Temper and Goodness O happy Nations where none but the honestest Man was to bear sway for he can do what he pleaseth who doth nothing but what he thinks he ought to do 'T was therefore in this Golden Age that the Government was committed to the Wisest They prevented Quarrels protected the Weak against the oppression of the Stronger they advised dissuaded and represented what was most useful and what not Their Prudence provided for the necessities of those who were under their Conduct their Valour drove away all Dangers and their good Deeds purchased daily new Subjects To Command was more a Burden than a Profit and the greatest threatning that a King could then offer to such as were not Obedient was to forsake them and depart the Kingdom But since Vice and Corruption had changed Rulers into Tyrants hence sprung the necessity of having Laws and wise Men were the first contrivers of them But without standing to examin these several Opinions which Lactantius looks upon as frivolous O ingenia hominum indigna quae has ineptias protulerunt Miseros atque miserabiles qui stultitiam suam literis memoriaeque mandaverunt Let us rather consider That the Laws according to Epicurus's Judgment being established for the publick benefit of Mankind that every one might enjoy his Right might live peaceably and securely and seeing there is nothing more agreable to Nature than this I think none has reason to upbraid him quod Leges Jura a Natura sejunxerit That he separated from Nature the Laws and Right seeing that he had rather join'd them inseparably together by the Tie of common Interest which is the firmest Bond according to the Rules of Nature Nor does there seem any reason to blame him because he hath rather derived the Laws and Right from Profit than from Nature seeing he could never have derived them from Profit but at the same time he must needs derive them from Nature Nay let us go further What cause have we to reprove him seeing there is no Person but will allow that both the primitive and modern Legislators had always this thing of Profit or publick Advantage still in their Eye and that no Laws can be just and useful but what tend to the publick Benefit and Advantage Civil Societies saith Aristotle seem to have not only their Rise but their Continuance also in this Foundation of Profit the Law-givers still aimed at this End and generally termed that Right which was found to be useful Cicero retain'd the same Opinion We must saith he intend all our Laws for the publick Good not interpreting them according to the strict Letter but what suits best with the publick Good and common Benefit For our Ancestors always used this Wisdom and Prudence that in making their Laws they still chiefly proposed to themselves nothing more than the Safety Welfare and Advantage of the Publick The Safety of the People saith he in another Place is the supreme Law Salus populi suprema lex He saith further That all Magistrates and Rulers ought to stick close to these two Maxims of Plato the First To be so careful of the benefit of their Subjects that they ought chiefly to aim at it in all their Proceedings forgetting even their own private Profit and Advantage when it comes in Competition Secondly To take heed in their Governments that they lose not one part by endeavouring to preserve the other Truly Cujas acknowledges that the civil Right or the Right of every particular Government is derived from the common Benefit but he denies it to be so in relation to the Right of Nations or of all Mankind in general for he supposeth that proceeds from Nature But since he owns that this Right which is common to particular Places proceeds from Interest which also is common to them all why may not he admit that the Right which is common to all Men is derived also from that Profit which is common to all Men So that natural Right is as it were the Genus Generalissimum of which the Right of Nations or of Men is an inferior Species and likewise this Right of Nations as a Genus more contracted whereof the civil Right or the Right of every City is a Species As to what Epicurus says That a true Law supposeth a mutual Compact or every Law is a kind of an Agreement 't is no more than what Plato Aristotle Demosthenes Aristides and several others assert Nay the divine Law it self so far as it concerns our Fellow Subjects may be reputed the noblest part of the civil Right is nothing else but a Covenant between God and Man There is nothing more common in Holy Writ than to hear them speak of the First and Second Law both the Old and the New as of a Covenant and an Agreement There is nothing more frequent in the Holy Scriptures than to read that God makes a Covenant as with Noah Abraham and Jacob who likewise engage reciprocally to God who had made this Promise to him I will be with thee and keep thee wheresoever thou goest and I will bring thee back into thine own Country c. Unto which Jacob answered If the Lord be with me and will keep me in the way that I go and will give me Bread to Eat and Raiment to put on so that I come again to my Father's House in Peace then shall the Lord be my God Erit mihi Dominus in Deum We need but mention the mutual Compact and Agreement between God and the People of Israel when God was pleased by the Mediation of Moses to proclaim the antient Law Thus God speaks If you hear my Voice and keep my Covenant I will look upon you as my peculiar Treasure and will have more care of you than of all other People And the People answered We will do all that the Lord hath commanded In relation to the new Law this is the Prophesy of Jeremiah The Days shall come saith the Lord that I will make a new Covenant with the House of Israel and with the House of Judah not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers in the Day that I took them by the Hand to bring them out of the Land of Egypt which my Covenant they brake c. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the House of Israel after those Days saith the Lord I will put my Law in their inward Parts and write it in their Hearts and will be their God and they shall be my People But not to insist longer on this let us only observe That tho from what hath been said we may conclude that to speak properly There is no Law of Nations and consequently no Right of Nations because there never hath been any Covenant or Agreement between all Nations nevertheless we may say that this common Precept Thou shalt not do to another what thou wilt not that another should do to thee ought to be esteemed as the first
THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS VIRTUE AND LIBERTY Collected from the WORKS of the Learn'd GASSENDI By Monsieur Bernier Translated out of French LONDON Printed for Awnsham and John Churchil at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row MDCXCIX THE PREFACE THE Epicurean Philosophers placing the Happiness of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind and Health of the Body assure us that those two are no otherwise to be procured than by a constant Practice of Virtue And because they have had the hard Fate to be misrepresented by most of the other Sects as well Ancient as Modern and their Principles traduced as favouring the most brutal Sensuality the Learned Gassendi who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Justice thought he could not employ his Time better than to vindicate the Morals of Epicurus and his Followers from the Slanders of Mistake and Malice and to shew that their principal Design was to lead Men by smooth and easie Paths to a just sober wise and virtuous Behaviour as the only way to true Happiness This he proved at large and illustrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks and Romans But because these Things were diffused through the voluminous Works of that Great Man Monsieur Bernier whose Name is a sufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning took the Pains to put them together and to form them into several intire Discourses which on account of their great importance to Mankind are here presented to the Publick OF Moral Philosophy IN GENERAL MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy the main bent and design of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way It is therefore an undeniable Truth that Happiness or a Life free from Pain and Misery are such things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purposes to the obtaining of them And tho' several Persons who neither want the Necessities nor Conveniences of Life possessing great Riches promoted to Dignites and Honours blessed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-spring in a word who want nothing that may seem requisite to compleat their present Happiness tho' I say we find many who have all these Advantages yet they lead an anxious and uneasy Life disquieted with Cares Troubles and perpetual Disturbances From whence the wiser sort of Mankind have concluded That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cause wherein our true Happiness consists and of the last end which every one should propose to himself in all his Actions which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Passions and forsake Honesty Vertue and good Manners without which it is impossible to live happily For this Reason they have therefore undertaken to instruct us wherein true Happiness consists and to propose such useful Precepts for the due regulation of our Passions whereby our Minds may be less liable to be disturb'd This Collection of Precepts Reflections and Reasonings they name The Art of Living or The Art of leading an happy Life And which they commonly call Moral Philosophy because it comprehends such Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men that is to say the accustomed and habitual Actions of Life From hence we may understand That this part of Philosophy is not only speculative and rests in the bare Contemplation of its Object but proceeds to Action and that it is as we usually say active and practical for it directs and governs our Manners rendring them regular and agreeable with the Rules of Justice and Honesty So that in this respect it may be said to be The Science or if this Term be scrupled at we may call it The Art of doing well I only make this Supposition for let it be stiled Art or Science 't is a difference only in Name which depends upon the manner of understanding those two Words and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter We will rather take notice that Democritus Epicurus and divers others of no small Eminency have had so high an esteem for Moral Philosophy that they have judged the Natural to be no further regarded than only as it was found useful in freeing us from certain Errors and Mistakes in our Understanding which might disturb the Repose and Tranquility of our Life and wherein it might be serviceable to Moral Philosophy or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge which teaches us to live happily and comfortably I shall not mention the Followers of Socrates Aristippius Anthistenes with the Cyrenaicks and Cynicks who altogether neglecting the Natural gave themselves entirely over to the study of Moral Philosophy considering with Socrates what might make for the Good or Ill of Families and what might contribute to the Grief and Disturbance of Man's Life Quid siet in domibus fortasse malumve bonumve We may also here observe That tho' Socrates is supposed to be the Inventer of Moral Philosophy this is only to be understood so far as he did cultivate and improve a new and considerable part not that he laid the first and Original Precepts of it for it is certain that before him Pythagoras had much improved this sort of Knowledge And 't is well known that he commonly asserted That the Discourser of a Philosopher that cures not the Mind of some Passion is vain and useless as the Physick that drives not away the Distemper from the Body is insignificant It is likewise very certain That the wise Men of Greece who lived a little before Pythagoras were named wise only because they addicted themselves to the Study of Moral Wisdom Therefore at this present time their famous Sentences that relate to Mens Manners are generally known all over the World We might add if we would make farther search into the Antiquity of the Heroes that we shall find Orpheus by this same Study of Moral Philosophy drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and savage way of Living which gave occasion of that Saying of him That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions as Horace describes Orpheus inspir'd by more than human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as lawless and as wild as they And first disswaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute In a word it was Morality that first set a Mark of Distinction between publick and private Good setled our Rights and Authority and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies as the same Poet expresses When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did Good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard However we must acknowledge our selves much indebted to Socrates as to Moral Philosophy since by his applying himself
can this shorten the long state of Death For tho' thy Life shall numerous Ages fill The State of Death shall be Eternal still And he that dies to day shall be no more As long as those who perish'd long before If Nature saith he again should in anger speak to us in this manner What Cause hast thou O Mortal to Weep and to Complain of Death If thy former Life hath been easie and pleasant and if thou hast known how to make use of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee why dost thou not as a Guest depart when thou art full and satisfied with Life and why dost thou not accept fond Creature of the agreeable Repose that is offered thee But if otherwise thy Life hath been to thee a burthen and if thou hast suffered my Bounties to perish why desirst thou more to mispend them after the same manner for I can give thee no new thing And if thou shouldst live thousands of years thou wilt but still see the same things repeated over again If Nature should speak to us in this Language should we not have reason to approve of this Discourse and own that it hath cause to Reproach us in this manner Fond Mortal what 's the matter thou dost sigh Why all these Tears because thou once must die And once submit to strong Necessity For if the Race thou hast already run Was pleasant if with joy thou saws't the Sun If all thy Pleasures did not pass thy Mind As thro' a Sieve but left some Sweets behind Why dost thou not then like a thankful Guest Rise cheerfully from Life's abundant Feast And with a quiet Mind go take thy Rest But if all those Delights are lost and gone Spent idly all and Life a burthen grown Then why fond Mortal dost thou ask for more Why still desire t' increase thy wretched store And wish for what must wast like those before Not rather free thy self from Pains and Fear And end thy Life and necessary care My Pleasures always in a Circle run The same returning with the yearly Sun And thus tho' thou dost still enjoy thy Prime And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time Yet I can find no new no fresh Delight The same dull Joys must vex thy Appetite Altho' thou coud'st prolong thy wretched Breath For numerous Years much more if free from Death At least we must acknowledge that a Wise Man who hath lived long enough to consider the World ought of his own accord to submit himself to the Course of Nature when he perceives that his time is come and cannot but suppose that his Race is Run and that the Circle that he hath finish'd is compleat and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity it is however with the continuance of the World As to what relates to the whole Prospect of Nature he hath often beheld the Heavens the Earth and other things included in the World He hath often seen the rising and the setting of the Coelestial Bodies He hath taken notice of several Eclipses and many other Phaenomenas or unusual Appearances in the Skye the constant succession of the Seasons and in a word many particular Generations many Corruptions and Transmutations And as to those things which relate to Mankind he hath seen or at least hath heard and understood from History the Transactions that have happen'd from the beginning of Peace and of War of Faith kept and violated of a Polite Life and of a rude and barbarous Behaviour of Laws Establish'd and Abolish'd of Kingdoms and Commonwealths in their first Birth and Declension and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of or which have been told him and with which he is in any wise acquainted as if he had been present when they first happen'd So that he ought to consider that all the time that is gone before him relates to him as if his Life were begun with the things themselves And because we must judge of the future by the time past he ought also to think that all the subsequent time relates to him in the same manner and that there shall be nothing hereafter but what hath been already that there is nothing but the Circumstances of things that alter and that all things in general steer the same common Course and make the like appearances so that Holy Writ hath reason to say The thing that hath been it is that which shall be and that which is done is that which shall be done again and there is no new thing under the Sun Is there any thing whereof it may be said see this is new From whence we may conclude that a Wise Man ought not to fancy his Life short for by casting his eye upon the time past and foreseeing the time to come he may extend it to as great a length as the duration of the Universe Moreover tho' Epicurus had cause to say That it is ridiculous to assert that there is no evil in Death when it is present and yet to dread it and be troubled when it must come as if there were any reason to be disturbed for that which is absent which when present never gives us the least sorrow Nevertheless because other Considerations represent Death dreadful as the Evils and Pains that Usher it and those that we think will be its necessary Attendants Seneca therefore makes it his business to recommend divers Considerations wherein he shews that tho' Death in it self is no Evil yet it appears so much in that Notion that it ought not to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing for as he expresseth himself Death is not indifferent in the same manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length or not for Death is to be reckon'd amongst those things which tho' they be no real Evils yet they appear to be so for we love our selves and naturally desire to subsist and preserve our selves and we have an innate aversion from a dissolution because it seems to deprive us of many advantages and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accustomed There is yet one thing more which causeth us to dread Death We know the things present but we are altogether Strangers to those unto which we are a going and therefore we fear that which is unknown Besides we have a natural dread of Darkness into which we imagin that Death is leading us So that tho' Death is indifferent yet it is not of the number of those things that are easily to be despised we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accustomed Habit to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the dismal approaches of Death The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks who were perswaded that in some Cases Men had the liberty to kill themselves for thus you see Seneca represents them arguing It is certainly a great
do they willingly reject any Pleasure that is offered them unless it chance to be accompanied by some Evil that may after procure a Pain and so cause us to repent of its first acceptance And truly as it is the nature of Good to invite and perswade the Appetite to love and embrace it so we can give no Reason why all Pleasure should not be of it self Lovely and to be desired seeing there is none but in it self is pleasing and desirable and which does of it self incline our Appetites So that if we refuse any we refuse them not as Pleasures but because of some inconveniences that are annexed and will infallibly attend them Now to illustrate this more plainly by an Example There is no Person but will allow Hony to be naturally sweet yet if Poyson happens to mixed with it whereby the Poyson it self doth also become sweet we shall then have a real aversion for the sweetness of the Hony but this is by accident for the Hony of it self is naturally sweet and pleasing to our Taste So that if we have any dislike we may say it is not really for the sweetness of the Hony but for the Poison that is mixt with it and for the Mischief that Poyson will bring for if it were separated from the Hony we should then willingly taste of it Now adjust any Pleasure whatsoever to this Example and you will easily perceive it to be never otherwise for we shall always eschew the Evil but not the Pleasure it self when distinct and separated from the Evil For either it is the thing from whence it is taken or the action that is joined to it or the damage that ensue either from the thing or from the action or the pain and grief that will attend it which proceed from the Thing from the Action or from the Damage And to make the matter still appear more obvious and intelligible Suppose that the same Pleasure is to be drawn from a Thing or Action that neither Law nor Custom nor Honesty prohibit suppose that from this Action or thing no damage or prejudice will happen either to our Health Reputation or Estate Suppose in a word that no Punishment will attend it nor Grief nor Repentance neither in this Life nor the next And you will plainly understand that nothing can hinder it to be esteem'd a real Good and real Advantage and if at present it is not so reputed this proceeds not from the nature of the Thing but from the Circumstances that I have mentioned Aristotle also proves the thing by an Argument taken from Pain which is opposite to Pleasure All the World saith he are agreed that Pain is an Evil and to be avoided Now that which is contrary to a thing that is to be avoided and a real Evil is good therefore Pleasure is a real Good Now to inlarge upon this Reason of Aristotle Is it not manifest That all Pain in general is of it self Evil and Hurtful and by consequence every Animal hath naturally an aversion against it So that if at any time it is called Good it is only by accident in regard it hath some good thing that is joined to it which obliges us to love and desire it But if you remove from Pain all hopes or expectation of obtaining any good thing either Honest Profitable or Pleasant there is no Man so foolish as to wish for it or seek after it As this is undeniable so it is apparent that if all Pain be of it self Evil and not good but by accident all Pleasure being contrary to Pain is of it self good and an evil by Accident Some object That a Temperate Man flies from Pleasures and that he that is Wise seeks rather a freedom from Pain That there are some Pleasures which are impediments to Wisdom and the rather because they are Violent and Furious as all Venereal Pleasures generally are That there are others which are not only hurtful because they dull the Understanding beget Diseases and cause Poverty but are also filthy and infamous But First The Temperate and Prudent Man flies not from all Pleasures for it is plain That he seeks after such as are pure and honest and if he avoids some it is not because they are only Pleasures but because inseparable from actions which are certainly attended with Destruction which a Prudent Temperate Man ought not to be guilty of for the enjoyment of a present Pleasure In the same manner as we fly from Poison sweetned not because it is sweet but because it is deadly and brings a Mischief with it which undoubtedly ought not to be bought at so dear a rate Besides it is plain That Pleasures alone are no impediments of Wisdom or Prudence but rather the Actions that accompany them such actions I mean by which the Spirits are too much spent whereby the strength of the Mind is weakned and the Judgment blinded So that when these Mischiefs are charged upon Pleasure it is a Paralogism or deceitful way of Arguing called by Aristotle Non causae ut causae when that which is not the Cause is taken for the Cause as if the Evil which ought to be ascrib'd to the Poison be attributed to the Hony or to the Sweetness Thus by consequence that which may be said in respect of Diseases and Poverty and other inconveniences which commonly succeed is that Pleasure simply consider'd as it is Pleasure is not the cause of these Evils but rather Gluttony or the excess of Wine and Meats prepared with Sawces which tempt us to exceed the Bounds of Moderation whence proceed Fevers and other grievous Distempers So also from the excess of Venery proceed the Disease of the Gout and other shameful Maladies accompanied with a numerous Train of other Mischiefs Thus the same may be said in respect of the Infamy which we commonly ascribe to Pleasures for it rather regards the actions that accompany them which are of themselves contrary to good Manners and therefore are reputed Vicious and Dishonest for this reason for Instance The Laws prohibit not the pleasure in Adultery but the action of Adultery it self which being forbidden and infamous in it self causeth the pleasure that it procures to be esteem'd also filthy and infamous But suppose in this case there were no prohibition as in the Estate of pure Nature Or suppose that it happen'd that the Wife of this Man had been the Wife of the present Adulterer here he had enjoyed the same Pleasure which in that case had not been reckoned of ill Repute because that action which accompanies it had not been then forbidden nor dishonest From whence we may conclude That Pleasure is not blame-worthy in it self but for the Circumstances that accompany it Some answer That tho' Pleasure be no Evil yet it is necessary to place it in the number of the Evils because of the Common People who being inclin'd to Pleasure ought like crooked Trees to be bent a contrary way and by that
all indirect means strive to acquire Riches that they might have the pleasure of wasting them in Prodigality Rioting and Luxury This hath given occasion to Manilius too justly to Complain For Heaven is kind with bounteous hand it grants A fit supply for Nature's sober Wants She asks not much yet Men press blindly on And heap up more to be the more Vndone By Luxury they Rapine's force maintain What that scrapes up flows out in Luxury again And to be Squander'd or to raise Debate Is the great Only use of an Estate That those good things which we call Honest have the nearest relation to Pleasure THis seems a little more difficult to be made out Bonum honestum or honest Good seems to carry its own intrinsick worth and to be desir'd only for it self Cicero amongst others appears very much incens'd against Epicurus after he had proposed a Form of Honesty such an one as he would have us understand he applies himself to Torquatus Thy Epicurus saith That he knows not what they mean who compute Man's chief Happiness only by Honesty who say that all things are to be referr'd to that and that there is nothing of Pleasure to be intermix'd with it These are idle Discourses which he can't understand and that he cannot conceive what they mean by this word Honesty for to speak according to the usual Dialect we stile that Honest which the People by their general Vogue term Glorious and Honourable And tho' that saith he be oftentimes more pleasing than divers other Pleasures still it is desired for Pleasure sake See here saith he this great Dispute A famous Philosopher who hath made so much noise in the World and hath spread his Fame not only over Greece and Italy but over the Barbarous Nations saith That he understands not what that Honesty means that is so much talk'd of if there be no Pleasure intermixt with it In this manner Cicero proposeth the Opinion of Epicurus in relation to these remarkable Words That nothing is called Honest but what the General Vogue of Men recommend Aristotle explains the Matter in these Terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Either that there is nothing Honest or it is that which is so esteem'd in the Opinion of Men. Now to speak first as in reference to the Notion or description of Honesty What harm is there if we consider it with a respect to Man from whom it receives Praise and Recommendation The word Honest amongst the Latins is said to be so from the Honour that Action deserves and amongst the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems to have no other Signification for if you please you may interpret it not only Honest but also Beautiful Honourable and Praise-worthy c. And you will find that it is not so in respect of it self but in respect of Men who allow of it to be so and consequently it appears to them Beautiful and Honourable and of whom it is and ought to be Praised The same ought to be understood of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when we interpret it Ignoble Shameful and Detestable we mean always in reference to Men to whom it seems to be so And that it is really so we will appeal to Cicero himself who gives this description of Honesty That when it is divested of all Profit and Applause it still remains desirable and commendable for its own sake without any regard to a Reward Now as I say is it not true that in this sense Honesty is that which may be approved of and desired which shews a relation to them who Praise it or as Epicurus saith To the common Esteem of the People But by this word People or Multitude who can think that Epicurus hath a design to exclude Men of Wisdom and Understanding and that he means not generally all the Men that make up a City or People It were Ridiculous and Foolish to have such a Fancy Now in reference to what Cicero saith That all Profit is removed Epicurus will agree with him That Honest Men don't propose to themselves any Profit or Advantage such as Mony and the like low mean things but they propose to themselves some other Benefits as Praise Glory Honour Renown c. which Cicero himself Acknowledges for in his Oration for Milo having supposed That there are divers Recompences offered to Men of Honour he saith That of all the Rewards of Vertue Glory is the greatest And in another Place he declares That Vertue desires no other recompence for all its Labours and Dangers but Praise and Glory which being removed saith he what is there in the course of this Life of so short a continuance for which we ought to be at so much Labour Epicurus therefore seems to have given a good description of what is Honest viz. That which is Glorious and Honourable by the Vogue and universal Consent of all Mankind For if at any time People account that to be Commendable and Glorious which is esteem'd Mean and Dishonourable amongst some People or Nations who have different Laws and Customs according to which the Notion of Honest and Dishonest differs but not in respect of the same People amongst whom that thing may be esteem'd Honest and agreeable with their Laws and Customs For this Reason therefore Cicero sometimes gives this general description of Honour A reward of Vertue granted to some Body by the Judgment and Approbation of his Fellow Citizens Praemium Virtutis judicio studioque Civium delatum ad aliquem As if he should say That Honour and by consequence Honesty or that which is Glorious and Honourable by Reputation depends upon the Judgment of the Citizens or of the People who make use of their own Laws and Customs But in conclusion to speak one word to the Purpose in reference to that Honesty which relates to Pleasure we must observe That this Relation hinders not but that Honesty in one sense may be said to be desired for it self or for its own sake because it is desired nulla contingente sive superveniente re as Aristotle Teaches that is to say as Cicero Interprets it All Profit being laid aside and without any Reward Recompence or Advantage such as Mony and the like can produce For some may desire Honour Learning and Vertue not because they may thereby advance Gain or increase Wealth but for the Renown and Satisfaction that will arise from the enjoyment of a clear and enlightned Understanding whereby we may the better rule and Govern our Passions and all this nevertheless because it is pleasant to be Honoured Learned and Vertuous and to enjoy a Soul Calm and Serene Whether the desire of Honour be Blame-worthy WE must here observe that tho a too eager and violent pursuit of Honour under a colour of Vertue be not to be allowed yet we must not totally condemn the Desire of it as some have done especially if we seek after it with a
that this distinction may serve to resolve the Opinion that Laertius ascribes to him That he was perswaded that all the Virtues had not a mutual Connection for it might happen that a Man might be Prudent and Just and yet might be Intemperate and Debauch'd for he will reply That those who seem to be adorned with some certain Virtues if they have not the rest have 'em in Appearance and Imperfect because their seeming Actions of Virtue are not inlivened with that inward Passion and general Inclination for Honesty whereby the Soul is influenc'd to act nothing without the direction of Reason 'T is the same as if we should say That they have a material Virtue but not a formal for the Form or Perfection and Completion of all Virtue is this Affection and general Disposition of the Mind by which a Man does nothing but in a just manner and out of a principle of Virtue for according to the Judgment of Aristotle nothing but this Disposition can qualifie Men to be Honest and Just So that he who is not rich and consequently not in a Condition to shew his Liberality or Magnificence yet may have a Soul so qualified that if his Estate increased he would do nothing but what is Just Honourable and Magnificent for tho' he hath not the Habit of bestowing large Gifts yet he hath a Propension of giving according to his Abilities and is not sparing of that which is in his small Power to give Therefore the Liberality of that poor Country-man who having nothing else presented Water to the King which he had drawn out of the River was as acceptable as the Gifts of Princes in rich and costly Vessels I shall not here mention the several Reasons that Alexander hath collected nor with him stay to tell you for instance That it is impossible for a Man to be just unless at the same time he hath all other Virtues for if he be intemperate or fearful or covetous he will cease to be just when an Opportunity offers of Pleasure Danger or Hopes of Gain and so it is with other Vices there is not any but is able to cause us to Violate and Corrupt some part of Justice I shall only take notice that this Doctrin of the Connection and Correspondency of Virtues together is common not only to Epicurus Aristotle Plato St. Ambrose and St. Gregory but chiefly to the Stoicks tho' these last add this Paradox That Virtues are all equal I add the word chiefly for among them these Opinions pass for Current That a wicked Man hath no Virtue and a just Man no Vice That the first sins in every thing and the latter acts nothing ill That whatsoever a wise Man doth he doth it assisted by all the Virtues and if he did but wag his Finger without the direction of Reason he would commit a Sin Ni tibi concessit ratio digitum exsere peccas A General Division of Virtue BUt as we are now to speak of the several kinds of Virtue we ought here first to lay down the common Division thereof Not to mention here what Zeno taught that there were divers sorts of Virtues which yet the Megarians would not allow of supposing 'em to be but one under several Names Nor what Apollophanes asserts viz. That of Prudence only That celebrated Division of Virtue into four parts is sufficiently known viz. of Prudence Temperance Fortitude and Justice Nevertheless Aristotle in his Morals treats of these four Virtues in the same manner as he treats also of Gentleness of Liberality of the greatness of the Mind of Magnificence of Moderation of just Indignation of Modesty of Gravity of Truth or Veracity of Civility and of the rest as distinct kinds of Virtue not tying himself to any limited Number And so begins to discourse of Fortitude For the Stoicks tho' they have variously divided Virtue nevertheless Possidonius among the rest holds to these four kinds and therefore Cicero seems to have taken this from the Stoicks Whatsoever is just and honest proceeds from one of these four Species for either it relates to the discerning of Truth and Falshood or the Preservation of the Society which consists in the faith of Contracts and in giving to every one what appertains to him or the strength and greatness of the Soul or else in the Moderation in all that we say or do By which Words the four sorts of Virtue are described Now we must observe that if since the days of St. Ambrose and St. Jerom these four Virtues have been stiled Cardinal Virtues because they are look'd upon as the Hinges upon which the rest turn it is doubtless in imitation of the Stoicks who affirm That among the Virtues some are Primitive or Principal the others subject and depending on the former and that the first are Prudence Fortitude Temperance and Justice and the latter a greatness of Mind Continency Patience quickness of Apprehension or liveliness of Spirit Subtilty and sound Judgment all which Cicero terms Companions and Seneca branches of the first Stock The Schoolmen call 'em Parts and divide 'em into three kinds that they might refer all the Virtues called Moral to one of the four chief Thus Thomas Aquinas hath dealt Now these three Parts are First Such as are properly called Subjects or Species Secondly The Integral Parts or which have in some respect the Parts which compose the whole and ought necessarily to assist to the perfect Act of a certain Virtue Thirdly The Potential which like the Powers of the Soul are accompanying but have not the Efficacy of a a principal Virtue Thus the Virtues subject to Prudence are the Private the Oeconomick the Politick the Military and the Royal The Integral are Memory Docility Sagacity Reason Providence Circumspection and Precaution or Fore-sight The Potential which bear their ancient Greek names are Ebulia that is Wisdom in Counsel Synesis sharpness of Apprehension Gnome a prudent Elocution Thus the Subject Parts of Justice are the General the Legal and the Special which have for Species the commutative and distributive Justice The Integral are the Precepts of the Law as To do wrong to no Body To give to every one what belongs to him and if we may make use of the words of Holy Writ To fly from Evil and to do Good The Potential are Religion Holiness Piety Charity Obedience Truth Gratitude Liberality Affability and Amity or Friendship In like manner the Subject Parts of Temperance are Abstinence and Sobriety first in relation to Eating the latter in respect of Drinking Chastity and Modesty The Integral are Bashfulness and Honesty The Potential are Clemency Humility Modesty Mildness Mercy Moderation Decency Gratefulness and Urbanity For Fortitude as it is not usual to ascribe to it any subject Parts because of that chief Matter about which it is employed so only four Parts are assigned to it which are reckoned to be Integral when they are lookt upon as being employed about a difficult Matter or Potential if
put an end either to him or his Suffering If it ceaseth the Pleasure of being delivered from it and the health of Body that succeeds with a perfect Indolency are so pleasing and delightsome that we seem to be well satisfied with the Pain we have undergone from the Pleasure we enjoy of being freed from it And if it takes away the Sufferer it brings him to the end of all Sufferings So that this Suffering brings at least this Advantage with it that it makes our Life which we must needs part with less pleasing and Death less terrible wherefore many care not how soon they Dye expecting thereby to be delivered from their Pains so that every Day they talk after this manner Nor is Death Grievous whilst it ends my Pains Now as for Death we have already alledged so many things to shew that we ought to expect it and bear it patiently that it is needless to insist any longer upon this Particular Let us therefore conclude with that kind of general Consolation which Horace in few Words expresseth With equal Foot impartial Fate Knocks at the Cottage and the Palace Gate And the French Poet Malherbius imitates him The Beggar in Straw Keeps the general Law And when Death gives the Word must advance And the Guards that each Hour Take their Place at the Louvre Can't defend the great Monarchs of France CHAP. VII Of Temperance CIcero tells us That Temperance makes up the second principal Part of Morality The Greeks style it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say the Protectrice of Prudence or as Plato terms it the safety of Prudence from hence a temperate Man is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is one who preserves Wisdom or one who keeps his Senses entire and sound and herein he is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Imprudent Man or a Fool for he who is Intemperate seems to have lost all Prudence to have no due use either of his Sense or his Reason This Virtue also is sometimes taken in too large an extent sometimes too narrow and sometimes in a mediocrity and in this last Sense we shall now treat of it Now that it is taken sometimes in too large a Sense as generally comprehending all Virtues or for all that is excellent and commendable in any other Virtue even the Word it self seems to import for Temperance expresseth a Mediocrity and all Virtue is a Mediocrity Besides it is as we have said the Protectrice of Prudence without which no Virtue can subsist and according to the Opinion of Pythagoras 't is the Life and Vigour of the Soul Socrates names it the Foundation of Virtue Plato the Ornament of all good Things and Iamblicus the Breast-plate of all the most excellent Habits That 't is sometimes taken in too narrow a signification may appear when 't is understood only for that Virtue that gives a check to the Pleasures of Tasting and Feeling and comprehends only Sobriety and Chastity Lastly It seems to be taken in a moderate Latitude and Extent when we understand not only hereby the regulation of the particular Appetites of Tasting and Feeling c. but likewise such as puff up the Mind and carry it beyond the bounds of Decency and Honesty So that we may say that a temperate Man is not only such a one who lives Soberly and Chastly but he also who neither Speaks nor Acts any thing but agreeable with Justice and Moderation and which is accepted and approved of by all good and wise Men. Of Modesty and Decency WHerefore among the several species of Temperance Sobriety and Chastity are not only to be reckoned which we have before mentioned but also many of those which we name Potential as are Gentleness or Mildness Clemency Modesty and some others So that Modesty and Decency which are said to be the integral Parts are of a larger Signification as being too general Means the one to draw us from Intemperance and the other to incline us to it For Modesty tho Aristotle pretends that 't is no Virtue but rather a bashful disturbance as being nothing else but a certain fear of Infamy nevertheless this disturbance tends to oppose that sort of Pleasure which we may take in too great Confidence which produces a great Displeasure namely that which proceeds from Infamy and Disgrace And Decency at least as it is here taken is nothing else but a certain Conveniency 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 approved of which prevailing upon us by its Beauty causeth us to give a check to that daring Impudence so that thereby our good Reputation being preserved safe and sound it procures a certain Pleasure much greater and more sincere Now tho it is commendable to shun Intemperance and to follow Temperance because of Decency alone and good Manners 't is likewise commendable for Modesty's sake or for fear of Shame which would otherwise ensue For as we cannot hate Darkness but we must love the Light so we cannot hate Shame and Dishonour but we must have a love for a good Reputation and for an honest Name Therefore when Aristotle in his Book to Nicomachus seems to disallow Modesty he does not mean that Shamefacedness which appears in the blushing Countenance of young Persons who are apt to be too far transported by a juvenile Heat but he allows it not in aged Persons who ought never to commit any thing whereof they may be ashamed for elsewhere in his great Treatises of Morality he placeth Modesty among the other Virtues and gives to it this Definition A Mediocrity between Impudence and Insensibility as if he should say That Modesty is a certain kind of Shame occasioned not by the commission of any base and dishonest Action but proceeds to advise and hinder us from the committing of it Of Sobriety and Chastity in general THese two Virtues seem to deserve a particular Tract at large for they constitue two principal kinds of Temperance but we can scarce add any thing to what hath been formerly said when we have mentioned the great advantages of a sober Life and when we have instanced that noble and celebrated Maxim of Epicurus Sapientem non esse amaturum nunquam prodesse venerea Therefore I shall here only observe some things in general and then more particularly In general that the Praise and Advantage of these two Virtues seem for the most part to consist not in the withdrawing our selves from living after the manner of Brutes in respect of Lusts and Pleasure but rather to approach nearer to ' em This will not seem so great a Paradox if we do but consider that we are very frequently more intemperate and worse than those Creatures that follow the meer dictates of Nature whereas we debauch and abuse Nature For there is no doubt but that that strong Inclination and Desire which we have for Eating and Drinking is natural seeing we find it equally in all Animals and proceeds from the institution of Nature who has ordain'd that by Food
need of any other Ground but to hinder them from doing Evil or from Transgressing But those who had not so much Ingenuity as to take notice of the importance hereof desisted from Murdering one another meerly out of the fear and apprehension of the grievous Punishments to be inflicted on Offenders which we see still at present to be our Case Between whom Right and Justice takes place AS after all that hath been said it may be questioned among whom Right and the violation of Right and consequently Justice and Injustice which are Opposites take place This in my Judgment is to be understood by comparing Men with other Animals Therefore as there is no kind of Right and Injury of Just or Unjust between the rest of Animals because it was not possible to make any agreement between them that they should do no Mischief to one another So there ought not to be between the Nations which could not or would not make any such Compact to do no wrong one to another For Just or Right the observance whereof is named Justice is only in a mutual Society therefore Justice is the Tie of that Society so that every one of its Members might live in Security and free from the apprehensions of Dangers and Disturbances that a continual fear of being Assaulted or recieving damage may raise in us So that all Animals whether Men or others who cannot or will not enter into a Society and consequently be concerned in such Agreements are deprived of this advantage and have not among themselves any obligation of Right and Justice to make them live in Security So that there remains to them no other means of Security than to prevent one another and to treat them so hardly that they may not have Power to do them any Mischief For this Cause as among those Animals that have agreed upon nothing among themselves if it happens that one injures another one may say that he who does the Evil to the other is Mischievous or hurts the other who is injured but not that it is unjust in this respect or that it does wrong because there is no manner of Right no Agreement no Law precedent to restrain 'em from doing Mischief so among Men who have made no Compact nor are not enter'd into any Society if any treats another rudely or barbarously one may say that he doth him Damage or doth him Mischief but not that he is unjust to him or that he wrongs or injures him because there is no Law to bind him to do no Mischief to such an one But between Men and other Animals can there be any Justice None at all 'T is true That if Men could with other Animals as with Men make Agreements and Contracts not to kill one another we could then between them and us demand Justice for that would tend to a mutual Security but because it cannot be that Animals that are without Reason should be obliged or tied to us by any common Laws therefore we cannot take any more security from the other Animals than from the inanimate Creatures So that to secure our selves there remains for us no other means than to make use of that Power that we have either to kill them or to force them to obey us You may perhaps here by the by ask why we kill those Creatures also which we have no reason to fear I confess we may do this sometimes through Intemperance and Cruelty as by Inhumanity and Barbarity we often abuse such sometimes who are out of our Society and of whom 't is not possible that we should apprehend any danger of Evil. But 't is one thing to offend against Temperance or any of its Species viz. such as Sobriety Gentleness or Humanity and a natural Goodness and another to offend against Justice which supposeth Agreements and Laws Besides of all Animals which are not injurious to humane Race there is no kind but may be so if we suffer 'em to increase and multiply beyond measure As to what at present concerns the pretended savage Life of the first Men 't is not Epicurus who was the first Broacher of this Fancy for the most ancient Poets make mention of it and say That it was Orpheus that sacred Interpreter of the Gods and Amphion the Founder of the City of Thebes who by their sage and eloquent Discourses withdrew those Men from their unsettled and wandring way of Living changing their cruel and barbarous Customs and Manners Orpheus inspir'd by more than Human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as Lawless and as Wild as they And first dissuaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion Built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute Cicero himself as if having almost forgotten that he had so highly exalted the dignity of the human Nature declaring it to be altogether Celestial and Divine yet acknowledges That there was a time when Men were wandring like Vagabonds about the Fields in some manner resembling the Brutes That neither Reason Religion Piety nor Humanity were then known among them That they were Strangers to Wedlock and a lawful Issue That they neither used natural nor civil Right That they were in a gross Ignorance and that their unbridled Lust put 'em upon exerting the Powers and Abilities of their Bodies to satiate it self every one possessing more or less according as he was able to take away and keep from another But says he afterward some Men were found to be of a better Temper and more Judgment and Reason than the rest who reflecting on this miserable way of Living and withal considering the tractableness of Mankind were resolved to represent to their Companions how advantageous it would be to joyn together in Societies And by this means by degrees they reclaimed them from their first barbarous manner of Living and reduc'd them to a civil Behaviour who inventing both divine and humane Rights gathered Men into Companies erected Towns and Cities made Laws and afterwards constituted Kings and Governours to check the Insolent and to protect the Feeble and Week against the Stronger Others are of Opinion that the first Age began with the famous Golden Age which was so happy that Men were not then bound up by any Laws nor frighted with the fear of Punishment but lived together innocently having regard to Piety Justice and Equity When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard Seneca renders it thus according to Posidonius They were not yet Corrupted nor Debauched in their Principles but followed the dictates of Nature which directed and awed them from doing ill In the Choice of their Governour they neither respected his Strength nor outward appearance but his