it s not so ordein'd to last long when it rests upon the shoulders of one man well may it indure being committed to the care of many to whom it belongs to maintain it For even so as many are not proper for the framing of one thing because all of them hit not on the true good of it by reason of their several opinions among them so after they have known it neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage And that Romulus was one of those who for the death of his brother and companion might be excus'd and that what he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition it appears in that he forth with ordain'd a Senate with whom he might take counsell and by their opinions be advis'd And he who considers well the Authority Romulus reserv'd himself will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies when they had resolv'd on War and to assemble the Senate which was apparent afterwards when Rome became free upon the banishment of the Tarquins whereupon the Romans were never brought in any new order unless that in lieu of a King during life they made two Consuls yearly Which confirms that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Government then to one absolute and Monarchical To verifie the thing abovesaid we might bring many examples as Moses Lycurgus Solon and other founders of Kingdomes and Commonwealths who could well having an absolute power in their hands ordain laws for the common good but I will let them pass as well know I shall alleadg only one not so famous but well worthy their consideration who desire to be good Law-makers which is That Agis King of Sparta advising to reduce the Spartans within those bounds the Laws of Licurgus had included them thinking that because they had broken out of that strictness his City had lost very much of the ancient vertue and by consequent of force and government was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the Spartan Ephores as one that aim'd to possess himself of the Tyranny But Cleomenes afterwards succeeding him in the Kingdom upon his reading of Agis Records and Writings which fell into his hands he understood his intention and grew desirous himself to bring the same thing to pass but found it was impossible to do that good to his Country unless he became absolute of authority it seeming to him by reason of mens ambition that he was unable to do good to many against the will of a few And taking a fit opportunity at length hee brought in all the Ephores and every one else that could withstand him and afterwards restor'd into force Licurgus his Lawes Which deliberation had bin able to have a new reviv'd Sparta and gain'd Cleomenes the reputation Licurgus had if then the Macedons power had not grown so vast and the other Grecian Republick been so weake For after such order given being set upon by the Macedons and finding himself single too weak to deale with them there being none could give him assistance was overcome and his project though just and commendable became unperfect Wheresore upon the weighing of all these things together I conclude it necessary that a founder of a Republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority and that Romulus for the death of Remus and Tatius deserves rather excuse than blame CHAP. X. As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are exceedingly praise-worthy so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy AMongst all commendable men those deserve esteem in the first place who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship and true Religion the next belongs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms After those are they famous that commanding over Armies have inlarg'd either their Kingdom or Country To these wee may adjoyn learned men And because they are of different dignities every one of them are valued according to their degree And to all other men whose number is infinite wee use to give that share of commendations which their Art and Skill deserves On the contrary infamous are they and execrable that are the perverters of Religion the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republicks enemies of vertue and learning and of any other art that brings profit and renown to mankind as also are the irreligious the mad-braind the ignorant the slothful and base And there will never be any so foolish or so wise so mischievous or so good that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him will not commend that which is commendable and blame the blameable Notwithstanding seeing that the most part as it were beguiled by counterfeit good and vain glory suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame then praiseâ— And having meanes with their perpetual honor to frame a Republick or Kingdom yet affect they a Tyranny neither are they advis'd by this course what reputation what glory what honor security quiet and satisfaction of mind they flie from and into what infamy dispraise blame danger and unquietness they plunge themselves And it is impossible that they that live private men in a Common-wealth or that by fortune or by their vertues become Princes if they read the histories or make any account of antiquities therein related that those private men I say had not rather be Scipioes in their native Country than Cesars and those that are Princes rather Agesilaus Timoleon or Dion than Nabis Phalaris or Dionysius for they would perceive these execedingly in all mens hatred and these as much beloved They would see also how Timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their Country then had Dionysius or Phalaris but they would find also they had far more security Nor let any be deeeived by Cesars glory seeing his memory much celebrated by writers for they that Praise him were corrupted by his fortune and frighted by the continuance of the Empire which being govern'd under that name gave not writers leave to speak freely of him But he that would know what free writers would say of him let him look upon that they say of Cataline and Cesar is so much the more to be disprais'd in that he executed the ill the other did but intend Let him see also how much they praise Brutus so that not daring to blame the other because of his power they attributed much honor to his Enemy Let him consider also him that is become Prince in a Republick what praises after Rome was made an Empire those Emperors rather deserv'd that liv'd under the Laws as good Princes than they that went a contrary course to them and he shall find that Titus Nerva Trajan Adrian and Antonius and Marcus had no need of Praetorian soldiers nor a multitude of the legions to guard them for their own vertues the good will of the people and the love of
are wary not to lose what they have already gotten I say that Marcus Menenius being made Dictatour and Marcus Follius General of the horse both Plebeyans to inquire after certain conspiracies which were made in Capua against Rome authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consuâ—ship and the other great honours of the City whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as against them they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means but the Plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees and particularly accused the Dictatonr and so powerfull was the accusation that Menenius in a publick assembly where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him quit the Dictatourship and submitted himself to the tryal which was made before the People and after his cause was heard he was absolved where it was argued whether savour'd more of ambition either he that would maintain or he that would gain for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest because men think they hold not surely what they have unless they make a new addition of somewhat else and besides this the larger territories they are Master of the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect and this also may we adde that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not a desire to have or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours which they see others use ill CHAP. VI. Whether in Rome there could have been â—uch a State founded as would quite haâ—â— taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate WEE have discours'd upon the effects which the differences betwixt the People and the Senate made Now they continuing till the Gracchies where they occasion'd the ruine of the common liberty some man would wish that Rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did without those jarres in her Yet it seems worthy the consideration to see if it were possible so to frame a State in Rome as could void all differencesâ— and if a man would examin this he should have recourse to those Republiques which without so many fallings out and bickerings have been long free and see what kind of State theirs was and whether Rome were capable of it An example among the ancients is Sparta among the modernes Venice both by me formerly named Sparta made it self a King with a little Senate to govern it Venice divided not the government with the names but in one general tearm all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen which chance rather cast on them then the deliberation of their founder for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks where now stands that City upon the occasions foretold when they were grown to such a number that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain Lawes they appointed a forme of government and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there from all power in State affaires And in success of time finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government to give them reputation that govern'd they call'd them Gentlemen and the others Plebeyans So that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any for when it was first made every one that dwelt at Venice did equally partake of the Government so that none could complain they who afterwards came to inhabit there finding the State setled and limited had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult there was no occasion because nothing was taken from them and the meanes they had not because they that govern'd kept them in subjection nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take authority upon them Add hereunto that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice were not many nor of so great a number that there was disproportion between the Governors and those that were governed for the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them or greater then they were so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity Sparta as I said was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate and might well maintain it self so a long time because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants and they having seis'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus Lawes took away quite all occasion of discord so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement for Lycurgus by his Laws ordain'd in Sparta more equality of estates and less of dignities for here poverty was to all alike and the Plebeyans less ambitious for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens and were held apart from the People neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them This eame from the Spartan Kings who being plac'd in that Principality and set in the midst of that Nobility had no surer means to maintain their dignity stedfast then to defend the People from injurious oppressions which made the People that it neither feared nor affected the Government and not having the rule nor fearing it the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided and all occasion of tumults and in this sort they might live in peace a long time But two principal things caus'd this agreement because the inhabitants of Sparta were few and therefore might be govern'd by few the other because not accepting of strangers into their Republick they had not occasion either of being corrupted or making great increase so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them Wherefore considering these things it appears that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients if they desir'd to maintain it quicker like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of either not to imploy the common people in War as the Venetians or not admit strangers into the City as the Spartans both of which they did which gave the people force and increase and sundry occasions of tumults So that if the Roman State grew more quiet this inconvenient follow'd that it was also weaker because it disabled it self of the means to come
wherewith together with his power he may comprehend their safety in general And when a Prince does this and that the people perceive it that by no accident he breaks those laws they will begin in a short time to live secure and content Wee have an example of the Kingdom of France which continues not in quiet by other means than that their Kings are tyed to many laws wherein the security of all his people is containd And he that was the founder of that State ordain'd that the Kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures but with all other matters they had nothing to do but they were at the laws appointment That Prince therefore or Republick which secures not themselves at their entrance into the government ought at least take hold of the first occasion as the Romans did He that lets that pass repents himself too late of not having done what he should The people of Rome being not as yet debauch't when they recovered their liberty might well maintain it when Brutus his sonnes were slain and the Tarquins dead by those remedies and orders which we have at several times recounted But had the people been corrupted neither in Rome nor any where else could they have found means strong enough to preserve it as in the Chapter sollowing we shall shew CHAP. XVII A disorderly people getting their liberty cannot keep themselves free without very great difficulties I think it necessarily true that either the Kings were to be expelled out of Rome or else Rome it self would have grown feeble and of no worth for considering how exceedingly the Kings were corrupted if after that rate two or three successions had followed and that corruption that was in them had distended it self throughout the members so that they likewise had received of the corruption it had been impossible ever to have reformed it But losing the head when the body was sound it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government And this should be presupposed for certain that a debaucht City living under a Prince though that Prince with all his stock be rooted out yet can it not become free but rather fall still into the hands of new Lords who continually make an end one of another And without the creation of some new Prince they shall never have an end unless he by his goodness and valour maintain them free But their liberty is of no longer conyinuance than his life as was that oâ— Syracusa for Dions and Timoelons lives whose vertues in several times while they liv'd kept that City free so soon as they were dead it fell into the former servitude We find not a braver example then that of Rome which upon the Tarquins banishments could presently lay hold off and maintaine that liberty But Caesar being slain C. Caligula Nero and the whole race of the Caesars blotted out it could not not onely keep no not so much as give a beginning to their liberty Neither did so great variety of accidents in one and the same citie proceed from other than that when the Tarquins were expell'd the people of Rome were not toucht with this corruption and in these latter times they were throughly infected For then to settle their mindes in a resolution against Kings it was enough to take an oath of them that never any King should raigne at Rome But in the after ages the authority and severity of Brutus with all the Orientall Regions were not of force to hold them in disposition to maintain that Liberty which he like the first Brutus had restored them Which sprung from that corruption which Marius his faction spread among the people whereof Caesar coming to be the Chiefe could so blind that multitude that they could not perceive the yoke which he himself put on their neck And though this example of Rome be better than any other yet will I alleadge to this purpose some people known in our dayes And therefore I say that no meanes could ever bring Milan or Naples to their freedome by reason of the infection of all their members Which appeared after the death of Philip Visconti when Milan desiring to recover her liberty neither was able nor knew how to keepe it Yet that of Rome was a great happiness that their Kings grow naught suddenly that they were banisht and that before the infection was gone down into the bowels of that Citie which was the occasion that those many tumults which were raised in Rome men doing it to a good end did not hurt but help the Commonwealth And we may make this conclusion that where the matter is corrupted lawes though well made profit little unless they have such a maker that with strong hand forces obedience to them till the matter become good which whether it hath ever happened I know not or whether it be possible it can happen for it is plain as a little before I said that a City declining by corruption of matter if ever it chances to rise again it is meerly by the vertue of one man who is then living and not by the vertue of the generality that keepes the good lawes in force and suddenly when that man is dead it returnes to the old guise as it came to pass at Thebes which by the vertue of Epaminondas while he liv'd could subsist in forme of a Republique and government but he being gone it fell into the former disorders The reason is because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccustome them to the ill and accustome them throughly to the good And if one man of a very long life or two vertuous Governors successively continued do not dispose of them to good when one of them failes as I have said before they are presently ruined unless the other with many dangers and much bloudshed recover them out of destruction For that corruption and unfitness for freedome arises from an inequality that is in the City and if a man would reduce it to equality he must use many extraordinary wayes which few know or will serve themselves of as other where more particularly shall be said CHAP. XVIII In what manner in a corrupted City a free state may be maintained being gotten or how when they have it not it may be gotten and well order'd I Thinke it will not be out of the way nor disagreeing to the former discourse to consider whether in a City disordered a free State can be preserv'd that being there a soot already or not being there how it may be attain'd and then reduc'd to good order Whereupon I say that it is very hard to do the one or the other and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the corruption yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing I shall not let this pass And I presuppose a city corrupted in extremity from whence I shall come
Servius Tullus was nothing wise to think that Tarquins sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law whose King they thought by right they ought to be And this desire of reigning is so great that it not only enters their breasts that look to succeed in the Kingdome but they also who no waies expect it As in Tarquinius his wife Servius his young daughter who would wish this rage against that piety shee ought her father set her husband against him to take his life from him and his Kingdome thereby so much more accounted she to be a Queen than the daughter of a King If then Tarquininus Priscus and Servius Tullus lost the Kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurpd Tarquinius the proud lost it for not observing the ancient Kings Customes as shall be shewd in the Chapter following CHAP. V. What it is that makes a King lose his Kingdome which he enjoyes by right of inheritance TArquinius the proud having stain Servius Tullus and of him no heirs remaining behind came to possess the Kingdom securely having no cause to feare those things that had hurt his predecessours And however his way of getting the Kingdom had been so extraordinary and odious yet had he observd the ancient customes of the other Kings he would have been borne with nor would the Senate nor the Commonalty have risen against him to wrest the State out of his hands Hee was not then banished because his son Sextus ravisht Lucretia but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdome and ruld tyrannously having taken all authority from the Senate and reserved it wholly to himself and those affaires which had been dispatcht in publick by the Senate of Rome with generall satssfaction he reduc'd to be treated in his own Palace which gain'd him both blame and envie so that in a very short time he despoyld Rome of all that liberty which she had alwaies maintained under others Nor was this enough to make the Senate his enemy but he provok'd the people also against him tiring them out in base mechanick services and such as were far different from that wherein his ancestors had imployd them so that having replenish'd Rome with examples of his cruelty and pride he had now dispos'd all the Romans minds to rebellion whensoever occasion should be off r'd And had not that accident of Lucretia fallen out so soon as any other should have chanc'd it would have produc'd the same effect for if Tarquinius had liv'd as the other Kings did and Sextus his son had committed that offence Brutus Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarquinius for revenge against Sextus and not to the people of Rome Therefore let Princes know that at the same houre they begin to lose the State when they begin to violate the Laws and those manners customs that are ancient under which men have liv'd a long time And in case they come to lose their State and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their Principalities who follow good counsell they themselves would much more lament their loss blame themselves more than others would for it is much easier to be belov'd by the good than by the bad to obey the Laws than command over them And if they would understand what course they were to take whereby to put this in practice and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good Princes take them for looking-glasses such as were Timoleon the Corinthian Aratus Sicioneus such like in whose lives they shall find security satisfaction as well of him that rules as of him that is ruled they would have a desire to become like them being able for the reasons alledgd to do so for men when they are well governd seek after no other liberty as it befell the people that were governd by the two were named before who were constraind to be Princes whiles they liv'd however they tryed many times to retire themselves to a private life And because in this the two precedent Chapters we have discoursed of humors stird up against Princes and of the conspiracy made by Brutus his sons against their Country of those against Tarquinius Priscus Servius Tullus methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following Chapter being a matter whereof Princes and private men may worthly take notice CHAP. VI. Of Conspiracies I Would not omit to discourse somewhat touching Conspiracies being they are dangerous for Princes and private men also for wee see that more Princes have lost their lives thereby and States too than by open war because few are able to make open war against Princes but every one may conspire against them On the other side private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this for it is full of difficulties and exceeding perillous every way From whence proceeds it that many of them are practisd but few succeed To the end there of that Princes may learn to beware of these dangers and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them I shall speak thereof more at large not omitting any thing remarkable that may serve for instruction of the one or the other And truly that of Tacitus is well termd a golden sentence where he saies that men are to reverence things past and submit to what is present and should wish for good Princes but whatsoever they are endure them and verily he who does otherwise ruines both himself and his Country Wee must then entring into the matter consider against whom Conspiracies are made and wee shall find they are plotted against amans Country or against his Prince of which two I intend this present discourse for touching those that are practis'd to deliver a Town into the enemies hands that besiege it or that have likelihood with this for any cause wee have already sufficiently spoken And wee will treat in this first part touching that against a Prince and first we will examine the reasons thereof which are many though one there is of more importance than all the rest And this is general hatred for that Prince that hath provok'd general hate must needs have netâ—ed some particulars somwhat more than others insomuch that they long to be revengd on him and they are the more incited hereto by the general hatred they find conceivd against him A Prince then ought to avoyd these publick blames and how he should behave himself to avoid them having treated otherwhere I will not now middle for if he beware well of them offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him one reason is because Princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extream hazard to revenge
every thing Chap. 26. It is very seldom that men know how to be altogether mischievous or altogether good Chap. 27. For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull to their Citizens then the Athenians Chap. 28. Whether of the two be more ungratefull people or a Prince Chap. 29. What means a Prince or Republ should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude and what a Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger Chap. 30. That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd for any error committed nor at all punish'd when either by their ignorance or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffered Chap. 31. A Prince or Republ. should not defer to do good unto men until their necessity require it Chap. 32. When an inconvenience is grown in a state or against a state it is better to bear with it for a while then presently to struggle with it Chap. 33. The Dictators authority did good and not harme to the Commonwealth of Rome and how authorities which the Citizens take upon them of themselves and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices are hurtfull to the government Chap. 34. The reason why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that Republique notwithstanding that it was made by publique and free voices Chap. 35. The Citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth ought not disdain the less as unworthy of them Chap. 36. What distastes the Agrarian law gave in Rome and that it is very â—ffâ—â—sive to make a law in a Commonwealth that looks far backwards and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the City Chap. 37. Weak Commonwealths are hardly drawn to a certain resolution and know not how to determine and the course they ordinarily take they are rather forc'd too then choose of themselves Chap. 38. The same accidents are seen to befall several People Chap. 39 The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome and what therein is to be noted where among many other things is considered how by the like accident a Republique may be preserved or suppressed Chap. 40. Of humble to become proud of mercifull cruell without passing through the due means between these extreams argues indiscretion and turns not to advantage Chap. 41. How easily men may be corrupted Chap. 42. They that fight for their own glory are the good and faithfull soldiers Chap. 43. A multitude without a head is unprofitable and a man should not first threaten and afterwards demand the power Chap. 44. It is a matter of very evill example when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it and it is very dangerous in a State to make a continual practice of cruel executions Chap. 45. Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another and first they ayme no further then that they themselves suffer no harme of others afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others Chap. 46. Men though they are deceived in generalities yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars Chap. 47. He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and very lewd or by one that is very noble and very good Chap. 48. If those Cities that have had their beginning free as Rome have found difficulty to make laws that can maintain them so those that have had their beginning immediatly servile find almost an impossibility Chap. 49. The power of stopping the publique actions of the City should not be given into the hands of one Council or one Magistracy Chap. 50. A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind which indeed meere necessity compells them to do Chap. 51. To stay the insolence of one that grows powerfull in a Commonwealth there is no way more secure and less offensive then to seize beforehand and so prevent him of those ways by which he attains to that power Chap. 52. The People deceived by a false shew of good oftentimes seek their own ruine and great hopes and large promises do easily move them Chap. 53. What authority the presence of a great and worthy personage hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude Chap. 54. How easily things are ordered in a City where the people is not corrupted and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principality and where that is not a Republique cannot be Chap. 55. Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or Countrey usually there are some prodigies that forerun them or men that foretel them Chap. 56. A Common people united are strong and vigorous but taken apart and separated vile and contemptible Chap. 57. The multitude is more wise and constant then a Prince Chap. 58. What confederation or league is rather to be trusted either that which is made with a Republique or that is made with a Prince Chap. 59. How the Consulship and every other magistracy in Rome was given without respect of age Chap. 60. The Table of the second book VVHich contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire either their vertue or their fortune Chap. 1. What people the Romans had to make warr withall and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty Chap. 2. Rome became a great City by ruining those that were near neighbors unto her and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignities Chap. 3. Republiques have taken three particular courses to amplify and inlarge their states Chap. 4. That the changes of Religions and languages together with the chances of flouds and pestilences abolish the memory of things Chap. 5. How the Romans proceeded in making of war Chap. 6. How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies Chap. 7. The occasions wherefore people leave their own native soyles and invade other countreys Chap. 8. Vpon what occasions wars are begun among Princes Chap. 9. Moneys are not the sinews of war according to the common opinion Chap. 10. It is not a match wisely made to joyn alliance with a Prince whose credit is greater then his strength Chap. 11. Whether it is better for a Prince fearing to be assaild by his enemy himself first to begin the war with him or to expect while it comes home to him Chap. 12. That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes rather by the help of guile then force Chap. 13. They are often deceived who think with humility to overcome pride Chap. 14. Weak States are alwaies irresolute in their determinations and slow deliberations are alwayes hurtful Chap. 15. How much the order used by our soldiers in these modern times differ from those of the ancients Chap. 16. What esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery and if the opinion which is generally conceived of it be true Chap. 17. How
others were built by some Prince not to make his seate there but for his glory and so was Alexandria by Alexander and because these cities have not their beginning free they seldome attain to that greatness as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdomes The like beginning had Florence whither it was built by Syllaes Souldiers or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesola who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian came down dwelt in the plain upon the Arne for it was built under the Romau government neither could it in the beginning make greater increase then what the Princes favour allow'd it The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free when any people either led by a Prince or of themselves are forc'd by contagion famine or war to abandon their native Soyle and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered as Moses did or build new as did Aeneas In this case appeares the ability of the founder and the fortune of the City founded the which is more or less admirable as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities which is seen in two kindes the first in choyce of the situation the second in making the lawes And because men act some things upon necessity others by their own election and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power it is to be consider'd whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance might live the better in agreement the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord as it was in Raugia and in many other Cities built in like places which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable of men were content to live of their own and not seek to rule over others but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle and to plant themselves in fruitful places where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them and over-master all that would oppose their greatness And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines the situation doth not and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries and apt to breed men given to Luxury loth to use that industry vertue requires and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers as by means of their strict discipline they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce such was the Kingdome of the Aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies the laws strictness prevail'd so far as there were bred by them many great personages and if time had not worne out their names it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise as did Great Alexauder and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us and whosoever had considered the Soldans Kingdome and the Mamalucks order with their military discipline before they were ruin'd by Selimus the great Turke would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises and therein have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory Dinocrates the Architect came to him and shewed him how it might be built upon Mount Athos which place besides that it would be strong he could so order that the City should be made in forme of a man which would be a wonder worthy his greatness and being askd again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet whereat having laught he left the mountain alone built Alexandria so that people might resort thither as well for the farness of the soyle as the commodity of of the sea and the River Nilus Whoever then shall examine the beginning of Rome if Aeneas be taken for the first founder it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers If Romulus among those that were built by the Natives And in what manner soever It were it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus Numa and others kept it under in an exact obedience as hereafter shall be said so that neither the fruitfulness of the country the commodity of the Sea the osten victories nor the vastness of the Empire could in many ages corrupt it but maintained it so eminent for vertue that never any commonwealth came near it And because those exploits she did and are recited by T. Livius were acted upon publique or private Counsel and either within or without the city I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice which I shall think worthy of remarke adding likewise all the dependences thereupon with which the first book or first part shall end CHAP. II. How many kinds of Commonwealths there are and what was that of Rome I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain serviâ—ude having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands either as a Commonwealth or as a Principality which have had as divers beginnings so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances for some either in their beginning or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone and that at once as the Spartans did theirs from Lycurgus others had their 's casually and at several times and upon occasion as Rome so that it is a great happiness for a Common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the State as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years And on the contrary that City may in some degree be termd unhappy which having not met with a judicious founder is forc'd to give it self a new frame and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances hath much mistaken the right way to perfection for
was the Principality Nobility and Commonalty as parts of the governments Among those who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most commendations is Lycurgus who made his laws after such a manner in Sparta that giving the King the Nobility and the people their shares he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares to his great credit and that Cities quiet The contrary befell Solon who made the laws in Athens which because it was a popular state prov'd but short liv'd and he before he died saw the Tyranny of Pisistratus begun and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence and Athens recover'd its liberty because it took again a popular government according to Solons institutions it maintain'd it not above a hundred years notwithstanding that to hold it there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general which were never provided for by Solon yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility Athens continu'd but a short time in respect of Sparta But let us come to Rome which though it had not a Lycurgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate that what their founder had not provided for chance did for if Rome lit not upon the best fortune it lit upon the next to the best for though the first ordinances were defective yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection because Romulus and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdome and not of a Commonwealth when the City became free there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty but were never ordain'd by those Kings And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alledged yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the Kings stead chas'd out of Rome the Regal title only not the Regal power so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities that is to say of the Principality Nobility There remain'd only to give the Commonalty a place in the government whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon the occasions which shall be hereafter told the people rose up against them so that rather then to lose all they were constrain'd to allow the people their part on the other side the Senate the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth so began the creation of the Tribuns of the people after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firme all the three kinds of governments having their shares And fortune did so much favour them that though they proceeded from the rule of a King of the Nobility to that of the people by the same degrees and for the same reasons set down before yet to give power to the Nobility they never took away all the authority from the Royalty nor was the power of the Nobility quite diminish'd to give it to the people but being mingled it made an exact Commonwealth to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following Chapters CHAP. III. Vpon what occasions the Tribuns of the people were created in Rome whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect ACcording as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government and so every History is full of examples to that purpose it is necessary that he who frames a Common-wealth and ordaines Laws in it should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds so oft as occasion shall serve and that when any mischief lies covert for a time it proceeds from an occasion unknown which is not come to light because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made but time afterwards discovers it which they say is Father of the truth It seem'd that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate when the Tarquins were banisht and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride were become of a popular disposition and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke This deceit lay hid nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the Tarquins liv'd of whom the Nobility being afraid and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people they might side with them behav'd themselves with good respect towards them But no sooner were the Tarquins dead and the Nobility delivered of that feare but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them which thing confirmes what I said before that men never do good unless inforc'd thereto but where choice is abundant and liberty at pleasure confusion and disorder suddenly take place Wherefore it is said that hunger and poverty make men laborious and Laws make them good But where one thing alone by it self without a Law does good there is no need of the Law but when that good custom failes the Law becomes necessary forthwith Yet the Tarquins being foil'd who with feare of them kept the Nobility in awe it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the Tarquins did when they were alive And so at length after many broyles tumults and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility at length for the peoples assurance the Tribuns were created and they bore such sway and had such credit that they could alwaies after mediate between the people and the Senate and stop the Nobilities insolency CHAP. IV. That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome made the Commonwealth both free and mighty I Must not fail to discourse upon these tumults which were in Rome from the Tarquins death till the creation of the Tribuns and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth and full of such confusion that if good fortune and military vertue had not supplyed their defects it would have been inferiour to any I cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the Roman Empire but methinks they do not consider that where good discipline is it is likely too that there is good order and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune But let us come to the other particulars of that City I say that they who condemne the troubles between the Nobility and the people
the Senate did defend them Moreover he shall see that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula Nero Vitellius and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them And if their Story were well read over it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace the way of security and of distrust Fot of 26 Emperors that were from Cesar to Maximinus 16 were slain 10. only died natural deaths And if any of those that were slain were good as Galba and Pertinax it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers And if among those those that died natural deaths any were wicked or lewd as Severus it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr which two accompany very few Hee shall see also by reading this Story how a man may order a good Kingdome for all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance except Titus were mischievous those that were adopted were all good as were those five from Nerva to Marcus And as the Empire fell upon the heyres it return'd alwaies to its destruction Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus and compare them with those that went before them and that follow'd them let him choose in which he would have been borne or over whether he would have had command For in those that were govern'd by the good he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens the world replenish'd with peace and justice the Senate enjoying their authority the Magistrates their honours and the wealthy Citizens their estates nobility and vertue exalted and with these all rest and good And on the other side all rancour dissoluteness corruption and ambition extinguished he shall see a returne of the golden age where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases and in the end shall see the world triumph the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperours he shall find the warres made them terrible and seditions full of discord as well in peace as in war cruell so many Princes slain with the sword so many civil so many forrain warres Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes the Cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd he shall see Rome burnt the Capitol by her own Citizens defac'd and spoyl'd the antient temples desolated and their ceremonies neglected the cities repleate with adulteries the sea full of banishments and the rocks besmeard with blood He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties and Nobility wealth honours and above all vertue reputed as a most capital crime He shall see accusers rewarded servants corrupted against their masters children against their parents and they who had not enemies oppressed by their friends and then he shall know very well how much Rome Italy and the world was beholding to Caesar And without doubt if he be borne of mankind he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good And truly a Prince ayming at glory would with to be Lord of a disorder'd City not to ruine it wholly as did Caesar but to recompose and restore it as Romulus And beleeve me the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory nor men desire it And if to renew and restore the frame of a City there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity should yet deserve excuse But when he could hold his Principality and yet restore the government he is no way excusable And in sum let them be well advis'd to whom the heavens present such opportunity that either of these two wales be propounded them the one that gives them security in life and makes them glorious after death the other that causes them to live in continual troubles and leave behind them in everlasting infamy CHAP. XI Of the Romans Religion THough Romulus were Romes first founder and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire put it into the Roman Senat 's mindes to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus that what he left unfinished the other might supply Who finding a very fierce people and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies applied himself to Religion as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility and ordain'd it in such a sort that for many ages there was not such a feare of God as in that Commonwealth Which facilitated much any enterprise whatsoever either the Senate or those brave Roman courages did undertake And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly and of many of the Romans by themselves in severall shal perceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath than the lawes as they that made more account of the power of God than of man as it appears manifestly by the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an overthrow at Canna many Citizens assembled together and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country and go into Sieily which Scipio understanding went and found them out and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare they would never forsake their native country Lucius Manlius that was afterwards call'd Torquatus was accus'd by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people and before the judgment day came Titus went to find Marcus and threatning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father bound him by his oath and he though by feare compell'd to sweare yet took the accusation off and so those Citizens whom neither the love to their country nor the lawes thereof could retain in Italy were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father the injury he receiv'd of the son and his own reputation to keep the oath he took which proceeded of nothing else but the Religion Numa brought in among them And it is manifest if a man consider well the Roman histories of how much availe their Religion was for the commanding of armies to reconcile the common people to preserve good men and to shame the lewd So that if we were to dispute to whether Prince Rome were more oblig'd Romulus or Numa I beleeve Numa would be prefer'd for where Religion is military discipline is easily brought in and where they are already warlike and have no Religion this hardly followes And it is plain that Romulus to order the Senate and frame certain other civil and military ordinances had no need of the authority of a God
more to augment such a difficulty because there are no lawes nor ordinances sufficient to bridle a universall corruption For as there is need of lawes to preserve good customes so to have the lawes well observ'd there is need of good customes Besides this the ordinances and lawes made in a Republique at birth thereof when men were good serve not to purpose afterwards when once they are growne vicious And if the lawes vary being accommodated according to the accidents seldome or never vary the old orders of the city which makes that the new lawes suffice nor because the orders that continue in force do corrupt And to lay this part more plain to the understanding I say that in Rome there was the order of government or rather of the states and the lawes afterwards which together with the Magistrates did bridle the Citizens The order of the state was the authority of the people of the Senate of the Tribuns and of the Consuls the manner of demanding or creating of Magistrates and the manner of making lawes These orders little or nothing did they vary among the Citizens the lawes varied which bridled the citizens as did that law against adulteries against expences against ambition and many others according as by degrees the citizens grew corrupted But the orders of state standing sted fast which in the time of corruption were no longer good those lawes which were renew'd again were not of force to keep men good but would have been well helpt if when the lawes were renew'd the orders also had bin chang'd And that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good it is expresly seen in two principal heads As for the creation of Magistrates and making lawes he people of Rome gave the Consulate and the other Prime degrees of the city onely to those that sued for them This order was in the beginning good because none stood for them but those citizens that esteem'd themselves worthy of them and to receive the repulse was a shame so that to be thought worthy every one did well But this way afterwards in a corrupted City proov'd very hurtfull for not the best deserving men but the most powerfull sued for the magistracy and those of small power howsoever vertuous forbore to demand them for fear It came not to this inconvenient at once but by degrees as men fall into all other inconvenients For the Romans having brought under Affrica and Asia and reduc'd well nigh all Greece to their obedience doubted no way of their liberty and thought they had no more enemies could scare them Thus farre their security and the weakness of their enemies workt that the people of Rome in bestowing the Consulate regarded not vertue so much as favour raising to that dignity those that could make most friends not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies After from those that had most favour they fell to give them to those that had most power So that the good by reason of the defect of this order were quite excluded A Tribun of the people and any other Citizen might propound a law to the people and thereupon every Citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it or against it before it were determin'd of This order was commendable while the integrity of the Citizens held for it was alwayes well that every one may give his opinion thereupon that the people having heard every one may after make choyce of the best But the Citizens being grown mischievous this order became naught for those that were powerfull onely propounded lawes not for the common good but to advance their own powers and against those dar'd none to speak for fear of these So that the people was brought either by falshood or force to determine their own ruine Therefore it was necessary to the end that Rome in her corrupted age should maintaine her liberty that as in the progress of her life she had made new lawes so should she have made new orders for other orders and other manners of living ought to be ordain'd in a good subject and others in a bad nor can the forme be like where the matter is quite contrarily dispos'd But these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good or else by little and little when their defaults be taken notice of by every one I say that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible For to renew them by degrees it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it who should foresee this inconvenient afarre off and when any of these arise it is a very likely thing that none of these men step forth and when they should they would never be able to perswade another what they eonceiv'd because men accustomed alwaies to live in one manner will not alter it and the rather not seeing that evill present which is to be shew'd by conjectures Touching the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knowes they are not good I say that this unprofitableness which is easily knowne is hard to correct for to effect this ordinary meanes serve not they being rather hurtfull but of necessity extraordinary remedies are to be put in practise as violence and war and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure And because the restoring of a city to a politique and a civil government presupposes a good man and by violence to become Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mifchievous wayes although his ends therein be all good nor will a wicked man by wicked meanes attaining to be Prince do good nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well which by evil meanes he came to From all these things above written arises the difficulty or impossibility that is in corrupted cities theree to maintaine a Republique or to create one anew And when it were to be created or maintained it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state to the end that those men who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the lawes might in some manner be restrained as it were by a regall power And to constraine them by any other way to become good would either be a most cruel attempt or altogether impossible As I said before that Cleomenes did who that he might command alone flew the Ephores and if Romulus for the same reasons slew his brother and Titus Tatius the Sabine but afterwards excercised very vertuously their authority yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject staind with that corruption whereof we have discoursed in this Chapter and therefore they might intend well and
Terentillus a Tribun who propounded they should create five men to consider the Consuls power and moderate it Which thing much angred the nobility giving them to thinke that the Majestic of the Empire was wholly declined and that there was not left to the Nobilitie any dignity more in the Commonwealth Yet such was the Tribuns obstinacie that the Consuls name was quite put out and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken rather to create Tribuns with Consulan power than the Consuls in such hatred had they their name and their authority And so they proceeded a long time till at length having knowne their errous as the Florentins return'd to the Counsell of tenne so they anew created their Consuls CHAP. XL. The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome and what the rein is to be noted where among many other things is consider'd how by the like accident a Republique may be preserv'd or suppressed HAving a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happen'd at Rome upon the creation of the Decemvirate methinks it is not much out of the way first to relate summarily the story of that creation and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions which are many and of good consideration as well for those that endeavor to maintain a Republique free as for them that intend to bring it under the yoke for in this discourse there will appear many errors committed by the Senate and by the people in prejudice of the Common liberty and many faults made by Appius Chiefe of the Decemvirate lammageable to that tyrannie which he had presupposed already founded in Rome After many disputes and strifes past between the people and the Nobility about the framing of new lawes in Rome whereby they might firmly establish the liberty of that State with one accord they sent Spurius Posthumius with two other Citizens to Athens for the copies of those lawes which Solon gave to that City that thereupon they might found the Roman Ordinances After their returne they came to appoint the men that were to examine and frame the said lawes And they ordained ten Citizens for a year of which Appius Claudius was one a cunning and a turbulent man And that they might without any respect make such lawes they took away the power of all other Magistrates in Rome espeaially of the Tribuns and Consuls They took away also all appeal to the people so that these new officers became absolute Princes of Rome Afterwards Appius gain'd the authority of all his other companions by means of the favors the people did him for he was grown so popular in his behaviour that it seem'd a mervail how so suddenly he had chang'd his nature and disposition having alwaies before this time bin thought a cruel persecutor of the common people These ten governed themselves very moderately not having above twelve Lictors who always went before him that was Chiese among them And although they had the absolute authority yet when they were to punish any Citizen of Rome for homicide they cited him in presence of the people and made them judge him They writ their laws in ten Tables and before they confirm'd them published them to the general view that every man might read and understand them whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them which before their confirmation should be amended After this Appius caus'd a rumour to be spread throughout Rome that if to these ten Tables an addition of twoothers were made they would be perfect So that the conceithereof gave the people occasion to make the Councell of tenne againe for another yeare whereunto the people consented willingly as well because they would not have the Consuls anew â—created as for that they hop'd they might well subsist without Tribuns these being judges of the causes as is aforesaid It being then agreed to make a new election the whole nobility betook themselves to sue for these honors and Appius was amongst the formost of them and behav'd himself in his suit with so much courtesie towards the people that all his competitors were jealous of it They did not beleeve that he being so proud a man used all this courtesie for nought And being in doubt publiquely to oppose him they resolved to do it cunningly and so though he were the youngest of them all they gave him the authority to propound to the people the ten that were to be elected thinking he would use the same terms others did not to name himself being a thing unusual and disgracefull in Rome But he took this impediment for an opportunity And named himself among the first to the admiration and displeasure of all the Nobility and after named nine others to his own purpose Which new creation made for another yeer began to shew the people and the Nobility their error for suddenly Appius made an end of dissembling to be what he was not and began to show his inbred pride and infected his companions with his own evil conditions and to fright the people and the Senate in exchange of twelve Lictors they made a hundred and twenty The fear was equall in all for a while but they began afterwards to give respect to the Senate and rudely to handle the Commons If any one being wrong'd by one of these Iudges did appeal to another he was worse abused in his appeal than in his first tryal So that the people having perceived their error began to look the Nobility in the face with a great deal of sorrow And thence they took occasion to seek after their liberty from whence by fearing their bondage they had brought the Commonwealth into that misery And the Nobility was wel pleased with this their affliction That being weary of their present condition they might desire to have their Consuls restored The dayes came at length that ended the year the two Tables of the lawes were finished but not published The ten hereupon tooke occasion to continue on their Magistracie and hold the State by violence and make the young Nobilitie their guard on whom they bestowed the goods of those they condemned With which gifts the youth being corrupted lov'd rather their own licentious life than the common liberty It fell out about this time that the Sabini and the Volsci made war against the Romans Upon which fear the ten began to see the weakness of their own estate for without the Senate they could not take order for the war and assembling the Senate together they thought they lost their authority yet upon meer necessity they took this last course and having gotten the Senators together many of them spake against the pride of the tenn and in particular Valerius and Horatius and their authority had bin quite abolished but that the Senate of meer envy to the Common people would not shew their authority thinking that if the ten should voluntarily depose their Magistracy the
appeal was profitable he should have caus'd it to be observ'd if otherwise he should never have so urg'd the making of it And so much more remarkable was this accident in that the Frier in those many sermons which he made after the breach of this law never either condemned him that broke it or excus'd the breach as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose and excuse it he could not Which having discover'd his ambitious and sactious mind took much from his credit and charg'd him with blame enough It is a very great fault also in a state every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate For all the ten and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd and condemn'd so that all the Nobility were exceedingly affrighted thinking they would never leave condemning them til they had destroyed the whole Nobility And certainly it had produc'd some inconvenient in the city if Marcus Duellius the Tribun had not taken order for it Who made a decree that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome which assur'd all the Nobility Where we see how great a hurt it is to a Republique or Prince to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken For men that begin to doubt of mischief in any case provide for themselves in their dangers and grow bolder and less respectfull how they venture on novelties Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any or the hurt that is to be done to do at once and afterwards let men injoy some assurance that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds CHAP. XLVI Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another and first they aime no further then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others THe people of Rome having recovered their liberty and being return'd into their former state or rather greater insomuch as they had made new laws which were as new foundations laid to establish their power it seem'd probable that Rome for some while would have bin at quiet yet by experience the contrary was seen for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements And because Titus Livius very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew methinks it is not out of purpose punctually to relate his words where he sayes that alwaies either the people or the Nobility waxed proud when the other grew humble and when the Commons containd themselves modestly within their bounds then began the youth of the Nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries nor could the Tribuns much remedy this for they also had their shares in the sufferance The Nobility on the other side although well they wot that their youth was too insolent yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side they wished rather their own should be the actors then the commonalty And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other And the order of these accidents is that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves they begin to put others in fear and that injury which they chase from themselves they thrust upon another as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Common-wealths come to dissolution and men rise from one ambition to another And as that sentence of Salust put in Caesars mouth was very true That all evil examples first spring from good beginnings The first thing that those citizens as is above said endeavor who behave themselves ambitiously in a Republick is not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs but out of the Magistrates power To attain hereto they seek after friendships which they gain by means in appearance honest either by supplying their want of moneys or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them And because this seems worthy and noble every one is easily deceived and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it till he presevering in the same course without let becomes such a one that the private Citizens stand in aw of him and the Magistrates bear him respect And when he is grown to this height and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness he comes to be in such termes that it proves very dangerous to justle with him for the causes I have formerly alleadged of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient which is already come to some growth in a city because then it is brought to such an exigent that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruine or letting it alone to submit to the yoke of bondage unless death or some other accident prevent it For being once come to the terms above written that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him and his without much adoe after will they understand their own strength and hurt at their own pleasure Whereupon a Republique among her wayes of government ought to use this to watch carefully over her citizens that they have not power under the colour of good to do mischief and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth and not wrong it as in its own place we shall argue it CHAP. XLVII Men though they are deceiv'd in generalities yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars THE people of Rome as is abovesaid having taken in distaste the very name of Consuls being desirous that Plebeyans might be made Consuls or their authority limited the Nobility that the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility The people were herewith contented thinking to abolish the Consulate and to have their share in this highest dignity Hence grew a notable accident that when they came to create these Tribuns which they could have made all Plebeyans the people chose them all out of the Nobility whereupon Titus Livius uses these words The event of these assemblies or Councils shewed that mindes differ much when contention is made for liberty or honour and when all strife being appeas'd the judgments rest clear And examining from whence this proceeds I beleeve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities than in particularities The Common people of Rome thought generally they deserv'd the Consulate because they were the greatest part of the City because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars because they were they by force of whose armes Rome maintain'd her liberty and became mighty And thinking as is said this their desire reasonable they would have this authority in any case
after by Numa Tullus Hostilius and Servius and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd and it was needfull to make new laws as it befell when they created the Censours which was one of those orders that help'd to keep Rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome they were a special occasion that Rome held off so long from being corrupted Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdome of Mamercus the Dictator who by a new law he made reduc'd the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen moneths Which the Censour that were then in office took so much a miss that they put Mamercus out of the Senate ' which thing was much blam'd both by the people and the fathers And because the story shews not any where that Mamercus could defend himself it must needs be that either the historian was defective or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect for it is not well that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordein'd that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in should be wrong'd without any remedy But returning to the beginning of this discourse I say that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate that if those cities that have had their beginnings free and were under their own government as Rome with much adoe can find out good laws to maintain them free it is no marvel that those cities which have had their beginnings immediatly servile have not found not onely difficulty but impossibity ever so to order themselves that they can quietly come to a civil government as appears it befell the city of Florence because her beginning was in Subjection to the Roman Empire and having gotten leisure to breathe began to make her own laws which having bin mingled with the ancient that were naught could not work any good effect and thus she proceeded in a government for 200 years as we have by certain relations without ever attaining to such a condition that she could truly be term'd a Republique and these difficulties which she hath had have those Cities alwaies had whose beginnings have bin like hers And though many times by publique and free voices ample authority hath bin given to some few Citizens to reforme this yet never have they order'd it to the advantage of the publique but to serve the turn of their own faction which hath caus'd more disorder then order in the City And to come to some particular example I say among other things which he that ordains a Republique should consider is that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his Citizens This was well provided for in Rome for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people yet if there were any occasion of importance where to delay execution by means of the appeal was dangerous they had the help of a Dictator who had power immediatly to execute which remedy they never us'd but upon necessity But Florence and other Cities beginning as she did that is servile had this authority committed alwaies to a stranger who was sent by the Prince to this purpose When afterwards they became free they continued this authority in a stranger whom they called their Captain Which thing because he might easily be corrupted by the potent Citizens was very pernicious But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states they ordained eight Citizens to supply the Captains place Which order of evil became very evil for the reasons we have otherwhere alleadged that a few are alwaies servants of a few and especially of the most wealthy from which the City of Veuice is well guarded which hath ten citizens who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent though they have the authority they have ordained the Quarantie or council of forty and besides they have taken care that the council of the Pregai which is the chiefer council may punish them so that where there is no want of an accuser they are never destitute of a Judge to restrain the great mens insolency There is then no marvail seeing that in Rome order'd by it self and by so many sage persons there grew every day new occasions whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the Common liberty if in other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery CHAP. L. The power of stopping the publique actions of the city should not be given into the hands of one council or one magistracy TItus Quincius Cincinnatus and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome who upon a quarrel arisen between them two made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique which the Senate seeing perswaded them to create a Dictator to the end that might be done which by reason of their discord was hindred But the Consuls disagreeing in every thing else in this alone were of accord both of them not to make a Dictator so that the Senate finding no other help desir'd assistance from the Tribuns who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to obey Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens ambitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people but also among themselves in the next place that it should never be so ordain'd in a city that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Common-wealth For example if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits or to a Magistrate to dispatch some business to be done it is fit to impose a necessity on him that he do it in any case or so provide that another might and should do it otherwise the order would be defective and perilous as we see it was in Rome unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authority In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits It sometime chanc't that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities nor to their Ministers of State abroad which was a very great disorder for all at once their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased or were no longer deceived And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them Who
countrey affords whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation and the beginning of all corruption For so they could not learn the French Spanish or Italian manners which nations together corrupt the whole world The other reason is because those Republiques where the common liberty is preserv'd and uncorrupted do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman but rather maintain among them an equality and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen And if by chance they fall into their hands they put them to death as the principal authors of corruption and occasions of scandal And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is I say that those are call'd gentlemen that live in idleness yet deliciously of the profits of their estates without having any care to cultivate their lands or to take any other pains necessary to the maintenance of mans life These kind of men are very hurtfull in every Commonwealth and countrey but worse are they that besides the foresaid fortunes hold strong Castles and have vassals that obey them With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds the countrey about Rome Romagna and Lombardia This is the cause that in those countreys there hath never bin any Republique nor any civil government for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government And if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a Commonwealth he would find it impossible but to bring them under some order if any man had the power he could take no other course then reduce them to a Royalty The reason is this because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted that the laws are not able to restrain it it is needfull to ordain together with them a greater power which is the authority of a King who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty This reason is verified in the example of Tuscany where we see that in a small space of countrey three Republiques have long consisted Florence Siena and Lucca and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind that they have their dispositions and their orders much like them and that they would willingly maintain the common liberty all this arises from hence because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys and never a one or very few Gentlemen but such equality that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments might easily reduce them to a free state But their misfortune hath bin so great that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution This conclusion then I draw from hence that he that strives to frame a Republique where there are many gentlemen cannot do it unless he first dspatch them all out of the way and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principallity where there is much equality shall never effect it unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent mindes and makes them rather gentlemen in effect then in title enriching them with Castles and possessions allowing them the favor of wealth and men to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them by their means may maintain his power and they by his favor preserve their ambition and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure And there being by this way a proportion from him that forces to him that is forced thereby men continue setled every one in their order And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a Kingdom and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority many there have bin that have endeavor'd it but few have bin able to go through with it because the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them and partly so overbears them that they fail in their first beginnings I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion that where there are gentlemen a Republique cannot be instituted for there none can partake of the dignities unless they be gentlemen The answer hereto is that this example makes no opposition against us for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name then in effect for they have not great revenues out of possessions and lands but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise and moveable goods and moreover none of them hold any Castles or have any jurisdiction over men but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen And as other Republiques have all their divisions under several names so Venice is divided into the Gentility and the Commonalty and their order is that those are capable of all honors these not Which is not any cause of imbroile among them for the reasons we have other where said Let a Common-wealth then be there ordain'd where allthings are reduc'd to an equality and contrariwise let a Prince be made where great inequality is otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance CHAP. LVI Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a countrey usually there are some prodigies which forerun them or men that foretell them FRom whence this proceeds I know not but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples that no very heavy accident ever befell any countrey or City that hath not bin foretold either by some Diviners or by some revelations or prodigies or signes from heaven And not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof hereof every one knows how long before the coming of Charles the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Fryer Jerome Savanarola and how besides this it was said throughout all Tuscany that there were heard in the aire and seen over Arrezzo many men in armes skirmishing together Moreover we all know here that before Laurens of Medici the old mans death the Duemo or principal Church was fir'd with lightning on the top even to the ruine thereof Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that Peter Soderini who had bin made the Florentines chief Standard-bearer for life was banish'd and depriv'd of his dignities the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning A man might alleadge other examples beside these but I leave them rather to avoyd tediousness I shall relate that onely which Titus Livius speaks of before the the Frenchmens coming to Rome and that is how one Marcus Ceditius a Plebeyan told the Senate that he had heard at midnight as he past by the new way a voyce greater
effect in a Prince for it is the opinion of all writers that vertue is commended even in ones enemies And if Manlius in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison and condemn'd him to death In like manner we see there were some Princes esteem'd wise too that have put some men to death whom afterwards they have much desired again as Alexander did Clitus and others of his friends and Herod Mariamme But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes as was that of the Romans but to that which is loose as was that of the Syracusians which committed those errors that men inraged and dissolute fall into as did Alexander the Great and Herod in the cases aforesaid Therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy than that of Princes for all equally do erre when all without respect have power to erre Whereof besides this I have alleadged there are examples enough as well among the Roman Emperors as other Kings and Princes where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life as never was yet seen in any multitude I conclude then beyond the common opinion which sayes that the people when they have the Principallity in their hands are various mutable unthankfull affirming that these faulâ—s are no otherwise in them than they are in particular Princes And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together he might say true but exempting Princes he is deceiv'd For a people that rules and is well in order will be constant prudent and gratefull as well as a Prince or better though esteem'd wise And on the other side a Prince loosen'd from the law will be unthankfull various and imprudent more than the people and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions because in all of them it is much after one manner and if there be any advantage on either side it is on the peoples part but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live than the other And he that considers the people of Rome shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hatefull to them and yet were they zealous for the glory and common good of their countrey and he shall see many examples among them that witness the one thing and the other of them And if any man alleadge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used towards Scipio I answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter where it was made plaine that people are lesse ungratefull than Princes But as touching wisedome and settled stayednesse I say that a people is wiser and more stayd and of more exact judgment than a Prince And therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to Gods voyce for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their presages so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill And touching their judgement in things it is seldome seene that when they heare two Oratours pleading each of them a contrary part when they are both of equall worth but that they follow the better opinion and are very capable of the truth they heare And if in matters of courage or in things that appeare profitable as it was abovesayd they erre many times also does a Prince erre drawne aside by his owne passions which are greater in them then in the people We see likewise in their choosing of Officers they make a farre better choice then does a Prince Nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life to which a Prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought We see a people begin to hate some one thing and continue many ages in the same opinion which we see not it a Prince And of the one and the other of these two things the people of Rome shall serve me for witnesse which in so many hundreds of yeares in so many electio 〈…〉 of Consulls and Tribuns never made foure choices whereof they had cause to repent them And they hated so much as I said the name of a King that no citizen of theirs could ever so farre oblige them that if once he affected the Royalty they would pardon his due punishment Moreover we see that in those cities where the Principality is in the people in a short time exceeding great increases are made and farre greater then those that have bin made under the government of a Prince as Rome did after the banishment of her Kings and Athens after she freed her selfe from Pisistratue which proceeds from nothing else but that the peoples governments are better then Princes Nor will we agree to this that all that our Historian sayes in the text before alleadged or any where else opposes this our opinion for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples the disorders of Princes and all the glorious actions of people as those also of Princes we shall see the people farre surmount the Princes in vertue and in glory And if Princes exceede the people in ordaining of Lawes in framing a civill government in making of statutes and new institutions yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so farre beyond them that they attaine to the glory of their founders And in summe to conclude this matter I say that as Princes states have lasted long so likewise have those of Republiques and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the lawes for a Prince that hath the power to doe what he list commits divers follies and a people that can do what they will seldome give great proofes of their wisdome If then the argument be touching a Prince and a people tied and chained to their lawes a man shall see more vertue in the People then in the Prince but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes fewer errours will appeare in the people then in the Prince and those lesse and which are capable of greater remedies for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people and so reduce them to reason But to a mischievous Prince no man can speake nor is there any other remedy but the sword Whereupon a man may guess at the importance of one and the others evill for if words are of Where he cut off the lappet of Sauls garment and therefore was checkt by his owne conscience And that in the Psalm 140. Touch not mine anointed c. Nor doe the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto wherefore Tacitus sayes Ferenda regum ingenia neque usui crebras mutationes Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem caetera naturae mala
years after they began to make war HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those who now a daies inlarge their dominions we have formerly discours'd enough and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly race to live with their own laws as well those that yeelded to them as subjects as those that came under their protection as associates And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire but tied them to some certain conditions which whiles they observ'd they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy and that they reduc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces Whereof the example is very clear for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua whether they sent him not through their own ambition but upon the Capuans intreaty who being they were at discord one with another judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them that might put them in order again and reunite them The Antiates also mov'd by their example and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them And T. Livius saies upon this occasion and upon this new way of ruling That now not only the Roman armes but their lawes also were in great repute We see therefore how much this course taken further'd the Romans advancement for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free or to be govern'd by their own Citizens are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not though it may bring some burden with it too rather than under that which they having every day in their view continually reproaches them with their slavery Besides this the Prince gains hereby another advantage that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies whereby they were to regulate those Cities there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away And that this is true besides ancient examples which we could alledge we have one of late memory in Italy for as it is well known Geneva having been several times possessed by the French that King did alwaies except at this present time send them a French Governor who under him should govern them For this present only but upon any intention of the Kings but it seem'd necessity so order'd it he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them gives the people most satisfaction would the rather alow of this latter Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty by how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to aske a Prerour of the Romans but had the Romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher they would presently have been in jealousie of them and started from them But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yeelded it self to the government of Florence It is as well known also what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans the Luckeses and the Seneses and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty as well as others do but because the Florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers but the others they treated as enemies This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them and the others struggle with all might and main as yet they do also not to come under them And doubtless had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours and not have alwaies scar'd them they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany But hereupon I advise not that armes and force are not to be us'd but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place where and when other meanes will not serve CHAP. XXII How erroneous many times the opinions of men are when they give their judgements touching great affaires HOw false oftentimes mens opinions are they well see who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations which many times unless they be determined of by able men are contrary to all truth And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths especially in peaceable times both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned such adwise is follow'd as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good This error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled if not well experienced in affaires the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible whereof in such a case men are perswaded These words are spoken upon that which Numicius the Pretour after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans perswaded them and upon that which few years since many beleeved when Francis the first King of France came to the Conquest of Milan which was defended by the Swissers Therefore I say that Lewis the Twelfth being dead and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdome of France and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the Switzers had of late possessed themselves by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement desired to have some aid in Italy which might further his undertakings so that besides the Venetians whom King Lewis had gain'd he tried the Florentines and Pope Leo the tenth thinking his enterprise much facilitated by having them to side with him because the King of Spains soldiers were in Lombardy and some of the Emperors forces in Verona Pope Leo yeelded not to the Kings desire but by those that counselled him he was perswaded as it was said to stand neuter showing him that herein consisted certain victory for it was nothing at all for the Churches good to have either mighty in Italy the King or the Swissers But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty it was fit to free it from the one and the other And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other divided
obstinacy they could have resolv'd on by force of their Religion or oath taken Yet it is plain how they thought they could have no other refuge nor try other remedy that could give them hope to recover their lost vertue Which fully shewes how great confidence Religion well us'd can give And though haply this part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the Roman Republick I thought better to insert it in this place that I might not be driven to interrupt my discourse and have need to return hereunto many times CHAP. XVI People accustomed to live under a Prince if by any accident they become free have much adoe to maintain their liberty HOW hard it is for a people us'd to live in subjection to a Prince afterwards to maintain their liberty if by any accident they get it as Rome did upon the Tarquins banishment very many examples shew us which we read in the memorialls of ancient histories And not without good reason for the people is nothing different from a brute beast which though fierce of nature and wilde hath been bred alwaies in a den and under command and though by ehance it hath got loose into the fields yet not being used to seek the sood nor being acquainted with the coverts where to hide itself becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it The self-same thing befalls a people used to live under the government of others the which not having knowledg to treat of publick desences or offences not knowing the neighbour Princes nor yet known by them quickly returns under the yoke which oftentimes is heavier then that which before was taken from their neck and they come to fall into these difficulties though as yet there be not entred among them much disorder For a people that is quite debauch'd cannot for a little while no not a whit enjoy their liberty as it shall after appear And therefore our speeches are not of those people where corruption is overgrown but where there is more good then naught To this former we may add another difficulty which is that the State that becomes free procures enemies that side against it and not friends to side with it Those hold together as enemies who got advantages by the tyrannical government feeding upon the Princes riches whereby they used to help themselves which being now taken from them they cannot rest content but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the Royalty that so they may recover their former advancements They get not as I have said friends to side with them for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions otherwise it rewards none nor honours none And when a man hath received those honours and those advantages which he thinks he deserv'd he acknowledges no obligation to them that reward him Moreover that common good which men reap of free government is not known by any while it is possest which is to injoy freely ones own without suspicion not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours not to be in fear for his sons or for himself For no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not And therefore if they come to have a free State as it is above mentioned there arise those that will be partisans against them and not side with them and to prescribe a remedy for these inconvenients and disorders which these difficulties might bring us there is none more potent nor soveraign nor necessary than to kill Brutus his sonns who as the Story shews were induc'd together with other young Romans to conspire against their native country for no other reason than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the Consuls as under the Kings so that they thought the peoples liberty was become their slavery And he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty or by way of Principality and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new State is not like to continue long True it is that I judge those Princes very unfortunate who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant waies having the vast multitude for their enemies for he that hath but few enemies easily and without many offences secures himself but he that hath the universality against him is never out of jealousie and the more cruelty he uses the weaker becomes his power So that the greatest remedy he hath is to make the people friendly And though this discourse be different from the former treating here of an exceeding good Prince and there of a Republick yet that I may not return here often upon this occasion I shall say somewhat of it but briefly And therefore if a Prince would gain the good will of a people that was enemy to him speaking of those Princes that are become Tyrants of their native country I say he ought to examine first what the people desire and he shall alwaies find that they desire two things the one to be reveng'd of him that occasion'd their slavery the other to have their liberty restor'd To the first the Prince can satisfie in whole to the second in part As for the first there is an example to the point Clearchus a Tyrant of Heraclea being in banishment it happen'd that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of Heraclea that the nobility finding themselves too weak turn'd to favour Clearchus and conspiring with him against the will of the people let him into the Town and took away the peoples liberty so that Clearchus being in a streight between the insolence of the nobility whom he could not any way content nor rectify and the rage of the people that could not indure thus to have lost their liberty resolv'd in one to free himself of the importunity of the Nobles and withall to gain the people And to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity cut in pieces all the Nobility to the peoples great satisfaction And thus he satlsfy'd one of the desires the people have that is to be reveng'd But as for the people 's other desire to recover their liberty if the Prince cannot satisfy them let him examine what are the reasons make them desire sreedom and he shall find there is but a small number of them would be free to command But all the rest which are the many desire liberty to life securely For in all Republicks of what manner soever ordered not above forty or fifty Citizens attain to the degrees of authority and because these are but few it is an easie thing to be sure of them either by taking them out of the way or by letting them share of such honours as agree to their conditions which they may very well be contented with Those others whom it suffices If they can live securely are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws
returne from thence to Rome through Tuscany sent a confident of his into Florence to aske passage for himselfe with his army Hereupon they consulted at Florence how to manage this businesse nor did any one advise them to grant it him Wherein they followed not the course the Romans tooke for the Duke being exceedingly well armed and the Florentines in a manner disarmed that they could not hinder his passage it had bin much more for their honour if it had seem'd that he had passd with their licence rather then by force for there it was wholly their disgrace which had bin in part lesse if they had carried it otherwise But the worst condition these weak Republiques have is to take to no resolution so that what party soever they take they take it perforce and if any good be done them it is forc'd upon them for which they owe no thankes to their owne wisdome I will give two other examples that happen'd in our dayes in the state of our city In the yeare 1500 when Lewi the 12 of France had recover'd Milan being desirous to put Pisa into our hands for the summe of 50000 ducats which the Florentines had promis'd him after such restitution he sent his army commanded by the Lord Beaumont towards Pisa in whom although he were a French man yet the Florentines repos'd much trust This army and Captaine came on betweene Cascina and Pisa to assaile the walls where staying some daies to give order for the siege there came some Deputies of Pisa to Beavmont who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the French army with these conditions that upon the Kings word he should promise not to give them into the Florentines hands till after foure monthes which termes were utterly resus'd by the Florentines whereupon ensued that after a while they left the siege with disgrace Nor was that accord refus'd for other reason then because they doubted of the Kings word although such was the weaknes of their counsell that they were forc'd to put themselves into his protection though they trusted him not nor in the meane while did they consider that the King could easier deliver Pisa into their hands having gotten possession of it than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power wherein if hee had fayl'd it had bin easy to discover the Kings intention and so have spar'd their cost In such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage had they agreed that Beaumont should have taken it upon any promise as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare 1502. when upon the rebellion of Arezzo the Lord Jubalt was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines Who being come neare to Arezzo began to treate agreement with the towne which upon certaine termes would have yeelded as before the Pisans but were againe refused by the Florentines Which Jubalt perceiving and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself without admitting the commissaries into the party so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head and thereupon entred Arezzo with his owne people shewing the Florentines they were fooles and understood not the affaires of the world and if they desir'd to have Arezzo in their hands they should let the King know of it who could more easily deliver it them having his people already in the towne then if they were without before the walls In Florence they forbare not to rayle upon and blame the said Jubalt till they understood that if Beaumont had bin like Jubalt they should have had Pisa as well as Arezzo And thus to returne to our purpose Republiques which will not come to resolution seldome make any party much to their advantage unlesse they are forc't thereupon because their weaknesse will never suffer them to determine where there is any doubt and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward they remaine always in suspence CHAP. XXXIX The same accidents are seene to befall severall peoples THIS is easily knowne by any one that considers things present and things long past that in all Cities and all peoples there are now the same desires and the same humours there were alwayes So that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past to foresee the future in any Commonwealth and to serve himself of those remedies which were in use among the auncients or not finding of those which were us'd to devise new for the resemblance these accidents have with the auncient But because these considerations are neglected or not understood by the Reader or if understood not knowne to him that governs it followes that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen The Citie of Florence after 94 yeares having lost a part of their dominions as Pisa and other Townes was forc't to make warre against those that held them And because hee that had them in his hands was of great power it came it passe that they were at great expence in the warrs without good successe From these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints And for that this warre was order'd by a Magistracie of tenne Citizens who were call'd the Councell of tenne for the warre they were malic't by the whole body of the Citie as the Authours of the warre and the expences of the same and they began to pâ—rswade themselves that by taking away that Magistracie they should end their wars so that having to make new they would not supply the places but rather suffering that Magistracie to expire they referr'd their imployments all to the Senate Which resolution was so hurtfull that not onely it ended not the warre as the generality was perswaded but those men being put out of the imployment who guided it with understanding there followed such confusion that besides Pisa they lost Arezzo and many other places in so much that the people perceiving their errour and that the feaver occasion'd the mischiefe and not the Physitian they created anew the Magistracie of tenne The selfe same humour grew up in Rome against the name of the Consuls for the people seeing one warre arise from another giving them no rest where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours ambition who dâ—sir'd to suppresse them they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobilitie who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the Tribunitiall power indeavour'd to draw them our of Rome under the Consuls and there to oppresse them where they had no assistance And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls or so to limit their power that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad The first that assaâ—d to put that law in practise was one
thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war as for example sake against the Latines they left all the rest to the Consuls discretion who had free power either to fight a batttel or to leave it and to besiege either this or any other town else as he pleas'd Which things by many examples are verified and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans for Fabius the Consul having overcome them near unto Sutrium and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina and go into Tuscany he did not onely not advise with the Senate but gave them no notice at all of it though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers which is witnessed by a resolution of the Senate taken directly against this very course who having understood of the victory Fabius had gotten and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany thinking it would be well not to try that war nor ruin that hazzard sent two Deputies unto Fabius to give him notice they would not have him pass into Tuscany who came thither when he had already past and gotten the victory and in liew of hindring the war they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten And whosoever considers these termes will find them discreetly used for if the Senate would have had the Consull to proceed on forwards in the war onely as they gave him order they had made him less circumspect and slower in his actions for he would have thought that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his but that the Senate had participated with him by whose counse he had bin governed Besides this the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand For notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars yet being they were not upon the place and therefore ignorant of very many particulars which are needfull for him to know that will advise well by interposing their Councell they would have committed many errors And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself and that the glory thereof should be entirely his the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well I have the more willingly marked this place because I see that the Republiques now adayes as the Venetian and the Florentine understand it not so and if their Commanders Proveditours and Commissioners are to plant any battery they will know it first and advise thereupon Which course deserves the same praise the others do which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer THE THIRD BOOKE CHAP. I. For the maintenance of a Religion or a Common-wealth long in being it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds IT is most true that all things in the world have an end of their life but those things eninjoy that course that is generally ordaind them by heaven whichdisorder not their body but govern it in such a regular course that either it changes not or if it does it is for the better and not for the worst And because I speak of mixt bodies such as are Republiques and sects I say that those changes are for the health thereof which bring them back to their first beginnings and therefore are they the best order'd and subsist the longest which by the help of their own orders may often be renewed or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation And it is more clear than the light that these bodies not being renewed last not and the way to renew them is as is said to reduce them to their first beginnings for all beginnings of Sects Commonwealths and Kingdoms must needs contain some goodness in them by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase for in process of time that goodness growes corrupt and unless something happen that reduces it to the just mark that body must needs be destroyed And our Doctors of Physick say speaking of the bodies of men That a man daily gathers some evil which sometimes hath need of cure This reducing to the beginning speaking of Commonwealths is done either by some outward accident or by some prudence within Touching the first we see it was necessary that Rome should be taken by the French if we would have her spring again and thus springing again should recover a new life and a new vertue and take her self a new to the observance of religion and justice which began in her to be much blemish'd which we may easily gather by the Story of Livie where he shews that in drawing gut the army against the French and in creating the Tribunes with Consular power they observed not any religious ceremonie so in like manner they did not onely not punish the three Fabij who against the law of nations had fought against the French but created them tribunes And we may well think that of other good laws also ordained by Romulus and their other sage Princes they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable or necessary to maintain a free government This forrain blow therefore lit on them to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their City and to shew that people that it was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice but to esteem well of their good Citizens to make more account of their vertue than of those profits which they thought they lost or got by their means Which we see came directly to pass for presently after Rome was recovered from the French they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion they punished those Fabij who fought against the Law of Nations and afterwards made such account of Camillus his vertue and goodness that the Senate all others wholly laying envy aside gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into hit hands It is necessary therefore as I have said that men who live together in any order should often revise themselves either upon occasion given by outward or else by inward accidents And for these last they must either proceed from a law which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body or else from some good man that may arise among them who by his example vertuous actions may work the same effect which that law or order can This good then arises in Common-wealths by the vertue of some man or the force of some order And touching this last those orders that reduc'd the Roman Republick to its own beginning were the Tribuns of the people the Censors all those other laws which were made against the ambition or insolence of men which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of some one Citizen that couragiously joynes with
them for their execution maugre the power of those that break them The executions whereof before the sacking of Rome by the French were notable the death of Brutus his sons the death of those of the Decemvirate that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne after the taking of Rome was the death of Manlius Capitolinus the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie the accusation of the Scipios which things being they were extraordinary remarkable whenosever any of them did chance caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule and when these began to fall out seldom then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught and become more dangerous and tumultuous for from one to another of such like executions there should not pass more than ten years time for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes and unless something chance which anew calls the punishment to memory and puts them in fear thereof there meer together so many delinquents that without danger they cannot be punished To this purpose they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the State otherwise it was hard to maintain it and they call'd reforming of the State to put that terror and fear in men which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations and speak ill of the present State and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds Also this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man without dependance on any law inciting thee to any execution yet are they of so great reputation and of such remarke that the good men desire to follow them and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects were Horatius Cocles Scevola Fabritius the two Decij Regulus Attilius and some others who by their rare and worthy examples in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome the corruptions multiplied for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen And though in Rome there arose the two Catoes yet such was the distance between him and them and between them from th' one to th' other and they remained so alone that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing and especially the last Cato who finding a great part of the City corrupted could not prevaile so by his example as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republicks But touching Religions wee see also these reformations are necessary by example of our Religion which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis and Saint Dominique it would have been quite defac'd for these by their poverty and their imitation of Christs life made a new impression thereof in mens minds which was quite blotted our thence and their new rules were so powerfull and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates and the heads of the Religion do not ruine it partly by their living in poverty and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people and preaching to them whereby they give them to understand that it is evill to speak evil against him that is evill and that it is good rather to live in obedience to them and if they are faulty to leave them to the chastisement of God And so they offend the most they can for they feare not the punishment they see not and beleeve not This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other Kingdom else Of which lawes and customes the Parliaments are the principal maintainers and especially that of Paris which restores them again to life whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm and that they condemn the King in their sentences and till this present it hath maintained it self by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished and they chance to multiply without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder or that Kingdom come to a dissolution Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government Sect Kingdom or Commonwealth that it be than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had and take a care that either the customes be good or the men good that they may rather work this effect that it be not left to some forraign force to do it For however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy as it prov'd to Rome yet is it so dangerous that it is in no case to be desir'd And to make it appear to any man how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness and wrought many good effects in that City I will come to the narration and discourse of them within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book and last part of this first decade And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable being the History sets them down at large we shall omit them nor speak of them otherwise unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage and here we will begin with Brutus Father of the Roman liberty CHAP. II. It is a very great part of wisdome sometime to seem a fool NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto which was to live in security and preserve his patrimony yet if we consider his manner of proceeding we may beleeve that he thus dissembled to the end he might be less observed have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings and free his Country upon any occasion offered And that he thought upon this it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle when he fained to fall down that he might kiss