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A42442 Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.; Selections. English. 1699 Gassendi, Pierre, 1592-1655.; Bernier, François, 1620-1688. 1699 (1699) Wing G297; ESTC R8129 274,288 497

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Temper and Goodness O happy Nations where none but the honestest Man was to bear sway for he can do what he pleaseth who doth nothing but what he thinks he ought to do 'T was therefore in this Golden Age that the Government was committed to the Wisest They prevented Quarrels protected the Weak against the oppression of the Stronger they advised dissuaded and represented what was most useful and what not Their Prudence provided for the necessities of those who were under their Conduct their Valour drove away all Dangers and their good Deeds purchased daily new Subjects To Command was more a Burden than a Profit and the greatest threatning that a King could then offer to such as were not Obedient was to forsake them and depart the Kingdom But since Vice and Corruption had changed Rulers into Tyrants hence sprung the necessity of having Laws and wise Men were the first contrivers of them But without standing to examin these several Opinions which Lactantius looks upon as frivolous O ingenia hominum indigna quae has ineptias protulerunt Miseros atque miserabiles qui stultitiam suam literis memoriaeque mandaverunt Let us rather consider That the Laws according to Epicurus's Judgment being established for the publick benefit of Mankind that every one might enjoy his Right might live peaceably and securely and seeing there is nothing more agreable to Nature than this I think none has reason to upbraid him quod Leges Jura a Natura sejunxerit That he separated from Nature the Laws and Right seeing that he had rather join'd them inseparably together by the Tie of common Interest which is the firmest Bond according to the Rules of Nature Nor does there seem any reason to blame him because he hath rather derived the Laws and Right from Profit than from Nature seeing he could never have derived them from Profit but at the same time he must needs derive them from Nature Nay let us go further What cause have we to reprove him seeing there is no Person but will allow that both the primitive and modern Legislators had always this thing of Profit or publick Advantage still in their Eye and that no Laws can be just and useful but what tend to the publick Benefit and Advantage Civil Societies saith Aristotle seem to have not only their Rise but their Continuance also in this Foundation of Profit the Law-givers still aimed at this End and generally termed that Right which was found to be useful Cicero retain'd the same Opinion We must saith he intend all our Laws for the publick Good not interpreting them according to the strict Letter but what suits best with the publick Good and common Benefit For our Ancestors always used this Wisdom and Prudence that in making their Laws they still chiefly proposed to themselves nothing more than the Safety Welfare and Advantage of the Publick The Safety of the People saith he in another Place is the supreme Law Salus populi suprema lex He saith further That all Magistrates and Rulers ought to stick close to these two Maxims of Plato the First To be so careful of the benefit of their Subjects that they ought chiefly to aim at it in all their Proceedings forgetting even their own private Profit and Advantage when it comes in Competition Secondly To take heed in their Governments that they lose not one part by endeavouring to preserve the other Truly Cujas acknowledges that the civil Right or the Right of every particular Government is derived from the common Benefit but he denies it to be so in relation to the Right of Nations or of all Mankind in general for he supposeth that proceeds from Nature But since he owns that this Right which is common to particular Places proceeds from Interest which also is common to them all why may not he admit that the Right which is common to all Men is derived also from that Profit which is common to all Men So that natural Right is as it were the Genus Generalissimum of which the Right of Nations or of Men is an inferior Species and likewise this Right of Nations as a Genus more contracted whereof the civil Right or the Right of every City is a Species As to what Epicurus says That a true Law supposeth a mutual Compact or every Law is a kind of an Agreement 't is no more than what Plato Aristotle Demosthenes Aristides and several others assert Nay the divine Law it self so far as it concerns our Fellow Subjects may be reputed the noblest part of the civil Right is nothing else but a Covenant between God and Man There is nothing more common in Holy Writ than to hear them speak of the First and Second Law both the Old and the New as of a Covenant and an Agreement There is nothing more frequent in the Holy Scriptures than to read that God makes a Covenant as with Noah Abraham and Jacob who likewise engage reciprocally to God who had made this Promise to him I will be with thee and keep thee wheresoever thou goest and I will bring thee back into thine own Country c. Unto which Jacob answered If the Lord be with me and will keep me in the way that I go and will give me Bread to Eat and Raiment to put on so that I come again to my Father's House in Peace then shall the Lord be my God Erit mihi Dominus in Deum We need but mention the mutual Compact and Agreement between God and the People of Israel when God was pleased by the Mediation of Moses to proclaim the antient Law Thus God speaks If you hear my Voice and keep my Covenant I will look upon you as my peculiar Treasure and will have more care of you than of all other People And the People answered We will do all that the Lord hath commanded In relation to the new Law this is the Prophesy of Jeremiah The Days shall come saith the Lord that I will make a new Covenant with the House of Israel and with the House of Judah not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers in the Day that I took them by the Hand to bring them out of the Land of Egypt which my Covenant they brake c. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the House of Israel after those Days saith the Lord I will put my Law in their inward Parts and write it in their Hearts and will be their God and they shall be my People But not to insist longer on this let us only observe That tho from what hath been said we may conclude that to speak properly There is no Law of Nations and consequently no Right of Nations because there never hath been any Covenant or Agreement between all Nations nevertheless we may say that this common Precept Thou shalt not do to another what thou wilt not that another should do to thee ought to be esteemed as the first
or controlled It is known what Socrates and Aristotle relate of a certain Persian who being asked what it was chiefly that made his Horse so fat answer'd The Eye of his Master And we have likewise heard the answer of that African from whom they inquired What was the best means to improve Land and make the Fields fertile answer'd The Foot-steps of the Landlord From whence we may conclude that commonly a Business is never better manag'd than when those who are chiefly concerned take care of it themselves Now because some would have the preservation and increase of an Estate patrimonial or an Estate otherwise obtained to belong to this kind of Prudence this doubtless is to be understood where our Estate is not so large as to spend our Days in Ease and Leasure and have sufficient to leave to our Posterity In such a Case 't is not only Honorable but also needful to employ our Cares to increase our Estate But to think upon nothing else but how to heap Riches and to purchase Lands to add Houses to Houses and Fields to Fields is to run into that Covetousness and unsatiable greedy Desire of which we have been Discoursing before But as there are Three expedients of gathering Wealth Husbandry Industry or honest Labour and Usury Cicero tells us that of all those means by which we get an Estate there is none better more pleasant and more suitable and worthy of a Freeman than Husbandry He Speaks of Merchandise that if the Traffick and Gain be small it is Sordid and Base but if great and large and gives an Opportunity of being Bountiful without Vanity or Presumption it is not to be slighted But for Usury saith Aristotle and Cicero 't is hated not without cause but chiefly when it is excessive For as the Poet observes constant Usury destroys the Poor Velox inopes usura trucidat I know there are other Means to grow Rich as the Service of great Men Flattery c. But it is not requisite that we should speak of those that take these Courses nor of such as purchase Offices and make Parties by Bribery nor of such as going to the Wars not contented with their Pay plunder and take the Goods of other Men seeing such kind of Men differ in nothing from those who make themselves Rich by Cheating by Perjury and Robbing But not to stay too long upon this Master let us examin Two great Complaints that are made against Epicurus The First because he saith That a wise Man ought not to be Married nor trouble himself in the Education of Children which seems not only to overthrow the very Foundations of Families but even of Common-wealths The Second is they seem to charge him with having said That there is no natural communication among Men and that the great Affection of Parents toward their Children is not the effect of Nature As to the First it is certain that he never intended this as a general direction to all Mankind but only to a few wise Men neither hath he prescribed that wise Men may not nor ought not to Marry if the good of the Common-wealth or some other weighty Consideration require it Now how can this be to overthrow the Foundation of the Commonwealth Is not this I pray more Holy and Religious than the practice of Aristotle who promulg'd a Law That such Children as were deficient in their Members should be destroyed that the number of such as should be brought up might be limited and that as many as should happen to be Born beyond that Number should be expos'd but if any Constitution of the Country prohibits such Practices they should cause the Fruit of the Womb to perish before it comes to have Life or Feeling And as to the Reason or Excuse he pretends of the privation or want of Sense and Life in the Foetus it is but a meer Mockery for he cannot prove that when a Woman Miscarries the Fruit or Foetus hath neither Sense nor Life and that to destroy any such Fruit which would be alive in a very short time if it be not already is the same thing as to destroy a Corps or a Body altogether incapable of Life For the Second 't is true Epictetus represents Epicurus exclaiming against that vulgar Error That there is a natural Communication between Men and that the Affection of Parents to their Children is Natural or Born with them Be not deceived as he represents him Speaking Ne decipiamini O Mortales Non est ratione praeditis ulla inter se naturalis Communicatio Amor Parentum erga Liberos non est Naturalis Mihi credite qui secus loquuntur in errorem inducunt vos ac rationibus falsis circumveniunt vos But doubtless the Envy and Hatred against Epicurus hath caused many to make him say things that he never imagined For certain it is that he allows a natural Communication between Nations and among Men who live under the same Laws Now if this be granted 't is plain that there is more reason to allow a natural Communication between those of the same Blood and between Parents and Children who are immediately united together by Blood and Nature Epictetus himself acknowledges that Epicurus was of Opinion That we are naturally inclined to Communication and that when we have a Child Born 't is not in our Power not to Love it or to Slight and Disregard it It seems they will have him maintain this Doctrin Nevertheless I will say That if they will absolutely make him hold this that the Love of Parents to their Children is not Natural they should at least give him liberty to interpret his own Words His Meaning is That this Affection is begot in us and increases by degrees not so much by a certain blind instinct of Nature as by a persuasion of the Father that it is his Child and a part of himself and by the Hopes that he shall be Beloved and Honoured or Relieved and Supported by him or because he judges his Name to be eternized and conveyed to Posterity by this means and that the plain and ingenuous Conversation of a Child that promiseth much rejoyceth his Heart Epicurus seems to have very good Reasons to be of that Opinion First because we see many that have equal Affection for Children that are none of their own but Bastards as they have for their own if they believe them to be lawfully begotten Secondly we find not that Love in those whose Children are lawfully Begotten if they are otherwise persuaded Thirdly we find as great a Love in those who have adopted Children when the Resolution or Will supplies the defects of the Persuasion Fourthly That if the Fruit is Abortive the Father and the Mother are not so much afflicted as if it had continued with them a longer time and been conversant with 'em not so much when it dies a young Infant as when it departs in a more advanc'd Age when it hath many Brethren as when it
is the only Child if he hath had already any Children as if he hath none left behind if he be Debaucht and Untractable as if he were Wise and Vertuous CHAP. V. Of politick or civil Prudence WE shall now speak of Politick Prudence which Aristotle calls not only Science or Ability but supposes it to be the Lady and Queen of all the rest the knowledge of Morality being subject to it as a part of it for he tells us That it belongs to a Politician to understand what may make for the Happiness of the People that he is properly the Master and chief Contriver of their Welfare and that consequently it belongs to him to take cognizance of Pleasure and Pain and of Virtue and Vice which are the Springs of Pleasure and Pain Now the politick Prudence is like the Oecononomick for as the latter is to regulate a Family composed of several particular Persons so the Politick or Civil is to govern a City or Town composed of divers Families We ought therefore first to examine in whom this Prudence resides or ought to reside as in its proper Subject This appears not difficult to resolve for it is plain that it ought to reside in none more than in him who hath the sovereign Power the chief Authority or the absolute Right to Command which Right may be discovered chiefly by certain particulars which Aristotle mentions As to be able to conclude Peace or War to make Alliances and dissolve them to establish and disannul Laws to determin about Life Death Banishment confiscation of Goods or Restitution Of the first Origin of Sovereign Power according to the Opinion of the Ancients THIS Power is supposed by the Vulgar to have first taken its beginning when Men like Beasts wandred up and down the Fields without any subjection each enjoying his full Liberty according to his own Will and Pleasure Hereupon they contrived to make up Societies in which every one renouncing in some measure his own Liberty yeilded to the Will of the Multitude which by this means claimed a Right and Authority over each individual Person and provided not only for their Safety and quiet way of Living by giving a check to the most Powerful and Robust by hindering them from insulting over their weaker and more peacable Neighbours but also hereby they made a more equal Distribution of the Products of the Earth and likewise communicated to each other the effects of their Arts and Labours wherein any excelled another For that lawless freedom which they pretended to enjoy in those early Days must doubtless cost them dear because every one having an equal Right over every Thing and no Man being able to appropriate any thing to his own use which another was able to take from him they must needs be continually Warring and Contending with one another So that such a way of Living being full of Quarrels cannot be properly called a Freedom because of the many Inconveniences and Mischiefs that attend it Therefore true and natural Liberty is easier to be found in a Society where Men being obedient to the Laws of that Society I mean those Laws that were enacted and approved for their Benefit and Advantage act in all other things as they please and have a Right to their proper Goods so that no other can take them away because of the publick Authority and Power that protects ' em For this Reason Aristotle seems to disapprove of Plato's Common-wealth in which Women Children Estates and all other Things were to be common For if we take away Mine and Thine the Common-wealth is so far from being at Unity thereby and consequently more perfect and compleat that it is the only way to introduce again that primitive Barbarity and brutish manner of Living for what we Fancy to be common to every one belongs properly to no Body This made Colotes a Disciple of Epicurus to say That they who have made the Laws and have settled the Government and the Magistracy in Cities have thereby secured Mens Lives and settled them in a peaceable State and that if we offer to abolish them we must return to live like Beasts and devour one another There may perhaps be found some who in consideration to Virtue and out of their own good Inclination may Rule and Govern themselves But truly they seem Strangers to the generality of Mankind who Fancy that they will restrain from Acts of Injustice by the Principles of Reason or of Honesty rather than by the Terror of the Magistrates or of the Laws But to return to our Matter in hand I omit to speak of the sovereign Power or sovereign Authority translated by common Consent from particular Persons to all the People Now the People meeting together to deliberate and resolve upon any Business what was resolved by all or by the greatest part was taken to be the Resolution of the whole Society And because it is inconvenient that all the People should meet and that every private Person should declare his Sentiment it happened that all the People of their own accord made over this Power to a certain number of Persons or to one single Person or it may be that this one Person or a greater Number by Force or by Cunning have taken it upon them I observe only that we understand from thence why we commonly distinguish according to the saying of Tacitus Cunctas Nationes et Vrbes Populus aut Primores aut Singuli regunt Three kinds of Common-wealths or of political Governments namely Monarchy or the Dominion of a single Person when the sovereign Power resides in one who Commands all the People and is Commanded by no Body Oligarchy or the Dominion of a few particular Persons when the sovereign Power is in a small Number Poliarchy or the Dominion of many it may be of all the People when the sovereign Power resides in every private Person Moreover tho from these three Sorts we may observe and distinguish two Kinds one Good Lawful and Praise-worthy the other Vicious Unlawful and deserving Blame yet common Experience hath Taught us to call the good sort of the first kind Kingdom and the evil Tyranny but the good sort of the second Aristocracy or the Dominion of the Chieftains and of the best the evil ought to be called Kyristocracy or the Dominion of many wicked Persons but it retains the Name of Oligarchy Besides Plato Xenophon and several others Teach That the third kind is called Democracy or Dominion of the People Aristotle nevertheless tells us That the word Democracy is ascribed to the vicious Species of that kind of Government and that the best is named Common-wealth but according to the present Use and Practice the Three sorts or forms of Government are called Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy Now 't is not necessary that we should busy our selves in giving the Character or Marks of each sort of Government they are sufficiently known I shall only here observe Two or Three particulars
is not impossible if you will strive with all your Courage Learn by degrees to be Continent and if you cannot abstain one Day of two at least abstain one in a Week for by this means it will happen that in a little while you will attain three Days of Abstinence afterwards Six and after that you will be Conqueror during whole Weeks and Months But above all things remember that as it is almost impossible but that many things must intervene which may divert you from your Design so you ought to keep steady and fixt to your Resolution You must break through all Obstacles You must proceed still on and be continually going forward You must consider with your self that it is a great weakness to express so early a Repentance and being a Man as you are to shew nothing less than your Manhood Consider what a satisfaction you will have when the Fatigue will be over and that you shall find that you have got the Victory whereas if you suffer your self to be meanly overcome a troublesome and uneasy Repentance will attend you but otherwise you will applaud and approve of your Happiness when you shall have bravely obtained the Conquest You will also from thence receive new Strength to help you to overcome again in a like Temptation and if you continue you will find that by degrees you will alter the evil Habit that you will draw your self out of a cruel Bondage deliver your self from a base Tyranny and instead of a dark and clouded Spirit it will become clear and Serene instead of a feeble and diseased Body it will become strong and vigorous and instead of a languishing and short Life it will become healthy and long Not to mention here the loss of Reputation and Goods neither shall I instance in those other odious Mischiefs which are known to all the World I shall not here trouble my self to inform you That it is usual to subdivide these two kinds of Temperance each into two Parts so that they assign four parts commonly subject to Temperance whereof Two of them relate to the Tast namely Abstinence and Sobriety the First concerns our Eating the Second our Drinking and the other Two relate to Venery namely Chastity and Modesty The First concerns the Act it self and the Latter some Circumstances such as are Kisses Approaches Embraces Looks and Discourses c. I shall not insist here to prove that Modesty is either Chastity it self and principally that of Virginity which being once lost as the Poet saith can never be retrieved Nulla reparabilis arte Laesa Pudicitia est deperit illa semel Or if it be understood for that Virtue that gives a check to the Circumstances that we have named it ought not to be esteemed so much a part subject to Prudence as a potential part of Chastity I will only observe in relation to Modesty which is so called from the word Modest being a kind of a Guard to Chastity that tho Nature produces nothing whereof we ought to be ashamed as an obscene Thing and therefore among Nations who own no Obscenity neither in the Members of the Body nor in the Language or Names that are given to them for as to this we are to refer our selves to common Usage nevertheless among those People who do own any such thing we are to refrain from them and we are not to banish Modesty which obligeth us to forbear them for let it be either Nature or Law or Custom which makes things to be esteemed Brave Good or Honest 't is always Nature that commands them to be observed which is to be obeyed for the common Good in which the Happiness and Welfare of every private Person as due to him of common right is comprised Therefore Cicero discourses excellently well upon this Point We are not to hearken to the Cynicks who Laugh at us because we esteem things to be filthy and undecent in Words which are not really so indeed and on the contrary Things that are really Wicked and Dishonest we don't stick to mention by their proper Names As to Steal to Cheat to commit Whoredom which indeed is Vnjust and Dishonest and yet is spoken without any Obscenity To beget Children is an honest Act but yet to use the proper Term is Obscene and Immodest For our part let us follow the dictates of Nature and let us abstain from all that our Eyes or Ears cannot honestly endure let our Carriage our Gate our Sitting our Lying down our Countenance our Eyes and our Hands observe the Rules of Modesty And hear what he says in another Place After he had shewn that there is nothing more indecent and unbecoming than in serious and weighty Matters to mix loose and light Expressions Says he Thus Pericles treated the Poet Sophocles very wisely who while sitting upon the Bench with him in open Court espied a beautiful young Damsel pass by and not being able to contain himself cried out What a Beauty is there before us Pericles answered O Sophocles 't is becoming a Judge upon the Bench to be Modest and Grave not only in respect to his Hands but in respect to his Eyes also Of Mildness and Gentleness WE shall now speak something as to the other parts of Temperance which some name Subject Parts others Potential But Mildness seems truly to belong rather to Fortitude than to Temperance in that it relates to Truth which ariseth because of Pain and because it resides in that part of the Appetite which derives its name from Wrath namely in the irascible part therefore it seems to deserve to be plac'd under Fortitude Nevertheless as it is the property of Fortitude to raise and encourage and of Temperance to check and depress and that in respect of Wrath the Mind hath not so much need to be incited and stir'd up as to be curb'd and kept in for this reason it is commonly placed under Temperance However Aristotle teacheth That Mildness or Gentleness ought to be reckoned among the Virtues because 't is a Mediocrity or a Medium between two Extremes the one a Temper inclinable to Wrath as when a Man is either sooner or in a higher degree enraged than he ought against one who deserves it not or for some frivolous Causes The other a simple Meekness or want of Anger as when a Man is not angry when and against whom and for such Reasons as he ought to be angry for he declares that under certain Circumstances 't is not only lawful but also requisite and needful to be so and that because Nature it seems hath not only given Man an Inclination to Anger but also because that this Passion is as a Spur that stirs us up and encourages us to repel not only private Injuries but likewise puts us upon securing our selves against such publick Dangers and Calamities as may affect our Country Parents Relations c. and all good Men. By this means our private and publick Welfare is secured and maintained and
it prohibits Adultery in that of Gentleness it Commands us to strike no Body nor so much as to speak Evil of 'em and so of the rest But not to insist too long upon this it is not to be question'd but that the two chief Offices or general Duties of Justice consist in hurting or doing wrong to no Body and in giving or rendring to every one that which he may lawfully claim which is commonly expressed in Holy Writ by these Words Declina a malo fac bonum fly from Evil and do Good This hath given occasion to the Lawyers to define Justice A constant and perpetual Will or Resolution to give or restore to every one his Right that is to say what justly belongs to him This Definition causeth us to make two Observations First That 't is not without Reason that it is named a Will or Resolution for tho this Word may signify the action of the Will or the Faculty it self nevertheless as they add further that it ought to be a constant and perpetual Willingness they hereby understand the Habit it self of Willing which expresseth the nature and true praise of Justice For to deserve commendation for this Virtue 't is not sufficient to perform some just Acts seeing that he who may do them without Knowledge or for Fear or for a Friends sake or for Gain or for some other such consideration cannot therefore be Just nor be said to do Justly because the End ceasing he would act otherwise but to be Just he must proceed willingly of his own accord for the sake of Justice Therefore Aristotle puts a difference between a just Action and an Action done Justly because 't is the Will alone that makes the Deed to be Justly or Unjustly done and that he who only does no Wrong is not esteemed Just but he who notwithstanding his Capacity to act unjustly yet will by no means do it as Philemon saith Sed qui facere licet potis non vult tamen And he who aims at no private Glory but desires rather to be truly Just than to appear so Vult esse justus quam viderier magis Secondly That 't is not also without Reason that they add To render to every one his Right Because these Words comprehend the Function and the proper Act of Justice and besides signify from whence this Mediocrity is to be taken which Aristotle requires to place Justice in the Number of the Virtues For Justice is not as the other Virtues between two Opposite Vices for there is but one only contrary to it namely Injustice But nevertheless 't is employed in rendring that which is Right which is to be reduc'd to a Mediocrity or Equality upon which Aristotle observes in the first place Of Retaliation THat Retaliation or as the Latins term it Perpessio reciproca a mutual Suffering is no Right or Equity simply so taken whatever Pythagoras's Disciples pretend to who seem to approve of the Justice that is ascribed to Radamanthus Aequum jus fuerit si quae egit quis patiatur To make a Man suffer the same Evil which he hath committed The Reason of this is because Retaliation cannot be found in distributive Justice where a respect is to be had to the Worth and to the Person For Example if a Magistrate strikes any Body he ought not therefore to be struck in the same manner and it would not be sufficient that he who should give a box on the Ear to a Magistate should only receive such another for it but he ought to be punished more severely I shall not here mention that a regard ought to be had chiefly to that which is done willingly and that which is acted against our Will Neither hath it any room in that part of Commutative Justice which respects the Actions and which is properly called Corrective for if for a Tooth pull'd out we only pull out a Tooth or an Eye for an Eye we don't hereby do Right because there is no amends made for the Injury or Wrong done but we must as much as is possible recompense the mischief done either by Mony or some other expedient which the Judge shall think convenient Therefore it may have place in the other part of Commutative Justice which respects the Things or the exchange made in recompence of it Aristotle observes in the second Place That for this kind of Justice there is nothing could be invented more convenient than Gold Silver or something of like Value for as human Society subsists by a necessary supply of one anothers Wants we cannot otherwise redress this defect than by exchange or commutation and that this is to be done by some equality that is to be found out Now what equality can we find between two Things so different for Example as a Horse and Box on the Ear. As therefore we cannot find any equality as to the Thing nevertheless as by Custom we have made Mony an equivalent to every thing else by this as by a common Measure we may adjust to every Man his due Right Thirdly A Judge ought sometimeis to do Right not strictly as the Law prescribes but as we usually say according to Equity Ex aequo bono For as the Law orders nothing but under general Terms and that often there happens particular Cases in which because of certain Circumstances none can judge according to the strict Letter of the Law without great Unjustice For that Reason saith he If a Legislator hath omitted or failed in any thing which he hath absolutely enjoyn'd here we must supply what was defective in this Law-giver and what he himself would have ordain'd by this Law if he had been now present or had known of it before Nay the Interpreters of the Laws go yet farther and say If the Law had commanded that no Strangers should walk upon the Bulwarks we must not therefore put to death one who is gone thither to defend the Town and repulse the Enemy for if the Law-giver had foreseen such a Case he doubtless had made such an Exception For this Reason 't is commonly said That under strict and severe Laws we ought to implore the Assistance of the Judge to make a reasonable and equitable Construction Judicis auxilium sub iniqua lege rogato Ipsae etenim leges cupiunt ut jure regantur But to return to the Definition of Justice As this part of the Definition viz. To render to every one his Right obliges us to understand and seek more at large what this Right is and from whence it derives its Original Let us consider first that this word being taken in several senses its primitive Signification is that Right is a Faculty to do something to have something to enjoy and to do ones self Right in something from thence we say to keep to retain to recover to pursue ones Right to yield to abate and surrender ones Right to enjoy ones Right or to be at our own Command Esse sui juris
is Profitable and that which is Good to be but one and the same thing and therefore to the making up of what is Just and Right two things are prerequisite The First That it be Useful or that it hath Usefulness on its side The Second That it be prescribed and ordained by the common Consent of the Society for there is nothing perfectly Just but what the Society by common Agreement or Approbation hath thought fit to be observed 'T is true some are of Opinion That what things are Just are of their own Nature and unchangably so and that the Laws do not make 'em Just but that they only declare 'em and ordain 'em to be according to what they were naturally before Nevertheless 't is not so but herein 't is as in other things which are useful such as are those that concern our Health and a great many more such like wich are useful to some and hurtful to others and consequently vary from the End both in general and particular And truly as every thing ought always every where and to every one appear such as 't is by Nature because Nature never changes and is unalterable in all Occurrences pray tell me if the things that some name Just be every where at all times and in respect of all Persons really Just Are we not to consider that what is ordained and established by Laws and what is consequently Lawful and Just is not ordained nor admitted among all Nations but that some look upon 'em as indifferent and others reject 'em as prejudicial and unjust Are there not some who hold generally for useful that which nevertheless is not so and thus receive things which are not generally convenient only because that they seem so to them or to their Society and appear to have some general Utility or Advantage belonging to ' em We may then say for the most part that that is universally Just or agreeable with the Nature of Just which is useful or conformable to the Notion of Just that we have now given For to speak more particularly as Utility is otherwise and differing among the several Nations so likewise what is Just differs in the same manner so that what we fancy to be Just others look upon it as Unjust This being so when we enquire whether Just and Right is the same among all Nations I answer that universally 't is so that is something that is useful in the mutual Society but if we look to Particulars and consider the several sorts of People and the diversity of Circumstances we shall find that 't is not the same every where In a word a thing is and ought to be reputed Just or to have the Qualities of Just in a Society if its Usefulness respects all the Individuals associated but if it be not so 't is not properly to be called Just nor deserves to be so esteemed So that if a Thing or an Action having been useful in a Society if by any Accident or by any Alteration this Usefulness begins to cease that thing will also cease from being Just it being no longer so than only while it continues useful and profitable to Society And thus I suppose every one will judge who suffers not himself to be misled and blinded by vain and frivolous Discourses but has a general Respect to all things Of the Origin of Right and of Justice BUt to begin the Matter a little higher and trace it from its first Source Right Equity or Justice seem to be as ancient among Men even as mutual Societies are For in the beginning when Men were Vagabonds wandering up and down like Brutes and suffered many Inconveniences from those salvage Creatures and the Rigour of the Seasons some natural Inclination which they had for one another by reason of the similitude and mutual Resemblance of Bodies as well as Souls or Manners inclined 'em to unite together in small Societies the better to prevent in some measure such like Inconveniences by Building Cottages and so thereby strengthning themselves against the Cruelty of wild Beasts and the Severity of the Weather But because every one more regarded his own private Benefit than that of another this begot many Quarrels in reference to Eating and Drinking and upon the account of Women and other Conveniences of Life which they daily robb'd and forcibly depriv'd one another of until such time as they began to consider that they could not subsist quietly or live securely and conveniently unless they made some Contracts and agreed among themselves to do no Injury one to another so that if any wrong'd his Neighbours the rest were to punish him for it This then was the first Knot or Tie of Societies which as it supposed that every Person might have something belonging to him or what he might call his own either because he was the first possessor of it or because it was given him or because he had it by way of exchange or because he acquir'd it by his Industry I say this was the first Knot which confirmed to every private Person the possession of that which he thus challeng'd as his own Now this Knot or Agreement was nothing else but a common Law which all were bound to observe and which was to secure to every one his Right or Power to make use of that which thus appertained to him And thus upon this account the Law became the common Right of Societies I shall not here mention how a whole Society at length transfer'd their power of punishing to a certain select number of the wisest and honestest Men or it may be to one Person who was look'd upon as the wisest of all the rest I shall observe only two or three Things First That such in the Society were esteemed Just or observers of Justice who contenting themselves with their own Rights never invaded the Goods of others and by this means wronged no Body And such were deemed Unjust or doers of Wrong who being not satisfied with what was their own usurp'd the Rights of others and thus wronged 'em either by Robbing of 'em Beating or by Killing 'em or the like The Second relates to the preservation of Life as the thing that was the dearest to 'em of all and the strong confirmation of their Agreements or of their common Laws for the wise Legislators taking a particular Care of what best secur'd their Lives and minding also what usually happen'd among Societies declared That it was an horrible and abominable Crime to kill a Man and that a Murderer should be look'd upon as a most infamous Person and be shamefully put to Death for there was nothing more unreasonable than to kill his Fellow Creature for which Act we ought to have the greatest aversion and the rather because thereby accrued no advantage to Life and that this Deed could not proceed but from a Wickedness in Nature Thirdly That those who at first took care to promote the Utility of the Laws had truly no
need of any other Ground but to hinder them from doing Evil or from Transgressing But those who had not so much Ingenuity as to take notice of the importance hereof desisted from Murdering one another meerly out of the fear and apprehension of the grievous Punishments to be inflicted on Offenders which we see still at present to be our Case Between whom Right and Justice takes place AS after all that hath been said it may be questioned among whom Right and the violation of Right and consequently Justice and Injustice which are Opposites take place This in my Judgment is to be understood by comparing Men with other Animals Therefore as there is no kind of Right and Injury of Just or Unjust between the rest of Animals because it was not possible to make any agreement between them that they should do no Mischief to one another So there ought not to be between the Nations which could not or would not make any such Compact to do no wrong one to another For Just or Right the observance whereof is named Justice is only in a mutual Society therefore Justice is the Tie of that Society so that every one of its Members might live in Security and free from the apprehensions of Dangers and Disturbances that a continual fear of being Assaulted or recieving damage may raise in us So that all Animals whether Men or others who cannot or will not enter into a Society and consequently be concerned in such Agreements are deprived of this advantage and have not among themselves any obligation of Right and Justice to make them live in Security So that there remains to them no other means of Security than to prevent one another and to treat them so hardly that they may not have Power to do them any Mischief For this Cause as among those Animals that have agreed upon nothing among themselves if it happens that one injures another one may say that he who does the Evil to the other is Mischievous or hurts the other who is injured but not that it is unjust in this respect or that it does wrong because there is no manner of Right no Agreement no Law precedent to restrain 'em from doing Mischief so among Men who have made no Compact nor are not enter'd into any Society if any treats another rudely or barbarously one may say that he doth him Damage or doth him Mischief but not that he is unjust to him or that he wrongs or injures him because there is no Law to bind him to do no Mischief to such an one But between Men and other Animals can there be any Justice None at all 'T is true That if Men could with other Animals as with Men make Agreements and Contracts not to kill one another we could then between them and us demand Justice for that would tend to a mutual Security but because it cannot be that Animals that are without Reason should be obliged or tied to us by any common Laws therefore we cannot take any more security from the other Animals than from the inanimate Creatures So that to secure our selves there remains for us no other means than to make use of that Power that we have either to kill them or to force them to obey us You may perhaps here by the by ask why we kill those Creatures also which we have no reason to fear I confess we may do this sometimes through Intemperance and Cruelty as by Inhumanity and Barbarity we often abuse such sometimes who are out of our Society and of whom 't is not possible that we should apprehend any danger of Evil. But 't is one thing to offend against Temperance or any of its Species viz. such as Sobriety Gentleness or Humanity and a natural Goodness and another to offend against Justice which supposeth Agreements and Laws Besides of all Animals which are not injurious to humane Race there is no kind but may be so if we suffer 'em to increase and multiply beyond measure As to what at present concerns the pretended savage Life of the first Men 't is not Epicurus who was the first Broacher of this Fancy for the most ancient Poets make mention of it and say That it was Orpheus that sacred Interpreter of the Gods and Amphion the Founder of the City of Thebes who by their sage and eloquent Discourses withdrew those Men from their unsettled and wandring way of Living changing their cruel and barbarous Customs and Manners Orpheus inspir'd by more than Human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as Lawless and as Wild as they And first dissuaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion Built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute Cicero himself as if having almost forgotten that he had so highly exalted the dignity of the human Nature declaring it to be altogether Celestial and Divine yet acknowledges That there was a time when Men were wandring like Vagabonds about the Fields in some manner resembling the Brutes That neither Reason Religion Piety nor Humanity were then known among them That they were Strangers to Wedlock and a lawful Issue That they neither used natural nor civil Right That they were in a gross Ignorance and that their unbridled Lust put 'em upon exerting the Powers and Abilities of their Bodies to satiate it self every one possessing more or less according as he was able to take away and keep from another But says he afterward some Men were found to be of a better Temper and more Judgment and Reason than the rest who reflecting on this miserable way of Living and withal considering the tractableness of Mankind were resolved to represent to their Companions how advantageous it would be to joyn together in Societies And by this means by degrees they reclaimed them from their first barbarous manner of Living and reduc'd them to a civil Behaviour who inventing both divine and humane Rights gathered Men into Companies erected Towns and Cities made Laws and afterwards constituted Kings and Governours to check the Insolent and to protect the Feeble and Week against the Stronger Others are of Opinion that the first Age began with the famous Golden Age which was so happy that Men were not then bound up by any Laws nor frighted with the fear of Punishment but lived together innocently having regard to Piety Justice and Equity When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard Seneca renders it thus according to Posidonius They were not yet Corrupted nor Debauched in their Principles but followed the dictates of Nature which directed and awed them from doing ill In the Choice of their Governour they neither respected his Strength nor outward appearance but his
attends those who do not greatly seek it and as often flies from those who eagerly pursue and hunt after it So true is it saith he further That there is some secret hidden Power that over-rules human Affairs and seems to delight and sport it self with over-turning Crowns and Dignities and trampling 'em under Feet Vsque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam Obterit pulchros fasces saevasque secures Proculcare ludibrio sibi habere videtur Of Destiny AS to what concerns Destiny Homer speaks more plainly of it than of Fortune for he makes Hector say That if the Destinies don't appoint nor order it nothing is able to take away his Life beside but no Man can avoid his Destiny Nam nisi Fata vocent nemo me mittat ad Orcum At Fatum vitat nemo mihi crede virorum Now tho' Cicero fancies that Fate and Destiny is but a foolish idle and superstitious Name Anilis plenum superstitionis fati nomen and Epicurus That 't is only a fantastical Name and that nothing is done by Destiny Nevertheless as there have always been Maintainers of Destiny some taking it in one sense others in another we must here endeavour to understand the several Opinions into which they have been divided Among these Opinions there are two Principal for some will have Destiny to be Divine others a meer Natural thing The First were the Disciples of Plato and the Stoicks according to whose Opinion Plutarch Chalcidius and some others look upon Destiny or Fate in two manners First As a Substance which they took for God himself or for that eternal Reason which from all Eternity hath ordered all things and hath so joined all Causes both Superior and Inferior together that all that happens either Good or Evil happens persuant to these Causes They bestowed several Names upon this Divine Substance or Reason for sometimes they termed it as Plato The Soul of the World The Reason and the eternal Law of the Nature of the Vniverse And sometimes as Zeno and Chrysippus The moving Virtue of Matter a spiritual Virtue and the Reason of the Order that Governs and Rules all Things Sometimes God Jupiter Understanding or Intellect as Aristotle and Seneca And sometimes with Heraclitus The Reason that penetrates into all Things And sometimes as Pythagoras The governing and ruling Cause of all Things both Vniversal and Particular Secondly As an Act namely in part for the Decree it self or for the Command by which God hath established and ordained all things and partly for the Order it self that Consequence and Concatenation of Causes at first appointed in which it pursues its course without varying in the least from the Rules and Methods at first prescribed For thus they spoke of it when they called Destiny The Law of Nature The Companion of the Whole The Daughter of Necessity The Order that includes and comprehends all other Orders Or as Chrysippus saith A certain eternal and immutable sequel of Things c. Sempiterna quaedam indeclinabilis series rerum catena volvens semetipsa sese implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines in quibus apta connexaque est To which Lucan seems to allude in these two Verses At simul à prima descendit origine Mundi Causarum series atque omnia Fata laborant And Hesiod when he speaks distinctly of the three Parcae which Spin the Life of Man the first is named Atropos because the Time past is irrecoverable which is as the Thread spun and wound in the Spindle The second is called Clotho because of the Time present that runs which is as the Thread in the hand of her who Spins The third is Lachesis because of the Time to come or the hazard which is as the Wool or Flax that is not yet twisted Lachesis in Plato is said to govern the Time past Clotho the present Atropos the future That which is added of Lachesis that she receives the celestial Actions of the two other Sisters that she joyns them together and that she distributes them here below upon the Earth shews the Opinion of the Astrologers who bind the Fate of Mankind to the Stars and make it to depend upon them and come from them according to Manilius Fata quoque vitas hominum suspendit ab Astris An Opinion among the Astrologers more certain than that of the Sybils and the Oracles which were said to utter forth the Destinies For to hear them speak they seem to be no less acquainted with the Designs and Decrees of Heaven than the Oaks which Plato tells us came forth from Voices of the Enchantresses as Virgil observes Quam comitabantur fatalia carmina quercus Moreover as the Disciples of Plato the Stoicks and the other Patrons of Destiny seem consequently to defend Necessity which Seneca stiles a Necessity of all Things and of every Action which no Violence can break or alter For the Destinies saith he exercise their Right and their absolute and uncontrolable Power without favouring any and without being moved either with Prayers or Compassion they observe their fatal course appointed and irrevocable like as the swift and furious downfal of the Waters from some steep Places which neither go back nor stop for those Waters which follow but continually thrust down the first thus the constant sequel of Destiny makes the order of Things under this first and eternal Law to submit to the irrevocable Decree As therefore they seem to maintain I say a Necessity which altogether destroys the Liberty of human Actions and leaves nothing in our Free-will for that reason these Objections are opposed proceeding from the Inconveniences that will ensue The Chief of these Inconveniences is That if our Souls as they are placed and ranked in the sequel of Things be governed by the Destinies and being deprived of all Libery they act always out of an immutable and unavoidable Necessity the Liberty and ordinary Conduct of the Affairs of human Life fails and all Consultations are useless for whatever you resolve upon there shall nothing happen but what hath been decreed by the Destinies Thus Prudence will become idle and needless the study of Wisdom frivolous Legislators and Tyrants will be equally ridiculous because they command things that we must unavoidably do or what we can by no means perform So that there will be neither Vice nor Virtue nor any thing that will deserve either Praise or Blame seeing that they alone are reputed worthy of Praise who might do ill but behave themselves well and those worthy of Blame who might do well but behave themselves ill In this case no body will deserve Reward for any good Deeds as no body will deserve Punishment for any bad because the first cannot but act well and the latter hath not the Power to forbear and abstain from what is ill Finally if all things proceeded from an unavoidable Necessity in vain should we offer up our Prayers our Vows and Sacrifices c. 'T is
THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS VIRTUE AND LIBERTY Collected from the WORKS of the Learn'd GASSENDI By Monsieur Bernier Translated out of French LONDON Printed for Awnsham and John Churchil at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row MDCXCIX THE PREFACE THE Epicurean Philosophers placing the Happiness of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind and Health of the Body assure us that those two are no otherwise to be procured than by a constant Practice of Virtue And because they have had the hard Fate to be misrepresented by most of the other Sects as well Ancient as Modern and their Principles traduced as favouring the most brutal Sensuality the Learned Gassendi who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Justice thought he could not employ his Time better than to vindicate the Morals of Epicurus and his Followers from the Slanders of Mistake and Malice and to shew that their principal Design was to lead Men by smooth and easie Paths to a just sober wise and virtuous Behaviour as the only way to true Happiness This he proved at large and illustrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks and Romans But because these Things were diffused through the voluminous Works of that Great Man Monsieur Bernier whose Name is a sufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning took the Pains to put them together and to form them into several intire Discourses which on account of their great importance to Mankind are here presented to the Publick OF Moral Philosophy IN GENERAL MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy the main bent and design of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way It is therefore an undeniable Truth that Happiness or a Life free from Pain and Misery are such things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purposes to the obtaining of them And tho' several Persons who neither want the Necessities nor Conveniences of Life possessing great Riches promoted to Dignites and Honours blessed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-spring in a word who want nothing that may seem requisite to compleat their present Happiness tho' I say we find many who have all these Advantages yet they lead an anxious and uneasy Life disquieted with Cares Troubles and perpetual Disturbances From whence the wiser sort of Mankind have concluded That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cause wherein our true Happiness consists and of the last end which every one should propose to himself in all his Actions which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Passions and forsake Honesty Vertue and good Manners without which it is impossible to live happily For this Reason they have therefore undertaken to instruct us wherein true Happiness consists and to propose such useful Precepts for the due regulation of our Passions whereby our Minds may be less liable to be disturb'd This Collection of Precepts Reflections and Reasonings they name The Art of Living or The Art of leading an happy Life And which they commonly call Moral Philosophy because it comprehends such Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men that is to say the accustomed and habitual Actions of Life From hence we may understand That this part of Philosophy is not only speculative and rests in the bare Contemplation of its Object but proceeds to Action and that it is as we usually say active and practical for it directs and governs our Manners rendring them regular and agreeable with the Rules of Justice and Honesty So that in this respect it may be said to be The Science or if this Term be scrupled at we may call it The Art of doing well I only make this Supposition for let it be stiled Art or Science 't is a difference only in Name which depends upon the manner of understanding those two Words and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter We will rather take notice that Democritus Epicurus and divers others of no small Eminency have had so high an esteem for Moral Philosophy that they have judged the Natural to be no further regarded than only as it was found useful in freeing us from certain Errors and Mistakes in our Understanding which might disturb the Repose and Tranquility of our Life and wherein it might be serviceable to Moral Philosophy or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge which teaches us to live happily and comfortably I shall not mention the Followers of Socrates Aristippius Anthistenes with the Cyrenaicks and Cynicks who altogether neglecting the Natural gave themselves entirely over to the study of Moral Philosophy considering with Socrates what might make for the Good or Ill of Families and what might contribute to the Grief and Disturbance of Man's Life Quid siet in domibus fortasse malumve bonumve We may also here observe That tho' Socrates is supposed to be the Inventer of Moral Philosophy this is only to be understood so far as he did cultivate and improve a new and considerable part not that he laid the first and Original Precepts of it for it is certain that before him Pythagoras had much improved this sort of Knowledge And 't is well known that he commonly asserted That the Discourser of a Philosopher that cures not the Mind of some Passion is vain and useless as the Physick that drives not away the Distemper from the Body is insignificant It is likewise very certain That the wise Men of Greece who lived a little before Pythagoras were named wise only because they addicted themselves to the Study of Moral Wisdom Therefore at this present time their famous Sentences that relate to Mens Manners are generally known all over the World We might add if we would make farther search into the Antiquity of the Heroes that we shall find Orpheus by this same Study of Moral Philosophy drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and savage way of Living which gave occasion of that Saying of him That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions as Horace describes Orpheus inspir'd by more than human Power Did not as Poets feign tame savage Beasts But Men as lawless and as wild as they And first disswaded them from Rage and Blood Thus when Amphion built the Theban Wall They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute In a word it was Morality that first set a Mark of Distinction between publick and private Good setled our Rights and Authority and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies as the same Poet expresses When Man yet new No Rule but uncorrupted Reason knew And with a native bent did Good pursue Vnforc'd by Punishment unaw'd by Fear His Words were simple and his Soul sincere No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd No Court erected yet no Cause was heard But all was safe for Conscience was their Guard However we must acknowledge our selves much indebted to Socrates as to Moral Philosophy since by his applying himself
lest by shunning of these they might fall into greater From hence we may learn that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones We shall find the same Arguments for Fortitude for it is neither Labour nor Pain nor Patience nor Constancy nor Industry nor Courage nor Watchfulness that draw us of themselves but we are perswaded by these actions that we may live without Trouble or Fear and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is disturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage insomuch that by this weakness of Spirit many have lost their Parents many their Friends and many their Native Country nay have altogether lost themselves But a generous stout and couragious Spirit is free from such Cares and Troubles because it despiseth Death and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death and the least have divers intervals of Rest and that as for moderate Griefs we are Masters of them Besides a noble Spirit considers that if the Pains be not extraordinary they are easily suffered but if they be very grievous we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life which in such a case becomes unpleasant to us so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre From hence we may conclude that Fear and Cowardise are not in themselves blame-worthy neither do Courage and Patience of themselves merit Praise But the first are slighted because they increase Pain and Sorrow and the other are desired because they procure real Pleasure There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice of which we may almost say the same For as I have already demonstrated that Wisdom Temperance and Fortitude are so joyned with Pleasure that they cannot be separated from it we ought to say the same of Justice which is not only inoffensive to all Men but does also constantly bring with it such advantages as by the strength of its own nature does quiet and settle the Thoughts by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire And as Timerousness Covetousness and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul it begets much Trouble and Vexation and if it hath committed any evil action tho' never so secretly yet it can never be assured that it shall always remain undiscover'd Jealousy and fear of being found out do commonly attend evil Actions and we suppose every one to be our Accuser and ready to Inform against us Nay some out of fear of being Discovered have been their own Accusers If some think their Riches a sufficient shelter and capable of quieting their Conscience yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes that upon a due resentment of this their Thoughts labour under a perpetual Agony and Disturbance Now their wicked Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience or the Laws of the Country and the hatred of their Acquaintance have to increase it Nevertheless such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches Luxury Honour Dominion c. that in the obtaining of them they will stick at no indirect Means so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws is able to stop their Career True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice Equity and Fidelity which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others and which is absolutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Sedate And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill because that the desires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person and as for other vain Desires we are not to regard them for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us by the seeming good things it brings along with it Therefore we cannot say That Justice is of it self desirable but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest where it hath once taken possession I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion but they relate to nothing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures which Epicurus abhors in express words I will only take notice that the Pleasure that is here understood is such true real and natural Pleasure in which our Happiness consists We therefore say That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it being the real and genuine cause of it for where that is supposed Happiness immediately attends and when that is removed Pleasure it self must needs decay In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day because it alone is the true and necessary cause thereof for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon the Day must needs be and when it withdraws the Day dis-appears Now the reason why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness is because he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues for all the rest proceed from this and have in a great measure a dependence upon her CHAP. III. Wherein an Happy Life doth consist WHat we have already discours'd of tends to little else than to make a plain discovery of Epicurus's Opinion But now we must come closer to the Matter and strictly examin whether he had sufficient ground to say That Pleasure is the main End Here we must weigh two of his chief Maxims First That all Pleasure is of it self and of its own nature a real Good and on the contrary That all Grief and Pain is an Evil. The Second is That notwithstanding sometimes we must prefer some sort of Pains before some sort of Pleasures Whether all Pleasure be good of it self IN respect of the first Maxim It is not without ground that Epicurus asserts That all Pleasure is of it self good tho' by accident it happens sometimes otherwise for all Creatures are of themselves so inclinable to Pleasure and Delight that it is the first and chief thing that they naturally covet nor
all indirect means strive to acquire Riches that they might have the pleasure of wasting them in Prodigality Rioting and Luxury This hath given occasion to Manilius too justly to Complain For Heaven is kind with bounteous hand it grants A fit supply for Nature's sober Wants She asks not much yet Men press blindly on And heap up more to be the more Vndone By Luxury they Rapine's force maintain What that scrapes up flows out in Luxury again And to be Squander'd or to raise Debate Is the great Only use of an Estate That those good things which we call Honest have the nearest relation to Pleasure THis seems a little more difficult to be made out Bonum honestum or honest Good seems to carry its own intrinsick worth and to be desir'd only for it self Cicero amongst others appears very much incens'd against Epicurus after he had proposed a Form of Honesty such an one as he would have us understand he applies himself to Torquatus Thy Epicurus saith That he knows not what they mean who compute Man's chief Happiness only by Honesty who say that all things are to be referr'd to that and that there is nothing of Pleasure to be intermix'd with it These are idle Discourses which he can't understand and that he cannot conceive what they mean by this word Honesty for to speak according to the usual Dialect we stile that Honest which the People by their general Vogue term Glorious and Honourable And tho' that saith he be oftentimes more pleasing than divers other Pleasures still it is desired for Pleasure sake See here saith he this great Dispute A famous Philosopher who hath made so much noise in the World and hath spread his Fame not only over Greece and Italy but over the Barbarous Nations saith That he understands not what that Honesty means that is so much talk'd of if there be no Pleasure intermixt with it In this manner Cicero proposeth the Opinion of Epicurus in relation to these remarkable Words That nothing is called Honest but what the General Vogue of Men recommend Aristotle explains the Matter in these Terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Either that there is nothing Honest or it is that which is so esteem'd in the Opinion of Men. Now to speak first as in reference to the Notion or description of Honesty What harm is there if we consider it with a respect to Man from whom it receives Praise and Recommendation The word Honest amongst the Latins is said to be so from the Honour that Action deserves and amongst the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems to have no other Signification for if you please you may interpret it not only Honest but also Beautiful Honourable and Praise-worthy c. And you will find that it is not so in respect of it self but in respect of Men who allow of it to be so and consequently it appears to them Beautiful and Honourable and of whom it is and ought to be Praised The same ought to be understood of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when we interpret it Ignoble Shameful and Detestable we mean always in reference to Men to whom it seems to be so And that it is really so we will appeal to Cicero himself who gives this description of Honesty That when it is divested of all Profit and Applause it still remains desirable and commendable for its own sake without any regard to a Reward Now as I say is it not true that in this sense Honesty is that which may be approved of and desired which shews a relation to them who Praise it or as Epicurus saith To the common Esteem of the People But by this word People or Multitude who can think that Epicurus hath a design to exclude Men of Wisdom and Understanding and that he means not generally all the Men that make up a City or People It were Ridiculous and Foolish to have such a Fancy Now in reference to what Cicero saith That all Profit is removed Epicurus will agree with him That Honest Men don't propose to themselves any Profit or Advantage such as Mony and the like low mean things but they propose to themselves some other Benefits as Praise Glory Honour Renown c. which Cicero himself Acknowledges for in his Oration for Milo having supposed That there are divers Recompences offered to Men of Honour he saith That of all the Rewards of Vertue Glory is the greatest And in another Place he declares That Vertue desires no other recompence for all its Labours and Dangers but Praise and Glory which being removed saith he what is there in the course of this Life of so short a continuance for which we ought to be at so much Labour Epicurus therefore seems to have given a good description of what is Honest viz. That which is Glorious and Honourable by the Vogue and universal Consent of all Mankind For if at any time People account that to be Commendable and Glorious which is esteem'd Mean and Dishonourable amongst some People or Nations who have different Laws and Customs according to which the Notion of Honest and Dishonest differs but not in respect of the same People amongst whom that thing may be esteem'd Honest and agreeable with their Laws and Customs For this Reason therefore Cicero sometimes gives this general description of Honour A reward of Vertue granted to some Body by the Judgment and Approbation of his Fellow Citizens Praemium Virtutis judicio studioque Civium delatum ad aliquem As if he should say That Honour and by consequence Honesty or that which is Glorious and Honourable by Reputation depends upon the Judgment of the Citizens or of the People who make use of their own Laws and Customs But in conclusion to speak one word to the Purpose in reference to that Honesty which relates to Pleasure we must observe That this Relation hinders not but that Honesty in one sense may be said to be desired for it self or for its own sake because it is desired nulla contingente sive superveniente re as Aristotle Teaches that is to say as Cicero Interprets it All Profit being laid aside and without any Reward Recompence or Advantage such as Mony and the like can produce For some may desire Honour Learning and Vertue not because they may thereby advance Gain or increase Wealth but for the Renown and Satisfaction that will arise from the enjoyment of a clear and enlightned Understanding whereby we may the better rule and Govern our Passions and all this nevertheless because it is pleasant to be Honoured Learned and Vertuous and to enjoy a Soul Calm and Serene Whether the desire of Honour be Blame-worthy WE must here observe that tho a too eager and violent pursuit of Honour under a colour of Vertue be not to be allowed yet we must not totally condemn the Desire of it as some have done especially if we seek after it with a
Method and Conception seems to be more reasonable in the Division of Prudence makes no mention of the Military because it belongs to the Politic nor of the Regal as being also a part of the Politic but after the Private and the Oeconomic he acknowledgeth none but the Politic which he supposeth to be not in the Subjects but in the Governours Therefore we shall follow the Division of Aristotle as the most reasonable and the most convenient I shall only take notice of the first Species that it is named Private Monastic and Solitary not because it is precisely designed to Moderate and Rule the Manners of one who leads a private Life and intermeddles not with public Affairs or who living in a solitary Place separates himself from the Society of Men as the Hermits but we make use of this Appellation to signifie that every Person of what Condition soever ought to be endowed with a certain Prudence which belongs to him alone and regards his particular Person So that tho' he may Govern others he must also Govern himself chiefly according to the Dictates of Reason and so provide for himself that he may become an honest Man that is to say a Man of good and laudable Manners Therefore this kind of Prudence is necessary as well for a Prince as a Master of a Family for both are bound not only to Rule others but moreover to know how to Rule themselves and not only to be good Governours but also to be honest and good Men. From hence it is therefore that this kind of Prudence is not only named Private or Solitary but also Ethic and Moral for it ought to prescribe and appoint the Manners of every particular Person and adjust them to the Rules of Reason For according to the Opinion of Aristotle and his Followers it belongs to Morality or to Moral Discipline to look after every ones manner of living thereby to render his life better So that by obeying its Precepts a Man may become a just and honest Man viz. by living prudently by subduing Anger and his other Passions to his own Reason by regulating their disorderly Motions and not suffering 'em to act extravagantly so that if he performs any thing he may be always ready to give a good Reason why he hath thus proceeded tho' none requires it of him and to give a check to himself by examining his own Manners and Actions and inquiring of himself as Phocilides did By what Course have I steer'd What have I been doing What good have I performed or omitted Quanam transilii quid feci quid boni omisi Rejoycing when he perceiv'd that he had judged aright that he had acted according to Reason and done wisely and grieving when he found the contrary Of the Offices of private Prudence THe Offices of a private Prudence are generally reckon'd two The first is to fix upon a certain course of Life wherein to spend the rest of our days The second to govern and direct all our Actions in that condition of Life according to the Laws of Reason and Virtue It is evident that the first concerns us very much and is not easily to be effected especially if we will not venture upon it without advising with our best Friends and duly consulting our Reason For such is the Condition of our Life and of all human Affairs that upon what State soever we cast our Eyes we shall perceive presently several inconveniences attend it which are so much the more troublesome because we can't well discover their Events for they appear to us as in a kind of a Chaos and their first Beginnings and Consequences are covered over with a kind of thick Mist not penetrable to our Understanding The ancient Greeks have often painted out to us this Incumbrance or troublesome Confusion and Ausonius after them hath left us an excellent Picture in his Poem where he tells us That he knows not what to resolve nor what kind of life to chuse That the Bar is full of trouble That the care of a Family is uneasie That a Traveller is always thinking of what is doing at home That a Merchant is continually subject to fresh Losses That the fear of Poverty hinders us from quietly enjoying what we have That daily Labour oppresseth and wearies the Workman That the Seas are dreadful because of the many Ship-wracks That a single Life hath its Inconveniences That the idle Suspicion of a jealous Husband is intollerable That the War is subject to Wounds Blood and Slaughter Quod vitae sectabor iter Si plena tumultu Sunt fora si curis domus anxia si peregrinos Cura domus sequitur mercantem si nova semper Damna manent cessare vetat si turpis Egestas Si vexat labor Agricolam Mare naufragus horror Infamat poenaeque graves in coelibe vita Et gravior cautis custodia vana Maritis Sanguineum si Martis opus c. Now as there is nothing more unhappy than to be always wavering in Uncertainty which we see to be the Condition of many and to spend all our Life in considering how we should spend it and in what Condition it concerns us most to exert to the utmost of our Power all our Faculties in considering and deliberately chusing such a State and Condition of Life as may be least subject to Mischiefs and Inconveniences Neither are we in this Case to slight the Counsel and Advice of wise experienc'd Friends Persons of a clear Repute and who aiming not at their own private Gain may afford us sound and profitable Advice But every one ought chiefly to consult his own Nature and understand what his own Strength can perform or not for we ought to be best known to our selves and we may discover in our selves for the most part something which is hid to all the World besides But we ought to know the unsetledness of human Affairs and the obscurity of the time to come to be such that we must in all things allow something to Chance and hope that every thing will succeed well And because some things may happen which may make us uneasie we ought to fortifie our Spirits against such Accidents in such a manner that we may slight them bear them easily and pass over them quietly What has been spoken is in respect to that State and Condition which our Laws will not allow us to change such as Marriage a Monastical Life or of that State which we cannot change but for a worse and with great disgrace For as for that which we may quit when we will to embrace another there is no need of so great Caution and Circumspection tho' still we ought to engage in such an one as if we always did intend to abide in it Otherwise the very Thought of changing will frequently disturb our Minds with various Imaginations and which being fixed to nothing but altering every moment as we say from white to black we shall never remain fix'd and resolv'd
and fulfilled his Duty Cicero also discourses admirably upon this subject thus Right Reason doubtless is a true Law agreeable with Nature and bestowed upon all Men a constant immutable eternal Guide inclining us by an inward impulse to our Duty and by secret Prohibitions turns us out of the way of that which is evil and deceitful 'T is a Law that needs not be proclaimed nothing can be retrench'd from it nor can it be abolished Neither the Senate nor the People can free us from our Obedience to this Law nor need we any other Interpreter but our selves It varies not at Rome from that at Athens nor does it differ at present from that which shall be hereafter but shall always be constantly and unchangably the same amongst all Nations and in all Times and God alone shall be the common Lord and chief Commander of all Men He is the Contriver and Maker of this Law the Interpreter and Law-giver He who will not be obedient to this Law must act against himself and despise the Nature of Man and tho' he may escape outward Punishments yet shall be grievously tormented inwardly Seneca speaks no less excellently well There is saith he something greater which we cannot conceive There is a Divinity that we acknowledge by our living let us obey his Will and Commandments A secret and reserv'd Conscience is of no use all things are open before God Will you saith he afterwards represent to your selves God great as he is full of Majesty and withal kind tender and affectionate and always ready to succour you 'T is not with the bloody Sacrifices of Beasts and with the abundance of Blood that you must honour him for what pleasure can there be in cutting the Throats of innocent Creatures but by a pure Conscience which hath always a respect to what is Good and Honest The Sacrifice that every one performs in his Heart is more acceptable to him than all these glorious Temples and large Edifices of Stones heaped one upon another After this manner he speaks in another place The first Worship of the Gods is to believe that they are and that they have one Existence We must next acknowledge their Sovereign Majesty and ascribe unto them the Attribute of Goodness without which there would be no Majesty We must believe that they Govern the World that by their Power they rule and dispose of all things take care of Human Race insomuch that sometimes they concern themselves with the Affairs of particular Persons That they do no Evil that they have no Evil in them but that they chastise and punish Mankind under an appearance of Good Would you have the Gods propitious to you study to be good He honours them sufficiently who imitates them As for what concerns Prayers Seneca truly is not of the number of those who believe that we ought not to pray to God But he will have us pray to him in such a manner as if all the World heard what we said and that no body but would approve of our Prayers Know saith he that you shall be free from all vain and idle Desires When you shall come about this ask nothing of God but what you may ask before all the World This is what you ought to pray for that he would bestow upon you the Health of the Mind with that of the Body To what does not the Fury and Folly of Men proceed They secretly offer up to God such filthy and corrupt Prayers that if they should perceive any to listen to or understand 'em they would stop and be silent filled with Shame and Confusion They have the impudence to ask of God what they are asham'd that Men should know Follow therefore this wholsome Advice Live with Men as if God saw you and speak unto God as if Men understood you 'T is sufficiently known how Satyrically the Poets have expressed themselves against these Whisperers and secret Desirers of others harms In private thus he Prays When wilt thou Jove My wealthy Vncle from this World remove Or O thou Thunderer's Son great Hercules That once thy bounteous Deity would please To guide my Rake upon that chinking Sound Of some vast Treasure hidden under Ground O were my Pupil fairly knock'd ' o th' Head I shou'd possess th' Estate if he were Dead The famous Satyrist of our time could not but mention them in that learned Epistle which he directs to his spiritual Friend Monsieur Guilleragues Que si cet hyver un rhume salutaire Guerissant de tans maux mon avare Beaupere c. O would some Rhume from these kind Winter Rains Cure my good Father-in-Law of all his Pains Wrap him in Lead well shriev'd and full of Prayers And grace the Miser's House with welcome Tears How gladly my last Gifts would I bestow Nor grudge the Charges of the pompous Wo This some Months since was all the Talk and Care Of the King's Farmer 's honest humble Heir Who plagu'd with Hunger and unkind delay Spent Forty wretched Years in hastning one good Day As concerning these unworthy and ridiculous Prayers the Answer that Socrates made when some inquired why the Oracle was more favourable to the Lacedemonians than to the Athenians is not to be omitted Because said he the Prayers of the Lacedemonians are more pleasing to the Oracle than those of the Athenians and they are more pleasing because they desire nothing else from the Gods neither in publick nor private but that they would grant them what is Good Honest and Just Lastly 't is well known what Epicurus said to this purpose That If God granted all the Prayers that were made to him Mankind would quickly Perish because they are continually asking Things which are useful to some but pernicious to others As for Superstition Cicero adviseth us to distinguish it from true Religion For we must not saith he imagine that by taking away Superstition we take away Religion It belongs to a wise Man to keep to the Institutions to the Mysteries and Ceremonies of his Ancestors and to acknowledge this excellent everlasting and wonderful Nature which the beautiful Fabrick of the World and the order and regulation of celestial Things force us to own Therefore as we ought to endeavour to increase Religion which is unseparable from the knowledge of Nature so ought we to root out Superstition and to cast away all its Relicks for it followeth and pursues us every where and to what side soever you turn you will always meet with it whether you hearken to a Diviner or to a Discoverer of Things to come or whether you sacrifice a Beast or whether you observe the flying of a Bird or whether you look upon a Fortuneteller a Chaldean or those who Prophesy by the inspection of the Intrails of Animals or whether it Lightens or Thunders or the Thunderbolt falls from Heaven or whether some Monstrous Creature is born or whether some thing hath been done or happned which commonly and necessarily
natural Law or according to Nature not only because there is nothing more Natural or more according to Nature than Society and Society being not able to subsist without this Precept it ought also to be esteemed Natural But also because God seems to have imprinted it in the Hearts of all Men and that this Law contains in such a full manner all the other Laws of Society that no Man can invade the Right of another but he must violate this Law Therefore this Law alone ought to be look'd upon as the Rule of all our Actions that concern our Neighbour And truly as every one desires that his Right may be Religiously preserved to him so that no Man may attempt upon it he need but think the same thing of others and to put himself in their Place and Condition to understand what he ought or what he ought not to do Therefore as there is nothing nearer at Hand and more ready nor more infallible than our own Conscience every one may consult himself and he alone may be his own proper and true Casuist So that he who seeks for others seems not so much disposed to be willing to do to another what he would not have done to himself as to not dare to do it if he hath not some Body upon whom he may cast the Blame And upon this Point Cicero treats very well in his Offices That those who prohibit any thing to be done whereof there is a Question whether it be Just or Unjust cannot prescribe any Rule nor Precept more useful and reasonable because Equity here appears and is plainly discoverable and that our doubting is a sign that we think or design to do Evil. Bene praecipiunt qui vetant quidquam agere quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se dubitatio autem cogitationem significat injuriae Upon this Subject I remember what Monsieur de la Moignon first President of the Parliament of Paris a wise and learned Judge said to us one Day as we were walking in his shady Retirement in the Wood de Baville That that Maxim of Cicero if it were duly practis'd among Men would be of a wonderful use and that for what concerns those who have such sort of doubts and trouble themselves to seek for Casuists to support them he had read an excellent Saying in a Spanish Author That such Persons seek to pick a Quarrel or to play the Cheat with the Law of God Quieren pley tear contra la lay de Dios. Let us observe more-over that the Holy Scriptures have said very well That the Law was not made for the Just because he who is truly Just observes it not out of fear of the Punishments that the Law threatens but out of a love for Justice it self and out of a respect for it so that if there were no Law nor Magistrates he would notwithstanding still live in Obedience to Law and Justice Therefore that excellent Expression of Menander is thought praise-worthy If you be Just your Manners will be to you instead of Laws And the Answer of Aristotle is remarkable when he was questioned what Profit he had found and received from the study of Philosophy To do said he of my own accord and without constraint what others do for fear of the Laws This obliged Horace to say That we ought not to do any thing for fear of Punishment Nihil esse faciendum formidine poenae From whence we may remark that Corrections and Punishments are not only ordained for the Wicked and Criminals that they may perish and be extinct but that by their Destruction they may also terrify and restrain others as Seneca observes and according to Lactantius who brings in Plato saying That a wise and prudent Man punishes not because 't is a Crime for he cannot make that which is already done to be undone but that others may not commit the same Crimes But let us hearken to Epicurus discoursing of the great Advantages that there are in observing Justice That there is great Reason to live up to Justice JVstice having been established by a common Agreement every one ought to think that he is born and admitted into the Society whereof he is a Member upon this Condition either express or understood That he shall do wrong to no Man nor no Man to him and thus we must either keep to this Agreement or depart out of the Society seeing that he is suffered there but upon the same Condition that he was admitted From whence it follows that as naturally he don't desire to be evilly dealt withal he ought not to deal ill with others nor do to others what he would not that others should do to him This being granted we may say that the Laws have been established in favour and for the sake of wise Men not to hinder them from committing Injustice but to prevent others from doing them wrong for of their own accord they are so inclined that if there were no Laws they would injure no body for they have limited their Desires and confined them to the necessities of Nature to supply which there is no need of doing Injustice for there is no Pleasure Nature allows of which will cause us to wrong any body for those exorbitances and irregular Desires which proceed from our vain and unruly Passions and Lusts are the only Causes of Mischief The Truth is the Products of the Earth such as Corn Fruits Water c. are to be obtain'd without any great difficulty and the enjoyment of these as often as Hunger and Thirst excite us afford us no small Pleasure and Satisfaction without being hereby tempted to Riot and Excess or to commit Robberies or other enormous Crimes upon our Neighbours which Men are more apt to become liable to and guilty of when they indulge their extravagant Lusts in living splendidly and sumptuously and by unjustly heaping up of Riches to maintain such their Extravagances Nor shall I here stand to take notice of Particulars such who are not satisfied with decent Habits with one Habitation nor one Wife and so of the like who passing the Bounds that Nature hath appointed are daily hurried away by their Passions and endless Desires beyond all Limits Moreover as the wise Man acts all things for himself and for his own Good and Satisfaction there is nothing that will contribute more to this purpose than in carefully observing the Rules of Justice for when he renders unto every one what belongs to him and that he does wrong to no Man he preserves and supports as much as in him lies the Society in which his own Safety is involved he provokes no body to do him Injury neither doth he fear the Penalties and Punishments which the Publick Laws threaten So that his Conscience being free from Guilt he is at quiet and ease within himself without any private Checks or Gripes which is one main design of Justice to procure and the most excellent