supposing the vice to be taken from the Act or habit of hating or hatred by its having sin for its object it must be granted to be a virtue and therefore not opposed to virtue by any kind of opposition which M. B. observes to be replyed by Ferrariensis To which although it is rejoyned by the same Ferrariensis yet the rejoynder is nothing else but a gross return to the old fallacie just now discovered in the Answer and so is equally refelled by every part of my Reply By the way I note one good confession and from the words of Aquinas that vice as well as virtue may be taken for a concrete whereas M. Hickman was fain to say that sin or vice is so perfectly an abstract that he cannot conceive it to be sin unless he conceive it as an Abstract and that he is to seek what vox abstracta is if sin be not such p. 54. It may very well be that he is to seek for he elsewhere confesseth that sin is complexum quid And if he thinks that abstractum doth signifie complexum he is a small Latinist indeed if he doth not he is a self-contradictor § 14. A Sin of commission is proved to have a positive being because it necessarily requireth some positive act whereby to become a perfect sin of commission which as it is granted by M. Barlow so it seemeth to be also confirmed by him p. 84. where he approveth that of Suarez Metaph. tom 1. disp 11. Malum simpliciter est illud quod est in se malum hoc est caret aliquo bono sibi ipsi debito ad modum perfectionis propriè quale est omne peccatum praesertim commissionis For if every sin of commissi on is not simply evil only but wholly too as that must needs be which doth carere omni bono sibi debito and though I deny the supposition that any good thing can be due to sin then the positive act without which it cannot be must needs be morally and simply evil It being the Sin of commission which is spoken of in both places not any action or quality which is no sin at all so as the ordinary shift of flying from the Act of hating God which is the sin of commission and so the subject of the Discourse to the act of hating without relation to any object which is no sin at all or with relation onely to sin which makes it a high moral good is foreseen and prevented by what I now say What is said by M. Barlow of the threefold difference beâ—wixt a sin of omission and commission p. 86. concerneth nothing that I know excepting those words which he frames to himself in his objection p. 82. In hoc SOLVM distinguitur peccatum omissionis commissionis quia omissio dicit nudam carentiam actus at commissio necessario requirit actum The word solùm is very strange And if he found it in GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE as it is more then I know so I am not concerned to make inquiry It is sufficient for me that my Argument being unanswer'd needs not the help of a Reply I hasten therefore to another way of eviction § 15. THat is properly a sin which is forbidden by the Law But the positive act of Adultery theft or hating God is forbidden by the Law And therefore the Act so forbidden is very properly a sin we commonly say it is a sin to do this or that as to hate God and to love the world because God hath forbid us to do the one and the other To this it is answered by Mr. Barlow who not producing any Author for the objection and putting in the word Formaliter p. 82. may seem to have adapted the Argument for an Answer That the Act precisely taken is not forbidden as a positive Act as in Murder meerly to kill is not forbidden quoad esse physicum for then it should not be lawfull to kill a malefactor who is justly condemned to be put to death but as it recedeth from the Rule of right reason and is subjected to the privation of that rectitude which is due pag. 86. But I reply 1. That this is the old fallacie so often mentioned for an act without reference to a negative precept of the law is not an act which is forbiddâ—n nor pretended by any to be a sin much less of comm ssion which alone was the act spoken of in the Argument and so instead of an answer we have onely an escape from the thing in Question 2. It is affirmed by Aquinas 1.2 q. 71. Art 6. and q. 72. art 6. That Austin put two things in the definition of sin to wit a material and formal part that is a positive act and its repugnance to the Law witness his citation p. 85. And what is this but to say that sin is totum essentiale which it cannot be without one of its two essentials so that the Answer doth offend against the Answerer himself by considering the one without relation to the other notwithstanding his Acquiescence in St. Austin's Definition 3. The Answer doth not deny that the positive act is forbidden and so a sin but onely speaks of that thing in respect of which it is forbidden And to this it may easily be replyed that as an act is not morally evil without relation to the Law which doth forbid it so an act hath nothing of moral goodness without Relation to the law which doth command it or to the Councel which doth commend it And again as no act can be a sin without repugnance to the Rule of right Reason so can there be no such repugnance without an act 4. It is not all killing but killing properly called Murder which is forbidden by the Law which commands the killing of the Murderer and thereby makes it an act of Iustice. And therefore that should have been the instance for all such killing is forbidden by the Law and such alone doth belong to the adaequate subject of our Discourse 5. To hate God is a sin and a positive act to which it hath beâ—n proved that no kinde of rectitude can be due And it had naturally been evil though it had never been forbidden which yet it could not but have been because the not forbidding of it had been repugnant to Gods nature For though the act of hating God could not be from Eternity yet this proposition is aeternae veritatis and might truly have been spoken from all eternity that it is evil to hate God Therefore this and the like acts were forbidden by the Law even because they were evil and are not onely evil by being forbidden by the Law which yet those men do presuppose who will have every thing good that hath a positive being and nothing simply evil but an abstracted repugnance unto the Law not considering the difference betwixt the breach of a positive and moral Law betwixt a Iews hating God and
extremity and nonsense in the worst degree because it implyes a contradiction to say the sin is the mere repugnance of the act to the law without the act which is repugnant Or that the sin of hating God is a deflection from the Precept without that hating which is the sin XIII 'T is so far from being false to call it a sin to blaspheme which is a positive entity that it is blasphemy to deny it This is a proof from plain experience XIV A part of nothing can be the thing of which it is but a part for then the part would be the whole which does imply a contradiction And so the formal part of sin cannot possibly be the sin but the sin must include the material also This doth prompt me Gentle Reader to prepare thee also for those evasions with which the Adversaries of Truth will pretend to answer what thou shalt urge 1. If therefore when thou provest a sin is positive they shall onely answer concerning sin quatenus sin Remember to tell them of their Fallacie à Thesi ad Hypothesin or à dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid 2. If again when thou sayst some sins are actions such as those which God forbids us to put in being they shall answer that sins of omission are not put them in mind of that other fallacie A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter 3. If when thou arguest by an Induction of such particulars as in the Instance of hating God they shall answer that hating is not evil in it self and good as fasten'd upon sin Tell them straight of their Fallacies A rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Argument is of hating as having God for its object And so to answer of hating without an object is an Intolerable impeâ—tinence dividing the Act from the Object which were onely considered in conjunction much more is it impertinent to talk of hating as 't is objected upon sin for that iâ— a traâ—sition à genere ad genus God is not sin nor is it a sin to hate sin but the sin of hating God is that to which they must speak in a compound sense Hold them punctually to this and they are undone 4 If they take upon them to prove acting the part of the opponent that the formal part of sin is a mere privation therefore the sin is a mere privation tell them first of their fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Antecedent might be true and yet the sequel extremely false Tell them next there is a Fallacie of Ignoratio Elenchì For the question is of sin not of a portion or part of sin They are past all Remedy who when the Question is whether it râ—ines do onely answer that the staff does not stand in the corner Tell them over and above that the formal part of some sins as of the Divels hating God is a positive Repugnance to the Law of God and so again there is the Fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 barely to say and not to prove the universality of the thing can amount to no more then onely the begging of the question Mr. Hickman must confess he is the worst of Blasphemers if there is but one sin that is a positive entity because he saith that All such must be either God's creatures or God himself This also prompts me to reflect upon the Mischievous effects of his sad Dilemma For if God is said to be the cause of that positive entity or action Adam's eating forbidden fruit And the cause of that Law Thou shalt not eat it he is said to be the Author or cause of that sin which was his very eating forbidden fruit I have therefore taken the greater pains in my following Treatise both in vindicating God from being the Author of such effects and in charging them wholly upon the Free-will of man shewing how the sinful agent is alone the cause of the sinful act to the end I might convince and convert my Adversary even in spight of his own perversness and disabuse his followers or abeâ—tors notwithstanding their partiality and praepossession That when they exert any such reall and positive actions as the hating of God the ravishing of virgins the killing of Kings the committing of sacriledge the coveting and seizing their neighbour's goods they may be forced to declare with Coppinger and Hacket in the Star-Chamber the works are evil and from themselves unless they will take in the Divel too not good and from God as Mr. Hickman no less irrationally than blasphemously saith That there are haters of God who is Love it self God hath told us by Moses and by Saint Paul And according to the importance of the original word they are hated by God who are haters of him How we ought to be affected towards them that hate God the Psalmist tells us by his example Do not I hate them O Lord that hate thee yea I hate them with a perfect hatred Who they are that hate God by way of eminence our Learned Doctor Stearn hath taken the Liberty to say I shall content my self at present to shew the place in my Margin and to observe Mr. Hickman is therein intimately concern'd I do not hate Mr. Hickman but do love him so well as to wish him better Yet of the Doctrine which he delivers and pleadeth for with so much vehemence That every positive thing is good and either God or his creature I have industriously discovered my perfect hatred For the Hellish murder of Gods Anointed of ever Blessed and glorious Memory was as positive a something as any action to be produced And all the plea of those Deicides who sought to justifie the Fact was the use they made of this Fatal Doctrine They ever imputed unto God irresistibly willing or unconditionally decreeing and effectually over-acting his peoples spirits whatsoever unclean thing they were suffer'd in What was really but the patience they call'd the pleasure of the Almighty His passive permission they stil'd appointment What he had every where forbidden they gave him out to have predetermin'd What was a sin not to be expiated They calld an expiatory sacrifice They gave out God to be the Author of all that he sufferd them to commit the favourable approver of whatsoever he condemned them to prosper in In a word they told the people that God was delighted in those impieties which with much long suffering he but endur'd And then I think I was excusable for being impatient of such a Doctrine as to the Ruin of three Kingdomes I saw reduced into practice for diverse years How impartial I have been in the maintaining of the Truth I shall evince in the following papers by my Reply to Mr. BARLOW the Reverend Provost of Queens Colledge in Oxford my very learned and loving Friend To certain Reasonings of his in his second Metaphysical
himself as shall be shew'd his making a distinction without a difference As betwixt the act of hating God which is granted to be the sin and the sin of that act which is granted to be that very act of hating God For to hate God is 1 a sin 2 a whole sin and 3 nothing but a sin to which three clauses I challenge M. Hickman to make some Answer That if he thinks there is something in hating God which is not sin but very good as being one of God's Creatures which he sufficiently intimates by distinguishing the sin of the act from the sinful act as if the very act of hating God were not a sin the world may know him to be a Libertine without the protection of his disguise Had he forâ—seen that challenge to which I call'd for his Answer in my Letter to Doctor Heylin pag. 266. I had not met with an occasion for this last Section § 13. But because he seems in this place to use the word sin for sinfulness I will first intreat him to remember how sin is taken in holy Scripture by D. Twisse by M. Whitf by M. Barlee and by himself as I have shewd in this chapter § 1.6.7 Next I will help him to understand what is the sinfulness of sin and wherein it lyes It is granted I think by all that sin is that whole or complexum which doth consist of two parts material and formal so as neither part singly can either be or be conceived to be a sin And it is granted I think by all that the materiall Part of sin is positive it being an action or quality and when a quality an act or habit as hath been shew'd The onely privative Part of sin mark the emphasis which lyes on Part is the defection from the Rule which yet is founded in a positive act of which the other is onely a superadded relation unavoidably resulting by the positive acts application to the Rule Thus I think we are to speak if we may rightfully distinguish the two parts of sin which D. Field will not allow nor indeed is it possible so to distinguish the one from the other as to intitle God to the one without the other and that I suppose is the Doctors meaning But now for the abstract of this concretum it is that which resulteth from both united For after the manner that inequality doth arise from the Relation of a Bicubitum to a cubit so the sinfulness of a sin to wit of the action of hating God or of Cain's killing Abel doth arise by resultance from these two things God 's forbidding it to be done and its being done when thus forbidden so then The positive action of hating God as the materiall part which carries with it a defection from the rule of God's Law as the formal part is that complexum or whole sin which I have proved and shall prove to have a positive being The meer defection from the rule or repugnance to it without the action of hating God is not the sin but the formal part onely The meer action of hating God without its defection from the rule which for once I will suppose docendi gratiâ would not be the very sin but the material part onely But the sin as I said is both united viz. The action of hating God in a repugnance to or defection from the rule of God's law whereas the sinfulness of this sin that is the abstract of this concrete is not both parts united for then it would be concrete and so Identical with sin but that which resulteth from both united As the humanity is not the man made up of a body and a rational soul any more then the man is either of the two without the other but that which onely resulteth from both united whereas the man is both united § 14. But now for a while let us admit that the Question were of moral evil as such It would then be comprehensive of all moral evil For à quaâ—enus ad omne valet consequentia by his own confession p. 85. what then mean's he by a privation when he saith that sin or moral evil as such is a privation unless he means a meer privation and nothing else he speaks not against the posiâ—ivity of sin which even they who do assert do also hold there is a want of such a rectitude as is due but they say there is something besides that want As in walking to kill a neighbour there is something positive besides the want of a good end to which the walking should be directed And if any thing could be due to the hating of God to make it good as nothing can be there would be an action besides the want of that due as M. Hickman confesseth p 94. Nay in saying that that action is essentially evil ibid. he confesseth the very action to be the sin And taking sin in the right sense for complexum quid as he confesseth p. 95. we may allow him his own way of stating the Question to his undoing § 15. Again he is ruin'd by his preservative as may appear by this Dilemma Does he think that privation is a thing real or onely nominal something or nothing If nothing then for M. Hickman to filtâ—h and plunder is but a sin and therefore nothing in his opinion and so is a Carneadist If something then he thinks it Gods Creature or not his creature If his creature then he thinks that God is the Authour of sin and so he must think that sin is good or not good if he thinks it to be good he will scruple to commit it If not good he thinks that God can create what is peculiar to the Devil as Master Calvin inferreth against the Libertines If he thinks it not Gods Creature though something real then he must eate up his former saying viz. That it belongs to the universality of the first cause to produce every Real Being pag. 95. § 16. I shall conclude this Chapter with the Concession of Bonaventure that the sin of Concupiscence imports two things to wit an appetite and an excesse of that appetite In which excesse he confesseth there seemes to be a Position though he endeavours by a simile which doe's not run upon all its feet to make it seem a privation rather Which however it may infer yet it cannot wholy be without implying a contradiction And if either of the two is something positive the act of the appetite it self or the excesse in the act sure that which consisteth of both together I mean concupiscence cannot be lesse then either of them CHAP. III. § 1. HAving hitherto cleared and in the doing of that accidentally proved the thing in question I might immediately proceed to shew the littleness of the Tricks in which our Gamster is wont to deal but that I think it incumbent on me to effect that first which is most material and of which most Readers
his eating swines flesh The latter which was evil because forbidden was after the Law for that very reason But the former which was forbidden because t was evil was such in order of Nature before the Law The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove by insisting on it a second time because I think it is the parent of many errours § 16 HAving thus done with my Reply to the several Answers of M. Barlow I now proceed to another Argument which I lately gathered out of FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before because it will make for its Confirmation Evil works saith this Author who for strength and accuteness gives place to none are synonymous with works which are forbidden by God Almighty who hath left it in our power to make our wayes evil which yet could not be if he did not onely permit but efficaciously make us to do the thing that he forbiddeth Now the thing that he forbiddeth will be confessed not to be this That when we act what he forbids us we do not suffer to come to pass that formal obliquity annexed to all such acts by the repugnance which they have to the Law forbidden them But the thing forbidden to us is this That we do not produce the positive being of that act with which the moral obliquity is inseparably annexed The former cannot be the thing because the law being given Thou shalt love the Lord thy God we cannot possibly hate him without a repugnance unto the law which by commanding our love forbids our hatred The latter therefore must be the thing which we are forbid to put in being And which is properly our work though a positive entity because it is absolutely impossible that God who forbids us the act of hating him should make that act which he thus forbids the making of or that by acting us with his power which is irresistible he should make us to do what he forbids us the doing of But to return to Diotallevius when it is said Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife the meaning of it cannot be this Beware that whilst thou proâ—ucest the free act of concupiscence the moral obliquity do not follow it for alas it cannot but follow The meaning therefore must needs be this see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence because of that obliquity which is inseparably annext Or determine not thy will to that object which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole Council at Trent which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration That God's concurrence is onely permissive to the free determination of the created will in producing the very being of the evil act And God's permission is so distinguished both by Fathers and Schoolmen from his effection or operation as to signifie no more then the negation of an impediment or cohibition Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act which by consequence is not a positive act And it is not an action saith Diotallevius but the negation of an impediment in respect of that operation which doth depend upon our free determination From whence it follows that he who hates God be he man or divel is the sole cause of that act which for that reason also is wholly sin § 17. THis is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum For if God does concurr to the positive act of hating God not onely permissively by not hindering it but physically too by praedetermining the will of the Sinner to it then he absolutely wâ—â—leth the actuall hating of himself which of all absurdities is the greatest And again when man is forbid by God to hate him and when God does grievously complain and threaten to punish with Hell fire the man that doth not obey his prohibition It cannot choose but follow that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth to wit the sinners hating of him he willeth and nilleth the same thing and after the very same manner which is a blasphemous contradiction And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman to whom alone I am henceforth speaking that the sin of hating God hath a positive being because that quality or action which hath a positive being is clearly proved to be a sin And it is proved to be a sin by being proved to be a Thing which is not made or produced but onely suffered or permitted by God Almighty to come to pass And only made or produced by them that hate him § 18. CAIETAN proves the positive Entity of sin because saith he it consisteth as well of a conversion to an object contrary to the object of virtue as of an aversion from the law And hence saith the Cardinal there is in sin a double nature of evil the one arising from the object the other from the not observing of the law the first is positive the second privative The first inferreth the second for it cannot be that a man should hate God but that in so doing he must break the law because it is simply and intrinsecally evil so that to do it is a sin And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. so I find the same Cardinal elsewhere saying that in moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum and est in moralibus malum dupliciter Implying the whole sin to be a concrete not a repugnance to the law without an act which doth imply a contradiction § 19. THe most acute EPISCOPIVS doth implicitly thus argue although by way of paralipsis As an act commanded by the law is the virtue it self or ordination of the will unto the law so the act forbidden by the law is the vice it self or inordination of the will against the law And as the act of virtue doth not contain or connote any reall thing positive superadded to the act which may be called ordination so the act of vice doth connote nothing privative superadded to the act which may be called inordination § 20. DOctor STERN a very late but Learned Writer doth briefly urge six Arguments to prove that sin may have a positive being four of which I praetermit because I have already shewd them as long since urged by other men though otherwise urged by him than others and perhaps in some places to more advantage The other two I shall mention as not yet touched First saith he a Non-entity may be morally good and therefore an entity may be morally evill The Consequence is evident both by the Rule of opposites and because there is not more repugnance betwixt Obliquity and Entity as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party then betwixt goodness and Non-entity The Antecedent is proved because a mere omission of a forbidden
the sin of sin or the sinfulness of sinfulness supposing both to be synonymous and sin so perfectly an abstract as hath been said Nay without any regard to his blessed self when he saith that sin doth not siginfie abstractly p. 100. § 3. But though sin is an Abstract in respect of the sinner viz. Abstractum physicum yet in respect of sinfulness which is abstractum metaphysicum all will confess it to be a concrete M. H. alone being excepted in his intemperate Fits who yet in Times of sobriety will confess what I would have him and such I proved it to be by proving an Identity betwixt the sin and the sinfull Act. For the transgression of the Law is confessedly an Act and sin by definition is the Transgression of the Law Nor will the Adversary deny that the Act of sinning is a sinfull Act. For being a Transgression it must needs be an Act and being such an act it must needs be sinfull The act of consenting to a Temptation which is sin in its birâ—h is punctum indivisibile and hath not any Dimensions to make it capable of a Division and so it must needs be the sin of consenting to the Temptation as well as it is the sinfull act § 4. Farther yet when in pursuit of the Controversie it lay upon me to shew how the determination of a mans will to the forbidden object was equally a sin and a positive being and what an Impiety it would be to intitle God to so foul a thing I made a challenge to M. Hickman as well as others to give an instance in some particular how the act and the obliquiâ—y might so be severed or distinguish'd as he might say which is Goâ—'s part and which is Satan's When a man doth curse God Lev. 24.15 which is the Act of that sin and which is the sin that is not the Act or which is the obliquity of the act o that sin M. Hickman did not attempt an Answer and sure I am he was not able For if the cursing of God is a whole sin it is an act of sin or an obliquity of an Act or both together and that either separably or inseparably 1. if onely an Act where then is the obliquity 2. if onely an obliquity of an Act where is the Act for all the whole sin is the cursing of God neither more nor less 3. if both together and separably let him make that seperation 4. if both are inseparably together he must confess that sin hath a positive being and that himself hath made God to be the Author of sin § 5. In a word I made appear what I meant by the word sin by the instances which I brought whereby to prove it the same with the sinfull act There being no difference no not so much as in imagination between David's lying with Bathsheba and his Adultery or between his Adultery and his sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 82. His lying with Bathsheba was his action which action was his sin p. 84. And again I discern no difference between the same evil action and it self as between Davids lying with Bathsheba and his Adultery ibid. Nor indeed was it possible that I should have spoken any otherwise when the Thing spoken of was not half of sin but the whole not the formal part as they phrase it but the very complexum as M. H. himself calls it p. 95. For actual sin of commission cannot otherwise be sin than as it is an act of sinning nor an act of sinning any otherwise then as it is a sinfull Act. § 6. That this was meant in our Dispute I have largely proved And that we ought to mean this I prove by the judgement of D. Twisse who saith that Fornication denoteth sin not onely according to its Formality as it is sin but also according to its materiality as it is an Act. His words in Latin are justly these Fornicatio notat peccatum non tantùm secundum Formale ejus quà peccatum est sed secundum materiale ejus quà actus est Now because M. Hickman doth boast so much of D. Twisse as one whom none durst undertake in the Arminian Controversies p. 106. I will farther insist upon his Authoritie whereby to prove the true Importance and together with that the positive entity of sin which that Doctor doth assert by unavoidable Implication whilst he saith that All sin being definitely considered and according to its certain species doth include two things the natural act and the turpitude of the Act or its repugnance with the Law of God He gives his instance in the sin of theft which he affirms to signifie as well the Aâ—t of taking away what is anothers as the deformity of the Act in as much as God hath said thâ—u shalt not steal The like instances he gives in the sins of Murther and Adultery which as it slatly contradicts what is said by M. Hick of sins being a meer abstract and the same with sinfulness pag. 53 54. so it proves â—e whole sin to have a positive entity by ascribing no less to a part of sin It being impossible for a part to have more of entity then the whole And if M. Hickman shall dare to say that a Repugnance to the Law may be theft without stealing or that stealing may be the sin of theft without a repugnance to the law so as one part of sin may be concluded to be a sin I forbear to say what will follow that he may not accuse me of bitter Language § 7. Noe 't is so absolutely impâ—ssible as implying a contradiction that a man shouâ—d be guilty of a Repugnance to any Law without the doing of that thing which the law forbids And by consequence so impossible that that alone should be the sin which is affirmed by D. Twisse to be but the formal part of it That as M. Whitfield and M. Barlee do acknowledge a materiall and â—ormâ—ll part making up one and the same sin so M. Hickman doth say as much when the necessity of his affairs compels him to it p. 94 95. how contradictory soever to what he had said a little before p. 53 54. when brought to a distress of another Nature And accordingly in his Title-page he held us in hand that he would prove there cannot be any positivity of sin not of the formall part of sin Again at the end of his long Preface when he pretends at least to come to the Thing in Question he sets down his Thesis in these express words ☞ That sin hath not a Positive Being pag. 1. No mention hitherto of any reduplication sin as sin or sin abstractly considered from act or habit And indeed he knew it to be impossible to consider the sin of hateing God abstractly from the act or habit since the Act of hateing God is the sin as well as the Act and the habituall hatred of God is as well the sin as
the habit He confesseth it an action to hate God and an action so intrinsecally and essentially evil because evil antecedently to any positive Law and evil ex genere objecto that no circumstance can make it lawful p. 94. And as impossible as it is to consider the same thing abstractly from it self so impossible it must be to consider the sin of hateing God abstractly from the Act of hateing God Thus M. Hickman hath written against his own light But which will grieve him most of all § 8. He hath also written against his Interest For first he confesseth by the means of his prevarication what he so stomachfully deny'd and vainly pretended to refute too to wit That sin hath a positive being I say he confesseth it in equivalence and that much more to his disadvantage then if he had said it in down-right Terms For why should he shamefully fall away from his first Engagement which was to prove that sin hath no positive being p. 1. but that he was inwardly convinced he had undertaken a thing impossible If he did not sin for sins sake nor think it a credit to be caught in the Act of Falshood why should he publish so grosse a Forgery as he knew would be detected by every Reader who should but thorowly peruse either his book or mine but that he thought it would pain him less to lye in the frying pan then the Fire If sin in his opinion hath no positive Being in any sense or respect whether as a Quality or as an Action or as complexum quid made up of a materiall and formall part why at last will he needs consider it as meerly abstracted from Act or habit and not without such abstraction when yet it is impossible that the hating of God should be so considered Let him shew how that sin can be abstracted from that act which is that sin or how it can be consider'd as so abstracted or else let him confess he dares not dispute of the thing in Question unless he may consider it as it is impossible to be consider'd which is not to dispute of the thing in Question but by an unmanlike Tergiversation to acknowledge the prevalence of the Truth at the very same time that he reviles it § 9. Again he hath open'd a wide Gate to the greatest absurdities in the world in proving that sin hath no positive Being because it hath none as abstractly considered from act or habit For according to this Logick one may prove that nothing hath a positive Being No vertue we may be sure as well as no vice For to clear it by an example as the act or habit of hating God hath no positive being abstracted from the act or habit so the act or habit of loving God hath no posiâ—ive being abstracted from the act or habit He confesseth it is an action to hate God and that the hatred of God is a quality he will not deny Nor can â—e possibly say more for the positive being of loving God or of the love which we have of God which can have no being at all neither positive nor privative if abstracted from all either act or habit that is from it self § 10. If M. Hickman's method were allowable he would strengthen the hands as of all evil doers so of the Atheist in particular who may prove to M. Hickman though not to any man else That God himself hath no positive entity which is as much as to say there is no God as abstractly considered from his Existence or from all manner of substance corporeall and incorporeall For the sin of hating God without the act of hating God which is the sin is simply nothing in the world And sure it cannot be a Question whether simply-nothing hath a positive being Yet this is the best that can be made of M. Hickman's skill in stâ—ting Questions § 11. Or admit a sin can be something abstracted from all manner of 〈◊〉 or habit yet the Question still would be whether such sin hath a positive being yea or nay in any respect whatsoever Not whether it hath it reduplicativè as sin that is so wretched a Transition à Thesi ad Hypothesin as by which I will prove that Master Hickman is a Brute For sure the Animal M. Hickman cannot possibly be a man reduplicativè as an Animal for then every Animal would be a man as well as he I say he cannot be a man as abstractly consider'd from the principle of reason And being not a man but yet an Animal he must needs be a Brute by all confessions But M. Hickman will say The Question is whether he is a man or no. Not whether he is such with the restrictive particle as joyned to Animal And I say the very same touching the business we have in hand The Question is Whether sin hath a positive being witness his own mouth p. 1. not with any restrictive as in conjunction with an abstraction from act or habit If M. Hickman be granted to be a man it will be a new Question how he comes by his manhood whether from his material or formal part which yet by the way are both essentials of his Being And sin being granted to have a positive being it matters not how or from whence it hath it whether from its material or formal part to use the words of D. Twisse which are both essentials of its Being what it is and no more can it exist without the one then the other But if the word as must needs be used then sin as synonymous with sinful act hath been ever the subject of my Discourse as by all my Instances and proofs may very sufficiently appear And whether sin hath a positive being as sin or as an action or as a quality for 't is confessed that to hate God is a sin and an action as that the hatred of God is a sin and a quality is a thing so easie to be determined that 't is not worthy of a Dispute But if M. H. will needs dispute it let him fairly confess 't is a second Question in the doing of which he must yield the first § 12. From all this it follows That when it is said by M. Hickman p. 49. my not distinguishing betwixt the sinful act and the sin of the act is the stone at which I have all along stumbled he does but dissemble the sense he hath of his unhappyness and by playing the Brave make the best of so bad a matter For he knew very exactly that I had proved an Identity betwixt the sin of killing Abel which was the act of murder and the act of killing him which was the sin of murder That the act of hating God is the sin of hating him and â— converso And so I must thank M. Hickman for whipping himself thus upon another mans back For this apparently is the stone at which he hath stumbled and faln headlong and bruised
do stand in the greatest expectation to wit the proving by such convincing and cogent Arguments that sin which is properly so called hath a positive Being as to put a conclusion to the whole Controversy and that by enabling the weakest Reader to stop the mouth of the strongest that shall oppose him And because I cannot but have observed what hath also been observed by many others that whatsoever is thought strong in Mr. H.'s Rhapsody by such as are partial to his Adventure he hath taken after his manner that is dishonestly without the citing his Author so much as once to whom he was beholding extreamly often from an Exercitation de naturâ mali which had been pen'd and printed more then 20. years agoe by my very good Friend Mr. THOMAS BARLOW who I conceive at that time could be but n wly Master of Arts though now the learned and Reverend Provost of Queens College I shall begin with that instance of which â— verily believed I had been the first urger ' â—â—ll since I found it in Dr. Field and in other writers of great Repute whom I have now consulted on this occaâ—â—on I mâ—an that which is drawn from the Sin of hating God and by consequence from all other sins of commission whereof this one is the fittest Instance to which Mr. Hickman pretends an answer though without the will and consent yet by the assistance of Mr. BARLOW The insufficiency of the Answer I intend to shew by my Reply Which being done I shall submit it to the consideration of Mr. Barlow That if he approves of my Reply he may may make me glad with the knowledge of it and that if he doth not he may shew me the reason of his dislike I suppose his judgement may now be altered from what it was in his younger years If not I shall desire to discuss the matter rather with Him who is able to tye me the hardest knoâ—s and to shew me my Error in case I erre then to contend with â—uch a Trifler as Mr. Hickman appears to be who is fitter to betray then maintain his Cause § 2. That the sin of hating God is nothing more then a sin and that it hath a posâ—â—ive being I have so often proved mine own way in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 besides what I have done in my Letter to Dr. Heylin and in the sections of the foregoing Chapter that I suppose it high time to shew how others have proved it as well as I. Both that the greatness of their Authority may help prevail with some men to accept of reason and that I may take an opportunity to speak mine own sense in their Vindication I will the rather begin with Dr. Field because He if any other saith Mr. BARLOW himself who doth oppose him was a learned Writer of our own Church which he hath studiously defended against the Papisâ—s First t is his peremptory assertion That the sin of Commission which is the doing of that the creature is bound not to do is merely positive HIs first Reason for it is this As the affirmative part of Gods Law is broken by the not putting that in being which it requireth so the negative is violated prâ—cisely by putting that in being which it would not have to be Again he saith a little after That sin of commission is an evil act and that there are some evil Acts which are not evil ex fine Circumstantiis but ex genere objecto which are therefore denominated evill not by passive denomination as if they wanted some Circumstances that should make them good but by active denomination because no Circumstances can make them good and because by way of contrariety they deprive the sinner of that orderly disposition that should be found in him and some other of that good which pertaineth to him As it appeareth in the acts of injustice spoiling men of that which is their own which Mr. Hickman cannot endure to hear of and iâ— the acts of blasphemy against God or the hate of God in which the sinner as much as in him lieth by attributing to God what is contrary to his Nature or denying that which agreeth unto the same maketh him not to be that which he is and hating him wisheth he were not and endeavoureth to hinder what he would have done NOw saith the Doctor a little after That that sin of Commission which is an evil ex genere objecto is not denominated evil passively from the want of rectitude due unto it it is evident in that no rectitude is due to such an Act. For what rectitude is due to the specifical Act of hating God or what rectitude is it capable of This he urgeth against Those who affirm the act it self in the hating God to be very good and the deformity of the Act to be onely evil which deformity they fancie to be the want of a rectitude which was due to that act not at all considering that there cannot be possibly any such thing as a right hating of God or a rectified injustice these things implying a contradiction in adjecto Yet such absurdities they will swallow rather then confess what yet they find saith D. Field that some sins are positive Acts. pag. 119. Nay the Doctor advanceth farther and certainly farther then he needed if not farther then he ought I am sure much farther then I have done That in the siâ— of commission specifically considered there is nothing but meerly positive and the deformity that is found in it is precisely a positive Repugnance to the Law of God which he doth not say upon his own account onely but farther backeth it with the Authority and concurrent Judgements of many eminent Schoolmen and great Divines many more then M. Hickman so much as attempted to produce whose names and words shall be seen anon § 3. To the first Reason of the two which the most learned D. Field as the learned M. Barlow does once more call him p. 74. was pleas'd to give for his asserting the positive entity of sin M. Barlow doth not make any answer nor doth he take the least notice that there was any such thing though as it is his first reason so I conceive to be his best too which I shall probably shew when occasion serves especially if I chance to be put in mind To the second Reason his answer is That no rectitude is due to the hatred of God in as much as it is limited to such an object to wit God But as he saith a little before to which he here referrs his Reader The hatred of God being taken by it self may be good and so by consequence the being of the act shall not be evil per se. Iust as walking is good of it self though walking to kill or commit adultery cannot be made good by any Circumstance § 4. To this Answer I reply in the behalf of D. Field first That it
inevitably import the whole complexum viz. that very act in conjunction with that very object that it cannot so much as be conceived to be the sin of hating God when the act is supposd to be divided from the object To shew him the fruit of his Distinction I will put the case into other colours Let him prove he is a man by the best medium that he can use and I will prove ad hominem he can be none For man is complexum quid and must not be spoken of as One there is something in him material and something formal The Animal is one thing the Anima rationalis is quite another And M. Hickman being either without the other may be a Brute or an Angel but not a man And being for certain not an Angel of light he must if an Angel be one of darkness This is every way as pertinent and as tolerably applyed as what is spoken by M. Hickman against the positive being of hating God If this Coin is not currant let him not pay it to other men And if it is let him accept it when it is paid Secondly He so shamefully flyes from the thing in Question to that which he knew neither was nor can be as to discover the mean opinion which he really hath of his own Tenet and to prove his Book written against nothing so much as his own conscience 1. He knew it was not the Question whether hatred without relation to God as its object is a sin or whether any thing without hatred is the sin of hating God But he knew by what I had said in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the thing in Question was the hating of God in sensu composito For I had said in the plainest terms That to hate God is a sin or a sinful act two expressions for one thing That the sinfulness consisteth neither in God without hating for he is purity it self nor in hating without God for hatred in it self is a thing indifferent and apt to be good as well as evil God himself hating sin with a perfect hatred but in the union and application of that act to that object As the nature of man consists not in a body onely nor onely in a soul but in the union of the one with the other p. 13. 2. He knew it could not be a Question whether hatred is a sin when taken per se without an object or whether the pravity of hating God can be any thing at all without the act of hating God or whether there can be possibly any act when there is none And yet his answer is as impertinent as if one of these had been the Question Thirdy In saying such works as the hating God are from God which the Scripture calleth the works of the Devil he speaketh Blasphemy And in saying the sin of hating God is complexum quid which must not be considered of as One he contradicts his other sayings that sin and sinfulness are the same that is a meer abstract and which cannot else be considered as sin So that here I must ask him a second time and challenge him to give me a Categorical Answer can the hating of God be conceived to be a sin or can it not when he answers I will reply But for his Blasphemies and self-contradictions let him read my letter to Dr Heylin p. 265. to p. 270. § 7. Having insisted thus largely on my Reply to those Answers which appear to shew us the very utmost that can be pleaded in the defence of so gross an Error and having detected the obvious Fallacies in which the whole force of the answers lyeth I shall study to be the briefer in all that follows without the least fear of being thought to be obscure by my plainest Reader To Dr. Field his 2. Reasons above recited A Third Reason may be added from HUGO GROTIUS who saith that some things are evil without the Law and that the Law being continuing to oblige it is naturally evil to procure any man's acting against the Law or to make a Law to the contrary and therefore repugnant to the Nature of God From whence there follow 2. things 1. that some whole acts are immutably evil and 2. That they cannot have any being from the Almighty IACOBVS ALMAIN giveth an instance in the hating of God and in Adultery and saith they could not but be forbid To whom 't is answered by Mr. Barlow that if God did not forbid theft it would not be a sin and that he may dispense with his Law as when he said to Abraham go kill thy son But I reply 1. That he speaks not to the Instances brought by Iacobus Almain It had been ill to hate God had it been possible that God had not forbid it 2. Theft is not of those things which are onely evil because forbidden as the eating swines flesh among the Jews but of those other things which are onâ—ly forbidden for being evil And therefore 3. It was not possible that God should never have forbidden all manner of injustice of which theft is one species 4. God did not say to Abâ—aham Go kill thy son but go and offer him up which he also did without killing 5. Had he done it he had not dispensed with his Law which onely forbiddeth such a killing as ipso facto becomes a Murder not such as ipso facto becomes a sacrifice else a thief could not be hanged for the fulfilling of one Law without the breach or dispensation of another The prohibition of murder comprehends not killing by commission from God who may as lawfully take away Isaacks life by Abrahams hand as by a Feaver 6. If the act of stealing or hating God be affirmed to be good and so a positive entity abstractly considered from Gods forbidding it must be granted to be such when it is forbidden I mean a positive entity although not good and so the Answer destroyes its end Mr. Barlow's words are si illud mandatum abfuisset idem numero actus horrendum fuisset homicidium p. 66. Had it been murder it had been sin for murder cannot but â—e sin and so we have his confession that sin may be a positive act But 7. It does imply a contradiction to say the same numerical act can be forbidden and not forbidden which I therefore leave to consideration § 8. What Mr Barlow calleth a concession in his behalf I call an argument against him viz. That if God could produce that act of hating God in respect of the substance of the Act then it would not be evil but say I that act is proved by me and others yea and confessed by Mr. H. to be wholy because intrinsecally and essentially evil evil ex genere objecto and antecedently to the Law therefore it cannot be Gods production for all its having a positive Entiâ—y This I retort to Mr. B. his p. 66 67. and it pincheth Mr. H. more
act although a Non-entity is morally good Again the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment the one of sense the other of loss whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God as is also the former of a conversion to the Creature so that if sin were nothing but mere privation the poena sensus would be inflicted without all justice under the notion of Revenge for a conversion to the creature § 21. AGain it may be thus argued and out of BARONIVS his Metaphysica Generalis That which hath not a positive entity cannot be the cause of any thing But sin many wayes is the cause of something For 1. it is the cause of punishment and 2 one sin is the cause of another A vitious act is the cause of a vitious habit A vitious habit is the cause of vitious actions And a natural propension to evil which Baronius calls original sin is said by him to be the cause of all the vitious actions oâ— our will T is true he answers this argument but his answer may be refuted by my Replyes to Mr. Barlow and by what Baronius grants of which anon as the Reader will finde if he makes a triall § 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged and that from many more Authors then Mr. Hickman hath named for his opinion I shall exhibit a larger Catalogue but with a lesser expense of time and paper of such eminently learned and knowing men as have justified my judgement with the authority of their own and of whom unawares I have undertaken a justification I will begin with those Writers with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. Field thought fit to credit his § 23. ALVAREZ saith the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law which is not broken but by a positive Act. Aquinas also saith that though in a sin of omission there is nothing but a privation yet in the sin of commission there is some positive thing Nay he saith more plainly what Dr. Field doth not observe that the ratio formalis of sin is two fold whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner And that it consisteth essentially in the Act of the free-will He also infers it to be an accident whilst he saith that every sin is in the will as in its subject And very often that in every sin there are two things whereof the one is a quality or action and so the whole sin must have a positive being Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of Cajetan saith Gregory de Valentiâ that sin formally as sin is a positive thing which he expresly also affirmeth in primam 2 dae q. 71. art 6. Some hold saith Cumel that the formal nature of sin consisteth in some positive thing to wit in the manner of working freely with a positive repugnance to the rule of Reason and the law of God Ockam saith further that the very deformity in an act of Commission is nothing else but the act it self viz. actus elicitus against the Divine Law And these are cited by Dr. Field l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. § 24. To these I add many more which partly were not and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field LESSIVS saith that an evil act is in somâ— sort evil even according to its Physical Entity Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIVS Omne ens quà ens bonum est Piscator himself hath this note and it is a note of exception At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis unde oriuntur actuâ—lia peccata bona non est The learned Professor of Divinity in Academiâ Tubingensi affirmes Original sin to be an accident as the opposite member to substantia and calls it the accident of a substance and compares it to the image of God in man which he also saith was not a substance but an Accident And that will be yielded to have a positive being especially if he means as Piscator did that that accident is a Quality Another learned Professor in Academiâ Oxoniensi by saying Concupiscence is a sin inferreth that sin to be a positive entity which concupiscence will be granted by all to be And if it is with consent it is an actual sin if without consent it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh against the law of God He also takes it to be an accident by ascribing to it subjectum quo subjectum quod because by entring at the flesh it did infect the spirit Dr. GOAD who was sent to the Synod at DORT whilest he was speaking in that Tract which some do call his Retractation against an ordinary Calvinian distinction which he conceived to make God the Author of sin expressly used these words Might I here without waâ—dring discourse the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way The tract is a Manuscript but divers have Copyes as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it if not by other men's care at least by mine That Great Divine Dr. IACKSON who was withall a great Philosopher and inferiour to none for skill in Metaphysicks doth not content himself to say of original sin that it is not a mere privation but also defineth it to be a positive Renitency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God especially against the negative Precepts c. And as he highly commends Illyricus for an extraordinary writer so he vindicates his notion by explaining his true sense of Original sin which if the Dr. took by the right handle Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong in the latter part of his 2. excercitation It was the businesse of Illyricus saith Dr. IACKSON to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of Theology and to put in continual caveats against the Admission of abstracts or mere relations into the definition of Original sin or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate The Judicious Doctor doth also tell us and who could tell better then he that St. Austine Aquinas and Melanchthon do say in effect as much as Illyricus if their meanings were rightly weighed and apprehended by their Followers Nay Calvin and Martyr and many other good writers consort so well with Illyricus in their definitions of sin in the unregenerate that they must all be either acquitted or condemned together Illyricus himself explains his meaning by producing the definitions of Original sin not onely given by Calvin and Martyr but explained by themselves into Illyricus his sense In so much that Dr. Iackson ranking Calvin and Martyr with Illyricus doth affirm them to make original sin to be the whole nature of man and all his faculties so far forth as they are corrupted Yet still their meaning was no more
being subordinate and determined by the first to that Numerical and particular Action which hath its specification from the influx of God either the action of hating God cannot possibly be a sin or not imputed as a sin to the second Cause thus acted by the first as hath been said But whatsoever it is must rest upon God as its Cause and Author If Mr Hick for an escape from this impiety shall rather say it is from God as the Immediate Cause his case will then be so much worse as it is worse by some odds to make God a sinner then only the cause of his Creatures sin Now besides that God is said to make the action which he forbids and at the Instant that he forbids it we know the obliquity to the action is so inseparably annexed that the Author of the One must needs be the Author of the other the inseparability is granted by Baronius § 5. p. 50.52 and not denied I think by any But I am truely so much in pain whilst Mr. Hick makes it my duty to expose him thus to publick view that I will onely refer him to the several parts of my ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the applying of this to his Distinction and choose to shew him the Danger of it out of other mens writings partly that Reason may not be slighted for want of Authority to commend it and partly to shew him I am no sharper then the necessity of the Case doth make it needful Because no sharper then other men who yet are famous for moderation I will begin with Dr. Field and the great Divines by him alledged and then proceeding to Dr. Goad one of the Synodists at Dort to Dr. Iackson and Diotallevius and other valuable Writers I will conclude with Dr. Hammond whom nothing but love to the truth of God and perfect zeal to his Honour could make to utter the least word that looks like sharpness to a Dissenter § 4. This distinction saith Dr. Field will not clear the doubt they move touching Gods efficiency and working in the sinful Actions of men Whensoever saith Durand two thins are inseparably joyned together whosoever knowing them both and that they are so inseparably joyned together chooseth the one chooseth the other also Because though haply he would not choose it absolutely as being evil and by the way no sinner doth so choose sin yet in as much as it is joyned to that which he doth will neither can be separated from it it is of necessity that he must will both The case appeareth in those actions which are voluntary and mixt As when a man casteth into the Sea those rich commodities to save his life which he would not do but in such a case Hence it followeth that the act of hating God and sinful deformity being so inseparably joyned together that the one cannot be divided from the other for a man cannot hate God but he must sinne damnably if God doth will the one he doth will the other also § 5. This of Durand is confirmed by Suarez who saith He shall never satisfie any man that doubteth how God may be cleared from being author of sin if he have an efficiency in the sinful actions of men that shall answer that all thâ—t is said touching Gods efficiency and concurrence is true in respect of the evil motions of mens wills materially considered and not formally in that they are evil and sinful For the one of these is consequent upon the other For a free and Deliberate act of a created will about such an act and such circumstances cannot be produced but it must have deformity annexed to it § 6. There are some operations or Actions saith Cumel that are intrinsecally evil so that in them we cannot separate that which is material from that which is formal as it appeareth in the hate of God and in this act ☞ when a man shall say and Resolve I will do evil so that it implyes a contradiction that God should effectually work our will to bring forth such actions in respect of that which is material in them and not in respect of that which is formal § 7. And this seemeth yet more impossible saith Dr. Field if we admit their opinion who think that the formal nature and being of the Sin of commission consisteth in some thing that is positive and in the manner of working freely so as to repugne to the rule of Reason and Lâ—w of God so that it is clear in the judgement of those great Divines that if God hath a true reall efficiency in respect of the substance of these sinful actions he must in a sort produce the deformity or that which is formal in them And again the Dr. saith If God doth determine the will of man to work repugnantly to the Law he must needs move and determine it to sin seeing to sin is nothing else but to repugne unto the Law p. 125. § 8. It s a hard case saith Dr. GOAD when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from Sinning And then he confutes the evasion thus That which is a principall â—â—use of any action is a cause of those concomitants which accompany that action necessarily This Rule is most certainly true Therefore if God by his Decrees do force us to do those actions which cannot be done without sin God himself I am afraid to rehearse it must needs be guilty of sin He gives an Instance in Adam's eating the forbidden fruit And I will gratifie my Reader with a Transcript of it because the Doctors Disputatioâ— is not commonly to be had If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit seeing the eating of that fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a grâ—ss obliquity I do not see saith the Doctor how this Distinction will justifie God For Adam sinned because he ate that fruit that was forbidden But they say God decreed that he should eat that fruit which was forbidden necessarily unavoidably The Conclusion is too blasphemous to be so often repeated The Reader may see as the Dr. goes on by which t is plain he intended his Disputation for the Press how wel that common distinction holds water Yea if this nicety were sound man himself might prove that he committed no murder although he stabbed the dead party into the heart For at his arraignment he might tell the Judge that he did indeed thrust a dagger into his heart but it was not that which took away his life but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits Who seeth not the wilde phrenzie of him that should make this Apologie yet this is all our Adversaries say for God They say his Decree was the cause that Adam took the forbidden fruit and put it into his mouth and eat that which he had commanded he should not eat yet they say he was not the cause of the transgression of the Commandment
illi annexam Nam Daemones non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa sed tantum solicitant c. multo itaque magis Malitiae reus est qui sciens volens non tentat aut solicitat sed actionem reipsa producit cujus malitia ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis ipsi quà m clarissimè patet What kind of Adversaries they are whom the Doctor thus handles and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concern'd he gives us to know by his two instances in Twisse and Zuinglius § 12. A whole Colledge of Remonstrants men of renown for their piety and learning too thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two wayes of Argumentation 1. Whensoever a superiour and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferiour and impotent that it being so moved cannot choose but sin Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superiour and omnipotent cause But according to those men who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God the inferiour cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superiour as that it cannot choose but sin Therefore according to those men the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superiour cause 2. When two causes do concurr to one action to wit the action of hating God whereof the one act 's freely and the other of necessity then must the cause which acts freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass But according to the men aforesaid God acts freely in the producing of such an action which M. Hickman reckons amongst Gods creatures and the inferiour cause of necessity Therefore according to those men God sustains the whole fault of its coming to passe And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity as well as the act § 13. The Apologist for Tilenus doth make this Answer to the distinction 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin or consent to it with a designe to oppose himself to the divine Law but to enjoy his Pâ—easure and satisfie his appetites 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law And then infers that according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine that consent and that purpose being positive entities and acts of the soul are from God and of his production from whence it followes either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act or that the fault is imputable to God who is called by Mr. Hickman the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply § 14. But after all and above all I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND who having shewed how those Doctrines which are commonly called Calvinistical are so noxious to the practice and lives of men as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity those I mean by him forementioned And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity which the Assertors of those Doctrins have commonly used as an Artifice for the avoiding of those consequences by which their Doctrines are rendred odious at last proceeds to make it appear That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God from being the Author of that sin of which he is said by those men to predetermine the act For 1. Though a free power of acting good or evil be perfectly distinct and separable from doing evil and therefore God that is the Author of one cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other yet the act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act the act of blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemie the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is straight and consequently he that predetermines the act must needs predetermine the obliquity Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter it would more truely be affirmed on the contrary side that God is the author of the obliquity and man of the act for God that gives the rule in transgressing of which all obliquity consists doth contribute a great deal though not to the production of that Act which is freely committed against that rule yet to the denominating it oblique for if there were no Law there would be no obliquity God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised thereby constitutes uncircumcision an obliquity which had he not given that law had never been such But for the act as that differs from the powers on one side and the obliquity on the other it is evident that the man is the cause of that To conclude this Chapter It is a thing so undeniable that the Author of the act of hating God must needs be the Author of the obliquity that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both and God of neither so the rigid Presbyterians as well as Papists affirm God to be the Author not onely of the act but of the obliquity of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer so much commended by Thomas Godwin in his Comfort for believers p. 36.37 Mr. Whitfield also and Mr. Hobbs Occham in sent 3. q. 12 cited by Dr Field p. 128. and Mr. Hickman in effect when he saith that God is the Cause of all Beings p. 78. and p. 95. and Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2. CHAP. V. § 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scripture and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latine that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion so the FATHERS are very few whose very figurative speeches do look that way And their meaning is so conspicuous by what the same Fathers say before and after that if he drank out of the Foâ—ntaines as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns I admire the greatness of his delusion His performance being no better then mine or any mans would be who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being although the work of mens hands and made of Massy Gold or silver because it is said by the Apostle an Idol is nothing in the world Or that the Planters of Christianity had not onely no positive but not so much as a Real Being because it is said by the same Apostle that God hath chosen the things that are not to bring to naught things that are Yet this ad hominem is a strong way of arguing very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost that Circumcision is nothing that the foreskin is nothing that wicked men are of nothing that every man is but vanity yea and
altogether lighter then vanity it self which will be granted by all the world to have positive beings yet doth he not say in any one text That sin is nothing in the world or that Blasphemies and Rapes have no positive being but on the contrary sins are said to be the works of men and devils And now to prevent any exception to the propriety of the word § 2. Those are properly called sins which God himself in his written word doth commonly call by that name And how many things are there that have positive entities or beings by the very confession of Mr. H. and all that are of his way of which wickednesse and sin are found to be predicated in scripture As for example For the man to lie with the Masters wife Ioseph called a great wickedness and a sin aginst God To take another mans wife was called a great sin by King Abimelech And Ieroboam in driving Israel from following the Lord is said to have made them sin a great sin Davids sin is called a deed that is an act or fact 2 Sam. 12 14. If St. Paul had not thought that some sins are actions and that other sins are qualities he would not certainly have told us of the motions of sins and the lusts of sins The motions of sins which were by the Law did work in our members to bring fruit unto death Rom. 7.5 So in the 7. verse of that Chapter he expresseth sin by lust as lusting by coveting And yet so far is the Apostle from ascribing those positive things to God that speaking there of wilful sin in the person of a Carnal unregenerate man the doing that which he would not do he doth not add like Mr. Hickman It is not I that DO it but GOD that DOTH it in me No his words on the contrary are justly these It is no more I that do it but SIN that dwelleth in me That I may not be over-long in so clear a case I fain would know of Mr. Hickman whether those works of the flesh which are manifest saith the Apostle and set in opposition to the fruits of the spirit and by an opposition of contrariety too Gal. 5.17 I say I would know of Mr. Hickman whether those lusts of the flesh are not properly called sins And whether Adultery Fornication Vncleanness Lasciviousness Idolatry Witchcraft Hatred Variance Strife Seditions Heresies Envyings Murders Drunkenness Revellings and such like have not real and positive beings He will not sure deny this because he knows that these things are either qualities or actions Nor can he deny they are sins because they are set in a contrariety to the Fruits of the spirit and because it is added presently after that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God And as I take it they must be sins for which the Doers are to suffer the loss of heaven which is waited on with the paines of Hell too When Iudas said I have sinned in that I have betrayed innocent blood Cain complained that his sin was greater then he could bear meaning the killing his brother Abel who sees not that sin is predicated in Recto of two such actions as are granted by all the world to have positive beings It is but dipping into the Scripture to finde abundance of such examples § 3. 'T were easy to write â— just volume in shewing the concurrence of Antient Fâ—THERS and even the least that I can shew with a desire of Brevity will be more then Mr. Hickman was able to wrest to his seeming interest I cannot better begin then with the great ATHANASIUS whom several mens misapprehensions have helpt to speak for their judgement against his own First he delivers his true meaning when he useth the expression of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And therefore with the Apostle he first applies it unto Idols which had as positive beings as those that made them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Next he sets down the reason why he useth that expression 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and his reason is because they are not from him who is indeed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from those free and depraved Agents who revolting from their maker made them Idols or Gods of their own invention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 4 where the lusts of the flesh which he calls the body are given as Instances of the sins to which the creature was now descended and by much repetition had made habitual After this he asserteth the opposition of contrariety twixt vice and virtue thereby proving the positivity as well of the one as of the other And giving examples of those actions as well as qualities which man is able to produce by being a voluntary Agent abusing the Liberty of his will to desires and lusts of his own forging he names the committing of Adultery Murder Rebellion Blasphemies Comumelies Perjuries plundering Beating Gluttony Drunkenness which though granted by all the world to be positive things are affirmed by that Father to be the wickednesse and sin of the soul of man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 6. And to make it yet more undeniable that he opposeth his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the excellent Creatures of God himself whom he often calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not to all that hath a positive being He sets Concupiscencies or Lusts in opposition to the Creature that is the creatures of wicked men in opposition to those of God Then shewing the power of the soul to incite the members of the body and of her self to excite her self he saith in the concrete she formeth evil unto her self And so he proceeds to shew the errour of certain Graecians who held sin to have a substance and not to be a meer accident A substance created by a God too whom they would have to be coeternal with the Father of Lights and the maker of sin as a second Nature which from all eternity was collaterall with the First First in Dignity though not in Time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 6. which shews Mr. Hickman the strange Impertinence of what he citeth from Athanasius p. 76. not onely quite beside but as I shall shew when I come thither against his purpose For the Father having proved against those hereticks That there is one onely God and that evil is a thing temporal not derived from God but from the voluntary creature indued with liberty of will goes on for several whole pages to speak as much for my purpose as I can wish him He shews the folly of their distinction who so endeavour to put a difference betwixt the act of hâ—ting God and the sin of hating God which they call the obliquity of the act as to affirm the first to be from God and therefore good the other evil and from the Creature whereas 't is impossible saith the Father that
confession of Learned VOSSIUS That the greatest part of the Amients do so speak as if they thought Original sin to be somâ—thing positive to wit either a Habit or some other Quality I call it the confession of GERARD VOSSIUS because I find it is none of his own opinions that Original sin is something positive whatever he speaks of actual sins And I think his confession to be of the greater consideration because of his being so very conversant in Antient writers and because or his abilitie to understand their true meaning and lastly of his unwillingness to understand them against himself Nay when he speaks of those Antients who were otherwise minded he takes their meaning to have been not so much that this sin was a meer defect of Original Righteousnesse as that it was rather an habitual aversion from God proceeding from the defect of Original righteousness They that held it to be a quality could not otherwise hold it in his opinion then by holding also that the soul was begotten with the body and sin begotten with the soul or that the spirit being created was at least infected by the flesh some thought that the soul was as it were kindled by the soul in generation and that the Leprosie of sin in childrens souls was by infection from the leprosy with which their parents had been infected Of which Opinion was TERTVLLIAN APOLLINARIVS and the greatest part of the Eastern Fathers Quomodo corpus ex corpore sic animam nasci ex animâ TERTVL Apoll. maxima pars Orientalium autumavit uti scribit Hieronymus ad Marcellinum Anapsychiam Epist. 45. RUFFINUS also and AUGUSTIN are cited for it But because of the latter t is said by VOSSIUS that he durst not publickly avow what was privately his opinion His words are the worthier to be observed For thus he writeth to OPTATVS se neque legendo neque orando neque ratiocinando invenire potuisse quomodo cum animarum Creatione peccatum Originis defendatur And for more to this purpose the Reader is referred to other places as Epist. 28. ad Hieronymum Lib. 10. in Genes ad lit cap 23. lib. 1 Retract c. 1. Nay even then when he is doubtful of the souls extraction whether created or begotten he still adheres to his opinion that it is infected by the flesh with some positive Quality as wine grows sowre by being put in a sowre vessel And VOSSIVS himself doth so explain him Haec enim mens est verborum Augustini profecto aut utrumque vitiatum exhomine trahitur aut alterum in altero tanquam in vase vitiato corrumpitur ubi occulta justitiâ— divinae legis includitur Quid autem horum sit verum libentius disco quà m dico ne audeam dicere quod nescio It seemes he doubted whether the soul were ex traduce or not although unlesse it were ex traduce he knew not how to defend Original sin But that he concluded it had a positive entity appears as by all that hath been spoken so by the motus bestialis bestialis Libido by which he expresseth the sin of Adam § 4. As the most of the Antients so the most eminent of the MODERNS have held the soul to be ex traduce and Original sin a positive entity two of which number are commended by learned Vossius but just now cited for men of Excellency and Renown And Vossius himself in divers places doth sufficiently assâ—rt the positivity of sin not so much when he saith of Original sin that it inclines the minde to vitious acts so that it may and is wont to be called a Habit as when he saith of its effects which arâ— Actual sins that they are grown over the soul as a spiritual Rust that carnal Concupiscence is wholy vitious as being a deflextion of the appetite from the Law of its Creation from whence ariseth a dispositâ—on and propensity to Râ—bellion that Morally vitious Acts are freely drawn out from that propensity that by the custom of such aâ—ts there is ingendered in the sinner a vitious Habit. Cùm affectus sic effraenis lascivit ut rationis imperium antevertat plurimùm adversus rationem insurgat ac nisi diligenter à ratione valletur facile aurigam rationem curru excutiat In graviori tentatione semper sit superior nisi ratio speciali juvetur Dei Judicio 2. And as they who affirme the propagation of the soul so also they who deny that God doth concur to the act of sin do eo ipso hold sin to have a positive being such as LOMBARD BONAVENTVRE ALEXANDER ALENSIS ASOTO DVRAND AVREOLVS the learned ARMACHANVS and others cited by Dr. STEARN in his Animi Medela p. 256 257. And though the Master of the sentences doth seem to some not to define which is truest the negative or the affirmative of Gâ—ds concurrence to acts of sin but leaves the Reader to judge of both tenets to Dist. 37. yet he is cited by CAMERACENSIS l. 1. q. 14. for the defence of the Negative Because according to his opinion God doth only permit those evils which are sin as saith our learned Dr. FIELD p. 128. 3. HEMMINGIVS the Scholar of Melanehthon and known to be of his minde defineth sin in general by disobedience against God and affirmes Disobedience to import four things in holy writ Defect corruption inclination and action Original sin he defines to be a propagated corruption of humane nature in which there is a material and formal part The Material saith he containeth both a defect in the intellect and a concupiscence in the heart In the fal of Adam there was a concurrence of these 8. sins 1. A doubting the truth of Gods word 2. A loss of faith or incredulity 3. Curiosity 4. Pride 5. Contempt of God 6. Apostacy 7. Ingratitude 8. A murdering of himself and his posterity And is expressed in Scripture by divers names Concupiscence Flesh the old man the Law of sin sin dwelling in us Rebellion the law of the members and sometimes sin without any epithâ—t Actuall sin he defines to be something done omitted said or thought fighting with the law of God Or as he puts it in other tearmes Actual sin is every action committed against the Law both in the Intellect and the will and in the heart and the outward members Thus that Regius Professor famous for learning and moderation 4. GREGORIE MARTIN of Silesia stating the sin of our first parents begins to expound the word Lapsus which he saith importeth a vitious act with which a man does any thing ill and is the same with peccatum Then coming to speak of the term originall sin he professeth to take the word for the positive act of eating the fruit which was forbidden And so the expression of Original sin he faith doth also include an actual From the importance of the word he comes to speak of the thing signified Which first he
is a high self-determining principle the great spring of our actions of Iudgement pag. 152. But Mr. B. as many others is produced by me in no fâ—â— place I not observing any order either of dignity or of time but giving to every one a place as he meets my memory or my eye The words of GROTIUS deserve great heed whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vitious but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vitious that is an action meaning that a vitious action as the action of hating God is meerly from the sinner man or Divel and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God either as a mediate or immediate cause And though I cited some part of his words before yet not to fail of his intenâ— I shall intreat my Reader to weigh the whole Neque ab eo quod diximus dimovere nos debet quod mala multa evenire cernimus quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse ut qui perfectissimè sicut ante dictum est bonus sit Nam cum diximus Deum omnium esse Causam addidimus eorum quae verè subsistunt Nihil enim prohibet quominus ipsa quae subsistunt deinde causae sint Accidentium quorundam quales sunt actiones Deus hominem mentes sublimiores homine creavit cum agendi libertate quae agendi libertas vitiosa non est sed potest suâ vialiquid vitiosum producere Et hujus quidem generis malis quae moraliter mala dicuntur omnino Deum adscribere auctorem nefas est p. 27 28. LYCERUS vindicating God from the very same calumnie with which Mr. Hickman hath not feared to â—sperse him saith that the Divel did peccâ—re ex semetipso according to our Saviour Ioh. 8.44 that he alone is pater fons malorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first inventor of evil things to which he accommodates that of Austin Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium God is said to be omnipotent not because he can do all things saith LOMBARD out of Augustin but because he can do whatsoever he will who cannot will to do any thing but what is good But there are some things saith he which God cannot do to wit those things wich are unjust sunt alia quaedam quae Deus nullatenus facere potest ut pâ—ccata p. 247. Non potest Deus facere injusta p. 248. These following Doctrines quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult eligit quod liberum Arbitrium est potentia passiva quod necessitate movetur ab Appetibili item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata Item quod alâ—quis faciat aliquid omnino ut Deus vult ipsum facere voluâ—tate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet c. were condemned with an Anathema by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. 1341. together with the Blasphemies of Ioannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature is so caused by vertue of the first cause And that God is the cause of every mode of the act and of every Circumstance that is produced All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Necessary truths by Mr. Hickman accordingly do call for a condemnation Bp. BRAMHALL shewes it to be his judgement whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad and saith it implyes a contradiction that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer Act. 13.18 Act. 14.16 Then he thus states the matter God causeth all good permitteth all evil disposeth all things both good and evil The general power to act is from God in him we live move and have our being this is Good But the specification and Determination of this general power to the doing of any evil is from our selves and proceeds from the free will of man it is a good consequence This thing is unrighteous therefore it cannot proceed from God Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Diotallevius not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the will which abuseth its liberty in determining it self to the evil act and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil not the cause by which we do it And so saith Aquinas Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium hoc non esse à Deo sed ab ipsâ again he saith non à motione divinâ sed à dispâ—sitione humanae voluntatis oriri ut malae potius actionâ—s quà m boâ—ae sequantur He also cites for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin and of which the result is this Dâ—termiâ—ationâ—m ad producâ—ndam huâ—â—s actus enâ—itatem esse à voluntate humanâ non autem à Deo Deum ita nolle antecedenâ—er ut haec entitas sit ut eam eâ—iam esse patiatur suum concursum non subtrahendo si conditio id exigat ex Creaturae libertate opposita p. 92.93.94 mark how it is expressed by Dr. GO AD. God made Adam able to be willing to sin but he made him not to will sin that he chose death it was by the strength of his will given him by God but God did not binde him to chose death for that were a contradiction a necessitated choice if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed this point will be most evident And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all He that first gives the Law and then preâ—etermines the Act of transgressing the disobedience the doing contrary to that law that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge and then predetermines Adams will to choose and eat what was forbidden is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity And indeed if the obliquity which renders the act a sinfull act be it self any thing it must necessarily follow that either God doth not predetermine all things or that he predetermines the obliquity and Regularity bearing the same pâ—oportion of Relation to any act of Duty as obliquity doth to sin it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act should not be the Author of the obliquity as well as the Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknowledged to be the Author of the regularity of it To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds Let not any man resolve sins into any other original then his
own Lusts. CHA P. VI. § 1. HAving bestowed so much paper on what is thought of most moment I shall need spend but little in the dispatching of those flyes to which Mr. H. gives the name of Arguments Artificial p. 69. The first he confesseth was Mr. Barlees If sin as sin be a positive entity then it is a thing in it self good For t was added by Mr. B. but now substracted by Mr. H. every positive thing is good Sect. 2. To this I answered many things of which Mr. H. replyeth onely to a few As 1. That if sin is a thing positive he seeks to prove by this Argument that sin is good 2. That I had proved sin a thing positive in my two last sections which continuing firm and not disproved evinceth the force of his Argument to serve for nothing but only to prove that sin is good 3. That a thing which is privative in one respect is also positive in another As that which is privative of life and sight must needs be positive of Death and blindnesse 4. That Mr. B. himself did grant as much in confessing the efficient cause of sin and saying there may be somthing of positive in a privation 5. That in saying sin is privative he confesseth it is not a meer privation because a privation is but the abstract of privative and what is most positive in one case may be privative in another 6. That sin is not conceivable unlesse as a concrete which hath something positive as well as privative there being no kinde of difference betwixt Davids lying with Bathshebah and hiâ— Adultery with Bâ—thshebah at the time of her being Vriahs wife 7. That bonum Metaphysicum hath quite another signification then bonum morale to which alone we oppose sin or malum morale 8. That a Libertine a Ranter or a Carneadist will be glad to introduce an opinion that sin is good by calling it bonum Metâ—physicum and confounding that with bonum morale 9. That the subject of Metaphysicks is ens quatenus ens reale illud not omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum and so in one sensâ— it comprehendeth Res aliquid 10. That bonum metaphysicum doth not signifie good in English as Canis astronomicus doth not signifie a dog in our english streets and apprehensions 11. That Dr. Twisse was betrayed into one of his worst errourâ— that it is better to be tortured to all eternity then not to have a real being by not considering this very thing 12. That a lye is verum as much as sin is bonum Metaphysicum because it hath a positive being which proved the Argument to be impertinent at the best § 3. Now Reader observe what an incomparable confuter I have to deal with There are but four things of twelve on which his courage would serve him to try his teeth which finding also to be too hard he does as lepidly nibble at them as the tame creature did at the Thistles which made Philemon so full of laughter For to the first he thus replyes The designe of the argument is to fright Mr. P. out of his sad opinion concerning the positivity of sin by bringing him to the grand Absurdity of saying sinne is good p. 70. But I rejoyn 1. That my answer was designed to fright Mr. Hick from his opinion concerning Gods being the Author of all things positive nay of all things real too neither Blasphemy nor Buggery nor hating God being excepted by bringing him to the grand Absurdities of saying God is the Author of the greatest wickednesse in the world and withal of saying the greatest wickednesse is good 2. He cannot bring me to saying that sin is good but onely he can say he designed to bring me which shews the folly of his designe too For. 3. as I said that Bonum amongst the Heathen Metaphysicians did not signify good in our English acception of the word any more then malum which is latine for an apple can signifie evil in a Translation though malum is latine for evil too so I shall make it undeniable by appealing even to them who are partial to him whether we can properly say in English That it is good to hate God or good for Mr. Hickman to lie with a beast because they are actions which have positive entities and therefore are Bona Metaphysica in Mr. Hickmans Dialect Nay in very broad English Mr. H. will tell us that they are Good and from God if he dares say twice what he hath said too often by saying once to wit in his pages 95 96 4. I told him Aristotlâ—'s phrase of every entity being good should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe and so returned to that Heathen from whence it came then have been used by a Christian to prove it good to hate God And accordingly Dr. Stearn doth somewhere deny that metaphysical Axiom to be of universal truth for when it was urged that the Act of hating God must be good because ens bonum convertuntur he called it the begging of the question as well he might 5. Mr. H. saith theMaxime is ens bonum convertuntur not quatenus positivum and so ascribes an equal goodnesse to the formal obliquity which is ens as to the Act it self to which the obliquity it annexed 6. T were easy to prove to Mr. H. that the greatest Lye is as true as the truth it self because it is Aristotle's Maxime and as generally received as that he urged ens and verum convertuntur 7. I had told him whilest it was time that if by good he means bonum morale as to be pertinent he must he must also prove parricide incest witchcraft or Rebellion a thing neither better nor worse then witchcraft either meer privations of being or moral good things For according to his dreaming they must be nothing or 2. no sins or 3. moral vertues or 4. sins and moral vertues too § 4. He replyes to the third by a full Concession p. 70.71 But conceiving it a disgrace to stick at nothing he wholy passeth by my answer and onely quarrells my Illustration which yet in one sense he doth approve too That sense was mine and as pertinent it was as whatsoever similitude he hath stoln from Mr. Morice what I said of darknesse he confesseth to be a truth and with a But it is very vulgar p. 71. As if the Sun were the worse for being an every day spectacle He thought his axiom the better for being vulgar and gave it this commendation that it is commonly received p. 70. when he impertinently saith that darkness cannot be felt p. 72. he should have excepted the Aegyptian and that of his own apprehension which is now so palpable to every Reader 2. I gave an instance in the transgression of the Law which I said was sin and yet a thing positive as well as privative to wit privative of virtue and positive of vice To this Mr.
of the Gospel being positive is very good and from God which yet he must or he must sing his Recantation In a word It can no more be proved that sin is a privation and nothing else from the saying of St. Iohn that sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Transgression of the Law 1 Iohn 3.4 then that Christ himself is not positive from the tropical saying of St. Paul that Christ was made sin 2. Cor. 5.21 or that darknesse is as positive as iron because the Angels were delivered to chaines of darknesse 2 Pet. 2.4 And whether it is not indeed a sin without any such figure or catachrestical way of speaking to ravish Virgins and lye with beasts to hate God and to love the Devil which are confessedly as positive as any actions that can be named I appeal to the usage of the word Sin in the common experience of all mankind § 16. His last argument as he calls it is very rare Original sin is not positive ergo sin as sin is not positive p. 8â— First for the manifold Absurdities as well as guilt into which he falls by his reduplication sin as sin I briefly refer to every part of my second chapter especially § 8 9 10 11 12 c. Next for what he saith of Original sin I refer to all I have produced from the Antient Fathers and learned modern Divines who held it to be a posiâ—ive quality in the third and fourth Sections of the fifth Chapter of this Book and also in the 3. Ch § 23. But thirdly as I never yet said so neither aâ— I concerned to say that all sins are positive It is enough that some are and those the worst to be imagined Nay Mr. H must be concluded a strange kinde of Blasphemer in saying all things positive are either Gods Creatures or God himself although there were but one sin that had a positive being such as was the Angels pride and the Divels hatred of God Almighty or the lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44 Yet now to speak more of Original sin as that doth signifie the proneness of the will to evil after the image of Adams will from after the time of his Depravation it must needs be also positive to wit a conversion to the creature And why might not Adam acquire by his sin the image of Satan unto himself and offspring too as well as sin-away the Image of God But this is not that upon which I am obliged to lay a stresse Nor shall this be the subject of new disputes whether a man doth beget a man as much as a Horse begets a Horse It may be argued for ever on either side but I believe with greatest force for that part of the question to which St. Austin was most inclined and all that is said by Mr. H. doth but help to disprove Original sin for which Pelagians and Socinians may chance to thank him I know St. Paul held that the whole of man doth consist of three things Body Soul and Spirit concerning which Dr. Hammond hath a most profitable Discourse with a Reference to which I will shut up this Section see his Annotation upon 1 Thess. 5.23 § 17. Having seen his Reasons let us see what he saith to some few of mine or rather how guiltily he sneaks from the whole duty of a respondent p. 90. For though he knew what I had said to wit that Sins in Scripture are called works works of Darknesse works of the flesh works of mens hands and works of the Devil as it were on purpose to shew that they are positive things yet he passeth by that as if the word works had been of no consideration and onely nibbles at my saying That that was positive that Christ came to destroy concealing also from his Reader what I had cited from St. Iohn of Christs being manifested in the flesh that he might destroy the works of the Devil 1 Iohn 3.8 nor taking notice of what I said about vacuum vacui implying locatum as the privation of a privation implyeth position by all confessions I shewed it implyes a contradiction to say an habit is a privation because it is called by a Catachresis the privation of a privation when after a losse it is recovered from hence I argued that if the works of the Devil which are also called the Lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44 had been meere privations the destruction of them could have been none But Mr. H's very weaknesse doth serve him here instead of strength for not considering that Death is said to be capable of destruction 1 Cor. 15.16 by the same catachrestical way of speaking whereby it is said in other places to have a body and a sting and so I might prove it at least to him to have a positive entity he urgeth his ignorance for a proof that of a meer privation there may be properly a privation How much better might I prove that death it self hath a positivity from Rev. 21.8 where to be burning in a lake of fire and Brimstone is expressed by the name of the second death But the work of the Devil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly so called and therefore positive The words of St. Iohn are even litterally true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3.4 and lusts are qualities Iohn 8.44 § 18. To the Argument which I urged from sins habitual or habits of sin such as Drunkennesse in a man who is seldom sober it seemes he knew so exactly that no good answer was to be given as to resolve to supply it with meer scurrility and impertinence p. 91. He is fain to say that I intended a Soriâ—es or rather seemed to intend it that he might seem to have something at which to nibble But no such thing as a Sorites was any more in my thoughts then in my mention And therefore this is so vile a practice as may be used by any Atheist who hath a minde to calumnâ—ate any passage of any writer It i an easy thing to say that such an Author makes a face as if he intended this or that which we have reason to believe he could not possibly intend But what saith the Rhapsodist to my Argument that vices are habits as well as vertues and therefore positive Qualities as well as Vertues He doth not deny that some sorts of vices indeed are Habits for he cannot think that an act of Drunkennâ—ss is a vice and that an habit of Drunkennenss is none at all nor can he think it impossible to be habituâ—lly drunk and that an habit is a thing positive he is so far from denying that he affirmes it he prâ—fesseth not to doubt of it p 92. so that now there is no question whether Drunkennesse when an habit is positive or not But whether or no it is a sin or whether it is not from God in Mr. Hickman's judgement one of the two we are assured by himsâ—lf is his
possession not for any the least crime of which I had any way been guilty but for being secretly suggested to be the Author of some Books which to this very day I could never hear named and though I earnestly desired to hear my self accused that I might know for what I suffered and if not my Accuser at least my Accusation and be heard speak for my self yet Dr. Reynolds professed to me in private he could not obtain that justice for me Mr Hickman expresseth this just complaint which I am able to prove just to any competent Judges who will but heare me by my throwing I know not what fiery darts not onely at him but at the far greater part of heads and Fellows of Colleges in Oxon at the Visitors and at the two Houses of Parliament p. 44. Now that his Readers may clearly see how great a violence he hath offered to truth and Candour and how he hath blurred the two houses with a most scurrilous suggestion I shall furnish them very briefly with a perfect Narrative of the Case I was permitted to appeare no more then once before the Visitors when they onely entertained me with this one question Whether I could submit to their Visitation or acknowledge they were my rightful Visitors My Answer was not Categorical either one wayâ— or other But as I really wanted so I modestly besought them to give me time wherein to consider that weighty question that so my answer might be rational which it could not be if it were rash For being then newly returned out of France I had not studied the matter of right And as I would not be perjured for fear of Ruine so would I not rashly incur my ruine by such a fear of being perjured as was not very well grounded They did not deny what I desired and that I thought was to yield it to me But they met a little after to passe a sentence of condemnation by a most absolute decree upon me and others and proclaiming my banishment before I was summoned to give my answer for which I concluded they gave me time they used the violence of the Souldiers to put their decree into execution Now is it likely that the two Houses would Authorize them to destroy me without a cause not only unconvicted but unaccused and unheard for that they suspected me the Author of I know-not-what-books which were never named I was privately informed by Dr. Reynolds who was not able to tell me what Books they meant Could the two Houses Authorize them to break the Law of the Land in Magna Charta and to act in contradiction to the Petition of Right I rather think that the Visitors did sin against the very râ—le to which the two Houses had tied them up in their commission A Nicodemus was able to ask doth our Law judge any man before it hear him and know what he doth John 7.51 And as Festus said unto King Agrippa It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which is accused have the Accusers face to face and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him so with greater force of reason since the Romans then were Heathens which we are not I may say to Mr. Hickman from Magna Charta and the Petition of right It is not the manner of the English in the two Houses of Parliament to dispossesse any man of whatsoever estate or condition of his land or Tenement his freehold or liberties or free Customes without his being brought to answer by due processe of Law and by the Lawful judgement of his Pâ—eres And this may serve as well for theirs as for mine own Vindication Next for the far greater part of Heads and Fellowes of Colleges in Oxon against whom he accuseth me to have thrown some darts ibid. He knows I never made mention of them And if he meanes that my case was also the case of all others who suffered with me he wrongs the Visitors extremely by concluding them worse then indeed they were For they did not cast out the greatest part of Heads and Fellows out of their rights untill they had given their final answer I hardly know any besides my self who were deprived of their places for being so circumspect onely and modest as to desire a little respit before they answered that so their answer might be unpassionate and after a due deliberation I know the sufferings of all the rest were illegally inflicted as well as mine as may appear by the case of the Vniversity which was sent in a letter to Mr. SELDEN and of which I may give account towards the end of this subject but what I speak against the Visitors was in reference to the case of which I had a peculiar knowledge Thirdly he playes upon himself by telling some stories of dâ—straction and Hypocondriacal conceits as if he were willing that his Readers should suspect me infected with his Disease And talk as odly of me as they do commonly of him But he is strangely unfortunate in this adventure For he discovers himself afresh to be a second hand-Historian in citing an Author he never read He would else have known had he consulted Laurentius as well as named him that there are three sorts of melancholy where of the first doth happen by the meer distemper of the Brain The 2. by a consent of the whole body the third is raised up from the Hypochondres that is from the entrals contained in them especially from the liver the spleen and the Mesenâ—erie The first is simply called Melancholy the last with an addition of the Epithet Hypochondriacal The first exagitates the patient without intermission the last affords him some times of truce The three instances produced do all belong unto the first not at all unto the last to which alone Mr. Hickman had the unskilfulness to apply them p. 46. And Laurentius besides doth adde no less then fourteen of which there is not so much as one referred to Flatus Hypochondriacus which by the Greeks is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but are widely different in two respects to wit in respect of the Original seat and of the manner of the delirium which is produced So that poor Mr. H. at once hath laid himself bare and put a rod into my hand for his due correction Did he think that Hypochondria were things residing in the brain or was he as sick as the Italian Foot-boy and fancied the brain was in the bowels His own conceit was more likely to be Hypochondriacal then mine when he reproached me with a distemper from the very suspicion of which I was ever free and with which if my Body had ever been affected in any measure as I blesse God for it it never was Mr. Hickman should not have been so barbarous as to have sported his Readers with my disease which had been honest and helpless too had it ever invaded my