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A84011 The survey of policy: or, A free vindication of the Commonwealth of England, against Salmasius, and other royallists. By Peter English, a friend to freedom. English, Peter, a friend to freedom.; Pierson, David. 1654 (1654) Wing E3078; Thomason E727_17; ESTC R201882 198,157 213

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That by the Law of Nations they understand an Universal Statute and general Sanction as it is contradistinct from the Civil Law you also gain just nothing for your pains 1. Because in such a notion the Law of Nations is not the proper and immediat opposit of the Law of Nature So it is properly and immediatly opposed to the Civil Law as Justinian out of Caius abundantly cleareth for as he opposeth Digest lib. 1. tit 1. loc 1. the Law of Nature to the Law of Nations so loc 9. and Inst. lib. 1. tit 2. loc 2. he contradistinguisheth the Law of Nations from the Civil Law In the one he taketh the Law of Nations as being the immediate opposit of the Law of Nature and in the other as being the proper opposit of the Civil Law 2. Because both Ulpian and Justinian in the forequoted places do call the Law of Nations a thing common amongst men But by your leave if we take a narrow view of the Law of Nations we shall find it rather particular then general it being taken as immediatly opposed to the Civil Law for so it is taken in a strict and rigorous acceptation And such Law hath greatest footing when Monarchy and the governing power is universal And whereas Mr. Prate alleadgeth That by servitude is understood slavery and tyranny he is far in the wrong to Ulpian and Justinian They mean no such thing 1. Because Justinian calleth Liberty a natural faculty enclining to that which any man pleaseth to do unlesse it be obstructed either by strength or Law In which we mark two things that make much for us Firstly Liberty is referred to the natural faculty of the Will So Aristotle defineth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lib. 6. Polit. Now no Government can be called the natural faculty of the Will or any power of the Mind Secondly Liberty is opposed not only to force and violence but also to Law and Ordinance These two things do absolutely distinguish the reason of Liberty from Government in so far as it is taken for natural liberty Now Justinian to the definition of Liberty subjoyneth the definition of Servitude But by your favour why may not I with far better reason say That Justinian taketh Servitude for Government then you can alleadge him to take it for slavery and tyrannous authority for as he defineth Liberty it is uncompetent both to lawful and unlawful authority If Government be natural the Liberty of which Justinian speaketh is no waies competent to it He speaketh not of natural but of morall liberty 2. Because Ulpian and Justinian call Servitude constitutie juris gentium But my friend what Ethnick much lesse Christian would have called tyranny constitutio juris and not rather constitutio non-juris Shew me another place where they take jus gentium abusively in a catachrestick signification 3. Albeit we should yeeld this to Mr. Prate yet should he no whit encroach upon the main purpose in hand for it is abundantly cleared that they understand all men by nature to be born free Jure enim naturali saith Justinian omnes homines ab initio liberinascebantur Just lib. 1. tit 2. loc 2. Thence was it in the golden age both before and after the Flood they knew nothing but fatherly government and filiall subjection Jerome also in this sideth with us He calleth Liberty a faculty of living according to pleasure But as government restraineth the Will so Nature giveth it liberty sweetly concurring and conniving with it Furthermore he sheweth how that Liberty is naturall both from the subject and object of it De Reg. inst disc lib. 5. Conclus 2. Nature per accidens and in a secondary way intendeth government The reason of this is clearer then the light for in the state of corruption Nature lieth between two straits Either it must be altogether beslaved to the predominant tyranny of it's corruption or else patiently submit it-self to Government 's yoke Thereby it mindeth to redintegrat that which by Corruption it losed It knoweth that it would be overcharged by the super-dominion of lording lusts if it did not come under the reverence of government It chooseth rather to take it's hazard of subjection to a friend then become captive to a foe and alwayes remain his prisoner Thus it no otherwise mindeth government but as in the case of fallen man it cannot be secure nor preserved from the rage of lust without it Therefore Writers do very pertinently call it naturall Arist Pol. 1. cap. 2. Ulp. Inst lib. 1. Just Dig. lib. 1. tit 1. loc 1,3,4,5,6,7,9 Inst lib. 1. tit 2. loc 1. and 2. And the Lawyer Vasquez in plain terms faith that same which we do Illustr quast lib. 1. cap. 41. The Law faith De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus 1. sin ad med C. de long temp praest I. This being done you may abundantly learn herefrom what man's condition is in the state of perfection integrity 'T is a condition altogether unliable to any Politick subjection It rendereth all free unsubjected to government Yet we must not think that it giveth man immunity and exemption from the Morall Law That were a giving him power above his duty Thus he should be rendered an out-law But in the state of integrity man was most strictly engaged to all the duties of the Morall Law He was obliged to perform them under pain of highest censure He was answerable then to no humane Judicatory but only to the Judge of judges His case was such that he needed no governours to hedge-in his ways He needed nothing for that but his own nature It 's integrity and perfection was the best governor and government But since the fall Man is become exceeding labill and standeth in need of many things which he did not before Since the fall he is obliged no lesse then before it to observe GOD's Law And though before the fall he was free and subject to none but to GOD yet now he cometh under Tutory Before the fall he needed no Tutors having wit enough then to govern himself But since the fall he is become infirm and ignorant and standeth now in need of Tutors to help his infirmities And the best Tutor he can have is government Now tell me which of the governments is best No question that which advanceth him neerest his first and primary condition Nature no otherwise intendeth government but as it contributeth in some measure or other to make up what it hath losed in the state of corruption And as it hath losed integrity so likewayes liberty It had both these in the state of perfection Well will any deny but of all goverments Democracy is most for liberty Monarchy and Aristocracy draw people's liberty within a narrow compasse In the one the whole liberty of the people is devolved upon one and in the other upon some few Thus the liberty which Man had in the state of perfection is extreamly eclipfed It denieth his
of Man's living Lib. de temp So faith Mnes Phoen. Damasc 97. histor and likewise Ovid. Metam lib. 1. But Fabius Pictor nobly storieth to this purpose saying That in the golden age there was no Kingly Government because then the desire of governing had not entered any man's breast De aur see c. lib. 1. In the interim observe concerning the duration of this golden age there are different opinions Some who alledge Ninus to have been the first that usurped authority and government do reckon it to have lasted 250. years So Mnes bist lib. 97. Xenoph. de aquiv. Por. Cat. ex lib. origfrag Pict de aur sec lib. 1. These again who alledge Nimrod to have been the first King and erecter of government after the flood alledge it to have endured 131. years Beros an t lib. 4. Whom both Manetho and Metasthenes do follow But Archilochus halteth between these two opinions Yet we incline to the judgement of Berosus and the Caldean Writers Therefore seing immediatly after the Flood 131. years Noah was honoured by all as a common father no question all power was devolved over upon him And that not onely because of his paternall priviledge which he had over them all but also because of his personall endowments wherein he exceeded all his posterity at that time Therefore nobly saith Fabius Pictor that because those who commanded them were just men and devouted to Religion they were called and esteemed as Gods for then saith he they did not depart from the Law whether the governours or the governed All then of their own accord did hold that which is good either without fear or constraint Shamesastnesse governed the people and Law the Princes De aur sec lib. 1. But by the Princes he doth not understand Kings or politick Governours As you may find it above-written he saith in terminis that at that time there were none such Therefore by Princes he understandeth the chief Fathers and the heads of the chiefest Families As Noah his sons and his sons sons Whom indeed these E●hnick Writers which before we have often already cited call and hold as Gods Philo-Judaus giveth us a very large and expresse Catalogue of these Princes and chief heads of Families at that time Bibl. ant lib. what can we say of Noah who was thesather of al but that he was also the chief and head of all Whereupon we need not fear to conclude but Noah then had a vast and absolute power And this may be considered two wayes in respect of the object of his power 1. In respect of good And so I do not think but he had a power without al limitation to order and govern every thing in an orderly and beseeming way Firstly because he was the common father of all and by nature it-self had the precedency over them Secondly the case then was extraordinary for at that time he was the only man who best knew how to order and govern affairs Men at that time were little or nothing acquainted with Lawes and constitutions Knowledge and Learning were but in their beginnings then Therefore the ignorance of these times necessarily called them to take the word at Noah's mouth who was extraoidinarily endowed with grace and knowledge from above None like him in his time All the rest weak and ignorant in respect of him Therefore seing he had the precedency before all not onely in respect of nature but also in respect of gifts and graces and not onely so but likewise all stood in need at that time of information from him no question all the reason in the world maketh for an absolute power in Noah in respect of every good thing Thence it is storied of him that he went abroad from Country to Country planting Colonies and ordering things wherein GOD's honour and the peoples weal were concerned 2. In respect of evill Indeed I will not say that such a Saint of GOD as he did take on him a power to rule at randome and according to his heart's lust I conceive indeed he took upon him an absolute power to govern according to Law but not against Law Neither did he take on him such a power because he delighted to govern and to be above others No verily But because he was necessarily called to govern so Both the precedency in respect of nature and likewise in respect of gifts as also the weakness and ignorance of the times called him to over-rule all according to Law with a vast and full power His government was extraordinary and by necessity And therefore we can conclude no ordinary government from it absolutely to govern according to Law devolved-over upon the shoulders of one man or of some few Much lesse can there be concluded therefrom a power of governing contrary to Law without all bounds of limitation Albeit I make it no question whether Noah took upon him an absolute power of governing whether against or according to Law yet do I think it very probable that none at this time would have taken it upon them to have judged him accused him or condemned him 1. No question drunkenness is punishable by Law But we hear of none that did so much as rebuke him for it but wicked Cham who therefore derided him and was therefore accursed 2. He was the common father of all at that time 3. Of all at that time he was the most reverend wise and eminent 4. They knew little what it was to hold Affizes and call Consistories All which move us to apprehend that none at that time would have dared to judge him even albeit he should have desired them David far inferiour to him wanting many priviledges over his People which Noah had over his in the golden age notwithstanding both his adultery and murder was spared and over-leaped by the Sanhedrin So Solomon was not judged by it notwithstanding his idolatry and multiplication of wives horses which were punishable and inhibited by Law And yet Solomon had no such priviledges over his people as Noah had over his posterity And I do verily beleeve that the emency of David and Solomon and because they were extraordinary persons moved the Sanhedrin to spare them Yea it is to be considered that such eminent men do not fal through a preposterous and malignant humour but through an extraordinary desertion of God for noble and high ends best known to God himself No question this hath been taken to heart by the Sanhedrin And this being conserred with the eminency and singularity of the men hath carried the Sanhedrin by from insticting punishment upon them I shall not stand to dispute whether they did this de jure or not But sure I am as they did it de facto so they-have been much moved thereto from pregnant considerations of the men's personal endowments And for my self though I think a David subject to Law yet would I think it a great temptation to me though as Judge to sentence such a man with
according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred because of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the species and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 1 2. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the city and all the publick matters whether at home or abroad thus the man speaketh of a governing power but arbitrary power is a misgoverning power he speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things but arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things it doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasibero there were not an all-commanding power according to Law This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent It is a fallacy ab homonymia for there is a twofold all-commanding power one according to and another above Law 'T is therefore a poor shift to conclude an arbitrary power from an all-commanding power The original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth bear an arbitrary power only by way of analogy and it is known that the Roman Dictator had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power though not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Well let it be so that Aristotle saith That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power a power above Law But I pray you what kings then doth he understand Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies or the after-Heroes and Founders of the secondary Colonies If of the first kind ergo you gain just nothing We have granted that already Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary If of the second kind we might also therein take you by the hand Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this ibid. Therfore howsoever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species I lose nothing If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power according to Law then do I gain my purpose And if you suppose his meaning to be otherwise you learn from what foregoeth that I lose nothing Thus the case is extraordinary And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary Yet you cannot deny but the first second third and fourth or the former part thereof Species of Monarchy do not speak a word of Royal power above Law Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning to put this sense upon them In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times which he expresseth in the latter part thereof But the one being opposed to the other if we speak rigorously and properly by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age which after the flood Ethnick Writers know no time before the flood lasted as some say 250 years and as others say with better warrant 131 years All which time if we speak properly and rigorously there was no kingly government at all for as is shewed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick In qua nullo ferente legem natura ipsa vivebatur Mnes Phoen. Damasc lib. 97. bist
restoreth us nearest thereto without all controversie is simply best In making good the Assumption we lay-down these two Conclusions Conclus 1. No man by nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government Firstly If Nature tied man formally and in an antecedent way to Politick subjection we demand Whether or not in such respect it layeth bonds of subjection upon all men If it doth then Kings no les●e then subjects are tied by Nature to jurisdiction 1. Because that which agreeth to a thing formally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also competent to it universally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. If Kings were not also subjected to Authority by nature it would inevitably follow all men and not all men were subjected to it Which is implicatory If not then it followeth That some men by nature formally are born subject to Authority and some not Both which are repugnant for if Nature as Nature subjecteth man to Authority it giveth exemption to none more then to another Otherwise you shall either admit a simple contradiction or else you shall deny all men to be natural Therefore of neccssity the Royallist must either admit all men according to Nature to be born free or else both King and People by Nature to be born subject to Government He must either admit the one or deny the other also Which he proudly affirmeth See what Philosophy this is Man by nature is formally born subject to Government So will the Royallists have it This will be the Conclusion Ergo man by nature is not formally born subject to Government A plain contradiction indeed The reason is If nature subject man formally to Government then it subjecteth all men thereto And if all men I demand Whether or not doth nature subject one to another If it doth ergo either committitur circulus or else one by nature is not subjected to another Otherwise all according to nature are not subjected thereto as is shewed to be If not ergo none by Nature are borne subjects for so by Nature there is none to whom they are subjected Non. entus nulla sunt accidentia Therefore it inevitably followeth either all to be born free or else all to be born subjected to Government and not to be born subjected thereto Secondly If Nature laid formal bonds of subjection upon Man to Politick Authority we judge it very strange how there have been and may be many families and societies of men void and free of such subjection We can scarcely think that the interveening of any accidental cause could obstruct the current of such a formal stream of Nature from issuing and streaming forth its formal effect We can hardly digest it how Nature formally bending its strength to produce Politick subjection doth not also erect Government amongst Beasts and subject one of them to another See we not by experience how natural predominants do alwaies produce effects suitable to their temper Why may we not then with as good reason alleadge that Nature producing Government and subjection to Policy would have also through its natural sourse drawn all natural creatures to the erecting of Government and Policy amongst them How cometh it to passe I pray you there is not King-Lion King-Eagle King-Elephant c. Thirdly If Nature formally tied some men to subjection and formally derived power of governing and reigning to others then the constitution of Judges and Governours would be a formal and natural act Physically and formally flowing from Nature's principles not contingently but necessarily Which taketh away the freedom of God Deut. 17.1 Sam. 12. Ps 75. and Dan. 4. in setting-up Governours and Rulers according to his pleasure excluding all formal and physical necessity from Nature And not only so but also it solloweth that both Rulers and ruled are eternal and unchangeable Which is repugnant both to Experience and Reason The Gymnosophists and Indian Philosophs did enact it by Law That all by Nature were free-born and none were servants but to be of equal authority and alike dignity Diod. Ant. lib. 3. cap. 10. Dionysius Halicarnassius saith In all men the desire of liberty is innate Lib. 5. 6. Julius Caesar averreth All men study to liberty Lib. 2. 3. de bel Gal. And Gregory affirmeth All men by Nature to be free whom Nations have subjected to bondage 12. quaest 2. The Law speaketh much for us in this and in positive terms saith what we affirm L. manumiss F. de just jur Lib. 1. digest tit 1. lib. 1. Inst tit 5. Ulpian Justian distinguish between the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations The one is particular only relating to man the other is general relative both to man and beast Ulp. lib. 1. sect ult Just dig lib. 1. tit 1. Inst lib. 1. tit 2. But I pray you Wherein can the Law of Nature be common both to man and beast if you affirm Nature to have laid strait bonds of subjection upon one to another We find by experience that Lions are not subject to King-Lion Boars to King-Boar Eagles to King-Eagle And so you annul this community of the Law of Nature to Man and Beast if you understand subjective authority formally to flow from Nature They do as yet more clearly difference these Laws calling the one slavery and the other liberty Ulp. lib. man D. Just dig lib. 1. Hence Ulpian Inst lib. 1. and Justinian Dig. lib. 1. say That all by Nature being free-born Manumission to Nature is unknown It is the consequent of servitude according to the Law of Nations See also Just Inst lib. 1. tit 5. Whence is it out of Florentine he defineth liberty from Nature and servitude from the custom of Nations Dig. lib. 1. tit 5. Where liberty is expresly opposed to Government and Authority The one is called humane constitution and the other Nature's birth But the Lawyer Prate would make us beleeve by the Law of Nations Ulpian and Justinian do understand a humane universal Law and Sanction and by servitude praedure and tyrannous form of Government And so faith he the Law of Nations must not alwaies be opposed to the Law of Nature as Livius saith Neither must we think faith he that all Civil Constitution is contrary to Nature but such as draweth the subjected into slavery The Lawyer Baldwin seemeth to take him by the hand whileas he calleth the Law of Nations the particular Law of Nature But the man com in Justit Inst lib. 1. 2. seemeth neither to be much for it nor much against it Nay but Mr. Prate wresteth Ulpian and Justinian their meaning for if the Law of Nature were taken by them for any humane Law then should humane Law be common both to man and beast Do not they say the Law of Nature is common to both Therefore you shall either conclude beasts to be men and affected with humane faculties or else you shall restrict your universal within the bounds of a particular But if you shall say
Law-principles in point of suit may be reduced as is known to all skilful Lawyers Posit 2. Intail is a corrupt title of Claim For it hath no ground either in Nature or in Reason but only in the circuit of a prodigal humour for perpetuating a Name which is but grasse and the glory thereof as the flower that fadeth Thus the perpetuating of the Line in the person of the eldest son by vouchsafing the whole substance on him is no lesse unjust then prodigal Posit 3. Jure divino upon the accompt of Divine Right all Pleas ought to be composed according to Conscience and Reason without all respect to any Platform of humane Law So it was in the Primitive Institution of the Jewish Common-wealth 1 Special care was had to establish such Judges in it as were men of Conscience and Religion Exod. 18.22 25. Deut. 1.13 15. Who were to judge the People as did Moses making them know the Statutes of GOD and his Laws in judging Pleas between one and another Ex. 18.16 2 Because as they were to judge no other Judgment but what was GOD's Deut. 1.17 so they were to judge only for the Lord 2 Chron. 19.6 Posit 4. The Rigour of the Law is great injustice although the Process be secundum allegata probata For Nimium jus nimia injuria I might instance a hundred cases in which the peremptoriness of the Law is either too intense or too remisse Posit 5. Though the Law were never so just in it self it can never be justly executed a Platform being observed men not being left to their own freedom in judging Because a Platform can never be pleaded without Interpreters Who I pray shall interpret Not the Judges for they cannot both judge and plead Hoc opus hic labor est Not the ignorant Pursuers and Defenders for ignoti nulla cupido far less intellectio Therefore it only remaineth that skilful Lawyers be employed And then be sure of heavie burdens which they themselves will not touch with one of their fingers And thus a Platform's abrogation is the Law 's reformation Otherwise it is but verberatio aëris Posit 6. To day the only best way of easing the People of their burdens in point of Suit is To remit all Pleas to the Arbitration of Neighbours The truth of this doth appear thus All determination of Pleas of necessity is either upon a judicial or as I may so say arbitral accompt If upon a judicial accompt then either according to the dictates of Conscience and pure Reason or the principles of a Platform The former cannot be to day Oh! how selfish are the best of men at this time Though there be both godly and able men to day yet cannot all places of trust be filled with such as answer the Scripture qualifications of Rulers Not til the time Our Officers be peace and Exactors righteousness the Judges being restored as at the first and Counsellours as at the beginning And as the former is impossible so the other is hurtful for as Judges qualified as said is are rare and many of them to fil al places of trust cannot be found so a Platform being established swarms of Lawyers the main face-grinders do abound It therefore remaineth that Pleas be determined by way of Arbitration among friends And then be sure not one of a hundred otherwaies of little expence great moderation and great dispatch Because of the untowardness of People I must needs adde some Cautions Caut. 1. The Pursuer refusing without all reason friendly to compound by way of Arbitration it will do well if by an Act be forfeited toties quoties so much of his suit as may daunt him viz. either one half or a third part thereof as may be judged convenient Caut. 2. The Defender upon no good grounds refusing to compound by way of friendly Arbitration it will do well if an Act bind him toties quoties to forfeit an half or a third part more and above what is sued of him Caut. 3. It will do well if some of the godliest and ablest men be appointed and authorized to that end to attend a ● Pleas which either cannot or stubborn persons refuse to be composed by way of Arbitration all due execution passing upon their Determination whether as to the deciding of the Plea or fining of the stubborn and refractory person All which as I conceive do stand with Reason for as the end of War is Peace so the end of Law is Arbitration Were all men beaten with the Law abroad be sure they would friendly agree at home And many are forced to do so when they have spent their time wits and estates upon it So old Clients can though wantons be ignorant thereof I shall not multiply words on this subject at present but willingly rest satisfied with what is spoken already though I might enlarge my self theron to which I shall be most ready whensoever called thereto being nothing but the abridgment of my thoughts in the matter and hoping the poor man's counsel may deliver the City supposing these words to be spoken in season the exigent of time calling for the like I have no more to adde at present but that I am Your Honours obedient and humble servant PET. ENGLISH To the READER THough my broken speech can adde nothing to the worth of this Treatise yet I judge it my duty to utter some few words concerning it I know Truth in all ages hath had many enemies some men asking what it is and some contradicting and apposing And surely that truth which crosseth most the vanity glory and pride of this world is most opposed by the men of this world in whom the Prince of the power of the a● worketh Yea and any truth which in former ages hath not appeared unto the sons of light but hath been under a cloud the Sun of Righteousness in whose sight Saints see light being pleased not to make the cloud flee away is seen and scarce clearly seen but by few who are of the day and not of the night Hence is it that many who are light even oppose such a truth No wonder then though the truth spoken of here be so much opposed seing it not only crosseth the vanity of a vain-glorious age but also hath been so long over-clouded Howsoever it is very necessary to be known Doubtest thou whether it be lawful for thee to submit to the present Government the Power of the King being in thy apprehension absolute without the bounds of Law or the Kingly Government being the choicest and best and so not be altered far better then a Commonwealth or it being unlawful to resist the King and decline his Authority Thou shalt find these things fully and largely cleared from arguments of all sorts To the Law and to the Testimony of the Spirit of Truth that compleat rule they are brought In the balance of Reason they are weighed But if that shall not suffice thee who eyest much the examples
of Politick Governments and sayings of men These arguments also are to be found here You shall find that even certain of your Poets Kings Law-makers Historians Orators Philosophers have said so as saith this Treatise And that this Government is neither new-found out nor usurped nor bad and dangerous but by example of the first and best the oldest sweetest and most to be desired and by lawful practises of old far from usurpation But if thou imaginest that thou art engaged by the League and Covenant to stand for Monarchy and so canst not take a contrary Engagement That case also is answered and cleared here I counsel thee who doubtest to search whether the things which are laid down in the Treatise as truths be so or not That is Nobility indeed O! if the sons of men could learn to be Berean-like more noble then those of Thessalonica Shut not thine eyes stop not thine ears at the seeing and hearing of things of such use and concernment But possibly courteous Reader thou art fully perswaded in thy mind of the truths spoken-of in this Book and therefore apprehendest it to be useless or born out of due time Well but art tho● so full of knowledge and so clear in the thing that thou canst not receive any more Be not deceived It may be thou shalt receive greater information therein if it pleaseth thee diligently to weigh and consider D●st thou engage thy life estate name or pains one way or other in defence of that truth which here by arguments is defended thou shalt do well to inform thy self well and to strengthen thy self with good and sound grounds that with the better and cleaner conscience or greater courage thou mayest go on thy way Moreover if the Book had come forth when first it was written thou couldst not but have said it had been born in the due time But hitherto it hath been hindered Yet I suppose it is born in a due time if we look upon the greatest part of men And if the spirits of men chiefly of such as know not this truth were so framed as in moderation impartiality and simplicity to read the Treatise they should rejoyce at the birth thereof and say it is very seasonable Yea and find more perhaps in it then in ethers of that same nature They would see the adversaries of these truths discomfited and overthrown by their own weapons in which they so much glory even by Reason the testimonies of men and that of all stations and conditions and example of the most refined Policies and Governments And what obscurity or obstrusness is in the Book it is because of such boasters whose mouthes the Author judged expedient to stop with arguments of that kind and so to beat them from that place in which they thought their strength did lie I have no more to adde but do again wish that without prejudice malice envie hatred selfishness in moderation and sobriety thou wouldst peruse the Treatise and I dare say thou shouldst receive more good thereby then possibly thou in the least expectest And for thine ease I have written the heads of it as so many Assertions or Conclusions I leave thee and it to the disposal of Him who ruleth all things in the Army of Heaven and among the Inhabitants of the Earth whose Kingdom and Dominion are everlasting in whose hand the hearts of the most mighty are as the rivers of water and He turneth them whithersoever he will And do remain Thy ingenuous wel-wisher DAVID PIERSON ANAGRAM MONARCHIE and DEMOCRACIE described under the names of Μοναρχικοσ Δημοκρατικοσ ΜΟΝΑΡΧΙΚΟΣ μονοσ alone αρχικοσ desirous of reigning ὀνοσ an Asse and the upper part of an Asse-mill αρχαιοσ ancient ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΣ δημοσ People κρατιστοσ most strong ἀριστοσ best δικη right κριμα or κρισισ judgment ΜΟΝ He MilstONe like weighs-down and grinds the state The people poor Asse-like enslaveth and He Reigns alone and Hath an AnCIEnt date ΔΗΜ People Do rule Electing who command MOst strong and best he 's and from Clear debate Makes Right Appear and Causeth IudgmEnt stand And if αριστοσ best Doth signifie This is me thinks Pure ARISTOCRACIE THE CONTENTS Of the whole BOOK SECT I. THe Power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot belaw fully contraveened pag. 2 The King hath not a Power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason p. 6 SUBSECT 1. The Jewish Sanhedrin had power over the Kings of Israel and Judah p. 11 Because of extraordinary Heroicism and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law 29 The first erecters of Kingdoms and planters of Colonies were of an absolute power altogether unsubject to Law 34 Personal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an absolute and full power without all reservation upon some men 40 Conquering Kings in old were of an absolute power 47 Vsurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an absolute power 47 Except for some of these causes there was never any King so absolute but his power one way or other according to Law was restricted Ibid. SUBSECT 2. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion and the People of GOD. 120 The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republick Ibid. The good Kings of the Jews because of personal endowments had exemption and immunity from Law 121 The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power 125 SECT II. Royal Power ectypically is the choicest of Governments 135 Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the best Government 136 Monarchy demotically in respect of the disposition of people is the choicest Government Ibid. Kingly Government consecutively in respect of its fruits and consequences may be hic nunc the best of all Governments 138 Regulated and mixed Monarchy per se and in it self is the sweetest Government 140 Monarchy consecutively in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce simply absolutely is of all Governments most dangerous and least to be desired 41 SECT III. Democracy arightly constituted simply absolutely is the sweetest Government and most for the good of the People 152 Moses before the counsel of Jethro had a Kingly power 155 After the accomplishment of Jethro's counsel and the institution of the seventy Elders neither Moses nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power 157 No man by Nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government 165 Nature per accidens and in a secondary way intendeth Government 169 SECT IV. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly power as the Kingly power 171 It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power Ibid. Kingly Government may very
lawfully be declined that one better may be set-up 180 SECT V. We are tied by League and Covenant to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon Ibid. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest and preserve Monarchy involably Ibid. A SURVEY of POLICY OR A Free VANDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND PROEME COURTEOUS READER I Beseech thee judge of me impartially Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely then is pertinent Let me tell thee my freedom is upon a good accompt I may hold my face toward Heaven and say what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit My record is from on high I do not speak from a by-assed principle and if I do so shall not my Lord try it out Why I pray thee wilt thou stumble at my freedome in expressing my mind against Kingly Government in behalf of that which is popular Verily I desire thee not to cleave to my judgment implicitly Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice what I speak and embrace that which is good wilt thou learn so much of that which the world cals Scepticisme as to suspend thy judgment a little and not sentence against me at the first Be not wedded to thine own opinion but try all things and hold that which is good Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book I do ingenuously profess I shal forthwith be of thy judgment if thou shew me better grounds inforcing the contrary of what I maintain Well the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power These Questions being put aside that follow it is easily answered 1. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute 2. Whether or not is Royall Government the choicest of Governments 3. Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments 4. Whether or not is it lawfull to resist the Royall Person and decline the Royall Authority 5. Whether or not doth the Covenant tye us to preserve Monarchy inviolably Of these as followeth SECT I. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute THe Court-Parasits and Nation of Royalists do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Person But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment ASSERT I. The power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened It is made good firstly from that which Solomon saith for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him what dost thou Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversly expounded 1. Some expound them concerning the absolutenes of the Kings power whether in things lawfull or unlawfull good or bad And in this we find none more willing then Salmasius the Humanist Defens Reg. cap. 2. 2. Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy do interpret the words not de jure but de facto Regis i.e. they opinionat that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them but concerning the absolute way of governing which one way or other is conferred upon Kings whether by usurpation or tyranny or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person Yet 3. I do choose a way distinct from either of these And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King in things lawfull and honest This I make good from the Contexts 1. The Preacher saith I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings is such a power whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey and that under an obligation being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power Unless you will say that it is lawfull for us to sin against the LORD and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD which is contrary to that which is spoken Act. 4. and 5. Yea as afterward is shewed arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundlesse power to do both good evill is sinful and unlawfull And therefore we cannot tye our selves by the oath of GOD to maintain it Sure we are we can not lawfully swear to maintain and obey a sinfull and unlawfull power Unlesse you may also say that we may lawfully engage our selves by oath and Covenant to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice and allowing that which is evill but for correcting and punishing of evill-doers Be not hastie to go out of his sight to do knaves who hate the light stand not in an evil thing Why for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him c. Would the Holy Ghost say ye must not dare to do evill and with draw your selves preposterously from the Kings presence for he hath a power conferred on him that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors And therefore if ye transgresse be sure the King will punish you So then this manifestly holdeth out to us that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place of such a power in Kings which exerciseth good and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD is incumbent to the Kingly power to do But sure I am illimited Monarchy whose power is also to do evill can spare the malefactour and punish the righteous The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power that produceth contrary effects 3. The Holy Ghost subjoyneth Whose keepeth the commandment shal feel no evil thing Then this must be a just and lawfull commandment otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death Rom. 6. But sure we are this cannot be spoken concerning a boundlesse and arbitrary Regall power for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regall power so he speaketh of the effects thereof and of our obedience thereto And as we find he speaketh onely of good effects so he onely speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto which according to the oath of GOD and in conscience we are tyed to perform But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regall power so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects Secondly we establish the point from reason it self the Kingly power as it produceth good effects not onely in it self is the Ordinance of GOD but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad But as the Ordinance of GOD
cannot be contraveened so it is laid on us as a necessary duty to subject our selves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD according to the prescript of GOD'S wil Rom. 13. So then in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened no more can the Kingly power be withstood but what it enacteth according to equity reason should absolutely be obeyed In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection not onely to Kings but also to all other Rulers Tit. 3.1 Per. 2. Kings and all Magistrats in this sense are called Gods GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth Ex. 4. and 22. Ps 82. feeders of the LORD'S people Ps 78. the shields of the Earth Ps 47. nursing Fathers of the Church Is 49 Captains over the LORD'S people 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD 1. Chr. 19 their judgment is the judgment of the LORD 2. Chr. 19. The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them Is 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power and to decline his authority for so there is a divine sentence in his lips his mouth transgresseth not in judgment his Throne is established by righteousnesse righteous lips are his delight and he loveth him that speaketh right his wrath is as messengers of death but in the light of his countenance is life and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion but his favour is as dew upon the grasse he sitteth in the Throne of judgment scattering away all evill with his eyes scattering the wicked and bringing the wheel over them So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy Yea his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon so that he who provoketh him to anger sineth against his own soul Prov. 19 and 20. Upon these grounds and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us to honour the King Proverb 24. and not to strike Princes for equity Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power as it is in it self and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth according to the LORD' 's good will and pleasure neither his power nor the just Acts thereof can be any more contraveened then the power of GOD and that which he commandeth to be performed for so the King's power is GOD'S power and what he doth is according to divine authority And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute for so as his power in such respects can not be contraveened in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient with a full and vast power according to Law and reason So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute not because he may do both justly and unjustly according to his pleasure but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes according to justice In this sense I confess Salustius his Author saith very well Impune quidvis facere id est Regem esse Indeed the King may do every thing that is just and equitable according to Law and Reason and deserveth not to be punished therfore This is the same which Solomon saith Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26 Albeit we may put such a favorable construction upon these words yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such Indeed I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion who saith concerning the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. 1. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King Tanta est ejus celsitudo ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regne suo Curt. in consol 65. col 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf notab 3. repet L. un c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi Imperator omnia potest Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for fid in F. in 1 Constit C. col 2. Chass catal glor mun part 5. consid 24. All these go no other wayes saith our learned Country-man but thus The King can do all things which by Law he can do and that holdeth in him Id possumus quod jure possumus Lex Rex 9.26 ass 3. This is a very quick and noble glosse But for my self as I judge their meaning to be nothing such so I am indifferent whether it be so or not No question there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy beside the Nation of Royallists And those to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish we find to be attended with these qualifications 1 They are meerly heroick and ambitious So were the Giants before the Flood Gen. 6. Beros Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the rest of the great Heroes Arist pol. 3. c. 10. 2 They are meerly tyrannous and cruel So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Israel Exod. 1 and 5. Nebuchad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahasuerus absolute power Haman was licenced to exercise tyranny on the People of the Jews Est 3. We might alledge many examples to this purpose But the point is most clear in it self for those who are of a tyrannous disposition can endure no Law but their will Otherwise they could never get their tyranny exercised 3 Those whom we find chief pleaders for absolute Monarchy are either concerned therein themselves as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius and such like or else Flatterers and Court-Parasites as Lyricus Rom. Virgil and such like And of this sort we find none more violent in this matter than Dr. Fern Hugo Grotius Arnisaeus Spalato c. whose foot-steps with his ful-speed Salmasius doth trace But although men by way of flattery and by-respect may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy yet let me tell you I do not imagin but they may act and plead for it through simple error and delusion And so I conclude that Aristotle Xiphilin Salust and the foresaid Lawyers do much run this way though they be more moderate in the matter then the rest And as afterward is shewed we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way somewhat inclining to the lawless and arbitrary power of absolute Monarchy Assert 2. The King hath not a power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason Firstly Such an arbitrary and vast power is repugnant to the first Institution and Scripture-mould of Kings According to the Holy Ghost's way of moulding the King he is thus qualified 1 He is an Elective King chosen by the People in subordination to God Thou shalt in any wayes set him King over thee whom the LORD thy God shall choose Deut. 17. 2 A Brother-King and not a stranger-King One from amongst thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee thou mayest not set
Nations The words admit a two-fold sense and so they may either signifie As other Nations have Kings so make us a King This sense we allow or as other Nations have absolute Kings so make us an absolute King This sense we deny And so this is a fallacy either ab Homonymia or à figura dictionis 2. We may as well conclude from these words after the manner of the Nations that the people of Israel did seek a non-absolute and regulated King for at that time there were King of the Nations who were regulated according to Law We read that Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects who did steal Helena but also what he did in the matter of Helena's away-taking was according to the advice and counsell of Senators whom Paris with his Complices did over-awe Dict. Cret de bello Tro. lib. 1. And it is observable that Agamemnon and Palamedes though the Kings of Kings were subjected to Law So storie Dictys Cretensis Dares Phrygius Homer and Aristotle Which was at that time when the Jewes did seek a King to reign over them Yea then the Egyptian Kings were subjected to Law Diod. Sic. Rer. Ant. l. 2. c. 3. And it is also evident that at this time the Athenian Monarchy was not absolute So Heraclid de polit ΑΘΗΝ Diod. Sic. lib. 5. c. 5. Moreover we do not imagine but there were many other Monarchies at that time which were not arbitrary and of an illimited power We might prove this at length if it were not both tedious and needlesse But Salmasius himself acknowledgeth that then all the Kingdoms of the Orient were of a limited power regulated κατὰ νόμον And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle pol. lib. 3. c. 10. and 11. 3. The people of Israel did seek a King under very fair pretences They not only alleaged that Samuel was unfit because of his years to govern them according to Law and reason but also they pleaded for a King from the tyrannie of Samuel's sons and their non-governing according to justice and equity Then tell me would they ever have sought a King that he might govern them according to his pleasure whether to tyrannize over them or not Thus they should not onely have palpably contradicted themselves but also they should have cut off from themselves these pretences whereby they urged their purpose in seeking a King 4. To say that the people of Israel did seek an absolute King is to mil●tat directly against these ends which they propounded to Samuel and set before their eyes in seeking a King The ends are three 1. To judge them 2. To conduct them 3. To fight for them and defend them from their enemies These three particular ends do abundantly evidence that they did not seek a King to govern them after the manner of the Nations whether according to Law or contrary to it but that they sought a King to govern them only according to Law and reason I am sure the second and third end imply no lesse And if you say that the first end may take along with it a judging whether according or contrary to Law we do easily obviat this difficultie 1. Because you shall not finde in Scripture where judging is taken for an act of injustice and tyrannie And the Holy Ghost in Scripture expoundeth judgment calling it justice 2. Sam. 8. 2. Had the people of Israel sought a King to judge them whether according to justice or injustice then their arguments whereby they enforced their purpose in seeking a King had been altogether uselesse Samuel haply might have said to them I see now ye do praevaricate in this matter your profession is altogether vain in declaring your selves sensible of my weaknesse and inability for judging you according to justice and equity and of the corruption and iniquitie of my sons in perverting righteous judgment Away might Samuel have said this is nothing but words Whereas ye seek a King to judge you whether according to Law or not ye contradict your own profession and give your selves the lie to your face Yea Salmasius himself doth acknowledge that they did not seek a King to tyrannize over them and to rule contrary to Law and reason Def. Reg. c. 2. But mark how the man straight-wayes giveth himself the lie For saith he they did not deprecat nor abominat an unjust King wicked violent ravenous and such-like as use to be among the Nations though most wicked Ibid. We demand at this Gentleman whether or not they did positively seek such a King as that to reign over them If he affirm it then they sought a tyrannous King to reign over them And so he belieth himself If he deny it then it followeth that in even-down terms they sought no King but one who would judge them in righteousnesse But this Royallist will have them positively to seek an absolute King to reign over them Then tell me how can this agree with these pretences whereupon they sought a King to wit to reform their Commonwealth and to banish corruption out of Judgment-seats and because Samuel was not able to perform this as they alledged therefore they sought a King But Samuel might have said to them in seeking an absolute King ye seek a remedy worse then the disease Such a King whom ye seek having power to govern at randome according to his pleasure will not be a sit man to redresse the enormities of your Estate He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan but he will not lessen them and ease you of your burden Be sure ye will get few or no good Kings but ye will have many bad who having a vast power will make you groan under their yoke So then might Samuel have said ye can no wayes pretend a sense in you of the want of the exercise of righteous judgment and of corruption and enormity in the Judges Ye scorn your selves to enforce your purpose therefrom in seeking a King whenas in seeking an absolute King ye forthwith give your selves the lie and undermine your own grounds Again if positively as is manifest from these ends above-written they sought no King to reign over them but such who would govern them according to Law and reason then is it more then apparent that positively they sought a regulated and non-absolute King to reign over them for as governing according to judgment and righteousnesse is done according to Law and reason so it can never absolutely be performed unlesse the governing power be absolutely hemmed in by Law and regulated thereby Now the absolute ends which the Israelites did set before their eyes in seeking a King do resolve upon governing according to judgment and righteousnesse And I would fain know of this man how he can conclude this consequence The people of Israel did seek a King to govern them according to judgment and righteousnesse Ergo they did seek an absolute King and did not deprecat the greatest of tyrants Verily
the consequence at least virtually is repugnant to the Antecedent for in so far as they seek a just and righteous King fit to govern them according to Law and reason in as far they abominat an absolute King one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them Thus you see that the people of Israel do neither positively nor negatively seek an unjust and tyrannous King to reign over them We hasten now to the Assumption And we observe that the man contradicteth himself in it for he saith not onely cap. 5. but also cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time subject to Law And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and II. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of his wine he recalleth to his memory what hath escaped him and laboureth to correct it And so he addeth that though Diodore storicth that the Kings of Egypt were subjected to Law yet do we never read saith he that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges And though Aristotle quoth he saith that all the Oriental Kings did govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet not withstanding they did rule with an absolute power though more remisly then did other Kings Def. reg c. 5. 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full subjection of Kings to Law yet nevertheless he is constrained by force of example to acknowledge that Kings were some way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law And he cannot deny but Diodore storieth of a most wonderful subjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law He telleth us that they were subjected to Law in their eating and drinking lying and rising yea in preserving their health they were restricted to Law And which saith he is more admirable they had not power to judge to gather Money together nor to punish anythrough pride or anger or any other unjust cause And yet saith Diodore they took not this in an evil part but thought themselves happy to be subjected to Law I trow this is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet He will have the King above Law not subject to any Law But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law and subject to it And though this immodest man doth say That the Egyptians notwithstanding did not cut-off any of their Kings yet catcheth he nothing thereby 1 Because the Egyptian Kings as Diodore telleth us were most observant of the Laws Therefore he saith Plurimi regum the greatest part of their ancient Kings lived blamelesly and died honourably Rer ant l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot strike against the innocent 'T is iniquity to kill a man who deserveth not death Diodore telleth us of three things which made the ancient Egyptian Kings to walk closely and keep themselves within bounds Firstly their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law Secondly they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Priests whose eyes were alwayes fixed on them Thirdly Kings that walked not straightly as nothing was proclaimed in their life-time to their praise but to their discredit so in their death they wanted the honor of solemn and sumptuous burials which were given to good Kings after their death The fear of this hedged-in their wayes and made them stand in awe 2 We deny not but Diadore in that same place insinuates there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings Yet we say not tyrannous as Salmasius would have it for we do not think that though many of their Kings were wicked in themselves they got liberty to tyrannize over the People The Egyptian Laws were more strict then that they would dispence such a liberty to any of their Kings Diodore saith they were tied to the Law no less then private men And withal he saith their Judges were most impartial and could not be bought-by either by favour or gain Which maketh us imagine that they hemmed-in the wayes of the most dissolute King amongst them and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People Therefore it is very observable that Amasis getting power in his hands did tyrannize over the Egyptians Whose tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate so long as Diodore saith as they wanted the opportunity of punishing him till Actisanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt And then saith the story the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels against Amasis and falling from him to Actisanes they unkinged him and set-up Actisanes in his room who governed them most gently and amicably Rer. ant l. 2. c. 1. 3 Let it be so many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them and they notwithstanding were not punished and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges What then That will never conclude their unwillingness and unreadiness to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings but that they wanted opportunity and power to do such a thing So it went as is said already with the People and inferiour Judges under Amasis tyrannous yoke But so soon as they got the opportunity they verified the old Maxim Quod differtur non aufertur Yea Diadore telleth us That the People did withstand the Priests and those who with-held honourable and solemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old Which affordeth us matter to aver That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings it was not because they were unready to do so but because the People were refractory thereto No question they would much more have withstood the off-cutting of their Kings then the want of solemnities at their death for what is it I pray you that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes but because they take them up in the notion of half-gods and far above the reach of ordinary men Whereupon they conclude that both their Persons and Authority are altogether inviolable They dote so much upon them that they think they should in no terms be resisted far less cut-off and punished according to their deserts This daily experience teacheth Therefore the People of Egypt would far more have withstood the inseriour Judges in cutting-off their Kings then in denying them sumptuous and stately burials for their offences 4 It is easie to belearned from Diadore that the Egyptians esteemed the want of honourable burials to their Kings more then any punishment could have been inflicted upon them Know this they were a most superstitious People tainted with a world of blind zeal And withall as Diadort stor eth the fear of the want of honourable and solemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumspectly and keep themselves within bounds Whereupon we conclude That both King and People thought no punishment more capitall and more hurtfull to the King then the want of an honourable buriall And so the inferiour Judges imagined that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings sumptuous and stately burials they executed more judgment upon
wer absolute without all restriction But afterwards we shew that Aristotle's meaning is concerning Heroes of the secondary rank and such who in after-times erected Kingdomes and planted Colonies Moreover as there were colonies planted in old by way of donation shelter and gratification as were the Griphcnians the Tyrhenians and the colonies of Phaeton and Auson so colonies were planted by way of commission and subordination So the Assyrian Median and Magogan colonies were planted in Asia together with the Moscits who at one time erected their tabernacle both in Asia and Europ An Nimr 45. This they did by vertue of a Commission which Assyrius Me us Magogus and Moscus their four chief leaders had from Nimrod I can not imagine that such had a vaste and arbitrary power over their colonies for what power they had over them was by way of Commission and in subordination to the Assyrian Monarchy But we shal not stand much to grant that even such had an absolute power over their colonies though not so vast intense as that of Nimroa's 1. Because though the Princes of these colonies were subordinate to Nimrod yet it is very likely that their Colonies had no power over them for as the being and residence of these colonies did in a most special manner depend from the conduct and means of their Princes and leaders so then a-dayes people did much adore Princely Government and they knew very little then what it was to call consistories and exercise the Lawes Xenophon telleth us that Ninus was Iupiter to the Assyrians De aquiv. and so we conceive that their Hercules hath been Assyrius their first Prince and leader for so by proportion Nimrod was their Coelum Belus thir Saturn Ninus their Iupiter and consequently their Hercules behoved either to be Assyrius or else Saturn's grand-child Xenophon alleadgeth that the chiesest of Saturns grand-children are the Herculeses But Belus had not a grand-child who succeeded to him in the Kingdom And so we suppose that their Saturn's grand child being wanting they have con serred the honor of Hercules upon their own native Prince And what the Assyrian colonies did in that purpose is most probable the rest of the foresaid colonies did the like also And so they conserring a Divine honour upon their Princes and first leaders no question they have given them all obedience and absolute subjection And Ashur whom Berosus calleth Assyrius is reckoned up Gen. 10. as a very mighty and active Prince 2. Because Hered though a precary and substitute King yet was he not subject to Law was declared unanswerable to any for the murder which he had committed against Aristobulus I●s●ph an t lib. 15 cap. 4. I confesse this was by the means and vindication of him of whom Herod in a precary and substitute way held the Kingdom And why may we not think far rather that the Princes of these Colonies though but Nimrod's deputies were of an absolute and arbitrary power though you should say that they had it not because of themselves but because of Nimrod Howsoever I stand not much here but let the Reader choose either of the parts he wil. And I onely put him in mind of this that the Colonies of Gelnus and Eridanus were Commissionary and subordinative for they erected a Kingdom in Istria by ordors and Commission from Ligur An. Armat 20. Furthermore observe there were some Colonies planted by meer purchase So Hercules the Egyptian planted the Thuscits whom Berosus calleth Arnits Libarnits and Musarnits These he planted by his own power and conquest So did Aeneas plant his Trojans in Italy and Brutus his Trojans in England Yea Iolaus upon his own proper purchase planted a Colonie in Sardinia calling it Iolaa Dioa. lib. 5. cap. 2. And as for the Kings and heads of such Colonies I see nothing against it but they have been of an absolute and arbitrary power for as they planted their Colonies without all obligation to the natives so the beeing and residence of their people did more intimately depend from their conduct and means then any of these sorts of colonies we have spoken-of already did depend from their Captains and leaders And so I think cateris paribus there was more reason for the absolutenes of the leading men of such colonies then for the absolutene●e of the heads of any of the rest of the colonies spoken-of already Here meer purchase carrieth the businesse but there the businesse is carried-on by the free donation of others and by lot or land for the up-taking Thus the colonies were the more oblidged to the conduct and industry of their Leaders Whereas in the plantation of Colonies according to this last sort they are extremely engaged to the endeavour and conduct of their heads and overseers This maketh me think the fondnesse of the people in ascribing too much to their industry hath made them devolve their whole power over upon their Kings who by their conquest and purchase made them a people and posessed them in land Conclus 3. Personall endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on people to devolve an absolute and full power without all reservation upon some men We may make this good from the example of Noah The Scripture acquainteth us with his compleatnesse how that there was none like him in his time Gen. 5,6,7,8 and 9. Yea Berosus talketh much to his praise and commendation ant lib. 1 2 3 4. 5. He holdeth him as a God yea as the first and chiefest of all Gods So did the Italians Myrs de orig Ital. M. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig frag Fab. Pict de aur sac c. lib. 1. Sempr. de divis It. c. So do Archilochus lib. de Temp. Xenophon de aquiv. Metasthenes de judic temp annal Pers lib. But for the clear uptaking of this matter you shall observe with me that in Noah's time about the 131. or 150. year after the flood the whole earth was divided But before this time they were all of one minde without all sedition and division Then men conveniently lived without any Civill and Politick Government for so they lived under Noah as under a common father receiving the Law from his mouth and withall every one of his posterity did know how that nature had laid most strict and neer bonds of relation upon each one to other Whence peace and piety were preserved amongst them Gen. 8.9 and 10. Ber. ant lib. 3. Ios an t Ind. lib. 2. cap. 4. and 5. Men then were given more to Piety then Policy They were little or rather nothing acquainted with the rules of complex Policy They studied more to entertain simple ingenuity and the ties of pure nature then to rule one of them over another Hence faith Archiloshus that 250. years after the flood there was a golden age in which Nature it self lived within the bounds of Law without all politick sanction ever and while Ninus and Semiramus by force of Armes began to corrupt the way
from all punishment and restraint And yet albeit I have read most of the ancient and chief Chronicles of all the ancientest and chiefest Kingdoms of the world I never read of any Kingdom that proceeded so much against and so often did punish delinquent Kings as the Scots in old have done No question our LORD in his wisdom hath done this that the ancient Scots may stand up in judgment to-day to condemn the practice of the latter Scots who are not ashamed to idolize a King a creature like themselves Having most abundantly evidenced how that Regal power in many sorrain Kingdoms in old hath been subjected to Law no lesse then any inferiour power we do now in the next room drawing home toward our own doors demonstrate the King of Britain to be a regulated and non-absolute King according to the Laws and Customes of England and Scotland As for England we must needs take it under these notions 1. As it was before Julius Caesar conquered it for that time it is thought very doubtsome and uncertain and therefore I minde to passe it at this time till aft●rwards in a more convenient place in a word not soaring to say that Brutus the first King of England was an absolute King for as he lived in the dayes of the Heroes wherein Regall power was most in request so by his own proper conduct and industry he firstly founded and planted a Kingdom there This cometh nigh that which Aristotle saith alledging that ●n the dayes of the Heroes Kings had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Observe by the way that tho●gh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 draweth nigh to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet is there some difference between them but how they diff●r as also how Aristotle in this place is to be understood you have at length expressed afterward Now Aristotle fo● his saying assigneth many causes amongst which these be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either by gathering people tog●ther or by pu●c●asing a kingdom Pelit 3. cap. 10. Now Brutus a● is reported did both these And consequently we need not scruple to say that he had a full and absolute power We dare not say so much in behalf of his posterity and those who immediatly s●cceeded h●m Heroîcisme then was upon the declining hand and withall the people were not so much engaged to them as to Brutus himself And after the Line of Brute was ended it is reported that Corbomannus K. 28. was deposed by the people which could not have been if he had had an absolute and arbitrary power Emerianus K. 34. when he had tyrannously reigned seven years was deposed Chirennus K. 41. through his drunkennes reigned but one year Whereupon we may very probably conclude that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus who was subdued by Julius Caesar the English Kings were not absolute 2. As it was from Julius Caesar unto William the Conquerour As for this time there may be something said for the absolutenesle of the English Kings If we speak of those Kings whom the Roman Emperours deputed it is likely they had an absolute power by derivation from the Roman Emperours as had Herod from Antonius and the Roman Senat. Jos an t lib. 15. cap. 4. And whileas the Englishes were subdued by the Danes and Saxons I think it no wonder though then the Kings of England had an absolute power and that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We have shewed already that conquering Kings are all-commanding Kings See Concl. 1.4 And those who are acquainted with the English History do know that from Cassivelanus unto William the Conquerour the Kingdom of England was never free either of intestine or of forraigne wars It was no time then for exercising Laws to the full against any much lesse Kings There were some of their Kings at that t●e to whose conduct and valour the Engl●shes were much engaged 〈◊〉 maintaining their Liberties and withstanding the force and fury of the common Enemy No wonder though such by way of gratification were invested with a full and large power Others again were meer Conquerours or else deputed by the Conquerour And so we think there was reason for it why such were clothed with an absolute and plenary power for then the Kingdom of England was not under Kings but under Masters And what can Masters do but ford over their servants All that while the Kingdom of England was an unsettled Kingdom and could scarcely be called it 's own Which maketh me in reason conclude that the● there was little time left for exercising Policy and putting Lawes in execution This Polydo us Virg●lius telleth in a word whileas he saith that before Henry 1. there were few Conventions made by the Kings amongst the people for ordering according to Law the businesse of the Kingdom Angl. hist lib. 11. Although in an absolute notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we may say that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus and from Cassivelanus unto William the Conquerour Kingly Government in England was non absolute and without full power yet we cannot say so in a relative notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as afterward shall appear 3. As the Kingdom of England was about the dayes of the Conquerour whether a little before or afterward unto this time We deny not but under the reigne of the Conquerour himself Regall Government in England was of a most absolute and arbitrary power In this we take Salmasius by the hand He needed not Des Reg. c●p 8. to have troubled himself to have cited any Authors for proof thereof Very reason it-self teacheth the p●t for he subdued England by strength of hand But sure I am a Conquerour may dispose upon a conquered Kingdom according to his pleasure It is an act of favour in him if he do not destroy all much more as an absolute Lord to rule over all In the interim I desire Salmasius to take a view of Polyd. Virg. Angl. hist lib. 9. where he shall find the point evidenced to his heart's desire beyond any Historian he citeth Although in this we go-along with him as we must needs do yet notwithstanding we cannot say so much whether concerning Edward who preceded or those who succeeded him Let it be so that those who succeeded the Conquerour had the same priviledges which the Conquerour did arrogat to himself Yet can it not be denied but according to Edward the Confessour his Lawes or as they are called the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom Kingly Government in England is regulated and not absolute We make the point good from these reasons Firstly because according to these Laws the King of England is not hereditary And therefore we read not that ever Edward did tie the Crown of England to Royall succession I confesse it is alledged that he promised the Crown after him to William the Conquerour who was of neer kinred and great credit with him if he had not children of his own But this is not only improbable in it-self but also it is so judged
Estates who in maintenance of their Liberties and the ancient Laws of the Kingdom did rise in armes against their Kings and caused them nilled they willed they to subject their necks to the yokes of Law Amongst other of their practices this is very remarkable that albeit they had saluted Ludovick as their King and put him in the room of John yet notwithstanding in the end they declined him and in his stead crowned Henry 3. John's son This speaketh much of the States power above the King 2. Virtually It cannot be denied but in this notion all temporall power dependeth from the King And that two wayes effectively and vindicatively Effectively because the King of England had not onely power of conveening dissolving the Parliament of ordaining inferior Judicatories but also by him the Parliament of England was firstly instituted and ordained Vindicatively because it was his part to patronize and execute the acts of Parliament at least as the main and prime man of maintaining and defending them The like power the Kings of Scotlana had also as is clear from their Acts of Parliament But as for the spirituall power of the King of England I stand not much to confesse that he had a formall and Ecclefiastick power in Church-matters and that what power the Church so called had was derived from him It cannot be denied but before the conquest there were Ecclesiasticall Laws made by many Kings of England as Inas Alfred Edward the elder Gythrum Ethelstane Edmund Edgar Aetheldred Canutus and others In the interim this Gentleman shall do well to observe that the King of England had not alwayes this power It cannot be denied but Lanfrancus Anselmus and Berket going to complain on their Kings and Governours firstly brought the Pope's judiciall authority from Rome into England both over King and people Which supremacy of the Pope over the Church of England untill in and about Henry 8. his dayes who did shake-off the Pope's yoke did continue And so Edward 6. succeeding to him to me it is more then probable that by the scresaid sanction made in his time the ancient power of the Kings of England in Church-matters was taken out of the Pope's hands and put upon the King And it cannot be denied but according to Edward the Confessour's Lawes the King of England had a primary formall and Ecclesiastick power in Church-matters I stand not to grant that But what though I should say that according to this statute made in Edward 6. his time the King of England had a primary and originall power and that formally both in respect of spirituall and temporall jurisdiction yet will it onely conclude an absolutenesse of the King according to Law but not against it It no wayes denudeth the people of a fountain-power to desend themselves against the unjust decrees and actings of the King The Roman dictatour had an absolute power in judging and yet it was lawfull for the people to repeal his acts in their own just defence Many times have the People of England defended themselves from their King and stood by their own liberties notwithstanding the King 's acting against them What I pray you is it for me to say that the King of England by this act is called the originall both of spirituall and temporall power under a formall notion Is he not called also the King and Sovereign Ford of the Parliament Is not the Parliament called his Parliament Is not every thing ordinarily acted and emitted under his name Is it not ordinarily said It is ordained by the King With the eonsent or at the desire of the three Estates It is very seldome said It is ordained by the King and Parliament But I pray you what be these but Court-complements They are words and nothing but words Go conser them with the practice of the Parliament and you shall finde the one just contrary to the other No wonder forsooth because the King getteth more honour then he hath power Trie this and you will find it an ordinary practice Aye which is more cannot a corrupt Parliament through the defection of the times give the King more then what is due to him either by the Law of GOD or by the law of the Nation Know we not that Parl. 18. K. Jam. 6. through the backsliding of the times did advance him to greater priviledges then the King of Scotland by the Law of the Kingdome had or can be warranted by the Law of GOD Indeed I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes as did others of his predecessors before him And as for Edward 6. I must needs say his times were better then any times of his predecessors But it appeareth to me that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church so called so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State But leaving Henry of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward I must tell you one thing concerning Edward and it is this Those who write of him and namely Foxe do crie him up beyond all the Kings of England for piety wisdom and learning And Foxe runneth so far out in his commendation that he esteemeth him inferiour to no King though worthy to be preferred to many Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah and put the qualifications of both in one ballance Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign did passe in his behalfe because of his personall endowments The like act upon that same ground though in respect of him it was meerly pretended without any reality in his person did passe Parl. 18. upon K. Iam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary We den●e not but because of personall endowments Kings may be and have been advanced to greatest power What will this conclude an ordinary president thereof and a standing law therefore No verily There is no consequence from extraordinaties to ordinaties The standing ancient lawes both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes Of scotland and of England we have spoken already at length Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more may serve to clear o●r purpose He to repair what was done amisse by his father Henry 3. who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta and de foresta did much gratifie the people restoring them to great liberty and abrogating all lawes which did make for the bondage and slavery of the people Howsoever the matter be five sic five non these sanctions above-cited by Salmasius do conclude the Parliament to have power above the King The reason is because if we look precisely on these acts what power the King hath is from them They not onely declare but also they enact and ratifie his power to be such such And so the
That Jeroboam was a vile idolater and was not worthy to be a King 2. That the people justly defired Rehoboam to dimit of the power which his father had and that the old men did arightly counsel Rehoboam to do so Neither of these doth Salmasius deny And so I gain the point as is already proved Fourthly from the People of the Jews processing their Kings So did they against Athaliah 2 King 11.2 Chron. 23. and Amaziah 2 King 14.2 Chron. 25. See subsect 2. prop. 1. And as they processed their Kings so did they resist them as afterward is shewed But I pray you could they have done such things lawfully if their Kings had had an arbitrary power over them And that they did such things according to Law and Reason is proved by us Fifthly If Ahab had had an absolute power I see no reason how he could have been refused of Naboth's Vineyard 1 King 21. Sure I am if he had had a prerogative above Law and a power to dispose according to his pleasure either upon the goods or the person of the subject he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard at his own hand without so much as demanding it with Naboth's leave And yet the text saith That Naboth having refused to give it him he went home much dismaid and refused to eat bread because Naboth had denied it to him And which is more he could not get it till a false processe was led against Naboth by the crast of Jezebel But is it imaginable that ever such things would have been done if Ahab's power had been arbitrary and uncircumscribed No verily No question if his power had been boundlesse by vertue of a Royal Act he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard either without grieving himself or without leading a false processe against Naboth And therefore Mr. Withers 〈◊〉 Tom Plain-man saith notably Why I pray Did Ahab grieve that Naboth said him nay Why made he not this auswer thereunto If what the Prophet said some Kings would do Were justly to be done Thy Vineyana's mine And at my pleasure Naboth all that 's thine Assume I may Why like a Turkey-chick Did he so foolishly gro● sullen sick And get possession by a wicked fact Of what might have been his by Royal Act If such Divinity as this were true The Queen should not have needed to pursue Poor Naboth as she did or so contrive His death since by the King's Prerogative She might have got his Vineyard nor would God Have scourge that murder with so keen a kod On Ahah had be asked but his due For he did neither plot nor yet pursue The murder nor for ought that we can tell Had knowledge of the dead of Jezebel Till God 〈◊〉 it by the Prophet to him Nor is it said that Naboth wrong did do him Or disrespect in that he did not yeeld To sell or give or to exchange his field Brit. Remembr Cant. 8 Now hereby is made to appear That the Kings of the Jews were not absolute whether according to the Law of God or the Law of the Kingdom And why then do Royallists plead so much for the King 's arbitrary power seing the Jewish Kings de jure had it not Which maketh me think other Kings far lesse should have it for the ordination of the Jewish Kings did depend from God in a most special way and God there in was most intimatly concerned We must not think that the Kings of Judah after the captivity de jure had any priviledge above Law more then those who preceded them According to the Law of God they had no such priviledge as is shewed already And that according to the Law of the Nation they had it not is also evident 1. Because after the captivity the store of the Government was changed And they had not so much as Kingly Government much lesse absolute Monarchy till Aristobulus firstly usurped the Crown Jos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 19. 2. Because the people did withstand the tyrant Alexander And whileas he was dying he was necessitate to exhort his wife who succeeded to him to dimit of his power and to promise to govern according to the advice and counsel of the Senatouis and Pharisees Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 22. 23. Which she did accordingly cap. 21. And at her death she desired the Sanhedrin to dispose upon the Kingdom as they pleased even while her son Aristobulus was in arms for bringing the Kingdom to himself Yea the Sanhedrin not onely accused Antipater but also arraigned Herod before them who for fear of them was constrained to slee Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 17. And what arbitrary power Herod had was by 〈◊〉 concession whom Herod blinded and deluded with gifts Ant. Jud. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confesse whileas Herod was cited before the Sanhedrin he was not King but Governour of Galilee But what then I hope Salmasius will not deny which indeed he confesses that his father Antipater did reign as King And yet the Elders of the People did accuse him before Hyrcanus But neither Hyrcanus who indeed was King of the Jews nor Antipater who was Procurator and managed the matters of the Kingdom because of his weakness were able to absolve Herod notwithstanding Caesar the President of Syria wrote some Letters to Hyrcanus threatning him if he did not absolve him The Sanhedrin went-on so precisely against Herod that they went about to condemn him to death So that Hyrcanus was necessitate in satisfying Caesar's desire to cause Herod flee quietly away Now I would fain know of Salmasius if either Hyrcanus or Antipater had had an absolute and arbitrary power might they not have absolved Herod at their pleasure the Sannedrin nilling or willing and not basely for fear of the Sanhedrin have dismissed Herod secretly Therefore Salmasius must give me leave to say though he imagineth the contrary that Sichardus very pertinently urgeth this example to prove that the power of the Sanhedrin was above the King And Salmasius himself denieth not Def. Reg. cap 2. 5. but the strain and current of Rabbinick Writers doth run this way Inst Nay but saith he in the Jewish Talmud it is spoken otherwise And therefore it is said Rex neque judicat neque judicatur non drest testimonium nec in ipsum dicitur in Cod. San. cap. 11. Def. Reg. cap. 2. Answ Verily this Gentleman needeth not brag much of this for the Jewish Writers pull this out of his hands by a distinction Some of them understand it concerning the Kings of Israel and some of them refer it to the Samaritan Kings But they deny it to have place in the Kings of Judah and those who came of David I admire much that he should cite the authority of Jewish writ for him He doth not deny but the Jewish Writers are no friends to Kingly Government And they positively say which he denieth not himself that the King of the Jews was subjected to Law And which is more they particularity
to the equal And if not subject to the Sanhedrin I see no reason why he was not also unpunishable and absolute And so the Judge had greater power then the King Which I am sure none will admit Secondly before the institution of the Sanhedrin all the greater and hard matters were reserved to Moses Ex. 18. And in this Moses power was greater then the power of those Judges which he appointed at the advice and counsel of Juthro But Moses finding that he alone was not able to manage all the weighticst matters therefore in greatest earnestnesse he besought the Lord to adde some to him who might help him therein and exonerate him of his burden Mark a little Either Moses as yet remained the only Judge of greatest matters or else every one of the higher Sanhedrin had equal power with him The reason is because Moses power was according to the object of it The greater matters the greater power Ex. 18. So proportion of Nature requireth If you say that not witstanding the institution of the Sanhedrin and its intermedling with great and weighty businesses the greatest of matters were reserved for Moses and the Judge's managing I understand not that That is against Moses desire The thing which he prayeth for is That the Lord would ordain some to bear burden with him in discharging the weightiest matters We find no such distinction in his desire as that some might be appointed to oversee some weighty matters and himself notwithstanding to reserve in his own hand the managing of the greatest affairs Friend this had been but a little easing of Moses burden under which he did grievously groan Yea in this case there had been great by-respect and self-interest in Moses desire No lesse forsooth then he should be eased of his burden and notwithstanding reserve a lording power over his brethren There is no little carnality in this desire and as great absurdity to bind it upon Moses Yea were this true he had been in power above the Seventy for so his power did reach furthe othen theirs and might do what they could not Tell not me that his desire was to be cased of his burden and notwithstanding to remain chief man in the Commonwealth There is great carnality and self-interest there also Moses desire is positive without distinction And if he or any of the Judges was major singulis I see no reason why they were not as essentially Kings as Saul David c. The Kings had no more power None of them according to Law was major universis So is demonstrated already And so in the ordination of Kings there was no essential and substantial change in the Common-wealth The people sought a King from Samuel Was it not a foolish desire to seek what they had already Samuel denied a King to them Was it not foolishnesse in him to deny them that which already they had and debate so much against it Verily there was nothing between them if this be true but pugna de lana caprina And verily Beliarm me wrongeth the people of the Jews very much in alleadging they sought a despotick heril and hereditary King There is no such thing in their desire as is shewed already They sought no more but a King According to the Law he was regulated And it is known that they did not give the kingdom to Saul's posterity Well let it be so the Judge had greater power then any one member of the Sanhedrin yet doth it follow that he only had such power as the annual Magistrate v. g. in the Athenian Commonwealth He had greater power then any one of the Councel And yet he had not a kingly power Here from we draw this Argument That Government is simply and absolutely best and most for the advantage both of Church and Commonwealth which the Lord not only did firstly institute amongst the people of the Jews but also was unwilling to change it and set-up another Government in place thereof But the Lord not only did firstly institute Democracy amongst the people of the Jews but also was unwilling to change it and set-up another Government in place thereof Ergo Democracy simply and absolutely is the best Government and most for the advantage both of Church and Commonwealth The Proposition I suppose cannot be denied for whatsoever is most for the good of Church and Commonwealth is most also for the glory and honour of God And shall not I imagine that the Lord most endeavoureth that which is most for his honour As there is nothing which is so precious in the eyes of God as his own honour so he endeavoureth most to erect preserve and maintain that which most contributeth thereto None will say that the Lord slighteth his own honour and postponeth it to any created interest The Assumption is made good from what foregoeth not only in this but also in the preceding Subsection Secondly from the judgment of the gravest and wisest Philosophs So Solon of whom it is storied 1. That he not only refused himself to reign over the Athenians as King but also he much endeavoured that Pisistratus should not attain thereto This he did for preserving the liberties of the Athenians and popular government amongst them inviolable 2. He wrote severall verses against the Athenians because they had set Pisistratus over them sharply rebuking them that they had gone from the better to the worse 3. Because the Atheniums had set up Monarchy amongst them therefore he lest Athens and went into Egypt 4. Not desiring to live under Kingly government he left Egypt Cyprus and Lydia and came into Cilicia where he built a City and called the name of it Solos And it is very observable that Craesus having desired him to come and live beside him he thanked him for his benevolent courtesie But with all he added that if he desired not to live in a free Common-wealth which he had set-up in Cilicia he would choose rather to live with him then in Athens 5. Being desired by Pisistratus to return to Athens he told him he would not lest he should appear an approver of his deed in taking upon him to reign as King 6. He wrote an Epistle to Epimenides wherein he exceedingly regrateth the foolishnesse of the Athenians in translating Democracy into Monarchy 7. He wrote to Periander King of Corinth desiring him to lay-down his Kingly power 8. It is reported that he did institute popular government amongst the Athenians But the simple truth is it was long before instituted by Theseus And by processe of time the Common wealth and the Laws thereof being corrupted Solon reformed both And as Solon so likewaies all the rest of the Sages did prefer Democracy to any other government Thales wrote to Solon in exile desiring him to come and dwell beside him at Miletum And if he did abominate the Milesian Monarchy there was no-where he could be free of the trouble of Kings And therefore he thought it best he should live with
striketh a midst betwixt all Governments Polit. 4. cap. 11. Thirdly Of the chiefest Historians and Orators Berosus imputeth it as a great fault to Nimrod because he erected Kingly Government contrary to what Janus i.e. Noah gave commandment and precept for Ant. lib. 4 I confess what Government was before that time was not purely politick Yet it drew very near the borders of Democracy for then they knew not what it was to be governed by one or by some few because of riches honour and such like No verily they admitted no precedency but purely natural and moral Purely natural because speaking rigorously they lived then as under fatherly and oeconomical Government Purely moral because those did govern who were eminent in godlinesse and vertue It is called the golden age because then men were free of deceit each one living in a brotherly conscionable way with another They knew not what Law-quircks and Politick quiddities meant then All lived as under one common father governed according to the Laws of pure Nature and Justice Subsect 2. Concl. 3. Thus then none were holden-back to govern to whom Nature and Vertue had given the precedency And this I find only to be the difference between Popular Government and what Government was then The one was natural and the other is political Persons then did govern not only because of vertue and godlinesse but also because of natural priority No wonder because then they lived under Governours as under natural fathers Government then was rather oeconomical then political But Popular Government though it giveth place to Physical and natural precedency yet not in the matter of Government It admitteth natural precedency in natural things But in policy only vertue and godlinesse have the first place Yet there is no repugnancy but per accidens in politick things both may consubsist Natural precedency in it self is not repugnantly capable of that which giveth political preferment Herodot seemeth to commend Ottanes who against Darius pleaded for the up-setting of Popular Government among the Persims He saith that Ottanes took the middle way Lib. 3. But in medio stat virtus No wonder though he enclineth to Ottanes judgment rather then to the opinion of Darius who pleaded for Monarchy The man as is said already approveth Pindarus in saying Law is King But amongst the Persians Monarchy was ever above Law Josephus calleth the Government firstly instituted amongst the Jews the best of Governments Ant. Jud. lib. 4. cap. 8. lib. 6. cap. 4. Howsoever he taketh-up the plat-form of that Government is not material But I may determinately say it was democratick and popular This we take to be the judgment of Salust He opposeth liberty to Regal Government a free City to Monarchy Yea he inveigheth against the Grectans as base free of vertue and painsulnesse because saith he libert●em per intertiam amiserint And he speaketh of Noble-men as unprositable members in quibus sicus in statua nihil est additamenti Yea he calleth them socordes tgnavi adding per superbiam cuncta gentibus moderantur Moreover he laieth down this as a maxim Libertas juxta bonis malis strenuis ignavis optabilis est Liberty is to be desired by all good and bad stout and cowardly In fragm Cicero was fully of Pompey's way He greatly commended his cause and did much exhort others thereto This you may see in many of his Epistles lib. 2. ep 18. lib. 4. ep 44. lib. 5. ep 62.64 74. See Plutarch in Cicer. Now Pompey was clearly for the defence and preservation of the Roman Commonwealth at it was established before Caesar's usurpation It is beyond all controversie at that time it was in part popular Then the Romans were governed by Tribunes of the people who had power to defend against any Magistrate whether Dictator Consul or any other of the people Sure I am none will say but Demosthenes was all the way for Democracy Orat. cont Theocr. He pleaded still for the Liberties of the Athenian Commonwealth in many Orations whereby he exhorted the Athenians to withstand Philip for preserving amongst them Popular Government inviolable Plutarch reporteth he incited all Greece both against Philip and Alexander In Demost Fourthly Of notable Kings and warriours Minos who by Homer Hesiod Plato and others is called the chiefest of Kings amongst the Cretians created Cosmi Popular Governours So Theseus whom Isoerates crieth-up above Hercules did institute Popular Government amongst the Athenians Theompompus Lycurgus and Agesilaus most noble Kings and most notable patrons of Popular Government And shall we not think but Miltiades Themistocles Aristides Cimon Hannibal and many other notable warriours who did live under the yoke of Popular Government esteemed it the choicest of Governments They acted much both gallantly and cheerfully for the preservation thereof Men's practice is a more evident testimony of their judgement then their profession 'T is known that Lysander an eminent warriour in an oration to the Lacedemonians perswaded them to shake-off Kingly Government altogether Plut. Prob. in Lys Had that been I suppose the Ephorick Magistracy should have governed all Though Dion a matchlesse warriour was against the popular multitude which inevitably begetteth confusion yet was he for Plato's Aristocracy which is reformed Democracy Fifthly From the example of the chiefest and most reformed Common-wealths whereof some were purely popular and some mixed v. g. dthenian Cyrenian Cumaean Pyrean Horean Syracusian Tarentinian Theban Roman c. Diodore out of Herodot reporteth That the Assyrian Kingdom being overturned by the Medes for a long time after the Cities were governed without Kings by Popular Government The point being thus established both by divine and human authority it nextly falleth into our way to make it good from Reason it-self And for this we shall shortly give you the abridgement of the Arguments of some ancient Philosophers which Aristotle alleadgeth Polit. 3. cap. 11. and 12. As they do plead for Popular Government so they do directly militat against Monarchy The first is taken from the parity and equality of the Members of the Republick the second from the necessity of Magistracy the third from the equity and infallibility of Law the fourth from the inconveniency of setting man above Law the fifth and sixth from example Sparing to repeat their arguments at length we content our self with an argument of our own framing And it is this That Government is simply best which restoreth us nearest beyond all Governments to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals But Democracy restoreth us nearest beyond all Governments to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals Ergo Democracy simply is the best Government The Proposition is undeniable because the state of perfection and integrity is simply the best It is without either spot or wrinkle And consequently the nearer we draw to that condition our case is so much more excellent and good And so whatsoever Government
others do render it 'T is a vain thing in Royallists to imagine Elishah and the Elders with him did not resist the King but his messenger 1. The text maketh clear against this 1s not the found of his masters feet behind him Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger because the King was backing him and coming-in immediatly after the cut-throat This intimateth to us the shutting of the door and the out-keeping of the house was mainly against Jehoram himself His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger is the ground of shutting the door and keeping-out the house They alleadge also this to be an extraordinary act Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary Away with this elusion 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name is done by him as in the King's person and authority And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary and to resist the King himself Salmasius would loose the knot another way And faith he the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from thus for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him to cut-off Jehoram That was done by Jehu whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this He only raileth and shifteth the Question The Question between us now is not concerning the off-cutting but the simple act of resisting Kings And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram yet he cannot deny but he withstood him and defended himself against his violence This is all for the present we crave Neither can he deny but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets to anoint Jehu King Whereupon he went forth and did cut-off Jehoram executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab From which example is shewed already to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings It is the Magistrat's part and not the Prophet's unlesse it be by extraordinary impulsion to cut-off the delinquent And so as from the example of Elishah it is lawful to resist so from the example of Jehu whom Elishah caused to be anointed for cutting-off the house of Ahab it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings 4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram and revolted from him 2 Kin. 8.2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this yet he faith nothing against it but what others of his own tribe said before him And faith he Libnah's revolt in respect of God the Judge of all the earth was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins But in respect of the revolters it is no where justified in all the text Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave the text insinuateth the contrary This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah with the revolt of the Edomites So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day There is nothing added to that The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand This is added as a reason because be had for saken the Lord God of his fathers Thus is abundantly holden-one unto us that Edom and Libnah revolted from Jeboram in a different way No question in respect of God the cause and ground of the revolt of both is one God caused both to revolt to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes The Edomites revolted because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah The text faith they chose a King of their own And from that which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt it is more then apparent to us it revolted from a principle of Religion And these who comment upon the text say Libnah revolted because Jehoram pressed the people of the Land to Idolatry I suppose upon good reason Libnah's revolt is far more justifiable then the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam The one revolted upon a natural and the other upon a spiritual accompt And yet as is shewed already the ten Tribes revolted allowably 5. Uzziah was withstood by Azariah accompanied with fourscore valiant Priests of the Lord. And in this contrary to the doctrine of Royallists we shall make good these three things 1. That they resisted him violently 2. allowably 3. that they dethroned him The first is evident from the text Firstly because it is said they withstood him They withstood Uzziah the King 2 Chron. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are words of violent resistance signifying to stand against And for this cause the fourscore Priests are called men of valour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of strength So the Seventy and Arius Montanus translate them It maketh us imagine they were purposely selected from amongst the rest of the Priests because of their valour and strength to withstand Uzziah in facrificing Secondly because they did thrust Uzziah violently out of the Temple Azariah the chief Priest and all the Priests thrust him out from thence Ibil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signisieth to thrust out with violence They hurried him out of the Temple as the word importech The second is also manifest because the Lord attended the undertaking of the Priests with miraculous and extraordinary succesfulnesse They no sooner laid hands on the King but beyond all expectation the Lord did put hand in him also He did back them notably They no sooner did resist the King but assoon the Lord from Heaven did strike him with Leprosie And is it imaginable but the Lord one way or other had plagued them also if they had failed in their-duty to the King I can see no reason why he should have spared them in failing in their duty more then he did not spare Uzziah in failing in his duty And which is more the Priests do not groundlesly withstand him They argue from the King's duty and from their duty They tell him in plain terms It did not become the King to sacrisice Num. 18. but the Priests Ex. 30. Upon these grounds they set-to to withstand him and keep him back from burning incense Which insinuat that their act of resisting him was in no part of his duty and that which was proper to his kingly charge but only in maintaining their own liberties and what according to God's Law was due to them Would they say We will withstand thee O King and have reason to do so because as thou dost that which is not incumbent to thee so thou encroachest upon the peculiar liberties of our charge The third is beyond controversie though Royallists start much at it 1. Because he was cut-off from the house of the Lord. This was because of his Leprosy for according to the Law the Leper was cut-off from the Congregation Thus the Priests spare not to execute the Law upon the King though Royallists estecm him to have exemption and immunity therefrom And Uzziah the King was a leper unto the day of his death and dwelt in