But those judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity to bind still not by virtue of that Sanction but by virtue of common principles of equity which certainly in the present shortness of humane reason cannot be fetched from a clearer Fountain then those Laws which once came from the Fountain of Goodness none of whose constitutions can any ways be supposed to deviate from the exactest rules of Justice and Equity And upon this very ground too some part of the fourth Commandment is abrogated and the other continues to bind still For the reason of the Ceremonial and occasional part is ceased and the reason of what was Moral continues Therefore the School-men say right of the Sabbath day Cultus est à naturâ modus à lege virtuâ— Ã Gratiâ Nature dictates that God should be worshipped the Law informs what day and time to spend in his worship Grace must enable us to perform that worship on that day in a right manner And because the same reason for Gods Worship continueâ— still therefore it is a Precept of the Natural Law that God should be worshipped What time precisely must be spent in Gods Worship as one day in seven though the reason be evident to nature of it when it is made known yet it is hard to conceive that Nature could have found out the precise determination of the time Although I must confess the general consent of Nations as to the seventh part if it were fully cleared would speak fair to be the voice of Nature or at least a tradition received from the Sons of Noah which if so will be an evidence of the observation of the Sabbath before the Children of Israels being in the Wilderness But granting that the seventh part of time was a positive Law of God yet I say it binds immutably because there is as strong a reason for it now as ever and Ratio immutabilis praecepti facit praeceptum immutabile This I take to be the sense of those who distinguish between morale positivum and morale naturale i. e. that some things are so moral that even Nature its self can discover them as that God should be worshipped Other things are so moral that though the reason of them be founded in Nature yet there wants Divine Revelation to discover them to us but when once discovered are discerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reason And these when thus discovered are as immutably obligatory as the other because the reason of them is immutable And of this nature is the determination of the particular time for Gods worship and limitation of it to one day in seven But what was in that Precept meerly occasional as the first and original ground of its limitation to the seventh in order Gods resting on that day from the work of Creation and the further ground of its inforcement to the Jews viz. their deliverance out of Egypt these being not immutâ—ble but temporary and occasional may upon as great ground given and approved of God for that end as is evident by the Apostles practice be sufficient reason of the alteration of the seventh day to the first day of the week By this may briefly be seen how irrationally those speak who say we have no further ground for our observation of the Lords day now then for other arbitrary Festivals in the Church viz. The Tradition of the Church of God I grant the Tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apostolical practice but the ground of our observation of the Lords day is not the Churches Tradition but that Apostolical practice conveyed by Universal Tradition which setting aside the Festivals observed upon the Lords days can very hardly be â—ound for any other But supposing Universal Tradition for other Festivals I say here Tradition is not only used as a testimony and instrument of conveyance as in the other case of the Lords day but is it self the only argument and the very ground of the original observation Between which two what a wide difference there is let any rational man judge But for a further clearing this observation we must consider that the reason of the Command which we say is the measure of its obligation must not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures among whom dreams often pass for reasons but it must be either expressed in the Law its self or deducible by apparent and easie collection from it as is plain in the Decrees of the Apostles about things strangled and offered to Idols where the reason of the Command is plainly implied to wit for present compliance with the Jews and therefore no sooner did the reason of the Command cease but the obligation of it ceased too but of this more afterwards This is one way then to discern the difference between positive Laws as to the obligation of them by the ground and reason of the Command And therefore it is well observed by Divines which further confirms what I now prove that no Command doth bind against the reason of the Command because it is not the words but the sense and reason of a Command which hath the greatest obligatory force Therefore Tully tells us that the ratio juris legislatoris consilium is the best Interpreter of any Law who excellently and largely proves that the reason of the Law is the Law and not the words So much for the first Rule Secondly Another way to know when Positive Laws are immutable is when Gods Will is expresly declared that such Laws shall bind immutably For it being granted on all hands that God may bind us to those things which are left indifferent by the Law of Nature and likewise for what term he please the only inquiry left is to see in his Word whether he hath so bound us or no and if he hath whether he hath left it in mans power to revoke his Laws For as to Positive Laws expresly laid down in Scripture the ground of which is only as the Jews speak 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the will of the King i. e. Gods own pleasure without any reason or occasion of it else expressed or necessarily implied these do bind immutably unless the same Power which commanded them doth again revoke them For we cannot in any wise conceive that the wise God should after the declaring his own will leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible Being to determine or dispence with the obligation of his own Laws Which to do and instead of them to enforce others immediately upon the Consciences of men as standing Laws is an attempt beyond that of the Gyants against heaven or the men at Babel that being only an affectation of reaching heaven but this an actual usurpation of Gods supreme and legislative power and authority But though man hath nor God alwayes reserves to himself a power to relax interpret and dispence with his own positive Laws which imply no repugnancy to his own nature And this
positive Laws for God being the Supreme Governour of the World hath the Legislative Power in his hands to bind to the performance of what duties be please which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Nature and Goodness Hence arise all those positive Laws of God which we have in Scripture for God's end in his written Law was that man should have a Copy of all Divine constitutions by him that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker The Precepts of the Law of Nature are by the Jews call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 absolutely without any addition because they are of such things as do perpetually bind which because they are known to all by natural light they sometimes call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praecepta scientia and being that their righteousness is so evident and apparent they call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verba rectitudinis but the clearest difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature and other positive commands is that which the famous Is. Casaubon takes notice of out of the Jewish Doctors Observant doctissimi è Rabbinis inter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hanâ— esse differentiam quod Mitsvoth sive prâ—ceptorum ratio aperta est ut Deum cole Honora patrem matrem at Chukim statuta sive decreta earum rerum esse dicunt quarum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratio soli Deo sit nota ut Circumcisionis similium The reason of the Laws of Nature is evident but of positive Laws there is no reason to be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non est alia praeter decretum regis no other account to be given of them but the will of God The Laws of Nature are by the LXX often call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so used Rom. 2. 16. by Iustin Martyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Iosephus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but Gods positive Laws are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thence we read of Zachary and Elizabeth Luke 1. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. walking in all the Ordinances and Commandments of God blameless and those are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by S. Paul Ephes. 2. 15. the Law of Commandments in Ordinances Now although this difference be not always observed in the words in Scripture yet there is a vast difference between the things themselves though both equally commanded by God That which is most to our present purpose to observe is that Positives being mutable and alterable in themselves a bare Divine Command is not sufficient to make them immutable unless there be likewise expressed that it is the Will of God that they should always continue This was that which the Jews stumbled at so much and do to this day because they are assured their Law came once from God therefore it must of necessity have a perpetual obligation as may be seen in their two great Doctors Maimonides and Abarbinel who both of them make the Eternity of the Law one of the Fundamental Articles of their Creed But Abarbinel splits this Article into two whereof the first is that the Law of Moses shall never be changed the other that no other Law shall come instead of it The original of which grand errour is from want of observing the difference between things commanded by God some of which are good and therefore commanded others commanded and therefore good In which latter if the reason of the Command ceaseth the Command its self obligeth no longer As the Ceremonial Law was to be their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is not meant in regard of the sharp severe nature of the Law to drive them unto Christ as it is by many interpreted but the Law is a Paedagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct as it signified him whose office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School as a learned man observes This being then the office of the Law when the Church was now entred into Christs School the office of this Paedagogue then ceased And so the Ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all exspiring of its self at Christs coming as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes Only because the Jews were so hardly perswaded that it should exspire the believing Jews conceiving at first the Gospel came rather to help them to obey the Law of Moses then to cancel the obligation of it therefore it was necessary that a more honourable burial should be given to it and the Apostles should pro rostris declare more fully that believers were freed from that yoke of Ceremonies under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned so long It appears then that a positive Law coming from God doth not meerly by virtue of its being enacted by God bind perpetually all persons unless there be a Declaration of Gods Will adjoyned that it should do so It will be here then well worth our inquiry to find out some 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or notes of difference whereby to know when positive laws bind immutably when not I shall â—ay down these following First when the same reason of the Command continues still then we cannot conceive how that which was instituted upon such an account as remains still should not have the same force now which it had at first That positive Law under which Adam was in his state of Innocency touching the forbidden fruit did not bind any longer then his fall because the reason of the Command ceased which was the tryal of mans obedience For which God made choice of a very facile and easie Command according to that rule of Politicians In minimis obedientiae periculum faciunt Legislatores of which they give this rational account Quia legislatoris ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda est ratio quà m rei de quâ lex est lata thence arose that Law of the Ephori at Sparta barbam tondere to which no other reason was annexed but this obtemperare legibus to learn them to obey the Laws This was Gods aim in that easie Command given to Adam to make thereon an experiment of mans willingness to obey his Maker and wherein man soon lost that Obsequii gloria as he in Tacttus calls it which as Pliny saith is in to major quod quis minus velit But had this Law been a standing Law for all mankind it would have continued its obligation still but since we see that it was only a personal temporary probative precept for no sooner was man fallen but its obligation ceased So likewise those precepts of the Judicial Law which immediately respected the Commonwealth of the Jews as such their obligation reacheth not to Christians at all nor as it is generally conceived to the Jews themselves when out of the Consines of their own Countrey because the reason of those Laws doth neither descend to Christians nor did travel abroad with the Jews
power is alwayes to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it which is done either by the annexing an Oath on a Promise which the Apostle calls the two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie For though God be free to promise yet when he hath promised his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance in which sense I understand those who say God in making promises is bound only to himself and not to men that is that the ground of performance ariseth from Gods faithfulness For else if we respect the right coming by the promise that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance But the case is otherwise in penal Laws which thoughâ— never so strict do imply a power of relaxation in the Legislator because penall Laws do only constitute the debstum poenae and bind the sinner over to punishment but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of faln man because it was a penal Law and therefore relaxable But because the debt of punishment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law therefore satisfaction was necessary to God as Law-giver either by the person himself or another for him because it was not consistent with the holiness of Gods nature and his wisdom as Governor to relax an established Law without valuable consideration Now for the third kind of Gods Laws besides promissory and penall viz such as are meerly positive respecting duties which become such by vertue of an express command these though they be revocable in themselves yet being revocable only by God himself and his own power since he hath already in his Word fully revealed his Will unlesse therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease they continue irreversible This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament which being commands meerly positive yet Christ commanding Christians as Christians to observe them and not as Christians of the first and second Ages of the Church his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them then that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the observance of them For al though the Socinians say that Baptism was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who professe themselves the admirers of it For Christs Command nowhere implying such a limitation and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation as obligatory as ever we have no reason to think that Christs command doth not reach us now especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call and consequently the same duty required which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws is when the things commanded in particular are necessary to the being succession and continuance of such a Society of men professing the Gospel as is instituted and approved by Christ himself For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what Society he please and appoint what Orders he please to be observed by them what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members into his Church in their continuing in it in the way means manner of ejection out of it in the preserving the succession of his Church and the administration of Ordinances of his appointment These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this Society they are thereby of a nature as unalterable as the duty of observing what Christ hath commanded is How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed will appear afterwards Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded viz either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature concurring with the rules of the written word or upon express positive Laws of God whose reason is immutable or which God hath declared shall continue as necessary to the being of the Church The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are brought for a Divine Right which are either Scripture examples or Divine acts or Divine approbation For Scripture-examples First I take it for granted on all hands that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them such are the Mediatory acts of Christ the Heroical acts of extraordinary persons all accidentall and occasionall actions Example doth not bind us as an example for then all examples are to be followed and so we shall of necessity go quà itur non quà eundum walk by the most examples and not by rule There is then no obligatory force in example it self Secondly there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind and when not for otherwise there can be no discrimination put between examples which we are to follow and which to avoid This rule must be either immediately obligatory making it a duty to follow such examples or else directive declaring what examples are to be â—ollowed And yet even this latter doth imply as well as the former that the following these examples thus declared is become a duty There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty and consequently it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such example which gives a Divine Right to those examples and not barely the examples themselves We are bound to follow Christs example not barely because he did such and such things for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility patience self-denyal c. and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation When men speak then with so much confidence that Scripture-examples do bind us unalterably they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty which I have shewn already to be absurd or else that the morall nature of the action done in that example or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example though in its self it be of no morall nature If the former of these two then it is the morality of the action binds us without its being incarnate in the example For the example in actions not morall binds not at all and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it and consequently it is the morality of the action which binds and not the example If the latter the rule making it our duty then it it is more apparent that it is not the example which
binds necessarily but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty And so it evidently appears that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves and resolved into one of the two former the morall nature of the action or a positive Law And therefore those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-examples must either produce the morall nature of these examples or else a rule binding us to follow those examples Especially when these examples are brought to found a New positive Law obliging all Christians necessarily to the end of the world Concerning the binding nature of Apostolicall practice I shall discourse largely afterwards The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right is by Divine Acts. As to this â—t is again evident that all Divine Acts do not constitute such a Right therefore there must be something expressed in those Acts when such a Divine Right follows them whence we may infallibly gather it was Gods intention they should perpetually oblige as is plain in the cases instanced in the most for this purpose as Gods resting on the seventh day making the Sabbath perpetual For it was not Gods resting that made it the Sabbath for that is only expressed as the occasion of its institution but it was Gods sanctifying the day that is by a Law setting it apart for his own service which made it a duty And so Christs resurrection was not it which made the Lords day a Sabbath of Divine Right but Christs resurrection was the occasion of the Apostles altering only a circumstantiall part of a morall duty already which being done upon so great reasons and by persons indued with an insallible spirit thereby it becomes our duty to observe that morall command in this limitation of time But here it is further necessary to distinguish between acts meerly positive and acts donative or legall The former conâ—er no right at all but the latter do not barely as acts but as legall acts that is by some declaration that those acts do conserr right And so it is in all donations and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legall title to it without express transferring of dominion and propriety with it Thus in Christs delivering the Keys to Peter and therest of the Apostles by that act I grant the Apostles had the power of the Keyes by Divine Right but then it was not any bare act of Christ which did it but it was only the declaration of Christs will conferring that authority upon them Again we must distinguish between a right conferâ—'d by a donative act and the unalterable nature of that Right for it is plain there may be a Right personall as well as successive derivative and perpetuall And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Christ unless it be made appear it was Christs intention that Right should be perpetuall if it oblige still For otherwise the extent of the Apostolical Commission the power of working miracles as well as the power of the Keyes whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty or a power authoritative and penall must continue still if a difference be not made between these two and some rule sound out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is personall when successive Which rule thus found out must make the Right unalterable and so concerning us and not the bare donative act of Christ For it is evident they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apostles by an act of Christ and if some continue still and others do not then the bare act of Christ doth not make an unalterable Divine Right And so though it be proved that the Apostles had superiority of order and jurisdiction over the Pastors of the Church by an act of Christ yet it must further be proved that it was Christs intention that superiority should continue in their successors or it makes nothing to the purpose But this argument I confess I see not how those who make a necessary Divine Right to follow upon the acts of Christ can possibly avoid the force of The last thing pleaded for Divine Right is Divine approbation but this least of all constitutes a Divine Right For if the actions be extraordinary Gods approbation of them as such cannot make them an ordinary duty In all other actions which are good and therefore only commendable they must be so either because done in conformity to Gods revealed Will or to the nature of things good in themselves In the one it is the positive Law of God in the other the Law of Nature which made the action good and so approved by God and on that account we are bound to do it For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his Will revealed or natural which Will and Law of his is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right i. e. perpetually binding as to the observation of it But for acts of meerly positive nature which we read Gods approbation of in Scripture by vertue of which approbation those actions do oblige us in this case I say it is not Gods meer approbation that makes the obligation but as that approbation so recorded in Scripture is a sufficient testimony and declaration of Gods intention to oblige men And so it comes to be a positive Law which is nothing else but a sufficient declaration of the Legislators will and intention to bind in particular actions and cases Thus now we have cleared whereon a necessary and unalterable Divine Right must be founded either upon the Law of Nature or some positive Law of God sufficiently declared to be perpetually binding CHAP. II. Six Hypotheses laid down as the basis of the following Discourse 1. The irreversible obligation of the Law of Nature either by humane or Divine positive Laws in things immediately flowing from it 2. Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God where there is no prohibition by positive Laws inlarged into 5 subservient Propositions 3. Divine positive Laws concerning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of Nature must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law 4. Things undetermined both by the naturall and positive Laws of God may be lawfully determined by the supream authority in the Church of God 5. What is thâ—â— determined by lawfull authority doth bind the consciences of men subject to that authority to obedience to those determinations 6. Things thus determined by lawfull authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed by the same authority HAving shewed what a Divine Right is and whereon it is founded our next great inquiry will be How far Church-Government is founded upon Divine Right taken either of these two wayes
for the internal acts of Worship for he can neither add to that Rule nor dissolve the obligation of it nor yet can he force the consciences of men the chief seat of Religion it being both contrary to the nature of Religion its self which is a matter of the greatest freedom and internal liberty and it being quite out of the reach of the Magistrates Laws which respect only external actions as their proper object for the obligation of any Law can extend no further then the jurisdiction and authority of the Legislator which among men is only to the outward actions But then if we consider Religion as it is publikely owned and professed by a Nation the supreme Magistrate is bound by vertue of his office and authority not only to defend and protect it but to restrain men from acting any thing publikely tending to the subversion of it So that the plea for liberty of conscience as it tends to restrain the Magistrates power iâ— both irrationall and impertinent because liberty of conscience is the liberty of mens judgements which the Magistrate cannot deprive them of For men may hold what opinions they will in their minds the Law takes no cognizance of them but it is the liberty of practice and venting and broaching those opinions which the Magistrates power extends to the restraint of And he that hath the care of the publike good may give liberty to and restrain liberty from men as they act in order to the promoting of that good And as a liberty of all opinions tends manifestly to the subverting a Nations peace and to the embroyling it into continual confusions a Magistrate cannot discharge his office unlesse he hath power to restrain such a liberty Therefore we find plainly in Scripture that God imputes the increase and impunity of Idolatry as well as other vices to the want of a lawful Magistracy Iudges 17. 5 6. where the account given of Micahs Idolatry was because there was no King in Israel which implies it to be the care and duty of Magistrates to punish and restrain whatever tends to the opposing and subverting the true Religion Besides I cannot find any reason pleaded against the Magistrates power now which would not have held under David Solomon Asa Iehosophat Hezekias Iosias or other Kings of the Jews who asserted the publike profession to the extirpation to what opposed it For the plea of Conscience taken for mens judgements going contrary to what is publikely owned as Religion it is indifferently calculated for all Meridians and will serve for a Religion of any elevation Nay stiff and contumacious Infidels or Idolaters may plead as highly though not so truly as any that it goes against their judgements or their conscience to own that Religion which is established by authority If it be lawfull then to restrain such notwithstanding this pretence why not others whose doctrine and principles the Magistrate judgeth to tend in their degree though not so highly to the dishonouring God and subverting the profession entertained in a Nation For a mans own certainty and confidence that he is in the right can have no influence upon the Magistrate judging otherwise only if it be true it wil afford him the greater comfort and patience under his restraint which was the case of the primitive Christians under persecutions The Magistrate then is bound to defend protect and maintain the Religion he owns as true and that by vertue of his office as he is Custos utriusque tabulae The maintainer of the honour of Gods Laws which cannot be if he suffer those of the first Table to be broken without any notice taken of them Were it not for this power of Magistrates under the Gospel how could that promise be ever made good that Kings shall be nursing Fathers to the Church of God unlesse they mean such Nursing Fathers as Astyages was to Cyrus or Amulius to Romulus and Remus who exposed their nurslings to the Fury of wild Beasts to be devoured by them For so must a Magistrate do the Church unlesse he secure it from the incursion of Hereticks and the inundation of Seducers But so much for that which is more largely asserted and proved by others The Magistrate then hath power concerning Religion as owned in a Nation Secondly We must distinguish between an external and objective power about matters of Religion and an internal formal power which some call an Imperative and Elicitive power others a power of Order and a power of Jurisdiction others potestas Ecclesiastica and potestas circa Ecclesiastica or in the old distinction of Constantine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power of things within and without the Church the sense of all is the same though the terms differ The internal formal Elicitive power of Order concerning things in the Church lies in authoritative exercise of the Ministerial Function in preaching the Word and administration of Sacraments but the external objective Imperative power of Jurisdiction concerning the matters of the Church lies in a due care and provision for the defence protection and propagation of Religion The former is only proper to the Ministry the latter to the Supreme Magistracy For though the Magistrate hath so much power about Religion yet he is not to usurp the Ministerial Function nor to do any proper acts belonging to it To which the instance of Uzzias is pertinently applied But then this takes nothing off from the Magistrates power for it belongs not to the Magistrate imperata facere but imperare facienda as Grotius truly observes not to do the things commanded but to command the things to be done From this distinction we may easily understand and resolve that so much vexed and intricate Question concerning the mutual subordination of the Civil and Ecclesiastical power For as Peter Martyr well observes these two powers are some wayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are conversant several wayes about the same thing but the Functions of both of them must be distinguished For the Pastors of the Church are not to administer Justice but it is their duty to declare how Justice should be rightly administred without partiality or oppression So on the other side the Magistrate must not preach the Gospel nor administer Sacraments but however must take care that these be duly done by â—hose to whose Function it belongs But for a clearer making it appear these things are to be considered both in a Magistrate and Minister of the Gospel In a Magistrate the Power it self and the Person bearing that Power The power it self of the Magistrate is no ways subordinate to the Power of the Ministry Indeed if we consider both Powers in reference to their objects and ends there may be an inferiority of Dignity as Chamier calls it in the civil power to the other considered abstractly but considering it concretely as lodged in the persons there is an inferiority of Subjection in the Ecclesiastical to the Civil But still the person
two We distinguish then between a power declarative of the obligation of former Laws and a power authoritative determining a New Obligation between the office of counselling and advising what is fit to be done and a power determining what shall be done between the Magistrates duty of consulting in order to the doing it and his deriving his authority for the doing it These things premised I say First that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws and of consulting and advising the Magistrate for setling of New Laws for the Policy of the Church belongs to the Pastors and Governours of the Church of God This belongs to them as they are commanded to teach what Christ hath commanded them but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church but rather a tying them up to the commands of Christ already laid down in his Word For a power to bind mens consciences to their determinations lodged in the Officers of the Church must be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right or else only from the consent of parties For any Law of God there is none produced with any probability of reason but that Obey those that are over you in the Lord. But that implies no more then submitting to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Gospel and to those whom Christ hath constituted as Pastors of his Church wherein the Law of Christ doth require obedience to them that is in looking upon them and owning them in their relation to them as Pastors But that gives them no authority to make any new Laws or Constitutions binding mens consciences any more then a Command from the Supreme authority that inferiour Magistrates should be obeyed doth imply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them But thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Ecclesiastical Constitutions though they neither bind by virtue of the matter nor of the authority commanding there being no legislative power lodged in the Church yet in respect of the circumstances and the end they should be obey'd unlesse I judge the thing unlawfull that is commanded rather then manifest open contempt of the Pastors of the Church or being a scandall to others by it But as to the other power arising from mutual compact and consent of Parties I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact not by vertue of any Supream binding power in them but from the free consent of the parties submitting which is most agreeable to the Nature of Church-power being not coactive but directive and such was the confederate discipline of the primitive Church before they had any Christian Magistrate And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd Canons and not Laws Secondly Though it be the Magistrates duty to consult with the Pastors of the Church to know what is most agreeable to the Word of God for the settlement of the Church yet the Magistrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their sentence decree and judgement but doth by vertue of his own power cause the obligation of men to what is so determin'd by his own enacting what shall be done in the Church The great use of Synods and Assemblies of Pastors of Churches is to be as the Council of the Church unto the King in matters belonging to the Church as the Parliament is for matters of civil concernment And as the King for the settling civil Laws doth take advice of such persons who are most versed in matters of Law so by proportion of reason in matters concerning the Church they are the fittest Council who have been the most versed in matters immediately belonging to the Church In the management of which affairs as much if not more prudence experience judgement moderation is requisite as in the greatest affairs of State For we have found by dolefull experience that if a fire once catch the Church and Aarons Bells ring backward what a Combustion the whole State is suddenly put into and how hardly the Churches Instruments for quenching such fires lachrymae preces Ecclesiae do attain their end The least peg serued up too high in the Church soon causeth a great deal of discord in the State and quickly puts mens spirits out of Tune Whereas many irregularities may happen in the State and men live in quietnesse and peace But if Phaâ—tons dâ—ive the Chariot of the Sun the World wil be soon on fire I mean such in the Church whose brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn Such who have more fury then zeal and yet more zeal then knowledge or Moderation Persons therefore whose calling â—temper office and experience hath best acquainted them with the State-actions Policy of the primitive Church and the incomparable Prudence and Moderation then Used are fittest to debate consult deliberate and determine about the safest expedients for repairing breaches in a divided broken distracted Church But yet I say when such men thus assembled have gravely and maturely advised and deliberated what is best and fitted to te done the force strength and obligation of the things so determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Magistrate for taking the Church as incorporated into the civill state as Ecclesia est in republicâ non respublica in Ecclesia according to that known speech of Optatus Milivetanus so though the object of these constitutions and the persons determining them and the matter of them be Ecclesiasticall yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civill So Peter Martyr expresly Nam quod ad potestatem Ecclesiasticam attinet satis est civilis Magistratus is enim â—urare debet ut omnes officium faciant But for the judgement of the reformed Divines about this see Vedelius de Episcopatis Constant. M Officium Magistratus Christiani annexed to Grotius de Imper. c. I therefore proceed to lay down the reason of it First That whereby we are bound either to obedience or penalty upon disobedience is the ground of the obligation but it is upon the account of the Magistrates power that we are either bound to obedience or to submit to penalties upon disobedience For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magistrate that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Constitutions Because it is not the particular determinations made by the civil Magistrate which do immediately bind Conscience but the general Law of Scripture requires it as a duty from us to obey the Magistrate in all things lawfull Obedience to the Magistrate is due immediately from Conscience but obedience to the Laws of the Magistrate comes not directly from Conscience but by vertue of the general obligation And therefore disobedience to the Magistrates Laws is an immediate sin against Conscience because it is against the general obligation but obedience to particular Laws ariseth not immediately from the obligation of Conscience to
sit conditio Iudaeorum qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverint legalibus tamen sarcinis non humanis praesumptionibus subjiciuntur For although we cannot positively say how such things as these do manifestly iâ—â—pugn our Faith yet in that they load our Religion with such servile burdens which the mercy of God hath left free for all other observations but the celebration of some few and most clear Sacraments that they make our condition worse then that of the Iews for they although strangers to Gospel Liberty had no burdens charged upon them by the Constitutions of men but only by the Law and Commands of God Which Sentence and Reason of his I leave to the most Impartial Judgement of every true sober minded Christian. And thus I am at last come through this Field of Thorns and Thistles I hope now to find my way more plain and easie So much for the fourth Hypothesis The two next will be discharged with lesser trouble Hypoth 5. What is left undetermined both by Divine Positive Laws and by Principles deduced from the Natural Law if it be determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God doth bind the Conscience of those who are subject to that Authority to Obedience to those Determinations I here suppose that the matter of the Law be something not predetermined either by the Law of Nature or Divine Positive Lawâ— for against either of these no Humane Law can bind the Conscience For if there be any moral evil in the thing Commanded we are bound to obey God rather than men in which case we do not formally and directly disobey the Magistrate but we chuse to obey God before him And as we have already observed a former Obligation from God or Nature destroys a latter because God hath a greater Power and Authority over mens Consciences then any Humane Authority can have And my Obedience to the Magistrate being founded upon a Divine Law it must be supposed my duty to obey him first by virtue of whose Authority I obey another then the other whom I obey because the former hath commanded me If I am bound to obey an Inferiour Magistrate because the Supreme requires it if the Inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the Supreme I am not bound to obey him in it because both the derives his Power of Commanding and I my Obligation to Obedience from the Authority of the Supreme which must be supposed to do nothing against it self So it is between God and the Supreme Magistrate By him Kings reign God when he gives them a Legislative Power doth it cumulativè non privativè not so as to deprive himself of it nor his own Laws of a binding force against his So that no Law of a Magistrate can in reason bind against a Positive Law of God But what is enacted by a Lawful Magistrate in things left undetermined by Gods Laws doth even by virtue of them bind men to Obedience which require Subjection to the Higher Powers for Conscience sake So that whatsoever is left indifferent Obedience to the Magistrate in things indifferent is not And if we are not bound to obey in things undetermin'd by the Word I would â—ain know wherein we are bound to obey them or what distinct Power of Obligation belongs to the Authority the Magistrate hath over men For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws therefore either there must be a distinct Authority without Power to oblige or else we are effectually bound to whatsoever the Magistrate doth determine in lawful things And if it be so in general it must be so as to all particulars contained in that general and so in reference to matters of the Church unless we suppose all things concerning it to be already determined in Scripture which is the thing in Question and shall be largely discussed in its due place Sixthly Hypoth 6. Things undetermined by the Divine Law Natural and Positive and actually determined by lawful Authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed according to the different ages tempers inclinations of men by the same Power which did determine them All Humane Constitutions are reversible by the same Power which made them For the Obligation of them not arising from the matter of them but from the Authority of the Person binding are consequently alterable as shall be judged by that Power most sutable to the ends of its first promulgation Things may so much alter and times change that what was a likely way to keep men in Unity and Obedience at one time may only inrage them at another The same Physick which may at one time cure may at another only inrage the distemper more As therefore the Skill of a Physitian lies most in the application of Physick to the several tempers of his Patients So a wise Magistrate who is as Nicias said in Thucydides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Physitian to cure the distempers of the body Politick and considers as Spartian tells us Adrian used to say in the Senate Ita se Rempub. gesturum ut sciret populirem esse non propriam that the Peoples Interest is the main care of the Prince will see a necessity of altering reforming varying many Humane Constitutions according as they shall tend most to the ends of Government either in Church or State Thence it is said of the several Laws of Nature Divine and Humane that Lex naturae potest poni sed non deponi Lex divina nec poni nec deponi Lex humana poni deponi The Law of Nature may be laid down as in case of Marriage with Sisters in the beginning of the world but not laid aside the Law of God can neither be laid down nor laid aside but Humane Laws both may be laid down and laid aside Indeed the Laws of the Medes and Persians are said to be unalterable but if it be meant in the sense it is commonly understood in yet that very Law which made them unalterable for they were not so of their own Nature was an alterable Law and so was whatever did depend upon it I conclude then whatever is the subject of Humane Determination may lawfully be alter'd and changed according to the wisdome and prudence of those in whose hands the care of the Publick is Thus then as those things which are either of Natural or Christian Liberty are subjected to Humane Laws and restraints so those Laws are not irreversible but if the Fences be thrown down by the same Authority which set them up whatever was thereby inclosed returns to the Community of Natural Right again So much for these Hypotheses which I have been the longer in explaining and establishing because of the great influence they may have upon our present Peace and the neer concernment they have to this whole Discourse the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon these Foundations CHAP. III. How
Did it make it self or was it made by a greater Power then it if it made its self it must be and not be at the same time it must be as producing and not be as produced by that Act. And what is become of our Reason now There must be then a Supream Eternal Infinite Being which made the world and all in it which hath given Nature such a Touch of its own immortality and dependance upon God that Reason capable of Religion is the most proper distinctive Character of man from all Inferior beings And this Touch and Sense being common to the whole Nature they therefore incline more to one anothers Society in the joynt performance of the common Duties due from them to their Maker And so Religion not onely makes all other Bonds firm which without it are nothing as Oaths Covenants Promises and the like without which no civill Society can be upheld but must of its self be supposed especially to tye men in a nearer Society to one another in reference to the proper Acts belonging to its self Thirdly it appears from the greater honour which redounds to God by a sociable way of Worship Nature that dictates that God should be worshipped doth likewise dictate that worship should be performed in a way most for the honour and glory of God Now this tends more to promote Gods honour when his service is own'd aâ— a publike thing and men do openly declare and profess themselves his Subjects If the honour of a King lies in the publikely professed and avowed obedience of a multitude of Subjects it must proportionably promote and advance Gods honour more to have a fixed stated Worship whereby men may in a Community and publike Society declare and manifest their homage and fealty to the supream Governour of the World Thus then we see the light of Nature dictates there should be a society and joyning together of men for and in the Worship of God CHAP. IV. The second thing the Law of Nature dictates that this society be maintained and governed in the most convenient manner A further inquiry what particular Orders for Government in the Church come from the Law of Nature Six laid down and evidenced to be from thence First a distinction of some persons and their superiority over others both in power and order cleared to be from the Law of Nature The power and application of the power distinguished this latter not from any Law of Nature binding but permissive therefore may be restrained Peoples right of chosing Pastors considered Order distinguished from the form and manner of Government the former Natural the other not The second is that the persons imployed in the Service of God should have respect answerable to their imployment which appears from their Relation to God as his Servants from the persons imployed in this work before positive Laws Masters of Families the first Priests The Priesthood of the first born before the Law discussed The Arguments for it answered The Conjunction of Civil and Sacred Authothority largely shewed among Egyptians Grecians Romans and others The ground of Separation of them afterwards from Plutarch and others THe second thing which the Light of Nature dictates in reference to Church-Government is That the Society in which men joyn for the Worship of God be preserved mantained and governed in the most convenient manner Nature which requires Society doth require Government in that Society or else it is no Society Now we shall inquire what particular Orders for Government of this Society established for the Worship of God do flow from the light of Nature which I conceive are these following First To the maintaining of a Society there iâ— requisite a Distinction of Persons and a Superiority of Power and Order in some over the other If all be Rulers every man is sui juris and so there can be no Society or each man must have power over the other and that brings confusion There must be some then invested with Power and Authority over others to rule them in such things wherein they are to be subordinate to them that is in all things concerning that Society they are entered into Two things are implyed in this First Power Secondly Order By Power I mean a right to Govern by Order the Superiority of some as Rulers the Subordination of others as ruled These two are so necessary that no Civil Society in the World can be without them For if there be no Power how can men Rule If no Order how can men be ruled or be subject to others as their Governours Here several things must be heedfully distinguished The Power from the Application of that Power which we call the Title to Government The Order it self from the form or manner of Government Some of these I Assert as absolutely necessary to all Government of a Society and consequently of the Church considered without positive Laws but others to be accidentall and therefore variable I say then that there be a Governing Power in the Church of God is immutable not onely by Vertue of Gods own Constitution but as a necessary result from the dictate of Nature supposing a Society But whether this Power must be derived by Succession or by a free Choice is not at all determined by the Light of Nature because it may be a lawful Power and derived either way And the Law of Nature as binding onely determines of necessaries Now in Civil Government we see that a lawfull Title is by Succession in some places as by Election in other So in the Church under the Law the Power went by lineal Descent and yet a lawful Power And on the other side none deny setting aside positive Lawes but it might be as lawful by choice and free Election The main Reason of this is that the Title or Manner of conveying Authority to particular Persons is no part of the preceptive Obligatory Law of Nature but onely of the permissive and consequently is not immutable but is subject to Divine or Humane positive Determinations and thereby made alterable And supposing a Determination either by Scripture or lawful Authority the exercise of that Natural Right is so far restrained as to become sinful according to the third Proposition under the 2. Hypoth and the 5. Hypoth So that granting at present that people have the Right of choosing their own Pastors this Right being only a part of the Permissive Law of Nature may be lawfully restrained and otherwise determined by those that have lawfull authority over the people as a Civil Society according to the 5. Hypoth If it be pleaded that they have a right by divine positive law that law must be produced it being already proved that no bare Example without a Declaration by God that such an Example binds doth constitute a Divine Right which is unalterable We say then that the manner of investing Church-Governours in their Authority is not Determined by the Law of Nature but that there should
be a Power Governing is supposing a Society of the immutable Law of Nature because it is that without which no Society can be maintained And this is one of those things which are of the Law of Nature not in an absâ—lute state of Liberty but supposing some Acts of Men which once supposed become immutable and indispensable As supposing Propriety every Man is bound to abstain from what is in anothers Possession without his consent by an immutable Law of Nature which yet supposeth some Act of Man viz. the voluntary introducing of Propriety by consent So supposing a Society in being it is an immutable dictate of the Law of Nature that a Power of Government should be maintained and preserved in it So I say for the second thing Order This as it implies the Subordination of some in a Society to others as their Rulers is immutable and indispensable but as to the Form whereby that Order should be preserved that is whether the Government should be in the hands of one or more is no wise Determined by the Obligatory Law of Nature because either of them may be lawfull and usefull for the ends of Government and so neither necessary by that Law For as to the Law of Nature the Case is the same in Civil and Religious Societies Now who will say that according to the Law of Nature any form of Government Monarchy Aristocracy Democracy is unlawfull These things are then matters of Naturall Liberty and not of Naturall necessity and therefore must be examined according to positive Determinations of Divine and Humane Lawes where we shall speak of it This then is clear as to our purpose That a power in the Church must be constantly upheld and preserved fitly qualified for the ends of Government is an immutable Law so that this power be lodged in some particular Persons to act as Governours and so distinct from others as subordinate to them but whether the Power of Government come from People by Election or from Pastors by Ordination or from Magistrates by Commission and Delegation whether one two or all these wayes is not determined by Naturall Law but must be looked for in Gods positive Laws if not there neither to be found we must acquiesce in what is determined by lawful Authority The same I say again as to forms of Government whether the Power of sole Jurisdiction and Ordination be invested in one person above the rank of Presbyters or be lodged in a Colledge acting in a pâ—rity of Power is a plea must be removed from the Court of common Law of Nature to the Kings Bench I mean to the positive Lawes of God or the Supream power in a Common-wealth There being no Statutes in the Law of Nature to determine it it must be therefore Placitum Regis some positive Law must end the controversie We therefore traverse the Suit here and shall enter it at the other Court The second thing dictated by the Law of Nature is That the persons imployed in the immediate Service of God and entrusted with the Power of governing the Society appointed for that end should have respect paid them answerable to the Nature of their imployment This appears to have foundation in the Law of Nature being easily deducible from one of the first principles of that Law that God is to be worshipped if so then those whose imployment is chiefly to attend upon himself ought to have greater Reverence then others By the same Reason in Nature that if we do honour the King himself the nearer any are to the Kings Person in attendance and imployment the greater honour is to be shewed them The ground of which is that the honour given to servants as such is not given to their persons but to their Relation or to the one only upon the account of the other and so it doth not fix and terminate upon themselves but rebounds back and reflects upon the Original and Fountain of that Honour the Prince himself So if any be honoured upon the account of their immediate imployment in the service of God it is God who is chiefly honour'd and not they it being the way men have to expresse their honour to God by shewing it proportionably and respectively to those who either represent him or are imployed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Chrysostome speaks in this very case The honour pâ—sseth through them to God himself Where he largely proves this very thing from the Egyptians sparing the Lands of their Priests and argues at least for an equality of honour from reason to be given to those who serve the true God Nay he is so far from looking upon it as part of their superstition that he mounts his argument à pari to one à minori ad majus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is As much as truth exceeds errour and the servants of God do the Idol-priests so much let the honour we give to them exceed that which was given by the Heathen to theirs But we have a further evidence of the honourablenesse of this imployment by the light of Nature from the persons imployed in this work before any positive Laws did restrain it For I say not that the Law of Nature doth dictate that the function of those imployed in this work should be differenced from all other that is done by Divine positive Laws but the honour of those in that function is from the Law of Nature which appears hence in that in the eldest times those who had the greatest authority civil had likewise the sacred conjoyned with it For as Aristotle rightly observes that the originall of civil Government was from private families so in those families before they came to associate for more publike worship the Master of the family was the Priest of it Thence we read of Noahs sacrificing Abrahams duty to instruct his family and his own command for offering up his Son we read of Iacobs sacrificing and Iobs and so of others Every Master of the family then was the High Priest too and governed his family not only as such but as a religious Society Afterwards from what institution we know not but certainly the reason of it if it were so was to put the greater honour upon the eldest son it is generally conceived that the first-born had the Priesthood of the Family in their possession till the time of the Leviticall Law The Jewish Doctors think that was the Birthright which Iacob procured from his Father and which Abraham gave to Isaac when it is said that he gave him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all that he had For saith Postellus if it be meant in a literall sense how could he give those gifts to his other Sons which are mentioned before Wherefore he conjectures by that All is meant the spiritual knowledge of Christ which he calls Intellectus generalis which might be more proper to him as Priest of the family But the plain meaning is no more than
when Abraham had bestowed Legacies on his other Children he left Isaac haredem ex asse his lawfull heir I am unwilling to deny a Tradition so generally received among both Jewish and Christian Writers as the Priesthood of the first-born before the Law but this I say I cannot yet find any other ground for it but Tradition no place of Scripture giving us sufficient evidence for it and many against it That which serves sufficiently for the consutation of it is that observation of Theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is to be observed that the younger are alwayes preferred before the first-born Which he takes notice of from the case he there speaks to of Ephraim and Manasses and so runs it up to Abel preferr'd before Cain Seth before Iapheth Abraham before his elder brethren Isaac before Ismael Iacob before Esau Iudas and Ioseph before Reuben Moses before Aaron and David before the rest of his Brethren although that was after the Law That place which gives the greatest countenanc◠to the opinion is Numbers 3. 41. And thou shalt take the Levites for me instead of the first-born where it seems that the first-born were formerly the Priests in whose room the Levites were taken But with submission to better judgements I can see nothing implyed in this place but only that God having delivered their first-born in Egypt Exodus 12. 23. and calling for them to be sanctified to him Exodus 13. 2. upon the account of the propriety he had in them in a peculiar manner by that deliverance and not on the account of any speciall service for many were very unfit for that by reason of age and which is observable God requires as well the first-born of beasts both to be sanctified and redeemed Numbers 3 41. therefore God now setling a way of Worship he gave the Israelites liberty to redeem them and instead of them pitched on the Tribe of Levi for his own service Another plac◠is Exodus 24. 5. where the young men are mentioned that offered burnt-offering It is confessed that the Chaldee Paraphrast and Arabick Version understand here the First-born but however the place implyes no more then that they were employed to bring the sacrifices for so the Septuagint render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or else that they were employed as the Popae only to kill the Sacrifices for we see the sprinkling of the blood which was the main thing intended here as a foederal rite was done by Moses himself who was the High priest of the people as well as Prince till Aaron and his sons were set a part which was not till Exodus 28. 1 2. and yet Aaron was three years elder then Moses Exod. 7. 7. which is an evidence that Aaron as first-born was not the Priest for till his consecration Moses and not Aaron performed the offices of Priesthood Thence we read Psalm 99. 6. Moses and Aaron among his Priests For although the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sometimes attributed to those in civill authority 1 as 2 Samuel 8. 18. compared with 1 Chron. 18. 17. and 2 Sam. 26. 26. Gen. 41. 50. Exodus 2. 16. Iob 12. 19. yet there is no reason so to understand it of Moses And further the ground why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was attributed to both Prince and Priest before the Law was because the same person might be both as the Priests of Egypt were Princes too Gen. 41. 50. But for Moses we read not only of the title but the proper offices of Priests attributed to him as sacrificing Exodus 24. 5. consecrating Aaron and his sons Exodus 29. 35. and therefore Aben Ezra upon that Psalm forecited calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the High Priest This Priest-hood of Moses leads us to another evidence of the honour of those who were employed in the service of God which is that when Families encreased and many associated into a Common-wealth though the private service might belong to the master of the Family yet the publike before positive Laws restraining it was most commonly joyned with the civill power That Melchizedek was both King and Priest in Salem if with the Jews we conclude he was Som which we have little reason for it will be a greater evidence Sem being then the greatest Potentate Living But we passe from him to other Nations after the dispersion to see where the power over religious Societies was generally held In Egypt we find that their Priests were often made Kings as Plutarch observes out of Hecataeus and is confessed by Strabo Diodorus and others Of the Greeks the same Plutarch gives us a large testimony that among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Priesthood was accounted of equal dignity with the Kingdom The same doth Aristotle in severall places of his Politicks and particularly of the Spartans of whom Herodotus adds that the Priest-hood of Iupiter Coelestis and Lacedaemonius did alwayes belong to the Kings own person For the old Latins Virgils Anius is sufficient and among the Romans after the powers were separated the Pontifex Max. had royal state his cella'curulis and Lictores as the Consuls had only their Priests medled not in civill affairs of which Plutarch gives a double reason the impossibility of minding both imployments as they should do and so must either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neglect the Worship of the Gods or else 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wrong the people with the neglect of the administration of justice The other reason is because those that were imployed in civill affairs were put upon execution of justice and it was no wayes fit a man should come reeking from the blood of Citizens to go and sacrifice to the Gods This conjunction of civill and sacred power is attested by Clemens Alexandrinus of the most civilized Heathens so likewise by Synesius of the most ancient Nations by Strabo of the Ephesians by the Roman Historians of the Roman Emperours who from Augustus to Gratian and some say after continued the title of Pontifex Maximus among the rest of the Imperiall Honours Thus much then may serve to manifest how the Honour of those persons who are im 〈…〉 e service of God and the Governme 〈…〉 is a dictate of the Law of 〈…〉 CHAP. V. The third thing dictated by the Law of Nature is the solemnity of all things to be performed in this Society which lies in the gravity of all Rites and Ceremonies in the composed temper of mind Gods worship rationall His spirit destroyes not the use of reason The Enthusiastick Spirit discovered The circumstantiating of fit time and place for Worship The seventh day on what account so much spoken of by Heathens The Romans Holy dayes Cessation of labour upon them The solemnity of Ceremonies used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silence in Devotions Exclusion of unfit persons Solemnity of discipline Excommunication among the Iews by the sound of a Trumpet amongst Christians by a Bell. THe next
were not such particular Organized Churches but they were as the first matter of many congregations to be propagated out of them which after made one Society consisting of those several congregations imbodyed together and ruled by one common Government As in a Colledge every Tutor hath his own Pupils wich he rules and if we suppose but one Tutor at first in the Colledge with his Pupils all the power both common to the Society and peculiar to his Flock is joyned together but when there are many more Tutors having Pupils under their charge all these for their better ordering as a Society must be governed by the common Government of the Colledge to which the particular Government of every Tutor is and must be subordinate But this will be more fully made appear in the Original of Civil Government It is far more evident that all Civil power lay at first in Adam and his Family and afterwards in particular Families than that all Church-power lay in particular congregations at first We may then with as good Reason say that there is no lawfull civil Government now but that of particular Families and that no Nationall Government hath any right or power over particular Families because Families had once all civil Power within themselves as because it â—â— supposed that all Church-power lay first in particular congregations therefore there must be no Church-power above them nor that particular congregations are subject to such Government as is requisite for the Regulating of the Society in common as comprehending in it many particular congregations Let them shew then how any Government in the State is lawfull when Families had the first power and by what right now those Families are subordinate to the civill Magistrate and what necessity there is for it and by the very same Reasons will we shew the lawfulness of Government in the Church over many Congregations and that those are by the same right and upon the same necessity to subordinate themselves to the Government of the Church considereâ—â—â— a Society taking in many particular Congregations The Parallel runs on further and clearer still For as the heads of the severall Families after the Flood had the command over all dwelling under their Roofs while they remained in one Family and when that increased into more there power was extended over them too which was the first Original of Monarchy in the World So the Planters of the first Churches that while the Church was but one Congregation had power over it when this Congregation was multiplyed into more their Power equally extended over them all And as afterwards several heads of Families upon their increase did constitute distinct Civil Governments wherein were subordinate Officers but those Governments themselves were co-ordinate one with another So in the Church so many Congregations as make up one Provincial or National Society as succession and prudence doth order the bounds of them do make up several particular Churches enjoying their Officers ruling them but subordinare to the Governours of the Church in common Which Society National or Provincial is subordinate to none beyond its self but enjoyes a free Power within its self of ordering things for its own Government as it judgeth most convenient and agreeable to the Rules of Scripture The summe then of what I say concerning subordination of Officers and Powers in the Society of the Church is this That by the light and Law of Nature it appears that no individuall company or Congregation hath an absolute independent power within its self but that for the redressing grievances happening in them appeals are 〈…〉 to the parties aggrieved and a subordination of that particu 〈…〉 Congregation to the Government of the Society in common 〈…〉 at the right of Appealing and Originall of Subordination is from Nature the particular manner and form of subordinate and superiour Courts is to be fetched from positive Lawes the limitation of Appeals extent of jurisdiction the binding power of Sentence so far as concerns external Unity in the Church is to be fetched from the power of the Magistrate and civil Sanctions and Constitutions The Churches power as to Divine Law being onely directive and declarative but being confirmed by a civil Sanction is juridicall and obligatory Concerning the Magistrates power to call confirm alter repeal the Decrees of Synods see Grotius Chamier Whitaker Casaubon Mornay and others who fully and largely handle it To whom having nothing to add I will take nothing at all from them As for that time when the Church was without Magistrates ruling in it in those things left undetermined by the Rule of the Word they acted out of Principles of Christian Prudence agreeable to the Rules of Scripture and from the Principles of the Law of nature One of which we come in the next place to speak to So much for the Churches Power considered as a Society for ending controversies arising within its self tending to break the Peace and Unity of it CHAP. VII The fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature That all that are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Lawes and Rules of it Civil Societies founded upon mutual consent express in the first entrance implicite in others born under societies actually formed Consent as to a Church necessary the manner of Consent determined by Christ by Baptism and Profession Implicite Consent supposed in all baptized explicite declared by challenging the priviledges and observing the duties of the Covenant Explicite by express owning the Gospel when adult very usefull for recovering the credit of Christianity The Discipline of the Primitive Church cleared from Origen Iustin Martyr Pliny Tertullian The necessary requisites of Church Membership whether positive signs of Grace Explicite Covenant how far necessary not the formal Constitution of a Church * proved by several Arguments THe Law of Nature dictates That all who are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of that Society according to its Constitution For none can be looked upon as a Member of a Society but such a one as submits to the Rules and Laws of the Society as constituted at the time of his entrance into it That all civil Societies are founded upon voluntary consent and agreement of parties and do depend upon Contracts and Covenants made between them is evident to any that consider that men are not bound by the Law of Nature to associate themselves with any but whom they shall judge fit that Dominion and Propriety was introduced by free consent of men and so there must be Laws and Bonds fit agreement made and submission acknowledged to those Lawes else Men might plead their Naturall Right and Freedom still which would be destructive to the very Nature of these Societies When men then did first part with their natural Liberties two things were necessary in the most express terms to be declared First a free and voluntary consent to part with
so not in subordination to any other Tribe for they had the heads of their Fathers as well as others Exodus 6. 25. and although when they were setled in Canaan their habitations were intermixt with other Tribes in their forty eight Cities yet they were not under the government of those Tribes among whom they lived but preserved their authority and government intire among themselves And therefore it was necessary there should be the same form of government among them which there was among the rest The whole body of the Nation then was divided into thirteen Tribes these Tribes into their several families some say seventy which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 these Families were divided into so many Housholds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their Housholds into persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 over the several persons were the several Masters of Families over the several Housholds were the Captains of 1000 and 100 50 10. Over the Families I suppose were the heads of the Fathers And over the thirteen Tribes were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chief Fathers of the Tribes of the Children of Israel Numb 32. 28. and we have the names of them set down Numb 34. 17 c. So that hitherto we find nothing peculiar to this Tribe nor proper to it as employed in the service of God For their several Families had their several Heads and Eleazar over them as chief of the Tribe And so we find throughout Numbers 2. all the Heads of the several Tribes are named and appointed by God as Eleazar was The only things then which seem proper to this Tribe were the superiority of the Priests over the Levites in the service of God and the supereminent power of the High Priest as the type of Christ. So that nothing can be inferred from the order under the Law to that under the Gospel but from one of these two And from the first there can be nothing deduced but this that as there was a superiority of Officers under the Law so likewise should there be under the Gospel which is granted by all in the superiority of Priests over Deacons to whom these two answer in the Church of God in the judgement of those who contend for a higher order by divine Institution above Presbyters And withall we must consider that there was under that order no power of jurisdiction invested in the Priests over the Levites but that was in the heads of the Families and ordination there could not be because their office descended by succession in their several Families Those who would argue from Aarons power must either bring too little or too much from thence Too little if we consider his office was typical and ceremonial and as High Priest had more immediate respect to God then men Heb. 5. 1. and therefore Eleazar was appointed over the several Families during Aarons life-time and under Eleazar his son Phinehas Too much If a necessity be urged for the continuance of the same authority in the Church of God which is the argument of the Papists deriving the Popes Supremacy from thence Which was acutely done by Pope Innocentius the third the Father of the Lateran Council who proved that the Pope may exercise temporall jurisdiction from that place in Deuteronomy 17. 8. and that by this reason because Deuteronomy did imply the second Law and therefore what was there written in Novo Testamento debet observari must be observed under the Gospel which according to them is a new Law All that can be inferred then from the Jewish pattern cannot amount to any obligation upon Christians it being at the best but a judicial Law and therefore binds us not up as a positive Law but only declares the equity of the thing in use then I conclude then That the Jewish pattern is no standing Law for Church-Government now either in its common or peculiar form of Government but because there was some superiority of order then and subordination of some persons to others under that government that such a superiority and subordination is no wayes unlawfull under the Gospel for that would destroy the equity of the Law And though the form of Government was the same with that of other Tribes yet we see God did not bind them to an equality because they were for his immediate service but continued the same way as in other Tribes thence I inferr that as there is no necessary obligation upon Christians to continue that form under the Jews because their Laws do not bind us now so neither is there any repugnancy to this Law in such a subordination but it is very agreeable with the equity of it it being instituted for peace and order and therefore ought not to be condemned for Antichristian The Jewish pattern then of Government neither makes equality unlawfull because their Laws do not oblige now nor doth it make superiority unlawfull because it was practised then So that notwithstanding the Jewish pattern the Church of Christ is left to its own liberty for the choyce of its form of Government whether by an equality of power in some persons or superiority and subordination of one order to another CHAP. IV. Whether Christ hath determined the form of Government by any positive Laws Arguments of the necessity why Christ must determine it largely answered as First Christs faithfulness compared with Moses answered and retorted and proved that Christ did not institute any form of Church Government because no such Law for it as Moses gave and we have nothing but general Rules which are applyable to several forms of Government The office of Timothy and Titus what it proves in order to this question the lawfulnesse of Episcopacy shewn thence but not the necessity A particular form how far necessary as Christ was the Governour of his Church the similitudes the Church is set out by prove not the thing in question Nor the difference of Civil and Church Government nor Christ setting Officers in his Church nor the inconvenience of the Churches power in appointing new Officers Every Minister hath a power respecting the Church in common which the Church may restrain Episcoâ—acy thence proved lawfull the argument from the Scriptures perfection answered VVE come then from the Type to the Antitype from the Rod of Aaron to the Root of Iessâ— from the Pattern of the Jewish Church to the Founder of the Christian To see whether our Lord Saviour hath determined this controversie or any one form of government for his Church by any universally binding act or Law of his And here it is pleaded more hotly by many that Christ must do it than that he hath done it And therefore I shall first examine the pretences of the necessity of Christs determining the particular form and then the arguments that are brought that he hath done it The main pleas that there must be a perfect form of Church-government laid down by Christ for the Church of God are from the
as yet strangers to the Covenant of promise and aliens from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 society of Christians And here I conceive a mistake of some men lies when they think the Apostles respected onely the Ruling of those which were already converted for though this were one part of their work yet they had an eye to the main Design then on foot the subjecting the World to the Obedience of Faith in order to which it was necessity in places of great resort and extent to place not onely such as might be sufficient to superintend the Affairs of the Church but such as might lay out themselves the most in Preaching the Gospel in order to converting others Haveing laid down these things by way of premisal we will see what advantage we can make of them in order to our purpose First then I say that in Churches consisting of a small number of Believers where there was no great probability of a large increase afterwards One single Pastour With Deacons under him were onely constituted by the Apostles for the ruling of those Churches Where the work was not so great but a Pastour and Deacons might do it what need was there of having more and in the great scarcity of fit Persons for setled Rulers then and the great multitude and necessity of unfixed Officers for preaching the Gospel abroad many persons fit for that work could not be spared to be constantly Resident upon a place Now that in some places at first there were none placed but onely a Pastour and Deacons I shall confirm by these following Testimonies The first is that of Clement in his Epistle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Apostles therefore preaching abroad through Countreys and Cities ordained the First-fruits of such as believed having proved them by the Spirit to be Bishops and Deacons for them that should afterwards believe Whether by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we understand Villages or Regions is not material for it is certain here the Author takes it as distinct from Cities and there is nothing I grant expressed where the Apostles did place Bishops and Deacons exclusive of other places i. e. whether onely in Cities or Countreys but it is evident by this that where-ever they planted Churches they ordained Bishops and Deacons whether those Churches were in the City or Countrey And here we find no other Officers setled in those Churches but Bishops and Deacons And that there were no more in those Churches then he speaks of appears from his Designe of paralleling the Church-Officers in the Gospel to those under the Law and therefore it was here necessary to enumerate all that were then in the Churches The main controversie is what these Bishops were whether many in one place or onely one and if but one whether a Bishop in the modern Sense or no. For the first here is nothing implying any necessity of having more then one in a place which will further be made appear by and by out of other Testimonies which will help to explain this As for the other thing we must distinguish of the Notion of a Bishop For he is either such a one as hath none over him in the Church or he is such a one as hath a power over Presbyters acting under him and by authority derived from him If we take it in the first Sense so every Pastor of a Church having none exercising jurisdiction over him is a Bishop and so every such single Pastor in the Churches of the Primitive times was a Bishop in this Sense as every Master of a Family before Societies for Government were introduced might be called a King because he had none above him to command him but if we take a Bishop in the more proper Sense for one that hath power over Presbyters and People such a one these single Pastors were not could not be For it is supposed that these were onely single Pastors But then it is said that after other Presbyters were appointed then these single Pastors were properly Bishops but to that I answer First they could not be proper Bishops by vertue of their first Constitution for then they had no power over any Presbyters but onely over the Deacons and People and therefore it would be well worth considering how a power of jurisdiction over Presbyters can be derived from those single Pastors of Churches that had no Presbyters joyned with them It must be then clearly and evidently proved that it was the Apostles intention that these single Pastors should have the power over Presbyters when the Churches necessity did require their help which intention must be manifested and declared by some manifestation of it as a Law of Christ or nothing can thence be deduced of perpetual concernment to the Church of Christ. Secondly either they were Bishops before or onely after the appointment of Presbyters if before then a Bishop and a Presbyter having no Bishop over him are all one if after onely then it was by his communicating power to Presbyters to be such or their choice which made him their Bishop if the first then Presbyters quoad ordinem are onely a humane institution it being acknowledged that no Evidence can be brought from Scripture for them and for any Act of the Apostles not recorded in Scripture for the constituting of them it must goe among unwritten Traditions and if that be a Law still binding the Church then there are such which occurre not in the Word of GOD and so that must be an imperfect coppy of Divine Lawes If he were made Bishop by an Act of the Presbyters then Presbyters have power to make a Bishop and so Episcopacy is an humane institution depending upon the voluntary Act of Presbyters But the clearest Evidence for one single Pastour with Deacons in some Churches at the beginning of Christianity is that of Epiphanius which though somewhat large I shall recite because if I mistake not the curtailing of this Testimony hath made it speak otherwise then ever Epiphanius meant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Sense of Epiphanius is very intricate and obscure we â—hall endeavour to explain it He is giving Aerius an account why Paul in his Epistle to Timothy mentions onely Bishops and Deacons and passeth over Presbyters His account is this first he chaâ—geth Aerius with ignorance of the Series of History which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the profound and ancient Records the Church wherein it is expressed that upon the first Preaching of the Gospel the Apostle writ according to the present state of things Where Bishops were not yet appointed for so certainly it should be read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for then he must contradict himself the Apostle writes to Bishops and Deacons for the Apostles could not settle all things at first for there was a necessity of Presbyters and Deacons for by these two Orders all Ecclesiastical Offices might be performed for where so I read it 〈◊〉
only on confederation such things being lyable to a Magistrates power there can be no plea from mutual consent to justifie any opposition to supream authority in a Common wealth But then how such persons can bee Christians when the Magistrates would have them to bee otherwise I cannot understand nor how the primitive Martyrs were any other then a company of Fools or mad-men who would hazard their lives for that which was a meer arbitrary thing and which they had no necessary obligation upon them to profess Mistake me not I speak not here of meer acts of discipline but of the duty of outward professing Christianity if this be a duty then a Christian society is setled by a positive Law if it be not a duty then they are fools who suffer for it So that this question resolved into its principles leads us higher than we think for and the main thing in debate must bee Whether there be an obligation upon conscience for men to associaâ—e in the profession of Christianity or no If there be then the Church which is nothing else but such an association is established upon a positive Law of Christ if there be not then those inconveniences follow which are already mentioned Wee are told indeed by the Leviathan with confidence enough that no precepts of the Gospel are Law till enacted by civil authority but it is little wonder that hee who thinks an immaterial substance implyes a contradiction should think as much of calling any thing a Law but what hath a civil sanction But I suppose all those who dare freely own a supream and infinite essence to have been the Creator and to be the Ruler of the World will acknowledge his Power to oblige conscience without being beholding to his own creature to enact his Laws that men might bee bound to obey them Was the great God sain to bee be holding to the civil authority hee had over the Iewish Common wealth their government being a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make his Laws obligatory to the consciences of the Iews What had not they their beings from God and can there be any greater ground of obligation to obedience than from thence Whence comes civil power to have any Right to oblige men more than God considered as Governour of the World can have Can there be indeed no other Laws according to the Leviathans Hypothesis but only the Law of nature and civil Laws But I pray whence comes the obligation to either of these that these are not as arbitrary as all other agreements are And is it not as strong a dictate of nature as any can bee supposing that there is a God that a creature which receives its being from another should be bound to obey him not only in the resultancies of his own nature but with the arbitrary constitutions of his will Was Adam bound to obey God or no as to that positive precept of eating the forbidden fruit if no civil Sanction had been added to that Law The truth is such Hypotheses as these are when they are followed close home will be sound to Kennel in that black Den from whence they are loath to be thought to have proceeded And now supposing that every full Declaration of the will of Christ as to any positive Institution hath the force and power of a Law upon the consciences of all to whom it is sufficiently proposed I proceed to make appear that such a divine positive Laew there is for the existence of a Church as a visible body and society in the World by which I am far from meaning such a conspicuous society that must continue in a perpetual visibility in the same place I find not the least intimation of any such thing in Scripture but that there shall alwayes bee somewhere or other in the world a society owning and professing Christianity may bee easily deduced from thence and especially on this account that our Saviour hath required this as one of the conditions in order to eternal felicity that all those who believe in their hearts that Iesus is the Christ must likewise confess him with their mouths to the world and therefore as long at there are men to believe in Christ there must be men that will not be ashamed to associate on the account of the Doctrine he hath promulged to the world That one Phrase in the New Testament so frequently used by our blessed Saviour of the Kingdome of Heaven importing a Gospel-state doth evidently declare a society which was constituted by him on the principles of the Gospel Covenant Wherefore should our Saviour call Disciples and make Apostles and send them abroad with full commission to gather and initiate Disciples by Baptism did he not intend a visible society for his Church Had it not been enough for men to have cordially believed the truth of the Gospel but they must bee entred in a solemn visible way and joyn in participation of visible Symbols of bread and wine but that our Saviour required external profession and society in the Gospel as a necessary duty in order to obtaining the priviledges conveyed by his Magna Charta in the Gospel I would fain know by what argument wee can prove that any humane Legislator did ever intend a Common wealth to be governed according to his mode by which we cannot prove that Christ by a positive Law did command such a society as should be governed in a visible manner as other societies are Did he not appoint officers himself in the Church and that of many ranks and degrees Did he not invest those Officers with authority to rule his Church Is it not laid as a charge on them to take heed to that flock over which God had made them Over-seers Are there not Rules laid down for the peculiar exercise of their Government over the Church in all the parts of it Were not these Officers admitted into theâ—â— function by a most solemn visible Rite of Imposition of Hands And are all these solemn transactions a meer piece of sacred Pageantry And they will appear to bee little more if the Society of the Church bee a meer arbitrary thing depending only upon consent and confederation and not subsisting by vertue of any Charter from Christ or some positive Law requiring all Christians to joyn in Church society together But if now from hence it appears as certainly it cannot but appear that this Society of the Church doth subsist by vertue of a Divine positive Law then it must of necessity be distinct from a civil Society and that on these accounts First because there is an antecedent obligation on conscience to associate on the account of Christianity whether Humane Laws prohibit or command it From whence of necessity it follows that the constitution of the Church is really different from that of the Commonwealth because whether the Common wealth be for or against this Society all that own it are bound to profess it openly and declare
us lyes not here as it is generally mistaken What Form of Government comes the nearest to Apostolical practice but Whether any one individual form be founded so upon Divine Right that all Ages and Churches are bound unalterably to observe it The clearing up of which by an impartial inquiry into all the grounds produced for it being of so great tendency to an accommodation of our present differences was the only motive which induced me to observe Aristotles wild Politicks of exposing this deformed conception to the entertainment of the wide World And certainly they who have espoused the most the interest of a jus divinum cannot yet but say that if the opinion I maintain be true it doth exceedingly conduce to a present settlement of the differences that are among us For then all parties may retain their different opinions concerning the Primitive form and yet agree and pitch upon a form compounded of all together as the most suitable to the state and condition of the Church of God among us That so the peoples interest be secured by consent and suffrage which is the pretence of the congregational way the due power of Presbyteries asserted by their joynt-concurrence with the Bishop as is laid down in that excellent model of the late incomparable Primate of Armagh and the just honour and dignity of the Bishop asserted as a very laudable and ancient constitution for preserving the Peace and Unity of the Church of God So the Learned Is. Casaubon describes the Polity of the Primitive Church Episcopi in singulis Ecclesiis constituti cum suis Prebyteriis propriam sibi quisque peculiari cura universam omnes in commune curantes admirabilis cujusdam Aristocraâ—iae speciem referebant My main design throughout this whole â—reatise is to shew that there can be no argument drawn from any pretence of a Divine Right that may hinder men from consenting and yielding to such a form of Government in the Church as may bear the greatest correspondency to the Primitive Church and be most advantagiously conduceable to the peace unity and settlement of our divided Church I plead not at all for any abuses or corruptions incident to the best form of Government through the corruption of men and times Nay I dare not harbour so low apprehensions of persons enjoying so great dignity and honour in the Church that they will in any wise be unwilling of themselves to reduce the Form of Church Government among us to its Primitive state and order by retrenching all Exorbitances of Power and restoring those Presbyteries which no law hath forbidden but onely through disuse have been laid aside Whereby they will give to the world that rare example of self-denial and the highest Christian prudence as may raise an honourable opinion of them even among those who have hitherto the most slighted so ancient and venerable an Order in the Church of God and thereby become the repairers of those otherwise irreparable breaches in the Church of God I conclude with the words of a late learned pious and moderate Prelate in his Via media I have done and now I make no other account but that it will fall out with me as it doth commonly with him that offers to part a fray both parts will perhaps drive at me for wishing them no worse than peace My ambition of the publike tranquillity shall willingly carry me through this hazzard let both beat me so their quarrel may cease I shall rejoyce in those blows and scars which I shall take for the Churches safety The Contents of the Chapters PART I. CHAP. I. THings necessary for the Churches peace must be clearly revealed The Form of Government not so as appears by the remaining controversie about it An evidence thence that Christ never intended any one Form as the only means to peace in the Church The Nature of a divine Right discussed Right in general either makes things lawful or else due For the former a non-prohibition sufficient the latter an express command Duty supposeth Legislation and promulgation The Question stated Nothing binds unalterably but by vertue of a standing Law and that two fold The Law of Nature and positive Lawes of God Three wayes to know when Positive Lawes are unalterable The Divine right arising from Scripture-examples divine acts and divine approbation considered p. 1. CHAP. II. SIX Hypotheses laid down as the basis of the following Discourse 1. The irreversible Obligation of the Law of Nature either by humane or divine positive Lawes in things immediately flowing from it 2. Things agreeable to the Law of nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God inlarged into five subservient Propositions 3. Divine positive Lawes conâ—erning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of nature must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law 4. Things undetermined both by the natural and positive laws of God may be lawfully determin'd by the supream authority in the Church of God The Magistrates power in matters of Religion largely asserted and cleared The nature of Indifferency in actions stated Matters of Christian liberty are subject to restraints largely proved Proposals for accommodation as to matters of Indifferency 5. What is thus determined by lawful authority doth bind the Consciences of men subject to that authority to obedience to those determinations 6. Things thus determined by lawful authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed by the same authority p. 27 CHAP. III. HOW far Church Government is founded upon the Law of nature Two things in it founded thereon 1. That there must be a Society of men for the Worship of God 2. That this Society be governed in the most convenient manner A Society for Worship manifested Gen 4. 26. considered The Sons of God and the sons of men who Societies for worship among Heathens evidenced by three things 1. Solemnity of Sacrifices sacrificing how far natural The antiquity of the Feast of first-fruits largely discovered 2. The Original of Festivals for the honour of their Deities 3. The sâ—crecy and solemnity of their mysteries This further proved from mans sociable nature the improvement of it by Religion the honour redounding to God by such a Society for his Worship p. 72 CHAP. IV. THE second thing the Law of Nature dictates that this Society be maintained and governed in the most convenient manner A further inquiry what particular Orders for Government in the Church come from the Law of Nature Six laid down and evidenced to be from thence First a distinction of some persons and their superiority over others both in power and order cleared to be from the Law of Nature The power and application of the power distinguished this latter not from any Law of Nature binding but permissive therefore may be restrained Peoples right of chosing Pastors considered Order distinguished from the form and manner of Government the former Natural the other not The
second is that the persons imployed in the Service of God should have respect answerable to their imployment which appears from their Relation to God as his Servants from the persons imployed in this work before positive Laws Masters of Families the first Priests The Priesthood of the first-born before the Law discussed The Arguments for it answered The Conjunction of Civil and Sacred Authothority largely shewed among Egyptians Grecians Romans and others The ground of Separation of them afterwards from Plutarch and others p. 85 CHAP. V. THE third thing dictated by the Law of Nature is the solemnity of all things to be performed in this Society which lyes in the gravity of all Rites and Ceremonies in the composed temper of mind Gods Worship rational His Spirit destroyes not the use of Reason The Enthusiastick spirit discovered The circumstantiating of fit times and place for Worship The seventh day on what account so much spoken of by Heathens The Romans Holy dayes Cessation of labour upon them The solemnity of Ceremonies used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 silence in devotions Exclusion of unfit persons Solemnity of Discipline Excommunication among the Iewes by the sound of a Trumpet among Christians by a Bell. p. 93 CHAP. VI. THE fourth thing dictated by the Law of Nature that there must be a way to end controversies arising which tend to break the peace of the Society The nature of Schisme considered The Churches Power as to Opinions explained When separation from a Church may be lawful Not till communion becomes sin Which is when corruptions are required as conditions of Communion Not lawful to erect new Churches upon supposition of corruption in a Church The ratio of a fundamental article explained it implyes both necessity and sufficiency in order to salvation Liberty of judgement and authority distinguished The latter must be parted with in religious Societies as to private persons What way the Light of nature directs to for ending Controversies First in an equality of power that the less number yield to the greater on what Law of Nature that is founded Secondly In a subordination of power that there must be a liberty of Appeals Appeals defined Independency of particular Congregations considered Elective Synods The Case paralleld between Civill and Church-Government Where Appeals finally lodge The power of calling Synods and confirming their Acts in the Magistrate p. 104. CHAP. VII THE fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature That all that are admitted into this Society must consent to be governed by the Lawes and Rules of it Civil Societies founded upon mutual Consent express in their first entrance implicite in others born under Societies actually formed Consent as to a Church necessary the manner of Consent determined by Christ by Baptism and Profession Implicite consent supposed in all Baptized explicite declared by challenging the Priviledges and observing the Duties of the Covenant Explicite by express owning the Gospel when adult very useful for recovering the credit of Christia nity The Discipline of the primitive Church cleared from Origen Iustin Martyr Pliny Tertullian The necessary reâ—â—â—â—â—â—es of Church membership whether Positive signs of Grace nothing required by the Gospel beyand reality of profession Exâ—â—â—â—â—tâ— Coâ—â—â—â—â—â— how far necessary not the formal Constitution of a Church proved by severâ—â— arguments p. 132. CHAP. VIII THE last thing dictated by the Law of Nature is that every offender against the Lawes of this Society is bound to give an account of his actions to the Governours of it and submit to the censures inflicted upon him by them The original of penalties in Societies The nature of them according to the nature and ends of Societies The penalty of the Church no civil mulct because its Lawes and ends are different from civil Societies The practice of the Dâ—uâ—ds and Câ—rceâ—ae in e 〈…〉 n. Among the Iewes whether a meer civil or sacr 〈…〉 y. The latter proved by six Arguments Cherem Col Bo what Objections answered The original of the mistake shewed The first part concluded p. 141 PART II. CHAP. I. THE other ground of divine Right considered viz. Gods positive Lawes which imply a certain knowledge of Gods intention to bind men perpetuaâ—ly As to which the arguments drawn from Tradition and the practice of the Church in after ages proved invalid by several arguments In order to a right stating the Question some Concessions laid down First That there must be some form of Government in the Church is of divine right The notion of a Church explained whether it belongs only to particular Congregations which are manifested not to be of Gods primary intention but for our necessity Evidence for National Churches under the Gospel A National Church-Government necessary p. 150 CHAP. II. THE second Concession is That Church Government must be administred by officers of Divine appointment To that end the continuance of a Gospel Ministry fully cleared from all those arguments by which positive Laws are proved immutable The reason of its appointment continues the dream of a â—aeculum Spiritus sancti discussed first broached by the Mendicant Friers upon the rising of the Waldenses now embraced by Enthusiasts It s occasion and unreasonableness shewed Gods declaring the perpetuity of a Gospel Ministry Matth. 28. 20. explained A Novel interpretation largely refuted The world to come What A Ministry necessary for the Churches continuance Ephes. 4 12. explained and vindicated p. 158 CHAP. III. THE Question fully stated Not what Form of Government comes the nearest to the Primitive practice but whether any be absolutely determined Several things propounded for resolving the Question What the Form of Church-Government was under the Law How far Christians are bound to observe that Neither the necessity of a superiour Order of Church-Officers nor the unlawfulness can be proved from thence p. 170 CHAP. IV. WHether Christ hath determined the Form of Government by any positive Laws Arguments of the necessity why Christ must determine it largely answered as First Christs faithfulness compared with Moses answered and retorted and thence proved that Christ did not institute any Form of Government in the Church because he gave no such Law for it as Moses did And we have nothing but general Rules which are appliable to several Forms of Government The Office of Timothy and Titus What it proves in order to this question the lawfulness of Episcopacy shewed thence but not the necessity A particular form how far necessary as Christ was Governour of his Church the Similitudes the Church is set out by prove not the thing in question Nor the difference between civil and Church-Government nor Christ setting Officers in his Church nor the inconvenience of the Churches power in appointing new Officers Every Minister hath a power respecting the Church in common which the Church may determine and fix the bounds of Episcopacy thence proved lawful The argument from the Scriptures perfection answered p. 175 CHAP. V. WHether any of Christs actions have determined the Form of
may quickly discern The main Plea for Forms of Government in the Church is their necessity in order to its Peace and Order and yet nothing hath produced more disorder and confusion then our Disputes about it have done And our sad experience still tells us that after all our Debates and the Evidences brought on either side men yet continue under very different apprehensions concerning it But if we more strictly enquire into the causes of the great Distances and Animosities which have risen upon this Controversie we shall find it hath not been so much the difference of Judgements concerning the Primitive Form of Government which hath divided men so much from one another as the prevalency of Faction and Interest in those whose Revenues have come from the Rents of the Church and among others of greater Integrity it hath been the Principle or Hypothesis which men are apt to take for granted without proving it viz. that it is in no case lawful to vary from that Form which by obscure and uncertain conjectures they conceive to have been the Primitive Practice For hereby men look upon themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law to endeavour the Establishment of that Idea of Government which oft-times Affection and Interest more then Reason and Judgement hath formed within them and so likewise bound to over throw any other Form not suitable to those Correspondencies which they are already engaged to maintain If this then were the Cause of the Wounds and Breaches this day among us the most successful Weapon-salve to heal them will be to anoint the Sword which hath given the Wound by a seasonable inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of particular Forms of Government in the Church The main Subject then of our present Debate will be Whether any one particular Form of Church Government be setled upon an unalterable Divine Right by virtue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to observe that Individual Form or whether it be left to the Prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that Form of Government which it judgeth most conducible within its self to attain the end of Government the Peace Order Tranquillity and Settlement of the Church If this latter be made fully appear it is then evident that however mens judgements may differ concerning the Primitive Form of Government there is yet a sure ground for men to proceed on in order to the Churches Peace Which one Consideration will be motive sufficient to justifie an attempt of this Nature it being a Design of so great Importance as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground whereon Different Parties may with safety not only treat but agree in order to a speedy Accommodation We come therefore closely to the business in hand and for the better clearing of our passage we shall first discuss the Nature of a Divine Right and shew whereon an unalterable Divine Right must be founded and then proceed to shew how far any Form of Government in the Church is setled upon such a Right Right in the general is a relative thing and the signification and import of it must be taken from the respect it bears to the Law which gives it For although in common acception it be often understood to be the same with the Law its self as it is the rule of actions in which sense Ius naturae gentium civile is taken for the several Laws of Nature Nations and particular States yet I say Ius and so Right is properly something accruing to a person by virtue of that Law which is made and so jus naturae is that right which every man is invested in by the Law of Nature which is properly jus personae and is by some call'd jus activum which is defined by Grotius to be Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid juste habendum aut agendum by Lessius to be Potestas Legitima ad rem aliquam obtinendam c. So that by these descriptions Right is that Power which a man hath by Law to do have or obtain any thing But the most full description of it is given by Martinius that it is adhaerens personae necessitas vel potestas recta ad aliquid agendum omittendum aut permittendum that whereby any person lies under a necessity of doing omitting or suffering a thing to be or else hath a lawful authority of doing c. For we are to consider that there is a two-fold Right either such whereby a man hath Liberty and Freedom by the Law to do any thing or such whereby it becomes a mans necessary duty to do any thing The opening of the difference of these two and the different influences they have upon persons and things is very useful to our present purpose Ius then is first that which is justum so Isidore Ius dictum quia justum est So what ever is just men have right to do it Now a thing may be said to be just either more generally as it signifies any thing which is lawful or in a more restrained sense when it implies something that is equal and due to another So Aristotle distributes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The former sense of it is here only pertinent as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law that is done jure because a man hath right to do it In order to this we are to observe that an express Positive Command is not necessary to make a thing lawful but a non-prohibition by a Law is sufficient for that For it being the Nature of Laws to bound up mens Rights what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby supposed to be left in mens power still to do it So that it is to little purpose for men to seek for Positive Commands for every particular action to make it lawful it sufficeth to make any action lawful if there be no Bar made by any direct or consequential prohibition unless it be in such things whose lawfulness and goodness depend upon a meer Positive Command For in those things which are therefore only good because commanded a Command is necessary to make them lawful as in immediate positive acts of Worship towards God in which nothing is lawful any further then it is founded upon a Divine Command I speak not of Circumstances belonging to the Acts of Worship but whatever is looked upon as a part of Divine Worship if it be not commanded by God himself it is no ways acceptable to him and therefore not lawful So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet In vain do they worship me teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men which the Chaldee Paraphrast and Syriack version render thus Reverentia quam mihi exhibent est ex praecepto documento humano plainly imputing the reason of Gods rejecting their worship to the want of a Divine Command for what they did And therefore Tertullian condemns all those things to be
vacuae observationis superstitioni deputanda as superstitious which are done sine ulliâ—s Dominici aâ—t Apostolici praecepti autoritate without the Warrant of Divine Command Although even here we may say too that it is not meerly the want of a Divine Precept which makes any part of Divine Worship uncommanded by God unlawful but the General Prohibition that nothing should be done in the immediate Worship of God but what we have a Divine Command for However in matters of meer Deceâ—cy and Order in the Church of God or in any other civil action of the lives of men it is enough to make things lawful if they are not forbidden But against this that a Non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful this Objection will be soon leavied that it is an Argument ab authoritate negativè and therefore is of no force To which I answer that the Rule if taken without limitation upon which this Objection is founded is not true for although an Argument ab authoritate negativè as to matter of Fact avails not yet the Negative from Authority as to matter of Law and Command is of great force and strength I grant the Argument holds not here we do not read that ever Christ or his Apostles did such a thing therefore it is not to be done but this we read of no Law or Precept commanding us to do it therefore it is not unlawful not to do it and we read of no Prohibition forbidding us to do it therefore it may be lawfully done this holds true and good and that upon this two-fold Reason First From Gods Intention in making known his Will which was not to record every particular fact done by himself or Christ or his Apostles but it was to lay down those general and standing Laws whereby his Church in all Ages should be guided and ruled And in order to a perpetual obligation upon the Consciences there must be a sufficient promulgation of those Laws which must bind men Thus in the case of Infant-Baptism it is a very weak unconcluding Argument to say that Infants must not be baptized because we never read that Christ or his Apostles did it for this is a Negative in matter of Fact but on the other side it is an Evidence that Infants are not to be excluded from Baptism because there is no Divine Law which doth prohibit their admission into the Church by it for this is the Negative of a Law and if it had been Christs intention to have excluded any from admission into the Church who were admitted before as Insants were there must have been some positive Law whereby such an Intention of Christ should have been expressed For nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before but a direct and express Prohibition from the Legislator himself who alone hath power to reâ—cind as well as to make Laws And therefore Antipaedobaptists must instead of requiring a Positive Command for baptizing Infants themselves produce an express Prohibition excluding them or there can be no appearance of Reason given why the Gospel should exclude any from those priviledges which the Law admitted them to Secondly I argue from the intention and end of Laws which is to circumscribe and restrain the Natural Liberty of man by binding him to the observation of some particular Precepts And therefore where there is not a particular Command and Prohibition it is in Nature and Reason supposed that men are left to their Natural freedom as is plain in Positive Humane Laws wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in Societies were willing to restrain themselves from those things which should prejudice the good of the Community this being the ground of mens first inclosing their Rights and common Priviledges it must be supposed that what is not so inclosed is left common to all as their just Right and Priviledge still So it is in Divine Positive Laws God intending to bring some of Mankind to happiness by conditions of his own appointing hath laid down many Positive Precepts binding men to the practise of those things as duties which are commanded by him But where we find no Command for performance we cannot look upon that as an immediate duty because of the necessary relation between Duty and Law and so where we find no Prohibition there we can have no ground to think that men are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden For as we say of Exceptions as to General Laws and Rules that an Exception expressed firmat regulam in non exceptis makes the Rule stronger in things not expressed as excepted so it is as to Divine Prohibitions as to the Positives that those Prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not-prohibited to be therefore lawful because not expresly forbidden As Gods forbidding Adam to taste of the fruit of one Tree did give him a liberty to taste of all the rest Indeed had not God at all revealed his Will and Laws to us by his Word there might have been some Plea why men should have waited for particular Revelations to dictate the goodness or evil of particular actions not determined by the law of nature but since God hath revealed his will there can be no reason given why those things should not be lawful to do which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of Further we are to observe that in these things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty but left to our natural liberty as things lawful the contrary to that which is thus lawful is not thereby made unlawful But both parts are left in mens power to do or not to do them as is evident in all those things which carry a general equity with them and are therefore consonant to the Law of Nature but have no particular obligation as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural Law Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety And in a state of Community it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a just equality supposing a preceding compact and mutual agreement Whence it is that some of the School-men say that although the Law of Nature be immutable as to its precepts and prohibitions yet not as to its demonstrations as they call them as Do as you would be done to binds always indispensably but that in a state of nature all things are common to all This is true but it binds not men to the necessary observance of it These which they call Demonstrations are only such things as are agreeable to nature but not particularly commanded by any indispensable precept of it Thus likewise it is agreeable to nature that the next of the kindred should be heir to him who dies intestate but he may lawfully wave his interest if he please Now to apply this to
our present case According to this sense of jus for that which is lawful those things may be said to be jure divino which are not determined one way or other by any positive Law of God but are left wholly as things lawful to the prudence of men to determine them in a way agreeable to natural light and the general Rules of the Word of God In which sense I assert any particular form of Government agreed on by the Governours of the Church consonant to the general Rules of Scripture to be by Divine Right i. e. God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particular form of Church-Government among them And hence it may appear that though one form of Government be agreeable to the Word it doth not follow that another is not or because one is lawful another is unlawful but one form may be more agreeable to some parts places people and times then others are In which case that form of Government is to be setled which is most agreeable to the present state of a place and is most advantagiously conducible to the promoting the ends of Church-Government in that place or Nation I conclude then according to this sense of jus that the Ratio regiminis Ecclesiastici is juris divini naturalis that is that the reason of Church-Government is immutable and holds in all times and places which is the preservation of the peace and unity of the Church but the modus regiminis Ecclesiastici the particular form of that Government is juris divini permissivi that both the Laws of God and Nature have left it to the Prudence of particular Churches to determine it This may be cleared by a parallel Instance The reason and the Science of Physick is immutable but the particular prescriptions of that Science are much varied according to the different tempers of Patients And the very same reason in Physick which prescribes one sort of Physick to one doth prescribe a different sort to another because the temper or disease of the one calls for a different method of cure yet the ground and end of both prescriptions was the very same to recover the Patient from his distemper So I say in our present case the ground and reason of Government in the Church is unalterable by divine right yea and that very reason which determines the particular forms but yet these particular forms flowing from that immutable reason may be very different in themselves and may alter according to the several circumstances of times and places and persons for the more commodious advancing the main end of Government As in morality there can be but one thing to a man in genere summi boni as the chief good quò tendit in quod dirigit aroum to which he refers all other things yet there may be many things in genere boni conducentis as means in order to attaining that end So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground end and reason of it yet it may as to the particular forms of it As is further evident as to forms of Civil Government though the end of all be the same yet Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy are in themselves lawful means for the attaining the same common end And as Alensis determines it in the case of Community of goods by the Law of Nature that the same reason of the Law of Nature which did dictate Community of goods to be most suitable to man in the state of Innocency did in his faln estate prescribe a propriety of goods as most agreeable to it so that herein the modus observantiâ—â— dissered but the ratio praecepti was the same still which was mans comfortable enjoyment of the Accommodations of life which in Innocency might have been best done by Community but in mans degenerate condition must be by a Propriety So the same reason of Church-Government may call for an Equality in the persons acting as Governours of the Church in one place which may call for Superiority and subordination in another Having now dispatched the first sense of a Divine Right I come to the other which is the main seat of the Controversie and therefore will require a longer debate And so jus is that which makes a thing to become a duty so jus quasi jussum and jussa jura as Festus explains it i. e. that whereby a thing is not only licitum in mens lawful power to do it or no but is made dâ—bitum and is constituted a duty by the force and virtue of a Divine Command Now mans obligation to any thing as a duty doth suppose on the part of him from whose authority he derives his obligation both legislation and promulgation First there must be a Legislative Power commanding it which if it respects only the outward actions of a man in a Nation imbodied by Laws is the supreme Magistrate but if the obligation respect the consciences of all men directly and immediately then none have the power to settle any thing by way of an universal standing Law but God himself Who by being sole Creator and Governour of the World hath alone absolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the souls of men But besides Legislation another thing necessary to mans obligation to duty is a sufficient promulgation of the Law made Because though before this there be the ground of obedience on mans part to all Gods Commands yet there must be a particular Declaration of the Laws whereby man is bound in order to the determination of Mans duty Which in Positives is so absolutely necessary that unless there be a sufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver mans ignorance is excusable in reference to them and so frees from guilt and the obligation to punishment But it is otherwise in reference to the dictates of the natural Law wherein though man be at a loss for them yet his own contracted pravity being the cause of his blindness leaves him without excuse Hence it is said with good reason that though man under the Moral Law was bound to obey Gospel-precepts as to the reason and substance of the duties by them commanded as Faith Repentance from dead works and New Obedience yet a more full and particular revelation by the Gospel was necessary for the particular determination of the general acts of obedience to particular objects under their several Modifications expressed in the Gospel And therefore Faith and Repentance under the Moral Law taken as a transcript of the Law of Nature were required under their general notion as acts of obedience but not in that particular relation which those acts have under the Covenant of Grace Which particular determination of the general acts to special objects under different respects some call New Precepts of the Gospel others New Light but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the consciences of men the difference is so small that it deserves not to be
named a Controversie But that which I am now clearing is this that whatsoever binds Christians as an universal standing Law must be clearly revealed as such and laid down in Scripture in such evident terms as all who have their senses exercised therein may discern it to have been the will of Christ that it should perpetually oblige all believers to the Worlds end as is clear in the case of Baptism and the Lords Supper But here I shall add one thing by way of caution That there is not the same necessity for a particular and clear revelation in the alteration of a Law unrepealed in some circumstances of it as there is for the establishing of a New Law As to the former viz. the change of a standing Law as to some particular circumstance a different practice by persons guided by an infallible spirit is sufficient which is the case as to the observation of the Lords day under the Gospel For the fourth Command standing in force as to the Morality of it a different practice by the Apostles may be sufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occasional part of it which was the limitation of the observation of it to that certain day So likewise that other Law standing in force that persons taken into Covenant with God should be admitted by some visible sign Apostolical practice clearly manifested may be sufficient ground to conclude what the mind of Christ was as to the application of it to particular persons and what qualifications are requisite in such as are capable of admission as in the case of Infants Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Gospel because it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular persons which might be gathered sufficiently from the Apostles practice the Analogy of the dispensation the equal reason of exclusion under the Law and yet notwithstanding the continual admission of them then into the same Gospel-Govenant Circumcision being the Seal of the Righteousness of Faith But this by the way to prevent mistakes We must now by parity of reason say that either the former Law in those things wherein it was not typical must hold in reference to the form of Government in the Church of Christ or else that Christ by an universal Law hath setled all order in Church Government among the Pastors themselves or else that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church to determine its own form of Government which I conceive is the direct state of the Question about Divine Right viz. Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be setled by an universal binding Law or no But for a further clearing the state of the Question we must consider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right or a standing Law in the Church of God for those who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right do not plead a Law in express terms but such things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred Which I now come to examine and that which I lay down as a Postulatum or a certain conclusion according to which I shall examine others â—ssertions concerning Divine Right is That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right nor can bind Christians directly or consequentially as a positive Law but what may be certainly known to have come from God with an intention to oblige Believers to the worlds end For either we must say it binds Christians as a Law when God did not intend it should or else Gods intentions to bind all Believers by it must be clearly manifested Now then so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually a thing may be said to be of an unalterable Divine Right and those can be no more then these two Either by the Law of Nature or by some positive Law of God Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two or by virtue of them as shall be made appear I begin with the Law of Nature The Law of Nature binds indispensably as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions but is founded upon the intrinsecal nature of good and evil in the things themselves antecedently to any positive Declaration of Gods Will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed that Law is unalterable as to its obligation When I say the Law of Nature is indispensable my meaning is that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept as the three first Commands of the Moral Law no man can by any positive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them neither by any abrogation of the Laws themselves nor by derogation from them nor interpretation of them nor change in the object matter or circumstance whatsoever it be Now although the formal reason of mans obedience to the precepts of this Law be the conformity which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodness yet I conceive the efficient cause of mans obligation to these things is to be fetched from the Will Command and Pleasure of God Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will but as it is executive of Divine purposes and as it ingraves such a Law upon the hearts of men For notwithstanding mans Reason considered in it self be the chiefest instrument of discovery what are these necessary duties of humane nature in which sense Aristotle defines a Natural Law to be that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath every where the same force and strength i. e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among all that have the free use of their reason and faculties yet I say it is not bare Reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law but as it is expressive of an Eternal Law and deduceth its obligation from thence And so this Law if we respect the rise extent and immutability of it may be call'd deservedly the Law of Nature but if we look at the emanation efflux and original of it it is a Divine Law and so it is call'd by Molina Alphonsus à Castrâ—â— and others For the sanction of this Law of Nature as well as others depends upon the Will of God and therefore the obligation must come from him it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a Law but those who had the Legislative Power to cause the obligation to it It appears then from hence that whatever by just consequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature is of Divine Right because from the very nature of that Law it being indispensable it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it The second way whereby we may know what is of Divine Right is by Gods
But for our more distinct clear and rationaâ—â— proceeding I shall lay down some things as so many Postulata or generall Principles and Hypotheses which will be as the basis and foundation of the following Discourse which all of them concern the obligation of Laws wherein I shall proceed gradually beginning with the Law of Nature and so to Divine positive Laws and lastly to speak to humane positive Laws The first Principle or Hypothesis which I lay down is That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty as flowing from the principles of it there no positive Law can be supposed to take off the obligation of it Which I prove both as to humane positive Laws and Divine First as to humane For first the things commanded in the Law of Nature being just and righteous in themselves there can be no obligatory Law made against such things Nemo tenetur ad impossibile is true in the sense of the Civil Law as well as in Philosophy as impossibile is taken for turpe and turpe for that which is contrary to the dictates of Nature A man may be as well bound not to be a man as not to act according to principles of reason For the Law of Nature is nothing else but the dictate of right reason discovering the good or evil of particular actions from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light Whatever positive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles is thereby of no force at all And that which hath no obligation in it self cannot dissolve a former obligation Secondly the indispensablenesse of the obligation of the Law of Nature appears from the end of all other Laws which are agreed upon by mutual compact which is the better to preserve men in their rights and priviledges Now the greatest rights of men are such as flow from Nature its self and therefore as no Law binds against the reason of it so neither can it against the common end of Laws Therefore if a humane positive Law should be made that God should not be worshipped it cannot bind being against the main end of Laws which is to make men live together as reasonable creatureâ— which they cannot do without doing what Nature requires which is to serve God who made it Again it overturns the very foundation of all Government and dissolves the tye to all humane Laws if the Law of Nature doth not bind indispensably for otherwise upon what ground must men yield obedience to any Laws that are made Is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature that men must stand to all compacts and agreements made If Laws take their force among men from hence they can bind no further then those compâ—cts did extend which cannot be supposed to be to violate and destroy their own natures Positive Laws may restrain much of what is only of the permissive Law of Nature for the intent of positive Laws was to make men abate so much of their naturall freedom as should be judged necessary for the preservation of humane Societies but against the obligatory Law of Nature as to its precepts no after-Law can derogate from the obligation of it And therefore it is otherwise between the Law of Nature and positive Laws then between Laws meerly civil for as to these the rule is that posterior derogat priori the latter Law cassats and nulls the obligation of the former but as to natural Laws and positive prior derogat posteriori the Law oâ— Nature which is firstâ— takes away the obligation of a positive Law if it be contrary to it As Iustellus observe it was in the primitive Church in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils that such as were inserted in the Codex Canonum being of the more ancient Councils did render the obligation of later Canons invalid which were contrary to them unlesse it were in mâ—tteâ—s of small moment We see then that supposing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory the obligation of all humane positive Laws will fall with it as the superstructure needs must when the foundation is removed for if any other Law of Nature may be dissolved why not that whereby men are bound to stand to Covenants and contracts made and if that be dissolved How can the obligation to humane Laws remain which is founded upon that basis And so all civil Societies are thereby overturned Thirdly it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this for humane Laws bind only outward humane actâ—ons directly and internall acts only by vertue of their necessary connexion with and influence upon outward actions and not otherwise but the Law of Nâ—ture immediately binds the soul and conscience of man And therefore obligatio naturalis and nexus conscientiae are made to be the same by Lessius Suarâ—z and others For Lessius dâ—sputing Whether a Will made without solemnity of Law doth bind in conscience or no He proves it doâ—h by â—his argument from the opinion of the Lawyers that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation and the hresae ab Intestato who is the next of Kin is bound to make it good therefore it doth bind in conscience So then there ariseth a necessary obllgation upon conscience from the dictâ—tes of the Law of Nature which cannot be removed by any positive Law For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law as in the former case of succession to a Will not legally made in covenants made without conditions expressed in recovery of debtâ— from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupillage without consent of his Tutor in these cases though no action lie against the persons yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man but only that he is not responsible for the breach of morall honesty in them before civil Courts In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal before which all such offences shall be punished Thus then we see no positive humane Law can dispence with or dissolve the obligation of thâ— Law of nature Much lesse Secondly can we suppose any positive Divine Law should For although Gods power be immense and infinite to do what pleaseth him yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodnesse else it is no divine power and therefore posse malum non est posse it is no power but weakness to do evil and without this posse malum there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil which must be supposed if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with Therefore it was well said by Origen when Câ—lsus objected it as the common speech of
the Christians That with God all things are possible that he neither understood how it was spoken nor what these all-things are nor how God could do them and concludes with this excellent speech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We say saith he that God can do all things which are reconcilable with his Deity Goodnesse and Wisdom And after adds That as it is impossible for honey to make things bitter and light to make things obscure so it is for God to do any thing that is unjust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the Divine Nature and that Omnipotency which is consistent with it To the same purpose he speaks elswhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God wills nothing unbecoming himself And again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We affirm that God cannot do evil actions for if he could he might as well be no God For if God should do evil he would be no God So then though God be omnipotent yet it follows not that he can therefore dissolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature or change the natures of good and evil God may indeed alter the properties of those things from whence the respects of good and evil do result as in Abrahams offering Isaac the Israelites taking away the Aegyptians Jewels which God may justly do by vertue of his absolute dominion but the change here is not in the obligation of the Law but in the things themselves Murther would be an intrinsecal evil still but that which was done by immediate and explicit command from God would have been no murther Theft had been a sin still but taking things alienaâ—ed from their properties by God himself was not Theft We conclude then what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of command binds immutably and indispensably Which is the first Hypothesis or Principle laid down The second Hypothesis is That things which are either deducible from the Law of Nature or by the light of Nature discovered to be very agreeable to it may be lawfully practised in the Church of God if they be not otherwise determined by the positive Laws of God or of lawfull humane authority We shall first inquire into the nature of these things and then shew the lawfulnesse of doing them For the nature of these things we must consider what things may be said to be of the Law of nature They may be reduced to two heads which must be accurately distinguished They are either such thingâ— which Nature dictates to be done or not to be done necessarily and immutably or else such things as are judged to be very agreeable to natural light but are subject to positive determinations The former are called by some jus naturae obligativum by others jus naturae proprium whereby things are made necessarily duties or sins the latter jus naturae permissivum and reductivum for which it is sufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light From these two arise a different obligation upon men either strict and is called by Covarrâ—vias obligatio ex justitiâ an obligation of duty and justice the other larger obligatio ex communi aequitate or ex honestate morali an obligation from common equity that is according to the agreeablenesse of things to natural light The former I have shewn already to bind indispensably but these latter are subject to positive Laws For our better understanding the obligation of these which is more intricate then the former we shall consider men under a double notion either in a state of absolute liberty which some call a state of Nature or else in a state wherein they have restrained their own liberty by mutual compacts or are determined by a higher Law These things premised I lay down these Propositions 1. In a state of absolute liberty before any positive Laws were superadded to the naturall Whatsoever was not necessarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature was wholly left to mens power to do it or not and belongs to the permissive Law of Nature And thus all those things which are since determined by positive Laws were in such a supposed state left to the free choyce of a mans own will Thus it was in mens power to joyn in civil Society with whom they pleased to recover things or vindicate injuries in what way they judged best to submit to what constitutions alone they would themselves to choose what form of Government among them they pleased to determine how far they would be bound to any Authority chosen by themselves to lodge the legislative and coercive Power in what persons they thought fit to agree upon punishments answerable to the nature of offences And so in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reason and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Nature 2. A state of absolute liberty not agreeing to the nature of man considered in relation to others it was in mens power to restrain their own liberty upon compacts so far as should be judged necessary for the ends of their mutuall Society A state of Nature I look upon only as an imaginary state for better understanding the nature and obligation of Laws For it is confessed by the greatest Assertors of it that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a state of natural liberty because Children assoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their Parents But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand we shall proceed with it Supposing then all those former rights were in their own power it is most agreeable to natural reason that every man may part with his right so far as he please for his own advantage Here now men finding a necessity to part with some of their Rights to defend and secure their most considerable Ones they begin to think of Compacts one with another taking this as a Principle of the Natural Law and the Foundation of Society That all Covenants are to be performed When they are thus far agreed they then consider the terms upon which they should enter into Society one with another And here men devest themselves of their original liberty and agree upon an Inclosure of Properties and the Fences of those Properties I mean upon living together in a civil state and of the Laws they must be ruled by This is apparently agreeable to Natural Reason the things being in their own power which they agree to part with Men entring upon Societies by Mutual Compacts things thereby become good and evil which were not so before Thus he who was free before to do what and how he pleased is now bound to obey what Laws he hath consented to or else he breaks not only a Positive Law but that Law of Nature which commands Man to stand to Covenants once made though he be free to make them And therefore it is observable that the doing of things that were lawful
before Covenants made and things thereby determined may be so far from being lawful after that the doing of them may contradict a Principle of the Obligatory Law of Nature Thus in a state of liberty every one had right to what he thought fit for his use but Propriety and Dominion being introduced which was a free voluntary act by mens determining Rights it now becomes an offence against the Law of Nature to take away that which is another mans In which sense alone it is that Theft is said to be forbidden by the Law of Nature And by the same reason he that resists and opposeth the lawful Authority under which he is born doth not only offend against the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives but against that Original and Fundamental Law of Societies viz standing to Covenants once made For it is a gross mistake as well as dangerous for men to imagine That every man is born in a state of Absolute Liberty to chuse what Laws and Governours he please but every one being now born a Subject to that Authority he lives under he is bound to preserve it as much as in him lies Thence Augustus had some reason to say He was the best Citizen qui praesentem reipublicae statum mutari â—â—â— vult That doth not disturb the present state of the Commonwealth and who as Alcibiades saith in Thucydides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endeavours to preserve that form of Government he was born under And the reason of it is that in Contracts and Covenants made for Government men look not only at themselves but at the benefit of Posterity if then one Party be bound to maintain the Rights of the others Posterity as well as of his person the other party must be supposed to oblige his Posterity in his Covenant to perform Obedience which every man hath power to do because Children are at their Parents disposal And Equity requires that the Covenant entred should be of equal extent to both parties And if a man doth expect Protection for his Posterity he must engage for the Obedience of his Posterity too to the Governorâ— who do legally protect them But the further prosecution of these things belongs to another place to consider of my purpose being to treat of Government in the Church and not in the State The sum of this is that the Obligation to the performance of what things are determined which are of the permissive Law of Nature by Positive Laws doth arise from the Obligatory Law of Nature As the Demonstration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks doth depend upon the Principles of the Theoremes themselves and so whoever denies the truth of the Probleme deduced by just Consequence from the Theoreme must consequentially deny the truth of the Theoreme its self So those who violate the particular Determinations of the Permissive Law of Nature do violate the Obligation of the Preceptive part of that Law Obedience to the other being grounded on the Principles of this 4. God hath Power by his Positive Laws to take in and determine as much of the Permissive Law of Nature as he please which being once so determined by an Universal Law is so far from being lawful to be done that the doing of them by those under an Obligation to his Positive Laws is an offence against the Immutable Law of Nature That God may restrain mans Natural Liberty I suppose none who own Gods Legislative Power over the world can deny especially considering that men have power to restrain themselves much more then hath God who is the Rector and Governor of the World That a breach of his positive Laws is an offence against the common Law of Nature appears hence because man being Gods creature is not only bound to do what is in general suitable to the principles of reason in flying evil and choosing good but to submit to the determinations of Gods will as to the distinction of good from evil For being bound universally to obey God it is implyed that man should obey him in all things which he discovers to be his will whose determination must make a thing not only good but necessary to be done by vertue of his supreme authority over men This then needs no further proof being so clear in its self 5. Lastly What things are left undetermined by divine positive Laws are in the Churches power to use and practise according as it judgeth them most agreeable to the rule of the Word That things undetermin'd by the Word are still lawfull evidently appears because what was once lawfull must have some positive Law to make it unlawfull which if there be none it remains lawfull still And that the Church of God should be debarr'd of any priviledge of any other Societies I understand not especially if it belong to it as a Society considered in its self and not as a particular Society constituted upon such accounts as the Church is For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as such in a restrained sense but in the general notion of it as a Society of men imbodyed together by some Laws proper to its self Although it subsist upon a higher foundation viz. of divine institution and upon higher grounds reasons principles ends and be directed by other Laws immediately then any other Societies in the World are The third Hypothesis is this Where the Law of Nature determines the thing and the Divine Law determines the manner and circumstances of the thing there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations by vertue of the Law of Nature in its general obligation As for instance the Law of Nature bindeth man to worship God but for the way manner and circumstances of Worship we are to follow the positive Laws of God because as we are bound by Nature to worship him so we are bound by vertue of the same Law to worship him in the manner best pleasing to himself For the light of Nature though it determine the duty of worship yet it doth not the way and manner and though acts of pure obedience be in themselves acceptable unto God yet as to the manner of those acts and the positives of worship they are no further acceptable unto God then commanded by him Because in things not necessarily determined by the Law of Nature the goodnesse or evill of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance it must depend upon his Command supposing positive Laws to be at all given by God to direct men in their worship of him For supposing God had not at all revealed himself in order to his worship doubtlesse it had been lawfull for men not only to pray to God express their sense of their dependance upon him but to appoint waies times and places for the doing it as they should judge most convenient agreeable to natural light Which is evident from the
Scripture its self as to places for as far as we can find sacrificing in high places that is such as were of mens own appointment was lawful till the Temple was built by Solomon as appears by the several examples of Gedeon Samuel David and others Indeed after the place was setled by Gods own Law it became wholly sinfull but if so before we should not have read of Gods accepting sacrifices in such places as he did Gedeons nor of the Prophets doing it as Samuel and David did It is a disputable case about Sacrifices Whether the offering of them came only from natural light or from some express command the latter seems far more probable to me because I cannot see how naturall light should any wise dictate that God would accept of the blood of other creatures as a token of mans obedience to himself And Rivet gives this very good reason why the destruction of any thing in sacrifice cannot belong to the Law of Nature because it is only acceptable as a sign and token of obedience and not simply as an act of obedience and this sign signifying ex instituto for mans destroying the life of a beast can never naturally signifie mans obedience to God and therefore it must have some positive Law for those which signifie only by institution and not naturally cannot be referred to a dictate of the Law of Nature To which purpose it is further observable that God doth so often in Scripâ—ure slight the offering of Sacrifices in respect of any inherent vertue or goodnesse in the action its self or acceptablenesse to God upon the account of the thing done In which sense God saith He that killeth a bullock is as if he slew a man and he that Sacrificeth a sheep as if he cut off a dogs neck c. For what is there more in the one then in the other but only Gods appointment which makes one acceptable and not the other So that it is no wayes probable that God would have accepted Abels sacrifice rather then Cains had there been no command for their sacrificing For as to meer natural light Cains Sacrifice seems more agreeable to that then Abels Cains being an Eucharistical offering without hurt to other creatures but Abels was cruentum Sacrificium a Sacrifice of blood But the chief ground of Abels acceptance was his offering in faith as the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us Now saith is a higher principle then natural light and must suppose divine Revelation and so a divine Command as the Principle and ground of his action Moses his silence in reference to a Command is no argument there was none it not being his design to write at large all the particular precepts of the Orall Law but to deduce the Genealogy of the Patriarchs down from Adam and the Creation But supposing a Command given from God determining modes and circumstances of such â—hings of which the substance depends on a natural Law men are as well bound to the observation of them after their revelation as the other before The one being a Testimony of their obedience to God as clear and full as the other yes and so much the clearer evidence of obedience in that there could be no argument for the performing of those things but a divine Command And even in doing things intrinsecally good the ground of purely religious obedience is because God commands men to do those things more then that they are good in themselves Doing a thing because most suitable to nature speaking morality but doing because God commands it speaks true Religion and the obedience of Faith For as the formal reason of the act of Faith is a divine Testimony discovered to our understandings so the formal principle of an act of spiritual obedience is a divine Command inclining the will and awing it to performance So far then as divine Law determines things we are bound to observe them from the dictates of the natural Law The fourth Hypothesis In things which are determined both by the Law of Nature and divine positive Laws as to the substance and morality of them but not determined as to all circumstances belonging to them it is in the power of Lawful authority in the Church of God to determine them so far as they judge them tend to the promoting the performance of them in due manner So that not only matters wholly left at liberty as to the substance of them are subject to humane Laws and Constitutions but even things commanded in the divine Law in reference to the manner of performance if undetermined by the same Law which enforce the duty Thus the setting apart some time for Gods Worship is a dictate of the natural Law that the first day of the week be that time is determin'd under the Gospel but in what places at what hours in what order decency and solemnity this Worship shall be then performed are circumstances not determined in Scripture but only by general Rules as to these then so they be done in conformity to those Rules they are subject to humane positive determinations But this is not an hypothesis in the Age we live in to be taken for granted without proving it some denying the Magistrate any power at all in matters of Religion others granting a defensive protective power of that Religion which is professed according to the Laws of Christ but denying any determining power in the Magistrate concerning things left undetermin'd by the Scripture This Hypothesis then hath landed me into a Field of Controversie wherein I shall not so much strive to make my way through any opposite party as endeavour to beget a right understanding between the adverse parties in order to a mutual compliance which I shall the rather do because if any Controversie hath been an increaser and fomenter of heart-burnings and divisions among us it hath been about the determination of indifferent things And which seems strange the things men can least bear with one another in are matters of liberty and those things men have divided most upon have been matters of uniformity and wherein they have differed most have been pretended things of Indifferency In order then to laying a foundation for peace and union I shall calmly debate what power the Magistrate hath in matters of Religion and how far that power doth extend in determining things left undetermin'd by the Word For the clear understanding the first of these we shall make our passage open to it by the laying down several necessâ—ry distinctions about it the want of considering which hath been the ground of the great confusion in the handling this Controversie First then we must distinguish between a power respecting Religion in its self and a power concerning Religion as it is the publick owned and professed Religion of a Nation For although the Magistrate hath no proper power over Religion in its self either taking it abstractly for the Rule of Worship or concretely
of the Magistrate though he is not subject to the power of the Ministers yet both as a Christian and as a Magistrate he is subject to the Word of God and is to be guided by that in the Administration of his Function So on the other side in a Minister of the Gospel there are these things considerable the Object of his Function the Function its self the Liberty of exercising it and the Person who doth exercise it As for the Object of this Function the Word and Sacraments these are not subject to the Civil Power being setled by a Law of Christ but then for the Function its self that may be considered either in the Derivation of it or in the Administration of it As for the derivation of the power and authority of the Function that is from Christ who hath setled and provided by Law that there shall be such a standing Function to the end of the world with such authority belonging to it But for the Administration of the Function two things belong to the Magistrate First to provide and take care for due administration of it anâ— to see that the Ministers preach the true Doctrine though he cannot lawfully forbid the true Doctrine to be taught and that they duly administer the Sacraments though he cannot command them to administer them otherwise then Christ hath delivered them down to us This for due Administration Secondly in case of male-administration of his Function or scandal rendring him unfit for it it is in the Magistrates power if not formally to depose yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exercising their Function within his Dominions as Solomâ—n did Abiathar and Iustinian Sylverius as Constantius did Vigilius For the liberty of exercise of the Function is in the Magistrates power though a right to exercise it be derived from the same power from which the Authority belonging to the Function was conveyed And then lastly as to the persons exercising this Function it is evident As they are members of a Civil Society as well as others so they are subject to the same Civil Laws as others are Which as it is expresly affirmed by Chrysostom on Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers that is saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Be he an Apostle Evangelist Prophet Priest Monk be he who he will So it is fully largely irrefragably proved by our Writers against the Papists especially by the learned Is. Casaubon in his piece de libertate Ecclesiasticâ So then we see what a fair amicable and mutual aspect these two powers have one upon another when rightly understood being far from clashing one with the other either by a subjection of the Civil Power to the Ecclesiastical or the Civil powers swallowing up and devouring the peculiarity of the Ministerial Function And upon these grounds I suppose Beza and Erastus may as to this shake hands So that the Magistrate do not usurp the Ministerial Function which Videlius calls Papatus politicus nor the Ministers subject the Civil power to them which is Papatus Ecclesiasticus Thirdly we distinguish between an absolute Architectonical and Nomothetical Power independent upon any other Law and a Legislative Power absolute as to persons but regulated by a Higher Law The former we attribute to none but God the latter belongs to a Supreme Magistrate in reference to things belonging to his power either in Church or Commonwealth By an Architectonical Nomothetical Power we mean that power which is distinguished from that which is properly call'd Political The former lies in the making Laws for the good of the Commonwealth the latter in a due execution and administration of those Laws for the Common Good This we have asserted to the Magistrate already We now come to assert the other where we shall first set down the bounds of this power and then see to whom it belongs First then we say not that the Magistrate hath a power to revoke repâ—al or alter any Divine positive Law which we have already shewn Secondly we say not that the Magistrate by his own will may constitute what new Laws he please for the Worship of God This was the fault of Ieroboam who made Israel to sin and therefore by the Rule of Reason must be supposed to sin more himself So likewise Ahab Ahaz and others Religion is a thing setled by a Divine Law and as it is taken for the Doctrine and Worship of God so it is contained in the Word of God and must be fetched wholly from thence But then thirdly The Magistrate by his power may make that which is a Divine Law already become the Law of the Land Thus Religion may be incorporated among our Laws and the Bible become our Magna Charta So the first Law in the Codex Theod. is about the believing the Trinity and many others about Religion are inserted into it Now as to these things clearly revealed in the Word of God and withall commanded by the Civil Magistrate although the primary obligation to the doing them is from the former determination by a Divine Law yet the Sanction of them by the Civil Magistrate may cause a further obligation upon Conscience then was before and may add punishments and rewards not expressed before For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other the obligation to the Higher Law takes away the obligation to the other yet when they are of the same Nature or subordinate one to the other there may a New Obligation arise from the same Law enacted by a New Authority As the Commands of the Decalogue brought a New Obligation upon the Consciences of the Jews though the things contained in them were commanded before in the Law of Nature And as a Vow made by a man adds a new â—ye to his Conscience when the matter of his Vow is the same with what the Word of God commands and renewing our Covenant with God after Baptism renews our Obligation So when the Faith of the Gospel becomes the Law of a Nation men are bound by a double Cord of duty to entertain and profess that Faith Fourthly in matters undetermined by the Word concerning the External Polity of the Church of God the Magistrate hath the power of determining things so they be agreeable to the Word of God This last Clause is that which binds the Magistrates power that it is not absolutely Architectonicall because all his Laws must be regulated by the generall rules of the Divine Law But though it be not as to Laws yet I say it is as to persons that is that no other persons have any power to make Laws binding men to obedience but only the civil Magistrate This is another part of the Controversie between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Power about the power of determining matters belonging to the Churches Government But there is here no such breach between those two but what may be made up with a distinction or
them in particular but to the Magistrate in general So that in things left lawfull and undetermin'd by the Word where there ariseth no obligation from the matter it must arise from our subjection and relation to the Magistrate and what is the ground of obedience is the cause of the obligation Secondly He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making Sanctions to those Laws By Sanctions I mean here in the sense of the civil Law eas legum partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint those parts of the Law which determine the punishments of the violaters of it Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power to punish upon disobedience And it is as evident that none hath power to punish but the civill Magistrate I speak of legall penalties which are annexed to such Laws as concern the Church Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as such all the force of such Laws as respect the outward Polity of the Church must be derived from the civill Magistrate Thirdly He who can null and declare all other obligations void done without his power hath the only power to oblige For whatsoever destroys a former obligation must of necessity imply a power to oblige because I am bound to obey him in the abstaining from that I was formerly obliged to But this power belongs to the Magistrate For suppose in some indifferent Rites and Ceremonies the Church representative that is the Governors of it pro tempore do prescribe them to be observed by all the Supreme power fâ—rbids the doing of those things if this doth not null the former supposed obligation I must inevitably run upon these absurdities First that there are two supreme powers in a Nation at the same time Secondly that a man may lie under two different Obligations as to the same thing he is bound to do it by one power and not to do it by the other Thirdly the same action may be a duty and a sin a duty in obeying the one power a sin in disobeying the other Therefore there can be but one power to oblige which is that of the Supreme Magistrate Having thus far asserted the Magistrates due power and Authority as to matters of Religion we proceed to examine the extent of this power in determining things left at liberty by the Word of God in order to the Peace and Government of the Church For our clear and distinct proceeding I shall ascend by these three steps First to shew that there are some things left undetermined by the Word Secondly that these things are capable of positive Determinations and Restraint Thirdly that there are some bounds and limits to be observed in the stating and determining these things First That there are some things left undetermined by the Word By Determining here I do not mean determining whether things be lawful or no for so there is no Ritâ— or Ceremony whatsoever but is determined by the Scripture in that sense or may be gathered from the application of particular actions to the general Rules of Scripture but by Determining I mean whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as Duties or no viz. that this we are bound to observe and the other not As for instance what time manner method gesture habit be used in preaching the Word whether Baptism must be by dipping or sprinkling at what day time place the Child shall be baptized and other things of a like Nature with these Those who assert any of these as duties must produce necessarily the Command making them to be so For Duty and Command have a necessary respect and relation to one another If no Command be brought it necessarily follows that they are left at liberty So as to the Lords Supper Calvin saith whether the Communicants take the Bread themselves or receive it being given them whether they should give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon or to their next Neighbour whether the Bread be leavened or not the Wine red or white nihil refert it matters not Haec indifferentia sunt in Ecclesiae libertate posita they are matters of indifferency and are left to the Churches liberty But this matter of Indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distinctions to see where the root of indifferency lies Which we shall the rather do because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person that there is no Indifferency in the things themselves which are still either unlawful or necessary if lawful at this time in these circumstances but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings which may make some things seem so to us But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake First that Indifferency is a medium participationis of both extremes and not only negationis viz. that as intermediate colours partake both of black and white and yet are neither so in morality between good and bad there is an intermediate entity which is neither but indifferent to either Whereas the Nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad but in some thing undetermined by Divine Laws as to the necessity of it so that if we speak as to the extremes of it it is something lying between a necessary duty and an intrinsecal evil The other mistake is that throughout that Discourse he takes Indifferency as Circumstantiated in Individual actions and as the morality of the action is determined by its Circumstances whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the Nature of the action considered in its self abstractly and so these things are implyed in an indifferent action First absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a Divine Law that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly that one part hath not more propension to the Rule then the other for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule then the omission or on the contrary this action is not wholly indifferent Thirdly that neither part hath any repugnancy to the Rule for that which hath so is so far from being indifferent that it becomes unlawful So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal virtue and so hovers in medio inclining to neither but supposing any degree of virtue added to the one above the other it then inclines towards it or as the Magnetical Needle about the Azores keeps its self directly parallel to the Axis of the world without variation because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two Great Magnets the Continents of Europe and America But no sooner is it removed from thence but it hath its variations So indifferency taken in
though it were lawful not to do them before that Command The truth of the Proposition appears because Lawful Authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done Because nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things for nothing can hinder him from Commanding but what may hinder the Subject from Obedience I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey when it is very inconvenient for the Magistrate to command but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things nay and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded but then the matter of the Command it self is unlawful As in executing an unjust Sentence granting that a Princes Servants may lawfully do it especially when they know it not yet in that case the ground of their lawful obedience is the ground of the Magistrates lawful Command which is the supposed Justice of the Execution But that which makes the Magistrates Command unlawful is the intrinsecal evil of the thing its self So for unlawful Wars though the Subjects may lawfully obey yet the Prince sins in commanding not but that he hath right to command so far as they are bound to obey which is only in things lawful but that which in this case alters the matter is the Princes knowing his cause to be unjust So that however the Proposition holds in things not manifestly unjust But however this be it is hereby granted that the things may be lawfully done when they are restrained by the Magistrates Command and by that it appears that liberty may be restrained else it could not be lawful to act under that restraint not as it respects the things themselves but under that formality as they are the restraint of that which ought to be left free The Restraint however then is lawful as to the persons acting under Authority who are the Subjects of this liberty though it were granted unlawfull as to the authority doing it Which former is sufficient for my purpose viz. that Christian liberty as to the subjects of it may be lawfully restrained Secondly A lesser duty ceaseth to be a duty when it hinders from the performance of greater but the preserving Christian liberty is a lesser duty which may hinder the peace of the Church which is a greater therefore in that case it may be restrained The Major is granted by Divines and Casuists when duties stand in competition the lesser ceaseth to bind as is evident in that God will have mercy rather then sacrifice Positives yield to morals and naturals Thence the obligation of an Oath ceaseth when it hinders from a natural duty as the Corban among the Jews from relief of Parents And therefore Grotius saith that an Oath taken concerning a thing lawfull if it doth hinder majus bonum morale the obligation of that Oath ceaseth Now that preserving-liberty is a lesser duty then the looking after the peace of the Church is evident because the one is only a matter of liberty and left undetermin'd by the Word and the other a matter of necessity and absolutely and expresly required of all as a duty as much as possibly lyes in them to endeavour after Thirdly If an occasional offence of weaker Brethren may be a ground for restraining Christian liberty then much more may commands from lawfull authority do it but the offence of weaker Brethren may restrain Christian liberty as to the exercise of it as appears by the Apostles discourse Rom. 14. 21. The reason of the consequence lies here that a case of meer offence which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren cannot have that obligation upon Conscience which a known duty of obeying lawfull Authority in things in themselves lawfull hath Nay further insisting only on the Law of scandall I would fain know whether it be a greater offence and scandall to Christians consciences to infringe the lawfull authority of the Magistrate and to deny obedience to his commands in things undetermin'd by the Law of God or else to offend the Consciences that is go against the judgements of some well-meaning but less-knowing Christians Or thus whether in the matter of scandall it be a greater offence to go against the judgements of the weaker and more ignorant or the more knowing and able when the one have only their own weak apprehension to byasse them the other are backed by and grounded upon an established Law And whether it be not a greater scandall to Religion to disobey a Christian Magistrate then it is to offend some private Christians Let these things be examined and then let us see whether the argument will not hold à majori if the Law of scandall as to private Christians may restrain liberty then may a command from the Magistrate do it Fourthly I argue thus If the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of the exercise of it then it is not against the nature of Christian-liberty to have the exercise restrained but the former is true and therefore the latter Now that the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of its exercise I prove by these arguments First Because the nature of Christian-liberty is founded upon the freedom of judgement and not the freedom of practice The case is the same in moral and natural liberty as in Christian. Now we say truly that the radical liberty of the soul is preserved though it be determined to a particular action For the liberty of the Will lying in the power of determining its self either way as it is generally thought the actuall determination of the Will doth not take away the internal power in the soul and in that respect there may be a potentia faciendi where there is not possibilit as effectûs a power of doing when there is no possibility the thing should be done when the event is otherwise determined by a divine decree as in breaking the bones of Christ upon the Crosse. So it is in reference to Christian liberty though the exercise of it be restrained yet the liberty remains because Christian-liberty lyes in the freedom of judgement that is in judging those things to be free which are so so that if any thing that is in its self free be done by a man with an opinion of the necessity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it or without any Law prescribing it thereby his Christian liberty is destroyed but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it self but only with a consequential necessity of doing it supposing the Magistrates command he retains the power of his Christian-liberty still though under the restraint of the exercise of it And therefore it would be well observed that the opinion of the necessity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture destroys Christian-liberty more then a Magistrates command doth And by this
reason they that hold any one posture at receiving the Lords Supper necessary as sitting leaning kneeling do all equally destroy their own Christian-liberty as to these things which are undetermined by the Word So a Magistrate when commanding matters of Christian-liberty if in the preface to the Law he declares the thing necessary to be done in its self and therefore he commands it he takes away as much as in him lyes our Christian-liberty And in that case we ought to hold to that excellent Rule of the Apostle Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath set you free and be not intangled again with the yoke of bondage But if the Magistrate declare the things to be in themselves indifferent but only upon some prudent considerations for peace and order he requires persons to observe them though this brings a necessity of obedience to us yet it takes not away our Christian-liberty For an antecedent necessity expressed in the Law as a learned and excellent Casuist of our own observes doth not necessarily require the assent of the practical judgement to it which takes away our liberty of judgement or our judgement of the liberty of the things but a consequentiall necessity upon a command supposed doth only imply an act of the Will whereby the freedom of judgement and conscience remaining it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a superior Law Now that liberty doth lye in the freedom of Judgement and not in the freedom of Practise and so is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it appears both in the former case of scandall and in the actions of the Apostles and primitive Christians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty yea which is a great deal more in such ceremonies of which the Apostle expresly saith that if they observed them Christ would profit them Nothing and yet we find Paul himself circumcising Timothy because of the Jews Certainly then however these ceremonies are supposed to be not only mortuae but mortiferae now the Gospel was preached and the Law of Christian-liberty promulged yet Paul did not look upon it as the taking away his liberty at any time when it would prevent scandall among the Jews and tend to the furtherance of the Gospel to use any of them It was therefore the opinion of the necessity of them was it which destroyed Christian-liberty and therefore it is observable that where the opinion of the necessity of observing the Judaicall Rites and Ceremonies was entertained the Apostle sets himself with his whole strength to oppose them as he doth in his Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians Whom yet we find in other places and to other Churches not leaven'd with this doctrine of the necessity of Judaicall Rites very ready to comply with weak Brethren as in his Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians From which we plainly see that it was not the bare doing of the things but the doing them with an opinion of the necessity of them is that which infringeth Christian-liberty and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supream Magistrate when it is declared not to be for any opinion of the things themselves as necessary but to be only in order to the Churches peace and unity Secondly It appears that Liberty is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it because the very power of restraining the exercise of it doth suppose it to be a matter of liberty and that both antecedently and consequentially to that restraint Antecedently so it is apparent to be a matter of liberty else it was not capable of being restrained Consequentially in that the ground of observance of those things when restrained is not any necessity of the matter or the things themselves but only the necessity of obeying the Magistrate in things lawfull and undertermin'd by the Word which leads to another argument Thirdly Mens obligation to these things as to the ground of it being only in point of contempt and scandall argues that the things are matter of liberty still I grant the Magistrates authority is the ground of obedience but the ground of the Magistrates command is only in point of contempt and scandall and for preserving order in the Church For I have already shewed it to be unlawfull either to command or obey in reference to these things from any opinion of the necessity of them and therefore the only ground of observing them is to shew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them nor of scandall to others that are offended at our not observing them Tota igitur religio est in fugiendo scandalo vitando contemptu saith our learned Whitaker All our ground of obedience is the avoiding scandall and contempt of authority To the same purpose Pet. Martyr speaking of the obligation of Ecclesiasticall Laws Non obstringunt si removeatur contemptus scandalum So that non-observance of indifferent things commanded when there there is no apparent contempt or scandall do not involve a man in the guilt of sin as suppose a Law made that all publike prayer be performed kneeling if any thing lies in a mans way to hinder him from that posture in this case the man offends not because there is no contempt or scandall So if a Law were made that all should receive the Lords Supper fasting if a mans health calls for somwhat to refresh him before he sins not in the breach of that Law And therefore it is observable which Whitaker takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primitive Church that though they did determine many things belonging to the externall Polity of the Church yet they observed this difference in their Censures or Anathema's That in matteâ—s of meer order and decency they never pronounced an Anathema but with the supposition of â—ppâ—rent contempt and inserted Si quis contrà praesumpserit si quis contumaciter contrà fecerit but in matters of Doctrine or Life fully determin'd by the Law of God they pronounced a simple Anathema without any such clause inserted Now from this we may take notice of a difference between Laws concerning indifferencies in civill and Ecclesiastical matters That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the case of contempt or scandall because in these the publike good is aimed aâ— of which every private person is not fit to judge and therefore it is our duty either to obey or suffer but in Ecclesiasticall constitution only peace and order is that which is looked at and therefore Si nihil contra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 feceris non teneris illis is the rule here If nothing tending to apparent disorder be done men break not those Laws For the end and reason of a Law is the measure of its obligation Fourthly Mens being left free to do the things forbidden either upon a repeal of the former Laws or when a man is from under
the Greeks the old form continued from Orpheus or Onomacritus his Orphaica 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and those that sacrifice asked 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the other answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 From all these things laid together we see the great solemnity used by them in their worship which considered in its self was not the product of superstition but a dictate of the Law of Nature And it seems most naturall to the acts of discipline that they should be performed in the most publick solemn manner and not in any private Câ—andestine way which being so done oft times lose the designed effect of them in making men sensible and ashamed of those miscarriages which made them deserve so sharp and severe a censure Thence among the Jews their solemn sentence of the greater excommunication was pronounced by the sound of a Trumpet and so they say Meroz was excommunicated with 400. Trumpets and the same number they report was used in excommunicating Iesus of Nazareth which was usually done by the Magistrate or the Rector of the University as they tell us a story of a man coming to buy flesh at Pombeditha which was one of the three Universities of the remaining Jews in Chaldea after the return from Captivity the other were Sora and Neharda but offering some opprobrious language to R. Iehuda then Governour of the University he makes no more to do but prolatus tubis hominem excommunicavit brings out his Trumpets and excommunicates him And as the use of Bells since their invention did supply the former use of Trumpets in calling the Congregation together which I suppose was the account of using Trumpets in excommunicating from the Congregation so it seems the Bells were sometimes used to ring men out of as well as into the Church thence the solemn Monkish curse cursing men with Bell Book and Candle which can have no other sense but from this practice So much shall suffice to shew the soundation which the solemnity of Worship and the acts belonging to it have in the dictates of Nature manifested by the voyce and consent of Nations for herein vox Populi is vox Naturae as at other times it is Vox Dei CHAP. VI. The fourth thing dictated by the Law of Nature that there must be a way to end Controversies arising which tend to break the peace of the Society The nature of schisâ—â— considered Liberty of judgement and authority distinguished the latter must be parted within religious Societies as to private persons What way the light of Nature directs to for ending Controversies in an equality of power that the lesse number yield to the greater on what Law of Nature that is founded In a subordination of power that there must be a liberty of Appeals defined Independency of particular Congregations considered Elective Synods The Original of Church-Government as to Congregations The case paralleld between Civil and Church Government Where Appeals finally lodge The power of calling Synods and confirming their acts in the Magistrate THe fourth thing which Nature dictates in reference to a Church-society is That there must be a way agreed upon to determine and decide all those Controversies arising in this Society which immediately tend to the breaking the peace and unity of it We have seen already that natural reason requires a disparity between persons in a society To form and constitute a Society there must be order and power in some there must be inferiority and subjection in others answering to the former And by these we suppose a Society to be now modeld But Nature must either be supposed defective in its designs and contrivements as to the necessaries required for the management of them or else there must likewise be implyed a sufficient provision for the maintenance and preservation of the Societies thus entred into It is no wise agreeable to the wisdom of Nature to erect a Fabrick with such materials which though they may lye one upon the other yet if not fitly compacted together will fall in pieces again assoon as it is set up nor yet to frame a body with meer flesh and bones and the superiority of some members above the other for unlesse there be joints and sinews and ligatures to hold the parts together the dissolution will immediately follow the formation of it The end and design of Nature is preservation and continuance and therefore things necessary in order to that must be implyed in the first design of the being of the thing so that at least as to its self there be no defect in order to that This must in reason be supposed in all Societies that when they are first entred it must be upon such terms as may be sufficient to maintain and keep up those Societies in that peace and order which is requisite in order to the continuance of them For what diseases are to bodies Age and fire are to buildings that divisions and animosities are to Societies all equally tending to the ruine and destruction of the things they seize upon And as bodies are furnished by Nature not only with a receptive and concoctive faculty of what tends to their nourishment but with an expulsive faculty of what would tend to the ruine of it So all civill bodies must not only have ways to strengthen them but must have likewise a power to expell and disperse those noxions humours and qualities which tend to dissolve the frame compages and constitution of them A power then to prevent mischiefs is as necessary in a Society as a power to settle things in order to the advancement of the common good of Society This therefore the Church as a religious Society must likewise he endowed with viz. a power to maintain its self and keep up peace and unity within its self which cannot otherwise be supposed considering the bilious humour in mens natures not wholly purged out by Christianity without some way to decide Controversies which will arise disturbing the peace of it For the clearing of this which much concerns the power and government of the Church we shall consider what the controversies are which tend to break the Churches peace and what way the Law of nature finds out for the ending of them Which we are the more necessitated to speak to because nothing hath begotten controversies more then the power of determining them hath done The Controversies then which tend to break the peace of a religious Society are either matter of different practice or matter of different opinion The former if it comes from no just and necessary cause and ends in a totall separation from that Society the person guilty of it was joyned with is justly call'd Schism which as 〈…〉 it is an Ecclefiasticall sedition as Sedition iâ— a Lay Schism both being directly contrary to that communion and friendlinesse which should be preserved in all Societies The latter if impugning somewhat fundamentall in order to the end of constituting religious Societies or being a
lesser matter if wilfully taken up and obstinately maintained is call'd Here sit which two are seldom seen out of each others company and when they are together are like the blind and same man in the Fable the one lent the other eyes and the other lent him feet one to find out what they desired the other to run away with it when they had it The Heretick he useth his eyes to spy out some cause or pretence of deserting Communion the Schismatick he helps him with his legâ— to run away from it but between them both they rob the Church of its peace and unity But in order to the making clear what the Churches power is in reference to these we are to take notice of these things First That the Church hath no direct immediate power over mens opinions So that a matter of meer different opinion lyes not properly within the cognizance of any Church power the reason of it is this because the end of power lodged in the Church is to preserve the peace and unity of its self now a meer different opinion doth not violate the bonds of Society for Opinionum diâ—er sitas opinantium unitas non sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Men may preserve communion under different apprehensions So long then as diversity of opinion tends not to the breaking the quiet and tranquillity of the Church of God a man may safely enjoy his own private apprehensions as to any danger of molestation from Church Governours That is so long as a man keeps his opinion to himself and hath the power of being his own Counsellor It is not the difference of opinion formally considered when it is divulged abroad that is punishable but the tendency to Schism which lyes in the divâ—lging of it and drawing others away from the received Truths For the opinion its self is an internall act of the mind and therefore is punishable by no externall power as that of the Magistrate or Church is as no internall action is under the jurisdiction or authority of a Magistrate any further then as necessarily conjoyned with the outward action or as it hath a direct influence upon it The case of blasphemy which is a thing of the highest nature in this kind is not punishable by men as blasphemy implyes low and undervaluing thoughts of God but as being a thing divulged else no formal blaspemy it tends apparently to the dishonour of God and consequently to the breaking in pieces all such Societies whose great foundation is the belief of the Majesty and glory of God So Idolatry under the Law was punished as it was immediately destructive of that obedience which men did owe to the true God And under the Gospel it is not meer difference of opinion judgement and apprehension which layes men open to the Censures of that power which moderates and rules a religious Society but the endeavour by difference of opinion to alienate mens spirits one from another and thereby to break the Society into fractions and divisions is that which makes men liable to restraint and punishment From whence it follows that where the peace and unity of the Church may be preserved and yet men keep up different apprehensions of things there is nothing deserving any severe animadversion from the Rulers of that Society For a power corrective and vindictive must suppose something acted contrary to the Laws and Rules of the Society and the end of committing that power into the hands of Governours now here is nothing of that nature for the Laws of mutual Society are observed and the end of Church-Government is to see nè quid Ecclesia detrimenti capiat lest the Church as a Society be any wayes prejudiced which cannot be while men maintain that love affection and communion which becomes the members of such a Society The unity then required in the Church is not an unity of judgement and apprehension among the members of it which though it be their duty to endeavour after yet it is no further attainable by mens endeavours then perfection is and Unio Christianorum in this sense is one of the Jewels belonging to the Crown of Heaven There is no necessity then of inquiring after an infallible Judge of Controversies unlesse we had some promise and assurance from Christ that the members of his Church should never differ in their judgements from one another and then what need of an infallible Judge and if Christ had appointed an infallible Judg he would infallibly have discovered it to the minds of all sober men or else his infallibility could never attain its end For while I question whether my Judge be infallible or no I cannot infallibly assent to any of his determinations And where there is no ground for an infallible Judge for any to pretend to it is the worst of supposable errours because it renders all others incurable by that apprehension and takes away all possibility of repentance while men are under that perswasion The Unity then of the Church is that of Communion and not that of Apprehension and different opinions are no further lyable to censures then as men by the broaching of them do endeavour to disturb the peace of the Church of God That then which seems most lyable to censures in a Church is Schism as being immediately destructive of that communion which should be maintained in a religious Society But as to this too we must observe something further and not to think and judge every thing to deserve the name which is by many call'd Schism it being well observed by a very learned and judicious Divine that Heresie and Schism as they are commonly used are two Theologicall scare-crows with which they who use to uphold a party in Religion use to fright away such as making enquiry into it are ready to relinquish and oppose it if it appear either erroneous or suspitious For as Plutarch reports of a Painter who having unskilfully painted a Cock chased away all Cocks and Hens that so the imperfection of his Art might not appear by comparison with nature so men willing for ends to admit of no fancy but their own endeavour to hinder an enquiry into it by way of comparison of somewhat with it peradventure truer that so the deformity of their own might not appear Thus he Schism then as it imports a separation from communion with a Church-society is not a thing intrinsecally and formally evil in it self but is capable of the differences of good and evil according to the grounds reasons ends and circumstances inducing to such a separation The withdrawing from Society is but the materiality of Schism the formality of it must be fetched from the grounds on which that is built It is therefore a subject which deserve a strict inquiry what things those are which may make a withdrawing from a religious Society to which a man is joyned to be lawfull For as it is a great sin on the one hand unnecessarily to
are required which mens consciences are unsatisfied in unless others proceed to eject and cast them wholly out of communion on that account in which case their separation is necessary and their Schism unavoidable Secondly therefore I assert that as to things in the judgement of the Primitive and Reformed Churches left undetermined by the Law of God and in matters of meer order and decency and wholly as to the form of Government every one notwithstanding what his private judgement may be of them is bound for the Peace of the Church of God to submit to the determination of the lawful Governours of the Church And this is that power of ending Controversies which I suppose to be lodged in a Church-Society not such a one as whereto every man is bound to conform his private judgement but whereto every private person is bound to submit in Order to the Churches Peace That is that in any Controversies arising in a Church there is such a power supposed that may give such an authoritative Decision of the controversie in which both parties are bound to acquiesce so as to act nothing contrary to that Decision For as it is supposed that in all Contracts and Agreements for mutuall Society men are content to part with their own Liberties for the good of the whole so likewise to part with the Authority of their own judgements and to submit to the Determination of things by the Rulers of the Society constituted by them For there must be a difference made between the Liberty and freedom of a mans own judgment and the Authority of it for supposing men out of all Society every man hath both but Societies being entred and Contracts made though men can never part with the freedom of their Judgements Men not having a Depotical power over their own understandings yet they must part with the Authority of their Judgements i. e. in matters concerning the Government of the Society they must be ruled by Persons in Authority over them Else there can be nothing imagined but confusion and disorder in stead of Peace and Unity in every civil State and Society The case is the same in a religious Society too in which men must be supposed to part with the Authority of their own judgements in matters concerning the Government of the Church and to submit to what is constituted and appointed by those who are intrusted with the care and welfare of it Else it is impossible there should be Unity and Peace in a Church considered as a Society which is as much as to say there neither is nor can be such a Society And that God hath commanded that which is Naturally impossible I mean freedom from divisions and the Unity and Peace of his Church Which will appear from hence because it can never be expected that all men should be exactly of one mind Either then men retaining their private apprehensions are bound to acquiesce in what is publikely determined or there is a necessity of perpetuall confusions in the Church of God For the main inlet of all disturbances and divisions in the Church is from hence that Men consider themselves absolutely and not as Members of a governed Society and so that they may follow their own own private judgements and are bound so to doe in matters belonging to the Government of the Church and not to acquiesce for the Churches Peace in what is established in Order to the ruling of this so constituted Society by lawfull Authority These things premised the way is now fully cleared for the discovering what wayes are prescribed by the light of Nature for ending controversies in the Church which will appear to be these two 1. In societies wherein persons act with an equality of Power for the ending differences arising the less number must alwayes acquiesce in the determination of the greater And therefore it iâ— a generally received Axiom that in all Societies pars major â—ut habet universitatis the greater part hath the power of the whole And it is a standing Rule in the Civil Law Refertur ad universos quod publice fit per majorem partem which is determined by the Lawyers to hold not of the persons in power but of the persons present at the Determination as when Alexander Severus made fourteen of the Viri Consulares to be Curatores urbis joyned with the Praefectis urbis to Determine cases brought before them what was determined by the greater part of those present was looked upon as binding as if the whole number had been there And this Aristotle layes down as one of the fundamental Lawes of a Democratical Government 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That must be looked on as a just and final decision of a Case debated which the major part determines And therefore rationally infers that in a Democracy the poorer sort and so likewise the worse must alwayes bear the greatest sway because they are the most Which is an unavoydable inconvenience in that form of Government whether in Church or State The same he elsewhere applyes to other forms of Government which have a multitude of Rulers as Aristocracy and Oligarchy That which seems good to the most obtains as a Law amongst all Which Appian thus briefly expresseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Dionys. Halicarnasseus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one speaking of matter of Fact that it doth obtain the other of matter of Law that it should do so It appears then from the Law and light of nature that where ever any multitude acts in an equality of Power the greater part have the power of the whole not from any right which the major part hath as superiour over the less but from the Law of nature which will have every part ordered for the good of the whole which good cannot oft times be obtained without a special determination on one side or other nor that determination have its effect if the Act of the major part may be rescinded by the less So that in every thing requiring special determination this is to be esteemed the most just and final decision which is done by the major part For it would be manifestly unjust for the lesser part to determine the greater and therefore by the Law of nature the greater part hath the right of the whole 2. In a society consisting of many particular Companies or Congregations there must be a subordination of Powers by the Law of nature which grants a right of Appeal to an injured person from the lower and subordinate Power to the higher and superiour Appealing is defined by the Lawyers to be Provocatio iniquae sententiae querelam contineus An address to a higher Power with complaint of wrong and so in geneall it is defined by Ulpian to be ab Inferioris Iudicis sententiâ ad superiorem provocatio but as Hottoman observes appeals may sometimes be made to a co-ordinate power upon complaint of injustice done As one
Praetor Consul Tribune might be appealed to from the sentence of another The originall of Appeals then is that injuries may be redressed and in order to that nature dictates that there ought to be a subordination of Powers one to another lest any injury done through corruption or ignorance of the immediate Judges prove irremediable To which purpose our learned Whitaker saith that Appeals are juris divini naturalis in omni societate admodum necessariae propter multorum judicum vel iniquitatem vel ignorantiam alioqui actum esset de innocente si non liceret ab iniqua sententia appestare So that appeals are founded upon natural right lest men should be injured in any determination of a case by those that have the cognizance of it And in order to a redress of wrongs and ending controversies Nature tells us that Appeals must not be infinite but there must be some Power from whence Appeals must not be made What that should be must be determined in the same manner that it is in Civils not that every Controversie in the Church must be determined by an Oecumenical Council but that it is in the Power of the Supream Magistrate as Supream head in causes Ecclesiastical to limit and fix this Subordination and determine how far it shall go and no further The Determination being in order to the Peace of the Church which Christian Magistrates are bound to look after and see that causes hang not perpetually without Decision And so we find the Christian Emperours constituting to whom Appeals should be made and where they should be fixed as Iustinian and Theodostus did For when the Church is incorporated into the Common-wealth the chief Authority in a Common-wealth as Christian belongs to the same to which it doth as a Common-wealth But of that already It is then against the Law and Light of Nature and the natural right of every man for any particular company of men calling themselves a Church to ingross all Ecclesiastical Power so into their hands that no liberty of Appeals for redress can be made from it Which to speak within compass is a very high usurpation made upon the Civil and Religious rights of Christians because it leaves men under a causeless censure without any authoritative vindication of them from it As for that way of elective Synods substituted in the place of authoritative Power to determine Controversies it is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which will never be soveraign enough to cure the distemper it is brought for For elective Synods are but like that which the Lawyers call arbitrium boni viri which they distinguish from arbitrium ex compromisso and binds no further then the party concerned doth judge the Sentence equall and just So that this helps us with no way to end controversies in the Church any further then the persons engaged are willing to account that just which shall be judged in their Case Taking then a coercive Power onely for such a one as may authoritatively decide a controvâ—rsie we see what great Reason there is for what the Historian observes Arbitriis ii se debent interponere qui non parenteâ— coercere possunt That all Power of Arbitration should have some juridicall power going along with it to make a finall end of quarrels But that which seems yet more strange to me is this that by those who assert the Independency of particular Congregationâ— it is so hotly pleaded that Christ hath given every particular Congregation a Power over its own Members to determine controversies arising between them but that if one or many of these particular Congregations should erre or break the Rule he hath left no power Authoritatively to decide what should be done in such cases Can we conceive that Christ should provide more for the Cases of particular Persons then of particular Churches And that he should give Authority for Determining one and not the other Is there any more coactive Power given by any to Synods or greater Officers then there is by them to particular Churches which power is onely declarative as to the Rule though Authoritative as to persons where-ever it is lodged Is there not more danger to Gods People by the scandals of Churches then Persons Or did Christs Power of governing his People reach to them onely as particular Congregations Doth not this too strongly savour of the Pars Donati only the Meridies must be rendred a particular Congregationall Church where Christ causeth his Flock to rest But supposing the Scripture not expresly to lay down a Rule for governing many Churches are men outlawed of their natural Rights that supposing a wrong Sentence passed in the Congregation there is no hopes way or means to redress his injury and make his innocency known Doth this look like an Institution of Christ But that which I conceive is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Original of this mistake is that the Churches we read of first Planted in Scripture were onely particular Congregations and therefore there is no proper Church-power beyond them or above them I meddle not with the Antâ—cedent now which is largely discussed by others but the extream weakness of the consequence is that I am here obliged to discover For what a strange shortness of Discourse is it to Argue thus If when there was but one Congregation that Congregation had all Power within its self then when there are more particular congregations it must be so and yet this is the very Foundation of all those Kingdomes of Yvetos as one calls them those sole self-governing congregations When there was but one congregation in a Church it was necessary if it had any Church-power that it must be lodged in that one congregation But when this congregation was multiplyed into many more is it not as necessary for their mutual Government there should be a common power governing them together as a joynt-society Besides the first congregational Church in the New Testament viz. that of Ierusalem could be no particular Organical Church for it had many if not all Universall Officers in it and if they were the fixed Pastours of that Church they could not according to the Principles of those who thus speak Preach to any other congregation but their own by vertue of their Office And so either their Apostolicall Office and Commission must be destroyed if they were Pastors of particular Organical Churches or if their Apostolicall Office be asserted their Pastorship of particular Organicall Churches is destroyed by their own Principles who â—ssert that the Pastor of a Church can do no Pastorall Office out of his own congregation The case is the same as to other Churches planted by the Apostles and govern'd by themselves which two as far as I can find in the New Testament were of an equal extent viz. That all the Churches planted by Apostles were chiefly governed by themselves though they had subordinate officers under them These first Churches then
so much of their Natural Rights as was not consistent with the well being of the Society Secondly a free submission to all Laws which should be agreed upon at their entrance into Society or afterwards as they see cause But when Societies were already entred and Children born under them no such express consent was required in them being bound by vertue of the Protection they find from Authority to submit to it and an implicite consent is supposed in all such as are born under that Authority But for their more full understanding of this Obligation of theirs and to lay the greater tye of Obedience upon them when they come to understanding it hath been conceived very requisite by most States to have an explicite Declaration of their consent either by some formal Oath of Allegiance or some other way sufficiently expressing their fidelity in standing to the Covenants long since supposed to be made To apply this now to the Church We have all along hitherto considered the Church in general as a Society or Corporation which was necessary in order to our discovering what is in it from the light of nature without Positive Laws But here we must take notice of what was observed by Father Laynez the Jesuit at the Council of Trent That it is not with the Church as with other Societies which are first themselves and then constitute the Governours But the Governour of this Society was first himself and he appointed what Orders Rules and Lawes should govern this Society and wherein he hath determined any thing we are bound to look upon that as necessary to the maintaining of that Society which is built upon his Constitution of it And in many of those Orders which Christ hath settled in his Church the Foundation of them is in the Law of nature but the particular determination of the manner of them is from himself Thus it is in the case we now are upon Nature requires that every one entring into a Society should consent to the Rules of it Our Saviour hath determined how this Consent should be expressed viz. by receiving Baptism from those who have the power to dispense it which is the federal Rite whereby our consent is expressed to own all the Laws and submit to them whereby this Society is governed Which at the first entring of men into this Society of the Church was requisite to be done by the express and explicite consent of the parties themselves being of sufficient capacity to declare it but the Covenant being once entred into by themselves not onely in their own name but in the name of their Posterity a thing implyed in all Covenants wherein benefits do redound to Posterity that the Obligation should reach them to but more particular in this it having been alwayes the Tâ—nour of Gods Covenants with men to enter the seed as well as the persons themselves as to outward Priviledges an implicite consent as to the children in Covenant is sufficient to enter them upon the priviledges of it by Baptism although withal it be highly rational for their better understanding the Engagement they entred into that when they come to age they should explicitely declare their own voluntary consent to submit to the Lawes of Christ and to conform their lives to the Profession of Christianity which might be a more then probable way and certainly most agreeable both to Reason and Scripture to advance the credit of Christianity once more in the World which at this day so much suffers by so many professing it without understanding the terms of it who swallow down a profession of Christianity as boyes do pills without knowing what it is compounded of which is the great Reason it works so little alteration upon their spirits The one great cause of the great flourishing of Religion in the Primitive times was certainly the strictness used by them in their admission of members into Church-Societies which is fully described by Origen against Celsus who tells us they did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 enquire into their lives and carriages to discern their seriousness in the profession of Christianity during their being Catechumeni Who after tells us they did require 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 true Repentance and Reformation of Life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then we admit them to the participation of our Mysteries I confess the Discipline of the Primitive Church hath been very much misrepresented to us by mens looking upon it through the glass of the modern practices and customs obtaining among us as though all this onely concerned the Admission to the Lords Supper though that was alwayes in chiefest veneration in the Church of God as being the chief of Gospel-Mysteries as they loved to speak yet I cannot find that any were admitted to all other Ordinances freely with them who were debarred from this but their admission to one did include an admission to all so on the contrary I finde none admitted to Baptism who were not to the Lords Supper and if Catechumeni presently after onely confirmation intervening which will hardly be ever found separate from Baptism till the distinction of the double Chrism in vertice pectore came up which was about Ieroms time The thing then which the Primitive Church required in admitting persons adult to Baptism and so to the Lords Supper was a serious visible profession of Christianity which was looked upon by them as the greatest Evidence of their real consent to the Rules of the Gospel For that purpose it will be worth our taking notice what is set down by Iustin Martyr Apolog. 2. speaking of the celebration of the Lords Supper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where we see what was required before Admission to the Lords Supper A Profession of Faith in the truths of the Gospel and answerable Life to the Gospel without which it was not lawful to participate of the Lords Supper And further we see by Pliny that the Christians of those times did make use of some solemn Engagements among themselves which he calls Sacramenta they did se Sacramento obstringere nè funta nè latrocinia nè adulteria committerent nè fidem fallerent c. and Tertullian reports it out of Pliny that he found nothing de Sacramentis eorum as Iunius first reads it out of M. S. for de Sacris after him Heraldus and as it is now read in Rigaltius Edition besides cautelam ad confoederandam disciplinam c. scelera prohibentes which Eusebius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pacta Covenants between them and so Master Selden interprets the place of Origen in the beginning of his Book against Celsus where Celsus begins his charge against the Christians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where he takes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as Gelenius renders it conventus but in its proper sense for contracts or covenants that were made by the Christians as by other Societies onely permitted and tolerated by the Common-wealth
may be a real confederation without this explicite covenant as appears in those Churches of Christ both in the primitive times and since the Reformation who have never used it which none I suppose who maintain this opinion will deny to have been true visible Churches of Christ. 2. If the Gospel-covenant entred into by any gives a right to Gospel-Ordinances by its self then an explicite covenant is not that which makes one a member of a Church but the Gospel-covenant gives that right to all Gospel-Ordinances If by Baptism the person baptized have a legal title to all Gospel-Ordinances then c. The Minor appears in that they are admitted Church-members by Baptism and how can any be a Member of a Church and not have right to all Ordinances in it supposing capacity to receive them A right once received continues till it be forfeited especially when it is such a right as is not limited to any particular priviledges but to all the priviledges of that Society into which they are entred 3. The reality of consent may be sufficiently manifested without an explicite covenant as in the joyning with those who are under the same profession in the common acts of the Society and acceptance of and submission to the Rulers of that Society which implicitely is that Covenant which they would have expressed and actions in this case are as declarative and significative as words 4. If a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning such a Covenant then it is not explicite covenanting which makes a Church but a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning it as in case of universall corruption as to Word and Sacraments as in the Church of Rome that still owns her self for a Church The ground of the consequence is from the parity of reason as to contraries But though I see no reason at all why an explicite Covenant should be so necessary to a Church that we cannot suppose a true Church without it yet I no wayes deny the lawfulnesse or expediency in many cases of having a personal profession from all baptized in Infancy when they come to age which we may if we please call Confirmation and the necessity of of desiring admission in order to participation of all Ordinances which desire of admission doth necessarily imply mens consenting to the Laws of that Society and walking according to the duties of it and so they are consequentially and virtually though not expresly and formally bound to all the duties required from them in that relation When Churches are over-run with loosnesse ignorance and prophanesse or when Christians are under persecution an externall profession of the Gospel-covenant and declaring their owning the Society they are entred into and submitting to the Laws of it may be if not wholly necessary yet very usefull and expedient And indeed at all times we see people understand so little of their duty or engagements and are so hardly brought under the exercise of Gospel-discipline that an open profession of their submission to the Rules of the Gospel seems the most likely way to advance the practise Power and purity of Religion But of this much is spoken by others lately and therefore I supersede From all this we see that every Society implying a joyning together in some common duties Nature tells us there must be a reall consenting together explicite or implicite in all persons who enter into such a Society CHAP. VIII The last thing dictated by the Law of Nature is that every Offender against the Laws of the Society must give an account of his actions to the Governours of it and submit to the censures inflicted upon him by them The originall of penalties in Societies The nature of them according to the nature and ends of Societies The penalty of the Church no civil mulct because its Laws and ends are different from civill Societies The practice of the Druids in excommunication Among the Iews whether a meer civill or sacred penalty The latter proved by six arguments Cherem Col Bo objections answered The originall of the mistake shewed The first part concluded NAture dictates further that in a well-ordered Society every offender against the Rules of that Society must give an account of his actions to the Governours of that Society and submit to the censures of it according to the judgement of the Rulers of it In all Societies subsisting by Laws men being more ruled by hopes and fears then by a sense of duty or love of goodness it is necessary for maintaining a Society that there must be not only a declaration of what men ought to do but a setting forth the penalties which they must undergo upon violation of the Laws whereon the Society doth subsist And as there must be penalties annexed as the sanction of the Law so it must of necessity be implyed in a well-ordered Society that every person as he doth promise obedience to the Law so by the same obligation he is bound to submit to the penalties upon disobedience For whatever Laws binds to duty where there is a penalty threatned doth bind likewise to punishment upon neglect of duty for no sooner is the Law broken but the offender lyes under the penall sanction of that Law and is thereby bound to give an account of himself and actions to those Governours who are bound to see the Laws obeyed or offenders punished Guilt follows immediately upon the breach of the Law which is nothing else but the offenders obligation to punishment From this obligation on the offenders part ariseth a new relation between the Governour of the Society and the offender On the Governours part a right to punish vindictive justice supposing offences committed and on the offender◠part an obligation to undergo what shall be inflicted upon him for his offence Punishment being nothing else but malum passionis ob malum actionis There must be then these things supposed in any well ordered Society Laws to be governed by Rulers to see the Laws kept or offenders punished penalties made known for offenders submission of the persons in the Societies to the penalties if they deserve them But now of what kind nature and degree the penalties must be must be resolved according to the nature end and design of the constitution of the Society If it be a Society for preservation of the rights of Bodies or Estates the penalties must be either pecuniary or corporal And the ground is because the end of legall punishment is not properly revenge but the preservation of the Society which without punishments could not be A threefold end is therefore assigned to punishments the reformation of the offending person the prevention of further offences in the Society of the same kind and the being a terrour and example to others the first is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The second 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being for the preservation of the honour of the
Magistrate the third 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when the punishment is inflicted upon one that others should take notice of it which must be alwayes done in a publike manner So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Matthew is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These things being thus in general considered come we now to apply it to the Church considered as a Society That it hath peculiar Laws to be governed by appears by the distinct nature end and design of the constitution of it which is not to preserve any outward Rights but to maintain and keep up a religious Society for the service of God and therefore the penall sanctions of these Laws cannot properly be any corporall or pecuniary mulct but somewhat answerable to the nature of the Society It must be then somewhat which implyes the deprivation of that which is the chiefest benefit of that Society The benefits of it are the priviledges and honour which men enjoy by thus associating themselves for so high an employment That punishment then must be the loss of those priviledges which the Corporation enjoyes which must be by exclusion of the offending person from communion with the Society Hence we see it is evident that which we call Excommunication is the greatest penalty which the Church as a Society can inflict upon the members of it considered as such And hence it is likewise clear that as the Society of the Church is distinct from others the Laws ends Governours of a different nature so the punishment must be a punishment distinct from civill and ordained wholly in order to the peculiar ends of this Society which they do not well consider who deny any such power as that of Excommunication peculiar to the Church which is as much as to deny that the Laws whereby the Church is ruled are different from the civil Laws or the end of this Society from the ends of civil Societies for the punishment must be proportioned to the Laws and referred immediately to its proper ends It were no wayes difficult to answer the pretences brought against this For although I acknowledge a subordination of this religious Society to the Supream Authority in the Commonwealth and that the Rules concerning the Government of the Society in common must have their sanction from thence yet this no wayes implyes but it may have its peculiar penalties and power to inflict them any more then any Company of Tradesmen have not power to exclude any from their Company for breaking the Rules of the Company because they are subordinate to the Supream Authority or any Colledge to expell any from thence for breaking the locall Statutes of it which are distinct from the Common-Laws Nor is it any argument that because Christians had mutuall confederations in times of persecution for the exercise of censures therefore these censures were only arbitrary and humane unless it be proved that it was not a duty in them so to confederate joyn together nor was there any antecedent obligation to inflict those censures upon offenders Much lesse thirdly because their jurisdiction is not civil and coactive therefore they have none at all which is as much as to say the Laws of Scripture are not our common-common-Laws therefore they are none at all I shall not here insist upon the divine Right of power to excommunicate offenders founded upon the positive Laws of Chist it being my only businesse now to shew what foundation such a power hath in the Law of Nature which we have seen doth follow upon the Churches being a distinct Society ruled by other Laws acting on other ends subsisting upon different grounds from any other Society A further evidence we have of this how consonant it is to the light of Nature from the practice of all Societies pretending to be for the Worship of God who have looked upon this as the proper penalty of offenders among them to be excluded out of those Societies Thus we find among the Druids whose great office was to take care of the worship of their gods and to instruct the people in Religion as Caesar relates Illi rebus divinis intersunt sacrificia publica ac privata procurant religiones interpretantur and accordingly the punishment of disobedience among them was excommunication from their sacrifices which they looked upon as the greatest punishment could be inflicted upon them as Caesar at large describes it Si quis aut privatus aut pubicus eorum decreto non stetit sacrificiis interdicunt haec poena apud eos est gravissima quibus ita est interdictum ii numero impiorū sceleratorum habentur iis omnes decedunt aditū eorū sermonemque defugiunt nè quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant neque iis petentibus jus redditur neque honos ullus communicatur The practice of Excommunication among the Jews is not questioned by any but the right ground and orignall of that practice with the effect and extent of it Some conceive it to have been only taken up among the Jews after the power of capitall punishments was taken from them and that it was used by them wholly upon a civill account not extending to the exclusion of men from their worship in the Temple or Synagogues but only to be a note of insamy upon offending persons This opinion though entertained by persons of much skill and learning in the Jewish antiquities yet carries not that evidence with it to gain my assent to it For first the causes of excommunication were not such as were expressed by their Law to deserve such civil punishments as might have been inflicted by them upon offenders nor were they generally matters of a civill nature but matters of offence and scandall as will appear to any that shall peruse the twenty four causes of Excommunication related out of the Jewish Writers by Selden and Ioh. Coch. Such were the neglecting the Precepts of the Scribes the vain pronouncing the Name of God bearing witness against a Iew before Heathen tribunals doing any common work in the afternoon of the day before the Passover with others of a like Nature If Excommunication had been then taken up among them onely ex confoederatâ disciplinâ to supply the defect of civil Judicatories at least all Capitall offenders must have lain under the Sentence of Excommunication But here we read not of any being Excommunicated for those but for other lesser matters which were looked upon as matters of scandal among them and though some of them were matters of civil injuries yet it follows not that men were Excommunicated for them as such but for the scandall which attended them As in the Christian Church men are Excommunicated for matters which are punishable by the civil Magistrate but not under that notion but as they are offences to that Christian Society which they live among Secondly It appears that Excommunication was not a meer civil Penalty because the increasing or abatement of that Penalty did depend upon the
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the civil and not sacred sense as it denotes an excluding them from common Society but though it be freely granted that that is sometimes the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Mat. 10. 17. yet those particulars being considered which are already laid down I shall leave it to consideration whether it be more probable to take the word Synagogue here in a Civil or Sacred Sense when the occasion expressed is meerly a matter of Doctrine and Opinion and not any thing condemned by their Law Another thing which hath been I believe a great ground of mistaking in this matter is that excluding from the civill Society among them was alwayes consequent upon Excommunication the Reason whereof was because the Church and Common-wealth were not distinct among the Jews and the same persons who took care of Sacred did likewise of Civil things there being no distinct Sanhedrins among them as some imagine but from hence it no wayes follows but their Excommunication might be an exclusion from Sacred Worship as well as Civil Society However were it as they pretend that it was from civill commerce yet the whole people of the Jews being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gods peculiar people and his only Church in being before the times of the Gospel an exclusion in that respect from the common Society of them might deservedly be looked upon as a sacred action and not meerly civill it being a separation from a people whose main ligature was their being a Church of God or a Community gathered together for Gods worship and service Thus we see the Church of the Jews had this power among them and for the Christian Church the practice of Discipline upon offenders was never questioned though the right hath been so that from hence we gather in that it hath been the practice of Societies constituted for the Worship of God to call offenders to an account for their offences and if upon examination they be found guilty to exclude them their Society that it is a dictate of the Law of Nature That every offender against the Laws of a Society must give an account of his actions to the Rulers of it and submit to the Censures inflicted on him by them Thus I am now come to the end of my first stage to shew how far Church-Government is founded upon the Law and Light of Nature And so to the end of the first Part. PART II. CHAP. I. The other ground of Divine Right considered viz. Gods positive Laws which imply a certain knowledge of Gods intention to bind men perpetually As to which the Arguments drawn from Tradition and the practice of the Church in after-ages proved invalid by several arguments In order to a right stating the Question some Concessions laid down First That there must be some form of Government in the Church The notion of a Church explained whether it belongs only to particular Congregations which are manifested not to be of Gods primary intention but for our necessity Evidence for National Churches under the Gospel A National Church-Government necessary I Now come to the second way whereby any thing comes to be of unalterable Divine Right which is by the positive Laws of God which do bind universally to obedience In the entrance into this Discourse it is necessary to lay down the ways whereby we find out a Divine positive Law determining an unalterable Obligation which must be either by express words of Scripture or by some other certain way whereby to gather from thence that it was Gods intention to bind men For the main thing requisite to make a standing universal positive Law is Gods declaring his mind that the thing enquired into should unalterably bind men to the practice of it Now whatever doth sufficiently manifest Gods intention is a medium to find out such a Law by and nothing else But it must be such a manifestation as gives a mans mind sufficient evidence and testimony whereon to build a true certain and divine assent to the thing as revealed So that whatsoever binds the conscience as a Law must first be entertained by the understanding as a matter of faith not as it imports something meerly doctrinall and dogmaticall but as it implyes the matter of a Divine Revelation and the object of an assent upon the credibility of a Testimony For God having the only immediate authority over the consciences of men nothing can bind immediately the conscience but a Divine Law neither can any thing bind as such but what the understanding assents unto as revealed by God himself Now the Word of God being the only Codex and Digests of Divine Laws whatever Law we look for must either be found there in express terms or at least so couched therein that every one by the exercise of his understanding may by a certain and easie collection gather the universall obligation of the thing enquired after In this case then whatsoever is not immediately founded upon a Divine Testimony cannot be made use of as a Medium to infer an universally binding Law by So that all Traditions and Historicall evidence will be unserviceable to us when we enquire into Gods intentions in binding mens consciences Matters of fact and meer Apostolicall practice may I freely grant receive much light from the Records of succeeding ages but they can never give a mans understanding sufficient ground to inferr any Divine Law arising from those facts attested to be the practice or Records of succeeding ages For first The foundation and ground of our assent in this case is not the bare testimony of Antiquity but the assurance which we have either that their practice did not vary from what was Apostolicall or in their Writings that they could not mistake concerning what they deliver unto us And therefore those who would inferr the necessary obligation of men to any form of Government because that was practised by the Apostles and then prove the Apostolicall practice from that of the ages succeeding or from their Writings must first of all prove that what was done then was certainly the Apostles practice and so prove the same thing by its self or that it was impossible they should vary from it or that they should mistake in judging of it For here something more is required then a meer matter of fact in which I confess their nearnesse to the Apostles times doth give them an advantage above the ages following to discern what it was but such a practice is required as inferrs an universall obligation upon all places times and persons Therefore these things must be manifested that such things were unquestionably the practice of those ages and persons that their practice was the same with the Apostles that what they did was not from any prudential motives but by vertue of a Law which did bind them to that practice Which things are easily passed over by the
most eager Disputers of the controversie about Church-Government but how necessary they are to be proved before any form of Government be asserted so necessary that without it there can be no true Church any weak understanding may discern Secondly Supposing that Apostolicall practice be sufficiently attested by the following ages yet unless it be cleared from Scripture that it was Gods intention that the Apostles actions should continually bind the Church there can be nothing inferred that doth concern us in point of Conscience I say that though the matter of fact be evidenced by Posterity yet the obligatory nature of that fact must depend on Scripture and the Apostles intentions must not be built upon mens bare â—urmises nor upon after-practices especially if different from the constitution of things during the Apostles times And here those have somewhat whereon to exercise their understandings who assert an obligation upon men to any form of Government by vertue of an Apostolicall practice which must of necessity suppose a different state of things from what they were when the Apostles first established Governours over Churches As how those who were appointed Governours over particular Congregations by the Apostles come to be by vertue of that Ordination Governours over many Congregations of like nature and extent with that over which they were set And whether if it were the Apostles intention that such Governours should be alwayes in the Church is it not necessary that that intention of theirs be declared by a standing Law that such there must be for here matter of fact and practice can be no evidence when it is supposed to be different from the constitution of Churches afterward But of this more hereafter Thirdly Supposing any form of Government in its self necessary and that necessity not determined by a Law in the Word of God the Scripture is thereby apparently argued to be insufficient for its end for then deficit in necessariis some things are necessary for the Church of God which the Scripture is wholly silent in I say not that every thing about Church-Government must be written in Scripture but supposing any one form necessary it must be there commanded or the Scripture is an imperfect Rule which contains not all things necessary by way of Precept For there can be no other necessity universall but either by way of means to an end or by way of Divine Command I know none will say that any particular form of Government is necessary absolutely by way of means to an end for certainly supposing no obligation from Scripture Government by an equality of power in the Officers of the Church or by superiority of one order above another are indifferent in order to the generall ends of Government and one not more necessary then the other If any one form then be necessary it must be by that of command and if there be a command universally binding whose footsteps cannot be traced in the Word of God how can the Scriptures be a perfect Rule if it fails in determining binding Laws So that we must if we own the Scriptures sufficiency as a binding Rule appeal to that about any thing pleaded as necessary by vertue of any Divine command and if such a Law cannot be met with in Scripture which determines the case in hand one way or other by way of necessary obligation I have ground to look upon that which is thus left undetermined by Gods positive Laws to be a matter of Christian-liberty and that neither part is to be looked upon as necessary for the Church of God as exclusive of the other This I suppose is the case as to particular forms of Government in the Church of God but that I may not only suppose but prove it I now come to the stating of the Question which if ever necessary to be done any where it is in the Controversie of Church-Government the most of mens heats in this matter arising from want of right understanding the thing in question between them In the stating the Question I shall proceed by degrees and shew how far we acknowledge any thing belonging to Government in the Church to be of an unalterable Divine Right First That there must be a form of Government in the Church of God is necessary by vertue not only of that Law of Nature which provides for the preservation of Societies but likewise by vertue of that Divine Law which takes care for the Churches preservation in peace and unity I engage not here in the Controversie Whether a particular Congregation be the first Political Church or no it sufficeth for my purpose that there are other Churches besides particular Congregations I mean not only the Catholick visible Church which is the first not only in order of consideration but nature too as a totum Integrale before the similar parts of it but in respect of all other accidentall modifications of Churches from the severall wayes of their combination together They who define a Church by stated worshipping Congregations do handsomely beg the thing they desire by placing that in their definition of a Church which is the thing in question which is Whether there be no other Church but such particular Congregations Which is as if one should go about to prove that there were no civil Societies but in particular Corporations and to prove it should give such a definition of civill Society that it is A company of men joyned together in a Corporation for the preservation of their Rights and Priviledges under the Governours of such a place It must be first proved that no other company of men can be call'd a civill Society besides a Corporation and so that no other society of men joyning together in the profession of the true Religion can be call'd a Church but such as joyn in particular Congregations To which purpose it is very observable That particular Congregations are not de primariâ intentione divinâ for if the whole world could joyn together in the publike Worship of God no doubt that would be most properly a Church but particular Congregations are only accidental in reference to Gods intention of having a Church because of the impossibility of all mens joyning together for the convenient distribution of Church-priviledges and administration of Gospel-Ordinances For it is evident that the Priviledges and Ordinances do immediately and primarily belong to the Catholick visible Church in which Christ to that end hath set Officers as the Apostle clearly expresseth 1 Corinth 12. 28. for how Apostles should be set as Officers over particular Congregations whose Commission extended to the whole World is I think somewhat hard to understand but for the more convenient participation of Priviledges and Ordinances particular Congregations are necessary This will be best illustrated by Examples We read that Esther 1. 3. King Ahashuerus made a feast for all his Princes and Servants Doubtlesse the King did equally respect them all as a Body in the feasting of them
Besides if either that place of Ioel or that of Ieremy cited Heb. 8. 11. or the Unction of the Spirit 1 John 2. 20 27. did take away the use of preaching how did the Apostles themselves understand their meaning when they were so diligent in preaching and instructing others Iohn writes to those to try the Spirits of whom he saith They have an Unction to know all things and those to whom the Apostle writes that they need not teach every one his Neighbour of them he saith that they had need to be taught the first principles of the Oracles of God And even in that very Chapter where he seems to say they that are under the New Covenant need not be taught he brings that very Speech in as an argument that the old dispensation of the Law was done away And so goes about to teach when he seems to take away the use of it These Speeches then must not be understood in their absolute and literal sense but with a reflection upon and comparison with the state of things in the times wherein those Prophecies were utter'd For God to heighten the Jews apprehensions of the great blessings of the Gospel doth set them forth under a kind of Hyperbolical expressions that the dull capacity of the Jews might at least apprehend the just weight and magnitude of them which they would not otherwise have done So in that place of Ieremy God to make them understand how much the knowledge of the Gospel exceeded that under the Law doth as it were set it down in this Hyperbolicall way that it will exceed it as much as one that needs no teaching at all doth one that is yet but in his rudiments of learning So that the place doth not deny the use of teaching under the Gospel but because Teaching doth commonly suppose ignorance to shew the great measure of knowledge he doth it in that way as though the knowledge should be so great that men should not need be taught in such a way of Rudiments as the Jews were viz by Types and Ceremonies and such things We see then no such dispensation was in the Apostles times for the same Apostle after this in Chapt. 10. 25. bids them not to forsake the Assembling themselves together as some did Wherefore were these Assemblies but for Instruction and in the last Chapter bids them obey their Rulers What need Rulers if no need of Teaching But so sensless a dream will be too much honour'd with any longer confutation In the Apostles times then there was no such dispensation of the Spirit which did take away the use of Ministry and Ordinances If it be expected since their times I would know whence it appears that any have a greater measure of the Spirit then was poured out in the Apostles times for then the Ministry was joyned with the Spirit and what Prophecies are fulfilled now which were not then Or if they pretend to a Doctrine distinct from and above what the Apostles taught let them produce their evidences and work those miracles which may induce men to believe them Or let them shew what obligation any have to believe pretended new Revelations without a power of miracles attesting that those Revelations come from God Or whereon men must build their faith if it be left to the dictates of a pretended Spirit of Revelation Or what way is left to discern the good Spirit from the bad in its actings upon mens minds if the Word of God be not our Rule still Or how God is said to have spoken in the last dayes by his Son if a further speaking be yet expected For the Gospel-dispensation is therefore called the Last dayes because no other is to be expected Times being differenced in Scripture according to Gods wayes of revealing himself to men But so much for this The second way whereby to know when Positive Lawes are unalterable is when God hath declared that such Lawes shall bind still Two wayes whereby God doth express his own Will concerning the perpetuity of an Office founded on his own Institution First if such things be the work belonging to it which are of necessary and perpetual use Secondly if God hath promised to assist them in it perpetually in the doing of their work First the Object of the Ministerial Office are such things which are of necessary and perpetual use I mean the Administration of Gospel-Ordinances viz. the Word and Sacraments which were appointed by Christ for a perpetual Use. The Word as a means of Conversion and Edification the Sacraments not onely as notes of distinction of Professors of the true faith from others but as Seals to confirm the Truth of the Covenant on Gods part towards us and as Instruments to convey the blessings sealed in the Covenant to the hearts of Believers Now the very Nature of these things doth imply their perpetuity and continuance in the world as long as there shall be any Church of God in it For these things are not typi rerum futurarum only Ceremonies to represent somthing to come but they are symbola rerum invisibilium signs to represent to our Senses things invisible in their own Nature and between these two there is a great difference as to the perpetuity of them For Types of things as to come must of necessity expire when the thing typified appears but representation of invisible things cannot expire on that account because the thing represented as invisible cannot be supposed to be made visible and so to evacuate the use of the Signes which represents them to us Types represent a thing which is at present invisible but under the Notion of it as future Symbols represent a thing at present invisible but as present and therefore Symbols are designed by Gods Institution for a perpetuall help to the weakness of our Faith And therefore the Lords Supper is appointed to set forth the Lords Death till he come whereby the continuance of it in the Church of God is necessarily implied Now then if these things which are the proper object of the Ministerial Function be of a perpetual Nature when these things are declared to be of an abiding Nature it necessarily follows that that Function to which it belongs to administer these things must be of a perpetual Nature Especially if we consider in the second place that Christ hath promised to be with them continually in the administration of these things For that notwithstanding the dust lately thrown upon it we have a clear place Matth. 28. 19. Go teach and baptize c. Loe I am with you alwayes to the end of the World If 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not signifie perpetuity yet certainly the latter words do for how could Christ be with the Apostles themselves personally to the end of the World It must be therefore with them and all that succeed them in the Office of Teaching and Baptizing to the Worlds end For that I
with the dispencers of the Word as appears from the titles of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Governours Rulers Pastors all which necessarily imply a Governing power which having been largely proved by others and yeelded by me I pass over CHAP. III. The Question fully stated Not what form of Government comes the nearest to the Primitive practice but whether any be absolutely determined Several things propounded for resolving the Question What the form of Church-Government was under the Law How far Christians are bound to observe that Neither the necessity of superiority nor the unlawfulnesse can be proved thence ANd now I come to the main Subject of the present Controversie which is acknowledging a form of Government necessary and the Governours of the Church perpetuall Whether the particular form whereby the Church must be governed be determined by any positive Law of God which unalterably binds all Christians to the observation of it By Church here I mean not a particular Congregation but such a Society which comprehends in it many of these lesser Congregations united together in one body under a form of Government The forms of Government in controversie the Question being thus stated are only these two the particular officers of several Churches acting in an equality of Power which are commonly called a Colledge of Presbyters or a Superiour Order above the standing Ministry having the Power of Jurisdiction and Ordination belonging to it by vertue of a Divine Institution Which order is by an Antonomasia called Episcopacy The Question now is not which of these two doth come the nearest to Apostolical practice and the first Institution which hath hitherto been the controversie so hotly debated among us but whether either of these two forms be so setled by a jus divinum that is be so determined by a positive Law of God that all the Churches of Christ are bound to observe that one form so determined without variation from it or whether Christ hath not in setling of his Church provided there be some form of Government and a setled Ministry for the exercise of it left it to the prudence of every particular Church consisting of many Congregations to agree upon its own form which it judgdeth most conducing to the end of Government in that particular Church 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Here now we fix our selves and the first thing we do is to agree upon our wayes of resolution of this Question whereby to come to an end of this debate And the most probable way to come to an issue in it is to go through all the wayes whereon men do fix an unalterable divine Right and to see whether any of these do evince a divine Right setled upon a positive Law or no for one of these forms The pleas then for such a divine Right are these Either some formal Law standing in force under the Gospel or some plain Institution of a New Law by Christ in forming his Church or the obligatory nature of Apostolical practice or the general sense of the Primitive Church to which we shall add by way of Appendix the Judgement of the chief Divines and Churches since the Reformation if we go happily through these we may content our selves with having obtained the thing we aim at The first inquiry then is Whether any formal Law of God concerning a form of government for his Church either by persons acting in an equality of Power or subordination of one Order to another under the Gospel doth remain in force or no binding Christians to the observing of it The Reason why I begin with this is because I observe the Disputants on both sides make use of the Pattern under the Law to establish their form by Those who are for Superiority of one Order above another in the government of the Church derive commonly their first argument from the Pattern under the Law Those who are for an equality of Power in the persons acting in government yet being for a subordination of Courts they bring their first argument for that from the Jewish Pattern So that these latter are bound by their own argument though used in another case to be ruled in this Controversie by the Jewish Pattern For why should it be more obligatory as to subordination of Courts then as to the superiority of Orders If it holds in one case it must in the other And if there be such a Law for Superiority standing unrepealed there needs no New Law to inforce it under the Gospel We shall therefore first enquire what foundation there is for either form in that Pattern and how far the argument drawn from thence is obligatory to us now For the practice then in the Jewish Church That there was no universal equality in the Tribe of Levi which God singled out from the rest for his own service is obvious in Scripture For there we find Priests above the Levites the family of Aaron being chosen out from the other families of Cohath one of the three sons of Levi to be employed in a nearer attendance upon Gods Service then any of the other families And it must be acknowledged that among both Priests and Levites there was a Superiority For God placed Eleazar over the Priests Elizaphan over the Cohathites Eliasaph over the Gershonites Zuriel over the Merarites and these are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Rulers over their several families for it is said of every one of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he was Ruler over the house of his Father Neither were these equal for over Eliasaph and Zuriel God placed Ithamar over Elisaphan and his own family God set Eleazar who by reason of his authority over all the rest is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ruler of the Rulers of Levi and besides these there were under these Rulers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chief Fathers of the several distinct families as they are called Exodus 6. 25. Thus we briefly see the subordination that there was in the Tribe of Levi the Levites first over them the heads of the Families over them the Rulers or the chief of the heads over them Ithamar over both Priests and Levites Eleazar Over all Aaron the High Priest There being then so manifest an inequality among them proceed we to shew how obligatory this is under the Gospel For that end it will be necessary to consider whether this imparity and Superiority were peculiarly appointed by God for the Ecclesiastical government of the Tribe of Levi as it consisted of persons to be employed in the service of God or it was only such an inequality and Superiority as was in any other Tribe If only common with other Tribes nothing can be inferred from thence peculiar to Ecclesiasticall government under the Gospel any more then from the government of other Tribes to the same kind of government in all civil States We must then take notice that Levi was a particular distinct Tribe of it self and
comparison of Christ with Moses from the equal necessity of forms of Government now which there is for other Societies from the perfection and sufficiency of the Scriptures all other arguments are reducible to these three Heads Of these in their order First From the comparison of Christ with Moses they argue thus If Moses was faithfull in his house as a servant much more Christ as a Son now Moses appointed a particular form of Government for the Church under the old Testament therefore Christ did certainly lay down a form of Church Government for the New Testament To this I answer first Faithfulnesse implyes the discharge of a trust reposed in one by another so that it is said vers 2. he was faithful to him that appointed him Christs faithfulnesse then lay in discharging the Work which his Father laid upon him which was the Work of mediation between God and us and therefore the comparison is here Instituted between Moses as typical Mediator and Christ as the true Mediator that as Moses was faithfull in his Work so was Christ in his Now Moses his faithfulnesse lay in keeping close to the Pattern received in the Mount that is observing the commands of God Now therefore if Christs being faithfull in his office doth imply the setling any one form of Goverment in the Church it must be made appear that the serling of this form was part of Christs Mediatory Work and that which the Father commanded him to do as Mediator and that Christ received such a form from the Father for the Christian Church as Moses did for the Jewish To this it is said That the Government is laid upon Christs shoulders and all power in his hands and therefore it belongs to him as Mediatour Christ I grant is the King of the Church and doth govern it outwardly by his Laws and inwardly by the conduct of his Spirit but shall we say that therefore any one form of Government is necessary which is neither contained in his Laws nor dictated by his Spirit the main original of mistakes here is the confounding the external and internal Government of the Church of Christ and thence whensoever men read of Christs power authority and government they fancy it refers to the outward Government of the Church of God which is intended of his internal Mediatory power over the hearts and consciences of men But withall I acknowledge that Christ for the better government of his Church and people hath appointed Officers in his Church invested them by vertue of his own power with an authority to preach and baptize and administer all Gospel-Ordinances in his own Name that is by his authority for it is clearly made known to us in the Word of God that Christ hath appointed these things But then whether any shall succeed the Apostles in superiority of power over Presbyters or all remain governing the Church in an equality of power is nowhere determined by the Will of Christ in Scripture which contains his Royal Law and therefore we have no reason to look upon it as any thing flowing from the power and authority of Christ as Mediator and so not necessarily binding Christians Secondly I answer If the correspondency between Christ and Moses in their work doth imply an equal exactnesse in Christs disposing of every thing in his Church as Moses did among the Jews then the Church of Christ must be equally bound to all circumstances of Worship as the Jews were For there was nothing appertaining in the least to the Worship of God but was fully set down even to the pins of the Tabernacle in the Law of Moses but we find no such thing in the Gospel The main Duties and Ordinances are prescribed indeed but their circumstances and manner of performance are left as matters of Christian-liberty and only couched under some general Rules which is a great difference between the legal and Gospel-state Under the Law all Ceremonies and Circumstances are exactly prescribed but in the Gospel we read of some general Rules of direction for Christians carriage in all circumstantial things These four especially contain all the directions of Scripture concerning Circumstantials All things to be done decently and in order All to be done for edification Give no offence Do all to the glory of God So that the particular circumstances are left to Christian-liberty with the observation of general Rules It is evident as to Baptism and the Lords Supper which are unquestionably of divine Institution yet as to the circumstances of the administration of them how much lesse circumstantial is Christ then Moses was As to circumcision and the pass-over under the Law the age time persons manner place form all fully set down but nothing so under the Gospel Whether Baptism shall be administred to Infants or no is not set down in expresse words but left to be gathered by Analogy and consequences what manner it shall be administred in whether by dipping or sprinkling is not absolutely determined what form of words to be used whether in the name of all three persons or sometimes in the Name of Christ only as in the Acts we read if that be the sense and not rather in Christs Name i. e. by Christs authority Whether sprinkling or dipping shall be thrice as some Churches use it or only once as others These things we see relating to an Ordinance of Divine Institution are yet past over without any expresse command determining either way in Scripture So as to the Lords Supper What persons to be admitted to it whether all visible professors or only sincere Christians upon what terms whether by previous examination of Church-officers or by an open profession of their faith or else only by their own tryal of themselves required of them as their duty by their Ministers whether it should be alwayes after Supper as Christ himself did it whether taking fasting or after meat whether kneeling or sitting or leaning Whether to be consecrated in one form of words or several These things are not thought fit to be determined by any positive command of Christ but left to the exercise of Christian-liberty the like is as to preaching the Word publike Prayer singing of Psalmes the duties are required but the particular Modes are left undetermined The case is the same as to Church-governwent That the Church be governed and that it be governed by its proper Officers are things of Divine appointment but whether the Church should be governed by many joyning together in an equality or by Subordination of some persons to others is left to the same liberty which all other Circumstances are this being not the Substance of the thing it self but onely the manner of performance of it 3. I answer That there is a manifest disparity between the Gospel and Jewish state and therefore Reasons may be given why all Punctilioes were determined then which are not now as 1. The perfection and
I come to examine the argument from Apostolical Succession Thus we see then that neither the qualification of the persons nor the commands for a right exercise of the office committed to them nor the whole Epistles to Timothy and Titus do determine any one form of Government to be necessary in the Church of God Thirdly Let us see whether the general Rules do require any one form which rules in that they are general can determine nothing of the authority it self as to its particular mode being intended only for the regulation of the exercise of the authority in which men are placed And it is an evidence that nothing is particularly determined in this case when the Spirit of God only lays down such Rules for government which are applyable to distinct forms Otherwise certainly some Rule would have been laid down which could have been applyed to nothing but to that one form That none take the office of preaching without a Call nor go without sending will equally hold whether the power of Ordination lye in a Bishop with Presbyters or in Presbyters acting with equality of power That offenders be censured and complaints made to the Church in case of scandal determines nothing to whom the power of Jurisdiction doth solely belong nor what that Church is which must receive these complaints That all things be done with decency and order doth prescribe nothing wherein that Decency lyes nor how far that Order may extend nor yet who must be the Judges of that Decency and Order That all be done for edification and the common benefit of the Church doth no wayes restrain his Churches freedom in disposing of its self as to the form of its government so the aym of the Church be for the better edification of the body of the Church and to promote the benefit of it But methinks these general Orders and Rules for Discipline do imply the particular manner of government to be left at liberty to the Church of God so that in all the several forms these general Rules be observed Whereas had Christ appointed a superiour Order to govern other subordinate Officers and the Church together Christs command for governing the Church would have been particularly addressed to them and again had it been the will of Christ there should be no superior Order above the Pastours of particular Churches there would have been some expresse and direct prohibition of it which because we no where read it seems evident that Christ hath left both the one and the other to the freedom and liberty of his Church So much shall serve in this place to shew how improbable it is that Christ did ever prescribe any one form of Government in his Church since he hath only laid down general Rules for the management of Church government But this will not yet suffice those who plead that Christ must determine one immutable form of Government in his Church but although it be a high presumption to determine first what Christ must do before we examine what he hath done yet we shall still proceed and examine all the pretences that are brought for this opinion The next thing then which is generally urged for it is the equal necessity of Christs instituting a certain form as for any other Legislator who models a Common-wealth Now for answer to this I say first That Christ hath instituted such an immutable government in his Church as is sufficient for the succession and continuance of it which is all which Founders of Common-wealths do look after viz. that there be such an Order and distinction of persons and subordination of one to the other that a Society may still be preserved among them now this is sufficiently provided for by Christs appointing Officers continually to rule his Church and establishing Laws for the perpetuating of such Officers so whatsoever is necessary in order to the general ends of Government is acknowledged to be appointed by Jesus Christ. Untill then that it be proved that one form of government is in it self absolutely necessary for the being of a Church this argument can prove nothing for what is drawn from necessity will prove nothing but in a case of necessity Secondly I answer That those things which are not absolutely necessary to the being of a Church are left to Christs liberty whether he will determine them or no and are no further to be looked on as necessary then as he hath determined by his Laws whether they shall be or no in his Church The thing will be thus cleared When I read that Zaleucus Lycurgus or Numa did form a Common-wealth and make Laws for it I presently conclude that there must be some order or distinction of persons in this Common wealth and some rules whereby persons must be governed and whereby others must Rule But I cannot hence inferr that Zaleucus or Lycurgus did institute Monarchical Aristocratical or Democratical Government because any of these forms might be agreeable to their design and therefore what kind of government they did appoint can no otherwise be known then by taking a view of the Laws which they made in order thereto So it is in reference to Christ when we read that Christ hath instituted a Church alwayes to continue in the World we presently apprehend that there must be some power and order in the members of that Society and Laws for the governing it but we cannot hence gather that he hath bound up his Officers to act in any one form because several forms might in themselves equally tend to the promoting the end of Government in his Church And therefore what Christ hath expresly determined in his positive Laws must be our Rule of judging in this case and not any presumption of our own that such a form was necessary and therefore Christ must institute and appoint it Which is fully expressed by judicious Mr. Hooker whose words will serve as a sufficient answer to this Objection As for those marvellous Discourses whereby they adventure to argue that God must needs have done the thing which they imagine was to be done I must confesse I have often wondred at their exceeding boldnesse herein When the question is Whether God have delivered in Scripture as they affirm he hath a compleat particular immutable form of Church-Polity why take they that other both presumptuous and superfluous labour to prove he should have done it there being no way in this case to prove the deed of God saving only by producing that evidence wherein he hath done it But if there be no such thing apparent upon record they do as if one should demand a Legacy by force and vertue of some written Testament wherein there being no such thing specified he pleadeth that there it must needs be and bringeth arguments from the Love and good will which alwayes the Testator bore imagining that these or the like proofs will convict a Testament to have that in it which other men can no
where by reading find In matters which concern the actions of God the most dutiful way on our part is to search what God hath done and with meekness to admire that rather then to dispute what he in congruâ—ty of reason ought to do Thus he with more to the same purpose The sum then of the answer to this Argument is this That nothing can be inferred of what Christ must do from his relation to his Church but what is absolutely necessary to the being of it as for all other things they being arbitrary constitutions we can judge no more of the necessity of them then as we find them clearly revealed in the Word of God And therefore the Plea must be removed from what Christ must do to what he hath done in order to the determining the particular form of Government in his Church But still it is argued for the necessity of a particular form of Government in the Church from the similitudes the Church is set out by in Scripture It is called a Vine and therefore must have Keepers an House and therefore must have Government a City and therefore must have a Polity a Body and therefore must have Parts I answer First All these Similitudes prove only that which none deny that there must be Order Power and Government in the Church of God we take not away the Keepers from the Vine nor the Government from the House nor Polity from the City nor distinction of parts from the Body we assert all these things as necessary in the Church of God The keepers of the Vine to defend and prune it the Governours of the House to rule and order it the Polity of the City to guide and direct it the parts of the Body to compleat and adorn it But Secondly None of these Similitudes prove what they are brought for viz. that any one immutable form of Government is determined For may not the Keepers of the Vine use their own discretion in looking to it so the flourishing of the Vine be that they aym at and if there be many of them may there not be different orders among them and some as Supervisors of the others work The House must have Governours but those that are so are entrusted with the power of ordering things in the House according to their own discretion and where there is a multitude is there not diversity of Offices among them and is it necessary that every House must have Offices of the same kind In great and large Families there must be more particular distinct Orders and Offices than in a small and little one The City must have its Polity but all Cities have not the like some have one form and some another and yet there is a City still and a Polity too A body must have all its parts but are all the parts of the body equal one to another it sufficeth that there be a proportion though not equality in them the several parts of the body have their several offices and yet we see the head is superintendent over them all and thus if we make every particular Church a Body yet it follows not that the form of cloathing that Body must alwayes be the same for the manner of Government is rather the cloathing to the Body than the parts of it the Governours indeed are parts of the Body but their manner of governing is not that may alter according to the proportion and growth of the Body and its fashion change for better conveniency But if these Similitudes prove nothing yet certainly say they the difference as to Civil and Ecclesiastical Government will for though there may be different forms in civil Government which are therefore call'd an Ordinance of man yet there must be but one in Church-Government which is an Ordinance of God and Christ hath appointed Officers to rule it I answer first We grant and acknowledge a difference between the Church and the Common-wealth they are constituted for other ends the one Political the other Spiritual one temporal the other eternal they subsist by different Charters the one given to men as men the other to men as Christians They act upon different principles the one to preserve civil Rights the other to promote an eternal Interest nay their formal constitution is different for a man by being a member of a Common-wealth doth not become a Member of the Church and by being excommunicated out of the Church doth not cease to be a Member of the Common-wealth The Officers of the one are clearly distinct from the other the one deriving their power from the Law of Christ the other from Gods general Providence the Magistrate hath no power to Excommunicate formally out of the Church any more then to admit into it nor have the Church-officers any power to cast men out of the common-wealth We see then there is a difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Government But then I answer Secondly The power of the Magistrate is not therefore called an Ordinance of man because of the mutability of its Form and as distinguished from the Form of Church-government For First The Apostle speaks not of the Form of Government but of the Power Submit to every Ordinance of man c. the ground of Submission is not the form but the power of civil government and therefore there can be no opposition expressed here between the Forms of Civil and Ecclesiastical government but if any such opposition be it must be between the powers and if this be said as to civils that the power is an Ordinance of Man in that sense whereas Paul saith it is of God yet as to the Church it is freely acknowledged that the Power is derived from God Secondly The civil power is not called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is a creature of mans making and so subject to mens power but the ground of that Speech is because all civil power respects men as men without any further connotation Humana dicitur non quod ab hominibus sit excogitata sed quod hominum sit propria saith Beza And to the same purpose Calvin Humana dicitur Ordinatio non quod humanitùs inventa fuerit sed quod propria hominum est digesta ordinata vivendi ratio Piscator Humanam appellat non quod magistratus homines authores habeat sed quod Homines eam gerant So then the civil power is not called an Ordinance of man as it is of mans setting up but as it is proper to man and so if there be any opposition between the civil and Church power it is onely this that the one belongs to men as men the other to men as Christians Thirdly Although it be granted that Christ hath appointed and set up his own Officers in his Church yet it doth not thence follow that he hath determined in what manner they shall Rule his Church It is true Christ hath set up in his Church some Apostles some
from whom they derived their power and by whose authority they acted And these were the most suitable to them as making it appear that a Divine presence went along with them and therefore they could not salsifie to the world in what they Declared unto them which was the best way for them to evidence the Truth of their Doctrine because it was not to be discovered by the Evidence of the things themselves but it depended upon the Testimony of the Authour and therefore the onely way to confirm the truth of the Doctrine was to confirm the credibility of the Authour which was best done by doing something above what the power of nature could reach unto And this was the prerogative of the Apostles in their first mission above Iohn the Baptist For of him it is said that he did no miracle Fourthly we observe that the Apostles in this mission were invested in no power over the Church nor in any Superiority of Order one over another The first is evident because Christ did not now send them abroad to gather Churches but onely to call persons to the Doctrine of the Messias and while Christ was in the World among them he retained all Church power and authority in his own hand When this temporary mission expired the Apostles lived as private persons still under Christs Tutorage and we never read them acting in the least as Church-Officers all that while Which may appear from this one argument because all the time of our Saviours being in the World he never made a total separation from the Iewish Church but frequented with his Disciples the Temple worship and Service to the last although he super-added many Gospel Observations to those of the Law And therefore when no Churches were gathered the Apostles could have no Church power over them All that can be pleaded then in order to Church-Government from the consideration of the Form of Government as setled by our Saviour must be either from a supposed inequality among the Apostles themselves or their superiority over the LXX Disciples or from some Rules laid down by Christ in order to the Government of his Church of which two are the most insisted on Matthew 20. 25. Matth. 18. 17. Of these in their Order The first argument drawn for an established form of Government in the Church from the state of the Apostles under Christ is from a supposed inequality among the Apostles and the superiority of one as Monarch of the Church which is the Papists Plea from Saint Peter as the chief and head of the Apostles Whose loud Exclamations for Saint Peters authority aâ—â— much of the same nature with those of Demetrius the Silver-Smith at Ephesus with his fellow craftsmen who cried up Great is Diana of the Ephesians not from the honor they bore to her as Diana but from the gain which came to them from her worship at Ephesus But I dispute not now the entail of Saint Peters power what ever it was to the Roman Bishop but I onely inquire into the Pleas drawn for his authority from the Scriptures which are written in so small a character that without the spectacles of an implicite Faith they will scarce appear legible to the Eyes of men For what though Christ changed Saint Peters name must it therefore follow that Christ baptized him Monarch of his Church Were not Iohn and Iames called by Christ Boanerges and yet who thinks that those sons of Thunder must therefore overturn all other power but their own Christ gave them new names to shew his own authority over them and not their authority over others to be as Monitors of their Duty and not as Instruments to convey power So Chrysostome speaks of the very name Peter given to Simon it was to shew him his duty of being fixed and stable in the Faith of Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this name might be as a string upon his finger a continual remembrancer of his duty And likewise I conceive as an incouragement to him after his fall that he should recover his former stability again else it should seem strange that he alone of the Apostles should have his name from firmness and stability who fell the soonest and the foulest of any of the Apostles unlesse it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which would be worse Divinity then Rhetorick The change then of St Peters name imports no such Universall Power neither from the change nor from the name But why then hath Saint Peter the honour to be named first of all the Apostles First it seems to be implyed as an honour given to Peter above the rest But doth all honour carry an Universal power along with it there may be order certainly among equals and there may be first second and third c. where there is no imparity and jurisdiction in the first over all the rest Primacy of Order as among equals I know none will deny Saint Peter A Primacy of Power as over Inferiours I know none will grant but such as have subdued their Reason to their Passion and Interest Nay a further Order then of mâ—er place may without danger be attributed to him A Primacy in Order of Time as being of the first called and it may be the first who adhered to Christ in Order of Age of which Ierome aetati delatum quia Petrus senior erat speaking of Peter and Iohn nay yet higher some Order of Dignity too in regard of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Greek Fathers speak so much of the servency and heat of his spirit whence by Eusebius he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Prolocutor among the Apostles who was therefore most forward to inquire most ready to answer which Chrysostome elegantly calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alluding to the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are frequently given to Peter by the Fathers which import no more then praesultor in choreâ he that that led the dance among the Disciples but his being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implies no Superiority of Power For Dyonys Haliarnass calls Appius Claâ—dius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereas all know that the Decemviri had an equality of power among themselves Neither doth his being as the mouth of the Disciples imply his power For Aaron was a mouth to Moses but Moses was Aarons Master Neither yet doth this Primacy of Order alwayes hold in reference to Peter For although generally he is named first of the Aposties as Matthew 10. 2. Mark 3. 16. Acts 1. 13. Mark 1. 36. Luk 8. 45. Acts 2. 14. 37. Yet in other places of Scripture we finde other Apostles set in Order before him as Iames Galat. 2. 9. Paul and Apollos and others 1 Cor. 3. 22. 1 Cor. 1. 12. 9. 5. No Argument then can be drawn hence if it would hold but onely a Primacy of Order and yet even that fails too in the Scriptures changing of the Order so often
mean such Differences as respect persons and not things which our Saviour layes down these Rules for the ending of And therefore I cannot but wonder to see some men insist so much on that place against such an Exposition of this Luke 12. 14. where Christ saith Who made me a Iudge and a Divider among you For doth it any wayes follow Because Christ would not take upon him to be a temporal Judge among the Jewes therefore he should take no course for the ending differences among his Disciples and the taking away all animosities from among them Nay on the contrary doth not our Saviour very often designedly speak to this very purpose to root out all bitterness malice envy and rancour from mens spirits and to perswade them to forgive injuries even to pray for persecutours and by any means to be reconciled to their Brethren Which he makes to be a Duty of so great necessity that if a man had brought his gift to the Altar and remembred his brother had ought against him he bids him leave his gift there and go be reconciled to his Brother and then offer up the Gift We see hereby how suitable it was to our Saviours Doctrine and Design to lay down Rules for the ending of any differences arising among his Disciples and this being now cleared to be the state of the Case it will not be difficult to resolve what is meant by telling the Church Which I make not to be any appeal to a juridical court acting authoritatively over the persons brought before it but the third and highest step of Charity in a man towards a person that hath offended him viz. That when neither private admonition nor before two or three witnesses would serve to reclaim the offendor then to call a select company together which is the Natural importance of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and before them all to lay open the cause of the breach and difference between them and to refer it to their Arbitration to compose and end it Which Sense of the place I humbly conceive to have the least force in it and in every part of it to be most genuine and natural and fully agreeable to the received practice among the Jewes which the Author of the Book Musar cited by Drusius fully acquaints us with whose words I shall Transcribe as being a plain Paraphrase on these of our Saviour Qui arguit socium suum debet primum hoc facere placide inter se ipsum solum verbis mollibus ita ut non pudefaciat eum Si resipiscit bene est sin debet eum acritèr arguere pudefacere inter se ipsum Si non resipiscit debet adhibere socios ipsumque coram illis pudore afficere si nec modo quicquam proficit debet eum pudefacere coram multis ejusque delictum publicare Nam certe detegendi sunt hypocritae That which this Authour calls pudefacere eum coram multis is that which our Saviour means when he bids him tell the Church or the Congregation as our Old Translation renders it This the Jews called reproving of men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before a multitude as the Vulg. Latin though falsly renders that place Lâ—viticus 19. 17. publicè argue eum and to this the Apostle may allude when he speaks of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Corinth 2. 6. censure of many and the reproof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all 1 Tim. 5. 20. which was to be in matters of publike scandal upon Religion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Jewes call them but in case the offendor should still 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 slight this overture of Reconciliation before the company selected for hearing the Case then saith our Saviour look upon him as an obstinate refractory creature and have no more to do with him then with a Heathen and a Publican by which terms the most wilful obstinate sinners were set out among the Jewes and by which our Saviour means a mans withdrawing himself as much as in him lies from all familiar society with such a person And thus saith Christ Whatsoever you bind in Earth shall be bound in Heaven and whatsoever you loose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven v. 18. that is If after all your endeavours of Reconciliation the offender will hearken to no agreement it is an evidence and token that mars sin is bound upon him that is shall not be pardoned so long as he continues impenitent but if he repent of his offence and you be reconciled as the offence is removed on Earth thereby so the sin is loosed in Heaven that is forgiven The guilt of sin that binds it being an Obligation to punishment and so the pardon of sin that looseth as it cancels that Obligation And so Grotius observes that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what is called retaining in one place is binding in another and what is loosing in one place is remitting in the other But now although I assert this to be the true proper genuine meaning of this difficult place yet I deny not but that this place hath influence upon Church-Government but I say the influence it hath is onely by way of Accommodation and by Analogy deduced from it According to which these things I conceive have Foundation in these words First gradual appeals from the Method here laid down by our Saviour Secondly Church censures and the Duty of submitting to Church-authority For although before any Church Power was actually set up as when our Saviour spake these words then there was none yet after that Church-Government was fixed and set up it must in Reason be supposed that all matters of the Nature of scandals to the Church must be decided there Thirdly The lawfulness of the Use of excommunication in Christian Churches for if every particular person might withdraw from the Society of such a one as continues refractory in his Offences then much more may a whole Society and the Officers of it declare such a one to be avoided both in religious and familiar civil Society which is the formal Nature of Excommunication Herein we see the wisdom of our Saviour who in speaking to a particular case hath laid down such general Rules as are of perpetual use in the Church of God for accommodating differences arising therein Thus have we hitherto cleared that our Saviour hath determined no more of Church-Govern-ment then what is appliable to a diversity of particular Forms and so hath not by any Law or practice of his own determined the necessity of any one form CHAP. VI. The next thing pleaded for determining the Form of Government is Apostolical practice two things inquired into concerning that What it was How far it binds The Apostles invested with the power and authority of Governing the whole Church of Christ by their Commission Io. 20. 21. Matth.
call'd the Ruler of the Synagogue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Scriptures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the importance of the New Testament Greek following that of the Alexandrian Iews in the version of the Old Testament implyes no more then a primacy of order in him above the rest he was joyned with And thence sometimes we read of them in the Plural number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Acts 13. 15. implying thereby an equality of power in many but by reason of the necessary primacy of one in order above the rest the name may be appropriated to the President of the Colledge Acts 18. 8 17. we read of two viz. Crispus and Sosthenes and either of them is call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which could not be did the name import any peculiar power of Jurisdiction lodged in one exclusive of the rest unlesse we make them to be of two Synagogues which we have no evidence at all for I confesse Beza his argument from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mark 5. 22. for a multitude of those so call'd in the same Synagogue is of no great force where we may probably suppose there were many Synagogues But where there is no evidence of more then one in a place and we find the name attributed to more then one we have ground to think that there is nothing of power or Jurisdiction in that one which is not common to more besides himself But granting some peculiarity of honour belonging to one above the rest in a Synagogue which in some places I see no great reason to to deny yet that implyes not any power over and above the Bench of which he was a Member though the first in order Much as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Prince of the Sanhedrin whose place imported no power peculiar to himself but only a Priority of dignity in himself above his fellow Senators as the Princeps Senatûs in the Roman Republick answering to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the great Sanhedrin who was next to the Nasi as the Princeps Senatûs to the Consuls which was only a Honorary Dignity and nothing else Under which disguise that Politick Prince Augustus ravished the Roman Commonwealth of its former liberty The name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may I suppose in propriety of speech be rendred in Latin Magister ordinis he being by his Office Praesul a name not originally importing any power but only dignity Those whom the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Latins render Magistros sui ordinis and so Suetonius interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Magisterium sacerdotii They who meet then with the name Archisynagogues either in Lampridius Vopiscus Codex Theodosii Iustinians Novels in all whom it occurs and in some places as distinct from Presbyters will learn to understand thereby only the highest honour in the Synagogue considering how little yea nothing of power the Jews enjoyed under either the Heathen or Christian Emperours One thing more we add touching this honour of the Rulers of the Synagogue among the Jews that whatever honour title power or dignity is imported by that name it came not from any Law enforcing or commanding it but from mutual conâ—oederation and agreement among the persons imployed in the Synagogue whose natural reason did dictate that where many have an equality of power it is most convenient by way of accumulation upon that person of a power more then he had but not by deprivation of themselves of that inherent power which they enjoyed to entrust the management of the executive part of affairs of common concernment to one person specially chosen and deputed thereunto So it was in all the Sanhedrins among the Jews and in all well-ordered Senates and Councils in the World And it would be very strange that any Officers of a religious Society should upon that account be out-Lawed of those natural Liberties which are the results and products of the free actings of Reason Which things as I have already observed God hath looked on to be so natural to man as when he was most strict and punctual in ceremonial Commands he yet left these things wholly at liberty For we read not of any command that in the Sanhedrin one should have some peculiarity of honour above the rest this mens natural reason would prompt them to by reason of a necessary priority of Order in some above others which the very instinct of Nature hath taught irrational creatures much more should the Light of Reason direct men to But yet all order is not power nor all power juridical nor all juridical power a sole power therefore it is a meer Paralogism in any from Order to inferr power or from a delegated power by consent to inferr a juridical power by Divine Right or lastly from a power in common with others to deduce a power excluding others All which they are guilty of who meerly from the name of an Archisynagogue would fetch a perpetual necessity of jurisdiction in one above the Elders joyned with him or from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Sanhedrin a power of a sole Ordination in one without the consent of his fellow Senators But of these afterwards Thus much may suffice for a draught in little of the Government of the Jewish Synagogue Having thus far represented the Jewish Synagogue that the Idea of its government may be formed in our understandings we now come to consider how far and in what the Apostles in forming Christian Churches did follow the pattern of the Jewish Synagogue Which is a notion not yet so far improved as I conceive it may be and I know no one more conducible to the happy end of composing our differences touching the government of the Church then this is I shall therefore for the full clearing of it premise some general considerations to make way for the entertainment of this hypothesis in mens minds at least as probable and then endeavour particularly to shew how the Apostles did observe the model of the Synagogue in its publike service in ordination of Church Officers in forming Presbyteries in the several Churches in ruling and governing those Presbyteries The general consideration I premise to shew the probability of what I am asserting shall be from these things from the community of name and customs between the believing Iews and others at the first forming of Churches from the Apostles forming Churches out of Synagogues in their travelling abroad from the agreeablenesse of that model of Government to the State of the Christian Churches at that time I begin with the first From the community of names and customs between the believing and unbelieving Iews at the first forming Churches All the while our blessed Saviour was living in the World Christ and his Disciples went still under the name of Jews they neither renounced the name nor the customs in use among them Our Saviour goes up to the
as poor Ierome lies in by a wound he is supposed to have given himself when the priest and the Levite hath passed him by it will be a piece of Charity in our passing by the way a little to consider his Case to see whether there be any hopes of recovery We take it then for granted that Ierome hath already said that Apostolus perspiâ—uè docet eosdem esse Presbytsros quos Episcopos in the same Epistle which he proves there at large and in another place Siâ—â—t ergo Presbyteri sciunt se ex Ecclesiae consuetudine ei qui sibi praeposiâ—us fuerit esse subjectos it a Episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine quam disposition is Dominicae veritate Presbyteris esse majores in commune debere Ecclesiam regere The difficulty now lyes in the reconciling this with what is before câ—ted out of the same Author Some solve it by saying that in Ieroms sense Apostolical Tradition and Ecclesiaestical Custome are the same as ad Marcellum he saith the observation of Lent is Apostolica traditio and advers Luciferian shith it is Ecclesiae consuâ—tudo so that by Apostolical Tradition he meant not an Apostolical Institution but an Ecclesiastical Custome And if Ierome speak according to the general Vogue this Solution may be sufficient notwithstanding what is said against it for according to that common rule of Austin Things that were generally in use and no certain Author assigned of them were attributed to the Apostles Two things therefore I shall lay down for reconciling Ierome to himself The first is the difference between Traditio Apostolica and Traditio Apostolorum this latter doth indeed imply the thing spoken of to have proceeded from the Apostles themselves but the former may be applyed to what was in practice after the Apostles times and the reason of it is that what ever was done in the Primitive Church supposed to be agreeable to Apostolical practice was called Apostolical Thence the Bishops See was called Sedes Apostolicâ— as Tertullian tells us ob consangâ—iâ—itatem doctrinae So Sidonius Apollinaris calls the See of Lâ—pâ—s the Bishop of Tricassium in France Sedem Apostolicam And the Bishops of the Church were called Viri Apostolici and thence the Constitutions which goe under the Apostles names were so called saith Albaspinaeus ab antiquitate â—nam cum corum aliquot ab Apostolorum successoribus qui teste Tertullianâ— Apostolici viri â—omiâ—ahantur facti essent Apostolicorum primùâ—â— Canones deinde nonnullorum Latinorum ignorantia aliquot literarum detractione Apostolorum dicti sunt By which we see what ever was conceived to be of any great antiquity in the Church though it was not thought to have come from the Apostles themselves yet it was called Apostolioal so that in this sense Traditio Apostolica is no more then Traditio autiqua or ab Apostolicis viris profecta which was meant rather of those that were conceived to succeed the Apostles then of the Apostles themselves But I answer Secondly that granting Traditio Apostolica to mean Traditio Apostolorum yet Ierome is far from contradicting himself which is obvious to any that will read the words before and consider their coherence The scope and drift of his Epistle is to chastise the arrogance of one who made Deacons superiour to Presbyters Audio quendam in tantam erupisse vecordiam ut Diaconos Presbyteris id est Episcopis anteferret and so spends a great part of the Epistle to prove that a Bishop and Presbyter are the same and at last brings in these words giving the account Why Paul to Timothy and Titus mentions no Presbyters Quia in Episcopo Presbyter continetur Aut igitur ex Presbytero ordinetur Diaconus ut Presbyter minor Diacono comprobetur in quem crescat ex parvâ— aut si ex Diacono ordinatur Presbyter noverit se lucris minorem Sacerdoâ—iâ— esse majorem And then presently adds Et ut sciamus traditiones Apostolicas sumptas de veteri Testamento Quod Aaron Filii ejus atq Levitae in Templo fuerunt hoc sibi Episcopi Presbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Ecclesiâ It it imaginable that a man who had been proving all along the superiority of a Presbyter above a Deacon because of his Identity with a Bishop in the Aposties times should at the same time say that a Bishop was above a Presbyter by the Apostles institution and so directly overthrow all he had been saying before Much as if one should go about to prove that the Prâ—fectus urbis and the Curatores urbis in Alexander Severus his timeâ— were the same Office and to that end should make use of the Constitution of that Emperour whereby he appointed 14. Curatores urbis and set the Praefectus in an Office above them Such an incongruity is scarce incident to a man of very ordinary esteem for intellectuals much less to such a one as Ierome is reputed to be The plain meaning then of Ierome is no more but this that as Aaron and his sons in the order of Priesthood were above the Levites under the Law So the Bishops and Presbyters in the order of the Evangelical Priesthood are above the Deacons under the Gospel For the comparison runs not between Aaron and his sons under the Law and Bishops and Presbyters under the Gospel but between Aaron and his sonnes as one part of the comparison under the Law and the Levites under them as the other so under the Gospel Bishops and Presbyters make one part of the comparison answering to Aaron and his Sonnes in that wherein they all agree viz. The Order of Priest hood and the other part under the Gospel is that of Deacons answering to the Levites under the Law The Opposition is not then in the power of jurisdiction between Bishops and Priests but between the same power of Order which is alike both in Bishops and Presbyters according to the acknowledgement of all to the Office of Deacons which stood in Competition with them Thus I hope we have left Ierome at perfect Harmony with himself notwithstanding the attempt made to make him so palpably contradict himself which having thus done we are at liberty to proceed in our former course onely hereby we see how unhappily those arguments succeed which are brought from the Analogy between the Aaronical Priest hood to endeavour the setting up of a Ius Divinum of a parallel superiority under the Gospel All which arguments are taken off by this one thing we are now upon viz. that the orders and degrees under the Gospel were not taken up from Analogy to the Temple but to the Synagogue Which we now make out as to Ordination in three things the manner of conferring it the persons authorized to do it the remaining effect of it upon the person receiving it First For the manner of conferring it that under the Synagogue was done by laying on of hands Which was taken up among
from Philo Iudaeus Iosephus Appian Lucian and others But Secondly granting it used in the primary signification of the word yet it cannot be applied to the people but to Paul and Barnabas for it is not said that the people did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that Paul and Barnabas did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 now where ever that word is used in its first signification it is implyed to be the action of the persons themselves giving suffrages and not for other persons appointing by the suffrages of others Thirdly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may import no more then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that laying on of the hands must suppose the stretching them out Which is onely a common figure in Scripture for the Antecedent to be put for the Consequent or one part for the whole action and concerning this sense of the word in Ecclesiastical Writers see the large quotations in Bishop Bilson to this purpose Fourthly It seems strangely improbable that the Apostles should put the choice at that time into the hands of the people when there were none fitted for the work the Apostles designed them for but whom the Apostles did lay their hands on by which the Holy Ghost sell upon them whereby they were fitted and qualified for that work The people then could no wayes choose men for their abilities when their abilities were consequenâ— to their ordination So much to clear the manner of Ordination to have been from the Synagogue The second thing we consider is The persons authorized to do it whom we consider under a double respect before their liberties were bound up by compact among themselves and after First Before they had restrained themselves of their own liberty then the general rule for Ordinations among them was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every one regularly ordained himself had the power of Ordaining his Disciples as Maimonides affirms To the same purpose is that Testimony of the Gemara Babylonia in Master Selden 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rabbi Abba Bar Ionah said that in times of old every one was wont to ordain his own Disciples to which purpose many instances are there brought But it is generally agreed among them that in the time of Hillel this course was altered and they were restrained from their former liberty in probability finding the many inconveniences of so common Ordinations or as they say out of their great reverence to the house of Hillel they then agreed that none should ordain others without the presence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Prince of the Sanhedrin or a license obtained from him for that end and it was determined that all Ordinations without the consent of the Prince of the Sanhedrin should be looked upon as null and void which is attested by the former Authors The same distinct on may be observed under the Gospel in reference to the fixed Officers of the Church for we may consider them in their first state and period as the Presbyters did rule the Churches in common as Hierom tells us communi Presbyterorum conciâ—io Ecclesiâ— gubernabantur before the jurisdiction of Presbyters was restrained by mutual consent in this instant doubtlesse the Presbyters enjoyed the same liberty that the Presbyters among the Jews did of ordaining other Presbyters by that power they were invested in at their own ordination To which purpose we shall only at present take notice of the Confession of two Canonists who are the hâ—ghest among the Papists for defence of a distinct order of Episcopacy Yet Gratian himself confesseth Sacros ordines dicimus Diaconatum Presbyteratum hos quidem solos Ecclesia primitiva habuisse dicitur And Iohannes Semeca in his Gloss upon the Canon Law Dicunt quidem quod in Ecclesia prima-primitiva commune erat officium Episcoporum Sacerdotum nomina erant communia Sed in secundâ primitivâ coeperunt distingui nomina officia Here we have a distinction of the Primitive Church very agreeable both to the opinion of Hierom and the matter we are now upon in the first Primitive Church the Presbyters all acted in common for the welfare of the Church and either did or might ordain others to the same authority with themselves because the intrinsecal power of order is equally in them and in those who were after appointed Governours over Presbyteries And the collation of orders doth come from the power of order and not meeâ—ly from the power of jurisdiction It being likewise fully acknowledged by the Schoolmen that Bishops are not superiour above Presbyters as to the power of order But the clearest evidence of this is in the Church of Alexandria of which Hierom speaks Nam Alexandria à Marco Evangelistâ usque ad Heraclam Dionysium Episcopos Presbyteri semper unum ex se electum in excelsiori gradu collâ—catum Episcopum nominabant quomodo si exercitus Imperatorem faciat aut Diaconi eligant de se quem industrium noverint Archidiaconum vocent That learned Doctor who would perswade us that the Presbyters did only make choice of the person but the ordination was performed by other Bishops would do well first to tell us who and where those Bishops in Aegypt were who did consecrate or ordain the Bishop of Alexandria after his election by the Presbyters especially while Aegypt remained but one Province under the Government of the Praefectus Augustalis Secondly how had this been in the least pertinent to Hieroms purpose to have made a particular instance in the Church of Alexandria for that which was common to all other Churches besides For the old Rule of the canon-Canon-Law for Bishops was Electio clericorum est consensus principis petitio plebis Thirdly this election in Hierom must imply the conferring the power and authority whereby the Bishop acted For first the first setting up of his power is by Hierom attributed to this choice as appears by his words Quod autem postea unus electus est qui caeteris praeponeretur in schismatis remedium factum est ne unusquisque ad se trahens Christi Ecclesiam rumperet Whereby it is evident Hierom attributes the first original of that Exsors potestas as he calls it elsewhere in the Bishop above Presbyters not to any Apostolical institution but to the free choice of the Presbyters themselves which doth fully explain what he means by consuetudo Ecclesiae before spoken of viz. that which came up by a voluntary act of the Governours of Churches themselves Secondly it appears that by election he means conferring authority by the instances he brings to that purpose As the Roman Armies choosing their Emperours who had then no other power but what they received by the length of the sword and the Deacons choosing their Archdeacon who had no other power but what was meerly conâ—erred by the choice of the Coâ—ledge of Deacons To which we may add what Eutychius the Patriarch of Alexandria saith in
his Origines Ecclesiae Alexandrinae published in Arabick by our moâ—â— learned Selden who expresly affirms that the twelve Presbyters constituted by Mark upon the vacancy of the See did choose out of their number one to be head over the rest and the other eleven did lay their hands upon him and blessed him and made him Patriarch Neither is the authority of Eutychius so much to be sleighted in this case coming so near to Hierom as he doth who doubtless had he told us that Mark and Anianus c. did all there without any Presbyters might have had the good fortune to have been quoted with as much frequency and authority as the Anonymous Author of the martyrdome of Timothy in Photius who there unhappily follows the story of the seven sleepers or the Author of the Apostolical Constitutions whose credit is everlastingly blasted by the excellent Mr. Duille De Pseudepigraphis Apostolorum so much doth mens interestâ—tend to the inhancing or abating the esteem and credit both of the dead and the living By these we see that where no positive restraints from consent and choice for the unity and peace of the Church have restrained mens liberty as to their external exercise of the power of order or jurisdiction every one being himself advanced into the authority of a Church Governour hath an internal power of conferring the same upon persons fit for it To which purpose the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery is no wayes impertinently alledged although we suppose St. Paul to concur in the action as it is most probable he did because if the Presbytery had nothing to do in the ordination to what purpose were their hands laid upon him Was it only to be witnesses of the fact or to signifie their consent both those might have been done without their use of that ceremony which will scarce be instanced in to be done by any but such as had power to confer what was signified by that ceremony We come therefore to the second period or state of the Church when the former liberty was restrained by some act of the Church it self for preventing the inconveniences which might follow the too common use of the former liberty of ordinations So Antonius de Rosellis fully expresseth my meaning in this Quilibet Presbyter Presbyteri ordinabant indiscretè schismata oriebantur Every Presbyter and Presbyters did ordain indifferently and thence arose schisms thence the liberty was restrained and reserved peculiarly to some persons who did act in the several Presbyteries as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Prince of the Sanhedrin without whose presence no ordination by the Church was to be looked on as regular The main controversie is when this restraint began and by whose act whether by any act of the Apostles or only by the prudence of the Church its self as it was with the Sanhedrin But in order to our peace I see no such necessity of deciding it both parties granting that in the Church such a restraint was laid upon the liberty of ordaining Presbyters and the exercise of that power may be restrained still granting it to be radically and intrinsically in them So that this controversie is not such as should divide the Church For those that are for ordinations only by a Superiour order in the Church acknowledging a radical power for ordination in Presbyters which may be exercised in case of necessity do thereby make it evident that none who grant that do think that any positive Law of God hath forbidden Presbyters the power of ordination for then it must be wholly unlawful and so in case of necessity it cannot be valid Which Doctrine I dare with some confidence assert to be a stranger to our Church of England as shall be largely made appear afterwards On the other side those who hold ordinations by Presbyters lawful do not therefore hold them necessary but it being a matter of liberty and not of necessity Christ having no where said that none but Presbyters shall ordain this power then may be restrained by those who have the care of the Churches Peace and matters of liberty being restrained ought to be submitted to in order to the Churches Peace And therefore some have well observed the difference between the opinions of Hierom and Aerius For as to the matter it self I believe upon the strictest enquiry Medina's judgement will prove true that Hierom Austin Ambrose Sedulius Primasius Chrysostome Theodores Theophylact were all of Aerius his judgement as to the Identity of both name and order of Bishops and Presbyters in the Primitive Church but here lay the difference Aerius from hence proceeded to separation from Bishops and their Churches because they were Bishops And Blondell well observes that the main ground why Aerius was condemned was for unnecessary separation from the Church of Sebastia and those Bishops too who agreed with him in other things as Eustathius the Bishop did Whereas had his meer opinion about Bishops been the ground of his being condemned there can be no reason assigned why this heresie if it were then thought so was not mentioned either by Socrates Theodoret Sozomen or Evagrius before whose time he lived when yet they mention the Eustathiani who were co-temporaries with him But for Epiphanius and Augustine who have listed him in the roul of Hereticks it either was for the other heretical opinions maintained by him or they took the name Heretick as it is evident they often did for one who upon a matter of different opinion from the present sense of the Church did proceed to make separation from the Unity of the Catholick Church which I take to be the truest account of the reputed Heresie of Aerius For otherwise it is likely that Ierome who maintained so great correspondency and familiarity with Epiphanius and thereby could not but know what was the cause why Aerius was condemned for Heresie should himself run into the same Heresie and endeavour not only to assert it but to avouch and maintain it against the Judgement of the whole Church Ierome therefore was not ranked with Aerius because though he held the same opinion as to Bishops and Presbyters yet he was far from the consequence of Aerius that therefore all Bishops were to be separated from nay he was so far from thinking it necessary to cause a schism in the Church by separating from Bishops that his opinion is clear that the first institution of them was for preventing schisms and therefore for peace and unity he thought their institution very useful in the Church of God And among all those fifteen testimonies produced by a learned Writer ouâ— of Ierome for the superiority of Bishopâ— above Presbyters I cannot find one that doth found it upon any Divine Right but only upon the conveniency of such an order for the peace and unity of the Church of God Which is his meaning in that place most produced to this purpose Ecclesiae salus
it transplanted into the Church There are yet some things remaining as to Ordination wherein the Church did imitate the Synagogue which will admit of a quick dispatch as the number of the persons which under the Synagogue were alwaies to be at least three This being a fundamental constitution among the Jews as appears by their writings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ordination of Presbyters by laying on of hands must be done by three at the least To the same purpose Maimonides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They did not ordain any by imposition of hands into a power of judicature without the number of three Which number Peter Galatinus and Postellus conceive necessary to be all ordained themselves but Master Selden thinks it was sufficient if there were but one of that number so ordained who was to be as principal in the action whose opinion is favoured by Maimonides who adds to the words last cited out of him Of which Three one at the least must be ordained himself Let us now see the Parallel in the Church of God The first solemn Ordination of Elders under the Gospel which some think to be set down as a Pattern for the Church to follow is that we read of Acts 13. 1 2 3. Which was performed by three for we read in the first verse that there were in the Church at Antioch five Prophets and Teachers Barnabas Simeon Lucius Manaen and Saul of these five the Holy-Ghost said that two must be separated for the work whereto God had called them which were Barnabas and Saul there remain onely the other three Simeon Lucius and Manaen to lay their hands on them and ordain them to their work Accordingly those who tell us that Iames was ordained Bishop of Ierusalem do mention the three Apostles who concurred in the ordaining of him But most remarkable for this purpose is the Canon of the Nicene Council wherein this number is set down as the regular number for the Ordination of Bishops without which it was not accounted Canonical The words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. The Ordination of a Bishop should if possible be performed by all the Bishops of the Province which if it cannot easily be done either through some urgent necessity or the tediousness of the way three Bishops at least must be there for the doing it which may be sufficient for the Ordination if those that are absent do express their consent and by Letters approve of the doing of it To the same purpose Theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Canons injoyn all the Bishops of the Province to be present at the Ordination of one and forbid the Ordination of any without three being present at it Thus we see how the Constitution of the Synagogue was exactly observed in the Church as to the number of the persons concurring to a regular Ordination The last thing as to Ordination bearing Analogy to the Synagogue is the effect of this Ordination upon the person It was the Custom of the Jews to speak of all that were legally Ordained among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Divine Presence or Schecinah rested upon them which sometimes they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Holy Spirit supposed to be in a peculiar manner present after this solemn Separation of them from others in the world and Dedication of them unto God Answerable to this may that of our Saviour be when he gives his Apostles authority to preach the Gospel he doth it in that Form of words Receive ye the Holy Ghost and then gives them the power of binding and loosing usually conveyed in the Jewish Ordinations Whose sins ye remit they are remitted and whose sins ye retain they are retained So that as under the Law they by their Ordination received a moral Faculty or Right to exercise that power they were Ordained to so under the Gospel all who are Ordained according to Gospel Rules have a right authority and power conveyed thereby for the dispensing of the Word and Sacraments Which right and power must not be conceived to be an internal indelible Character as the Papists groundlesly conceive but a moral legal Right according to the Lawes of Christ because the persons Ordaining do not act in it in a natural but a moral Capacity and so the effect must be moral and not physical which they must suppose it to be who make it a Character and that indelible Thus much may serve to clear how Ordination in all its circumstances was derived from the Jewish Synagogue The other thing remaining to be spoken to as to the correspondence of the Church with the Synagogue in its constitution is what order the Apostles did settle in the several Churches of their Plantation for the Ruling and Ordering the Affairs of them Before I come to speak so much to it as will be pertinent to our present purpose and design we may take notice of the same name for Church-Rulers under the Gospel which there was under the Synagogue viz. that of Presbyters The name Presbyter as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 though it Originally import Age yet by way of connotation it hath been looked on as a name both of Dignity and Power Because Wisdome was supposed to dwell with a multitude of years therefore persons of age and experience were commonly chosen to places of honour and trust and thence the name importing age doth likewise cary dignity along with it Thence we read in the time of Moses how often the Elders were gathered together Thence Eliezer is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gen. 24. 2. which the Greek renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Seignior Domo the chief Officer in his house and so we read Gen. 50. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Elders of the Land of Egypt So the Elders of Mâ—dian the Elders of Israel the Elders of the Cities so among the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for their Council of State and among the Latines Senatus and our Saxon Aldermen in all importing both age and honour and power together But among the Jewes in the times of the Apostles it is most evident that the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imported not only dignity but power the Presbyters among the Jewes having a power both of judgeing and teaching given them by their Semicha or Ordination Now under the Gospel the Apostles retaining the name and the manner of Ordination but not conferring that judiciary power by it which was in use among the Jewes to shew the difference between the Law and the Gospel it was requisite some other name should be given to the Governours of the Church which should qualifie the importance of the word Presbyters to a sense proper to a Gospel State Which was the Original of giving the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Governours of the Church under the Gospel A name importing Duty more then Honour and not a
goods was used at first by the Church oâ— Ierusalem as most sutable to the present state of that Church but as far as we can find did neither perpetually hold in that Church nor universally obtain among other Churches as is most clear in the Church at Corinth by their Law-suiâ—â— by the different offerings of the rich and poor at the Lords Supper and by their personal contributions So the Apostles Preaching from house to house was for want of conveniency then of more publick places as free onely for Christians although that practice binds now as far as the Reason doth viz. in its tendency the promoting the work of Salvation of mens Souls Laying on hands for conferring the gifts of the Holy Ghost can never certainly bind where the Reason of it is ceased but may still continue â—s a rite of solemn Prayer and not by vertue of that practice Observing the Apostolical Decrees of abstaining from blood and things strangled and offered to Idols did hold as long as the ground of making them did which was condescension to the Jews although it must be withall acknowledged that the Primitive Christians of the second and third Centuries did generally observe them and the Greek Church to this day and some men of note and learning have pleaded for the necessary observation of them still as Christ. Beckman Steph. Curcellaeus in a Diatriba lately published to this purpose to which Grotius is likewise very inclinable The arguments are too large here to examine although I see not how possibly that place of Paul can be avoided Whatever is set in the shambles eat making no scruple for conscience sakâ— I conclude this with what I laid down at the entrance of this Treatise that where any Act or Law is founded upon a particular reason or occasion as the ground of it it doth no further oblige then the reason or occasion of it doth continue Therefore before an acknowledged Apostolical practice be looked on as Obligatory it must be made appear that what they did was not according as they saw reason and cause for the doing it depending upon the several circumstances of Time Place and Persons but that they did it from some unalterable Law of Chrâ—ist or from some such indispensable reasons as will equally hold in all Times Places and Persons And so the Obligation is taken off from Apostolical practice and laid upon that Law and Reason which was the ground of it Thirdly Offices that were of Apostolical appointment are grown wholly out of use in the Church without mens looking upon themselvs as bound now to observe them As the Widdows of the Churches afterwards from their Office called Deaconnesses of the Church of which number Phoebe was one whom Paul calls the Deaconness of the Church at Cenchrea so both Origen and Chrysostome understand it Of them and their continuance in the Church for some Centuries of years much is spoken by several Writers and resolved by several Councils and yet we see these are laid aside by the pâ—etenders to hold close to Apostolical practice if that binds certainly it doth in its plain institutions if it doth not bind in them how can it in that which is only gathered but by uncertain conjectures to have been ever their practice So that in the issue those who plead so much for the obligatory nature of Apostolical practice do not think it obligatory for if they did how comes this office of Widdows and Deaconesses to be neglected If it be answered that these are not usefull now then we must say that we look upon Apostolical practice to be binding no further then we judge it useful or the reason of it holds which is as much as to say of its self it binds not Fourthly Rites and customs Apostolical are altered therefore men do not think that Apostolical practice doth bind For if it did there could be no alteration of things agreeable thereunto Now let any one consider but these few particulars and judge how far the pleaders for a divine Right of Apostolical practice do look upon themselves as bound now to observe them as Dipping in baptism the use of Love Feasts community of goods the Holy kiss by Tertullian called Signaâ—ulum orationis yet none look upon themselves as bound to observe them now and yet all acknowledge them to have been the practice of the Apostles and therefore certainly though when it may serve for their purpose men will make Apostolical practice to found a divine Right yet when they are gone off from the matter in hand they change their opinion with the matter and can then think themselves free as to the observation of things by themselves acknowledged to be Apostolical Thus we are at last come to the end of this chapter which we have been the longer upon because the main hinge of this controversie did lyâ— in the practice of the Apostles which I suppose now so far cleared as not to hinder our progress towards what remains which we hope will admit of a quicker dispatch We come therefore from the Apostles to the Primitive Church to see whether by the practice of that we can find any thing whereby they looked on themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law to observe any one particular form of Church-Government CHAP. VII The Churches Polity in the ages after the Apostles considered Evidences thence that no certain unalterable Form of Church-Government was delivered to them 1. Because church-Church-Power did in large as the Churches did Whether any Metropolitan Churches established by the Apostles Seven Churches of Asia whether Metropolitical Philippi no Metropolis either in Civil or Ecclâ—siastical sense Several degrees of inlargemext of Churches Churches first the Christians in whole Cities proved by several arguments the Eulogiae an evidence of it Churches extended into the neighbour Territories by the preaching there of City Presbyters thence comes the subordination between then Churches by degrees inlarged to Diocesses from thence to Provinces The Original of Metropolitans and Patriarchs 2. No certain Form used in all Churches Some Churches without Bishops Scots Goths Some with but one Bishop in their whole Countrey Scythian Aethiopian Churches how governed Many Cities without Bishops Diocesses much altered Bishops discontinued in several Churches for many years 3. Conforâ—eing Ecclesiastical Government to the civil in the extent of Diocesses The suburbicarian Churches what Bishops answerable to the civil Governours Churches power rises from the greatness of Cities 4. Validity of Ordination by Presbyters in places where Bishops were The case of Ischyras discussed instances given of Ordination by Presbyters not pronounced null 5. The Churches prudence in managing its affairs by the several Canons Provincial Synods Codex Canonum HAving largely considered the actions of Christ and the practice of the Apostles so far as they are conceived to have reference to the determining the certain form of Government in the Church our next stage is according to our
propounded method to examine what light the practice of the Church in the ages succeeding the Apostles will cast upon the controversie we are upon For although according to the principles established and â—aid down by us there can be nothing setled as an universal Law for the Church but what we find in Scriptures yet because the general practice of the Church is conceived to be of â—o great use for understanding what the Apostles intentions as well as actions were we shall chearfully pass over this Rubicon because not with an intent to increase divisions but to find out some further evidence of a way to compose them Our Inquiry then is Whether the primitive Church did conceive its self obliged to observe unalterably one individual form of Government as delivered down to them either by a Law of Christ or an universal constitution of the Apostles or else did only settle and order things for Church-government according as it judged them tend most to the peace and settlement of the Church without any antecedent obligation as necessarily binding to observe onely one course This latter I shall endeavour to make out to have been the onely Rule and Law which the primitive Church observed as to Church-government viz. the tendency of its constitutions to the peace and unity of the Church and not any binding Law or practice of Christ or his Apostles For the demonstrating of which I have made choyce of such arguments as most immediately teâ—d to the proving of it For If the power of the Church and its officers did encrease meerly from the inlargement of the bounds of Churches if no one certain form were observed in all Churches but great varieties as to Officers and Diocesses if the course used in setling the power of the chief Officers of the Church was from agreement with the civil government if notwithstanding the superiority of Bishops the ordination of Presbyters was owned as valid if in all other things concernning the Churches Polity the Churches prudence was looked on as a sufficient ground to establish things then we may with reason conciude that nothing can be inferred from the practice of the primitive Church Demonstrative of any one fixed form of Church-government delivered from the Apostles â—o them Having thus by a lâ—ght 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 drawn ouâ— the several lines of the pourtraiture of the Polity of the antient Church we now proceed to fill them up though not with that life which it deserves yet so far as the model of this Discourse will permit Our first argument then is from the rise of the extent of the power of Church-Governours which I assert not to have been from any order of the Apostles but from the gradual encrease of the Churches committed to their charge This will be best done by the observation of the growth of Churches and how proportionably the power of the Governours did increase with it As to that there â—re four observable steps or periods as so many ages of growth in the primitive Churches First when Churches and Cities were of the same extent Secondly when Churches took in the adjoyning Terriâ—ories with the Villages belonging to the Cities Thirdly when several Cities with their Villages did associate for Church-Government in the same Province Fourthly when several provinces did associate for Government in the Roman Empire Of these in their order The first period of Church government observable in the primitive Church was when Churches were the same with Christians in whole Cities For the clearing of this I shall first shew that the primitive constitution of Churches was in a society of Christians in the same City Secondly I shall consider the form and manner of Government then observed among them Thirdly consider what relation the several Churches in Cities had to one another First That the Primitive Churches were Christians of whole Cities It is but a late and novel acception of the word Church whereby it is taken for stated fixed congregations for publike Worship and doubtless the original of it is only from the distinction of Churches in greater Cities into their several 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or publike places for meeting whence the Scotch Kirk and our English Church so that from calling the place Church they proceed to call the persons there meeting by that name and thence some think the name of Church so appropriated to such a society of Christians as may meet at such a place that they make it a matter of Religion not to call those places Churches from whence originally the very name as we use it was derived But this may be pardoned among other the religioâ—s weaknesses of well meaning but lesse knowing people A Church in its primary sense as it answers to the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applyed to Christians is a society of Christians living together in one City whether meeting together in many Congregations or one is not at all material because they were not called a Church as meeting together in one place but as they were a Society of Christians inhabiting together in such a City not but that I think a society of Christians might be called a Church where-ever they were whether in a City or Countrey but because the first and chief mention we meet with in Scripture of Churches is of such as did dwell together in the same Cities as is evident from many pregnant places of Scripture to this purpose As Acts 14. 23. compared with Titus 1. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in one place is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the other Ordaining Elders in every Church and ordaining Elders in every City which implyes that by Churches then were meant the body of Christians residing in the Cities over which the Apostles ordained Elders to rule them So Acts 16. 4. 5. As they went through the Cities c. and so were the Churches established in the faith The Churches here were the Christians of those Cities which they went through So Acts 20. 17. He sent to Ephesus and called the Elders of the Church If by the Elders we mean as all those do we now deal with the Elders of Ephesus then it is here evident that the Elders of the Church and of the City are all one but what is more observable ver 28. he calls the Church of that City 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Take heed to your selves and to the flock over which God hath made you overseâ—rs to feed the Church of God Where several things are observable to our purpose first that the body of Christians in Ephesus is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the flock of the Church and not the several flocks and Churches over which God hath made you Bishops Secondly That all these spoken to were such as had a pastoral charge of this one flock Paul calls them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and chargeth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do the work of a Pastor towards it So
with them as may be seen in the actions of Paschasinus the Roman Legat in the Council of Chalcedon From whence forward the great Leviâ—than by his tumbling in the waves endeavoured to get the Dominion of all into his hands but God hath at last put a hook into his nostrils and raised up the great instruments of Reformation who like the Sword fish have so pierced into his bowels that by his tumbling he may only hasten his approaching ruine and give the Church every day more hopes of seeing its self freed from the tyranny of an Uâ—urped power By this Scheme and draught now of the increase of the Churches power nothing can be more evident then that it rise not from any divine institution but only from positive Ecclesiastical Laws made according to the several states and conditions wherein the Church was which as it gradually grew up so waâ— the power of the Church by mutual consent fitted to the state of the Church in its several ages Which was the fiâ—st argument that the Primitive Church did not conceive its self bound to observe any one unalterable form of Government This being the chief the rest that follow will sooner be dispatched The second is from the great varieties as to Government which were in several Churches What comes from divine right is observed unalterably in one uniform constant tenour but what we find so much diversified according to several places we may have ground to look on only as an Ecclesiastical constitution which was followed by every Church as it judged convenient Now as to Church Government we may find some Churches without Bishops for a long time some but with one Bishop in a whole Nation many Cities without any where Bishops were common many Churches discontinue Bishops for a great while where they had been no certain rule observed for modelling their Dâ—ocesses where they were still continued Will not all these things make it seem very improbable that it should be an Apostolical institution that no Church should be without a Bishop First then some whole Nations seem to have been without any Bishops at all if we may believe their own Historians So if we may believe the great Antiquaries of the Church of Scotland that Church was governed by their Culdei as they called their Presbyters without any Bishop over them for a long time Iohannes Maior speaks of their instruction in the faith per Sacerdotes Monachos sine Episcopis Scoti in fide eruditi but least that should be interpreted only of theâ—r conversion Iohannes Fordònus is clear and full to their government from the time of their conversion about A. D 263. to the coming of Palladius A. D. 430. that they were only governed by Presbyters and Monks Ante Palladii adventum habebant Scoti fidei Dâ—ctores ac Sacramentorum Ministratores Presbyteros solunmodo vel Monachos ritum sequentes Ecclesiae Primitivae So much mistaken was that learned man who saith That neither Beda nor any other affirms that the Scots were formerly ruled by a Presbyterie or so much as that they had any Presbyter among them Neither is it any wayes sufficient to say that these Presbyters did derive their authority from some Bishops for however we see here a Church governed without such or if they had any they were only chosen from their Culdei much after the custom of the Church of Alexandria as Hector Boethiuâ— doth imply And if we believe Philostorgius the Gothick Churches were planted and governed by Presbyters for above seventy years for so long it was from their first conversion to the time of Ulphilas whom he makes their first Bishop And great probability there is that where Churches were planted by Presbyters as the Church of France by Andochius and Benignus that afterwards upon the encrease of Churches and Presbyters to rule them they did from among themselves choose one to be as the Bishop over them as Pothinus was at Lyons For we nowhere read in those early plantations of Churches that where there were Presbyters already they sent to other Churches to derive Episcopâ—l ordination from them Now for whole Nations having but one Bishop we have the testimony of Sozomen that in Scythia which by the Romans was called Masia inferior 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Although there were many Cities they had but one Bishop The like Godignus relates of the Abâ—ssine Churches Though their Territories be of vast extent there is but only one Bishop in all those Dominions who is the Bishop of Abuna And where Bishops were most common it is evident they looked not on it as an Apostolical rule for every City to have a Bishop which it must have if it was an Apostolical institution for the Church to follow the civil Government Theodoret mentions 800 Churches under his charge in whose Diâ—cess Ptolomy placeth many other Cities of note besides Cirus as Ariseria Regia Ruba Heraclea c. In the Province of Tripoly he reckons nine Cities which had but five Bishops as appears by the Notitia Ecclesiae Africanae In Thracia every Bishop had several Cities under hâ—m The Bishop of Heraclea that and Panion the Bishop of Byze had it and Arcadiapolis of Coela had it and Callipolis Sabsadia had it and Aphrodisias It is needless to produce more instances of this nature either ancient or modern they being so common and obvious But further we find Bishops discontinued for a long time in the greatest Churches For if there be no Church without a Bishop where was the Church of Rome when from the Martyrdome of Fabian and the banishment of Lucius the Church was governed only by the Clergy So the Church of Carthage when Cyprian was banished the Church of the East when Meletius of Antioeh Eusebius Samosatenus Pelagius of Laodicea and the rest of the Orthodox Bishops were banished for ten years space and Flavianus and Diodorus two Presbyters ruled the Church of Antioch the mean while The Church of Carthage was twenty four years without a Bishop in the time of Hunerik King of the Vandals and when it was offered them that they might have a Bishop upon admitting the Arrians to a free exercise of their Religion among them their answer was upon those terms Ecclesia Episcopum non delictatur habere and Balsamon speaking of the Christian Churches in the East determines it neither safe nor necessary in their present state to have Bishops set up over them And lastly for their Diocesses it is evident there was no certain Rule for modelling them In some places they were far less then in others Generally in the primitive and Eastern Churches they were very small and little as far more convenient for the end of them in the government of the Churches under the Bishops charge it being observed out of Walafridus Strabo by a learned man Fertur in Orientis partibus per singulas urbes praefecturas singulas
Presbyterii honore provexit What more plain and evident then that here a Presbyter ordained a Presbyter which we now here read was pronounced null by Theophilus then Bishop of Alexandria or any others that at time It is a known instance that in the ordination of Pelagius first Bishop of Rome there were only two Bishops concurred and one Presbyter whereas according to the fourth Canon of the Nicene Council three Bishops are absolutely required for Ordinaâ—ion 〈…〉 Bishop either â—hen Pelagius was no Canonical Bishop and so the point of succession thereby fails in the Church of Rome or else a Presbyter hath the same intrinsecal power of Ordination which a Bishop hath but it is onely restrained by Ecclesiastical Lawes In the time of Eustathius Bishop of Antioch which was done A. D. 328 as Iacobus Gothâ—â—redus proves till the time of the ordination of Paulinus A. D. 362. which was for thirty four years space when the Church was governed by Paulinus and his Colleagues withdrawing from the publick Assemblies it will be hard to say by whom the Ordinations were performed all this while unless by Paulinus and his Collegues In the year 452. it appears by Leo in his Epistle to Rusticus Narbonensis that some Presbyters took upon them to ordain as Bishops about which he was consulted by Rusticus what was to be done in that Case with those so ordained Leo his resolution of that Case is observable Siqui autem Clerici ab ist is pseudo-Episcopis in iis Ecclesiis ordinati sunt quae ad prâ—prios Episcopos pertinebant ordinatio â—orum cum consensn judicio praesidentium facta est potest rata haberi ita ut in ipsis Ecclesiis perseverent Those Clergy men who were ordained by such as took upon them the Office of Bishops in Churches belonging to proper Bishops if the Ordination were performed by the consent of the Bishops it may be looked on as valid and those Presbyters remain in their Office in the Church So that by the consent ex post facto of the true Bishops those Presbyters thus ordained were looked on as Lawful Presbyteâ—s which could not be unless their ordainers had an intrinsecal power of Ordination which was onely restrained by the Laws of the Church for if they have no power of Ordination it is impossible they should confer any thing by their Oâ—dâ—nation If to this it be answered that the validity of their Ordination did depend upon the consent of the Bishops and that Presbyters may ordain if delegated thereto by Bishops as Paulinus might ordain on that account at Antioch It is easily answered that this very power of doing it by delegation doth imply an intrinsecal power in themselves of doing it For iâ— Presbyters be forbidden ordaining others by Scriptures then they can neither do it in their own persons nor by delegation from others Fâ—â— Qâ—od alicui suo nomine â—on lices nec 〈…〉 Anâ—â—â—â—â— Rule oâ— Cyprian must hold true Non aliquid câ—i â—â—â—â— largiri potest humana indulgentia ubi intercâ—dit legâ—â— tribuit Divina â—râ—scriptio There can be no dispensing with Divine Lawes which must be if that may be delegated to other persons which was required of men in the Office wherein they are And if Presbyters have power of conferring nothing by their Ordination how can an after-consent of Bishops make that Act of theirs valid for conserring Right and Power by it It appears then that this Power was restrained by the Lawes of the Church for preserving Uâ—ity in its self but yet so that in case of necessity what was done by Presbyters was not looked on as invalid But against this the case of Ischyras ordained as it is said a Presbyter by Collutbus and pronounced null by the Council of Alexandria is commonly pleaded But there is no great difficulty in answering it For first the pronouncing such an Ordination null doth not evidence that they looked on the power of Ordination as belonging of Divine right onely to Bishops for we find by many instances that acting in a bare contempt of Ecclesiastical Canons was sufficient to degrade any from being Presbyters Secondly If Ischyras had been ordained by a Bishop there were câ—rcumstances enough to induce the Council to pronounce it null First as done out of the Diocess in which case Ordinations are nulled by Concil Arel cap. 13. Secondly done by open and pronounced Schismaticks Thirdly done sine titulo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and â—o nulled by the Canons then Thirdly Colluthns did not act as a Presbyter in ordaining but as a Bishop of the Meletian party in Cynus as the Clergy of Mareotis speaking of Ischyras his ordination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Collytbus a Presbyter making shew of being a Bishop and is supposed to have been ordained a Bishop by Meletius More concerning this may be seen in Blondel who fully clears all the particulars here mentiâ—â—eâ— So that notwithstanding this Instance nothing appears but that the power of Ordination was restrained only by Ecclesiastical Lawâ— The last thing to prove that the Church did act upon prudence in Church-Government is from the many restraints in other cases made by the Church for restraint of that Liberty which was allowed by Divine Laws He must be a stranger to the ancient Canons and Constitutions of the Church that takes not notice of such restraints made by Canons as in reference to observation of several Rites and Customes in the Churches determined by the Provincial Synods of the several Churches for which purpose their Provincial Synods were still kept up in the Eastern Church as appears by the Testimony of Firmilian in his Epistle to Cyprian Qua ex causa necessariò apud nos fit ut per singulos annos Seniores Praepositi in unum conveniamus ad disponenda ea quae curae nostrae commissa sunt Ut si quae graviora sunt communi consilio dirigantur lapsis quoque fratribus c. medela quaeratur non quasi à nobis remissionem peccatorum consequâ—ntâ—r sed â—t per nos ad intelligentiam delictorum suorum convertantur Domino pleniùs satisfacere cogantur The several orders about the Discipline of the Church were detâ—rmined in these Synods as to which he that would find a command in Scripture for their ordeâ—s about the Catechumeni and Lapsi will take pains to no purpose the Church ordering things it self for the better Regulating the several Churches they were placed over A demonstrative Argument that these things came not from Divine command is from the great diversiâ—y of these customes in several places of which besides Socrates Sozomen largely speaks and may easily be gathered from the History of the several Churches When the Church began to enjoy ease and liberty and thereby had opportunity of enjoying greater conveniency for Councils we find what was detrrmined by those Councils were entred into a Codex Canonum for that purpose which
may be determined by lawfull authority and what is so determined by that authority doth bind men to obedience as hath been proved by the 5. Hypothesis in the entrance of this Treatise I conclude all with this earnest desire That the wise and Gracious God would send us one heart and one way that he would be the Composer of our differences and the repairer of our breaches that of our strange divisions and unchristian animosities While we pretend to serve the Prince of peace we may at last see THE END Glory to God on high on earth peace good will towards men Luke 2. 14. A Discourse concerning the Power of EXCOMMUNICATION in a Christian Church The Name of Power in a Church explained The mistake of which the Foundation of Erastianism The Notion of the Church opened as it is the subject of Power The Church proved to be a Society distinct from the Common-wealth by reason of its different Nature and divine Institution distinct Officers different Rights and Ends and peculiar Offences The Power of the Church doth not arise from meâ—r confederation The Churches Power founded on the nature of the Christian Society and not on particular Precepts The Power of Church-Officers not meerly Doctrinal proved by several Arguments Church-Power as to particular persons antecedent to confederation The Power of the Keys relates to Baptism The Churches Power extends to Excommunication what it is and what grounds it had under the Law No exclusion from Temple-worship among the Iews Excommunication necessary in a Christian Church because of the conditions supposed to communion in it Of the Incestuous person and the Grounds of the Apostolical censure Objections against Excommunication answered The fundamental Rights of the Church continue after its being incorporated into the civil State The Magistrates Power as to Excommunication cleared IT is a matter of daily observation and experience in the World how hard it is to keep the eyes of the understanding clear in its judgement of things when it is too far engaged in the dust of Controversie It being so very difficult to well manage an impetuous pursuit after any Opinion nothing being more common than to see men out-run their mark and through the force of their speed to be carried as far beyond it as others in their Opinion fall short of it There is certainly a kind of ebriety of the mind as well as of the body which makes it so unstable and pendulous that it oft times reels from one extream unto the quite contrary This as it is obvious in most eager controvertists of all Ages so especially in such who have discovered the â—alsity of an opinion they were once confident of which they think they can never after run far enough from So that while they start at an apparition they so much dread they run into those untroden paths wherein they lose both themselves and the Truth they sought for Thus we find it to be in the present controversie for many out of their just zeal against the extravagancies of those who scrued up Church-Power to so high a peg that it was thought to make perpetual discord with the Common wealth could never think themselves free from so great an inconvenience till they had melted down all Spiritual Power into the civil State and dissolved the Church into the Common-wealth But that the World way see I have not been more forward to assert the just power of the Magistrate in Ecclesiasticals as well as Civils than to defend the Fundamental Rights of the Church I have taken this opportunity more fully to explain and vindicate that part of the Churches-Power which lies in reference to Offenders It being the main thing struck at by those who are the followers of that noted Physician who handled the Church so ill as to deprive her of her expulsive faculty of Noxious humours and so left her under a Miserere meî I shall therefore endeavour to give the Church her due as well as Caesar his by making good this following Principle or Hypothesis upon which the whole hinge of this Controversie turns viz. That the power of inflicting censure upon Offenders in a Christian Church is a fundamental Right resuâ—â—â—â—g from the constitution of the Church as a Society by Jesus Christ and that the seat of this Power is in those Officers of the Church who have derived their power Originally from the Founder of this Society and act by vertue of the Laws of it For the clear stating of this Controversie it will be necessary to explain what that Power is which I attribute to the Church and in what notion the Church is to be considered as it exerciseth this Power First concerning the proper notion of Power by it I cannot see any thing else to be understood than a right of governing or ordering things which belong to a Society And so Power implies onely a moral faculty in the person enjoying it to take care ne quid civitas detrimenti capiat whereby it is evident that every well constituted Society must suppose a Power within its self of ordering things belonging to its welfare or else it were impossible either the being or the rights and priviledges of a Society could be long preserved Power then in its general and abstracted notion doth not necessarily import either meer Authority or proper Coaction for these to any impartial judgement will appear to be rather the several modes whereby power is exercised than any proper ingredients of the specifick Nature of it which in general imports no more then a right to govern a constituted Society but how that right shall be exercised must be resolved not from the notion of Power but from the nature and constitution of that particular Society in which it is lodged and inherent It appears then from hence to be a great mistake and abuse of well-natured Readers when all Power is necessarily restrained either to that which is properly Coâ—rcive or to that which is meerly Arbitrary and onely from consent The Original of which mistake is the stating the Notion of Power from the use of the Word either in ancient Roman Authours or else in the Civil Laws both which are freely acknowledged to be strangeâ— to the exercise of any other Power than that which iâ— meerly authoritative and perswasive or that which is Coactive and Penal The ground of which is because they were ignorant of any other way of conveyance of power besides external force and Arbitrary consent the one in those called Legal Societies or Civitates the other Collegia and Hetaeriae But to as that do acknowledge that God hath a right of commanding men to what Duty he please himself and appointing a Society upon what terms best please him and giving a Power to particular persons to govern that Society in what way shall tend most to advance the Honour of such a Society may easily be made appear that there is a kind of Power neither properly
Coactive nor meerly Arbitrary viz. such a one as immediately results from Divine Institution and doth suppose consent to submit to it as a necessary Duty in all the members of this Society This Power it is evident is not meerly Arbitrary either in the Governours or Members for the Governours derive their Power or right of Governing from the institution of Christ and are to be regulated by his Laws in the execution of it and the Members though their consent be necessarily supposed yet that consent is a Duty in them and that duty doth imply their submission to the Rulers of this Society neither can this power be called Coactive in the â—ense it is commonly taken for coactive power and external force are necessary correlates to each other but we suppose no such thing as a power of outward force to be given to the Church as such for that properly belongs to a Common-wealth But the power which I suppose to be lodged in the Church is such a power as depends upon a Law of a Superiour giving right to Govern to particular persons over such a Society and making it the Duty of all Members of it to submit unto it upon no other penalties then the exclusion of them from the priviledges which that Society enjoyes So that supposing such a Society as the Church is to be of Divine Institution and that Christ hath appointed Officers to rule it it necessarily follows that those Officerâ— must derive their power i. e. their right of Governing this Society not meerly from consent and confederation of parties but from that Divine Institution on which the Society depends The â—â—ht of understanding the right notion of power in the sense here â—â—â— down is certainly the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Erastianism and that which hath given occasion to so many to question any such thing as Power in the Church especially when the more zealous then judicious defenders of it have rather chosen to hang it upon some doubtfull places of Scripture then on the very Naturâ— and Constitution of the Christian Church as a Society instituted by Iesus Christ. This being then the nature of power in general it is I suppose clear that an outward coactive force is not necessary in order to it for if some may have a Right to Govern and others may be obliged to obedience to those persons antecedently to any Civil Constitution then such persons have a just power to inflict censures upon such as transgress the Rules of the Society without any outward force It is here very impertinent to dispute what effects such censures can have upon wilful persons without a Coactive power If I can prove that there is a right to inflict them in Church-Officers and an Obligation to submit to them in all Offenders I am not to trouble my self with the event of such things as depend upon Divine Institutions I know it is the great Objection of the followers of Erastus that Church censures are inflicted upon persons unwilling to receive them and therefore must imply external and coactive force which is repugnant to the nature of a Church But this admits according to the Principles here established of a very easie solution for I deny not that Church Power goes upon consent but then it 's very plain here was an antecedent consent to submit to censures in the very entrance into this Society which is sufficient to denominate it a voluntary act of the persons undergoing it and my reason is this every person entring into a Society parts with his own freedom and liberty as to matters concerning the governing of it and professeth submission to the Rules and Orders of it now a man having parted with his freedom already cannot reassume it when he please for then he is under an Obligation to stand to the Covenants made at his entrance and consâ—quently his undergoing what shall be laid upon him by the Lawes of this Society must be supposed to be voluntary as depending upon his consent at first entrance which in all Societies must be supposed to hold still else there would follow nothing but confusion in all Societies in the World if every man were at liberty to break his Covenants when any thing comes to lye upon him according to the Rules of the Society which he out of some private design would be unwilling to undergo Thus much may serve to settle aright the Notion of Power the want of understanding which hath caused all the confusion of this Controversie The next thing is In what Notion we are to consider the Church which is made the subject of this Power As to which we are to consider This Power either as to its right or in actu primo or as to its exercise or in actu secundo Now if we take this Power as to the fundamental Right of it then it belongs to that Universal Church of Christ which subsists as a visible Society by vertue of that Law of Christ which makes an owning the Profession of Christianity the Duty of all Church members If we consider this Power in the exercise of it then it being impossible that the Universall Church should perform the executive part of this power relating to offences I suppose it lodged in that particular Society of Christians which are united together in one body in the community of the sâ—me Government but yet so as that the administration of this Power doth not belong to the body of the Society considered complexly but to those Officers in it whose care and charge it is to have a peculiar oversight and inspection over the Church and to redress all disorders in it Thus the visive faculty is fundamentally lodged in the Soul yet all exterior acts of sight are performed by the Eyes which are the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Overseers of the Body as the other are of the Church so that the exercise and administration of this power belongs to the speciall Officers and Governours of the Church none else being capable of exercising this Power of the Church as such but they on whom it is settled by the Founder of the Church it 's self This Society of the Church may be again considered either as subsisting without any influence from the Civil Power or as it is owned by and incorporated into a Christian State I therefore demand Whether it be absolutely necessary for the subsistence of this Christian Society to be upheld by the Civil Power or no And certainly none who consider the first and purest Ages of the Christian Church can give any entertainment to the Affirmative because then the Church flourished in it's greatest purity not onely when not upheld but when most violently opposed by the Civil Power If so then it 's being united with the Civil State is onely accidental as to the constitution a Church and if this be onely accidental then it must be supposed furnished with every thing requisite to it 's well ordering accidentally to
any such Union and abstractly from it For can we imagine our Blâ—ssed Saviour should institute a Society and leave it destitute of means to uphold it's self unless it fell into the hands of the civil Power or that he left every thing tending thereto meerly to Prudence and the Arbitrary constitutions of the persons joyning together in this Society Did our Saviour take care there should be a Society and not provide for means to uphold it Nay it is evident he not onely appointed a Society but Officers to rule it Had those Officers then a Right to Govern it or no by vertue of Christs institution of them if not they were rather Bibuli than Caesares Cyphers than Consuls in the Church of God If they had a power to Govern doth not that necessarily imply a Right to inflict censures on Offenders unless we will suppose that either there can be no Offenders in a Christian Church or that those Offenders do not vâ—olate the Laws of the Society or there be some Prohibition for them to exercise their power over them which is to give power with one hand and take it away with the other or that this power cannot extend so far as to exclude any from the Priviledges of the Church which is the thing to be discussed Having thus cleared our way I now come to the Resolution of the Question its self in order to which I shall endeavour to demonstrate with what evidence the Subjâ—ct is capable of these following things First that the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature distinct from the Common-wealth Secondly that the power of the Church over its members doth not arise from meer confederation or consent of Parties Thirdly That this Power of the Church doth extend to the exclusion of offenders from the Priviledges of it Fourthly That the Fundamental Rights of the Church do not escheat to the Common-wealth upon their being united in a Christian State If these Principles be established the Churches Power will stand upon them as on a firm and unmoveable Basis. I begin with the first That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature distinct from the Common-wealth which I prove by these Arguments 1. Those Societies which are capable of subsisting apart from each other are really and in their own Nature distinct from one another but so it is with the Church and Common wealth For there can be no greater Evidence of a Reall Distinction than Mutual Separation and I think the proving the possibility of the Souls existing separate from the body is one of the strongest Arguments to prove it to be a substance really distinct from the body to which it is united although we are often fain to go the other way to work and to prove possibility of separation from other Arguments evincing the Soul to be a distinct substance but the reason of that is for want of evidence as to the state of separate Souls and theiâ— visible existence which is repugnant to the immateriality of their natures But now as to the matter in hand we have all evidence desirable for we are not put to prove possibility of separation meerly from the different constitution of the thingâ— united but we have evidence to Sense of it that the Church hath subsisted when it hath been not onely separated from but persecuted by all civil power It is with many men as to the Union of Church and State as it is with others as to the Union of the Soul and Body when they observe how close the Union is and how much the Soul makes use of the Animal Spirits in most of its Operations and how great a sympathy there is between them that like Hippocrates his Twins they laugh and weep together they are shrewdly put to it how to fancy the Soul to be any thing else than a more vigorous mode of matter so these observing how close an Union and Dependence there is between the Church and State in a Christian Common-wealth and how much the Church is beholding to the civil power in the Administration of its functions are apt to think that the Church is nothing but a higher mode of a Common-wealth considered as Christian. But when it is so evident that the Church hath and may subsist supposing it abstracted from all Civil Power it may be a sufficient demonstration that however neer they may be when united yet they are really and in their own nature distinct from each other Which was the thing to be proved 2. Those are distinct Societies which have every thing distinct in their nature from each other which belong to the Constitution or Government of them but this is evident as to the Church and Common-wealth which will appear because their Charter is distinct or that which gives them their being as a Society Civil Societies are founded upon the necessity of particular mens parting with their peculiar Rights for the preservation of themselves which was the impulsive cause of their entring into societies but that which actually speâ—ks them to be a society is the mutual consent of the several partyes joyning together whereby they make themselves to bee one Body and to have one Common Interest So Cicero de Repub. defines Populus to bee coe'us multitudinis juris consensu utilitatis communione sociatus There is no doubt but Gods general providence is as evidently seen in bringing the World into societies and making them live under Government as in disposing all particular events which happen in those Societies but yet the way which Providence useth in the constitution of these societies is by inclining men to consent to associate for their mutual benefit and advantage So that natural Reason consulting for the good of mankind as to those Rights which men enjoy in common with each other was the main foundation upon which all civil Societies were erected Wee finde no positive Law enactiâ—g the beeing of Civil Societies because Nature its self would prompt men for their own conveniencies to enter into them But the ground and foundation of that Society which we call a Church is a matter which Natural Reason and common Notions can never reach to and therefore an â—ssociating for the preserving of such may be a Philosophical Society but a Christian it cannot be And they that would make a Christian Church to be nothing else but a Society of Essens or an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Pythagoreans do either not understand or not consider whereon this Christian Society is founded for it is evident they look on it as a meerly voluntary thing that is not at all setled by any Divine positive Law The truth is there is no principle more consistent with the opinion of those who deny any Church power in a Christian state then this is and it is that which every one who will make good his ground must be driven to for it is evident that in matters meerly voluntary and depending
themselves members of it Whereas were the Church and Commonwealth really and formally the same all obligation to Church society would arise meerly from the Legislative Power of the Common wealth But now there being a Divine Law binding in conscience whose obligation cannot bee superseded by any Humane Law it is plain and evident where are such vastly different obligations there are different Powers and in this sense I know no incongruity in admitting imperium in imperio if by it wee understand no external coactive power but an internal power laying obligation on conscience distinct from the power lodged in a Commonwealth considered as such An outward coactive power was alwayes disowned by Christ but certainly not an internal Power over conscience to oblige all his Disciples to what Duties hee thought fit Secondly I argue from those Officers whose rights to govern this Society are founded on that Charter whereby the Society it self subsists Now I would willingly know why when our Saviour disowned all outward power in the World yet hee should constitute a Society and appoint Officers in it did hee not intend a peculiar distinct Society from the other Societies of the world And therefore the argument frequently used against Church-power because it hath no outward force with it by the constitution of Christ is a strong argument to me of the peculiarity of a Christian society from a Commonwealth because Christ so instituted it as not to have it ruled at first by any outward force or power When Christ saith his Kingdome was not of this world he implies that he had a Society that was governed by his Laws in the world yet distinct from all mundane Societies had not our Saviour intended his Church to have been a peculiar Society distinct from a Commonwealth it is hard to conceive why our Saviour should interdict the Apostles the use of a civil coactive power Or why instead of sending abroad Apostles to preach the Gospel hee did not employ the Governours of Commonwealths to have inforced Christianity by Laws and temporal edicts and the several Magistrates to have impowred several persons under them to preach the Gospel in their several Territories And can any thing bee more plain by our Saviours taking a contrary course than that hee intended a Church society to bee distinct from civil and the power belonging to it as well as the Officers to bee of a different nature from that which is settled in a Commonwealth I here suppose that Christ hath by a positive Law established the Government of his Church upon Officers of his own appointment which I have largely prove â—â—sewhere and therefore suppose it now Thirdly I arguâ—â—â—om the peculiar rights belonging to these Societies For if every one born in the Commonwealth have not thereby a right to the priviledges of the Church nor every one by being of the Church any right to the benefits of the Commonwealth it must necessarily follow that these are distinct from one another If any one by being of the Common-wealth hath right to Church-priviledges then every one born in a Common-wealth may challenge a right to the Lords Supper without Baptism or open professing Christianity which I cannot think any will be very ready to grant Now there being by Divine appointment the several rights of Baptism and the Lords Supper as peculiar badges of the Church as a visible Society it is evident Christ did intend it a Society distinct from the Common wealth Fourthly I argue from the different ends of these societies A Common-wealth is constituted for civil ends and the Church for spiritual for ends are to be judged by the primary constitution but now it is plain the end of civil society is for preservation of mens rights as men therefore Magistracy is called by St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but this Christian society doth not respect men under the connotation of men but as Christians The answer given to this is very short and insufficient when it is said that every man in a Commonwealth is to act upon spiritual accounts and ends For there is a great deal of difference between Christianities having an influence upon mens actings in a Commonwealth and making a society the same with a Commonwealth To argue therefore from one to another is a shortness of discourse I cannot but wonder at unless it could be proved that Christianity aymed at nothing else but regulating men in the affairs of a Commonwealth which is a task I suppose will not be undertaken Lastly I argue from the peculiar offences against this society which are or â—ay bee distinct from those against a Commonwealth I deny not but most times they are the same but frequently they differ and when they are the same yet the consideration of them is different in the Church and Common wealth for which I shall suppose the six arguments produced in the last chapter of the first part to stand good which will strongly hold to exâ—â—â—â—unication in the Christian Church though there produce 〈…〉 ly for the Iewish I would fain know what is to bee done in many offences known to bee against the Laws of Christ and which tend to the dishonour of the Christian society which the civil and Municipal Laws either do not or may not take cognizance of Thus much may serve as I think to make evident that the Church in its own nature is a peculiar society distinct from a Commonwealth which was the first proposition to bee proved The second is That the power of the Church over it's members in case of offences doth not arise meerly from confederation and consent though it doth suppose it This Church power may be considered two wayes Either first as it implyes the right in some of inflicting censures Or secondly as it implyes in others the duty of submitting to censures inflicted now as to both these I shall prove that their original is higher than meer confederation 1. As to the right of inflicting censures on these accounts First What ever society doth subsist by vertue of a divine constitution doth by vertue thereof derive all power for it's preservation in peace unity and purity but it is plain that a power of censuring offenders is necessary for the Churches preservation in peace and purity and it is already proved that the Church hath its Charter from Christ and therefore from him it hath a power to inflict punishments on Offenders suitable to the Nature of the Society they are of I am very prone to think that the ground of all the mistakes on this subject have risen from hence that some imprudently enough have fixt the original of this Power on some ambiguous places of Scripture which may and it may bee ought to bee taken in a different sense and their adversaries finding those places weak and insufficient proofs of such a power have from thence rejected any such kind of power at all But certainly if wee should reject every truth that is weakly
proved by some who have undertaken it I know no opinion would bid so saiâ— for acceptance as Scepticism and that in reference to many weighty and important truthâ— for how weakly have some proved the existence of a Deity the immortality of the soul and the truth of the Scriptures by such arguments that if it were enough to overthroâ—â— an opinion to bee able to answer some Arguments brought for it Atheisme it self would become plausible It can be then no evidence that a thing is not true because some Arguments will not prove it and truly as to the matter in hand I am fully of the opinion of the excellent H. Grotius speaking of Excommunication in the Christian Church Neque adâ—am râ—m peculiare praeceptum desideratur eum Ecclestae coetu à Christo semel constituto omnia illa imperata censeri debent sine quibus ejus coeiûs puritas retineri non potest And therefore men spend needless pains to prove an institution of this power by some positive precept when Christs founding his Church as a peculiar Society is sufficient proof hee hath endowed it with this fundamental Right without which the Society were arena sino calce a company of persons without any common tye of union among them for if there bee any such union it must depend on some conditions to bee performed by the members of that Society which how could they require from them if they have not power to exclude them upon non performance 2. I prove the divine original of this power from the special appointment and designation of particular Officers by Iesus Christ for the ruling of this Society Now I say that Law which provides there shall bee Officers to Govern doth give them power to govern suitably to the Nature of their society Either then you must deny that Christ hath by an unalterable Institution appointed a Gospel Ministry or that this Ministry hath no Power in the Church or that their Power extends not to excommunication The first I have already proved the second follows from their appointment for by all the titles given to Church Officers in Scripture it appears they had a Power over the Church as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All which as you well know do import a right to Govern the Society over which they are set And that this power should not extend to a power to exclude convict Offenders seems very strange when no other punishment can be more suitable to the nature of the Society than this is which is a debarring him from the priviledges of that Society which the offender hath so much dishonoured Can there be any punishment less imagined towards contumacious offenders then this is or that carries in it less of outward and coactive force it implying nothing but what the offender himself freely yielded to at his entrance into this Society All that I can find replyed by any of the Adversaryes of the opinion I here assert to the argument drawn from the Institution and Titles of the Officers of the Church is that all those titles which are given to the Ministers of the Gospel in the New Testament that do import Rule and Government are all to be taken in a Spiritual sense as they are Christs Ministers and Ambassadors to preach his Word and declare his Will to his Church So that all power such persons conceive to lye in those Titles is only Doctrinal and declarative but how true that is let any one judge that considers these things 1. That there was certainly a power of Discipline then in the Churches constituted by the Apostles which is most evident not onely from the passages relating to Offenders in Saint Pauls Epistles especially to the Corinthians and Thessalonians but from the continued Practice of succeeding Ages manifested by Tertullian Cyprian and many others There being then a power of Discipline in Apostolical Churches there was a necessity it should be administred by some Persons who had the care of those Churches and who were they but the severall Pastors of them It being then evident that there was such a Power doth it not stand to common sense it should be implyed in such Titles which in their Naturall Importance do signifie a Right to Govern as the names of Pastors and Rulers do 2. There is a diversity in Scripture made between Pastors and Teachers Ephes. 4. 11. Though this may not as it doth not imply a necessity of two distinct Offices in the Church yet it doth a different respect and connotation in the same person and so imports that Ruling carries in it somewhat more then meer Teaching and so the power implyed in Pastors to be more then meerly Doctrinal which is all I contend for viz. A right to govern the flock committed to their charge 3. What possible difference can be assigned between the Elders that Rule well and those which labour in the Word and Doctrine 1 Timothy 5. 17. if all their Ruling were meerly labouring in the Word and Doctrine and all their Governing nothing but Teaching I intend not to prove an Office of Rulers distinct from Teachers from hence which I know neither this place nor any other will do but that the formal conception of Ruling is different from that of Teaching 4. I argue from the Analogy between the Primitive Churches and the Synagogues that as many of the names were taken from thence where they carried a power of Discipline with them so they must do in some proportion in the Church or it were not easie understanding them It is most certain the Presbyters of the Synagogue had a power of Ruling and can you conceive the Bishops and Presbyters of the Church had none when the Societies were much of the same Constitution and the Government of the one was transscribed from the other as hath been already largely proved 5. The acts attributed to Pastor in Scripture imply a power of Governing distinct from meer Teaching such are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used for a right to Govern Matth. 2. 6. Revel 12. 5. 19. 15. which word is attributed to Pastors of Churches in reference to their flocks Acts 20. 28. 1 Pet. 5. 2. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is applyed to Ministers when they are so frequently called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes praesidentiam cum potestate for Hesychius renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at Athens had certainly a power of Government in them 6. The very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is attributed to those who have over-sight of Churches 1 Cor. 12. 8. by which it is certainly evident that a power more than Doctrinal is understood as that it could not then be understood of a power meerly civil And this I suppose may suffice to vindicate this Argument from the Titles of Church Officers in the New Testament that they are not insignificant things but the persons who enjoyed them had a right to govern the Society over which the
understanding of the truth and certainty of Christian Religion For when once the mind of any rational man is so far wrought upon by the influence of the Divine Spirit as to discover the most rational and undoubted evidences which there are of the truth of Christianity he is presently obliged to profess Christ openly to worship him solemnly to assemble with others for instruction and participation of Gospel Ordinances and thence it follows that there is an antecedent Obligation upon Conscience to associate with others and consequently to consent to be governed by the Rulers of the Society which he enters into So that this submission to the power of Church Officers in the exercise of Discipline upon Offenders is implyed in the very conditions of Christianity and the solemn professing and undertaking of it 2. It were impossible any Society should be upheld if it be not laid by the founder of the Society as the necessary Duty of all members to undergo the penalties which shall be inflicted by those who have the care of governing that Society so they be not contrary to the Laws Nature and Constitution of it Else there would be no provision made for preventing divisions and confusions which will happen upon any breach made upon the Laws of the Society Now this Obligation to submission to censures doth speak something antecedentaly to the confederation although the expression of it lies in the confederation its self By this I hope we have made it evident that it is nothing else but a mistake in those otherwise Learned persons who make the power of censures in the Christian Church to be nothing else but a Lex confederata Disciplinae whereas this power hath been made appear to be deâ—ived from a higher Original than the meer Arbitrary consent of the several members of the Church associating together And how farre the examples of the Synagogues under the Law are from reaching that of Christian Churches in reference to this because in these the power is conveyed by the Founder of the Society and not left to any arbitrary constitutions as it was among the Iews in their Synagogues It cannot be denied but consent is supposed and confederation necessary in order to Church power but that is rather in regard of the exercise then the original of it For although I affirm the original of thiâ— power to be of Divine Institution yet in order to the exercise of it in reference to particular persons who are not mentioned in the Charter of the power its self it is necessary that the persons on whom it is exerted should declare their consent and submission either by words or actions to the Rules and Orders of this Society Having now proved that the Power of the Church doth not arise from meer consent of parties the next grand Inquiry is concerning the extent of this power Whether it doth reach so far as to Excommunication For some men who will not seem wholly to deny all power in the Church over Offenders nor that the Church doth subsist by Divine Institution yet do wholly deny any such power as that of Excommunication and seem rather to say that Church-Officers may far more congrâ—ously to their Office inflict any other mulct upon Offenders then exclude them from participation of Communion with others in the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Gospel In order therefore to the clearing of this I come to the third Proposition That the power which Christ hath given to the Officers of his Church doth extend to the exclusion of contumacious Offenders from the priviledges which this Society enjoyes In these terms I rather choose to fix it then in those crude expressions wherein Erastus and some of his followers would state the question and some of their imprudent adversaries have accepted it viz. Whether Church Officers have power to exclude any from the Eucharist ob moralem impuritatem And the reasons why I wave those terms are 1. I must confess my self yet unsatisfied as to any convincing Argument whereby it can be proved that any were denyed admission to the Lords Supper who were admitted to all other parts of Church-Society and owned as members in them I cannot yet see any particular Reason drawn from the Nature of the Lords-Supper above all other parts of Divine worship which should confine the censures of the Church meerly to that Ordinance and so to make the Eucharist bear the same Office in the Body of the Church which our new Anatomists tell us the parenchyme of the Liver doth in the natural Body viz. to be colâ—â—â— sanguinis to serve as a kind of strainer to separate the more gross and faeculent parts of the Blood from the more pure and spirituous so the Lord's Supper to strain out the more impure members of the Church from the more Holy and Spiritual My judgement then is that Excommunication relates immediately to the cutting a person off from Communion with the Churches visible Society constituted upon the ends it is but because Communion iâ— not visibly discerned but in Administration and Participation of Gospel Ordinances therefore Exclusion doth chiefly referre to these and because the Lords Supper is one of the highest privilledges which the Church enjoyes therefore it stands to reason that censures should begin there And in that sense suspension from the Lords Supper of persons apparently unworthy may be embraced as a prudent lawful and convenient abatement of the greater penalty of Excommunication and so to stand on the same general grounds that the other doth for Qui pâ—test majus potest etiam minus which will hold as well in moral as natural power iâ— there be no prohibition to the contrary nor peculiar Reason as to the one more then to the oâ—her 2. I dislike the terms ob moralem impuritatem on this account Because I suppose they were taken up by Erastus and from him by others as the Controversie was managed concerning Excommunication among the Iâ—wes viz. whether it were â—meerly because of Ceremonial or else likewise because of moral impurity As to which I must ingenuously acknowledge Erastus hath very much the advantage of his adversaries clearly proving that no persons under the Law were excluded the Temple Worship because of moral impurity But then withall I think he hath gained little advantage to his cause by the great and successfull pains he hath taken in the proving of that My reason is because the Temple-Worship or the sacrifices under the Law were in some sense propitiatory as they were the adumbrations of that grand Sacrifice which was to be offered up for the appeasing of Gods wrath viz. The Blood of Christ therefore to have excluded any from participation of them had been to exclude them from the visible way of obtaining pardon of sin which was not to be had without shedding of Blood as the Apostle tells us and from testifying their Faith towards God and Repentance from dead works But now under the Gospel those
Ordinances which suppose admission into the Church by Baptism do thereby suppose an all-sufficient Sacrifice offered for the expiation of sin and consequently â—he subsequent priviledges do not immediately Relate to the obtaining of that but a gratefull commemoration of the Deatâ— of Christ and a celebration of the infinite mercy and goodness of God in the way of Redemption found out by the death of his Son And therefore it stands to great reason that such Persons who by their profane and unworthy lives dishonour so Holy a profession should not be owned to be as good and sound Members of the Society â—ounded on so Sacred a Foundation as the most Christian and Religious Persons To this I know nothing can be objected but that first The Passover was commemorative among the Iews and Secondly That the priviledges of that people were then very great above other people and therefore if God had intended any such thing as Excommunication among his peoplè it would have been in use then To these I answer 1. I grant the Passeover was commemorative as to the occasion of its Institution but then it was withal Typical and annunciative of that Lamb of God who was to take away the sins of the world and therefore no person who desired expiation of sins was to bee debarred from it but the Lords-supper under the Gospel hath nothing in it propitiatory but is intended as a Feast upon a Sacrifice and a Federal Rite as hath been fully cleared by a very learned person in his discourse about the true notion of the Lords Supper 2. I grant the Iews had very many priviledges above other Nations Nay so far that the whole body of the people were looked upon as Gods chosen and peculiar and holy people and from thence I justly inferr that whatever exclusion was among the people of the Iews from their society will far better hold as an argument for Excommunication under the Christian Church than if it had been a meer debarring from their Levitical Worship And that I should far sooner insist upon from the reason assigned as the ground of Excommunication then the other infirm and proâ—ligated Argument and so the Exclusion out of the Camp of Israel and the Cerith among the Iews whatever we understand by it may à pari hold to be a ground of exclusion from the Christian Society In imitation of which I rather suppose that exclusion out of the Synagogues was after taken up rather then as a meer Out lawry when they were deprived of Civil Power The Question then being thus clearly stated it amounts to this Whether under the Gospel there be any power in the Officers of the Church by vertue of Divine Institution to exclude any Offenders out of the Christian Society for transgressing the Laws of it And according to our former Propositions I suppose it will be sufficient to prove that power to bee of Divine Institution if I prove it to bee fundamentally and intrinsecally resident in the Society its self For whatever doth immediately result from the Society its self must have the same Original which the subject hath because this hath the nature of an inseparable property resulting from its constitution For the clearing of which I shall lay down my thoughts of it as clearly and methodically as I can and that in these following Hypotheses 1. Where there is a power of declaring any person to bee no true member of the Society hee is in there is a formal power of Excommunication For this is all which I intend by it viz. an authoritative pronouncing virtute officii any convict Offender to have forfeited his interest in the Church as a Christian society and to lose all the priviledges of it So that if this power be lodged in any Church Officer then he hath power formally to Excommunicate 2. Where the enjoyment of the priviledges of a society is not absolute and necessary but depends upon conditions to bee performed by every member of which the Society is Iudge there is a power in the Rulers of that Society to debar any person from such priviledges upon non-performance of the conditions As supposing the jus Civitatis to depend upon defending the Rights of the City upon a failing in reference to this in any person admitted to Citizen-ship the Rulers of the City have the same power to take that Right away which they had at first to give iâ— because that Right was never absolutely given but upon supposition that the person did not overthrow the ends for which it was bestowed upon him 3. The Church is such a Society in which Communion is not absolute and necessary but it doth depend upon the performance of some Conditions of which the Governours of it are the competent Iudges And that appears 1. Because the admission into the Church depends upon conditions to be judged by Pastors as in case of adult persons requiring Baptism and the children of Infidels being Baptized in both which cases it is evident that conditions are pre-requisite of which the Pastors are Iudges 2. Because the priviledges of this Society do require a separation from other Societies in the world and call for greater Holiness and purity of life and those very priviledges are pledges of greater benefits which belong only to persons qualified with suitable conditions it would therefore bee a very great dishonour to this Society if it lay as common and open as other Societies in the World do and no more qualifications required from the members of it 3. Wee have instances in the sacred Records of Apostolical times of such scandals which have been the ground of the exclusion of the persons guilty of them from the priviledges of the Christian society And here I suppose we may notwithstanding all the little evasions which have been found out â—ix on the incestuous person in the Church of Corinth As to which I lay not the force of the argument upon the manner of execution of the censure then viz. by delegation from an Apostle or the Apostolical Rod or delivering to Satan for I freely grant that these did then import an extraordinary power in the Apostles over offenders But I say the ground and reason of the exercise of that power in such an extraordinary manner at that time doth still continue although not in that visible extraordinary effect which it then had And whatever practice is founded upon grounds perpetual and common that practice must continue as long as the grounds of it do and the Churches capacity w 〈…〉 dmit which hypothesis is the only rational foundation on which Episcopal Government in the Church doth stand firm and unshaken and which in the former Discourse I am far from undermining of as an intelligent Reader may perceive now I say that it is evident that the reasons of the Apostles censure of that person are not fetched from the want of Christian Magistrates but from such things which will hold as long as any Christian Church