavens and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 my Record that is conscious of me is on high Job 16. 19. The blessed Apostle also St. Paul in the ninth of the Romans and the first when he had called on God to be the witnesse of the truth he was about to speak he presently subnecteth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 my Conscience bearing me witnesse As if he should have said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Christ knows it and I know it with him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Christ doth testify it and my Conscience doth aâ—â—est it with him Let this therefore be the first reason of the derivation of the word that Conscience is so called because the deeds of Man are known unto God as well as to himself VI. In another sence the Conscience is called the conjoyned Science of many things as of Objects or of things that are known when a man knoweth many things at once or which strikes on the same string when he conjoyneth and joyntly applyeth the knowledges of several things that are in themselves distinct From whence proceedeth this second reason of the word which pleased much St. Thomas of Aquine and a great part of the Schoolmen and which seeming to be deservedly preferred above the other already mentioned doth bear no unprofitable light to illustrate the Nature and the force of Conscience which is that Conscience is so called because it addeth Science unto Science that is the universal knowledge or the knowledge of Law and Right to the particular knowledge or the knowledge of the fact by applying one unto the other I shall make this more manifest to you by one or by two examples in the first of Samuel the 24 Chapter and the 50 Verse it is said that Davids Heart did fail him after that in the Cave he had cut off the wing of Sauls Garment that is to say his Conscience did prick him for we may imagine that David thus reasoned within himself I know that I ought not to offer any violence to the Sacred Person of the King I know also that very lately I have done that which commeth very near unto violence I am afraid therefore that I have done that which peradventure I ought not to have done and I give thanks unto God who held back my hand from acting that which certainly I ought not to have committed In this manner also the Conscience of Judas the Betrayer did object unto him Thou knowest that thou oughtest not to betray thy Master