A second cause of weakning and dissolving a State are certain Doctrines The first That every private man is Judge of good and evil actions G. L. Judgement is publick or private publick no private man can pass private he may and that both of his own actions and others too The acts of others are private or publick of both these he may Judge Publick acts of the Governors are Laws Judgements Execution Even of Laws he may he must within himself so far as they are a rule and bind him enquire examine and determine whether good or evil Otherwise he can perform but only a blind obedience to the best and if he conform unto the unjust he in obeying man disobeys God which no good man will do In other acts which are apparently just we may judge of them truly as they are and no otherwise Yet this must not be done to palliate our disobedience to that which is just or raise sedition or rebel but we may complain to God and by our humble prayers seek redress T. H. A second Doctrine That whatsoever a man doth against conscience is sin The conscience may be erroneous and he that is subject to no Civil Law sins in all he acts against his conscience Yet to him that is in a Common-wealth the Law is the publick conscience by which he hath undertaken to be guided G. L. Conscience is a mans knowledge of his own acts as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God It s not a faculty but an act of the soul and an act not of the will but understanding and the same as practical The proper act is knowledge the object is his own acts and these acts not any way but as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God For as Aquinas saith there must be applicatio facti ad legem Otherwise a mans understanding cannot judge of it as conformable or not unto the Law of God These acts may be considered as to be done or done In the former respect conscience binds as a Law though it be not the Law but presupposeth or includeth the knowledge of the Law In the latter respect it judgeth and is a kind of judge of himself in some sort as superiour to himself But before the tribunal of God it is a witness and doth accuse or excuse The great Question so much vexed by the Casuists is whether an erroneous conscience doth bind But let them determine what they please an erroneous conscience in proper sense is no conscience For an errour is no knowledge but a defect of knowledge or rather a plain want of knowledge and also an act contrary to knowledge Conscience is a knowledge in proper sense and knowledge is true and certain and it s a knowledge of a mans own act or acts as agreeable to the Law of God this an erroneous conscience cannot be That conscience is such a knowledge is made evident by the Apostle saying That when the Gentiles not having the Law do the things contained in the Law they having not the Law are a Law unto themselves who shew the work of the Law written in their heart by their conscience witnessing c. Rom. 12.14 15. Where we may observe 1. That the conscience could not witness accuse or excuse except there were something to be accused or excused 2. The thing accused as evil or excused as good must be something conformable or contrary to the Law of God 3. The conscience could not accuse or excuse any thing as good or evil without knowledge both of the Law and of the act that was contrary or consentaneous to that Law 4. Therefore the Apostle before he makes mention of the conscience affirmeth 1. That they did the things contained in the Law 2. They were a Law unto themselves 3. That they did by their conscience witnessing prove or demonstrate the work of the Law that is the work which the Law did command written in their heart To have the work of the Law written in their heart is to have a certain true knowledge of it not an erroneous mistake But to return to the Author Conscience in proper sense doth bind yet not as it is knowledge nor as knowledge of a mans proper act nor as knowledge of the Law in general but by vertue of the Law known as a rule of his particular act For man being subject unto God and under his Laws cannot bind himself and be his own Law-giver but the Law of God not an errour truly understood by him doth bind him But let the erroneous judgement of the practical understanding be called conscience as by a Trope it may because there may be something of conscience in it yet whether can it bind or no I answer it cannot bind for an errour of the understanding cannot be a binding rule to command the will of man neither can it be a rule at all Again an erroneous judgement especially practical is a sin and against the Law of God therefore it can no waies bind only thus far most Casuists do grant that by it a man is so far bound as not to act against it yet this it doth only per accidens for per se he is bound to act otherwise then it doth dictate For because God hath made a mans reason his guide he must needs be much depraved in his will that will act contrary unto his reason And he that will not seruple to act against his erroneous judgement will be bold to act against his judgement rightly informed But the full debate of this I refer to another occasion And these things premised I return unto Mr. Hobbs that of the Apostle Whatsoever is not of faith is sin and therefore whosoever acts againt saith and conscience properly so taken sinneth and for him to affirm that the true Doctrine of God revealed in the Scripture should be either false or destructive of eivil States and Governments is no waies tolerable Whereas he alledgeth that the Law of the Common-wealth is the publick conscience by which the subject hath bound himself to be guided it s too loose and fallacious if examined For 1. The Law is not the publick conscience but the publick rule of conscience in matters civil 2. It s a rule of the subjects obedience not as its a Law of the Common-wealth but as it is agreeable and not contrary to an higher Law the Law of God For the Laws civil do not immediately bind the conscience and immortal soul as the civil Soveraign hath no power to punish it for his sword cannot reach that spiritual substance Secondarily and by consequence they may oblige the soul 3. No subject may or ought to make the Law of the State his absolute guide For the Law may be against the Law of God and then how can the subject undertake to obey it and make it his rule and not offend God 4. Every subject is first bound and subject unto God before he be subjected to civil powers and is first
obligativa 4. Not content to give the definition he explains what is right and that is that which is not contrary to the Law and wrong and its that which is contrary But what he means by rule is hard to know If he mean by rule Law it self then its absurd if he intends some antecedent rule of divine wisdom manifesting what is just or unjust before a civil power command it he is obscure Though he undervalue the Philosopher so much as far below him though he was far above him he might with Marsulis of Padua in his Defensor Pacis pars 1. cap. 10. have observed out of him a better definition of a Law given Ethn. ad Nicho. lib. 10. cap. 9. Lex est sententia doctrina seu judicium universale justorum conferentium civilium suorum oppositorum cum praecepto coactivo per poenam aut praemium de ejus observatione in hoc saeculo destribuenda More briefly it s a coactive precept of the Soveraign binding the subject to obedience and upon the same to be rewarded or upon disobedience to be punished in this life where many things are to be observed 1. The matter of this Law is something in it self just and conducing to the publik good yet so that it reacheth to the contrary 2. This must be known and judged to be so by the wisdom and understanding of the Soveraign for all Laws arr made by wisdom Political 3. This judgement of the Law-giver must be made known unto the subject therefore the Philosopher saith its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word And he means not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word not only inwardly conceived in the mind of the Law-giver 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle saith but it must be uttered and made known as the ten Commandements are called the ten words therefore it s said Exodus 20. God spake all these words 4. It must be praeceptum which includes the will of the Soveraign intending to bind the subject and so declaring himself 5. It must be an universal precept binding the whole community of the subject 6. It must be a coactive precept and backt with the sword for to make the Obligation effectual In this respect the Philosopher saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law must have a coactive force And the Apostle saith he beareth not the sword in vain which words imply the Law-giver must have a sword 7. This sword protects and rewards the obedient who observe this Law according to their obligation and it punisheth the disobedient and for these two ends the Law must be co-active and armed with a sword 8. These rewards and punishments are to be conferrd and inflicted in this life for it cannot reach the soul and the life to come and this doth difference the civil Laws of men from the Laws of God which bind men to obedience upon the promise of spiritual and eternal rewards and for defect of obedience unto eternal and spiritual penalties This hath far more of the definition of a Law then his and more fully declares the nature of a Law civil Yet if either he or any other will improve it I shall like it well for I know mine own imperfections From his definition he infers several conclusions the first whereof is T. H. The Legislator in all Common-wealths is the Soveraign Again the Common-wealth is the Legislator by the Representative G. L. That pars imperans is the Legislator in every State must needs be granted but that the Common-wealth should be the Legislator either by or without pars imperans the Soveraign I do not understand For it consists of two parts the Soveraign and the subject and if the whole Common-wealth make Laws then the subject as well as the Soveraign is Legislator In a Republick or free-State there is a difference between the Soveraign and the subject much more in other models and forms Therefore he must needs speak either improperly or untruly when he saith the State is Legislator T. H. Conclusion 2. The Soveraign is not subject to the civil Laws because he hath power to make and repeal them at pleasure G. L. That the Soveraign in divers respects and especially as a Soveraign is not subject unto but above the Laws is a certain truth For Laws do bind the subject not the Soveraign to obey or be punished but the Soveraign doth command as Superiour not obey as inferiour doth punish is not punished The power to make a Law when there is none and to repeal after that it s made is sufficient evidence of his superiority as also dispensations in judgement and pardons be Yet this supreme will Legislative over men is subject to the superiour will of God and must neither make nor repeal Laws but according to wisdom and justice T. H. Conclusion 3. Custom is not Law by long continuance of time but by consent of the Soveraign G. L. This follows from the first Conclusion For if the Soveraign only be the Legislator then continuance of time and practise of the people though universal cannot make a Law The Soveraign must give either an express or tacit consent and this consent is then most evident when he makes the custom a rule in judgement and observes it And the Civilians well observe that besides continuance of time and the Soveraigns consent A third thing is required and that is that the beginning of it be reasonable as the Author here doth note T. H. Conclusion 4. The Law of Nature and the Civil Law contain each other and are of equal extent For the Laws of Nature which consist in equity justice gratitude and other moral vertues on these depending in the condition of meer nature are not properly laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience when a Common-wealth is once actually settled then are they Laws c. G. L. 1. This is no Conclusion from the definition except he mean that the rule of right and wrong be the Law of Nature 2. The Laws of Nature are the Laws of God and not of man and not only subjects but Soveraigns are bound by them 3. Therefore they bind not as commanded by the civil Soveraign but as written by the hand of heaven in the heart of man Neither is that which afterwards he makes the difference between the Law of Nature and the Law of civil Governors any difference at all that the one is written the other not For both are written one by the hand of man though every Civil Law be not written and the other by the hand of God the one in the heart the other upon some other material substance and that which is written in the heart may be written out of it 4. Equity justice gratitude and other moral vertues are not Laws of nature but either habitual or actual conformities unto the Laws of Nature 5. How the Laws of Nature and Laws Civil should be of equal extent and yet contain one
AN Examination OF THE POLITICAL Part OF Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan By GEORGE LAWSON Rector of More in the County of Salop. LONDON Printed by R. White for Francis Tyton at the three Daggers in Fleet-street near the Inner-Temple Gate Anno Dom. 165â— The Epistle to the Reader TO glorifie God and benefit man both by doing good and preventing and removing evil should be the endeavour as its the duty of every Christian in his station Upon this account I have undertaken this examination of Mr. Hobbs I was indeed at the first unwilling though sollicited to do any such thing because upon the perusal of the Political part of his Leviathan I conceived that as little good was to be expected so little harm was to be feared from that book Yet after that I understood by divers learned and judicious friends that it took much with many Gentlemen and young Students in the Universities and that it was judged to be a rational piece I wondered for though I knew the distemper of the times to be great yet by this I found it to be far greater then I formerly suspected And upon which considerations I judged it profitable and convenient if not necessary to say something to the Gentleman and did so After that I had communicated my pains unto divers worthy and learned friends they pressed me to give way to the Printing of them which I did if they after serious perusal should think them worthy the Press They were at length approved and again by some desired to be publick yet by others thought too brief and I was desired to enlarge But this I refused to do both because there is very little if any thing material at all in Mr. Hobbs his Civil and Ecclesiastical Politicks omitted by me and not examined and also because I had formerly finished a Treatise of Civil and Ecclesiastical Government which if it had not been lost by some negligence after an Imprimatur was put upon it might have prevented and made void the Political part of Mr. Hobbs and though one Copy be lost yet there is another which may become publick hereafter When thou hast read this brief Examination thou maist if judicious and impartial easily judge whether there be any thing in Mr. Hobbs which is either excellent or extraordinary and whether there be not many things inconsistent not only with the sacred Scriptures but with the rules of right reason But not willing to prepossess thee I commit thee to God and remain Thine in the Lord Geo. Lawson EA est plerumque Apologiarum aut Vanitas aut infelicitas ut injustam amoliendo Censuram justam ferant vel nova saltem Apologia indigeant Whereas in the close of the Preamble to this Examination the Learned Author upon the account of his Ministerial calling Apologizeth for his undertaking the Political part of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan he is not so to be understood as if he looked upon Mr. Hobbs as such an Hercules as could not be conquered by less then two a States-man in the Civil and a Church-man in the Ecclesiastical Part of his beastly Politie but as intending at first the consideration of the Civil Part only This was thought meet by a Friend of the Authors to be thus communicated least the Reader should take occasion to grow more Censorious than he ought or Mr. Hobbs more Proud than he is T. G. CAP. I. Of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan concerning the Causes Generation and Definition of a Common-wealth CIvil Government derives its Being from Heaven for it is a part of Gods Government over mankind wherein he useth the Ministery of Angels and the service of men yet so as that he reserves the supreme and universal Power in his own hands with a liberty to depose the Rulers of the World at will and pleasure and transfer the Government of one Nation to another to lay the foundation of great Empires and again to destroy them for their iniquity To think that the sole or principal Cause of the constitution of a civil State is the consent of men or that it aims at no further end then peace and plenty is too mean a conceit of so noble an effect And in this particular I cannot excuse Mr. Hobbs who in the modelling both of a Civil and also of an Ecclesiastical Common-wealth proceeds upon principles not only weak but also false and dangerous And for this reason I undertake him This should have been done by some wel-skill'd in Political Learning and not by me who do not profess it as being a Divine and one of the meanest amongst many And my intention is not to inform my Betters who know the vanity and absurdity of his discourse but to undeceive the ignorant Reader who may too easily be surprized The first Chapter of the second Part which is the seventeenth of his Book doth inform us First That the end of civil Government is Security Secondly This Security cannot be had in the State of Nature because it is the state of War nor by a weak nor a great multitude except united by one perpetual judgement Thirdly A great multitude are thus united when they conferr all their power and strength upon one man or assembly of men that may reduce all their wils by plurality of voices to one will c. From whence ariseth a Common-wealth Fourthly This Common-wealth is defined and distributed Against all this some thing may be excepted For First That the State of Nature is the State of War may be doubted if not denied For man is a rational creature and if he act according to his nature he must act rationally and though he may seek to preserve himself and that sometimes with the dammage or destruction of another yet he cannot may not do this unjustly but according to the Laws of Nature which are two The First Love thy neighbour as thy self The Second Do as thou wouldst be done unto These tend directly unto Peace not unto War which is unnatural and they may be kept by multitudes of men not united in a civil State or under a form of Government And this is evident from Divine and profane Histories For Families and Vicinities which had no dependance one upon another and also States both by confederation and without any such thing have lived peaceably together When the Apostle saith The Gentiles which have not the Law by nature do the things contaâ—â— in the Law he doth not mean by Nature a Common-wealth or form of Government civil It s true the Apostle brings in a Bill of Indictment against all mankind and accuseth them That their feet are swift to shed blood Destruction and calamity or misery are in their ways And the way of peace they have not known Rom. 3.15 16 17. Yet he understands this not of Nature but the corruption of Nature and the parties here accused are not men only as in the state of Nature but also under a Government and that not only Civil but Ecclesiastical
few passages to manifest that he never understood what liberty is Liberty of subjects is not Natural nor Moral nor Theologicall but Political and Civil In the Civil Law and Politicks it s opposed to servitude and bondage not simply and meerly to obligation by Laws as he fancieth for thus he writes T. H. So men have also made artificial Charms called Civil Laws which they themselves by mutual Covenants have fastened at one end to the lips of the Soveraign at the other to their own ears G. L. The Authors meaning is That so far as Laws bind the subject so far they take away his liberty and men by constitution of a Soveraign over them give a power absolute to make Laws and so far as they are virtually subject to his power and actually bound by his Laws they cannot be free yet this well examined will not prove true For not any kind of Obligation takes it away for then the Laws of Nature by which a man is bound before he be subject to a civil Soveraign should deprive him of his liberty yet they leave him as free a man as any possibly in a free-State can be The Obligation of just Laws and wise Edicts do regulate liberty keep it within its proper bounds and no waies destroy it or take it away Therefore that which follows is questionable For he affirms T H. That the liberty of a subject therefore lieth only in those things which in regulating their actions the Soveraign hath pretermitted G. L. But 1. In things left indifferent because not defined by Law the subject is not only liber sed dominus and hath not only libertatem but potestatem He is not only free but Lord of those actions and hath not only liberty but also an absolute power 2. Though wise and just Laws do regulate actions yet they do not make the agent a slave or a servant For to be a slave or a servant is to be cast below the condition of a man and make him subject to some thing below himself Wisdom and Justice are above the power of the Soveraign much more above the liberty of a subject They are particles of the divine perfection and to be bound by them is not only a liberty but an honour To be free from the dominion of our own base lusts and sins and the power of Satan is true liberty divine and so not to be subject to the lusts and imperious unworthy commands of absolute Soveraigns whose wills though irrational contrary to justice must stand for Laws is civil liberty And then a man is Politically free when he is so far Master of his life goods children and that which is justly his that they cannot be taken away from him but for some crime contrary to just Laws deserving such a penalty In a word the liberty of a subject is such a state or condition as that he is neither by the Soveraign power nor any Laws bound to do any thing which a rational and just man would not willingly do though there were no Laws or Penalties Civil at all This is not to be free from Laws And I do not know who they are which he saith demands any such thing The rude and ignorant people and also all children of Belial desire to have a licence not only to do good but evil too as they please and they judge all Laws as heavy burdens and grievous yoaks If he mean that the subjects of England demanding the benefit of Magna Charta and the Petition of Right did aim at any such extravagant liberty he must needs be a slanderer of his own fellow-subjects and an enemy to the English liberty as indeed he is and that through an erroneous notion and conceit of absolute power civil The liberty of the subjects of this Nation is very great and such as if we either consider the Laws of the Constitution or Administration the ordinary and common subjects of other Nations are but slaves unto them Our Free-holders have the choice of their Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament so that neither any Laws can be made nor moneys imposed upon them without their verbal consent given by their Representatives In all causes civil criminal capital no Judgement can pass against them but by the verdict of a Jury made up of their neighbours which in it self is an excellent priviledge The Civilians say Libertas est res inestimabilis and to be redeemed at any rate much more the English liberty is to be valued and ever was by our ancestors who obtained it recovered it kept it though with the blood of many thousands But the question is whether this liberty is consistent with the Soveraigns power His opinion is T. H. That by the liberty of the subject the Soveraigns power of life and death is neither abolished nor limited G. L. It s certain that the Soveraigns power and the subjects liberty are consistent For the Soveraign may take away the life of his subject yet according to the evidence of Judgement agreeable to Law no otherwise Yet he presupposeth 1. That the King is supreme and the primary subject owner and possessor of the original power which sometimes may be yet with us its far otherwise 2. That the power of civil Soveraigns is absolute For with him T. H. Nothing the Soveraign representative can do to a subject on what pretence soever can properly be called Injustice or Injury because every subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth so that he never wanteth right to any thing otherwise then as he himself is the subject of God and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature When Jephtah sacrificed his daughter and David murthered Uriah both innocent yet they did them no injustice c. G. L. Here he seems to contradict himself For he grants two things 1. That the Soveraign is subject to God 2. That in that respect he is bound to observe the Laws of nature yet he saith he can do no injustice to the subject and that he hath right to any thing yet so as he is limited by subjection to God and the Laws of Nature 1. If he be Gods subject as certainly he is it follows 1. That in that respect he is but trusted as a servant with the Administration of the power civil 2. That he is fellow-subject with his subjects 3. He may do injustice as one fellow subject may wrong another Secondly If he be bound to observe the Laws of Nature which are the Laws of God then 1. He is not absolute or solutus legibus His power is limited and bounded by these Laws 2. Then he hath no power to murther oppress and destroy his innocent subjects who are more Gods then his and only trusted by God in his hands for to be protected righted in all just causes and vindicated from all wrongs 3. No Prince or Soveraign can assume or any people give to any person or persons any the least power above or contrary unto the
Laws of Nature These Laws are the moral precepts of eternal justice and equity from which all civil Laws have their rise and are either conclusions drawn from them or certain rules tending to the better observation of them Which things well considered do make it very evident how little the power of civil Lords and Princes must needs be In some few indifferent things they may be absolute have arbitrary power and be in some respect above those constitutive Laws which they themselves enact His instance in Jephtah gives them power above and contrary to the Laws of God and Nature Yet who will grant him that Jephtah sacrificed his daughter The text will not evince it for it only saith that whatsoever cometh forth of my doors to meet me c. shall be the Lords or I will offer it up for a burnt-offering Judges 11.31 For the particle 〈◊〉 Vau turned by some copulatively for and is here as in many other places dis-junctive and signifies or Again if Jephtah did sacrifice her he sinned not only against the Law of Nature but also the written Law of Moses For God gave no command permission or toleration to any that we read of but only to Abraham to sacrifice with humane blood and that Commandment was but to try him for he would not suffer him to put him to death Besides God threatens ruine and destruction to such as did offer their children to Moloch and shed their blood And their sin was not only because they offered them to Idols and Devils but also because they shed innocent blood without any warrant or Commission from God the only supreme and absolute Lord of life Further how could the vow of man which was but a voluntary Obligation be above the Law of God and make that lawful which by a Superiour Law was unlawful I verily believe she was devoted only not sacrificed But suppose he did sacrifice her to God to whom he had vowed her yet he did not this as a Soveraign of her life but as a subject to God The example of David murthering Vriah can much less prove the absolute power of Soveraigns to take away the lives of their innocent subjects For David had no such power for 1. He was no absolute Prince but limited both by the written Laws of God and also the Natural 2. Neither he nor any other can have any such power because man cannot God doth not give any such power 3. David did not only iniquity but injustice to Vriah 1. As his fellow-subject in respect of God 2. As his own subject whom he was bound as innocent to protect not to destroy 4. His proof out of Psal 51.4 Against thee only is invalid For 1. Though it be so translated by some and so understood by Ambrose and others who follow him yet neither that translation nor the interpretation thereon can be evinced either out of the Original or the Septuagint or the vulgar or Junius or Vatablus 2. Genebrard Vatablus Junius Ainsworth and others understand it that God only was privy to and knew of this sin and the words following And done this evil in thy sight seem to confirm this sense 5. Yet suppose it should be turned against thee only yet others interpret onely to be principally as supreme Law-giver and Judge not only to me but all others who only hast the Original power of punishing and pardoning not only me but others and that not only temporally but spiritually and eternally Yet the exposition of Ambrose is taken up because Princes desire it to be so absolute and both Divines and other men are very ready to slatter such as are in present possession of power But to make the point more evident let me digress a little and search out the reason and cause of the power of life and death as in the hands of civil Soveraigns To this end observe That no man hath absolute power of his own life as he hath of his goods Man may have the use and possession but not the propriety and dominion of it Therefore it s granted on all hands that though a mans life be said to be his own yet he may not be felo de se and kill himself he is not Master of his life so far as to have any power or liberty to do any such thing It s true that God who is Lord of life and death gives liberty to man in some cases to hazard in some he commands to lay down his life He may hazard it in a just war and defence of his own Countrey and also of himself against an unjust invader He must lay down his life and God commands it for the testimony of Christ in which case he that loseth it shall find it From all this it follows that no people can by making a Soveraign give any absolute power of life and death unto him For nothing can give that which it hath not neither can they make themselves Authors of the unjust acts of their Soveraign much less of his murthers and taking away the lives of their innocent subjects Id enim quisque potest quod jure potest If thus it be then they must have power to take away life from God who alone hath power of life and this power he only gives in case the subject be guilty of such crimes as by his Laws are capital T. H. pag. 110. in the margent The liberty which writers praise is the liberty of Soveraigns not of private men G. L. By writers he means the Roman and Greek Historians and Philosophers who wrote so much of liberty amongst the rest especially Aristotle and Cicero By this it seems he never understood these Authors though he accuse others of ignorance The liberty which the English have challenged and obtained with so much expence of blood is not the power of Kings much less of absolute Soveraigns as he would make the world believe but that which is due unto us by the constitution of the State Magna Charta the Laws and the Petition of Right It s but the liberty of subjects not Soveraigns when he hath said all he can we are not willing to be slaves or subject our selves to Kings as absolute Lords Neither are we willing that either flattering Divines Court-Parasites or Unjust Ministers of State should wind up the pretended prerogative so high as to subject our lives and estates and also our Religion to the arbitrary absolute and unreasonable will of one man whom they did desire to advance so much for their own interest There is a difference between the subjects liberty whereby in many things he may command himself and supreme power which commands others under their Supremacy By liberty Aristotle Cicero meant such a priviledge as every subject might have in a free-State not that Soveraignty which belonged to the whole and universal body over several persons where it is to be noted that one and the same person who is a subject and at the best but a Magistrate