Selected quad for the lemma: law_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
law_n	flesh_n	member_n	sin_n	6,691	5	4.9879	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A11048	The courtiers academie comprehending seuen seuerall dayes discourses: wherein be discussed, seuen noble and important arguments, worthy by all gentlemen to be perused. 1 Of beautie. 2 Of humane loue. 3 Of honour. 4 Of combate and single fight. 5 Of nobilitie. 6 Of riches. 7 Of precedence of letters or armes originally written in Italian by Count Haniball Romei, a gentleman of Ferrara, and translated into English by I.K.; Discorsi. English	Romei, Annibale, conte, 16th cent.; Keper, John, b. 1546 or 7, attributed name.; I. K.	1598 (1598)	STC 21311; ESTC S116155	207,844	304

most honorable Signiory in whom in his greene yeeres a most bright beame of heroicall vertue doth shine gratiously obeying the commaundement of the Queene beganne in this maner You O Knights if I doe carry well in minde haue grounded this opinion which is termed Honour vppon a secret supposition that a man if there appeare nothing to the contrary is good Which supposition I holde to bee very doubtfull yea and further that some notable signe of vertue not appearing hee may bee coniectured rather a wicked than good man considering that humane nature of it selfe enclineth rather to vice than vertue Which by this may be imagined because the way of vertue is asprous hard and laborsom so that as a thing myraculous men point at him who arriueth to the end and becommeth perfectly vertuous and on the contrary the way that conducteth to vice is so easie plaine and pleasant as the number of them is infinite which walke by it and become vitious this being a manifest signe that naturally we are not enclined to vertue but to vice because things difficult and that seldome happen are farre from the condition of nature Experience furthermore sheweth that wee rather encline to vice than vertue in that there is none of vs for what preuayleth it to lie which in himselfe hath not triall with howe great violence he is drawne to vice and howe hardly hee abstaineth from sensible contentments how troublesome continence is vnto him and patience bitter Which being as it is true so shall your supposition be false for as all things hauing no impediment do rather worke according to their inclination than against their nature so must we presume not knowing any other that man for the most part is rather wicked than good the which is confirmed by the answer of Pythagoras who being demaunded what was most true made answer that men are wicked The supposition therefore being false so shall the opinion of an others valour and iustice be vntrue for the foundation failing the building falleth downe Notwithstanding I attend your answere The reasons of your renowmed Segniory answered Gualenguo introduced against my supposition and opinion are so preualent as I may wel say the conclusion pleaseth me not a whit for I know not well how to answer the argument and certainly our naturall fragillitie is such as that it neuer ceaseth to make triall of occasion while it be brought in subiection vnto vice neyther could diuine Paul effect although he were diuinely illumined but that he was driuen to say I perceiue in my members and flesh an other lawe repugnant to the lawe of my minde which subdueth mee to the lawe of sin Yet notwithstanding all this I am of opinion that my supposition is true as also that man in his naturall estate is inclined to vertue and not to vice being good and not wicked the which I hope with so liuely reasons to make manifest as euery one shall bee out of doubt I say therefore that all things comprehended in this vniuersall frame hauing their originall from God as God is chiefe bountie and goodnes so are all these partakers of this bountie and therefore al are good in the first instant of nature To affirme therefore that man is wicked by nature is no other but to auerre that amongst all the creatures of the whole worlde the sensible image of the insensible God for so is man is wicked a matter repugnant to trueth and the authoritie as wel of holy diuines as philosophers who are of opinion that in this inferior world amongst all liuing creatures only man may be vertuous and happy and as fire should not be light if of his nature he did incline to the centre so a man should neyther be vertuous nor good if naturally hee were inclined to vice Furthermore if Nature the ministresse of God dooth not onely generate but guideth al things generated to their end and therefore heauy things descend and those light ascend as also beasts and liuing creatures so soone as they are generate by nature herselfe they are directed to their end perfection how can it be that man should only rest by her abandoned and which is worse not onely abandoned and contemned but further instigated to his ruine and imperfection Man by the beautiful gift of the mind is true man who as he is diuine so will wee affirme with the Poet that Like to his Maker he doth heauenly state retaine And therefore hee desireth that onely which is best and diuine neyther can hee knowing the true and principall good wish euill by which reason the diuine Philosopher beeing mooued subscribed to the opinion of the Stoickes affirming in all his conclusions that man is by nature good and against nature wicked and that hee as all other things is inclined to this end which is best and the Philosopher sayth that man is neuer wicked but when he is affected against Nature which commeth to passe when in himselfe hee hath not ciuill gouernment and that which should obey commaundeth which is sence ouer reason If wee shall also further consider that man naturally is thirsting after knowledge as the Philosopher affirmeth in the Proemium of his diuine Philosophie wee may easily iudge that to vertue and not vice hee is naturally disposed for of vice there can be no science it being nothing in existance but otherwise a meere priuation as affirmeth great Dionisius in the booke of Diuine Titles and likewise the Academikes and Peripatetickes If we therefore most famous Lord haue respect to the Creator of man hee is his owne Image if to the gift of Nature he is most apt if to the end of euerie thing created man amongst mortall creatures is onely capable of cheefe good hauing onely the vse of reason and good consultation to him alone is proper wherefore notwithstanding the reasous by your Segniory all eadged to the contrarie wee must conclude that naturally he is enclined to vertue and not to vice and that it is to be presumed that he is good and not wicked To which reasons I being to make answer we must consider that in man three natures are comprehended one common to al liuing creatures which is vegetable another common to creatures and man and that is sence the third common to man and things Diuine and this is reasonable Nature By the first man is like to plants by the second to other liuing creatures by the thrid he commeth to be true man and a diuine creature and therefore man by participation is in the midst betwixt mortall and diuine for in respect of body and sence he partaketh of mortalitie but touching his mind he is diuine and immortal as in man these three natures are discouered so finde we in him likewise three natural inclinations one called properly naturall and dependeth on the vnsatiable knowledge of vniuersall nature which mooueth all things depriued of knowledge to those operations that may conduct them to their proper ends and therefore this

commaundeth me although to my self I am not ignorāt that so high excellent a subiect very farre exceedeth the power of my wit hoping these valorous knights most faithfull subiects to Honour will be readie to supply my defects Honour excellent Queene being aboue measure desired by mā it is a thing manifest that in the nūber of humane goods some be appertaining to the body as beautie health strength agilitie and some to the minde as vnderstanding wisedome knowledge prudence and arte as also other goods there be externall belonging to fortune Amidst these therefore Honour out of doubt cannot bee numbred amongst those goods that appertaine to the bodie or mind but rather is accounted amongst them in our selues not resident as are likewise riches principalitie power friendes a faire and modest wife children nobility and such like Vniuersally therefore wee will affirme that honour is the most precious of all goods externall But because this word Honor signifieth not one alone but two honors of diuers nature in themselues not beeing able to assigne such a definition as wherein both may bee comprehended I will diuide them and one as a new forger of these words I will tearme naturall and imperfect the other acquired honour and perfect By not conceiuing that honors are of two kinds diuers of themselues not one al they which hitherto haue entreated of Honour haue fallen into most manifest errors and amongst other the learned Bishop of Caserta prouided if it bee true that the booke of Honour set forth vnder the name of Posseuiuo were by him made as of himselfe he affirmeth is led into a most notable errour For he in the same booke hauing defined honour wrong interpreted the fence of Aristotle in his book of Rhetorike after a long discourse vpon the same he groundeth his combate not obseruing that combate is wholly contrarie to the nature of that honor by him discussed and defined At this time therefore I not swaruing frō the order of nature which is to go from the imperfect to the perfect wil first intreat of honor naturall and conclude in honor acquired which is one of the principall circumstances of humane felicity I say therfore that honor naturall is a common opinion that he honored hath neuer failed in iustice nor valor I term it honor natural because man bringeth it from his mothers wombe and preserueth it vnspotted except through some greeuous offence or suspition he loose this good opinion This was defined by Fausto Longiano in his Combate to bee no other than an incorruptible state of Nature as though to possesse this honor it were sufficient to maintaine our selues such as wee were borne This is that honour most excellent Queene whereof there is so great fame and wherein there is not any one which professeth not himselfe to haue his part as surely hee hath though in no other respect at loast yet in his mouth in that hee will neyther say nor doe anye thing wythout the licence of honour or except honour permit This is that which giueth occasion euery day of bralles hatred and rancours and vppon which was grounded in times past wicked combate I affirmed it to be an opinion and not a science or knowledge For science is grounded on trueth and necessity Opinion vpon probability and accident For we may well haue an opinion that one is an honest man but wee cannot affirme it wythout vnderstanding so much because externally he may be good and in secret wicked This opinion which is termed honour is grounded vppon a secret supposition that man is good if there appeare nothing to the contrary and notwythstanding this hath in it difficulty especially for that which the Philosopher sayth in the second of his Ethickes that vertues and vices in a man are neither naturall nor against nature and that good and wicked habite not by nature but by custom is acquired notwythstanding by that which hee addeth in his sixt Booke it seemeth this supposition may be graunted because he affirmeth that man is borne with a certaine vertue by meane of which he seemeth apt to iustice fortitude and temperance seeing in a man by vertue of his mind there are naturally some principall notes by which we may worthily presume that hee is rather good then wicked and I haue set downe these two parcels that haue not failed in iustice nor valor differing from other defects for that God onely being immaculate and without fault it is necessarie that man accompanied with some imperfection must offend notwithstanding those sinnes are tollerable which sometimes through humane fragilitie wee cannot but commit and therefore the Philosopher in the seconde of his Ethikes sayth that he cannot be termed vicious and wicked which a little swarueth from comlinesse and honestie minding to infer that those sinnes although they giue testimonie after a certaine manner that wee haue not performed vertuous habite yet are they not sufficient to make him loose his honour but rather those which are committed against iustice and fortitude And that euerie one may the better vnderstand how honour is preserued and lost I haue not thought it much from the purpose to declare what it is to faile in Iustice and what in Honour To faile in Iustice therefore is no other but to performe the things which by good lawes are forbidden and seuerely punished to iniurie another against reason and by sinister meanes rashly to commit manslaughter murther theft ' rapines treasons adulteries and sinne against nature to be an heretike conceiuing sinisterly of God and diuine things to practise vsury and to bee addicted vnto vnlawfull gaine to bee a falfe witnesse to the preiudice of the goods life or honor of another finally he is sayd to haue failed in Iustice who hath extremely offended against any vertue seeing that of Iustice vniuersally all things depende To want valour is no other but basely to carrie our selues in daungers as that should bee to abandon the colours or battaile by flying away or else to leaue our friend and companion in daunger not to hazard our liues for defence of religion and of holy Christian Church for his prince for his countrie for father wife children and such like as also hee manifesteth vilitie who easily swalloweth iniurie without by his owne proper valour shewing himselfe therewith mooued And let this by mee spoken suffice to make knowne the nature of this honour the which true lie may be termed imperfect Honour in comparison of that by proper valour acquired This Honour principally is incident to beneficence vnderstanding this word not onely for bountie or liberality as many times wee doe but as beeing derined of the Latine woords bene and facio to doo well or good it being the most excellent of all other vertuous actions And it is by the Philosopher two manner of wayes defined in the first booke of his Rhetorike saying Honor is a signe of beneficent opinion and in the fourth of the Ethikes Honour is the reward of

ought not without vrgent necessity to depriue his country of a valiant champion The reasons alleadged to the contrary are true Supposing with the Philosopher which is false that chiefe good cannot be without worldly honor but because they are grounded on a supposition diuers from ours they no waie preiudice our position For they suppose that with an honorable death a mā shunneth infamy that his former life remaineth vnspotted but if I imagin the ruth his whol life past remaineth no lesse infamous by death then by yeelding himselfe because he which dieth be he defendāt or assailant resteth in opiniō to haue failed either in iustice or valor consequētly is dishonored This opinion of Gualinguos was confirmed by the greater part of the gentlmē those in points of honor most iudiciall when the illustrous Signior Hippolito Bentiuogli if I carry well in minde the Philosopher affirmeth in his Rethoricke that nor only hee which offendeth our selues offereth vs iniurie but also he who wrongeth those thinges belonging to vs as our father son brother frend or such like I would know if in point of honor we are bound to reuenge such an iniurie When Gualinguo that such an iniurie should tie vs to reuenge it is requisite there depend vppon it these conditions first that it be performed in contempt of vs through no manifest fault of him offended further that he iniuried be impotent for if he were sufficient to reuenge of himselfe by taking vpon him the burden of his honor hee should come to dishonour himselfe therefore the Father is not tied to reuenge the iniury of his strong able childe as neither the Sonne his Fathers wrong when of himselfe he is sufficient to answer the offender and to conclude the strong mightie standeth bound to answer for the weake and impotent considering the iniurie is done in despight of him that can reuēge himself when it is not offred throgh any manifest fault of him offended for otherwise to reuenge his cause who is iustly offended were no other but to faile in iustice therfore I say by manifest fault because if it were secret he is by al means to endeuor to keep it close that hee offended rest not infamous Cōsidering that we are not only bound to protect our selues but also the honor of thē that belong to vs. Bentiuoglie was satisfied count Alfonso Turchie You if I vnderstood well said he haue recounted heresie among those defects that depriue of honor and this in my opinion hath in it some difficulty seeing honor dishonor agree with action not with opiniō sin or maleficence as the Philosopher affirmeth in the sixt of his Ethikes is not properly of knowledge nor of opinion and it is cleare that heresy is no other but an opiniō which thogh it be false yet shall not hee herewith possessed rest infamous and the reason is readie made by the same Philosopher in the third of his Ethikes for honour dishonor reward and punishment follow those actions that depend on free will and are in our power but the sin of heresie is not in our power seeing we cannot enter into what opinion wee would but are inforced to beleeue what the minde iudgeth to be true or like to truth Although heresie answered Gualinguo as it it is an opinion can neither giue nor take away honor notwithstanding in as much as it is a beginning to work against holy laws Catholike decrees it maketh a man more then all other sinnes infamous when either by tongue or exterior actiōs she commeth to manifest her selfe Distinguishing therefore I affirme that heretikes are of two sorts the one secret who neither with words nor deeds discouer their Heresie and these though they loose the fauour of God yet do they not forgoe their honour for the reasons aboue cited The other kind be manifest which impudently striue against the lawes and institutions of holy Christian Church further seeke to drawe this and that man into their peruerse opinion by scandalizing the world and therefore loose their honour they being held in the opinion of the world to haue failed in iustice and to be most notable destroyers of soules health the which of honest men ought to be preferred before all other goods Vndoubtedly sayd Count Alfonso these sorts of men are not onely worthie of eternall infamie and in comparison of honour to bee excepted against but for chasticement are right woorthie of the fire I am also in doubt saide Scipion Sacrati neither can I see how it may be that an vsurer should loose his honour as also I cannot perceiue in what respect hee faileth in iustice or valour but I call to minde a Dialogue of a great learned man wherein he prooueth that vsurie is necessarie to liue well and happily It is necessarie answered Gualinguo that husbandmen should be great vsurers as Virgill teacheth and that they should labour that the earth may render an hundred for one and after this manner doth learned Spocone entend it in his dialogue but the vsurer whom I place among men dishonored is not such a one but rather one that is vniust and who practiseth against good lawes seeking vnlawfull gaine and vsing monye contrarie to his proper nature And wherefore against his proper nature replied Sacrati Because answered Gualinguo mony by the law was to no other ende found out but to make contracts equall in the exchange of things wherevpon he that vseth it without any change imploieth it contrarie to his nature and against the ordinance of the law But such a one is the vsurer because he changeth not his mony for commoditie but mony immediatly for mony and therefore vsurie by the Grecians was tearmed Focos which signifieth one begottē for as the childe is like him that begot him so mony imploied by the vsurer is like the mony which without any permutatiō but only with the benefit of time it bringeth forth The vsurer deseruedly therefore is put in the number of those infamous because by an euill meane he wasteth other mens goods Sacrati said no more When Count Hereule Tassone seeing honor is lost by failing in iustice or valor I would furder vnderstand whether of these two defects deeplyer wound honor Questionlesse honour cannot be lost but in defect of Iustice answered Gualinguo neither doth want of valor touch honor in any other respect but because with such a defect there is annexed iniustice or the caracter thereof I vnderstand you not after my minde saide Tassone and Gualinguo He which through vilitie hazardeth not his life for Religion his Countrie Prince and Friends cōmitteth an vniust fact for a man not being borne to himselfe but for all these defraudeth his Countrie Prince Religion and Friends of that which is their proper good and therefore as vniust hee is worthy of infamie hee likewise that is not moued with an iniurie besides that he infringeth the lawe of Nature which permitteth euery