them should have taken to them that function as did Korah and his company there was a power unlawful in regard of person The Ministry of the word or Office of teaching in the Church is expresly forbidden to women 1 Cor. 14.35 1 Tim. 2.11 12. If then a woman should take up this work as some they say of late have done and as the Pepasians Quintillians and Maxionites are said to allow and practise * Augustine de Haeres cap. 22 27. Et Daneus in cundem there were a power in this sense unlawful Master Knox of Scotland held a woman uncapable otherwise then by extraordinary call of Civil Magistracy or Supreme rule †History of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland pag. 220. 311. So did the Jews as Mr. Selden tels us * Jo. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 812. and others conceive it simply prohibited by our Saviour unto a Minister of the Gospel by those words of his Matth. 20.26 According to these opinions if a Woman or if a Minister should undertake the Civill power however humanely admitted to it their power would be unlawful in regard of Person This is a second way of a powers lawfulness and unlawfulness Where note that under this head the person is considered in specie or in some common condition or rank for as â—o persons individual warrant or the want of it that 's reducible to the next particular Thirdly in regard of Title A power may be in it self or for matter abstracted from persons lawful and a person may be in common qualified for investure with it that is as capable to receive it as another but all this makes not this or that man a Moral power There must be put one thing more to both these to constitute an authorized or lawful and so a moral power and that is a right or title to rule This is of the nature and essence of Moral power for what is Authority but a right to Rule As private dominion or property consists in a right to employ and dispose of the thing owned so publique dominion or authority consists in a title to rule That right or title is necessary to all tenure or to Civil dominion in general or that such right in most worldly things consists in a special property or sequestration of the things from common claim and use to one or some peculiar persons it may seem too much digressive and not needful to go about here to prove For however some things by reason either of their vastness and inexhaustibleness or their joint-occupyableness by all without interruption to any are exposed to the common arbitrary and promiscuous use of every man as are the great Ocean the light the air and however at the beginning of the World and for some time after by reason of the fewness and simplicity of mankâ—nde dominion or right in respect of the objects was not reduced to distinct property yet now upon the multiplication of occupants besides the emergent pravity into which men are lapsed in most things dominion or right is stated by sequestration or peculiar appropriation and that doubtless agreeably to the law of Nature and from the dictate of right Reason and the general agreement of all men that are but sound witted and any thing moralized Yea it is delivered to us by Scripture to be the act of God The earth hath he given to the children of men Psal 115.16 he hath given it as the experience of this and all precedent ages discoverable to us tell us not to be catched up as fodder and harbor are by brute beasts in the Wilderness among whom the stronger and fiercer seize on what and where they please the weaker take only what the other leave them but under a rule of equity and right apportionated or distributed by property according to that of St. Paul He hath determined the bounds of theiâ— habitation Act. 17.26 and that of Moses When the most high divided to the nations their inheritance when he separated the sons of Ad m he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel Deut. 32.8 But to follow this Argument only with application to our particular subject Amongst the things that are subjected to property or a seqâ—estred right all authority of one person over another must neâ—ds be one yea and that more or rather then other things For though other things in the first age of the world mighâ— have been common as soon as ever matrimony or other domestick or civill societies were instituted he rights of the correlatives of these societies were distinguisht and appropriate neither could it be other ways for whereas there was possible to be a community of right or use at the beginning in things of ordinary and external possession whether moveable or immoveable yet in matter of authority this could never be It is repugnant to the nature of the thing it cannot exist without the subjection of some determinate persons to it and you must of necessity put and tie up authority and subjection in distinct and several subjects so as it may be said this man is to command and these are to obey whereupon it is inevitably to be yeelded that authority consists in a right or title to rule appropriate to one or some certain persons reserved from others That to the producing or constituting of a moral power whether Civil Magistracy or any other there must go the entitling or interesting of the persons to it or an investing him or them with a right thereto may be thus further manifest All Moral power is derived from God as the fountain or Author That which the Apostle here saith of the Civil Magistracy in specie There is no power but of God the powers that he are ordained of God is true of all power in general and he might have so expresly extended it had his scope in this place been so large Gods derivation of authority to men must needs import two things 1. His institution of authority in the general with the several species of it as conjugal parental herile magistraticall 2. His communicating conferring or conveying that power which he hath so instituted to be to particular persons There must be this latter as well as the former to the real actual constituting of an authority or putting it into existence Gods ordaining at the first the conjugal parental herile and political power that is his appointing that the husband parent master or prince shal have authority over their respective correlatives suppose by those words of the commandment Honour thy Father c. doth not of it self put any of those authorities in being or in one person more then another or it makes no man a husband father master or Prince Wherefore if we will make this good which cannot be denyed that all Power viz. Authority is derived from God we must say God doth by some act of his
Book pag. 9. and this is impossible to be or the major part must conclude the rest and against this they say The major part bindes not the whole unless either men first agree to be so bound or a higher power so commands Unto this I answer It may be supposed that each community at their first coalition either judge themselves bound by the law of nature which is a superiours command to stand to the vote of the major part or are so wise as either to constitute that or some other way of bringing their matters of publique interest unto a result obligatory to the whole Common reason will guide them to the one at least of these or rather to both for if it dictate the former it must be presumed to bring on the latter viz. either by tacite or expresse consent The dictate of right reason in materia morali I suppose must be yielded to be the appointment of nature But that the major part doth conclude the whole in those affairs the determination of which doth necessarily concern the whole untill suâ—â— time as they have setled the determination of such affaires to be by other persons or means seems to be the plain dictate of right reason For in this case the very end of a multitudes associating and becoming one Common-wealth and the being and interest of them as such is concerned that so it be 1. From a peoples becoming one society there doth result in them a faculty and interest to act some things politically all being is in order to action and every actus primus is for an actus secundus and a Political being is for Political operation and although such a body may put off its affairs to be acted not perse totum immediately but vicariously by particular organs or members yet some acts it must needs put forth immediately viz. such as conduce to the organizing of it self and such also as are necessary to its own preservation and cannot be or are not transected by others as suppose a common engine or other calamity be seising on a people destitute of or neglected by particular subsidiaries 2. In those matters that are to be acted immediately by the whole community there must be some way for them to come to a resolution and conclusion about â—hem If the concurrence of the whole multitude very numerous and vast to a single person be not at all or not ordinarily possible or likely then cannot that he the way of determination and if not that then some other there must be and what more obvious natural and congruous to reason then this that the lesser part be swayed and obliged by the greater 3. Yea what other expedient can common sense suggest but this When a thing is proposed to the determination of a multitude which requires a conclusion by them either positive or negative and there is foreseen likely or found to be a diversity of sense and vote among them 1. In case the major part consent and the minor deny the thing either the major part must carry it for the whole or the negative of the minor by their dissent carries it against the major which is against all Reason 2. And if the major be for the negative and the minor for the affirmative either the minor must be overruled by the negative of the major or standing to their affirmative they must secede and be severed into another Common wealth for to the nature of a community it is required that there be communio juris and this secession as it is unreasonable to be made by a lesser party without the others consent so it and the occasion of it admitted tends to the making void and ruining of societies This course then of the minor parts obliging the whole appearing so necessary to the acting and to the subsistence of a community why may we not conclude it in the cases and matter above specified to be the dictate of nature * Vide Grotium lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 17. 2. If the major part be allowed to conclude the whole it is next asked Idem pag. 10. How shall the whole people be assembled Here are two difficulties 1. Where all are equally interested and authorized what one or more lesse then the whole hath power to appoint time or place or give summons to the rest without which appointment it is unjust to binde the absent R. It is to be presumed this scruple is practically precluded by the peoples proceeding when they agree to become one people for who can imagine but that then they have the end and immediate necessary acts for which they joyne to be a community before them and in order to them either they forthwith make choise of the Government they shall be under and provide for a succession in it and the means by which it shall be continued or if that be not at the first instant dispatched they appoint how they shall come together or pâ—sse their resolutions on that or the like publique occasion We see there is a course to be taken for such assemblies in the polarchies that now are as in the united Provinces of the Netherlands in Venice Genoa and the rest Yea the many distinct Republiques of Germany confederate in one general interest and band as one great community have their order how to assemble and hold their publique diets as likewise have the thirteen united Common-wealths of the Switzers who upon any occasion of universal concernment have referred it to the Burgomasters of Zurich to give notice to all the Cantons to meet at Baden And in the ancient State of Rome the Consuls summoned the Senate the Senate the Assembly of the Centuries and the Tribunes the Assembly of the Tribes 2. But suppose this uncertainty setled and a diet orderly called with time and place appointed another difficulty there is which may be subdivided into two Idem ibid. 1. All cannot be present one is sick another is lame a third is aged a fourth under age besides many are women some are Virgins all these are of the people and how shall the consent of them be passed or included R. 1. These natural or personal defects are common to all mankind and apt to incapacitate persons as much or more for other humane affaires as for this which yet are not therefore argued into a frâ—stration This occasion of a peoples agreement about politique Government but rarely occurreth but when a Government is setled whether by our or by the Objectors means the dayly management of it is much more obnoxious to these impediments in the person or persons in whom it is seated and when one of them seiseth on such a subject it is prone to make a greater interruption in publique concernments then all of them are wont to do in this yet are Salvos in those cases ordinarily found out 2. We have already seen that some acts at some time must needs be admitted to flow from a politique body immediately now
what ever couple do accordingly contract are joyned together by God The same may be exemplified in the office of the Ministery of the Gospel Christ hath given commission to certain in the Church to ordain Elders and when such are accordingly ordained they aâ—e then the Ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God and are said to be made by the Holy Ghost * Act. 14.23 1 Tim. 4.14 5 22. Tit. 1.5 2 Tim. 2.2 with Act. 20.28 1 Cor. 4.1 In the natural body God is said to have given more abundant honour to that part which lacked 1 Cor. 12.24 How it is said God hath given this honour it is not by his making that part more comely then other parts for contrarily the words are spoken of those parts that by making are more uncomely and lesse honourable then the rest But in as much as we by an instinct of nature do repute some parts naturally lesse honourable and more uncomely then other and thereupon do bâ—stow more abundant artificial honour and comeliness upon them viz. do more cloath and cover them with dressings in this regard what is upon that consideration thought fit by man to be done in the distribution of honour to his natural parts in such an inequality as may fill up the natural disproportion God is said to do viz. by directing us by natures instinct to do it The Judges of Israel for those 450. years mentioned by St. Paul are said to be given them of God and to be raised up to them of God and that he commanded them to feed his people * Act. 13.20 Jud. 2.16 c. 1 Chron. 17.6 and yet we read not of any immediate particular expresse call from God given to them all or to the most of them none of them I take it can upon any evident ground be supposed to have had any such except Deborah Gideon and Sampson but a mediate call from God by men that all of them doubtless had and of Jeptha his call of this nature the text at large informs us †Jud. 10.5 from such an orderly call by men we may therefore take it to have been that they were given raised up commissioned to that people of God We all acknowledge Subordinate Magistrates to be ordained of God and many of our Commentators include them as well as the supreme in this text and Mr. Calvin Calvin in loc Spanhem Dub. Evang. part 3. Dub. 64. pag. 288. Estius in Ro. 13. Spanhemius and Estius takes those words in 1 Pet. 2.13 sent by him to refer not unto the King but to God as the sender yet those inferior Magistrates have their election and deputation from the supreme humane power but they are notwithstanding reckoned to be of God in as much as they are surrogated by them who are empowered by God to do it Our Saviour speaking of all Magistrates saith that unto them the word of God came that is Joh. 10.35 as Expositors interpret these words God hath given out to them a warrant and commission for their offices But how is that the speech certainly can have no reference to an immediate designation from God in relation to the most of them but the word of God comes to or authorizeth them who are advanced to the seat of power by men according to his word We may take this then for clear that the conveying of power from man so man may make a power ordained of God only with this proviso be it said this is not meerly because it is done by men for neither every humane action nor every act of any whomsoever in this matter can entitle this effect to divine ordination but it is because and so far forth as this is done of men by virtue of a rule and warrant from God and therefore hath the authorization and seal of God upon it Wherever therefore such a platform of Magistracy is erected and such persons are invested with it as God hath declared eligible and this by them to whom God hath committed this management and such power placed in the persons as he hath legitimated there is a power enstamped with this of the Apostle of God ordained of God And this is the sentence of Commentators on the text and others that treat on this subjâ—ct As Peter Martyr P. Martyr loc com clas 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Sometimes this to wit the creation of the power comes to passe by the consent of the Senate sometime by the suffrages of the people but these are but instruments the proper cause of Magistrates is God himself Pareus Pâ—reus in loc sub dub 3. Neither do second causes exclude the first In old time God by an immedia e call advanced some Magistrates Kings to the throne as Moses c. But the rest as the 70. Elders he by mans act and counsel placed in power and yet ceaseth not so to do and that according to the laws and custom received of every people either by the election and consent of a Senate as now the Roman Empire or by the voices of the people as the Governers of the Cities that are meerly or mixtly democratical c. Tolet in loc Toler Of God as of the first principle and cause the powers proceed although by the intervenient wils of men as heat cold and the like are of God but by intermediate second causes Estius in loc Estius The secular power is mediately of God by men who by the instinct of the law of Nature set over those of whom they may be governed in a community For this instinct is of God so that by reason thereof it may be truly and positively said that this power is not but of God Mr. John Selden Selden â— de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 108. But whatsoever by that license is constituted variously betwixt men civilly and duely according to the several formes of Government only by way of determination as the Schoolmen speak so as not to be contrary neither to the natural nor the positive law of God that also receiveth sanction and obligation according to the several qualifications of the constitution from the said law which is both naturall and divinely positive or written Willet upon the place As the fruits of the earth are brought forth by mans labour yet are Gods gifts so is Magistracy c. 2. The negative is Whatever power so named or pretended there may be or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the Power or Magistrate over a State and are not thereto appointed or therein enstated as is abovesaid that is either by special expresse revelation from God or by men proceeding upon and by virtue of a warrant or authority from God they are not a Power ordained of God This will follow upon what is said already For if it be so that to the making of a particular Power or Magistrate to be Gods ordinance there goes not only a law
Monarchy which they presuppose Adam had from God and which or any part whereof none of his posterity could have but by grant or succession from him But let this be supposed what will be gained by it to their purpose 1. Touching the universal Monarchy of Adam it will be questioned how he had or received it Whether by natural right as the Father of all or by an immediate expresse and positive grant from God 2. Besides the way of immediate and expresse grant from God which it may be supposed Adam and after him some other special persons as Moses Saul David had there must be acknowledged a mediate and ordinary way of Gods advancing of persons to authority and power which is standing general and common to all times and places And of this our controversie is I enquire therefore how this universal Monarchy of Adam passed from him unto others 1. Whether distributively and piecemeal to many that is to his sons cach a share or whole and solid to one 2. Whether it passed from him to them or any of them by his arbitrary and positive assignement or by order or law of nature as to the heir or heirs general 3. If by his voluntary assignement it passed to whom and in what proportion he pleased then the natural right of Fatherhood or Primogeniture took no place at his death carryed not the Civil power from him and so cannot challenge to convey it downwards 4. If by order or law of nature it passed from him then the question will be 1. Whether they that succeeded to him had it by right of Progenitorship that is by reason of the Fatherhood which was in them in relation to their posterity who were therefore their subjects so that upon that title every son of Adam was soveraign to the issue that came of him But then it will be said this course of deriving Supreme Magistracy could be but temporary and must needs have a stop for otherwise it would multiply Common-wealths in infinitum according to the multiplication of Fathers and confine Common-wealths to extend no further then to comprise a Father and his children which as was argued before is neither agreeable to the practise of men even from the time of Noah nor to the end of a Common-wealth which is union of a multitude of households for strength and security When therefore this course of Genarchy ceased what was the way of continuing Government 2. Or it passed from Adam by right of inherence to Adams sons as his sons and so as heirs of their Father And this is a way different from that of Progenitorship and upon this point the right of Fatherhood and that of Primogeniture are at odds and prove as to the purpose of conveying power from Adam inconsistible For if the Civil power went by Fatherhood then were all Adams sons joynt successors in it as was before said every one in relation to his posterity if it went by primogeniture but one of them could by that claim the power and this will run as upon the necessi y of having but one Monarchy over all mankind throughout all ages which was above disproved Unless we must say the first-begotten could but claim a double portion of power and then the rest of the sons had each a single part in proportion to his double But this 1. Fals again upon the absurdity even now alleadged of multiplying Common-wealths by the endlesse number of Fathers 2. Out of what or whom would you make the eldest son a double portion without depriving some other of the sons of his single part and so destroying the right of inheritance to it you could make no addition to the single share of the first born or give him dominion over more then he was superiour to by virtue of his own Fatherhood To make an end therefore with this point if the insisting on the meer natural right either of Fatherhood or Primogeniture will not beat us out a clear path for the derivation of Government from Adam or carrying it on with some justifiableness of title among men then we must return to that of voluntary agreement and grant unto which the true natural right of Fatherhood is not repugnant but may very well be reconciled yea and assistant unto the founding and continuing Civil Government Some of them that insist on the Fathers power as the only Civil Power in the world do yet place in him a right to transfer it from himself unto whom he pleaseth If this be granted then I will say the way of setling Civil authority by the agreement or consent of the governed might thus come in Suppose we Adam to have ruled as sole Monarch during his life afterward some one of his sons in succession to him or all his sons each over their own progeny as distinct societies after by the confusion of languages they being forced to sever or when those distinct races of Adam became so numerous and dispersive over many countries that they were too vast to be continued in one society they may be supposed each of them voluntarily to withdraw or part themselves into several Common-wealths and the Fathers of the families in every of these new erected Common-wealths having in them the interest of power each in relation to his children and family and agreeing together for themselves and theirs to some one as their publique civil-head or King and thus cometh in Magistracy to be voluntarily constituted in that way wherein the right of Fatherhood is preserved and continued in subordination to the Civil publique power and this put in such a way as both it and politique societies of convenient amplitude might be kept up and new ones as need should require might be erected whereas by the meer right of Fatherhood holding and exercising the power it had in relation to those only who were natural children to it it could not be no not with the supplement of Primogeniture as was before shewed And with this the Assertors of the sole right of Fatherhood are driven in a sort to comply * See the Anarchy c. p. 11. 2. I come to the second way of attaining a title to Government above proposed to consideration which is that of Conquest The jus gladii as it is understood and qualified by many Grave Learned and approved Authors I shall not here call into question But that the Sword and successe of it unto victory simply and by it self whatsoever the cause or quarrel pursued by it be or taken as it may be separate from or contradictory to the choice or consent of the people can be a sufficient and justificatory title to Civil Government I cannot yield We know how Augustine August de Civ Dei lib. 4. cap. 4. hath branded this claim with the style of Magnum Latrocinium In supply of the halts and defects which at every turn are detected to occurre in the title of Fatherhood and Primogeniture an Author of that way I even now quoted
to ordain or proceed by any laws or to take cognisance of causes by any rule it is but ad libitum without any obligation certainty or constancy only as far as stands with its own humor or interest for as its rise is its own force and appetite so its end is its proper and private accommodation and safety The Moral power to speak of it only as seated in and relating to man and more particularly that of the Civil Magistrate is a special state or function or administration amongst men It s original is not its own inherent or adjacent robiâ— or main strength but positive constitution It consisteth in not only an ability but a right to command It hath indeed de jure and should have de facto a Sword as well as a Scepter a coactive as well as a directive power the Natural power joyned to its Moral but its Moral power lyeth in its word Eccl. 8.4 not in its sword Where the word of a King is there is power Solomon saith It is its reason not its might which gives law and its reason is legislative whereas anothers is not Ratio cujuslibet non est factiva legis saith Aquinas * Aquinas 1. 2a. quast 96. artic 3. Cajetan in quaest 96. artic 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46. It s proper primary and genuine act is to prescribe guide and direct the sword is requisite to it but ex accidenti upon occasion of others pravity compulsoriness is not of its essence but an after addition to it for its preservation and efficacy †It 's probably conceived that the sword is a superaddition to the Civil power annext to it Gen. 9.6 See Dr. Hammond of Resisting c. pag. 27. It could not be from the beginning for in the state of integrity there was no use of it It never useth the sword but where equity and dignity are consemned where by reason of the subjects either vitiousness or defect of reason bare authority cannot take place The special reason of its erection by men is the proneness of some to take the advantage of their natural power to invade and the inability of others to defend themselves against such and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the â—xorbitances of Natural power in ill disposed persons and thereby to secure the community in order to the general and each ones particular good Again it doth not take the Sword in the sense of our Saviour Matth. 26.25 * Per accipere gladium intelligitur propria authoritate voluntate uti gladio Principes enim judices non accipiunt quasi a seipsis sed concesso sibi gladio a deo utuntur Cajetan Jentac 6. quaest 3. but beareth it as Rom. 13.4 that is it doth not snatch it up or wrest it from another to it self but hath it delivered It hath the Sword not only in its hand but in its commission and the Sword that it hath is not the cause but the consequent of its superiority It doth not assume or hold its authority by vertue of the sword but it assumes and holds the sword by vertue of its authority The Scepter goes before the Sword and is that which legitimates it * Potentia vero debet sequi justitiam non praire Aug. To. 3. de Trinit lib. 13. cap. 13. Observemus jus gladâ—i magistratibus esse a deo datum tanquam necessarium adminiculum nervum suae potestatis Pareus in Rom. 13.4 when it draweth the sword the difference betwixt its Sword and anothers that is armed only by natural strength is that its edge is not meerly backed with mettal or in an arme of flesh and sinews but with warrant and commission and that signed by God Let me add by way of Supplement to what hath been said to demonstrate both that there is a reall difference betwixt Power Natural and Moral and what it is this further That even in God we distinguish betwixt his Power by which we mean his arme of strength and might and his Power by which we signifie his throne of authority or Soveraign rule betwixt his power of command and his power of efficiency betwixt his working power and his legislative or willing power betwixt the power of his right hand and the power of his scepter of righteousness in the Lords-Prayer Kingdom and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power ascribed to God are distinguished and though both be natural that is essential to God yet the one we may call his Physical the other his Moral power †Vide Zanchium de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Thes 3. Arminium Dis priv Thes 22. Sect. 2. Thes 27. Sect. 2. Answerable to this twofold power in Man there is a twofold subjection one of the body only which respecteth the Natural power the other of the body with the minde also relating unto the power wich is Moral * Duplex est servitus corporis animi vis quippe in corpore in externis prohibitio autem Juris animum poâ—issinum cogit Greg. Tholos Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4. The Morall power layeth an oblâ—gation upon the conscience to it a man doth or ought to submit as of right and duty It may challenge our obedience though and where it cannot compel to it and we are to subject though there be nothing to overaw us to it and this is the property of this Power in distinction from the natural that which is but natural reacheth not the mind the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body but not a tie on the conscience What ever be the natural or armed power of one person or party above another no man is under any obligation to obey nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it if he had there could be no such thing as Moral power in the world this being as was before said for most part if not ever seated in those persons who in regard of Natural power are inferiour to them whom they should reign over If Natural power could oblige to obedience the Monarch were bound to resign his Crown to the multitude and the Senate or Parliament must receive laws from the community Every heady commotion or rout of a multitude risen up were to be submitted to and were not to be repressed the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Ephesius or to refer the plaintiffs from the present uproare to a court or lawful assembly he should have let them go on and have both submitted to and assisted them But this is absurd enough to appear so to any man the commonly received maxime is By nature men are in regard of Civill jurisdiction all equal no man a Ruler or servant to another * Hooker Eccl. posit lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26 c. Ascham Discourse c. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobs Elem. part 1. c. â— 1. So that the
commandement and the order of Gods Counsell and Providence above noted that passage concerning Josephs selling into Egypt by his brethren Gen. 45.5 7 8. 50.20 and peruse the words in the text it self There was in that event the order of justice and of that mutual love care help which God hath prescribed to Brethren broken on the part of those sons of Jacob as also that order of Gods counsell concerning Josephs preheminency above his brethren which God had declared was intended to be broken by them but the order of Gods counsel about that and other things is by his most wise potent and holy Providence therein yea and thereby kept and performed theirs is an act of selling Gods is an act of sending Joseph into Egypt their act is sinful Godâ— is righteous their act in the intent of it on their part in pernicious to Joseph Gods act both in the purpose and event of it is most eminently preservative and beneficial both to Joseph to his Father CHAP. V. SECT II. to those his sellers and to the Egyptian King and people with many others Thus the order of Gods commandment may direct one course the order of his counsel and Providence may steer quite another SECT II. What the special and proper acception of the term Ordained of God is in this text HAving thus expressed the importance in general and distinguished the several acceptions of this clause ordained of God our next work is to discern positively and particularly the purpose of it in this text There being this variety in the use of it in divers places of Scripture as it 's brought in on divers occasions the question is how we are here to take it For this my resolution is that in this sentence of the Apostle ordained of God importeth not meerly the proceeding of the things from God providentially as Providence is put to signifie Gods counsel and acting but such a being from God as carryeth in it his instituting or appointing of it by the warrant or sanction of his word law precept or commandment Although it be true and may be said that the rise the standing and the falling of every civill power is as all other occurrences in the world whatsoever are ordered and disposed by the counsell of Gods will and the hand of his acting Yet I conceive this not to be the thing which the Apostle here only or specially if at all takes in or intends but the main thing within his porpose and aime to be the asserting of Gods preceptive ordination of the Civil Magistracy My assertion then is that this Proposition The Powers that be are ordained of God is a positive declaration of the divine right property or title which those powers which are meant in and are the subject of this text have to their place of dignity and rule and to the obedience of every soul within the Civil state by virtue of the Law revealed will or warrant of God delivered in his word or otherwise promulgated And this I assert in opposition to that claim or title which some would build upon this text for such as obtain the upper hand or a prevalent possession by virtue of a meer eventual Providence understanding this term ordained of such a being of God They that would found the power upon meer eventual Providence by virtue of these words do not well agree what it is that they would build upon them Some of them understanding the words to give a title property or right to any person or persons that hold possession of the place of rule in as much as they are in by Providence Others admit the meer occupant to be an unwarranted unlawful unjust Ruler but they say he being in place by the order or ordination of divine Providence he is therefore a Power to be obeyed But my assertion stands against both these affirming this ordination of God not meerly to import a providential possession but withall and especially a preceptive institution or legislative sanction Which if it hold and be made good will infer that meer eventual Providence doth not by the authority of this text either create a title or command obedience to an unentitled power The Power which this text intends it doth justifie or imply necessarily to be a lawful enrighted or entitled power but then it bottometh this right and title not upon eventual Providence CHAP. V. SECT III. or a meer possessory act but upon the warrant of the word or law of God here called his Ordinance SECT III. Reasons to prove that Gods Ordination of the Power is preceptive or warrantative not meerly providentiall ANd this now remaineth to be proved viz. That the ordination of God in this text is an authorizing warrantative or preceptive not meerly a providential dispositive factive or operative Ordination 1. The first thing I shall say for this interpretation is that it is as far as I can observe the sense which our Divines commonly give of this word ordained in this place I shall name and refer the Reader to some Commentators upon it so taking this word viz. Beza Piscator Melancthon Aretius Willet and in him Haymo Fajus Hyperius Tolet Estius Pareus Eluathan Par and the late Annotations of our English Divines adding to them these other that citing the words occasionally so expound it Calvin Instit lib. 4. cap. 10. Sect. 5. fol. 420. B. and in 1 Pet. 2.14 Perkins discourse of conc vol. 1. pag. 527. A. Althamerus Conc. loc 179. fol. 192. B. Martyr loc com clas 4. cap. 15. Sect. 3. pag. 932. cap. 13. Sect. 17. pag. 904. Synopsi Theol. Disput 5. Sect. 17. pag. 752. Grotius De Jure belli lib. 1. cap. 2. Sect. 2. pag. 23. Jo. White his way to the tree of life cap. 3. pag. 47. Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne pag. â—8 And let me also note that our Divines do from these words fetch their main ground to prove against the Anabaptists the warrant and lawfulnesse by the word of God of the Office of the Magistrate in a Christian and over Christians which argument were void did not ordained of God here intend an authorization by the warrant of his word Some of them that make this their main ground I shall name The Harmony of Confessions in that of Auspurg Artic. 16. and in that of Saxony Artic. 23. Piscâ—â—or in locum inter observat Bucan loc 45. quest 18 pag. 856. Synops pur Theologiae Disput 50. Sect. 18 17. pag. 751. But let us passe from humane testimony or opinion unto matter of proof by Reason 2. The nature of the Power here spoken of argues this to be the sense of the words ordained of God The Power here is not a meer natural or physical but as was before shewed a Moral power Now the text undertaking to describe to us the procedure or origination of this power or to tell us whence it is viz. of God and how of him viz. by way of ordination it must
to be ascribed unto God This is it then the Power is ordained of God that is CHAP. V. SECT IV. Subsect 1. whatsoever is effective or productive of a Magistrate is derived from God Subsection 1. Ordination contains Institution and Constitution and what each of these signifies THis ordination or creation of the power must needs I conceive have in it two things The first is institution or the ordaining of Magistracy to be in the state or civil society It is Gods preceptive ordinance that men in every politique body should have and live under a Government In this act of institution may be contained not only the simple appointment of Magistracy to be but the defining also of the office or the prescribing what shall be the end and what the measure compass or bounds of its authority how the Soveraign power shall rule and be obeyed what shall be necessary or allowable for him to do and what to have The other is Constitution which is the bringing of that Institution into act and execution in particular states And this may have ascribed to it two parts 1. Specification or the determining of the special kind of Government comprehensible under that general institution or the setting down which shall be the formâ— of policy pro bic nunc or here and now in this or that state whether Monarchy Aristocracy or another And unto this Specification may be reducible the designment of the proportion or latitude which this or that magistrate shall have I shall not here enter into the dispute whether the supreme power be limitable otherwise then the general institution it self confines him But I will suppose the which is to me the more probable opinion that there is a latitude in the allotment of power by that general institution and as some things are necessary and of the essence of supreme power so other things are allowable or lawful and being so are left arbitrary and referred to the choice and agreement of the parties concerned in the constitution and these may be the subject of that designation or apportionating as may be also the several shares or measures of power which each party shall have where the supreme power is either mixt or compounded of several simple formes or is distributed into several hands 2. Individuation or the investure of the power or the assignation of it to the person or persons that shall sustain it or the concrediting and committing of it to this or that man or number of men or to one living or stock of persons in whom the designed fram of Government shall reside That these acts must necessarily go to the creating or putting of the particular power in being I think will not be questioned It remains then to shew that they are and how they are every one of them from God and by his ordination understanding ordination in this sense in which we have before construed it Subsection 2. CHAP. V. SECT IV. Subsect 2. That Institution of the Power is of God and whether by the law of Nature in mans Innocency FIrst The institution of the Power the ordaining in general that Magistracy shall be and what shall be the office power and preeminencies of the Magistrate this is with one consent acknowledged to be of God Whether its institution by God was in mans innocency or it was since his whether Magistracy be of God by the law of nature or by a positive or postnate law is not agreed upon by all learned men but most Divines as far as I observe both antient and modern Protestants and of the Scools conclude it to have been instituted of God in the state of mans innocency and to be from the light and law of nature * Vide Aquin. part 1. qu. 97 art 4. Durand in Sentent lib. 2. Dist 44. qu. 2. fol. 157. A. P. Martyr loc com clas 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Bucan loc 49. qu. 16. Pareus in hunc loc Scharp Symph Epo 1. pag. 39. Estium Willet in loc Aristot pol. lib. 1. num 8 17. And to their authority I may add that of the Prince of Philosophers and also that of the Jewish Doctors These as Mr. Selden tels us †Selden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 118 119 127. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 804. Dr. Hammond of Resol centrov Quaer 1. Sect. 7. pag. 6. deliver seven principal heads of the law of nature which they call the seven precepts of the Noachidae and the sixth of them is concerning the being of Civill Government and of obedience to it and this tenent of the original of the law of Magistracy may be confirmed 1. By this that we finde the duty of all inferiors to their superiors injoyned in the Fifth commandement of the moral law as it is generally expounded by which it must needs be presupposed that the being of superiority in every state is enacted 2. In that all nations and people that are or have been and have owned reason and morality as they have inclined to entertain civill society and communion so they have been guided to esteem it necessary to have a Government in every society and accordingly have erected and submitted to it 3. God hath as is evident by Scripture by his law of creation set other reasonable creatures as spirits in a distinction of order and superiority of some over others and there can be no reason given why it should not be so in mankind by the same original law 4. Though there appear not what use the state of integrity could have of punishment or a coercive sword yet it is not to me conceivable how there could be either distinction or communion in humane societies or actions without the commanding and leading power of some over others Subsection 3. That constitution of the Power or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God and how or by what means he doth it SEcondly The constitution of Magistracy this both as to the determination of the form and composure of the Government and as to the individuation or investure of the person is from God Yet not alwayes and in every state after the same manner 1. We read God did sometime CHAP. V. SECT IV. Subsect 3. unto the Common-wealth of Israel ordain both the special form of Government and the particular persons in whom it should reside by peculiar revelation So it was in the government of Israel by Moses Josuah Gideon Deborah Saul David and his posterity 2. But besides that way of peculiar Revelation proper to that people and those persons and such other as are in like manner mentioned in Scripture God hath another which is his ordinary and constant way of determining the special form of Goveâ—nment and designing the persons for it to wit by giving order and direction to men how to proceed in their vacancy of Magistracy and by leading and steering men according to that his order unto the constitution of it among them
questioning abolished by an act of State and our consent had been required to the said act or our oath of abrenunciation of him what should we in conscience have done On the one hand the right was confessed to be in the King on the other possession by a long accustomed usurpation was in the Pope If this were the sense of the Text meer actuall possession makes one to be the power to wiâ— that power that is of God ordained of God we should have been bound in conscience by this Text to have opposed the King and State in the same act and sided with the Pope To conclude this argument then either we must refuse this position actuall domination makes a civill power or we must allow to the Pope his Temporall supremacy both unto the reproof and condemnation of those Protestants who have cast it off and to the establishing of him in it wherever he yet possesses it by the disallowing of those that are de facto still under it to put it off and these are the fruits of this truly Popish Doctrine Shall we suppose him still to be the Antichrist the man of sin the Beast and his City to be the whore of Babylon and professe so much to be for the ruine of him under these names and yet make him so large a Grant in the matter and point which is most for his promoting and securing Subsection 3. CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 3. Argument 3. From the custome of hereditary Kingdomes accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the decease of his predecessor without actual investure 3. I Thus argue If a government by hereditary succession be lawful and in it the predecessor dying or otherwise ceasing the succeeding heire is immediately the power or the supream Magistrate without or before actual possession acknowledgment or investure by the Estates or people over whom he is the power then it is not actual possession which puts the power in being But a government by hereditary succession is lawful and in it the Predecessor ceasing the heire is the power in being without further act done by him or passed by the people or any other The first of these premisses is evident and the latter will need little proof The first part of it that an hereditary govergment is lawfull is attested by Scripture by the generall consent of Nations expressed both by lawes and practise by the lawes of this Land which have not onely setled this government but made it Treason to affirme the contrary and by the votes and pens as of other Authors so of our best Protestant Writers Divines and others unanimously asserting it And for the later that in hereditary government the successor is the power in being immediately and without more adoe upon the ceasing of his Predecessor is a poynt also generally subscribed unto * See Hooker his Ecclesiast pol. li. 8. p. 154. Chamier To 2. li. 15. cap. 10 sect 19. Treat of Monarchy part 1. cap. 3. sect 7. Stat. of 1 Jac. 1. King James his Remonstrance against Card. Perron p. 154. CHAP. VII SECT III. Subsect 4. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulnesse and usefulnesse of fundamental Lawes and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession and against encroachers upon the same 4. IF it be lawful and necessary as well as it is the universal practice of Common-wealths to make and ordain fundamental lawes constitutions and provisions about government for the upholding and continuing of it and for the transmitting and transferring of it from hand to hand whether by succession election or otherways upon the death or other change of the present Magistrate and for the preventing resisting punishing and suppressing of the violators thereof then is it not the meer in being or actual seising of rule and command which makes the power But the aforesaid course is lawful and necessary This minor I suppose will be uncontested in all the parts of it * Vide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4 sect 17. If the latter part the lawfulnesse of ordaining Laws for the risistance and prosecution of intruders and incroachers against fundamental constitutions be questioned the generality of this Nation even every one that hath participated actively in the late Wars what party soever they have led or followed have manifested their consent to it For the true state of the difference was the intrusions upon the fundamental Laws concerning the interest of government which each accused other mutually of which supposed intrusions and incroachments were in things lawful in themselves as the power of imposing taxes disposing of the Militia and interpreting lawes and the like only the interest therein which on both sides the one assumed the other denyed to belong unto him or them CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 4. was that which each of the two opposites gave out to be the cause of their debate and war For the consequence of the major that may also easily appear good For if the actual possessor be the power of God then it must needs be both unlawful and a frivolous thing to make such constitutions and being made to in force or vindicaâ—e them either by the civil or martial sword from violation and vice versâ if such Laws be lawful and necessary then meer actual possession doth not constitute any one to be the power It must I say needs be unlawful to make such laweâ— if the Word of God determine the actual possessor to be the power for the direct and proper use and formal reason of such constitutions is to inhibite all invasion upon the government or entrance upon it otherwise then according to such constitution and to disapprove illegitimate and condemn it if it be done the use then and nature of such constitutions is to crosse and thwart that which the Word of God enacteth and therefore they are in their making unlawful and unjust And it must needs be as frivolous and vain to make them For let us suppose the fundamental Laws of a Common-wealth to appoint a Prince or Senate to the Supream power but for a limited terme as for a stinted number of dayes moneths or years as the Roman Consuls the Carthaginian Kings and the Theban Boeotarchae were * Greg. Tholos Syntag. Iuris li. 18. cap. 1. sect 16 17. and at the end of the said terme that Prince or Senate should declare their will and resolution to continue still in the power and should accordingly hold it notwithstanding such fundamental Law to the contrary by this opinion such persons being actually possessed are the power ordained of God and to what purpose then should such laws be made to confine or dissolve their power by a prefixed time when they are made of what force or authority can they be And if any execution be of such Laws as if a Senate will and do sit beyond the time prescribed in the fundamental order and he or they that are
civill politick 2. His private personall and humane capacity And this distinction is grounded upon that of power before given in Chap. 1. to wit that there is 1. A naturall or physical 2. A moral power The difference betwixt those two capacities they have assigned to be that his personall private capacity in it all that he is and doth or may and can do either naturally or ethically that is by vertue of any naturall or morall power distinct from the Civill or Magistratical His politick capacity is conferred on him and exercised by the Law it is still inclusive of the Law both as it is originall and instrument of working and it signifies onely that which he is doth and may doe legally or by the Lawes of the Land The necessiâ—y and use of this distinction is to state the rise and extent of the Magistrates authority and both the ground or reason and the measure or latitude of the Subj cts obligation unto the power This distinction hath been much used by them that have defended the late Parliaments cause See it in the fuller answer to Dr. Ferne pag. 9. 16. And the answer to Dr. Fern's Reply pag. 36. The vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy pag. 27. The Answer to Doubts and Queries upon the Oath and Covenant pag. 6. Mr. Burroughs upon Hos cap. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. Yet had it not its effiction from them but was unto the very same sense delivered by our Divines before as Bishop Bilson in his true difference of Christian subjection c pag. 520. Dr. Willer Hexap 〈◊〉 Rom. cap. 3. quest 17. pag. 593. Yea the substance of this distinction hath been owned by both the Parliaments and the Royal party Yea both by Prince and People hence these generally received maximes The King hath no power in him but what is invested in him by Law The Law is the measure and bottome of the Kings power He can claim nothing but what the Law gives him He is our Liâ—ge that is legall Lord we his liege or legall Subjects Whatsoever power is exercised and is not setled by Law it is not authoritative See the Kings Declaration from New-Market March 9. 1641. Judge Jenkins Judge Jenkins saith The Kings prerogative and the Subjects liberty are determined and bounded and measured by the written Law what they are We doe not hold the King to have any more power neither doth his Majestie claime any other but what the Law gives him his vindication pag 19. Treatise of Monarchy pars 3. cap. 1. and sect 2. pag 31 32. and the vindication of that Treatise pag 58 61. This distinction and the import of it if it may passe for good as it is no lesse cleare boâ—h in â—eason and Religion then generally acknowledged doth quit and clean diâ—claim and shut out this potation and title of the possessory power and that so plainly as it is supeâ—fluous fuâ—ther to forme or draw out the argument For how can you distinguish of these two capacities in a meer possessor where is his legall civill politick capacity to wit that which is conferred on or exeâ—cised by him by the Lawes distinct from his naturall private CHAP. IX SECT VIII and personall capacity and consequently where is any ground or rise of the peoples obligation unto obedience to him as their civill power SECT VIII Argueth from the being of civill power by the law of nature 8 UPon supposal of the truth of that Position that civill Magistracy is by the Law of nature for the proof of which I have said something before * Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect 2. I would thus argue If the law of nature doth and from the beginning hath dictated that civil Government be in politick societies it must also be presumed to direct and authorize a way how in particular communities it may be erected and that way which it hath determined is to be practised and no other can unlesse it derive an expresse positive rule from God be admitted especially none that is contradictory or subversive to that now no man can reasonably imagine that meeer possession which must be ever supposed to be against the wills of the community and for the most part is in prejudice and wrong of anothers title yea which alway is by unnatural violent and dishonest meanes introduced and maintained can be by order or law of natur or otherwise then by encroachment upon and violation of it CHAP. IX SECT IX SECT IX Argueth from the generall solemn disclaim of Arbitrary Government 9 ARbitrary rule government is a thing that we to wit this kingdom generally did condemn and decry as a publique evill and in opposition to it we entred into a publique and solemn promise vow and protestation See the Preface to the Protestation of May 3. 1641. I do not in the least reprehend that action but upon it I argue If that were well and justly done then is not Arbitrary government an ordinance of God necessarily to be submitted to and maintained and that which may not be resisted On the other hand if Arbitrary government be an ordinance of God c. then were we externally extreamly out in the said action but then the question is what is Arbitrary government and wherein doth it and that government which we owned and took upon us to assert and stand for differ Doubtless arbitrary is opposed to lawful or legal or that which is setled by National convention pact and constitution The government then we have in that Protestation obliged our selves to is that established by Law and that which is otherwise and without controversie meer possessory dominion is otherwise we bound our selves from and against SECT X. CHAP. IX SECT X. Argueth from the impossibility of determining what measure of possession shall make a power 10 LAstly If possession will serve to make a power and to breed an obligation in the people to it I aske what sort size or degree of possession is it that will do it If you say partial possession will suffice I reply possession of a part cannot give title to the whole For that may at one and the same time be in divers opposite competitors as it hath been in England in our late Wars and is in every Territory where there are wars for Dominion One contrary party may be seised on one City or Province another of another within the same Common-wealth If then the title follow partiall possession it may appertain to many at once But this cannot be The intire title or interest over a Kingdome cannot be wholly in divers contra-distinct and opposite parties neither can the peoples allegiance be owing or yielded to many contrary claimers 1. It hath often come to passe that the forcible occupancy of one part of a Kingdome by one and another by another power hath been the occasion of dividing the same into severall and distinct Kingdoms or Principalities So was the Greek Empire parcelled after the death of Alexander
the Governour of Syria and upon that suppression Gabinius setled the government of the Jewish Common-wealth in another forme distributing the Province of Judea into five equall parts and appointing so many several Cities in each of them for the people respectively to belong and repair unto for justice the which course of government took so well with the Jewes that the remaining grudges at the Roman Dominion were removed The words of Josephus upon it are Joseph de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 6. The Jewes being delivered from the government of one alone were willingly governed by severall Chieftaines or Aâ—istocratically I am to adjoyne now some other Wâ—iters testimonies one of the most learned Antiqâ—aries especially in the Jewish affairs we have is Mr. John Selden And he hath purposely enquired into and professedly debated this question and he resolves it for us thus It is not obscure to be seene that in the times of the Empires of the Babylonians the Persians the Grecians and the Romans the Jewes upon their respective victories over them were soedere seu deditione subditi subjects to them by covenant or surrendring up of themselves that by vertue of the said covenants or deditions they payed tribute and they served as Souldiers under Alexander the Great And particularly in reference to the Romans he saith concerning the publique acknowledgement of the Right of the Romans by Warre and armes over this Nation the Jewes there is cleare evidence from the leagues and charters of Princes which both Josephus and Philo in the Book de legatione do hold forth And that that Nation was received of the Romans by dedition or by that league which is betwixt unequals And that the tribute which Judas the Galilean stood up to free that people from was imposed by Augustus by the law of victory and dedition And that the sedition of those Jewes mentioned Acts 5 37. who mutinied upon occasion of that tribute taxed upon them by Augustus by the law of victory and dedition was according to Gaâ—aliels speech disallowed of by that Sanhedrim or Councell of the Jewes as St. Luke relates in that story Acts 5.40 as being by the delusion of a seditious incendiary and not of God And that the Jewes had yeelded themselves unto and owned the Roman Dominion in Pompey Caesar Augustus and Tiberius ere this question about tribute-paying was proposed to our Saviour And that be from the inspection of that Denarius the coyne which upon the moving of this question and his demand to have it shâ—wen was produced raised an irrefragable argument of that dedition and from thence of their d bt of tribute-paying And that they who ex animo and really stuck at the payment of it were a seditious party dissenting from the Body of that Nation All this may be seene more at large delivered by Mr Selden * Io. Selden de jure Naturae c. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 751 c. What an act dedition is let Groâ—ius inform †Deditio sponte permittit quod alioqui vis esset ereptura Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 3. cap. 8. sect 4. Dedition is a yeelding voluntarily to that which otherwise force would extort That there was on the part of the Jewish Nation a rendring of themselves up to the Roman government yea and a covenant of fealty or subjection entred into by them upon Pompeys coming to Jerusalem in assistance to Hircanus and his besieging and taking the Temple from Aristobulus his party the opposites of Hircanus and of the greater part of that nation another of our most learned and judicious searchers of Antiquity Arch-bishop Vsher hath furnished us with divers testimonies out of History One is of Eutropius viz. Pompey passing into Jury tooke Jerusalem the Metropolis of that Nation in the third moneth killing 12 thousand of the Jewes and receiving the rest into fealty * Ad Judaeos transgressus Pompeius Hierosolymam caput gentis tertio mense cepit duodecim milibus Judaeorum occisis caeteris in fidem acceptis Eutropius Another of Orosius who speaking of Pompey saith He sendeth to the City of Jerusalem Gabinius with his Army himselfe presently following and being received of the Fathers into the City but repulsed by the common sort from the walls of the Temple he begins to besiege it and hardly tooke it in three moneths Thirteen thousand of the Jewes are reported there to be slaine The rest of the people entred into a league of subjection †Ad Hierosolymam urbem eorum Gabinium cum exercitu mittit ipse continuò subsecutus a patribus uâ—be receptus sed a plebe muro Templi repulsus oppugnationem ejus intendit c. vix tertio mense expugnavit Tredecim millia Judaeorum ibi caesa narrantur Caetera multitudo in fidem venit Orosius Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 262 263. Another testimony of the Jewes consent to the Roman authority the same Arch-bishop gives us out of Josephus which is that I cited even now of their willing embracement of an Aristocraticall government setled over them by Gabinius * Usseri Annal. pert 2. pag. 281. Another witnesse shall be Calvin who upon the Text mainly referred to in the Objection saith The authority of the Romane Empiâ—e was by common use approved and received among the Jewes whence it was manifest that the Jewes had now of their owne accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword * Romani Imperii authoritas communi usu probata receptaque erat unde constabat Judaeos ipsos jam sibi sponte legem imposuisse solvendi Tributi quia Romanis gladii potestatem concesserant Calv. in Matth. 22.19 For this voluntarinesse of the Jewish subjection to the Romans and consequently the freedome of these from usurpation in relation to them at what time our Saviour conversed on Earth among them I have more testimony of primest worth but will spare the citing of their words and shall refer my Reader to Weems Weems Exposition of the Judic Law pag. 52 53. Grotius Groâ— de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 4. sect 14. and Dr. Hammond Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth. Chap. 22. note B. the last of whom I shall have occasion to bring in by and by and unto these may be put Chamier before cited in answer to the first Objection Let us nâ—xt see what is said in this matter against the exercitation above cited and the Romans Title to Judea therein asserted by the Book called The Exercitation answered He page 51. objects against the Maccabean title by the consent of one of which Hircanus the Romans came into the Dominion of Jewâ—y But what if none of them of that race that ruled what if the last of them Hircanus had not any good title yet if the Romans had the peoples consent as the exercitation asserteth they had their claim might be good But
let us see how he avoids the Maccabean title First he objâ—cts That the Maccabees came in by force into the Kingdome when there was another King a successor of Alexander He saith but proves it not I answer him 1 It is no concluding argument of the unlawfulnesse of any power that they come in by force The question is whether that force be just or unjust whether it be a meer force or a force bâ—cked with a just title at its entrance or if it had noâ— a question will be further whether it had none subsequently conferred by which meanes though the force were unjust in its entry yet it might be absolved in its continuance from usurpative tenure But the justifiablenesse of the Maccabean armes against the Syrian Kings is commonly yeelded and assâ—rted although there may be some diversity in the way of making it out of which the Reader may see in Grotius * Grot. de jure Bâ—l lib 1. cap. 4. sect 7. For them there are rendred these reasons 1 The allowednesse of the Subjects defensive arms against their lawful Soveraign in case of exâ—ream necessity as was that of the Jewes under Antiochus This is a ground undenyable by that answer 2 But it is further to be said that at what time Mattathias the Father of the Maccabean brethren and after him his son Judas and the other in succession raised armes against and repelled the Seleucian oppressions be that was then reigning of that race Antiochus Epiphanes was an usurper the right of succession being in Demetrius the son of Seleucus the son of Antiochus the G eat and elder brother to this Antiochus And that Demetrius being now an hostage at Rome and by the Senate there detained from succeeding in the Kingdom the Jews had some occasion given them to assume the administration of the affâ—irs of their own nation especially they being now under Tyranâ— not onely as to title but as to his immâ—ne or Epimane as his style is in Athenaeus * Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 1. Roâ—â—e his hist lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 2. government And it may be noted also that this Antiochus at his end vowed to God to grant the Jewes an Autonomie that they might thence forward use their own Laws and constitutions and moreover wrote supplicatory Letters in behalfe of himselfe and his son Antiochus whom he left to succeed him to pray and beseech their fidelity to them both †Vide Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 47. and 2 Macc. 9 13 c. 2 As for the freedome of the Maccobeans Dominion in reference to their own Nation Josephus gives very clear testimony of the J wes election and admission of them and in particular of the fore-leaders of them Mattathias and his sons * Iosâ—ph de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 1. Et Antiqu. lib. 13. cap 1 11. 2. He questions whether the High Priest were capable both of a Crown and Mitre wherein some say he was a pattern of Antichrist To this blur of typifying Antichrist it may be replyed Antichristianisme is now grown a very common and stale imputation many having applyed it to any thing which they please to asperse 2 It 's strange that under the Law not only Christ but Antichrist should have his types 3 How will he make it apppeare that to weare both a Crown and a Mitre is a property of Antichrâ—st that is that it doth competere to him and to him with his types alone 4 It is certain Christ is both King and Priest and so in their modell are all Christians The Maccabees then if in this they must be typicall being they were such faithful and pious as well as magnanimous persons might rather be construed presidentiall in this good then in so soule an application 2 But to his question let the examples of Melchisedech Eli Samuel and Jehoiada who sure were no patterns of Antichrist be considered as to the lawfulnesse of the conjunction of civill regiment with the Priesthood Yea I presume upon better enquiry it will be found that temporall power to wit the judgement of civill causes was the ordinary investure of the Priesthood of Aaron by institution * See Deut. 17.8 9 10 11. 19.17 2 Chr. 19.8 9 10. And certainly the Priests that were either presidents or members of the Jewish supream Councel or Sanhedrim were interested in such a power 3 As for the pomp or honour of a Crown or Kingdome the former Maccabees never assumed it The first that did it was Aristobulus say some Alexander his brother and next successor say others the latter was father to Hircanus from whose hand the power passed upon Pompeys victory to the Romans and the said Hircanus sate High Priest nine years ere the Kingdome came to him which he had not enjoyed three moneths say some †Montaâ—us Apparatus 6. Sect. 24 25 26. pag. 229. Lightfoot of Temple cap. 4. sect 3. pag. 29. when the difference brake out betwixt him and his brother Aristobulus which was the occasion of calling in the Romans by Hircanus and his party and so of their soveraignty there 2. He alledgeth The covenant made betwixt Hircanus Aristobulus importing that the latter should command the Kingdom the which disinabled Hircanus forgiving away the Kingdome after to Pompey Answ 1. Hircanus indeed forced by Aristobulus yielded him up the Kingdome by such a covenant but the Chieftaines of Judea not consenâ—ing after set up Hircanus again upon d slike of Aristobulus and by the assistance of Aretas the Arabian King first and then of Pompey recovered it from him * Vide Iâ—seph Antiqu. lib. â—4 cap. 1 2 7 8. And Pompey before his coming in was sought unto by both those parties to determine the controversie betwixt them †Vide Usseâ—i Annal. part 2. pag. 249 250. 163. Upon which he adjudging for Hircanus and taking up his cause joyned with him and his party in the oppugning and suppressing of Aristobulus 3. He excepteth against the Roman Title by surrendâ—y of Hircanus to Pompey upon that maxime a King cannot passe away his Kingdome without their consent This position is a truth acknowledged by Staâ—esmen * See K. Iames his Remonstr c. p. 207 208. The â—rraignment of the powdâ—r-Trâ—tytors in the Earl of Norâ—hampt speech pag. 273 309 314. Widdâ—ing Theolog. Disput adm to Reader sect 10. and others save that some distinguish of a constitutive and a patrimonial Kingdome and deny it of the latteâ— and from thence is voided his nâ—xt preceding objection of Hircanus his covenant which for this reason could be no obligation to the people or bar to the Romans title coming in against Aristobulus Neither doth the exeâ—citation at all inf inge that maxime by founding the Roman claim upon Hircanus his sole act for it expresly takes in and brings proof of the consent of the Nation Which proof now comes in to be defended against this Answerer 4. He alledgeth the words of
one or more to be such a power there will be necessary a knowledge or evidence of his or thâ—ir just title or orderly call But this may suspend or bring in question the owning of any civill power that is ordinarily to be found to be of God as his ordinance and will make it a very hard matter to avow or take any to be such For 1. It cannot be expected that the common people shâ—uld be able nor requisite that they should busie their beâ—ds to look into the justnesse or legality of their Soveraigns title entry or tenure of his power or should be perfectly acquainted with the ancient Lawes or Histories yea or the present transactions which concern the disposall of Crowns and Scepters 2. Divers governments are of a succession or descent so ancient that their first root or rise cannot at all or can but dubiously be discovered or determined by the learnedst Antiquaries Besides the certainty of the doings of former ages will be still in regard of the imperfection and partiality of Authors of story dubitable Yea the truth equity and reason of what is but emergent and acted in our own time is often in State-affairs of a dark and intricate appearance 3. Most or many governments that now are in being are by Histories tainted with violence or other indirect meanes of getting up at their first erection and yet they are accounted and passe for powers truly authorized and to be of God as his Ordinance Answ This objection raiseth difficulties of some shew but little strength It is in this respect in the holding of Thrones and publique authority as it is in private possessions and patrimonies There are few or none holders of lands or hereditaments that can make out an originall title to them The usuall titles by which the present owners of them do stand upon descent purchase or gift are but derivative they do not as such properly bottom a title but convey or transferre it They cannot create a right or constitute a thing just onely they transfer or convey the same title which the Ancestor seller or donor had the which what it was in it selfe in point of justice is notwithstanding the conveyance or change of the person possessing still qâ—estionable and is to be determined by some other way And the wayes of stating the justnesse of pâ—ivate p ss ssions whether moveable or immoveable especially if of any durable and ancient tenurâ— seem to be altogether under as great obscurities intricacies and dispuâ—ablenesse as are those by the objection attrâ—buted to publique places yea to some more obscurity in as much as the originall seisures of these have not the memorials and recognitions taken of them which the publique have But though this be generally the state and account which can be given of mens titles to their possessions now adayes and so hath been of others before time out of mind yet no man scruples his ancient patrimony or his late purchase or grant upon this score and on the other side neither may therefore any say there is no such thing as honesty or justice in the concernment of a mans tenure actuall possession or occupancy is enough nothing is to be regarded as requisite to ones becoming or discovering the true owner of an estate or goods but present possession No this would make mad work both in the consciences and in the dealings of men But notwithstanding all the darknesse that is upon the originall of titles and all the inevidence or disputeableness of subsequent contracts or conveyances every man is bound to see to his just and righteous holding of his estate and goods Micah 2.1 and woe to them that practise iniquity because it is in the power of their hand Tell me then how you will exâ—ricate an honest-meaning conscience from the pinch of the obligation to equity on the one hand and the obscurity of the matter of fact on the other in the case of a private possession and this will facilitate the clearing of most that is in the objection Thus the case as I take it is commonly to be resolved It was a true Mâ—xime Quod non disprobatur praesumitur Where no wrong appears we may ordinarily take it to be right And again In re dubiâ potior est conditio possidentis Continued possession is a title when it cannot be evicted or where the beginning is uncâ—rtain There is security enough in holding that which comes to my hand and continues in it without detection of injury If a possession have run in a right current as farre as the notice of him whose conscience is concerned in it can reach there is usually a satisfactory or acquiescive title and he that hath a thing so is called bona fidei possessor an honest owner The truth is that which the Civilians call Vsucapio or praescriptio to wit an immemorâ— l usage or an occupancy good as farre as humane knowledge in looking back can goe stands up in stead â—f an originall title where that is out of ken Not because such a possession may ever be positively concluded to have been originally right but because nothing to the contrary doth appear and therefore reason dictates if any thing this must passe for right It being to be supposed that the thing possessed either hath come down from the first Proprietor to this hand by a clear transmission or if any diversion hath been unwitting to this occupant the right owner letting it passe so long unclaimed hath laid aside his title and given his consent to that alienation of it And thus I conceive the aforesaid uncertainties which are usually attendant upon the discovery of the positive ground or rise of civill right whether publique or private are ordinarily avoydable so as on the one hand they shall not impose any reall cause of perplexity to the conscience on the other they may not be drawn to patronize the neglect or overthrow of justice or order in present transactions or to shelter what is manifestly and evincibly wrong The errour of an act or possession which lyes hid and buried in ignorance or oblivion Casuists with one consent absolve as being involuntary and therefore inculpable Concerning this I shall onely relate the resolution of a Casuist of our own and well approved and the rather because his words touch the special matter we are upon as to the objection It is Amesius * Si quis rem aliquam suam esse bonâ fide judicet cum sit aliena conscienti â dictante potest ac debet eâdem uti ut suâ Si quis bonâ fide eum judicet esse suum Magistratum qui est Tyrannus vel eum esse legitimum magistratum qui titulum illum falso sibi vendicat obedientiam debâ—tam tenetur ipsi praestare Ames de consc lib. 1. cap. 4. sect 7. Vide etiam Grot. de jure Bel. lib 2. cap. 4. sect 5 c. CHAP. X. SECT IV. If a man without collusion or in
this Messala Corvinus returns this Answer to Caesars Encomiastick Tu me Caesar sâ—mper sectae partiumque invenies meliorum justiorum q. d. Whoever is the upper thou shalt ever finde me the friend and follower of the better and juster party The other is that of the honest and excellent Poet Juvenal who thus whips the sordid servility and compliance of the Roman common people in reference to prevalent successe Sed quid Turba Remi sequitur fortunam ut semper Juvenal Satyr 10. et odit Damnatos Idem populus si Nurscia Thusco Favisset si oppâ—essa foret sâ—cura senectus Principis hac ipsâ Seianum diceret horâ Augustum But what way goes the Roman rout they own Or ' bandon Princes still as up or down The wheel of Fortune bears them for if she The Thuscan Sâ—ian favoured had even he That first Tibeâ—ius minion was and then His Rivall and his jealous master fallen The crafty Fox Tiberius at this hour Their crie had been Sejanus Emperour CHAP. X. SECT VIII SECT VIII Three other Enquiries spoken to viZ. Whether the power of a meer possessor may not be made use of whether subjection to it be not lawfull or necessary and if it be whether the subjects conscience or practice be at all concerned in the justnesse or the unjustnesse of the power that is over him IN the eighth place there comes in this threefold question 1. But may not some use be made of and recourse had to a meer possessory power for the obtaining of politicall râ—dresse and safety 2. Is not subjection to him lawfull or necessary 3. And if so then is it not all one as to the subjects conscience or as to his performance of obedience whether the power be just or unjust be the ordinance of God or be the presumption and inâ—rusion of man I answer 1. For the first quaetie Such is the necessity of order justice and place and such is every mans title and interest in them that there is no scruple I know to be made of accepting or seeking them at the hand of any who may reach them out to us though he that conveyes them to us be not interested in the umpirage of them yet are we and every man is interested in the benefit and use of them And though one may not perswade assist or consent to any to take or appropriate to themselves the publique place or office of administration of them to the community that is not thereto lawfully called and authorized yet of them that have unduly possessed themselves of that place and do exercise the same they that are under them may request both in reference to publique concernments and to private that the administrations which they have assumed into their hands and are resolved to hold may for their matter and use to others be just and profitable This I finde resolved without dispute * Cajetan Summul Tit. Rempub. Tyran Navarri Compend Tit. Tirannus The Exercitation concer Vsurp Powers cap. 3. pag. 23. 2. And for the next It is also easily admitted viz. That submission and complyance with a meer occupant may and in divers cases ought to be Such may be the warrantablenesse or the goodnesse either in point of profit or of morall duty of the things that obedience or complyance with the commands of a superiour in them will heare a commission either of lawfulnesse or of necessi y. 3. But then it must be said It is not therefore all one as to the Subjects either conscience or act of obedience whether the power be just and of Gods ordination or it be unjust and of mans prevarication For there is a difference to be put betwixt the submission yieldable to the meer possessor and that which is payable to a right authority And the difference may be observed in more respects then one 1. There is a difference in regard of ground or in the reason or consideration upon which it is yeelded We are to render obedience to a reall authority or to a lawfull power or potentate as owing or due to him It is his right and it belongeth to him up n the account of strict justice the people are under that obligation to him which we call Allegiance and by reason of it we call them his Liege people and him their Liege Lord. Liege is as much as legall and Allegiance imports a bond of obedience by vertue of the law and it may referre either to the ordinative law of Gâ—d or to the constitutive law of man But to the meer occupant there is no such â—ye in acts of submission to him it is the matter prescribed and not the precipient that obligeth or it is not the commander or his commanding but the condition of the commanded which is the rise or reason of this subjection Or yet more distinctly people may be led â—o obey such by force of other considerations besides Allegiance to them and those may be either the more generall morall ones common to this with other cases such as are the lawfulnesse of the thing to be done in its own nature or the coincidency of another just and obliging authority and command with that of the occupants or 2. And therewithall such as are peculiarly arising from that state of subduednesse as the necessity that is incumbent to do or part with the thing required for the avoidance of a greater loss or suffeâ—ing to come if the subject detrect that or the greater conveniency safety or emolument which there is to ones self to his neighbour or to the publique in doing then in denying as the circumstances of the imposall lye though weâ—e it not so imposed it would not be eligible Though we aâ—e obliged to nothing jussu ejus or upon the intuition of his command yet we may doe many things ea jubente he commanding and shouâ—d doe eo prememe he enforcing them and we have many things to doe ipso seu volente seu nolente whether he will or forbid the doing of them This difference in the ground the Reader may finde set down by H. Grotius de Jure B. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 15. And by the paper of Dr. Sanderson printed by a Replyer to it in defence of Mr. Ascams Discourse And by Mr. Burroughs upon Hosea Chap. 1. Lect. 3. pag. 65. and Lect. 4 pag. 111. And by the Author of the Observations upon Aristotles Politiques pag. 46 ad sin And by the Exercitation conc usurp powers cap. 3. pag. 22. 2. There is also a difference in regard of the extent of the subjâ—ction and that 1. In relation to the acts or attributions which the subjection reacheth to Whatsoever duty we owe immediately to Gâ—d whatsoever is due from us to the publique safety or weal whatever act of justice or of charity is owed to another whatsoever is an office of our station or place or which we have any other way a call unto whatsoever is within the rule of the vertuous