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A33176 Tully's three books of offices, in English with notes explaining the method and meaning of the author.; De officiis. English Cicero, Marcus Tullius.; Cockman, Thomas, 1675?-1745. 1699 (1699) Wing C4322; ESTC R20450 290,592 366

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to do himself a Kindness either thinks he does nothing that 's contrary to Nature or that the doing an Injury is a less degree of Evil than Death or Poverty or Pain or loss of Children Friends or Relations If he thinks that in Wronging and Abusing of others he doth not do any thing that is contrary to Nature 't is in vain to dispute any longer with such a one who takes away from Man the distinguishing Part and very Characteristick as it were of his Nature But if he allows that 't is indeed an Evil only thinks that some others such as Poverty Pain or Death may be worse he 's grosly mistaken in being of Opinion That the Ills which touch nothing but the Body or Fortune can be greater than those which affect the Soul CHAP. VI. The Interest of Particulars inseparable from that of the whole Community The Rule of not Wronging another for our own Advantage extends not only to Relations or Fellow-Citizens but to all Mankind The breaking of it ruins all Justice Liberality c. Several Cases about it put and resolv'd Tyrants no Members of Human Society a This is a Conclusion from the foregoing Discouse seeing for one Man to injure another is so very pernicious to Human Society it follows That no one should do any thing for his own Interest as distinct from that of the whole Community WE should all of us therefore propose the same End and every one think his own Interest in particular to be the same with that of the Republick in general which if each one endeavour to draw solely to himself all Union and Agreement amongst Men will be dissolv'd b To what he has prov'd in the former Chapter That the Injuring of others for our own Advantage is the ruin of Society and consequently most unnatural it might have been answer'd That this holds good only as to lesser Societies and in respect of our Kin c. but as for those who are of a different Tribe or Country we are under no such Obligation of not Injuring them He therefore here shews in answer to this the extent of this Obligation and proves that 't is not confin'd to those of the same Family City or the like but equally comprehends all Mankind forasmuch as all are alike subject to the same Law of Nature c. And if Nature enjoyn us That every Man should desire and procure the Advantage of another whoever he be tho' for no other reason than because he is a Man it necessarily follows That all Men are joyn'd by the self-same Nature in one common Interest which if it be true then all Men are subject and live equally under the same Law of Nature and if this be true too then certainly they 're forbid by that same Law of Nature any ways to Injure or Wrong one another But the first of these is undoubtedly certain therefore the last must needs be so likewise For as to what is usually said by some Men That they would not take any thing away from a Father or Brother for their own Advantage but there is not the same reason for their ordinary Citizens 't is foolish and absurd For they thrust ' emselves out from partaking of any Priviledges and from joyning in common with the rest of their Citizens for the Publick Good An Opinion that strikes at the very Root and Foundation of all Civil Societies Others there are who are ready to confess That they ought to bear such a Regard to Fellow-Citizens but by no means allow of it in relation to Strangers Now these Men destroy that universal Society of all Mankind which if once taken away Kindness Liberality Justice and Humanity must utterly perish which excellent Virtues whoever makes void is chargeable with Impiety towards the immortal c For tho' the Offence more immediately concerns the Persons that are injur'd yet 't is also a Sin against God himself since 't is a Breach of his Laws and Commands Gods For he breaks that Society which they have establish'd and settled amongst Men the closest Cement or Bond of which is the being of Opinion That for Men to Injure and Wrong one another for their private Interests is an Evil that Nature is much more a verse from than all those which happen either to the Body or Fortune d That is To take away any thing from another which is an Act of Injustice is not only a greater Evil than any of Body or Fortune but of Mind too i. e. than any other Vice except only those which are Offences against Justice as well as it self nay and I might add to the Mind also provided only they ben't contrary to Justice for that one Virtue is as 't were a kind Mistress and Queen of all the rest But what perhaps some Men will be apt to say if a Wise Man be ready to perish for Hunger must not he take away Victuals from another tho' a perfectly useless and insignificant Fellow Not at all for Life it self is not so dear to me as a setled Resolution of doing no Wrong for my private Advantage But suppose this good Man almost dead with Cold should have it in his power to take Phalaris's Cloaths away one of the most savage and inhuman of Tyrants would not you have him to do it There 's no great difficulty in determining such Cases For 't is certain if you take away any thing from another tho' never so useless and insignificant a Creature for no other End but to Benefit your self by it 't is an inhuman Action and plainly contrary to the Laws of Nature But if you are one who by Living will do very great Service to the Republick or perhaps to the Society of Mankind in general and for that only reason take something from another 't is an Action that is not to be found much fault with But in all other Cases every Man 's bound to bear his own Misfortunes rather than to get quit of 'em by Wronging his Neighbour You 'll say then Is not it more contrary to Nature To Covet or Seize what belongs to another than to be in Sickness or Want or any such Evil Yes but withal 't is as contrary to Nature to abandon all Care of the publick Interest for 't is a piece of Injustice e 'T is true the Laws of Nature or Right Reason forbid Men to take away ought from another for their own Advantage for it would be the Ruine and Dissolution of Society which they especially desire to maintain But if it should at any time chance so to happen that the doing of a Damage to any third Person should be necessary to the Support and Maintenance of that Society then the doing it is not only allow'd but commanded by the Law of Nature From whence it follows That an honest prudent and valiant Person whose Death would bring a great Disadvantage on the Publick may take from an idle and useless Citizen
of what he bought I have brought you these Instances only to let you see That these cunning sort of Men were ne're approv'd of by our Ancestours CHAP. XVII The different Methods us'd by Law and Philosophy for the rooting out of Knavery Treachery to set up Traps tho' one don 't drive the Beasts into ' em How the Law of Nature differs from the Civil The Excellence of the Roman Civil Laws The Extent of that Expression Ex fide bona Knavish Cunning very different from true Prudence How the Laws provide against Fraud in Selling of Slaves Nature forbids one Man to make his Gain of another's Ignorance The ill Effects of false Prudence BUt a The Difference between the Laws and Philosophers as to taking away Wickedness is cheifly this That those can restrain the outward Actions only but these inform the Mind and Understanding those can only punish the actual Crimes of Delinquents but these by informing the Judgment and improving the Reason take care to prevent the Commission of 'em and keep Men from Vice out of a Love of Virtue whereas the Laws can only terrifie them from it by fear of Punishment the Laws take one way to root these Frauds out and Philosophers another the former medling no further with them than as they break out into open Acts and may as 't were be laid hold on by the Hands of Justice the latter endeavouring to hinder their breaking out and to prevent them by Precepts of Wisdom and Reason Reason therefore requires of us That we do nothing Treacherously nothing Deceitfully nothing meerly by outward Shews and false Pretences Now is it not Treachery to set up a Trap tho' one does not raise and pursue the Beasts into it for the simple Creatures of themselves will run into it without being driven Just so you offer an House to be sold because of some Faults which you know to be in it and put up your Bill as it were like a Trap in which some unwary sort of Body will be taken I know that at present the depravation of Manners and prevalence of evil Custom have made this be counted neither Base nor Dishonourable and that 't is tolerated by the Laws and Constitutions of the Publick but I am sure 't is not tolerated by the Laws of Nature For 't is to be consider'd I must repeat it again tho' I have already mention'd it a great many times that there is such a thing as Natural Society which comprehends all Men and ties and unites 'em to one another There 's a nearer between those of the same Nation and a nearer yet between those of the same City Therefore our Fore-fathers made a distinction between b The Law of Nations is nothing else but some Rules and Maxims of the Law of Nature which Reason tells us we ought to observe in our Actions and Entercourse with all Men whatever This is not so distinct from that of particular Cities as tho' this could command any thing contrary to the former No the Laws of every City must be allow'd by Reason and suppose it as their Foundation but they determin some things which Reason has left indifferent and descend to some Particulars as to Time Place c. which Reason does not meddle with that Law which is common to Nations and that which belongs to each City in particular Whatever we are bound by the Civil Constitutions to do to our Citizens we are c Because the Civil may add tho' it can add nothing contrary to that of Nations not oblig'd by the Law of Nations to do the same to Strangers but d Because that of Nations is still in force and obliges notwithstanding what the Civil may have added to it The building upon a Foundation does not take away the Foundation it self whatever we are bound by this latter to do to others the same we ought to do to our Citizens also But e The Laws and particular States consider Men as now they are in the World and only regulate their outward Actions so as to preserve the Peace and Safety of the Publick But those of Nature or Right Reason in the Observation of which consists the perfectest Justice that Men are capable of considers Men as they ought to be and commands all that Purity Sincerity c. that becomes the Perfection of a Reasonable Nature which is more than the Civil can possibly do The Nature of God is the true Standard of genuin Right and perfect Justice Right Reason which is taken from the Nature of God is an original Piece which tho' in no wise equal to the living Standard is at least agreeable to it as far as it reaches The Civil Laws are taken from Reason and are only a Copy and faint Representation of it however 't were to be wish'd that such as it is it were carefully follow'd This is the Sence in which I take this place the Law which at present we use amongst us is far from being an original Piece immediately taken from genuin Right and true perfect Justice 't is only a Copy and faint Representation of it However I could wish we liv'd up even to this for 't is copy'd at least from some of the best Originals which were drawn from the Truth and Nature of the thing For how excellent is that Form in judicial Proceedings Uti ne c. That I mayn't be Defrauded or brought to an Inconvenience by trusting to you and your Honesty And how incomparable that other That Honest Men do nothing but that which is Honest and without Design But the great Question is Who they are that are Honest Men and what 't is to do nothing but that which is Honest f Of whom he speaks chap. 1. of his de Amicitia and to whom he apply'd himself for Knowledge in the Civil Laws after the Death of the other Mucius who was Augur He was Cos. with L. Licinius Crassus An. U. C. 658 whom he call'd duo Sapientissimi Consules chap. 11. of this Book He was afterwards kill'd by Marius's Order in Vesta's Temple Temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen says our Author ante simulachrum Vestae trucidatus est c. De Nat. Deor. Q. Scaevola I remember the High-Priest was us'd to say That all those Judgments which had Ex fide bona Faithfully and honestly put into their Forms were of marvellous Force and that Faithfully and Honestly were of very large Extent and belong'd not only to Wardships Societies Trusts and Commissions but to Buyings Sollings Lettings and Hirings which relate to the Society and Entercourse of Mankind and that 't was the part of an extraordinary Judge to determin exactly all these Cases what one Man ought to make good to another upon only the bare Principles of Conscience and Honesty especially seeing Men differ in their Judgments about the greatest part of ' em All Craft therefore should utterly be banish'd and that knavish sort of Cunning which would fain indeed
regard the Oppress'd whom yet 't is their Duty to save and protect I am therefore of Opinion that Plato's Consequence will hardly hold good where speaking about the Philosophers he says They are wholly taken up in the seeking out of Truth and perfectly neglect and make light of those things which the rest of the World are so eager after and so contend about and that therefore they are just This I say I am afraid is a bad Consequence for tho' 't is true b In Chap. 21. he puts two Cases wherein he thinks these Men may be excusable 1. If their Genius lie very much toward Learning c. 2. If they are of weak Constitutious so as to be unable to meddle with Publick Affairs as Scipio's Son was they keep the first sort of Justice inasmuch as they actually do no Wrong yet they run perfectly counter to the other for being engag'd in their Learning and Studies they abandon their Friends to be injur'd by others whom in Justice they ought to have protected and defended So that 't is believ'd they 'd hardly ever trouble ' emselves so far as at all to inter-meddle with the Business of the Publick if it was not altogether as it were forc'd upon them But 't were a great deal better would they do it voluntarily for an c The Moralists make a distinction between doing an honest Action and doing it honestly honestum and honeste agere He that pays another his due does an honest Action but he does not do honestly if against his Will and by compulsion of Laws Action tho' Honest is not therefore truly virtuous unless it be done out of Choice and with a Good-will There are d Another Cause of this sort of Injustice a morose unsociable Temper c. others yet who out of a Desire of improving their own Estates or else a morose and unsociable sort of Temper cry They meddle with Nobody's Business but their own that so they may seem to be Men of strict Honesty and to Injure Nobody and they do indeed avoid the one sort of Injustice but directly run themselves into the other for they desert the common Good and Society of Mankind while they bestow neither Study Pains nor Money toward the Preservation of it Thus have I laid down the two sorts of Injustice and pointed out to you the Causes of each and have also endeavour'd to explain the true Nature and Extent of Justice from all which Account 't will be easie to judge unless we are extreamly fond of our own Ease what those several Duties are which at several times are required of us I say Unless we are fond of our own Ease for the truth on 't is 't is a troublesome thing to be concern'd in the Business of other People however old e Terence's Heautontimoroumenos Act. 1. Sc. 1. Chremes expostulating with Menedemus for working so very hard the other asks him What he has to do to meddle with another's Business to which he answers Homo sum humani nihil 〈◊〉 me alienum puto I am a Man and accordingly ought to be concern'd in whatever relates to the Welfare of any Man Which good-natur'd Sentence S t Austin tells us was applauded by the whole Theatre We are all Fellow-members and as was observ'd Chap. 7. born for the Service Good and Assistance of one another it being the fundamental Principle of the Law of Nature That every Man should seek the Good and Welfare of the whole Society and every Member of it as well as his own private and particular Interest Omnis homo est omni homini proximus nec ulla cogitanda est longinquitas generis ubi est natura communis says the forecited Father Chremes in Terence thinks That he ought to be concern'd for the Good of all Men. But be that as it will forasmuch as the Success of our own Affairs whether Good or Ill more nearly concerns us and makes us more sensible than that of another's which appears to us small as a thing at a great distance therefore we pass a quite different Judgment upon the one and the other And upon this account 't is a very good Rule that is given by some Men That we should never venture upon any Action of which we doubt whether 't is Honest or Dishonest For Honesty quickly would shew it self by its own native Brightness and the Doubting about it is a plain Intimation that at least we suspected some Injustice when we did it CHAP. X. Justice is alter'd upon an Alteration of Circumstances and what was our Duty in one Case to do in other Circumstances 't is our Duty to avoid Promises are not to be stood to in several Cases as If they are Prejudicial If made thro' Fear c. A close adhering to the words of a Law or Bargain is a means of being Unjust Craft in such cases to be diligently avoided BUt here 't is observable a Having given an account of the Nature of Justice and Injustice with the Causes of this he proceeds to shew How in several Cases that which is usually a part of Justice upon an alteration of Circumstances becomes the contrary For as a thing may be pleasing to the Palate or healthful to the Body in some Circumstances which is not so absolutely as a Cup of bad Water to one in extream Thirst So may an Action which generally speaking is vicious and unreasonable as the breaking of one's Promise or the like in some certain Cases become honest and agreeable to Right Reason That the Limits of Justice are not so fixt but that they may be alter'd upon an alteration of the Circumstances so that what at one time appears to be the Duty of an honest and good Man at another is alter'd and becomes the quite contrary To deliver up a Trust for example or perform a Promise and other things relating to Truth and Faithfulness are Duties which Justice it self will allow us in several Cases to b The Word migrate signifies transitively here as in some other places of this Author So migrare communia jura signifies to transgress or violate ' em neglect or omit For respect must be had to those general Rules we before laid down as the Ground and Foundation of all Justice First That no Injury be done to any other And Secondly That we make it our earnest Endeavour to promote the Good and Interest of all Mankind So that our Duty is not always the same but various c By ea tempora I suppose he means those Cases or Circumstances for so he often uses the Word in this Work He had just been saying That nothing must be done contrary to the two great Rules of Justice before given And then he adds Ea cum tempor'd commutantur that is When the Case is such as that the keeping one's Promise or the like would be acting contrary to one of those Rules that is would be a great Injury to him
Reason and Discourse are the Bonds of Society where they are wanting therefore there can be no Society and by consequence no Justice Equity c. which are the Virtues that consist in preserving Society because they are destitute of Reason and Discourse This is then the largest and most comprehensive of all Societies being made up of Men consider'd barely as such and so taking in even the whole Race and Kind of 'em one with another the d The Duties incumbent on us by virtue of this Society are First To let every one have a share in those things which by Nature are common and what these are he tells us immediately Secondly Not to break in upon another's Property Thirdly In those things which are made our own and become a Property to be communicative c. What he means by E quibus ipsis c. I confess I don 't very well understand neither do any of the Commentators tell me but I take the meaning of it to be as I have translated it so that quibus should relate to quae descripta sunt legibus the things that are every one 's own by Laws Concerning which his first Rule was That we should not break in upon another's Right and then as to all other cases about 'em he only puts us in mind of the Greek Proverb the meaning of which is That we should all count our selves Friends to one another and practice accordingly Duties of which are To let every one have a share in those things which by Nature were produc'd for the common Advantage and Benefit of all To let what 's already determin'd by Laws and civil Constitutions remain as it is without breaking in upon any Man 's Right as to which things however we should remember a Rule which is now among the Greeks become an usual Proverb All things in common amongst Friends But perhaps you may ask what kind of things we suppose them to be which ought to be common to all Mankind Ennius has given us one Instance of 'em which may easily be apply'd to a great many others He who directs the wandring Traveller Doth as 't were light another's Torch by his own Which gives him ne're the less of Light for that It gave another By this one Case he sufficiently teaches us That whatever Kindness can be done for another without any Damage or Loss to our selves 't is our Duty to do it tho' to never so much a Stranger From hence have arisen those general Maxims and Principles of Humanity Not to deny one a little Running-water or The lighting his Fire by ours if he has occasion To give the best Counsel we are able to one who is in Doubt or Distress which are things that do Good to the Person that receives them and are no Loss or Trouble to him that confers them Such things therefore being by Nature common should accordingly be kept open for the free use of all Men And of those which are our own we should always be giving something that may contribute to the Benefit and Welfare of the whole e He puts in a necessary Caution about Giving and letting our Things be in common which he would have us carry no further than Ennius's Rule prescribes that is We should not be so Communicative and Open-hearted to all in general as to impoverish our selves and put it out of our Power to assist those who are more nearly ally'd to us We must light indeed another's Candle by ours but not so as to lose our own Light by it Here we must proceed by the Measures of Prudence and Charity But because the Revenues of Particulars are small and there are infinite numbers of those that Want therefore is f Viz. That of always Giving something out of what is our own for the general Benefit this universal Bounty to be kept within the Limits prescrib'd by Ennius It gives him ne'r the less of Light that so we may have it within our Power to be Liberal to those that are more nearly ally'd to us CHAP. XVII Several other Degrees of Relation less extensive than that mention'd in the former Chapter That of Friendship the most closely knit The Ground and Foundation of true Friendship The Relation arising from doing Kindnesses to one another The Love a Man has for his Native Country swallows up all other Loves whatever Which of the several Relatives we ought to prefer in our Liberality and doing Kindnesses A Description of Friendship and of all Friendships which is most pleasant a He now proceeds to reckon up the several Degrees of Nearness or Relation among Men that so we may know to whom we are oblig'd to be most Liberal upon this last account of Merit viz. Nearness of Relation BUt there are several Degrees of Society and Fellowship amongst Mankind for to take now our leave of that general and universal one already mention'd there 's a nearer among those who are all of the same Country Nation or Language than which nothing more knits and unites Men to one another There is a closer yet among those who are all of the same City for a great many things are in common to Fellow-citizens such as Markets Temples Walks Ways Laws Privileges Courts of Justice Freedom of Votes besides common Meetings and Familiarities and abundance of Business and Entercourse with one another But there 's a stricter Bond of Alliance still between those who belong to the same Family as taking into it but a very small part of that vast and immense one of all Mankind For there being by Nature implanted in all things a certain Desire of Begetting their Like the closest and nearest of all Societies is between Man and Wife then follows that between them and their Children and afterwards that of the whole Family who inhabit together and have all things in common which is as it were the first beginning of a City and Ground or Seed-plot of a whole Common-wealth Next to this comes the Bond of Relation between Brothers as also between first and second Cosins who growing too numerous to live in the same House are sent out to others as it were into new Colonies Next after this follow Marriages and Alliances and so a new Stock of Relations that way from whence comes a new Propagation and Off-spring which serves to give rise as was said to Commonwealths Now that nearness of Blood and the natural Love which arises from it can't but endear Men to one another is past all doubt 't is a very great matter to have the same b The Images c. of their Ancestors which were kept for the Honour of all the Family into how many Branches soever divided Relicks and Monuments of our Ancestors to make use of the same c Private Sacrifices or Ceremonies belonging to such or such Families in particular which the Publick in general was no ways concern'd in Cui praeter cognatos affines nemo interponebatur says
in this Book his next Business is to lay down some Method of determining our selves aright In order to which he proposes a general Rule and Standard which is always to be made use of in such occasions of Doubt If therefore we would upon all Emergencies be sure to determin our selves aright when that which we call our Advantage or Interest seems to be repugnant to that which is Honest we must lay down some general Rule or Measure which if we will make use of in judging about things we shall never be mistaken as to point of Duty Now this Measure I would have to be conformable to the Doctrin and Principles of the Stoicks which I principally follow throughout this Work For tho' I confess that the ancient Academicks and your Peripateticks n See chap. 1. Book 1. which were formerly the same make Honesty far preferable to that which seems one's Interest yet o Viz. The Stoicks those who assert That whatever is Honest must be also Profitable and Nothing is Profitable but what is Honest talk much more bravely and heroically upon this Subject than p Viz. The Peripateticks and ancient Academicks those who allow That there are some things Honest which are not Profitable and some things Profitable which are not Honest. And we have very great Liberty given us by our Academy so as never to be ty'd up to such and such Tenets but are left free to defend what we think most probable CHAP. V. The Rule or Measure mention'd in the former Chapter The ill Effects of Mens Injuring others for their own Advantage Every one allow'd to take Care of himself in the first place but not so as to Injure any other tho' to save his own Life Two Errors that occasion Mens Acting contrarywise and the Absurdity of ' em BUt to return to our General Rule or Measure a For nothing being so agreeable to Nature as Conjunction and Society that which tends to the Ruine and Dissolution of this must needs be of all things most contrary to Nature Now the very End and Design of Society is the mutual Help and Assistance of each other without which 't is impossible it should ever subsist It a naturalis est societatis utilitatum communio says the learned Grotius ut sine ea nequeat Societas consistere Those Men therefore who instead of profiting injure their Fellows do what directly tends to the Ruine of Society and consequently what of all things is most contrary to Nature There 's nothing upon Earth then so contrary to Nature neither Death nor Poverty nor Pain nor whatever other Evil can befal a Man either in his Body or Fortune as to take away any thing wrongfully from another and do one's self a Kindness by injuring one's Neighbour For in the first place it ruins all manner of Society and Entercourse amongst Men since 't is plain that if once Men arrive at such a pass as to Plunder and Injure the rest of their Neighbours out of hopes to procure some Advantage to themselves there must follow of course a Dissolution of that Society which of all things in the World is most agreeable to Nature Should we suppose for Example that the bodily Members had every one of 'em gotten an Opinion that to draw to its self all the Vigour of its Neighbours would very much serve to encrease its own 't is certain the whole Body must decay and perish And just so should every one amongst us deprive other People of their Profits and Advantages and take away all he could get from them with design of applying it only to his own Use the general Society and Fellowship of Mankind must of necessity be broken For tho' 't is no more than what Nature will allow of That each Man should look after himself in the first place and furnish himself with the Necessaries of Life before he takes care to provide for other People yet the same Nature will by no means permit that any one should rise by his thrusting down another and encrease his own Fortune by the Spoils of his Neighbours And not only Nature that is the universal Law or Consent of Nations but particular Laws by which several Countries and Commonwealths are govern'd have commanded likewise That no one be suffer'd to do an Injury to another for the sake of procuring any Advantage to himself For the very Design and End of Laws is to keep up Agreement and Union amongst Citizens which whoever destroys is by them punish'd not with the loss of his Goods alone but with Prisons Banishment or even Death it self But Nature and Right Reason as being at once both an b Humane because consented to and acknowledg'd by all Mankind and natural to them Divine because whatever Right Reason commands us God himself who has given us that Reason does in effect command us too Human and Divine Law too command this Duty with much greater Authority and whoever obeys them as all Men must who propose to live according to the Rules of Nature will never be guilty of coveting what 's another's or applying to his own Use what had first been injuriously taken from his Neighbour For certainly Greatness and Elevation of Soul as also the Virtues of Courtesie Justice and Liberality are much more agreeable to Nature and Right Reason than Pleasure than Riches than even Life it self to despise all which and regard 'em as just nothing when they come to be compar'd with the Publick Interest is the Duty of a brave and exalted Spirit whereas to rob another for one's own Advantage is as has been shewn more contrary to Nature than Death than Pain or any other Evil whatever of that kind Again Those Men live much more according to Nature who suffer perpetual Troubles and Labours for the Good and Preservation were it possible of all Men like Hercules of old whom Men as a grateful Requital for his Benefits report to be plac'd among the number of the Gods than those who consume all their Lives in Retirement where they 're not only free from Disturbances and Vexations but are furnished with all the Pleasures and Conveniencies of Life and have moreover the advantages of Strength and Comliness superadded to them And accordingly we find it to be so in effect that all the most great and extraordinary Geniuses have prefer'd all the Troubles and Difficulties of the former before the Quiet and Ease of this latter way of Living From all which laid together it unanswerably follows That whoever lives agreeably to the Dictates of Nature can never be guilty of Injuring another c Having laid down his general Rule or Measure and prov'd the Truth of it from Reason Laws and the Examples of the greatest Men he now shews the Absurdity of the two contrary Principles which are the Grounds or Causes of Mens Injuring one another Viz. Either they think 't is not contrary to Nature c. In fine He that Injures another
allow'd of by the Law e For he that has no more regard to Honesty than just what the Laws of the Publick require and will scruple to do nothing so as he can escape their Cognizance can never be an Honest and Good Man The Laws and Dictates of Nature and Right Reason not only of the City he dwells in ought to be the Rule of an honest Man's Actions these being only a Shadow and faint Draught of that perfect Justice to which we are led by the other See chap. 17. for which I think he does not much deserve to be thank'd or commended If then to make pretence of that which never was and cunningly to dissemble the real Truth be pieces of Knavery there are but very few Actions that are altogether free from it And if he alone be an honest Man Who does all the Good he can and does no Injury to any body 't will be no easie matter to find one in the World The Result of what has been said is this To be Knavish and Wicked can never be Profitable because 't is attended with Baseness and f He does not mean that outward Dishonour which Men draw upon themselves by their wicked Actions when they come to be known for that is avoided when the Action is conceal'd whereas even then 't is infamous to be Wicked but he means the inward Reproach of Mens Consciences and the real Scandal and Dishonour that it is for a Man to do such things as are unworthy of and disagreeable to his Reason This follows every wicked Action tho' kept never so secret and can't be avoided but by living such a Life as becomes the great Rule of our Actions Reason Dishonour and it always must be Profitable to be Virtuous and Good because it always is Honest and Creditable CHAP. XVI The Care taken by the Romans to make the Seller tell the Faults of the thing to be sold. An Example or two of Cases of this nature a He proceeds to fome particulae Cases wherein Knavery was punishable by the Civil Laws Such as are concealing the Faults of an House or the like IN the Matter of buying and selling Estates 't is provided amongst us by the Civil Constitutions That he who 's the Seller should tell all the Faults that he knows of to the Purchaser For the XII Tables ordering no more than this That the Seller should be bound to make good those Faults which were expresly mention'd by word of Mouth in the Bargain and which whoever deny'd was to pay double Damages The b For tho' the XII Tables were the Ground and Foundation of the Roman Law yet the Learned by their Interpretations Inferences from 'em by their Formulae apply'd to particular Cases or the like added a great many new things to 'em which pass'd for a Rule in Judgments as well as the XII Tables Lawyers have appointed a Punishment for those who themselves don't discover the Defects of what they sell. For they so decreed That if the Seller of an Estate when he made the Bargain did not tell all the Faults in particular that he knew of it he should afterwards be bound to make 'em good to the Purchaser Titus Claudius Centumalus to give an Example had a House that stood upon the Coelian Hill and hindred the Augurs as they made their Observations from the c For making their Observations from the flights of Birds and that many times at a very great distance 't was necessary they should have some high Place and that nothing should be in the way to hinder their Prospect Capitoline Mount who therefore gave him orders to pull that down which was such an hindrance to their Business Instead of this Claudius puts a Bill over the Door That the House was to be sold and quickly put it off P. Calpurnius Lanarius being the Man that bought it The Augurs in a short time sent him the same Orders and he accordingly took care to perform them But afterwards coming to understand That Claudius had not set the House to sale till after he had been order'd by the Augurs to demolish it he brought in against him an Action at Law To receive such Satisfaction as in Conscience and Equity he was bound to make him Marcus Cato the Father of him that is now living for as others are distinguish'd by the Names of their Fathers so he that begot this incomparable Person should be nam'd from his Son sat as Judge in the Case and gave this Sentence upon the whole matter That since Claudius knew this Inconvenience before-hand and did not discover it when he sold the Estate he was oblig'd in Equity to make it good to the Purchaser He judg'd it therefore to be a part of Honesty That the Seller should fairly declare to the Buyer all the Faults which he knows in the thing to be sold. If then this Judgment were just and equitable neither the Merchant that brought the Corn nor the supposed Seller of the infectious House did well in concealing what either of 'em knew But all the particular sorts of Concealing could never be taken notice of by the Laws of the City however such as could were very carefully provided against M. Marius Gratidianus a d Son of one M. Gratidius of Arpinum whose Sister was Married to Cicero's Grandfather therefore he calls him his Kinsman He was adopted by M. Marius Brother of him that was seven times Consul He was afterward kill'd by Sylla's Order having been of Marius's Party against him Kinsman of mine had sold an House to Sergius Orata which he had bought of the same not many Years before The House it seems e A thing in Law is said Servire alicui when some one has a Right of using it some way or hindring some thing about it c. As I may be said to have a Servitus upon a Man's House or Ground when I can of Right demand a Way thro' it or hinder from Building higher c. lest he should hinder my Prospect paid a Duty to Sergius which Marius never once mention'd in the Bargain The Business came at last to a Suit in Law where f The two famous Orators mention'd above and brought in speaking in his de Oratore where he mentions this very Cause Lucius Crassus took part with Orata and f The two famous Orators mention'd above and brought in speaking in his de Oratore where he mentions this very Cause Anthony with Gratidianus Crassus insisted very much upon the Law which says That the Seller shall make good those Faults which he himself knew of and yet conceal'd 'em from the Buyer Anthony on the other side argu'd for Equity That Sergius could not but know that Incumbrance who had sold the House himself but a little while before and therefore what need was there of telling him of it That he could not complain of being any ways trick'd upon since he knew very well the condition
be counted but is the farthest from Prudence of any thing in the World For Prudence consists in the making a right Distinction between Good and Evil but this kind of Cunning gives the preference to Evil if at least it be true as most certainly 't is that every thing is Evil which is contrary to Honesty Neither is it only in Farms and Houses that the Laws of the City which are copied from Nature take care to have Cheating and Knavery punish'd but in Slaves they exclude all Fraud in the Seller For he that 's presum'd to know what the Slave was if he does not declare whether he be Healthy a Runagate or apt to Steal is answerable to the Buyer by an Order of the Aediles But this does not hold in the Case of g Because he being newly come to the Estate of which Slaves were a part is presum'd not to know whether they are Healthy c. or not an Heir From what has been said it apparently follows h That is The Laws command that no one should Enrich himself by Cheating another and the Laws are copied from Reason whence it follows that Reason commands c. since Nature is the Fountain from whence Law is deriv'd that 't is agreeable to the Dictates and Rules of Nature that no one should endeavour to make his own Advantage from the Ignorance of another i Having shewn by a sufficient number of Instances That none of these Actions can be Profitable which are contrary to strict Justice or Honesty he now goes on to those Actions which are done under the pretence of Wisdom and Prudence but indeed are quite contrary to it and shews these also to be Unprofitable And indeed there is no greater Mischief in the World than this Wisdom falsly so nam'd joyn'd with Baseness and Knavery From this have arisen innumerable Cases wherein Profit is set up in opposition to Honesty For where almost is there a Man to be found that would scruple to Injure and Wrong any other if he could do it with secresie and without fear of being punish'd CHAP. XVIII An Example of a Wickedness committed when there was no Fear of Punishment 'T is a Wickedness to be a Receiver of ill-gotten Goods tho' you have no hand in the getting ' em 'T is Dishonest to get Estates by servile Flattery Separating Profit from Honesty the Cause of all Mischiefs LEt us try if you please by some Examples of that nature wherein the common sort of People perhaps think there is no Crime For we don't speak here of such as cut Throats Poyson make false Wills Rob or Embezzle the publick Treasures who aren't to be repress'd with nothing but Words and philosophical Discourses but must be vex'd and wearied out with Chains and Imprisonment But let us consider here what is done by those who pass in the World for Men of Honesty and Integrity A Will that was forg'd of one Minutius Basilus a wealthy Person was brought by some People out of Greece into Italy who to make it the more easily pass for good made a Both mention'd before ch 8. Book 1. and ch 16. Book 2. Marcus Crassus and Lucius Hortensius the two greatest Men at that time in the City Joint-Heirs with themselves who tho' they suspected the whole to be a Forgery yet having nothing of hand in 't themselves they made little scruple of getting an Advantage by other Peoples Villany And what then was that sufficient to excuse 'em from Fault That they themselves had no hand in 't Truly I am fully persuaded not tho' I always lov'd b Hortensius one of 'em while he was alive and don 't hate the c Crassus whom Cicero by no means lik'd as appears from the next Chapter and especially from his sixth Paradox other since he is dead and gone But when Basilus had desir'd that Marcus Satrius his Sister's Son should bear his Name and had appointed him his Heir I nominate him says he Lord of my Sabine and Picenian Mannors was it any ways a just and reasonable Thing and not rather an eternal Blot upon those times that some principal Citizens should have a Man's Estate and Satrius the Heir be put off barely with his Name For if he be unjust that don't keep off Injuries from any of his Neighbours and defend and protect 'em as far as he 's able as I 've shewn already in the d Chap. 7. first Book what sort of Man shall we take him to be who not only does not keep off an Injury but rather on the contrary helps to promote it Nay I for my part am wholly of Opinion That Estates which are left Men by true Wills if gotten by knavish and servile Flatteries not by a real but pretended Friendship are Scandalous and Dishonest But in such kind of Cases it often comes to pass that one thing seems Profitable and another Honest undoubtedly by a Mistake for the same e Viz. Nature or Right Reason to which whatever is contrary can neither be Honest nor Profitable thing is the Measure both of the one and the other which whoever perceives not will easily be led into all sorts of Roguery For he that begins thus to argue with himself That indeed is Honest but this is Advantagious impudently divides by this gross Mistake those things which by Nature are coupled and united which is the deadly Root from which all Frauds Wickednesses and Villanies spring CHAP. XIX The Carriage of a truly Honest Man when 't is in his power to be Dishonest so as not to be discover'd The true Notion of a Good Man A Saying of Fimbria 's in the Case of Lutatius Pinthia to this purpose A Proverb borrow'd from the Country shewing That nothing Dishonest how secret soever can be Profitable IF a Good Man therefore should have such a power as that by snapping of his Fingers he could slip his Name cunningly into rich Peoples Wills he 'd never make use of it no not altho' he were fully assur'd that no one living could either know or suspect it But give such a power to Marcus Crassus that by doing the same thing he should make himself Heir where he really was not so and he 'd a Dancing was esteem'd but a scandalous Practice and unbecoming a sober and prudent Person among the Romans wherefore our Author tells us in his Oration for Muraena chap. 6. No body almost Dances unless he be Drunk or Mad and calls it Omnium vitiorum extremum A Vice that no one would be guilty of 'till he had utterly abandon'd all Virtue and Umbram luxuriae that which follows Riot and Debauchery as the Shadow does the Body The meaning therefore of this place is That Crassus would not stick at the basest Actions if he could but fill his Coffers by them Dance I dare warrant you publickly in the Market-place But he that is Honest and answers to our Notion of a Good Man will
that made it or him to whom it was made as he explains himself afterwards then our Duty is alter'd and we are bound not to keep it because if we should 't would be a Breach of the fundamental Rule of that Virtue This is the first Case wherein a Man is not oblig'd to be as good as his Promise according to the variety of Circumstances There may be a Contract or Promise for instance the performance of which would bring very great Damage either to the Person himself that made it or the other Party whom it was made to Thus had d See chap. 25. Book 3. Naptune not granted what he promis'd to Theseus Theseus had not suffered the loss of his Son Hippolytus For as the Story goes Neptune having granted him any three Wishes for the third he once in a very great passion desired the Death of his own Son by obtaining of which he was afterwards brought into the greatest Afflictions Such Promises therefore are e Because the keeping of 'em would be an Offence against the first Rule of Justice Not to do any Wrong and if may be suppos'd the Person to whom they were made had he seen such a Mischief ensuing would not have demanded it See chap. 24 25. Book 3. not to be kept as will but bring a Mischief on him they were made to f Because 't is presum'd the Person who made such a Promise had he thought of such a Damage likely to come of it would not have made it We promise as Men who aren't infallible and can't provide against every thing that may happen wherefore we are suppos'd not to promise any further than what we now know and should any extraordinary thing happen in the mean time 't is to be taken as a thing which we tacitly excepted But here we must proceed very warily and cautiously this will hardly hold good in the case of a Promissory Oath where God himself is call'd to witness See Grot. de Jure B. P. Puffendorf c. upon this whole Subject no more are those which tend to the Damage of the Promiser himself more than to the Profit of him they were promis'd to Again g Another Case wherein a Man is dispenc'd from keeping his Promise is when some greater Duty requires his Attendance in the mean time even Justice it self requires us to perform a greater before a lesser Duty You promise for example a Friend of yours to assist him in a Cause that he has depending but your Son grows dangerously sick in the mean time here 't would be no h Because to take care of a Son's Life is a greater Duty than to assist a Friend and therefore ought to take place before it breach of Duty in you if you should not make good what you promis'd to your Friend and he himself rather would be much to blame should he complain of being disappointed by you Further i Another Case wherein a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Promise is when he was forc'd to make it thro' Fear or drawn to it by some Deceit See the forecited Authors 't is plain to any one's Sence that such sort of Promises can never be binding as are made by People over-aw'd by Fear or over-reach'd by Deceit most of which are void by the k The Laws being deliver'd only in general Terms and not being able to descend to all particular Cases 't was in the power of the Praetor or Judge to supply that Defect by his Edicts and Authority Praetor's Edicts and some of 'em even by the Laws themselves But another great Spring from which Injuries arise is some Quirk or Cavil and an over-subtle and malicious Interpretation of the Laws from whence that Saying Summum jus summa Injuria The height of Justice is the height of Roguery is now become a daily and common Proverb among us There are frequent Examples of this to be met with in our Publick Transactions as that of Him for Example who concluding a Truce with the Enemy for thirty Days made continual Incursions into their Territory by Night because forsooth the Truce was not made for so many Nights but only so many Days Just such a crafty and pittiful Trick if the Story be true was that notable Cunning of Quintus Fabius Labeo's or whoever the Man was for I have it only by hear-say who being by the Senate appointed Arbitrator in a Difference between those of l Two Cities in Italy about fourteen Miles distant from one another Nola and Naples about their Bounds when he came to the place that was appointed for the Treaty took aside the Commissioners of either Party and exhorted 'em privately Not to be too eager and greedy in their Demands but rather to take up and content ' emselves with less than pretend to any more than what was honestly their Due Both Parties did so according to his desire so that a good quantity of Ground was left between them this he e'en goes and adjudges to the Romans leaving that to each Party which they ' emselves had demanded And is not this now to Deceive and Cheat rather than to Judge In all cases therefore such subtle kind of Tricks should be diligently avoided CHAP. XI Justice to be kept towards all sorts of Men. Bounds to be observ'd in Punishing those that have Injur'd us Laws of War to be strictly observ'd Two sorts of Disputing by Reason and by the Sword The latter is allowable when we can't obtain what 's our Right by the former What ought to be the End of making War How it should be carry'd on The Strictness of the old Romans in observing the Laws of War A Story of the Elder Cato to that purpose THere are certain a After having discours'd of the Nature of Justice c. he proceeds to shew That we ought to practice it towards all sorts of People as First Even towards those who have wrong'd us Duties or Offices also to be strictly observ'd even towards those that have injur'd us for we ought not to go beyond such and such Bounds in exacting Revenge and Punishment of another in which particular it may perhaps be enough to make him that has wrong'd us repent of the Wrong done so that he himself may abstain from the like and others take warning from his Example for the future There are certain peculiar Laws of b In the second place we ought to shew Justice to our Enemies First By not entring upon a War but upon very just and good Grounds Secondly By carrying it on fairly and being ready to accept of a reasonable Peace Thirdly By shewing Mercy to the Conquer'd after we have gotten the Victory The Words therefore Inter arma silent leges must be taken in a very restrain'd Sence so as to mean the Civil and Judiciary Laws not those of Nature and Justice towards Enemies See Grot. Prolegom ad Lib. de Jure B. P. War also which
Clearness of the Voice and by Ornatus the acquir'd or adventitious of which 't will appear he discourses in the four next Chapters By Ordo a due timing our Words and Actions of which chap. 40. in a certain kind of natural Beauty and Comliness in Pertinence and Well-timing our Words and Actions and such other kind of Ornaments and outward Embellishments as are proper for the Business one is going about things which 't is no easie matter to express but I hope I am understood and that is sufficient and seeing that c See Note on chap. 28. Care which we ought to take of making our selves agreeable to those we converse with consists in a due Regulation of d Viz. Our Words Actions and Carriage of Body these I shall proceed to discourse of 'em each in particular e He begins with the last of those three things in which Decorum shews it self viz. Bodily Carriage Dress c. of which in this and the next Chapter In the first place then it may be worth our observing how much Care and Concern has been shewn by Nature in ordering the Frame and Constitution of our Bodies Those Parts which were handsom and agreeable to the sight she has plac'd in view but those which could not be so handsomly shewn and were only given to serve certain Ends and Necessities of Nature these she has been careful to conceal and cover A Sence of Shame and Modesty in Men has seconded this her Diligence in framing their Bodies for all that aren't wholly bereav'd of their Reason keep those Parts hidden which she has conceal'd and are always as secret as they can in those Actions which natural Necessity forces 'em upon Neither do they call by their proper and broad Names the Parts that are given to serve such Necessity nor the Uses of 'em and Modesty forbids us to mention those things which may be done very honestly provided it be in secret Therefore the plain and open f Prodit mores plerumque oratio says Quintil. animi secreta detegit nec sine causa Graeci prodiderunt Ut vivat quemque it a etiam dicere Unwholsom Waters argue the Fountain from whence they proceed to be unwholsom too and when People can delight in such fulsom lascivious unbeseeming Talk 't is a certain sign their Inclinations are vitious and their Hearts tend very much to Lewdness and Debauchery since from the abundance of these as the Scripture assures us the Mouth speaketh Talking of those things as well as the plain and open Acting of 'em discovers immodest and wanton Inclinations The g An ill-natur'd Sect of Philosophers Followers of Antisthenes that lov'd to Talk and Act in opposition to the rest of the World and to be Snarling and Biting at every Body and and every thing whence they had their Name the word in Greek signifying Dogged or Currish These People holding that nothing is commendable but only Virtue nor any thing blamable but only Vice and some of the rigider Stoicks with them cast off all Modesty and such kind of things Not being asham'd of doing any thing in publik tho' never so Unbecoming nor speaking of it openly provided 't were an Action that was not Dishonest or Vitious in it self But our Author here advises us with very good Reason to disregard what they say and rather choose Nature for our Guide and Directress than any of their vain and frivolous Reasonings For Est aliquid quod non oportet etiam si licet as he tells us in another place some things there are lawful enough in themselves which yet Modesty and Civility oblige us to abstain from Cynicks therefore are wholly to be rejected and some of the Stoicks little better than Cynicks who laugh at and blame us for calling those things by their proper Names which are really dishonest and scandalous in themselves while we count it a shame to speak plainly of those in the doing of which there 's no manner of Dishonesty To Rob for Example to Cheat and Whore are Actions in themselves the most shameful and scandalous and yet it is not counted immodest to name 'em whereas to make one's self a Father of Children is an Action that is honest and creditable in it self and yet forsooth must not be plainly mention'd for fear of its giving Offence to chast Ears This and much more to the same purpose they commonly urge against Modesty and Bashfulness But let us follow where Nature has shew'd us the way and whatever may offend either the Eyes or Ears that let us shun in our Carriage and Conversation In all our Postures and Gestures of Body such as standing walking sitting and h Accubitio signifies the Posture they us'd in Eating viz. Leaning on one side upon a Couch which they call'd Lectus set round about their Tables leaning nay in our very Countenance in the cast of our Eyes and motions of our Hands we should be careful to keep and observe what 's Becoming in which there 's a double Extream to be avoided that of too much Niceness and Effeminacy on the one hand and that of meer Clownishness and want of Breeding on the other Nor let any one imagin That these things do well in an Actor or Orator but that we are left free to observe or not observe them The Actors indeed have had always so much regard for Modesty as that time out of mind it has been their Custom never to appear upon the Stage in publick without something on to conceal those Parts which ought to be kept secret for fear least their Cloaths being open'd by any Accident something might be seen which Modesty bids 'em hide And our common Custom forbids the Son when grown toward Man's Estate to Bathe with his Father and likewise the son-in-Son-in-law with his Father-in-law We should therefore take care to be strict Observers of these Rules of Modesty especially being such as even Nature herself has directed us to CHAP. XXXVI Two sorts of Beauty one proper for Men t'other for Women Men should avoid Niceness c. Nothing affected can Become Rules about Cloaths Walking and outward Ornaments Outward Carriage discovers the inward Dispositions of the Mind More Care should be taken to keep Decency in the Motions of the Soul How this may be done Two sorts of Motions in the Soul the sensitive Appetite and Reason How each shou'd be manag'd BUt since there are two sorts of Beauty in the World to the one of which belongs Prettiness or Neatness to the other Comliness and Majesty the former of these should be left to the Women and the latter only be thought proper for the Men. From hence it follows that these should avoid all unmanlike Ornaments and Niceness in their Habits and the same in the Motions and Gestures of their Bodies For all People hate the a Palaestricimotus The Palaestra was a kind of Dancing-school and Place of Exercise where People were taught to
are more Powerful for 't is not the Number but the Quality of the Persons that must carry it in this Case h Thirdly 'T is very unjust and unreasonable Besides what Reason or Equity is there when Estates have been held for a great many Years or perhaps Ages that the rightful Owners should be thrust out from 'em and others that never had any should come and possess them CHAP. XXIII Several Examples of the unhappy Effects of taking away Mens Estates in order to bring things to a Level The wise Conduct of Aratus the Sicyonian in doing the contrary What a Magistrate's Duty in such Cases is FOr such kind of partial injurious Proceedings a Having shewn how pernicious foolish c. these Designs are he gives here some Examples of their unhappy Effects and of the good ones of the contrary Practice the Spartans once banish'd b Not their famous General Lysander Son of Aristarclytus who beat the Athenians c. but another Son of one Olbis made Ephore by King Agis and his Assistant in his Designs Lysander one of their c The Word signifies Inspectors or Overseers They were Officers among the Spartans usually five in number much like the Tribunes in Rome who restrain'd the Power and Greatness of their Kings so that Appeals were allow'd from the Kings to them as in Rome from the Consuls to the Tribunes Ephori and put to Death d The third King of Sparta of that Name Son of Eudamidas and sixth in Descent from the famous Agesilaus who for endeavouring to alter the then present State of things and bring in some obsolete Laws of Lycurgus about dividing Lands into equal Portions c. was murder'd by the contrary Faction See his Life and Death in Plut. Agis their King for the same Reason an Action unheard of before in that City This was succeeded by such grievous Contentions and Discords in the State as that Tyranny and Oppression got the upper-hand amongst 'em the Nobles were banish'd from their Native Country and the best constituted Republick upon the face of the Earth was utterly dissolv'd and brought into Confusion Nor did this Mischief end with the Spartans only but like a Contagion spreading it self farther involv'd all Greece in the same Miseries and Calamities Pray what was it ruin'd our own two Gracchi Sons of the famous Tiberius Gracchus and Grandsons of e The Elder whose Daughter Cornelia was married to Sempronius Gracchus and had those two Sons by him Africanus but only these Controversies about Levelling Estates f A noble Man of Sicyon a City in Peloponnesus Son of one Clinias His Father being kill'd by the treachery of Abantidas he was forc'd to fly to Argos at six Years old Afterwards at about the Age of Twenty he took the City again by Surprize made Nicocles the then Tyrant fly and settl'd Peace and Unity amongst his Citizens His Life is written by Plut. Aratus the Sicyonian is deservedly commended as much on the other hand He when his County for fifty Years together had been greatly oppress'd and over-run by Tyrants went secretly one Night from Argos to Sicyon and made himself Master of the City by Surpize and unexpectedly falling upon Nicocles the then Tyrant he put him to flight This being done he recall'd six Hundred of the wealthiest Citizens who had all been formerly banish'd by the Tyrants and by this his arrival delivered the City from Slavery and Oppression But he afterwards found 't would be a great deal of trouble to settle the Business of their Estates and Possessions for he thought on the one hand 't was very unreasonable that those Men whom he had restor'd should Want whilst others enjoy'd what in Equity was theirs and yet it seem'd hard on t'other side that Men should be thrust out of those Possessions which now they had held for these fifty Years if more especially 'twere withal consider'd That it could not but happen in so long a time that they must have gone a great part of 'em from one to another either by Inheritance Purchase Dowry or the like and therefore were possest by the present Incumbents without their having injur'd the rightful Proprietors Upon these Considerations he judg'd it necessary both to bear with the latter in the Enjoyment of what they had and yet to Satisfie the former whom it justly belong'd to And finding a large Sum of Money was requisite to settle this Business as it ought to be he told 'em he had occasions to go to g The capital City of Aegypt and Seat of their Kings built by Alexander the Great in his return from visiting the Temple of Jupiter Hammon Alexandria and order'd they should not concern ' emselves about it till his return He goes accordingly with all possible speed to his old Friend h Sirnam'd Philadelphus the Founder of the famous Alexandrian Library He was Son of that Ptolomy who was Alexander the Great 's Captain and who got Aegypt to himself after the Death of that Prince Ptolomy who at that time was reigning in Alexandria being second King after the Founding of that City Having told him his Design of settling Liberty in his Country and the Reasons that put him upon undertaking of that Voyage he quickly obtain'd of that wealthy Prince to supply him with a quantity of Money for his Assistance With this he immediately returns to Sicyon and choosing out fifteen o' th' principal Citizens to help him with their Counsel upon this occasion he heard both the Causes of those who possess'd what had belong'd to others and of those who had lost what had been formerly their own At last he so manag'd the whole Business as that the Estates being set at their true Values i Viz. Of the present Incumbents who possess'd those Lands which originally belong'd to others some were persuaded to part with what they had and take an Equivalent in Money for it and k Viz. Of those who had been outed of their Lands by the Tyrants others to neglect the Recovery of their own and rest themselves content with being pay'd its full Value By this means the Controversie was fairly determin'd and all went Home satisfy'd without Grudging or Complaining Here was a great and extraordinary Man now Here was one that deserv'd to have been born in our Republick This is the true way of Dealing with Citizens and not as hath been practis'd amongst us l First under Sylla the Dictator and afterwards under Caesar. twice to make sale of their Goods in the publick Markets and have them cry'd by the Voice of the Common Cryer But this famous Grecian as was the Duty of a wise and extraordinary Person thought it became him to provide alike for all And indeed every Magistrate who proceeds upon Principles of Reason and Prudence will always take care not to make any Difference between the Interests of his People but will govern them all by the same Rule and
Canius immediately was all on fire and beg'd of Pythius that he would sell him the Place He pretended abundance of Unwillingness at first but at length to make short of it was brought to a Compliance Canius buys it together with all that belong'd to it and being very Rich and desirous of the Purchase gives as much for it as Pythius demanded Security's given and taken for the Money and the whole Bargain finally brought to a conclusion The next Day Canius invites some Acquaintance thither and he comes himself somewhat earlier than ordinary but sees not one of the Fishermens Boats there Hereupon he enquires of one of the next Neighbours whether or no that were any Holiday with the Fishermen because he saw none of 'em thereabouts Not that I know of replies the other but they none of 'em ever use to fish here and therefore I wonder'd what the matter was Yesterday This put Canius into a lamentable Fret but how could he remedy himself c A noble and learned Roman oftentimes mention'd and commended by our Author whose Collegue he was in the Pretorship He was excellently skill'd in the Civil Law which he learn'd of Muc. Scaevola the High-Priest There was no Action against a Man it seems for this sort of Knavery before his time The Occasion of his making these Formulae See in Valer. Max. Book 8. chap. 2. For Aquillius my Collegue and familiar Friend had not then publish'd his Court-forms about Knavery upon which when he was ask'd what he meant by the word Knavery he answer'd d These words must be taken in an ill Sence For all making Shew c. is not Knavery but only that which is joyn'd cum Malitia with an ill Design of Cheating c. The making shew of one thing while one's doing another a very perspicuous and plain Definition as indeed he was a Man very happy at Defining Pythius then and all others whatever that make shew of one thing and yet do the contrary are perfidious wicked and knavish Rascals 'T is impossible therefore that any of their Actions should ever be Profitable when they 're under the scandal of such a number of filthy and detestable Vices CHAP. XV. All Hypocrisie and Dissimulation to be taken away Knavery or Dolus malus punish'd by the Roman Laws and Judgments of Equity A remarkable Action of Scaevola ' s. He is not a Wise Man who is not Wise for his own Advantage in what Sence true A truly Good Man is not content with being as Just as the Laws require A Definition of such a One. He 's very hard to be found IF then this Definition of Aquillius be good all Hypocrisie and Dissimulation must be banish'd from amongst Men so that no honest Man will be guilty of either of 'em for the sake of buying or selling to his greater Advantage a He proceeds from Natural Honesty or the Laws of Right Reason to the Laws of the City and shews that Knavery was punishable by those tho' not in all yet in several Cases Nay this Knavery or Cozenage has always been punish'd by the Laws of the City witness the XII Tables about the Case of Guardianship and Laetorius's Law about the Over-reaching of Minors Nay where there was nothing of a Law against it 't was nevertheless punishable in those Judgments of Equity the Form of which was Ex fide bona agitur That all things be done faithfully and honestly And the same sort of words are in all other Judgments as when a Wife for Example enters an Action for her Dowry upon a Divorce from her Husband Melius Aequius That things be settled better and more equitably when any thing had been mortgag'd and pawn'd to another Ut inter bonos bene agier That among honest Men there be nothing done but only that which is Honest. And could there possibly be any Knavery allow'd of in that where the very Court-form was Melius Aequius For the better and more equitable setling of things Or any thing done thro' Deceit and Roguery where these words are publickly read in Court Inter bonos bene agier That amongst honest Men there may be nothing done except that which is Honest Now there 's something of this Knavery as Aquillus says in all false Shews and hypocritical Pretences Lying therefore should wholly be banish'd from all sorts of Business and Commerce in the World Nor should Sellers bring People to bid high for their Goods and enhance their Prizes nor Purchasers others to bid under-value and so beat 'em down lower but each of 'em if they come to speak about a Bargain should say at a word what he 'll give and take b Mention'd before chap. 32. Book 1. Quintus Scaevola the Son of Publius going to buy an Estate desir'd the Owner to tell him at one word what 't was he must have for it the Seller did so and Scaevola told him He thought 't was worth more than what he had demanded for it and accordingly gave him a thousand Crowns over Now there 's no one but will grant this was done like an Honest but they will not allow 't was like a Prudent Man any more than if he had sold a thing for less than he might have had for it Here now you may see is that pernicious Opinion thus to make a Distinction between Prudence and Honesty Ennius has a Saying to this purpose That he would not give a Farthing for a Prudent Man that could not be prudent for his own Advantage to which I am ready to set my Hand if he and I can agree upon one and the same Meaning of the word Advantage I find that c Mention'd again afterwards chap. 23. He flourish'd about the Year of Rome 640. All his Works are lost Hecaton a Rhodian Philosopher and Scholar of Panaetius in his Book about Offices which he wrote to d A noble Roman Grandson to Paullus Aemilius and Nephew to the Younger Africanus belov'd of Laelius Scaevola and all the great Men of that time He was Hearer of the famous Panaetius a Letter of whose to him is mention'd by our Author who often commends him for a Man of Wisdom Industry and Learning He was a great Admirer of the Stoick Philosophy which lost him the Pretorship See Orat. pro Muraena chap. 63. Q. Tubero hath laid this down as a Wise Man's Duty First to conform to the Laws and Customs and Practises of his Country and when he hath done that to make the best Improvement he can of his Estate since we ought to seek Riches not only for our selves but our Children Friends Relations and especially the Commonwealth whose publick Riches must principally consist in the Wealth and Stock of its particular Members This Man can by no means approve of that Action which I just now mention'd of Quintus Scaevola and there 's nothing he tells us that he 'd scruple to do for his own Advantage if it be but permitted and