Countrey and true Religion which though they are the words of Paraeus only yet they contain the minde and meaning of all the rest of that faction as his son Philip doth demonstrate e In Append. ad Cap. 13. Epist ad Rom. Hence was it that John Knox delivered for sound Orthodox doctrine Procerum esse propria autoritâ—te Idololatrian tollere Principes intra legum rescripta per vim reducere f Camden Annal Eliz. An. 1559. that it belonged unto the Peers of each several Kingdom to reform matters of the Church by their own authoritie and to confine their Kings and Princes within the bounds prescribed by law even by force of Arms. Hence that Geselius one of the Lecturers of Roterdam preached unto his people that if the Magistrates and Clergie did neglect their duty in the reformation of Religion necesse est id facere plâ—beios that then it did belong to the Common people g Necessaria Respons who were bound to have a care thereof and proceed accordingly And as for points of practise should we look that way what a confusion should we finde in most parts of Europe occasioned by no other ground then the entertainment of these principles and the scattering of these positions amongst the people Witness the Civil wars of France g Jean de Serres inventaire de Fr. the revolt of Holland h History of the Netherlands the expulsion of the Earl of East-Friezland out the City of Embden i Thuan hâ—st l. 114. the insurrections of the Scots k Camden Annal An. 1559. the tumults of Bohemia l Laurca Austriaca the commotions of Brandenbourg m Continuati Thuan. hist l. 8. the translation of the Crown of Sweden from the King of Pole to Charles Duke of Finland n Thuan. hist l. 8. the change of Government in England all acted by the Presbyterian or Calvinian partie in those several States under pretence of Reformation and redress of grievances 11 And to say truth such is the Genius of the sect that though they may admit an equal as paritie is the thing most aimed at by them both in Church and State yet they will hardly be perswaded to submit themselves to a Superiour to no Superiours more unwillingly then to Kings and Princes whose persons they disgrace whose power they ruinate whose calling they indevour to decry and blemish by all means imaginable First for their calling they say it is no other then an humane Ordinance and that the King is but a creature of the peoples making whom having made they may as easily destroy and unmake make again Which as it is the darling doctrine of this present time so is it very eagerly pursued by Buchannan who affirms expressly Quicquid juris populus alicui dederit idem justis de causis posse reposcere o Buchann de â—ure Regni that whatsoever power the people give unto their King or Supreme Magistrate they may resume again upon just occasions Their power they make so small and inconsiderable that they afford them very little even in matters temporal and no authoritie at all in things spiritual CALVIN professeth for himself that he was very much agrieved to hear that King Henry the eight had took unto himself the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England accuseth them of inconsiderate zeal nay blasphemie who conferred it on him and though he be content at last to allow Kings a Ministerial power in matters which concern the Reformation of Gods Publick Worship yet he condemns them as before of great inconsiderateness Qui facerent eos nimis spirituales p Calvin in Amos cap. 7. who did ascribe unto them any great authoritie in spiritual matters The designation of all those who bear publick office in the Church the calling of Councels or Assemblies the Presidencie in those Councels ordaining publick Fasts and appointing Festivals which anciently belonged unto Christian Princes as the chief branches of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which is vested in them are utterly denied to Kings and Princes in their Books of Discipline In so much that when the Citizens of Embden did expel their Earl they did it chiefly for this reason Quod se negotiis Ecclesiasticis Consistorialibus praeter jus aequitatem immisceret q Thuan. hist l. 114. that he had intermedled more then they thought fit in Ecclesiastical causes and intrenched too much upon their Consistorie As for their power in temporal or civil causes by that time Knoxes Peers and Buchannans Judges Paraeus his inferior Magistrates and CALVINS popular Officers have performed their parts in keeping them within the compass of the laws arraigning them for their offences if they should transgress opposing them by force of arms if any thing be done unto the prejudice of the Church or State and finally in regulating their authoritie after the manner of the Spartan Ephori and the Roman Tribunes all that is left will be by much too little for a Roy d' Ivitot or for a King of Clouts as we English phrase it Last of all for their persons which God held so sacred that he gave it for a law to his people Israel not to speak evill of their Princes saying Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people Let us but look upon these men and we shall finde the basest attributes too good for the greatest Kings Calvin calls Mary Queen of England by the name of Proserpine r Calvin in Amos cap. 7. and saith that she did superare omnes Diabolos that all the Devils of hell were not half so mischeivous Beza affords Queen Mary of Scotland no better titles then those of Medea and Athaliah s Beza in Epist ad Jo. of which the last was most infamous in divine the other no less scandalous in humane stories the one a Sorceress and a Witch the other a Tyrant and usurper The Author of the Altare Damascenum whosoever he was can finâ—e no better a tribute for King James of most blessed memorie then infensissimus Evangelii hostis t Didoclavius in Epistola ad Lâ—ctor the greatest and deadly enemie of the Gospel of Christ And Queen Elizabeth her self did not scape so clear but that the zealous Brethren were too bold sometimes with her name and honor though some of them paid dearly for it and were hanged for their labour How that seditious Hugonot the Author of the lewd and unworthy Dialogue entituled Eusebius Philadelphus hath dealt with three great Princes of the House of France and what reproachful names he gives them I had rather you should look for in the Author then expect from me being loath to wade too far in these dirtie pudoles save that I shall be bold to adde this general Character which Didoclavius gives to all Kings in general viz. Naturâ insitum est in â—mnibus Regibus Christi odium that all Kings naturally hate Christ which may
quod iidem Decanus Archichidiaconi in propriis personis suis ac dictum Capitulum per unum idemque Clerus per duos Procuratores idoneos plenam sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis Capitulo Clero habentes praedicto die loco personaliter intersint ad consentiendum iis quae tunc ibidem de communi consilio ipsius Regni nostri divina favente clementia contigerit ordinari Which clause being in the Writs of King Edward 1. and for the most part of the reign of his next Successorsâ— till the middle of King Richard the second at which time it began to be fixt and formal hath still continued in those writs without any difference almost between the Syllables to this very day z Id. ibid. Now that this clause was more than Verbal and that the Proctors of the Clergy did attend in Parliament is evident by the Acts and Statutes of King Richard the second the passages whereof I shall cite at large the better to conclude what I have in hand The Duke of Glocester and the Earl of Arundel having got the mastery of the King obtained a Commission directed to themselves and others of their nomination to have the rule of the King and his Realm a Statur 21 R. 2. c. 2. and having their Commission confirmed by Parliament in the 11 year of his reign did execute divers of his Friends and Ministers and seized on their Estates as forfeited But having got the better of his head-strong and rebellious Lords in the one and twentieth of his reign he calls a Parliament in the Acts whereof it is declared That on the Petition of the Commons of the assent of all the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Proctors of the Clergy he repealed the said Statute and Commission b Ibid. c. 2. and with the assent of the said Lords and Commons did ordain and establish that no such Commission nor the like be henceforth purchased pursued or made This done the heirs of such as had been condemned by vertue of the said Commission demanded restitution of their Lands and Honors And thereupon the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Procuratours of the Clergy the Commons having prayed to the King before as the Appellants prayed severally examined did assent expresly that the said Parliament and all the Statutes c. should be voyd c. and restitution made as afore is said c Ibid. c. 12. And also the Lords Spiritual and Temporal the Procuratours of the Clergy and the said Commons were severally examined of the Questions proposed at Notingham and of the Answer which the Judges made unto the same which being read aswell before the King and the Lords as before the Commons it was demanded of all the States of the Parliament what they thought of the Answers and they said that they were lawfully duly made c. And then it followeth whereupon the King by the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Procuratours of the Clergy and the said Commons and by the advise of the Justices and Sergeants aforesaid who had been asked their opinion in point of Law ordained and established that the said Parliament should be annulled and held for none Adde unto this that passage in the 9 of Edward 2. where it is said that many Articles containing divers grievances committed against the Church of England the Prelates Clergy were propounded by the Prelates and Clerks of our Realm in Parliament and great instance made that convenient remedy might be appointed therein d Proem ad articulos Clâ—ri that of the complaints made to the King in Parliament by the Prelates and Clergy of this Realm 50 Ed. 3. 5. 8 Rich. 2. c. 13. and that of the Petition delivered to the King in Parliament by the Clergy of England 4 Hen. 4. c. 2. Selden hist of Tithes c. 8. 33. And finally that memorable passage in the Parliment 51 Edw. 3. which in brief was this The Commons finding themselves agrieved aswell with certain Constitutions made by the Clergy in their Synods as with some laws or Ordinances which were lately passed more to the advantage of the Clergy than the Common people put in a Bill to this effect viz. That no Act nor Ordinance should from thenceforth be made or granted on the Petition of the said Clergy without the consent of Commons and that the said Commons should not be bound in times to come by any constitutions made by the Clergy of this Realm for their own advantage to which the Commons of this Realm had not given consent The reason of the which is this and 't is worth the marking car eux ne veullent estre obligez a nul de vos estatuz ne Ordinances faitz sanz leur assent because the said Clergy did not think themselves bound as indeed they were not in those times by any Statute Act or Ordinance made without their Assent in the Court of Parliament Which clearly shews that in those times the Clergy had their place in Parliament as the Commons had Put all which hath been sayd together and tell me if it be not cleer and evident that the inferiour Clergie had their place in Parliament whether the Clause touching the calling of them thither were not more than verbal in the Bishops writs and is true that in the writ of summons directed to their several and respective Bishops they were called only ad consentiendum to manifest their consent to those Acts and ordinances which by the Common counsell of the Realm were to be ordained But then it is as tru withall that sometimes their advice was asked in the weighty matters as in the 21 of K. Richard the 2. and sometimes they petitioned and remonstrated for redress of grievances as in the instances and cases which were last produced And 't is as true that if they had been present only ad consentiendum to testifie their assent to those Acts which by the common Counsell of the Realm were proposed unto them their presence was as necessary and their voice as requisite to all intents and purposes for ought I can see as the voice and presence of the Commons in the times we speak of For in the writs of summons issued to the several Sheriffs for the electing of Knights Citizens and Burgesses to attend the Parliament it is said expressely first that the King resolveth upon weighty motives touching the weal and safety both of Church and State to hold his Parliament e Foâ—ma Brevis pro fammonit Parliamenti et ibidem cum Praelatis Magnatibus et Proceribus dicti regni nostri colloquium habere et tractare then and there to advise and treat with the Prelates Peers and Nobles of this Realm Which words are also expressely used in the writs of summons directed to the Bishops and to every of them who also are required in a further clause consilium suum impendere f
or interrupted by any claim of right made in the behalf of the two Houses which is as sure a title as the Law can make the Houses have declared by a Act of Parliament a Sâ—at 7 Ed. 1. cap. 1. that of right it belongs unto the King streightly to defend that is prohibit all force of Arms and that the Parliament is bound to aid him in that prohibition Touching the Royal navy and the ports and forts the Kings prescription to them is so strong and binding that in the 3d. of Edward 3. Edw. 3. the House of Commons did disclaim the having cognisance of such matters as the guarding of the Seas and marches of the Kingdome which certainly they had not done had they pretended any title to the ports and navy As for suppressing tumults and providing for the safety of the Kingdom against sudden danger the Law commits it solely to the care of the King obliging every Subject by the duty of his allegeance to aid and assist him at all seasons when need shall require b 11 Henr. 7. c. 18. And for their power of declaring law in the House of Peers wherein they deliver their opinion in the point before them in true propriety of speech they have none at all c Case of our Affairs p. 4. And this is that which was affirmed by his Majesty at the end of the Parliament Anno 1628. saying that it belonged only to the Iudges under him to interpret laws and that none of the Houses of Parliament joynt or separate what new Doctrine soever might be raised had any power either to make or declare law without his consent d 3 Car. And if it be done with his consent it is not so properly the declaring and interpreting of an old law as the making rather of a new saith a learned Gentleman e Case of our affairs P. 5. 9. Others have found out a new way to invest the Parliament with the robes of Soveraignty not as superiour to the King but co-ordinate with him and this say they appears sufficiently in that the two Houses of Parliament have not only a power of consulting but of consenting and that too in the highest office of the Monarchy whereof they are a Coordinative part the making of Laws f Fuller Answer to D. F. p. 2. Which dangerous doctrin as it was built at first on that former error which makes the King to be one of the three Estates in Parliament so it is super-structed with some necessary consequents whether more treasonable or ridiculous it is hard to say For on these grounds the Author of the Fuller Answers hath presented us with these trim devises g Id. pag. 1. viz. that England is not a simple subordinate and absolute but a coordinative and mixt Monarchy that this mixt Monarchy is compounded of three coordinate Estates a King and two Houses of Parliament that these three make but one supreme but that one is a mixt one or else the Monarchy were not mizt and finally which needs must follow from the premises that although every Member of the Houses sâ—orsim taken severally may be called a Subject yet all collective in their houses are no Subjects Auditum admissi risum teneatis Can any man hear these serious follies and abstain from laughter or think a fellow who pretends both to wit and learning should talk thus of a Monarchy which every one that knoweth any thing in Greek know to imply the supreme government of one compounded of three coordinate Estates and those coordinate Estates consisting of no fewer than 600 persons Or that a man who can pretend but to so much use of reason as to distinguish him from a beast could fall on such a senselest Dotage as to make the same man at the same time to be a Subject and no Subject a Subject in the Streets and in his private House no Subject when he sits in Haberdashers Hall for advance of moneys or in either of the two Houses of Parliament And yet this senseless Doctrine is become so dangerous because so universally admired and hearkned to that the beginning and continuance of our long Disturbances may chiefly be ascribed unto this opinion to which they have seduced the poor ignorant people The rather in regard that some who have undertook the confutation of these brainless solies have most improvidently granted not only h As in the book called Conscience satisfied that the two Houses of Parliament are in a sort coordinate with the King ad aliquid to some Act or exercising of the supreme power that is to the making of Laws but that this coordination of the three Estates of which the King is yielded every where for one is fundamental and held by the two Houses on no worse a title than a fundamental Constitution which is as much as any reasonable Parliamentarian need desire to have Therefore in Answer to the Fuller not taking notice of his foolish and seditious inferences we will clear those points 1. That the two Houses of Parliament are not coordinate with the King but subordinate to him And 2. that the power of making laws is properly and legally in the King alone As for the first we had before a Recognition made by Act of Parliament by which the Kingdom of England is acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreme head and King to whom all sorts and degrees of people ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience i 24 H. 8. c. 12. which certainly the Lords and Commons had not made to the dethroning of themselves their heirs and successors from this coordinative part of Soveraignty if any such coordination had been then believed Or if it be supposed to excuse the matter that K. Henry the 8th being a severe and terrible Prince did wrest this Recognition from them which yet will hardly serve for a good defence what shall we say to the like recognition made in the beginning of Queen Elizabeths reign k 1 Eliz. c. 1. when she was green in State and her power unsetled and so less apt to work upon her people by threats and terrors Assuredly had the Houses dream't in those broken times of that coordinative Soveraignty which is now pretended they might have easily regained it and made up that breach which by the violent assaults of King Henry the 8th had been made upon them which was a point they never aimed at Besides if this coordinative mâ—jesty might be once admitted it musts needs follow that though the King hath no Superiour he hath many Equalls and where there is Equality there is no Subjection But Bracton tells us in plain terms not only that the King hath no Superiour in his Realm except God almighty but no Equal neither and the reason which he gives is exceeding strong Quia sic amitteret praeceptum cum par in Parem non habeat potestatem l Bracton de leg Aâ—gl
aswell now as formerly in the times of the Roman Emperors Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem nothing but that which the King pleaseth to allow of is to pass for Law the laws not taking their coercive force as judicious Hooker well observeth from the quality of such as devise them but from the power which giveth them the strength of laws d Hooker Ecclesiast Pol I shut up this Discourse with this expression and comparison of a late leatned Gentleman viz. That as in a Copyhold Estate the Copybolder of a meer Tenant at will comes by custom to gain an Inheritance and so to limit and restrain the will and power of the Lord that he cannot make any determination of the Copyholders Estate otherwise than according to the custome of the Mannour and yet doth not deprive the Lord of his Lordship in the Copyhold nor participate with him in it neither yet devest the Fee and Franktenement out of the Lord but that they still remain in him and are ever parcel of his Demesn e Case of our Affairs p. 6. so in the restraining of the Kings Legislative power to the concurrence of the Peers and Commons though the custome of the Kingdom hath so fixed and setled the restraint as that the King cannot in that point use his Soveraign power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons according to the custom of the Kingdom yet still the Soveraignty and with it the inseparable Legislative power doth reside soly in the King 11. If any hereupon demand to what end serve Parliaments and what benefit can redound to the Subject by them I say in the Apostles words much every way f Rom. 3. 2. Many vexations often times do befall the Subjects without the knowledge of the King and against his will to which his ears are open in a time of Parliament The King at other times useth the eyes and ears of such as have place about him who may perhaps be guilty of the wrongs which are done the people but in a Parliament he seeth with his own eyes and heareth with his own ears and so is in a better way to redresse the mischief than he could be otherwise Nor do the people by the opportunity of these Parliamentary meetings obtain upon their Prayers and petitions a redress of grievances only but many times the King is overcome by their importunity to abate so much of his power to grant such points and pass such Laws and Statutes for their ease and benefit as otherwise he would not yield to For certainly it is as true in making our approaches and petitions to our Lord the King as in the pouring out of our prayers and supplications to the Lord our God the more multitudinous and united the Petitioners are the more like to speed And therefore said Bodinus truly Principem plaeraque universis concedere quae singulis denegarentur g Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. that Kings do many times grant those favours to the whole body of their people which would be absolutely denied or not so readily yielded to particular persons There are moreover many things of greater concernment besides the abrogating of old Laws and making new which having been formerly recommended by the Kings of England to the care and counsel of their people convened in Parliament are not now regularly dispatched but in such conventions as are altering the tenure of Lands confirming the rights titles and possessions of private men naturalizing Aliens legitimating Bastards adding sometimes the secular authority to such points of Doctrin and forms of worship as the Clergy have agreed upon in their Comvocations if it be required changing the publick weights and measures thorowout the Kingdom defining of such doubtfull cases as are not easily resolved in the Courts of Law raising of Subsidies and Taxes attainting such as either are too potent to be caught or too hard to be found and so not tryable in the ordinary Courts of Justice restoring to their blood and honours such or the Heirs of such as have been formerly attainted granting of free and general pardons h Sir Tho. Smith de Rep. Angl. Camden in Brit. Crompt of Courts c. with divers others of this nature In all and each of these the Lords and Commons do co-operate to the publick good in the way of means and preparation but their co-operation would be lost and fruitless did not the King by his concomitant or subsequent grace produce their good intentions into perfect Acts and being Acts either of special grace and favour or else of ordinary right and justice no way derogatory to the Prerogative Royalâ— are usually confirmed by the Royal assent without stop or hesitancy But then some other things there are of great importance and advantage to the Common wealth in which the Houses usually do proceed even to final sentence the Commons in the way of imquisition or impeachment the Lords in that of judicature and determination with the consent and approbation of the King though many times without his personal assent and presence The King may be abused in his Grants and Patents to the oppression of the people or the dilapidation and destruction of the Royal Patrimony Judges and other the great Officers of Law and Equity are subject to corruptions and may smell of gifts whereby the passages of Justice do become obstructed The Ministers of inferiour Courts as well Ecclesiastical as Civil either exhaust the miserable subject by extortions or else consume him by delayes Erroneous judgements may be given through fear or favour to the undoing of a man and his whole posterity in which his Majesties Justices of either Bench can afford no remedy The great ones of the State may become too insolent and the poor too miserable and many other waies there are by which the Fabrick of the State may be out of Order for the removing of which mischiefs the rectifying of which abuses the Lords and Commons in their several waies before remembred are of special use yet so that if the Kings Grants do come in question or any of his Officers are called to a reckoning they used heretofore to signifie unto his Majesty what they found therein and he accordingly either revoked his Grants or displaced his Servants or by some other means gave way unto their contentment the Kings consent being alwaies necessary and received as a part of the final sentence if they went so far So that we may conclude this point with these words of Bodin who being well acquainted with the Government of this State and Nation partly by way of conference with Dr. Dale the Queens Ambassadour in France and partly in the way of observation when he was in England doth give this resolution of the point in controversie i Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c. 8. Habere quidem Ordines Anglorum authoritatem quandam jura vero majestatis imperii summam in unius Principis arbitrio
25. His Scholars sing another song and use all arts imaginable to excite the people to rise against them and destroy them The Author of that scandalous and dangerous Dialogue entituled Eusebius Philadelphus doth expresly say that of all good actions the murther of a Tyrant is most commendable r Euseb Philadelph Dial. Buchannan accounts it a defect in Polities proemia eorum interfectoribus non decerni Å¿ Buchannan de jure regni that publick honors and rewards are not propounded unto such as shall kill a Tyrant and some late Pamphleters conclude it lawful to rebel in the case of tyrannie because forsooth If a King exercising tyrannie over his subjects may not be resisted that is to say if the subject may not take up Arms against him he and his followers may destroy the Kingdom And now we are fallen upon the business of resistance CALVIN allows of no case for ought I can see in which the Subject lawfully may resist the Soveraign quandoquidem resisti magistratui non potest quin simul resistatur Deo t Sect. 23. for as much as the Magistrate cannot be resisted but that God is resisted also and reckoning up those several pressures whereof Samuel spake unto the Jews and which he calls jus Regis as himself translates it he concludes at last cui parere ipsi necesse esset nec obsistere liceret u Sect. â—6 that no resistance must be made on the Subjects part though Kings entrench as much upon them both in their liberties and properties as the Prophet speaks of His Scholars are grown wiser and instruct us otherwise Paraeus saith that if the King assault our persons or endevour to break into our houses we may as lawfully resist him as we would do a Theif or Robber on the like occasions x Paraeus in Rom. cap. 13. And our new Masters have found out many other Cases in which the Subject may resist and which is more then so is bound to do it as namely in his own behalf and in Gods behalf in behalf of his Countrey and in behalf of the laws and in so many more behalfs that they have turned most Christian Kings out of half their Kingdoms But to go on CALVIN determines very rightly that notwithstanding any contract made or supposed to be made between a King and his people yet if the King do break his Covenants and oppress the subject the subject can no more pretend to be discharged of his Allegiance then the wife may lawfully divorce herself from a froward husband or children throw aside that natural dutie which they owe their Parents because their Parents are unkinde and it may be cruel Those which doe otherwise conclude from the foresaid contract he calls insulsos ratio cinatores y Sect. 29. but sorrie and unsavorie disputants and reckoneth it for a seditious imagination that we must deal no otherwise with Kings then they do deserve nec aequum esse ut subditos einos praestemus qui vicissim Regem nobis non se praestet z Sect. 27. or to imagine that it is neither sense nor reason that we should shew our selves obedient subjects unto him who doth not mutually perform the dutie of a King to us His Scholars are grown able to teach their Master a new lesson and would tell him if he were alive that there is a mutual contract between King and Subjects and if he break the Covenant he forfeiteth the benefit of the Agreement and he not performing the dutie of a King they are released from the dutie of subjects As contrary to their Masters Tenet as black to white and yet some late Pamphlets press no doctrine with such strength and eagerness as they have done this Nor have the Pulpits spared to publish it to their cheated Auditories as a new Article of faith that if the Ruler perform not his dutie the contract is dissolved and the people are at liberty to right themselves What excellent uses have been raised from this dangerous doctrine as many Kings of Christendom have felt already so posteritie will have cause to lament the mischiefs which it will bring into the world in succeeding Ages Finally CALVIN hath determined and exâ—eeding piously that if the Magistrate command us any thing which is contrarie to the Will and Word of God we must observe S. Peters rule and rather choose to obey God then men and that withaâ—l we must prepare our selves to endure such punishments as the offended Magistrate shall inflict upon us for the said refusal Et quicquid potius perpeti quam a veritate defiectere a Sect. 32. and rather suffer any torments then forsake the way of Gods Commandements The Magistrate as it seems by him must at all times be honoured by us either in our active obedience or in our passive if we refuse to do his will we must be content to suffer for it His Scholars are too wise to submit to that and are so far from suffering for the testimony of the Gospel and a good conscience that they take care to teach the people that it is lawful to rebel in behalf of God to preserve the true religion when it is in danger or when they think it is in danger by force of Arms and to procure the peace of Hierusalem by the destruction of Babylon Which being so the difference being so great and irreconcileable between the Followers and their leader in the point of practise between the Master and the Scholars in the points of doctrine me thinks it were exceeding fit the man were either less admired or better followed that they who cry him up for the great Reformer would either stand to all his Tenets or be bound to none that they would be so careful of the Churches peace and their own salvation as not to swallow down his errors in his points of discipline and pass him by with a Magister non tenetur when he doth preach obedience to them and doth so solidly discourse of the powers of Government b Tully Philip. 2. Aut undique religionem suam tollant aut usquequaque conservent as Tully said of Antony in another case But of this no more 9. Hitherto CALVIN hath done well few better of the Genevian Doctors none ne unus quidem not so much as one But there 's an herb which spoils the pottage an HERB so venomous that it is mors in olla unto them that taste it The figs in the next basket are evill Ierem. 24. very evill not to be eaten as it is in the Prophets words they are so evill In that before he did exceeding soundly and judiciously lay down the doctrine of obedience unto Kings and Princes and the unlawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Soveraign In this to come he openeth a most dangerous gap to disobedience and rebellions in most States in Christendom in which his name is either reverenced or his works esteemed of For having fully
the Clergie the Knights the Citizens and the Burgesses did represent the whole Comminalty of the Realm of England a Cap. ult And this holds good in law for ought I find unto the contrary to this very day Certain I am that Crompton in his book of the Iurisdiction of Courts where he fpeakes of Parliaments doth tell us that the Knights Citizens Burgesses and Barons of the Cinque ports b Grompton Iurisd des Courts caâ— ove le Clergie qu' eux assemble au Pawles represent le corps de tout le Comminalty Dengliterre together with the Clergie which assembled at S. Pauls doe represent the body of the whole Comminalty of England So then the Clergie were not only called but were present also according to that clause in the writ of Summons which before I spake of directed to their several and respective Bishops as the Kings spiritual Sheriffs if I may so say inabled by the Laws to that end and purpose Which some endeavouring to avoid have at last found out that the clause before recited out of the Writ to the Bishops is not a calling of the Clergy to attend in Parliament but to command them to attend in the Convocation which I have heard much pressed by those who pretend unto some knowledge in the course of things Which though it be a gross mistake and inconsistent with the words and circumstances of the VVrit it self which relates meerly to the Parliament and business of a Parllamentarie nature yet for the clearing of the point and undeceiving such as have been deceived they may please to know that besides this VVrit by which the Clergy are commanded to appear in Parliament there is another writ and another form of calling them unto the service of the Convocation which is briefly this The King sends out his VVrit or Mandat to the Arch-bishop of Canterbury requiring him super quibusdam arduis urgentibus negotiis c. n Regist Warham for divers great and weighty reasons concerning the Kings honour the Churches safety and the publick peace of his dominions to summon all the Bishops Deans and Chapters Arch-deacons and the whole Clergy of his Province to meet in Convocation at a day and place appointed On the reception of which Writ the Arch-bishop sendeth out his Monitory to the Bishop of London who by his place is Dean of the Episcopal College o Antiqu. Britan. in initio and to disperse the Mandates of the Metropolitan requiring him to appear himself in person and to send out his warrant unto every Bishop of the Province to appear there also and to take order that the Deans of the Cathedrals and Arch-deacons personally the Chapter by one Procurator the Clergy of the Diocese by two whom we usually call Clerks of the Convocation do attend that service p b Regist Warham VVhich comming to the hands of each several Bishop they do accordingly give intimation to their Deans and Chapters to their Arch-deacons and the Clergy and they accordingly prepare themselves to obey the Monitory and to return Certificate of their doings in it The like proceeding is observed also for the Province of York So that the calling of the Clergy to the Convocation being by a different VVrit and another form which hath no reference to nor dependance on the writs directed by the K. to each several Bishop for their attendance in the Parliament it must needs be as I conceive it that by that clause remaining in the VVrits aforesaid the Clergy have good right and title to a voice in Parliament though they have lost their jus in re the benefit the use and possession of it 11. But I speak this as once the Apostle said in another case not by commandement but by permission For I perswade my self the Clergy do not aim so high at the recovery of a right so long antiquated and disused but would be well enough content with the restitution of the Bishops to their vote in Parliament of which they stood possessed by so strong a Title as the very constitution of the Parliament and the fundamental laws of the English government could confer upon them For though the Bishops sate in Parliament in their own personal capacities and not as the representative body of the Clergy yet the poor Clergy found it some respect unto them to be thus honoured in their heads and were the more obliged to obey such Acts as were established in that Court wherein these heads had opportunity of interceding if perhaps any thing were propounded which might be grievous to the Clergy and many times a power of hindering and diverting if not by voice and numbers yet by strength of reasons They were not altogether Slaves and Bond-men whilest the Church held that remnant of her antient rights for whilest the heads retained that honor the body could not choose but rejoyce in it and be cherished by it But since they have been stripped of that by what unworthy Acts the world knows too well they are become of such condition that the most despicable Tradesman in a Corporate Town is more considerable in the eye of the State and hath a greater interesse in the affairs thereof than the greatest Prelate and to say truth than all the Clergy of the Realm For being there are three Ingredients which make up a Freeman as S. Francis Bacon well observed in his speech concerning the Post-nati that is to say 1. jus Civitatis which did inable a man to buy and sell and to take Inheritances 2. jus suffragii a voice in the passing of Laws and Election of Officers and 3. jus honoris a capability of such offices and honors as the State could give him the Clergy by this means are limited to the first right only utterly excluded from the other two and therby put into a worse condition than the meanest Freeman in the Kingdome Insomuch that whereas every needy Artizan if he be free of any Corporate Town or City every Cottager that dwelleth in an antient Burrough and every Clown which can lay claim to sorty shillings per Annum of free hold either for life or of inheritance hath a voyce in Parliament either in person or by Proxie and is not bound by any law but what himself consents to in his Representatives the Clergy only of this Realm as the case now stands being one of the greatest States of this Kingdom as is acknowledged expresly in terminis by Act of Parliament p 8 Eliz. c. 1. are neither capable of place there in their personal capacities nor suffered to be there in their Procuratours as of old they were nor have so much as any voice in choosing of the Knights and Burgesses which represent the body of the people generally I know it hath been said in reply to this that the Clergy may give voices at the election of the Knights and Burgesses and that it is their own neglect if they do it not But I know too
first by these who first ventured on the expression or were improvidently looked over I can hardly say Certain I am it gave too manifest an advantage to the Antimonarchical party in this Kingdome and hardned them in their proceeding against their King whom they were taught to look on and esteem no otherwise than as a Joynt-tenant of the Soveraignty with the Lords and Commons And if Kings have partners in the Soveraignty they are then no King such being the nature and law of Monarchy that si divisionem capiat interitum capiat necesse est m Lactant Institut Div. l. 1. c. if it be once divided and the authorities thereof imparted it is soon destroyed Such is the dangerous consequence of this new Expression that it seemeth utterly to deprive the Bishops and in them the Clergy of this Land of all future hopes of being restored again to their place in Parliament For being the Parliament can consist but of three Estates if the King fall so low as to pass for one either the Bishops or the Commons or the Temporal Lords must desert their claim the better to make way for this new pretension and in all probability the Commons being grown so potent and the Nobility so numerous and united in blood and mariages will not quit their interesse and therefore the poor Clergy must be no Estate because lesse able as the world now goeth with them to maintain their title I have often read that Constantine did use to call himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Euseb de vita Constant the Bishop or Superintendent of his Bishops and I have oft heard our Lawyers say that the King is the general Ordinary of the Kingdome but never heard nor read till within these few yearrs that ever any King did possess himself of the Bishops place or vote in Parliament or sate there as the first of the three Estates as antiently the Bishops did to supply their absence By which device whether the Clergy or the King be the greater losers though it be partly seen already future times will shew 2. This rub removed we next proceed to the examination of that power which by our Author is conferred on the three Estates which we shall find on search and tryal to be very different according to the constitution of the Kingdome in which they are For where the Kings are absolute Monarchs as in England Scotland France and Spain l Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c. the three Estates have properly and legally little more authority than to advise their King as they see occasion to represent unto his view their common grievances and to propose such remedies for redresse therof as to them seem meetest to canvass and review such erroneous judgements as formerly have passed in inferiour Courts and finally to consult about and prepare such laws as are expedient for the publick In other Countries where the Kings are more conditional and hold their Crowns by compact and agreement betweeen them and their Subjects the reputation and authority of the three Estates is more high and eminent as in Polonia Danemark and some others of the Northern Kingdomes where the Estates lay claim to more than a directive power and think it not enough to advise their King unless they may dispose of the Kingdome also or at least make their King no better than a Royal Slave Thus and no otherwise it is with the German Emperors who are obnoxious to the Laws m Thuan. hist sui temp l. 2. and for their Government accomptable to the Estates of the Empire insomuch that if the Princes of the Empire be perswaded in their consciences that he is likely by his mal-administration to destroy the Empire and that he will not hearken to advice and counsel n Anonym Script ap Philip Paraeu in Append. â—d Rom. 13. ab Electorum Collegio Caesaria potestate privari potest he may be deprived by the Electors and a more fit and able man elected to supply the place And to this purpose in a Constitution made by the Emperor Jodocus about the year 1410. there is a clause that if he or any one of his Successors do any thing unto the contrary thereof the Electors and other States of the Empire sine rebellionis vel infidelitatis crimine libertatem habeant o Goldast Constit Imperial Tom. 3. p. 424. should be at liberty without incurring the crimes of Treason or Disloyalty not only to oppose but resist them in it The like to which occurs for the Realm of Hungary wherein K. Andrew gives authority to his Bishops Lords and other Nobles sine nota alicujus infidelitatis p Bonfinius de Edict publ p. 37. that without any imputation of disloyalty they may contradict oppose and resist their Kings if they do any thing in violation of some Laws and sanctions In Poland the King takes a solemn oath at his Coronation to confirm all the Privileges rights and liberties which have been granted to his Subjects of all ranks and orders by any of his Predecessors and then addes this clause quod si Sacramentum meum violavero incolae Regni nullam nobis obedientiam praestare tenebuntur which if he violates his Subjects shall no longer be obliged to yield him obedience q Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. Which oath as Bodine well observeth doth savour rather of the condition of the Prince of the Senate than of the Majesty of a King The like may be affirmed of Frederick the first King of Danemark who being called unto that Crown on the ejection of K. Christian the 2d An. 1523. was so conditioned with by the the Lords of the Kingdome that at his coronation or before he was fain to swear that he would put none of the Nobility to death or banishment but by the judgement of the Senate that the great men should have power of life or death over their Tenants and Vassals and that no Appeal should lye from them to the Kings tribunal nor the King be partaker of the confiscations nec item honores aut imperia privatis daturum c r Id. ibid. nor advance any private person to commands or honors but by authority of his great Counsel Which oath being also taken by Frederick the second made Bodinus say that the Kings of Danemark non tam reipsa quam appellare Reges sunt were only titular Kings but not Kings indeed Which character he also gives of the Kings of Bohemia Å¿ Id. ibid. p. 88. But in an absolute Monarchy the case is otherwise all the prerogatives and rights of Soveraignty being so vested in the Kings person ut nec singulis civibus nec universis fac est c. that it is neither lawful to particular men nor to the whole body of the Subjects generally to call the Prince in question for life fame or fortunes t Id. ibid. p. 210. and amongst these he reckoneth the kingdoms of France
Spain England Scotland the Tartars Muscovites omnium paene Africae Asiae imperiorum and of almost all the Kingdomes of Africk and Asia But this we shall the better see by looking over the particulars as they lye before us 3. But first before we come unto those particulars we will look backwards on the condition and authority of the Jewish Sanhedrim which being instituted and ordained by the Lord himself may serve to be a leading case in the present business For being that the Iews were the Lords own people and their Kings honored with the title of the Lords Anointed it will be thought that if the Sanhedrim or the great Councel of the seventie had any authority and power over the Kings of Iudah of whose jus Regni such a large description is made by God himself in the first of Sam. cap. 8. the three Estates may reasonably expect the like in these parts of Christendom Now for the authority of the Sanhedrim it is said by Cardinal Baronius that they had power of judicature over the Law the Prophets and the Kings themselves u Baron Annal. Eccl. An. 31. §. 10. Erat horum summa autoritas ut qui de lege cognoscerent Prophetis simul de Regnibus judicarent Which false position he confirms by as false an instance affirming in the very next words horum judicio Herodem Regem postulatum esse that King Herod was convented and convicted by them for which he cites Iosephus with the like integrity I should have wondred very much what should occasion such a grosse mistake in the learned Cardinal had I not shewn before that as he makes the Sanhedrim to rule the King so he hath made the high Priest to rule the Sanhedrim which to what purpose it was done every man can tell who knoweth the Cardinal endeavoureth nothing more in his large Collections than to advance the dignity and supremacy of the Popes of Rome x Id. in Epist dedicator But for the power pretended to be in the Sanhedrim and their proceedings against Herod as their actual King Iosephus when he cite's is so far from saying it that he doth expresly say the contrary For as Josephus tells the story Hyrcanus was then King not Herod and Herod of so little hopes to enjoy the Kingdom that he could not possibly pretend any Title to it But having a command in Galilee procured by Antipater his Father of the good King Hyrcanus he had played the wanton Governor amongst them and put some of them to death against Law and Justice For which the Mothers of the slain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did often call upon the King and people in the open Temple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Joseph Antâ—q Judic l. 14. cap. 17. c. that Herod might answer for the murther before the Sanhedrim Which being granted by the King he was accordingly convented by them and had been questionlesse condemned had not the King who loved him dearly given him notice of it on whose advertisement he went out of the Town and so escaped the danger This is the substance of that story and this gives no authority to the Court of Sanhedrim over the persons or the actions of the Kings of Iudah Others there are who make them equal to the Kings though not superiour Magnam fuisse Senatus autoritatem Regiae velut parem z Grotius in Matth. cap. 5. v. 22. saith the learned Grotius And for the proof thereof allege those words of Sedechias in the Book of Ieremie who when the Princes of his Realm required of him to put the Prophet to death returned this Answer a Jerem. 38. 5. Behold he is in your hâ—nd Rex enim contra vos nihil potest for the King is not he that can do any thing against you Which words are also cited by Mr. Prynne to prove that the King of England hath no Negative voyce b Prynne of Parl. pt 2. p. 73. but by neither rightly For Calvin who as one observeth composed his expositions on the book of God according to the doctrine of his Institutions c Hookers preface would not have lost so fair an evidence for the advancing of the power of his three Estates had he conceived he could have made it serviceable to his end and purpose But he upon the contrary finds fault with them who do so expound it or think the King did speak so honorably of his Princes ac si nihil iis sit nequandum d Calvin in Jerem. c. 38. v. 5. as if it were not to deny them any thing Not so saith he it rather is amerulenta Regis querimonia a sad and bitter complaint of the poor captivated King against his Counsellors by whom he was so over-ruled ut velit nolit cedere iis cognitur that he was forced to yield to them whether he would or not which he expresly calls inexcusabilem arrogantium an intollerable piece of sawciness in those Princes and an exclusion of the King from his legal rights 4 Let us next take a view of such Christian Kingdomes as are under the command of absolute Monarchs And first we will begin with the Realm of France the government whereof is meerly Regal if not despotical such as that of a Master over his Servants which Aristotle defineth to be a form of Government 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c Aristot Politic. l. 3. wherein the King may do whatsoever he list according to the counsel of his own mind For in his Arbitrary Edicts which he sendeth abroad he never mentioneth the consent of the People or the approbation of the Counsel or the advice of his Judges which might be thought to derogate too much from his absolute power but concludes all of them in this Regal form Car tel est nostre plaisir for such is our pleasure And though the Court of Parliament in Paris do use to take upon them to peruse his Edicts before they passe abroad for d View of France by Dallington Laws and sometime to demurr on his grants and patents and to petition him to reverse the same as they see occasion yet their perusal is a matter but of meer formality and their demurs more dilatory than effectual It is the Car tel est nostre plaisir that concludes the business and the Kings pleasure is the Law which that Court is ruled by As for the Assemblie des Estats or Conventus Ordinum it was reputed antiently the Supreme Court for government and justice of all the Kingdome and had the cognizance of the greatest and most weighty affairs of State But these meetings have been long since discontinued and almost forgotten there being no such Assembly from the time of K. Charles the eighth to the beginning of the reign of K. Charles the ninth e Thuanus hist sui temp which was 70 years and not many since And to say truth they could be but of little use as the world
beginning of the Reign of King Edward the third till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th save that sometimes we find the Lords complaining r 10 Ed. 3. c. or petitioning Å¿ 21 Ed. 3. c. and the Commons assenting t 28 Ed. 3. c. as their occasions did require and sometime also no other motive represented but the Kings great desire to provide for the ease and safety of his people upon deliberation had with the Prelates and Nobles and learned men assisting with their mutual Counsell u 23 Ed. 3. And all this while there is no question to be made but that the power of making Laws was conceived to be the chiefest flower of the Royal Diademe to which the Lords and Commons neither joynt nor separate did not pretend the smallest Title more than petitioning for them or assenting to them it being wholly left to the Kings grace and goodness whether he would give ear or not unto their petitions or hearken unto such advise as the Lords or other great men gave him in behalf of his people And this is that which was declared in the Parliament by the Lords and Commons and still holds good as well in point of Law as Reason that it belonged unto the regality of the King to grant or deny what Petitions x 2 Her 5. in Parliament he pleaseth But as the Kings came in upon doubtfull Titles or otherwise were necessitated to comply with the peoples humours as sometimes they were so did the Parliaments make use of the opportunities for the increase of their authoritie at least in the formalities of Law and other advantages of expression So that in the minority of King Henry the sixth unto those usual words by the advise and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and at the special instance and request of the Commons which were inserted ordinarily into the body of the Acts from the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 6th was added this By the authority of the said Parliament y 3 Hen. 6. c. 2. 8 H. 6. 3. c. But still it is to be observed that though those words were added to the former clause yet the power of granting or ordaining was acknowledged to belong to the King alone as in the places in the Margin where it is said Our Lord the King considering the premises by the advise and assent and at the request aforesaid hath ordained and granted by the authority of the said Parliament 3 H. 6. 2. and our Lord the King considering c. hath ordained and established by authority of this Parliament 8 H. 6. 3. And thus it generally stood but every general rule may have some exceptions till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th about which time that usual clause the special instance or request of the Commons began by little and little to be laid aside and that of their advise or assent to be inserted in the place thereof for which I do refer you to the book at large Which though it were some alteration of the former stile and that those words By the authority of this present Parliament may make men think that the Lords and Commons did then pretend some title unto the power of making laws yet neither advising or assenting are so operative in the present case as to transfer the power of making laws to such as do advise about them or assent unto them not can the alâ—eration of the forms and stiles used in antient times import an alteration of the form of Government unless it can be shewed as I think it cannot that any of our Kings did renounce that power which properly and solely did belong unto them or did by any solemn Act of Communication confer the same upon the Lords and Commons convened in Parliament And this is that which is resolved and declared in our Common law where it is said z Cited in the unlawfulness of resist p 107. Le Roy fait les loix avec le consent du Seigneurs et communs et non pas les Seigneurs et communs avec le consent du Roy that is to say that the King makes Laws in Parliament by the assent of the Lords and Commoni and not the Lords and Commons by the assent of the King And for a further proof of this and for the clearing of this point that the Lords and Commons pretend to no more power in the making of laws than opportunity to propound and advise about them and on mature advise to give their several Assents unto them we need but look into the first Act of the Parliament in the third year of King Charles being a Recognition of some antient Rights belonging to the English subject An Act conceived according to the primitive form in way of a Petition to the Kings most excellent Majesty a Statut. 3 Carol. in which the Lords and Commons do most humbly pray as their Rights and Liberties that no such things as they complained of might be done hereafter that his Majesty would vouchsafe to declare that the Awards doings and proceedings to the prejudice of his people in any of the premises shall not be drawn hereafter into consequence or example and that he would be pleased to declare his Royal pleasure that in the point aforesaid all his Officers and Ministers should serve him according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm To which although the King returned a fair general Answer assuring them that his Subjects should have no cause for the time to come to complain of any wrong or oppressions contrary to their just Righâ—s and Liberties yet this gave little satisfaction till he came in person and causing the Petition to be distinctly read by the Clerk of the Crown b Ibid. returned his Answer in these words Soit droit fait come est desire that is to say let right be done as is desired Which being the very formal words by which the said Petition and every clause and Article therein contained became to be a law and to have the force of an Act of Parliament and being there is nothing spoken of the concurrent authority of the Lords and Commons for the enacting of the same may serve instead of many Arguments for the proof of this that the Legislative power as we phrase it now is wholly and solely in the King although restrained in the exercise and use thereof by constant custome unto the counsel and consent of the Lords and Commons Le Roy veult c Smith de Rep. Angl. or the King will have it so is the imperative phrase by which the Propositions of the Lords and Commons are made Acts of Parliament And let the Lords and Commons agitate and propound what Laws they please for their ease and benefit as generally all Laws and Statutes are more for the ease and benefit of the Subject than the advantage of the King yet
us to honour the King and so doth Solomon also where he requires us to fear God and the King Prov. 24. 21. For the first under the the term of honouring comprehends a good esteem a fair opinion the other joyning God and the King together shewes plainly that in the person of a King there is a ray of sacred majesty And that of Paul is richly worth our observation where he commands us to obey not for wrath only Rom. 13. 5. but for conscience sake By which he means that Subjects are not only to contain themselves within the bounds of their obedience for fear they should incurre the anger and displeasure of their Prince or Governor as men submit themselves to an armed enemy whom they see ready to chastise them if they should resist but also to perswade themselves that the expressions of their duties which they make to them are made indeed to God himself from whom what ever power they have is devolved upon them Nor speak I of the men themselves as if the vizard of authority were enough to hide either their follies or their sloth on their lusts or cruelties or gain the name of virtues to their filthiest vices but that the function is so venerable and so full of honour that they who execute the same and bear rule over us are to be worthily esteemed and reverenced for their Office sake The second duty of the Subjects doth arise from this SECT 23. which is that we express the reverence and respect which we owe unto them by the actions of obedience whether it be in yeelding obedience to their Lawes or in paying tributes or undergoing such publick services and burdens as do relate unto the preservation of the publick or executing such commands as are laid upon us Let every soul saith Paul be subject to the higher powers Rom. 13. 1. for he that doth resist the power resists the ordinance of God Put them in minde saith he to Titus to be subject to Principalities Tit. 3. 1. and powers to obey Magistrates and to be ready to every good work And Peter thus Submit your selves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake 1 Pet. 2. 13. whether it be to the King as Supreme or unto Governors as to those which are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers and for the praise of them that do well And to the end the subject may not think that it is sufficient to counterfeit or pretend obedience in the outward shew but to perform it truly and sincerely from the very heart Paul adds that we commend the health and flourishing estate of those under whom we live 1 Tim. 2. 1. in our prayers to God I exhort saith he that first of all supplications prayers intercessions and giving of thanks be made for all men for Kings and for all that are in authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty Let no man here deceive himself For seeing the Magistrate cannot be resisted but that God is resisted also though the unarmed Magistrate may possibly be contemned and slighted without fear of punishment yet God is armed sufficiently to revenge those insolencies which are thus offered to himself in them Now under this obedience I also do include that moderation and discretion which private persons ought to have and to impose upon themselves as a rule or law that so they neither intermeddle in affairs of State nor invade the office of the Magistrate nor put themselves on any publick undertakings if any thing be amiss in the publick Government which stands in need of Reformation it appertains not unto them to be tumultuously active in it or to put their hands unto the work whose hands are tied and to be tied on all such occasions but that they make it known unto the Magistrate whose hands are only left at liberty to effect the same My meaning is that they do nothing uncommanded For when the power or precept of the Governor doth intervene they are then armed with just authority and may do accordingly For as the Princes Privy Councel are said to be his Ears and Eyes so those inferiour Ministers by whom he executeth his commands or mandates are not unfitly called his Hands 3. The Magistrate being such as he ought to be SECT 24. and as before we have described him that is to say The Father of the Countrey the Shepheard of his people the preserver of the publick peace the great distributer of justice and the avenger of the innocent he must be somewhat more then mad who is not pleased with such a Government But seeing that all Ages do afford examples of negligent and slothful Princes who have no care at all of the publick safety of others who are so intent of their private profit as to make markets of all laws and priviledges and to expose their justice and their favours both unto open sale of some who drain their peoples purses to no other end but to maintain a vain and wastful prodigalitie and some who spend their time in nothing more then either the rifling of the subjects houses the deflouring of their wives and daughters or in the slaughter of the innocent that these should be received for Princes and their commands obeyed at all even in lawful matters is such a thing as some will hardly be perswaded to consent unto For where men finde so much unworthiness and such filthy facts as do not only mis-become a Magistrate but a private person when they see no resemblance of that Image of God which ought to shine most brightly in a Christian Magistrate when they behold no track nor footstep of such a Minister of Gods as is ordained for the incouragement and praise of those that do well and for the punishment of those that are evil doers they take him not for such a Governour whose office and authoritie is extolled so highly in the Scriptures And to say truth it hath been always naturally implanted in the souls of men not more to love and reverence a just vertuous Prince then to abominate and detest an ungodly Tyrant But if we look into Gods Book SECT 25. we shall there be taught not only to submit our selves to the command of those Princes who faithfully and as they ought do discharge their office but of all those who are advanced unto the highest place of Government though they do nothing less then perform their duties For though the Magistrate be one of the greatest blessings given by God for the good of mankind and that he hath confined the Magistrate within certain limits yet he declares that whatsoever they are they do receive their power from no hand but his that if they principally do intend the publick good they are the greatest testimonies and examples of his goodness to us if they prove insolent and unjust they are the executioners of his wrath and judgement for the sins
Halicarnass lib. 6. But a new war approaching a new promise made and that neglected also when the war was ended the people seeing no relief was like to come from the hands of the Senators Longè aliâ quam primò instituerant viâ grassabantur began to lend an ear to some desperate Counsels and fell to entertain such hopes as formerly they durst never dream of For drawing themselves into a body under the conduct of Sicinius a troublesome and seditious person they forsook the City and incamped upon an hill adjoyning resolving as they gave it out to seek new dwellings and that there was no place in Italy but would afford them air and water 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and ground in which they might be buried There is no question to be made but if the Senate had beheld the action with neglect and scorn as Appius d Dionys Halicarn l. 6. and C. Martius e Plutarch in Coriolano did advise they should the people out of love to their wives and children would have returned to their houses or if they had presented them in time with any tolerable mitigations of the former laws they might have taken off their edge and appeased the tumult But giving way unto their furie till it grew too high and shewing in their resolutions far more fear then courage the people got the better of them and thought they stood upon the higher ground as indeed they did Which pride and high conceit of theirs was the more increased by the authoritie and perswasions of one Junius Brutus who came not to them till they were too far ingaged to go off with safetie A man as the Historian noteth of a turbulent and seditious spirit more apt to kindle a rebellion then to quench the flame but otherwise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 f Dionys Halicarnass l. 6. of very great fore-sight into business and one that had a ready tongue upon all occasions To him they gave the managing of the whole design and he improved the trust to their best advange Insomuch that when Menenius Agrippa was imployed unto them to demand their grievances and had brought the point to such an issue that there was nothing wanting to make up the breach but some securitie to be given on the part of the Senate that the people should be no more deluded with such emptie promises this Junius Brutus took upon him to propose the terms and no securitie would content him as the plot was laid but that some popular Magistrates should be forthwith made for the protection of the people Concedite nobis inquit Magistratus aliquot quotannis è nostro corpore creare c. g Id. ibid. Let us saith he have certain Magistrates to be chosen yearly out of our own body on whom we shall not ask you to confer more power then that they have authoritie to assist the Commons when they are either injured or oppressed by violence and to take order that they be not robbed of their rights and liberties Other securitie then this we will trust to none Which when the people heard for few of them were made acquainted with the plot before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they made many a loud and joyful shout praising the man unto the skies and absolutely resolving to admit of no other terms then what their Spokesman had proposed 2 But yet the business was not done It must first pass the approbation of the Senate and there it met with very grreat heats and opposition before it passed and passed not at the last but upon conditions The people had a faction in the very Senate and a strong one too who laboured what they could to obtain the point Of these Valerius was the chief whose Brother had not long before expulsed the Kings and from his courting of the people was surnamed Poplicola a family that had been always favourable to the popular partie and more endevoured their content then the honor or profit of the publick In which regard Appius charged him to his face 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 h Id. ibid. that the whole generation of them were so partial in behalf of the people that they had almost destroyed the Common-wealth Others and those of greater courage and Nobility scorning that such an innovation should be made in the publick Government opposed it with all might and main not sparing to assure the Senate that in the setting up of this new authoritie they would in fine put down their own And of these Appius and Caius Martius who after had the name of Coriolanus were the leading men who standing upon point of honor advised the Senate that having shaken off the tyrannie of their Kings they should not prostitute themselves to the lusts of the people i Id. ibid. that they should stand on their own ground and not do any thing unworthy of their place and dignitie that these were but the beginnings of sedition and that the purpose of the Commons was to abolish law and set up a paritie h Plutarch in M. Coriolano Appius fore-telling as inspired with the spirit of Prophesie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how great a Seminarie of mischiefs it would prove to the Common-wealth and calling all the Gods to witness that he had done his best to prevent the same But when they found it like to pass and that the major part of the house did incline that way it was advised that they should hold the people to the terms by themselves proposed and give their Officers no more power but to relieve the people from unjust oppression and that they should only interpose if any thing were passed in Senate to the peoples prejudice but propose nothing of themselves nor appear in any thing untill the Senate had before considered of it that the election should be made in centuriatis Comitiis only where the Patricii and their followers bare the greatest stroke and finally that in their applications and addresses to the Lords of the Senate in any business whatsoever they should all agree upon the point so that if any one dissented the agreement and consent of all the rest should pass for nothing For seeing that Tribunes must be granted they hoped that by their disagreement the honor of the State might be kept upright and that the Common-wealth was not quite past help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l Dionys Halicarn l. 10. as long as any discord or dissension might be sown amongst them Which last condition for all the rest were broken assoon as they were agreed on was most religiously observed till the very last as we read in Plutarch who gives it for a rule amongst them that if one Tribune did oppose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r m Plutareh in Caio Tiber. the agreement and command of all the rest did effect just nothing Things being brought unto this temper and all points agreed on the people went to the election and chose five new Officers according
to the number of the Spartan Ephori which they called Tribunes of the people of which Sicinius and Junius Brutus must be two at least We may be sure they took not all this pains for nothing 3 And yet all this was nothing if they got not more The Articles and Conditions which they had agreed on had bound them too precisely to their good behaviour and if they did not break those bonds they were Prisoners still But first they must be fortified with some special priviledges to keep their persons out of danger that they might boldly venture upon any project without fear of law and put themselves into such condition that whatsoever wrongs they did they would not be called to an accompt To that end Brutus taking his opportunitie whilest the heats were up and the Senate in a disposition to deny them nothing causeth a law to be propounded obtained for the perpetual indemnitie of the Tribunes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for declaring of their Office to be sacred and inviolable n Dâ—oâ—ys Halicarn l. 6. The substance of the law was to this effect That no man should compell the Tribunes to doe any thing against their wills nor beat or cause them to be beaten nor kill or cause them to be killed if any should presume to do the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he was to be pursued as an execrable person and his goods confiscate and whosoever slew him should escape unpunished and do a meritorious service to the Common-wealth A Priviledge which they found good use of in the times succeeding and made it serve their turns upon all occasions Martius complained of them in the Senate for disobedience to the Consuls and an intent to bring an Anarchie upon the State o Plutarh in Coriolano they vote this for a breach of priviledge and nothing but his death or banishment will give them satisfaction for it Apptus being Consul sends his Lictor to lay hands upon them for raising tumults in the City p Livie hist Rom. lib. 2. this is another breach of priviledge and he shall answer for it when his year was out Caeso Quintius like a noble Patriot joyns with the Consuls and the Senate to oppress their insolencies when neither law nor reason would prevail upon them this also is a breach of priviledge and his life shall pay for it q Id. l. 3. But to proceed having obtained this law for their own securitie their next work was to break or pass by those laws by which the State was governed in all times before and which themselves had yeelded to at their first creation It was the practise of the City from the first fnundation and a continual custom hath the force of law to give such respect unto the Senate that the people did not vote nor determine any thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r Dionys Halicarnass l. 7. which the Senate had not first debated and resolved upon This though no breach of priviledge was a main impediment to the advancing of those projects which they had in hand and therefore fit to be removed as removed it was and so a way made open unto that confusion which did expose the State to so many changes that it was never constant to one form of government Which being obtained the next thing to be brought about was to bring the election of the Tribunes into the hands of the people who had before the least part in it that so depending mutually upon one another they might co-operate together to destroy the State and bring it absolutely under the command of the common people For at the first according to the Articles of the Institution the Tribunes were to be elected in Comitiis Centuriatis as before was said where none but men of years and substance such as were of the Liverie as we speak in England had the right of Suffrage By means whereof the Patricians had a very great stroke in the Elections Et per Clientum suffragia creandi quos vellent potestatem s 〈◊〉 hist and by the voyces of their Clients or dependents set up whom they listed They must no longer hold this power The Tribunes were the creatures of the Common people and must be made by none but them A law must therefore be propounded to put the Election wholly into the hands of the people and to transact the same in Comitiis Tributis where no Patrician was to vote but all things carried by the voyces of the rascal Rabble Which though it caused much heat and no small ado yet it was carried at the last Appius complaining openly as his custom was Rempub. per metum prodi that the Senate did destroy the Common-wealth by their want of courage And whereas at the first they had so much modestie as not to come into the Senate t Valer. Maxim lib. 2. c. 2. Sed positis subselliis ante fores decreta Patrum examinare but to sit without upon some benches whilest they examined the decrees which had passed the house they challenge now a place though no vote in Senate t and had free ingress and egress when they would themselves 4 But their main business was to pull down the Nobles and make them of no more esteem then the common sort And upon this they set their strength and made it the first hansel of their new authoritie Martius had spoke some words in Senate which displeased the Tribunes and they incense the people to revenge the injury who promising to assist them in their undertakings an Officer is forthwith sent to apprehend him This caused the Patricians whom the cause concerned to stand close together and to oppose this strange incroachment and generally to affirm as most true it was that when they yeelded to the setting up of this new authority there was no power given them by the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 u Dionys Halicarn l. 7. but only to preserve the Commons from unjust oppressions The like did Martius plead in his own behalf as we finde in Livie auxilii non poenae jus datum illi potestati plebisque non patrum Tribunos esse x Livie hist lib. 2. that they were trusted with a power to help the Commons but with none to punish and were not Tribunes of the Lords but of the people And so much also was affirmed in the open Senate that the authority of the Tribunes was at first ordained not to offend or grieve the Senate but that the Commons might not suffer any grievance by it and that they did not use their power according to such limitations as were first agreed on and as of right they ought to use it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Dionys Halicarn l. 7. but to the ruine and destruction of the Lawes established Enough of conscience to have staved them from the prosecution but that they had it in design and resolved to carry it For Brutus had before given out and
to re-invest the Tribunes with that height of power of which they had been justly dispossessed by Sylla Upon which grounds it had been formerly averred by the Consuls and the rest of the Senate that the Tribunes were the cause of those distractions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the Authors words which did so miserably afflict the Common-wealth * Dionys Halicarn l. 10. But this to say the truth is so clear a point that it needs no proof I only shall observe and so pass it by how justly the Nobility and Senate were punished by their own example and for how little time they enjoyed that Soveraignty which they had wrested from their Kings From the expulsion of the Kings to the creating of the Tribunes were but sixteen years and from the death of Tarquin to the reign of Brutus and Sicinius but one year no more and in that little span of time the people profited so well in the school of rebellion that they did not only beat the Senate at their own weapon of disloialty but choaked them with their own objection For when it was objected against the Tribunes that their authority was gotten and maintained by seditious courses the Tribunes handsomely replyed that that objection might aswell be made against the authority of the Consuls which had been introduced and established by no other means m Id. lib. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then the rebellion of the Nobles or Patricians against their Kings A very shrewd retortion if you mark it well and fit to be considered of in these present times 6 If any ask to what end all these stirs were raised and these seditions set on foot he may please to know that there was an intent from the first creating of the Tribunes to change the government of the State and to put the Supreme Power of all into the hands of the people that is to say to bring it under the command of a few factious persons on whom the body of the people had devolved their power And this is positively affirmed by Florus where having told us that the Tribunes were the cause of all the tumults and seditions which had been raised within the City he adds that being at first ordained specie quidem tuendae plebis Florus hist Rom. l. 3. under pretence of being Protectors of the Commons and taking care for the preserving of their rights and liberties they sought in very deed to usurp the Soveraignty re autem dominationem sibi acquirere and to get the Supreme power into their own hands To this end as the Tribunes strived to oblige the people by causing new Lawes to be made in their behalf and for the increase of their authority so did the people readily obey the Tribunes and gathered into an head upon all occasions aswell for the protection of their persons as the confirmation of their power When Martius had declamed against them in the open Senate for their factious and seditious courses the Tribunes presently made complaint to the people of it calling upon them to assist them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to save their Tribunes n Plutarch in Coriolano at which the people were so madded and ran on so furiously that they were like to have fallen desperately upon all the Senate And Appius found unto his cost that in offering to attach a Tribune though he well deserved it concio omnis coorta pro Tribuno in Consulem o Livie l. 2. the whole assembly rose against him as one man to defend their Tribune the rascall multitude gathering together out of all the City to do him right against the Consul And Plutarch tels us in the life of Tiberius Gracchus that the people were so sottishly affected to him that many of the needy and seditious rout waited upon him all night long up and down the Town p Plutarch in Tiber. C. Gracchis some of them buying tents and lying about his house to watch it as a guard to his person And on the other side the houses of the Tribunes were kept continually open aswell nights as daies that they might serve as a Protection or a Common Sanctuary for men of all sorts to repair unto whom either debt or misdemeanor or some greater matter had made obnoxious to the Sergeants or other Ministers of justice to the great prejudice of the honest and well meaning Subjects in their suits and businesses And besides this the Tribunes never failed to flatter and bewitch the people by some piece of courtship or by preferring some new Lawes as before was said for their ease and benefit They had no sooner way then that to advance their power or to obtain unto that absoluteness of command and empire which they projected to themselves For doubtlesse that of the Historian is exactly true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q Dionys Halicarn lib. 6. that he that means to be a Tyrant must be first a flatterer there being no readier way to advance a Tyranny then by being popular a profest servant of that people whom he would command But this confederacy between the Tribunes and the people and the mutual ties that were between them I cannot better lay before you then in Plutarchs words r Plutarch in Agis Cleomen who speaking of the Gracchi doth inform us thus That having received many favours from the peoples hands they were ashamed to be indebted to them and therefore earnestly endevoured to requiâ—e their courtesies by making new Decrees and Lawes which they propounded and obtained for the peoples profit and on the other side the people for their parts were not wanting to admire and honour them the more by how much they perceived them studious of their good and benefit So that with like strife on either side the one to gratifie and oblige the other their interesses were so mingled and their intentions so concorporated that they must needs hold on as they had begun and either stand or fall together By means whereof the people in conclusion became lords of all the majesty of the State and the power of judicature being absolutely vested in them which since they could not manage but by their Atturneys nor otherwise execute and discharge then by their Proxies who but the Tribunes their own creatures must be trusted with it And this is that which Tacitus observes to be the issue of those quarrels which were kept on foot between the Nobility and the Commons modo turbulenti Tribuni s Tacit. hist lib. 2. modo Consules praevalidi sometimes some factious Tribunes carried it away and then again the Consuls had the better and prevailed in power according as they did comply with the peoples humours till Marius and Sylla first and Julius Caesar afterwards by their example by force of Arms subdued both parties and introduced an absolute Government 7 Now for the steps by which the people did asâ—end to this height of power they were not raised at once but
were long a making When first the discontented Nobles had expulsed their Kings and found they could not master all those difficulties which so great a business as that was did present unto them without being sure to have the people theirs without fear of lapsing Poplicola advised and at last enacted it for Law that no man should presume upon pain of death to take upon him any Office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 t Plutarch in Publicola unlesse it come unto him by the gift of the people and that if any were condemned and appealed to them the execution should be respited till the people should give sentence in it But then withall the Nobility kept all Offices both of power and State in their own hands only the people being uncapable of the meanest office which did relate unto the Government of the Common-wealth untill they gained the Tribunes and the two Aediles which were under officers to the Tribunes to be chosen out of their own body Which once obtained there was no place how high soever which they did not aim at and which their Tribunes did not finde some way to compasse for them the Nobles and Patricians still in vain complaining how much they were dishonoured in the competition First therefore having gained a Law but with much adoe that the Commons might be married into Noble Families they presently propose another ut populo potestas esset seu de Plebe seu de Patribus vellet Consules faciendi u Livie l. 4. that the people might have liberty to choose the Consuls out of which rank of men they listed and at the first attempt did prevail so far that in stead of the two Consuls which they had before six Military Tribunes should be chosen by them to be possessed of all the Consular authority and they to be promiscuously elected out of the Patricians and the People as they saw convenient x Livie l. 4. and having got this ground they went on a main For not long after P. Licinius Calvus a meer Plebeian is made one of these Military Tribunes and shortly after that the Magister Equitum or the Commander of the horse Thus Silius and Aelius are made Questors those of Patrician rank having had the canvass and next that followed a Decree that the Docemviri Sacrorum who had the custody and charge of the Sibyls Books partim ex Plebe partim ex Patriciis a Id. lib. 6. should be indifferently chosen out of both Estates In little time the Tribunes pressing hotly for it L. Sextus obtains the Consulship b Id. ibid. C. Martius Rutilius is first made Dictator afterwards one of the Censors also c Id. lib. 7. and P. Philo is advanced to the place and dignity of the Prator d Id. lib. 8. Having thus took possession of all Civil Magistracy which were of any power and dignity in the Common-wealth the Tribunes would not rest nor content themselves untill the Commons were made capable of the Priesthood also which after some slight opposition made by Appius Claudius a Family that never yeelded any thing to advance the people was conferred upon them five Augures and four Pontifiâ—es being added to the former number all chosen and for ever to be chosen by and out of the Commons e Id. lib. 10. There were only now two places of respect and credit that of the Maximus Curio and the Pontifex Maximus both which the Nobles did pretend to belong to them but the Tribunes were resolved to have it otherwise According to which resolution C. Manilius got the Office of the Maximus Curio f Id. lib. 26. and in the close of all but a good while after Omnibus honoribus plebi communicatis g Rofin Antiq. Rom. l. 3. c. 22. after all other honors were conferred upon them or rather communicated to them one T. Coruncanius was declared the Pontifex Maximus All this and more they had but it would not satisfie 8 For there was wanting still both the power of Judicature and the Supreme Majestie of the State to make all compleat and to gain this the Tribunes must bestir themselves both with art and violence or else they could not hope to estate it on them A business of so high a nature that it was never in a way to be brought about till the two Gracehi undertook the contrivance of it who being men of excellent parts and great abilities did most unfortunately fall on the undertaking and being fallen upon it did devise all ways which either art or wit could present unto them to effect the work Of these Tiberius was the eldest who stumbling in the way on the Lex Agraria as being a means to make the poor people more confiderable and the rich less powerful and finding that Octavius one of his Colleagues did oppose him in it deposed him from his Office by force and violence only because he stood upon the right of his negative voice h Plutarch in Tib. Caio He had before inflamed the people by making a seditious speech to prefer their business and now he takes a course to inflame them more for the advancement of his own For one of his friends being found dead upon a sudden not without some suspicion of poyson as he gave it out he put on mourning apparrel and brought his sons before the people into the Common Forum beseeching them to have compassion on his Wife and Children as one that utterly despaired of his own safetie having for their sakes got the hatred of the Noble men And sometimes he would be the first man in the Market-place apparelled all in black his face swelled with tears and looking heavily upon the matter would pray the people to stand to him saying he was afraid his Enemies would come in the night and overthrow his house to kill him By means of which devices he so wrought upon them that many of them bought tents and lay about his house continually to keep him from the hands of his deadly Enemies So that being sure of their concurrence and assistance in any project which he should set on foot to advance himself under pretence of doing service to the Common-wealth he presently proposed a law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that any man that would might appeal from the Judges to the people in what cause soever And that he might be sure to embase the Senate to the improvement and increase of the peoples power he had prepared another of an higher nature which was to adde unto the Senate an equal number of the Equites or the Roman Knights who were to be of equal power and to have libertie of voting in all publick businesses with the antient Senators In passing which and other of his Popular laws he got this trick and he was very constant to it that if he found the sense of the house to be against him and was not like to carry with him the major part of the voyces he would
quarrel with his fellow Tribunes to spin out the time till his partie were all come together and if that could not do it neither then he adjourned the Assembly to some other day But yet for all these artifices and unworthy practises he could not compass the design but left it to be finished by his Brother Caius Who taking the same course to ingage the people which his Brâ—ther had pursued before brought those designes about which Tiberius failed in i Id. ibid. For first whereas the Senate were the only Judges in matters which concerned the affairs of the Common-wealth which made them no less reverenced by the Roman Knights then by others of the common people Caius prevailed so far that he gained a law for adding three hundred of these Equites to as many Senators for the Senate did consist of three hundred antiently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving them equall power of judging in all causes which were brought before them So that by gaining this and the former law of appealing to the people upon all occasions the people were estated in the power of Judicature and the dernier resort as the Lawyers call it was in them alone The only point now left was the Supreme Majestie and that did Caius very handsomely confer upon them without noise or trouble For whereas all other Orators when when they made their speeches turned themselves towards the Palace where the Senate sate he on the contrary turned himself towards the Market place where the people were and taught all other Orators by his Example to doe the like And thus saith Plutarch by the only turning of his look he gained a point of infinite consequence and importance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 changing the Common-wealth from an Aristocratie to a meer Democratie which was the matter so aimed at by his Predecessors 9 The Tribunes had been insolent enough in the former times but the obtaining of these laws made them more unsufferable Before they used to quarrel all the greatest Officers as if the State could not consist but by their contentions there being no Magistrate so great nor man so innocent whom they exposed not sometimes to contempt and scorn and made not subject to their tyranniâ— The renowned Scipio himself the very Atlas of the State when it was in danger a man in whom there was not any thing but brave and gallant could not scape so clear but that he was accused by these factious Tribunes k Livie hist lib. 28. and forced to live retired in his Countrey-house far from the employments of that State which did not otherwise subsist but by his abilities Nor could they look on their Dictators but with eyes of malice although they had as much authoritie as that State could give them or any of their Kings had enjoyed before whom they endevour to make subject to their pride and tyrannie by all means imaginable And to that end sometimes denyed him the honor of a Triumph though he had deserved it in all mens judgements but their own and sometimes making this Magister Equitum l Id. lib. 22. to be of equal power and authoritie with him and finally sometimes they declaim against him m Id. ibid. to make him of no reputation with the common people And for their dealing with the Consuls it had been a complaint of old even in the dawning of the day of their new authoritie Consulatum captum oppressum a Tribunitiae potestate n Id. lib. 2. that the Consulship was suppressed and captivated by the power of the Tribunes and we can no where finde that they improved their modestie as they did their power Nor did they only quarrel with the Consuls and proceed no further though that had been an high affront to the Supreme Magistrate but threatned to commit them to the Prison also and many times their threatnings were not made in vain For thus we read that Caius Marius being Tribune o Plutarch in Mario threatned to send Cotta the Consul unto Prison but afterwards was taken off by fair perswasions and Sulpitus one as violent as he though not so valiant assaulted both the Consuls as they sate in the Senate house p Id. ibid. and killed one of their sons there who was not so quick of foot as to scape his hands Which though they were but bare attempts were yet lewd enough sufficiently to the dishonor of such eminent Magistrates and to the infamy and disgrace of the publick Government And therefore to make sure work of it and that the world might see they could more then threaten Quintius will tell you in the Dialogue with his Brother Cicero Brutum P. Scipionem tales tantos viros hominum omnium infimum sordidissinum Trib. Pl. C. Curiatium in vincula conjecisse q Cicero de Legibus lib. 3. that C. Curiatius a most base and unworthy person had caused such gallant men as Brutus and P. Scipio to be cast in Prison And if we make a further search we shall quickly finde that M. Drusus being Tribune caused Philip the Consul to be cast headlong out of his seat to the no small danger of his life only for interrupting him in the middle of a factious speech which was an insolencie beyond imprisonment To speak of their behaviour towards the other Magistrates were a thing impertinent For if the Consuls and Dictators could not scape their hands there is no question to be made but that the Praetors Censors Quaestors yea the Pontifices themselves were most abundantly debased and insulted on by these popular Tyrants 10 Thus have we brought the Tribunes to as great an height both for power and insolencie as were the Ephori before and thereby made them ready for the greater fall A fall which was not long a coming after they had made up the measure of their pride and tyrannie For Lucius Sylla having brought the estate of Rome under his command and knowing full well how dangerous these men would be to him if they were suffered to continue in their former power set forth a law by which they were reduced to their antient bounds inabled only to relieve not to wrong the Subject Sylla Tribunis Plâ—bis lege sua injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit auxilii ferendi reliquit as we read in Tullie r Id. ibid. A thing that much displeased the people and the Tribunes more But Sylla was no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no great applier of himself to the peoples humors and therefore cared but little how they took the matter Pompey succeeding him in power and in purpose too took a course quite contrary and re-established them in that authoritie whereof Sylla had of late deprived them For finding that the common people longed for nothing more then to see the Office of the Tribunes in the height again and being resolved to lay the foundation of his greatness on the affections and dependence of the common people
a desire to incorporate all the Inhabitants of Attica into the City of Athens the better to unite them against forein force and to assemble them together as occasion served he was fain to win them to it by large promises of giving them some share in the publick Government without which bait the wealthier sort and such as had authoritie in their several Burroughs could not be drawn into the City b Plutarch in Theseo Yet still he kept unto himself and to his successors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as we finde in Plutarch the chief Cnmmandery in the wars and the preservation of the laws together with a superintendency in matters which concerned Religion the main points of Soveraigntie And in this State things stood till the death of Codrus the seventh from Theseus who giving up his own life to preserve his Countrey became so honored and admired amongst his people that they resolved for his sake to have no more Kings for fear they should never meet with any who might be worthy to succeed him which was one of the prettiest wanton quarrels that ever was picked against a Monarchie The Princes which succeeded after his decease they called not Kings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Governors but the change was only in the name and in the manner of their getting the Supreme authoritie For being once invested with the Supreme power they held it during life without check or censure as is affirmed by Africanus an antient writer who laying down the succession of the Kings of Athens to the death of Codrus d African apud Eusib Chron. edit Scaliger addes this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that after them succeeded the perpetual Archonteâ— who held the Government during life The like Eusebius doth affirm e Euseb in Chro. and all Authors else which treat of the affairs of Athens The difference was that formerly the Kingdom was successive meerly entailed upon the Princes of the line of Cecrops now it began to be Elective and to be given to them who best pleased the people Et loco libertatis erat quod eligi coeperunt f Tacit. hist l. 1. and it was some degree of liberty and a great one too that they had power to nominate and elect their Princes But long they did not like of this although no doubt a great intrusion on the Regal dignity The Princes were too absolute when they held for life not so observant of the people as it was expected because not liable to accompt nor to be called unto a reckoning till it was too late till death had freed them from their faults and the peoples censure And therefore having tryed the Government of 13 of these perpetual Archontes of which Medon the son of Codrus was the first and the last Alâ—maeon In decem annos Magistratuum consuetudo conversa est g Euseb in Chr. they introduced another custom and every tenth year changed their Governors These they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 h African apud Euseb Chronic. or Decennial Archontes of which they had but seven in all and then gave them over and from that time were governed by nine Officers or Magistrates chosen every year who for that cause waa called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Annual Magistrates And yet it is to be observed that in both these changes the Archon whosoever he was and whether he was for term of life or for ten years only had all the power which formerly was belonging to the Kings save the very name in which regard Eusebius doth not stick to call them by the name of Kings where speaking of the institution of these Annual Magistrates he doth thus express it Athenis Annui principes constituti sunt cessantibus Regibus i Euseb Chron. as St. Hierom renders it 2 Now for these Annual Magistrates they were these that follow that is to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Iul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. which we may call the Provost who 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was called the Archon the Bishop or High Priest the Marshal and the six Chief Justices Of these the Provost was the chief 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of whom they did denominate the ensuing year and by whose name they dated all their private contracts and Acts of State l Id. ibid. Sect. 2. To him it appertained to have a care of celebrating the Orgies of Bacchus and the great festival which they termed Thargelia consecrated to Apollo and Diana as also to take cognizance of misdemeanors and in particular to punish those who were common drunkards and to determine in all cases which concerned matter of inheritance and furthermore to nominate Arbitrators for the ending of fuits and private differences to appoint Guardians unto Orphans and Overseers unto women left with childe by their husbands The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call the Bishop or high Priest had the charge of all the sacred mysteries m Id. ibid. Sect. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the administration of the usual and accustomed sacrifices together with the cognizance of sacriledge prophaneness and all other actions which concerned Religion as also power to interâ—â—ct litigious persons or Common Barretters as we call them from being present at the celebrating of the holy mysteries And he retained the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because that antiently their Kings as in all places else had the chief hand in matters which related to the publick service of the Gods and the solemn sacrifices On the which reason and no other the Romans had their Regem Sacrificulum whom Plutarch calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Plutarch in Problemat in imitation of the Latine but Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o Dionys Halicarnens hist l. 5. in the true Greek phrase of which Livie thus Rerum deinde divinarum habita cura quia quaedam publica sacra per ipsos Reges factitata erant necubi Regum desiderium esset Regem Sacrificulum creant p Livie hist Rman lib. 2. But to proceed the Polemarchus whom we English by the name of Marshall sate judge in cases of sedition and such whereby the grandour of the State might suffer detriment as also in all actions which concerned either Denizens or Merchant-strangers and unto him it appertained to sacrifice to Diana and to Mars the two military Deities q Jul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to prescribe the funeral pomp for such as lost their lives in their Countries service Each of these had their two Assessors of their own election but so that they were bound to choose them out of the Senate of five hundred r Id. ibid. Sect. from no lower rank Finally for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call Chief Justices they were six in number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s Suidas in Lex and had authority to give judgement absolutely in all
against the Senate who began sensibly to incroach on the Regal power that the Tribunes were first instituted to no other end but to preserve the people from unjust oppression and that their opposition to the Consuls was accounted alwayes to be against the rules of their institution and a breach of Articles And as for these Demarchi whom we spake of last that neither by their institution nor by usurpation they did oppose against the Senate in behalf of the people but executed their commands upon the people as their duty bound them So that the great imagination which the Author had of shewing to the world a view of such popular Magistrates as might incourage men of place and eminence to think themselves ordained after these examples to moderate their licentiousness of Kings and Princes is fallen directly to the ground without more ado as being built upon a weak nay a false foundation not able to support the building And more then so in case the instances proposed had been rightly chosen and that the Ephori in Sparta had been first ordained to oppose the Kings the Tribunes to oppose the Consuls and the Demarchi to keep under the Athenian Senate yet these would prove but sorry instances of such popular Officers as were ordained ad moderandum Regum libidinem to moderate the licentiousness of Kings soveraign Princes for proof of which they were produced The Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta till the Kings were brought under the command of the Senate and the State become an Aristocratie in which the Kings had very little left them of the Royal dignity but the empty name and were in power no other then the Dukes of Venice save that they were to have the command of the Armies which those Dukes have not And for the Tribunes 't is well known to every one who hath perused the Roman story that there were no such creatures to be found in Rome till the Romans had expuâ—sed their Kings were under the command of Coâ—suls the Monarchie being changed to an Optimatie and the people bound by solemn oaths never to admit of a King amongst them The like may be affirmed also of the Demarchi of Athens supposing that they were of as great authority as either the Ephori or the Tribunes that they were instituted in a time when the affairs of State were managed by nine Annual Magistrates all of them chosen by the people and accomptable to them In all these cases â—um non in regno populus esset sed in libertate e Livie hisâ— lib. 2. when the people had sued out their Wardship and thought themselves to be at liberty freed from those bonds which nature and allegiance formerly had laid upon them they did no more then what a wise and understanding people had good cause to do in taking the best course they could for their future safety And in my minde the people pleaded most unanswerably in their own behalf when they alleadged se foris pro imperio libertate dimicantes domi a civibus captos oppressos f Id. ibid. that fighting valiantly abroad both for their own liberty and their Countries honor against their Kings they were oppressed and wronged at home by their fellow Citizens that their condition as things stood was better in times of war then in times of peace their liberty never more assured then when they were amongst their Enemies and therefore being no otherwise bound to submit themselves to that change of Government then as it had been introduced by their own consent they had all the reason in the world to get as good terms as they could and be no losers by the bargain Which though it were the case and plea particularly of the people of Rome might be used also very fitly by the Spartans and Athenians on the self same reasons But this can no way be pretended or alleadged by those who live in an established and successional Monarchie where there is one only to command in chief and nothing left to the Subject g Tacit. Annal. praeter obsequii gloriam but the glory of obedience only and the necessity of submitting with a loyal heart to those commands and impositions which may be â—aid upon them with an unjust hand So that admitting it for true as indeed it is not that the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes were ordained for the ends supposed yet it can follow by no rules of law or logick that because such popular Officers have been sometimes instituted to keep the scale upright and the balance even betwixt the Nobles and the People in an Aristocratie therefore the like are to be fancied in a setled Monarchie for moderating the licentiousness that is to say for that no doubt must be his meaning for regulating the authority of the Soveraign Prince 8 Thus have we seen a manifest discovery of Calvins purpose for setting up some popular Officers in every Kingdom to regulate the authority and restrain the power of Soveraign Princes and we may see a secret and more subtile danger included in that short Parenthesis then what is obvious at first sight to the unwary Reader For by the instances proposed and presented to us it seems to be his meaning that these popular Officers should not hâ—ve power only to restrain their Kings when they transgress the bounds of law or equity and either tyrannically oppress the Subject or wilfully dilapidate the patrimony of the Common-wealth but that they should set themselves against them and control their doings in the same way after the same manner as the Ephori did the Kings of Sparta or the Tribunes did the Roman Consuls Now we have shewn before out of several Authors h Vide chap. 2. that the Ephori did not only take upon them to appoint such Privie Counsellors about their Kings as to them seemed best to limit and prescribe them in the choyce of their wives to send them out unto the wars and recall them home as if they had been hirelings only and of no more reckoning to put them upon fine and ransome if they did any thing which was not pleasing to these humorous Gentlemen to have them at command both to come and goe as often as they whistled for them or held up a finger and finally to look for lowly reverence from them whensoever they vouchsafed to summon them to attend their pleasures but also to imprison next to banish and in fine to murder them And we have shewed you of the Tribunes i Vide chap. 3â— that after they had fortified themselves with large priviledges and grew predominant in the affections of the common people they did not only quarrel and oppose the Consuls under pretence of setting forth new laws for the peoples benefit nor were content to put the people into the possession of all the offices and honors of the Common-wealth which formerly belonged to the Nobles only whether the Consuls
it and therefore sate in Parliament in no other capacity then as spirituall persons meerly who by their extraordinary knowledge in the word of God and in such other parts of learning as the world then knew were thought best able to direct and advise their Princes in points of judgement In which capacity and no other the Priors of the Cathedrall Churches of Canterbury Ely Winchester Coventry Bath Worcester Norwich and Durham the Deans of Exceter York Wells Salisbury and Lincoln the Officiall of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Dean of the Arches the Guardian of the Spiritualties of any Bishoprick when the See was vacant and the Vicars generall of such Bishops as were absent beyond the Seas r Selden Titles of hon part 2. c. 5. had sometimes place and suffrage in the house of Lords in the Ages following 7. But when the Norman Conqueror had possest the State then the case was altered The Prelates of the Church were no longer suffered to hold their Lands in Frankalmoigne as before they did or to be free from secular services and commands as before they were Although they kept their lands yet they changed their tenure and by the Conqueror were ordained to hold their Lands sub militari servitute Å¿ Maâ— Paris in Will 1. An. 1070. either in â—apite or by Baronage or some such military hold and thereby were compellable to aid the Kings in all times of war with Men Arms and Horses as the Lay-subjects of the same tenures were required to do Which though it were conceived to be a great disfranchisement at the first and an heavy burden to the Prelacy yet it conduced at last to their greater honor in giving them a further Title to their place in Parliament than that which formerly they could pretend to Before they claimed a place therein ratione Officii only by reason of their Offices or spiritual Dignities but after this by reason also of those antient Baronies which were annexed unto their Dignities en respect de lour possessions L'antient Baronies annexes a lour dignities t Stamfords Plâ—es l. 3 c. 1. as our Lawyers have it From this time forwards we must look upon them in the House of Parliament not as Bishops only but as Peers and Barons of the Realm also and so themselves affirmed to the Temporal Lords in the Parliament holden at Northampton under Henry 2. Non sedimus hic Episcopi sed Barones nos Barones ves Barones Pares hic sumus u Ap Selden titles of hon pâ— 2. c. 5. We fit not here say they as Bishoâ—ps only but as Barons We are Baroâ—s and you are Barons here we sit as Peers Which last is also verified in terminis by the words of a Statute or Act of Parliament wherein the Bishops are acknowledged to be Peers of the Land x Stat. 25 Edw. 3. c. 5. Now that the Bishops are a fundamental and essential part of the Parliament of England I shall endeavour to make good by two manner of proofs wherof the one shall be de jure the other de facto And first we shal begin with the proofs de jure and therin first with that which doth occur in the Laws of King Athelstan amongst the which there is a Chapter it is Cap. 11. entituled De officio Episcopi quid pertinet ad officium ejus and therein it is thus declared Episcopo jure pertinet omnem rectitudinem promovere dei scilicet seculi c. z Spelm. concil p. 402. et convenit ut per consilium testimonium ejus omne legis scitum Burgi mensura omne pondus sit secundum dictionem ejus institutum that is to say it belongeth of right unto the Bishop to promote justice in matters which concern both the Church and State and unto him it appertaineth that by his counsel and award all Laws Weights and Measures be ordained thorowout the Kingdom 2. Next we will have recourse to the old Record entituled Modus tenendi Parliamentum In which it is affirmed ad Parliamentum summoniri venire debere Archiepiscopos Episcopos Abbates Pricres alios majores cleri qui tenent per Comitatum aut Baroniam ratione hujusmodi tenurae * modus tenendi Parliament that all the Arch-bishops Bishops Abbats Priors and other Prelates of the Church who hold their lands either by an Earls fee or a Barons fee were to be summoned and to come to Parliament in regard of their tenure 3. Next look we on the chartularies of King Henry the first recognized in full Parliament at Clarendon under Henry the 2d where they are called avitas consuetudines which declare it thus Archipiscopi Episcopi universae personae qui de Regetenent in Capite habeant possessiones suas de Rege ficut Baroniam c. sicut caeteri Barones debent interesse judiciis Curiae Regis cum Baronibus quousque perveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum vel ad mortem * Matth. Paris in Hen. 2. The meaning is in brief that Arch-bishops Bishops and all other ecclesiastical persons which hold in Capite of the King are to have and hold their lands in Barony and that they ought as Barons to be present in all Judgements with the other Barons in the Court of Parliament untill the very sentence of death or mutilation which was very common in those times was to be pronounced And then they commouly did use to withdraw themselves not out of any incapacity supposed to be in them by the Law of England but out of a restraint imposed upon them by the Canons of the Church of Rome 4. In the great Charter made by King John in the last of his reign we have the form of summoning a Parliament and calling those together who have votes therein thus expressed at large Ad habendum commune consilium Regni de auxilio assidendo c. de scutagiis assidendis faciemus summoneri Archiepiscopos Episcopos Abbaâ—es Comites Majores Barones Regni sigillatim per liâ—eras nostras Et praeterea summoneri faciemus in generali per Vice-Cemites Ballivos nostros omnes alios qui in Capite tenent ad certum diem sc ad terminum 40 dierum ad minus et ad certum locum c. a Id. in Ioh. In which we have not only a most evident proof that the Bishops are of right to be called to Parliament for granting subsidies and Escuage and treating of the great affairs which concern the kingdom but that they are to be summoned by particular Letters as well as the Earls and Barons or either of them A former Copy of which summons issued in the time of the said King John is extant on Record and put in print of late in the b Pt. 2. c. 5. Titles of Honour And we have here I note this only by the way a brief intimation touching the form of summoning the Commons to attend in
made in Parliament the King passed a Law to this effect viz. r 4 Hâ—n 8. c. 8. That ull sutes condemnations executions charges and impositions put or hereafter to be put upon Richard Strode and every of his Complices that be of this Parliament or aâ—y other hereafter for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any thing concerning the Parliament to be communed and treated of shall be void and null but neither any reparation was allowed to Strode nor any punishment inflicted upon those that sued him for ought appears upon Record And for the Houses joyned together which is the last capacity they can claim it in they are so far from having the supreme authority that as it is observed by a learned Gentleman they cannot so unite or conjoyn as to be an entire Court either of Soveraign or Ministerial jurisdiction no otherwise co-operating than by concurrence of Votes in their several Houses for preparing matters in order to an Act of Parliament s Case of our Affairs p. 9. Which when they have done they are so far from having any legal authority in the State as that in Law there is no stile nor form of their joynt Acts nor doth the Law so much as take notice of them until they have the Royal Assent So that considering that the two Houses alone do no way make an entire Body or Court and that there is no known stile nor form of any Law or Edict by the Votes of the two Houses only nor any notice taken of them by the Law it is apparent that there is no Soveraignty in their two Votes alone How far the practise of the Lords Commons which remaind at Westminster after so many of both Houses had tepaired to the King c. may create Precedents unto posterity I am not able to determine but sure I am they have no Precedent to shew from the former Ages But let us go a little further and suppose for granted that the Houses either joynt or separate be capable of the Soveraignty were it given unto them I would fain know whether they claim it from the King or the people only Not from the King for he confers upon them no further power than to debate and treat of his great Affairs to have access unto his person freedome of Speech as long as they contein themselves within the bounds of Loyalty authority over their own Members which being custumarily desired t Hakewell of passing bils in Parliament and of course obtained as it relates into the Commons shews plainly that these vulgar privileges are nothing more the rights of Parliament than the favours of Princes but yet such favours as impart not the least power of Soveraignty Nor doth the calling of a Parliament ex opere operato as you know who phrase it either denude the King of the poorest robe of all his Royalty or confer the same upon the Houses or on either of them whether the King intend so by his call or otherwise For Bodin whom Mr. Prynne hath honored with the title of a grand Politician u Pryn of Parliam par 2. p. 45. doth affirm expresly Principis majestatem nec Comitorum convocatione nec Senatus populique praesentia minui x Bodin de Repub. that the majesty or Soveraignty of the King is not a jot diminished either by the calling of a Parliament or Conventus Ordinum or by the frequency and presence of his Lords and Commons Nay to say truth the Majesty of Soveraign Princes is never so transcendent and conspicuous as when they sit in Parliament with their States about them the King then standing in his highest Estate as was once said by Henry 8. who knew as well as any of the Kings of England how to keep up the majesty of the Crown Imperial Nor can they claim it from the people who have none to give for nemo dat quod non habet as the saying is The King as hath been proved before doth hold his Royal Crown immediately from God himself not from the contract of the people He writes not populi clementia but Dei gratia not by the favour of the people but by the grace of God The consent and approbation of the people used and not used before the day of coronation is reckoned only as a part of the solemn pomps which are then accustomably used The King is actually King to all intents and purposes in the Law whatever immediately on the death of his Predecessor Nor ever was it otherwise objected in the Realm of England till Clark and Watson pleaded it at their arraignment in the first year of King James y Speeds History in K. James Or grant we that the Majesty of this Kingdom was first originally in the people and by them devolved upon the King by their joynt consent yet having given away that power by their said consent and setled it upon the King by an Act of State confirmed by Oaths and all solemnities which that Act requires they cannot so retract that grant or make void that gift as to pass a new conveyance of it and settle it upon their Representees in the House of Commons Or if they could yet this would utterly exclude all the Lords from having the least share or portion in this new found Soveraignty in that they represent not the common people but sit there only in their own personal capacities and therefore must submit at last to these new made Soveraigns who carry both the Purse Sword at their own girdles So then the people cannot give the Soveraignty and if they have no power to give it the Lords and Commons have no claim thereunto de jure See we next therefore how much of this Soveraignty they or their Predecessors rather have enjoyed de facto in peaceable and regular times fit to be drawn into example in the Ages following The chief particulars in which the Soveraignty consists we have seen before and will now see whether that any of them been exercised and injoyed in peaceable and regular times by both or either of the two Houses of Parliament And first for calling and dissolving Parliaments making of Peers granting of liberty to Towns and Cities to make choyse of Burgesses which antiently had no such liberty treating with forein States denouncing war or making Leagues or Peace after war commenced granting safe conduct and protection indenizing of Aliens giving of honors unto eminent and deserving persons rewarding pardoning coyning printing making of corporations and dispensing with the Laws in force they are such points which never Parliament did pretend to till these later times wherein every thing almost is lawfull I am sure more lawâ—ull than to fear God and honor the King Nor do I find that Mr. Prynne hath laboured to entitle them to these particulars For levying of Arms and the command of the Militia besides that the Kings of England have ever been in possession of it and that possession never disturbed
made for the common use and benefit of the Subject they are left at liberty and may proceed in governing the people given by God unto them according to their own discretion and the advice of their Counsel New Laws are chiefly made for the Subjects benefit at their desire on their importunate requests for their special profit not one in twenty nay I dare boldly say not one in an hundred made for the advantage of the King either in the improvement of his power or the increase of his Revenue Look over all the Acts of Parliament from the beginning of the reign of King Henry 3. to the present time and tell me he that can if he finds it otherwise Kings would have little use of Parliaments and less mind to call them if nothing but the making of new Laws were the matter aimed at And as for raising monies and imposing taxes it either must suppose the Kings to be always unthrifts that they be always indigent and necessitous and behind-hand with the world which are the ordinary effects of ill husbandry or else this argument is lost and of little use For if our Kings should husband their estates to the best advantage and make the best benefit of such escheats and forfeitures conâ—iscations as day by day do fall unto them If they should follow the example of K. Henry 7. and execute the penal Laws according to the power which those Laws have given them and the trust reposed in them by their People if they should please to examine their revenue and proportion their expence to their comings in there would be litle need of subsidies and supplies of money more than the ordinary aids and impositions upon Merchandize which the Law alloweth of and the known rights of Sovereignty backed by prescription and long custom have asserted to them So that it is by Accident not by right and nature that the Parliament hath any power or opportunity to restrain their King in this particular for where there is no need of asking there is no occasion of denying by consequence no restraint upon no baffle or affronting offered to the Regal power And yet the Soveraign need not fear if he be tollerably carefull of his own estate that any reasonable demand of his in these mony matters will meet with opposition or denial in his Houses of Parliament For whilest there are so many Acts of Grace and favour to be done in Parliament as what almost in every Parliament but an enlargement of the Kings favours to his people and that none can be done in Parliament but with the Kings fiat and consent there is no question to be made but that the two Houses of Parliament will far sooner choose to supply the King as allwise Parliaments have done than rob the Subject of the benefit of his grace and favours which is the best fruit they reap from Parliaments Finally whereas it is objected but I think it in sport that the old Lord Burleigh used to say that he knew not what a Parliament in England could not do and that King Iames once said in a Parliament that then there were 500 Kings which words were took for a Concession that all were Kings as well as he in a time of Parliament they who have given us these Objections do either mis-understand their Authors or abuse themselves For what the Lord Burleigh said of Parliaments though it be more than the wisest man alive can justifie he spake of Parliaments according as the word is used in its proper sense not for the two Houses or for either of them exclusive of the Kings presence and consent but for the supreme Court for the highest Judicatory consisting of the Kings most excellent Majesty the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Representees of the Commons and then it will not serve for the turn intended And what King James said once in jest though I have often heard it used in earnest upon this occasion was spoke only in derision of some daring Spirits who laying by the modesty of their Predecessors would needs be looking into the Prerogative or finding errors and mistakes in the present Government or medling with those Arcana imperii which former Parliaments beheld at distance with the eye of reverence But certainly King James intended nothing lesse than to acknowledg a co-ordinative Soveraignty in the two Houses of Parliament or to make them his Co-partners in the Regal power His carriage and behaviour towards them in the whole course of his Government clearly shews the contrary there never being prince more jealous in the points of Soveraignty nor more uncapable of a Rival in those points than he 14. But yet the main objection which we may call the Objection paramount doth remain unanswered For if the three Estates convened in Parliament or any other popular Magistrate whom Calvin dreams of be ordaned by the Word of God as Guardians of the peoples Liberties and therefore authorised to moderate and restrain the power of Kings as often as they shall invade or infringe those liberties as Calvin plainly saies they were or that they know themselves to be ordained by Gods word to that end and purpose cujus se lege Dei Tutores positos esse norunt as he saies they do then neither any discontinuance or non-usage on their parts nor any prescription to the contrary alledged by Kings and supreme Princes can hinder them from resuming and exercising that Authority which God hath given them whensoever they shall finde a fit time for it But first I would fain learn of Calvin in what part of the Word of God we shall finde any such Authority given to those popular Magistrates by what name soever they are called in their several Countreys as he tels us of Not in the old Testament I am sure though in the institution of the seventy Elders there be some hopes of it For when Moses first ordained those Elders it was not to diminish any part of that power which was vosted in him but to ease himself of some part of the burthen which did lie upon him And this appears plainly by the 18. Chapter of the Book of Exodus For when it was observed by Jethro his Father in Law that he attended the businesses of the people from morning till night he told him plainly ultra vâ—res sâ—as negotium esse that the burthen was too heavy for him vers 18. and therefore that he should choose some Under-officers and place them over Thousands over Hundreds and ever Fifties and over Tens Vers 21. Leviusque sit tibi partito in alios onere that so it might be the easier for him those officers bearing some part of the burthen with him Yet so that these inferior Officers should only judge in matters of inferior nature the greater matters being still reserved to his own Tribunal Which counsel as it was very well approved by Moses so was it given by Jethro and approved by Moses with reference to the
between St. Peter and St. Paul by which last the Supreme Powers whatsoever they be are called the Ordinance of God The Powers saith that Apostle are ordained of God and therefore he that resisteth the Powers resisteth the Ordinance of God Upon which words Deodate gives this Glosse or Comment That the supreme Powers are called the Ordinance of God because God is the Author of this Order in the world and all those who attain to these Dignities do so either by his manifest will and approbation when the means are lawfull or by his secret Providence by meer permission or toleration when they are unlawfull Now it is fitting that man should approve and tolerate that which God approves and tolerates But thirdly I conceive that those words in the Greek Text of St. Peter viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not so properly translated as they might have been and as the same words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are rendred by the same Translators somewhat more neer to the Original in another place For in the 8. chapt to the Romans vers 22. we finde them rendring 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the whole Creation and why not rather every Creature as both our old Translation and the Rhemists read it conform to omnis Creatura in the vulgar Latine which had they done and kept themselves more near to the Greek Original in St. Peters Text they either would have rendred it by every humane Creature as the Rhemists do or rather by all Men or by all Man-kinde as the words import And then the meaning will be this that the Jewes living scattered and disperst in Pontus Galatia Cappadocia and other Provinces of the Empire were to have their conversation so meek and lowly for fear of giving scandal to the Gentiles amongst whom they lived as to submit themselves to all Man-kinde or rather to every Man unto every humane Creature as the Rhemists read it that was in Authority above whether it were unto the Emperor himself as their supreme Lord or to such Legats Prefects and Procurators as were appointed by him for the government of those several Provinces to the end that they may punish the evil-doers and incourage such as did well living comformably to the Lawes by which they were governed Small comfort in this Text as in any of the rest before for those popular Officers which Calvin makes the Overseers of the soveraign Prince and Guardians of the Liberties of the common people If then there be no Text of Scripture no warrant from the word of God by which the popular Officers which Calvin dreams of are made the Keepers of the Liberties of the Common people or vested with the power of opposing Kings and soveraign Princes as often as they wantonly insult upon the people or wilfully infringe their Priviledges I would fain learn how they should come to know that they are vested with such power or trusted with the defence of the Subjects Liberties cujus se Dei ordinatione Tutores positos esse norunt as Calvin plainly saies they do If they pretend to know it by inspiration such inspiration cannot be known to any but themselves alone neither the Prince or people whom it most concerneth can take notice of it Nor can they well assure themselves whether such inspirations come from God or the Devil the Devil many times insnaring proud ambitious and vain-glorious Men by such strange Delusions If they pretend to know it by the Dictate of their private Spirit the great Diana of Calvin and his followers in expounding Scripture we are but in the same uncertainties as we were before And who can tell whether the private Spirit they pretend unto and do so much brag of 1 King 22. 22. may not be such a lying Spirit as was put into the mouthes of the Prophets when Ahab was to be seduced to his own destruction Adeo Argumenta ex absurdo petita ineptos habent exitus as Lactantius notes it All I have now to add is to shew the difference between Calvin and his followers in the propounding of this Doctrine delivered by Calvin in few words but Magisterially enough and with no other Authority then his ipse dixit enlarged by David Paraeus in his Comment on the 13. chapter to the Romans into divers branches and many endevours used by him as by the rest of Calvins followers to finde out Arguments and instances out of several Authors to make good the cause For which though Calvin scap'd the fire yet Paraeus could not Ille Crucem pretium sceleris tulit hic Diadema For so it hapned that one Mr. Knight of Brodegates now Pembroke Colledge in Oxford had preach'd up the Authority of these popular officers in a Sermon before the University about the beginning of the year 1622. for which being presently transmitted to the King and Councel he there ingenuously confessed that he had borrowed both his Doctrine and his proofs and instances from the Book of Paraeus above mentioned Notice whereof being given to the University the whole Doctrine of Paraeus as to that particular was drawn into several Propositions which in a full and frequent Convocation held on the 25. of June 1622. were severally condemned to be erroneous scandalous and destructive of Monarchical Government Upon which Sentence or determination the King gave order that as many of those books as could be gotten should solemnly and publickly be burnt in each of the Universities and St. Pauls Church-yard which was done accordingly An accident much complained of by the Puritan party for a long time after who looked upon it as the funeral pile of their Hopes and Projects till by degrees they got fresh courage carrying on their designs more secretly by consequence more dangerously then before they did The terrible effects whereof we have seen and felt in our late Civil Wars and present confusions But it is time to close this point and come to a conclusion of the whole Discourse there be no other Objections that I know of but what are easily reduced unto those before or not worth the Answering 15. Thus have we took a brief Survey of those insinuations grounds or Principles call them what you will which CALVIN hath laid down in his Book of Institutions for the incouragement of the Subjects to rebellious courses and putting them in Arms against their Soveraign either in case of Tyrannie Licentiousness or Mal-administration of what sort soever by which the Subjects may pretend that they are oppressed either in point of liberty or in point of property And we have shewn upon what false and weak foundations he hath raised his building how much he hath mistook or abused his Authors but how much more he hath betrayed and abused his Readers For we have clearly proved and directly manifested out of the best Records and Monuments of the former times that the Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta to oppose the Kings nor the Tribunes in the State of Rome to oppose the Consuls nor the Demarchi in the Common-wealth of Athens to oppose the Senate or if they were that this could no way serve to advance his purpose of setting up such popular Officers in the Kingdoms of Christendom those Officers being only found in Aristocraties or Democraties but never heard or dreampt of in a Monarchical Government And we have shewn both who they are which constitute the three Estates in all Christian Kingdoms and that there is no Christian Kingdom in which the three Estates convened in Parliament or by what other name soever they do call them have any authority either to regulate the person of the Soveraign Prince or restrain his power in case he be a Soveraign Prince and not meerly titular and conditional and that it is not to be found in Holy Scripture that they are or were ordained by God to be the Patrons and Protectors of the Common people and therefore chargeable with no lesse a crime than a most perfidious Dissimulation should they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or want only abuse that power which the Lord hath given them to the oppression of their Subjects In which last points touching the designation of the three Estates and the authority pretended to be vested in them I have carried a more particular eye on this Kingdom of England where those pernicious Principles and insinuations which our Author gives us have been too readily imbraced and too eagerly pursued by those of his party and opinion If herein I have done any service to Supreme Authority my Countrey and some misguided Zelots of it I shall have reason to rejoyce in my undertaking If not posterity shall not say that Calvins memory was so sacred with me and his name so venerable as rather to suffer such a Stumbling-block to be laid in the Subjects way without being censured and removed than either his authority should be brought in question or any of his Dictates to a legal tryal Having been purchased by the Lord at so dear a price we are to be no longer the Servants of men or to have the truth of God with respect of persons I have God to be my Father and the Church my Mother and therefore have not only pleaded the Cause of Kings and Supreme Magistrates who are the Deputies of God but added somewhat in behalf of the Church of England whose Rights and priviledges I have pleaded to my best abilities The issue and success I refer to him by whom Kings do reign and who appointed Kings and other Supreme Magistrates to be nursing Fathers to his Church that as they do receive authority and power from the hands of God so they may use the same in the protection and defence of the Church of God and God even their own God will give them his Blessing and save them from the striving of unruly people whose mouth speaketh proud words and their right hand is a right hand of iniquity FINIS
of the Spartan Ephori upon what grounds first instituted and on what destroyed by what foul practises and unlawful means they gained the Soveraigntie of the State and by what they lost it how and by what degrees they came from low and mean beginnings to so strange a tyrannie and with what suddenness they lost their power and their lives together But in all this there is not any shew or colour for that which is affirmed by CALVIN no ground for nor veritie at all in that assertion that the Ephori were at first ordained to oppose the Kings to regulate their proceedings and restrain their power but rather that they were ordained as indeed they were to curb the Senate to be the Ministers of the Kings and sub-servient to them to sit in Judgement for them and discharge such Offices as the Kings pleased to trust them with in their times of absence If Calvins popular Magistrates have no more authoritie then the Spartan Ephori according to the rules of their Institution they will have little colour to controll their Princes and less for putting a restraint on the Regal power The most they can pretend to must be usurpation and that will hold no longer if it hold so long then they have power to make it good by bloud and violence which I hope Calvin did not aim at And if they have no other ground then an unjust title prescription will not serve the turn for nullum tempus occurrit Regi as our Lawyers tell us when a couragious Prince is concerned in it and oppressed by it If any Popular spirits entertain such hopes if nothing else will satisfie their vast ambitions but to be equal with their Kings and Supreme Governors and at last above them let them remember what became of the Spartan Ephori and that there was a Cleomenes which called them to a sad account for all those insolencies and affronts which they had put upon himself and his Predecessors And let all Kings and Supreme Governors take heed by the example of these Spartan Princes how they let loose the reins of Government and lay them on the necks of the common people which if unbridled once and left at libertie will not be easily induced to receive that Bit into their mouths which before they champed on and that they give no way to such popular Magistrates as Calvin hath presented to us who whatsoever colour and pretence they make aim at no other mark then the Royal power though out of too much modestie they disclaim the title and must be either Kings or nothing Of which invasions and incroachments on the Supreme Power our Author gives another hint in the Roman Tribunes the truth and fitness of which supposition must be looked on next CHAP. III. Of the Incroachments of the Tribunes on the State of Rome and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin I The Tribunes of the people why first Instituted in the State of Rome II And with what difficultie and conditions III The Tribunes fortifie themselves with large immunities before they went about to change the Government IV The Tribunes no sooner in their Office but they set themselves against the Nobilitie and the Senate contrary to the Articles of their Institution V The many and dangerous Seditions occasioned by the Tribunes in the City of Rome VI The Tribunes and the people do agree together to change the Government of the State VII By what degrees the people came to be possessed of all the Offices in the State both of power and dignity VIII The Plots and Practises of the Gracchi to put the power of the Judicature and Supreme Majestie of the State into the hands of the people IX The Tribunes take upon them to commit the Consuls and bring all the Officers of the State under their command X The Office and authoritie of the Tribunes reduced unto its antient bounds by Corn. Sylla and at last utterly destroyed XI An application of the former passages to the point in hand 1 ALthough the reasons which induced the people in the State of Rome to desire some Officers of their own and the considerations which induced the Senate to give way unto it are obvious to the eyes of every Reader which hath perused the Roman stories yet I shall briefly lay it down the better to remove the intimation which we finde in Calvin that they were purposely ordained to oppose the Consuls The storie then in brief is this The people having not long before expulsed their Kings and got some reputation by their prowess in those petit States which bordered neerest to the City found quickly that the libertie which they expected was nothing but a golden dream not able to protect them from the common Gaols and that their reputation in the wars would not pay their debts or save them from the hands of their cruel Creditors For serving in the wars at their own proper charges and having little else to subsist upon but their trades or labor they were fain sometimes to take up money upon usurie And though they did return from the wars with victorie and shewed those honorable scars which they had received fighting in defence of their Countrey and the Common-wealth yet this did edifie but little with their hungry Creditors a Plutarch in M. Coriolano who did not sell their goods if they were not solvent but apprehended their persons also and either laid them up in the common prisons or made them serve in stead of Bond-men and made them subject to the whip and other base corrections fit for none but Slaves And somewhat to this purpose the old man complained as we read in Livie declaring to the people who were apt to hear it how his Patrimonie had been seized on by the merciless Usurers his person apprehended by them and that he was not only made a Slave but marked out for slaughter Inde ostentare tergum foedum recentibus vestigiis verberum b Livie hist l. 2. shewing withall upon his back the miserable prints which the whip had left This made the people murmur and at last to mutinie and in tumultuous manner minaciter magis quam suppliciter rather with threats then supplications to require the Senate to take some course for their relief resolving otherwise to go no more unto the wars serve the State who would The Senate promised fair as there was good cause the Volsci pressing hard upon them to their very gates and by that promise won the people and obtained a victorie But when the wars were done and performance looked for in stead of finding a redress of their former grievances the rigor of the law took place creditoribus tradibantur and they were seised on by their Creditors as in former times the Senate thinking it unreasonable to make the law submit to the necessities of particular men and against law to defraud any man of the debts which were due unto them c Dionys
assured the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 z Id. ibid. that he would humble the Nobility and bring down their pride and 't was no reason that such a man as he should be disappointed and not be master of his word Martius being banished at the last their next bout was with Appius Claudius a constant and professed enemy of the popular faction one who had openly took part against them in behalf of Martius and after seeing them apprehend some Gentlemen who opposed their insolencies had openly denied jus esse Tribuno in quenquam nisi in plebeium a Livie l. 2. that they could exercise their power on any but the Commons only Him therefore they accused of Treason or at least sedition in that he had intrenched upon their authority which was made sacred by the Lawes and doubtlesse had condemned him to some shameful punishment had he not died before his triall Which victory on Martius and the death of Appius did so discourage the Nobility and puffe up the Tribunes that from this time forwards as the Historian doth observe the Tribunes cited whom they listed to answer for themselves before the people and to submit their lives to their finall sentence which as it did increase the power of the popular faction in the depressing of the Nobles and weakning the authority of the Senate so did it open them a way to aim at and attain to all those dignities in the Common wealth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 b Dionys Halicarn l. 7. which were most honourable in themselves and had formerly belonged to the Patricians and to none but them And yet the Senate and Nobility did not so give over but that sometimes they put them in remembrance of their first conditions and challenged them of breaking all those bonds and Covenants which were so solemnly agreed on and accepted by them at the first erection of their Office For this did Fabius presse upon them when they went about to make some Law for the restraint and regulating of the power of the Consuls viz. that their authority was given them ad auxilium singulorum for the relief of such particulars as did want their help not for the ruine of the publick and that they should do well to bethink themselves c Livie l. 3. Tribunos plebis se creatos non hostes Patribus that they were chosen Tribunes to protect the people not enemies to oppresse the Senate And the expostulation of the Senate was both just and necessary when they demanded of the Tribunes on the same occasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d Dionys Halicarn l. 10. who gave them power to introduce new Lawes and subvert the old and told them in plain terms they had broke their Covenants and that they were not made upon such conditions as to do all things that they listed nor to do any thing at all but only to protect the poor and preserve the Commons from oppression Which put together makes it a most evident truth that in the creation of the Tribunes there was nothing lesse intended then to curb the Senate or to set up a power to oppose the Consuls as vainly and seditiously is supposed by CALVIN though true it is they did abuse their power with the Common people and the authority of their office to suppresse them both 5. And this they were resolved to do although they had no other way to effect the same then by raising seditions in the State and putting the people into Arms upon all occasions at which they were so perfect and so constant in it that seldome the whole year went round without some tumult or sedition of their setting forward as will appear to any one who is versed in Livie If they held quiet for one year as they seldom did till they had brought the City under their obedience they broke out in the next that followed with the greater violence and when the course of the distemper was so intermitted that it held not alwaies a Quotidian it proved a Tertian Feaver or at most a Quartan and therefore like to tarry longer with the afflicted Patient How many seditions did they raise about the law Agaria of which Livie tels us that it was never moved e Hâ—st Rom. l. 2. sine maximis motibus without great tumults and dissensions How many tumults did they raise to oppose the Consuls when they had any wars in hand and were to press the Souldier to pursue those wars How often finde we in that Author Tribunitium bellum domi territare patres f Id. lib. 3. that when the Fathers had no wars abroad they found a Tribunitian war at home which did more affright them how often finde we them complaining non ultra ferri posse Tribunitios furores g Id. lib. 4. that the insolencies of the Tribunes were no longer sufferable and that they could not look to be without continual alarms and renewed distractions whilest the seditions and the authors of them did succeed so prosperously Nay they were so accustomed to it that having had some intermission and that no otherwise obtained but by yeelding all things to the people which they had a minde to Livie takes notice of it as a thing observable permultos annos esse h Id. lib. 10. that many years had intervened since the Patricians and the Tribunes had their last contention And all this while they managed their seditions by the tongues end only seldom proceeding unto blowes and much lesse to bloud But when the two Gracchi came in play and attained the Office they fell from words to blowes and from blowes to murther Tiberius one of the two Brothers and many of his friends and followers being tumultuously slain in the Common Forum as he was acting the part of a busie and seditious Tribune whom Caius the other of the two not long after followed both in life and death And this saith the Historian initium in urbe Roma Civilis sanguinis gladiorumque impunitatis fuit i Velleius Patercul hist was the first time that the sword was suffered to range at liberty in the streets of Rome and to be discoloured with the bloud of the Citizens their differences before that day though not often afterwards being determined by parlies but not by bloudshed Which being put together and considered seriously it will appear to be no Paradox which we finde in Florus where he affirmeth Seditionum omnium causas Tribunitiam potestatem excitasse k Florus histor Rom. l. 3. that the Tribunitian power was the source and fountain of all those seditions wherewith the quiet of the State had been disturbed Nor was it said by Quintius without very good reason that the authority of the Tribunes in seditione ad seditiones nata was born in a sedition and to raise seditions * Cicero de Legibus l. 3. that it was pestifera potestas a pestilent pernicious office and that Pompey did exceeding ill
persisting in their former obstinacy excluso e Parliamento Clero Consilium Rex cum solis Baronibus populo habuit totumque statim Clerum protectione sua privavit d Antiqu. Brit. in R. Winchelsey the King saith the Historian excluding the Clergy out of the Parliament advised with his Barons and his people only what was best to be done by whose advise he put the Clergy out of his protection and thereby forced them to conform to his will and pleasure This is the summa totalis of the business and comes unto no more but this that a particular course was advised in Parliament on a particular displeasure taken by the King against the body of his Clergy then convened together for their particular refusal to contribute to his wants wars the better to reduce them to their natural duty Which makes not any thing at all against the right of Bishops in the House of Peers or for excluding them that House or for the validity of such Acts as are made in Parliament during the time of such exclusion especially considering that the King shortly after called his States together and did excuse himself for many extravagant Acts which he had committed e Walsingâ— in Edw. 1. anno 1297. against the liberties of the Subject whereof this was one laying the blame thereof on his great occasions and the necessities which the wars which he had abroad did impose upon him And so much as in Answer unto that Record supposing that the words thereof be rightly senced as I think they are not and that by Clerus there we are to understand Arch-bishops and Bishops as I think we be not there being no Record I dare boldly say it either of History or Law in which the word Clerus serves to signifie the Arch-bishops and Bishops exclusive of the other Clergy or any writing whatsoever wherein it doth not either signifie the whole Clergy generally or the inferiour Clergy only exclusive of the Arch-bishops Bishops and other Prelates Therefore in answer unto that so much applauded Cavil of Excluso Clero from what Record soever it either hath been hitherto or shall hereafter be produced I shall propose it to the consideration of the sober Reader whether by Clerus in that place or in any other of that kind and time we must not understand the inâ—eriour Clergy as they stand distinguished in the Laws from my Lords the Bishops For howsoever it be true that Clerus in the ecclesiastical notion of the word doth signifie the whole Clergy generally Arch-bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons yet in the legal notion of it it stands distinguished from the Prelates and signifieth only the inferiour Clergy Thus do we find the Ecclesiasticks of this Realm divided into Prelates men of Religion and other Clerks 3. Edw. 1. c. 1. the Seculars either into Prelates and Clerks 9 Edw. 2. c. 3. 1 Rich. 2. c. 3. or Prelates and Clerks beneficed 18 Edw. 3. c. 2. or generally into the Prelates and the Clergy 9 Edw. 2. c. 15. 14 Edw. 3. c. 1 3. 18 Edw. 3. 2. 7. 25 Edw. 3. 2. 4. 8 Hen. 6. c. 1. and in all acts and grants of Subsidies made by the Clergy to the Kings or Queens of England since the 32 of Henry 8. when the Clergy subsidies first began to be confirmed by act of Parliament So also in the Latin ideom which comes neerest home Nos Praelati Clerus in the submission of the Clergy to King Henry 8. f Regist Waâ—ham and in the sentence of divorce against Anne of Cleve g Regist Cranmer and in the instrument of the grant of the Clergy subsidies presented to the Kings of England ever since the 27 of Queen Elizabeth and in the form of the Certificates per h Statut. 8 Eliz. c. 17. ever since Praelatâ—s Clerum returned by every Bishop to the Lord High Treasurer and finally Nos Episcopi Clerus Cantuariensis Provinciae in hac Synodo more nostro solito dum Regni Parliamentum celebratur congregati i Stat. 1 Phil. Mar. c. 8. in the petition to K. K. Phillip and Mary about the confirmation of the Abby lands to the Patentees So that though many Statutes have been made in these later times excluso Clero the Clergy that is to say the inferiour Clergy being quite shut out and utterly excluded from those publick Counsails yet this proves nothing to the point that auy act of Parliament hath been counted good to which the Bishops were not called or at the making of which Act they either were shut out by force or excluded by cunning As for Kilbancies book which that Author speaks of k Prerâ—g pract of Paâ—l p. 38. in which the Justices are made to say 7 H. 8. that our Soveraign Lord the King may well hold his Parliament by him and his Temporal Lords and by the Commons also without the Spiritual Lords for that the Spiritual Lords have not any place in the Parliament chamber by reason of their Spiritualties but by reason of their Temporal possessions besides that it is only the opinion of a privat man of no authority or credit in the Common wealth and contrary to the practice in the Saxon times in which the Bishops sate in Parliament as Spiritual persons not as Barons the reason for ought I can see will serve as well to pretermit all or any of the Temporal Lords as it can serve to pretermit or exclude the Bishops the Temporal Lords being called to Parliament on no other ground than for the Temporal possessions which they hold by Barony 9. If it be said that my second answer to the argument of Excluso Clero supposeth that the inferiour â—lergy had some place in Parliament which being not to be supposed makes the Answer void I shall crave leave to offer some few observations unto the consideration of the sober and impartial Reader by which I hope to make that supposition probable and perhaps demonstrative First then we have that famous Parliament call it Concilium magnum or Concilium commune or by what other name soever the old writers called it summoned by King Ethelbert anno 605. which my l Concil Hen. Spelm. Author calleth Commune concilium tam Cleri quam Populi where Clerus comprehendeth the body of the Clergy generally aswell the Presbyters as the Bishops as the word populus doth the lay-subject generally as well Lords as Commons or else the Lords and Commons one of the two must be needs left out And in this sense we are to understand these words in the latter times as where we read that Clerus m Matth. Paris in Hen. 1. Angliae populus Vniversus were summoned to appear at Westminster at the Coronation of King Henry the first where divers Laws were made and declared subscribed by the Arch-bishops Bishops and others of the principal persons that were there assembled that Clero populo
convocato n Rog. Hov. in Hen 2. the Clergy and people of the Realm were called to Clarendon anno 1163. by King Henry the second for the declaring and confirming of the Subjects liberties that in the year 1185 towards the later end of the said Kings reign Convocatus est Clerus populus cum tota Nobilitate ad fontem Clericorum o Matth. paris in Hen. 2. the Clergy Commons and Nobility were called unto the Parliament held at Clerkenwell and finally that a Parliament was called at London in which the Arch-bishop of Canterbury was present cum toto Clero tota secta Laicali p Quadrilog ap Selden Tit. of Hon. pt 2. c. 5. in the time of King John Hitherto then the Clergy of both ranks and orders as well as Populus or tota secta Laicalis the Subjects of the Laity or the Lords and Commons had their place in Parliament And in possession of this right the Clergy stood when the Magna Charta was set out by King Henry the 3d wherein the freedoms rights and privileges of the Church of England of which this evidently was one was confirmed unto her q Magna Charta cap. 1. of the irrefragable and inviolable authority whereof we have spoke before The Cavill of Excluso Clero which hath been used against the voting of the Bishops in the house of Peers comes in next for proof that the inferiour Clergy had their place or vote with the house of Commons if in those times the Lords and Commons made two houses which I am not sure of the Clergy could not be excluded in an angry fit or out of a particular design to deprive them of the benefit of the Kings protection if they had not formerly a place amongst them if we will not understand by Clerus the inferior Clergy which much about that time as before we shewed began to be the legâ—l English of the word we must needs understand the whole Clergy generally the Clergy of both ranks and orders But our main proofs are yet to come which are these that follow First it is evident that antiently the Clergy of each several Diocese were chargeable by Law for the expences of their Proctors in attending the service of the Parliament according as the Counties were by Common law since confirmed by Statute 23 H. 6. c. 11. to bear the charges of their Knights the Burroughs and Cities of their Representees which questionless the Laws had not taken care for but that the Clergy had their place in Parliament as the Commons had And this appears by a Record z Rotul Parent 26 Ed. 3. pt 1. M. 22. of 26 of King Edward the 3d. in which the Abbat of Leieester being then but never formerly commanded to attend in Parliament amongst others of the Regular Prelates petitioned to be discharcharged from that attendance in regard he held in Frank-Almoigne only by no other tenure Which he obtained upon this condition ut semper in Procuratores ad hujusmodi Parliamenta mittendot consentiat ut moris est eorundem expensis contribuat that is to say that he and his Successors did give their voyces in the choyse of such Procuratours as the Clergy were to send to Parliament and did contribute towards their charges as the custom was Next in the Modus tenendi Parliamentum which before we spake of there is amodus convocandi Clerum Angliae ad Parl. Regis r Modus tenendi Parl. Mâ— a form of calling the English Clergy that is the Prelates Clergy as John Selden e renders it to the Court of Parliament said to be used in the time of Edward the Son of Ethelred s V. Titles of hon pt 2. presented to the Conquerour and by him observed which shews the Clergy in those times had their place in Parliament Which being but a general inference shall be delivered more particularly from the Modus it self which informs us thus Rex est caput principum finis Parliamenti c. t Modus tenendi Parl. Ms. c. 12. The King is the head the beginning and end of the Parliament and so he hath not any equal in the first degree the second is of Arch-bishops Bishops and Priors and Abbats holding by Barony the third is of Procurators of the Clergy the fourth of Earls Barons and other Nobles the fifth is of Knights of the Shire the sixt of Citizens and Burgesses and so the whole Parliament is made up of these six degrees But the said Modus tells us more and goeth more particularly to work than so For in the ninth chapter speaking of the course which was observ'd in canvassing hard and difficult matters it telleth us that they used to choose 25 out of all degrees like a grand Committee to whose consideration they referred the point that is to say two Bishops and three Proctors for the Clergy two Earls three Barons five Knights five Citizens and as many Burgesses And in the 12th that on the fourth day of the Parliament the Lord high Steward the Lord Constable and the Lord Marshal were to call the house every degree or rank of men in its several Order and that if any of the Proctors of the Clergy did not make appearance the Bishop of the Diocese was to be fined 100 l. And in the 23d chapter it is said expresly that as the Knights Citizens Burgesses in things which do concern the Commons have more authority than all the Lords so the Proctors for the Clergy in things which do concern the Clergy have more authority than all the Bishops Which Modus if it be as antient as the Norman Conquerour as both Sir Edward Coke conceiveth u Preface to the 9th part of Reports and the title signieth it sheweth the Clergies claim to a place in Parliament to be more antient than the Commons can pretend unto but if no older than the reign of King Edward third as confidently is affirmed in the Titles of Honour x Titles of hon pt 2. c. 5. if sheweth that in the usage of those later times the Procurators of the Clergy had a right and place there as well as Citizens and Burgesses or the Knights of the Shires And this is further proved by the writs of Summons directed to the Arch-bishops and Bishops for their own comming to the Parliament in the end whereof there is a clause for warning the Dean and Chapter of their Cathedralls and the Arch-deacons with the whole Clergy to be present at it that is to say the Deans and Arch-deacons personally the Chapter and Clergy in their Proctours then and there to consent to such Acts and Ordinances as shall be made by the Common counsail of the Kingdom The whole clause word for word is this y Extant ibid. pt 2. c. 5. Praemunientes Priorem Capitulum or Decanum Capitulum as the case might vary Ecclesiae vestrae N. ac Archidiacanos totumque Clerum vestrae Dioceseos
in number nor more obvious than those of our Kings serving their turns by and upon their Parliaments as their occasions did require For not to look on higher and more Regal times we find that Richard the 2d a Prince not very acceptable to the Common people could get an Act of Parliament t 21 Ric. 2. to confirm the extrajudicial opinion of the Iudges given before at Notingham that King Henry 4th could by an other Act reverse all that Parliament u 1 Hen 4. entayl the Crown to his posterity and keep his Dutchy of Lancaster and all the Lands and Seigneuries of it from being united to the Crown that King Edward the 4th could have a Parliament to declare all the Kings of the House of Lancaster to be Kings in fact but not in right x 1 Ed. c. 1. and for uniting of that Dutchy to the Crown Imperial notwithstanding the former Act of separation that King Richard the 3d. could have a Parliament to bastardize all his Brothers Children to set the Crown on his own head though a most bloody Tyrant and a plain Usurper y Speeds hist in K. Richard 3. that King Henry 7. could have the Crown entayled by an Act of Parliament to the issue of his own body z Verulam hist of K. Hen 7. without relation to his Queen of the house of York which was conceived by many at that time to have the better Title to it another for paying a Benevolence which he had required of the subject a 11 Hen. 7. c. 10. though all Benevolences had been damned by a former Statute made in the short but bloody reign of King Richard the 3d. that King Henry 8. b 65 Hen. 8. c. 22 28. c. 7. 35 H. 8. c. 1. could have one Act of Parliament to bastardry his Daughter Mary in favour of the Lady Elizabeth another to declare the Lady Elizabeth to be illegitimate in expectation of the issue by Queen Jane Seymour a third for setling the succession by his Will and Testament and what else he pleased that Queen Mary could not only obtain several Acts in favour of her self and the Sâ—e of Rome c 1 Mar. sâ—s 2. c. 1 2. 1. 2 Ph. M. c. 8. 10. but for the setling of the Regency on the King of Spain in case the Children of that Bed should be left in nonage And finally that Queen Elizabeth did not only gain many several Acts for the security of her own Person which were determinable with her life but could procure an Act to be passed in Parliament for making it high treason to affirm and say That the Queen could not by Act of Parliament bind and dispose the Rights aâ—d Titles which any person whatsoever might have to the Crown d 13 Eliz. c. 1. And as for raising monies and amassing treasures by help of Parliaments he that desires to know how well our Kings have served themselves that way by the help of Parliaments let him peruse a book intituled the Privilege of Parliaments writ in the manner of Dialogue between a Privy Counsellor and a Iustice of Peace and he shall be satisfied to the full Put all that hath been said together and sure the kingdom of England must not be the place in which the three Estates convened in Parliament have power to regulate the King or restain his actions or moderate his extravagances or where they can be taxed for perâ—idious treachery if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the Common-people or otherwise abuse that power which the Lord hath given them Calvin was much mistaken if he thought the contrary or if he dreamt that he should be believ'd on his ipse dixit without a punctual enquiry into the grounds and probability of such a dangerous intimation as he lays before us 13. But against this it is objected that Parliaments have disposed of the Militia of the Kingdom of the Forts Castles Ports and the Navie Royal not only without the Kings leave but against his liking that they have deposed some Kings and advanced others to the top of the Regal Throne And for the proof of this they produce examples out of the reign of K. Henry 3. K. Edw. 2. and K. Richard the 2. e Prynnes Book of Parl. part 2. Examples which if rightly pondered doe not so much prove the power as the weakness of Parliaments in being carried up and down by the privat conduct of every popular pretender For 't is well known that the Parliaments did not take upon them to rule or rather to over-look K. Henry 3. but as they were directed by Simon Montfort Earl of Leicester who having raised a potent faction in the State by the assistance of the Earls of Glocester Hereford Derby f Maâ— Paris Henr. 3. and some others of the great Lords of the kingdom compelled the King to yeeld unto what terms he pleased and made the Parliaments no other than a means and instrument to put a popular gloss on his wretched purposes And 't is well known that the ensuing Parliaments which they instance in moved not of their own accord to the deposing of King Edward the 2. or King Richard the 2. but sailed as they were steered by those powerfull Counsels which Queen Isabel in the one and Henry Duke of Lancaster in the other did propose unto them g Walsingham in Hist Angl. Hypodig Neustriae It was no safe resisting those as their cold wisdoms and forgotten loyalties did suggest unto them qui tot legionibus imperarent who had so manany thousand men in arms to make good their project and they might think as the poor-spirited Citizens of Samaria did in another case but a case very like the present Behold two Kings stood not before him how then can we stand h 2 Kings 10. 4. For had it been an argument of the power of Parliaments that they deposed one King to set up another dethroned King Richard to advance the Duke of Lancaster to the Regal diadem they would have kept the house of Lancaster in possession of it for the full demonstration of a power indeed and not have cast them off at the first attempt of a new plausible pretender declared them to be kings in fact but not in right whose lawfull right they had before preferred above all other titles and set the Crown upon the heads of their deadly Enemies In the next place it is objected that Parliaments are a great restraint of the Soveraign power according to the Doctrine here laid down by Calvin in that the King can make no laws nor levy any money upon the Subject but by the counsel and assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament But this objection hurts as little as the former did For Kings to say the truth need no laws at all In all such points wherein they have not bound themselves by some former laws