may forfeit their Charter by it Now I do not deny but it is the Duty of the Mayor and it is the equal Duty of the Aldermen to see a time be appointed for an Election And as the Mayor is the Chief in pre-eminence so it aggravates his neglect if he refuses it But his neglect of his Duty will not excuse the rest of the Electors for the not doing of their Duty and the performing of their Qaths If it be said What if they do not agree upon the time but are divided I Answer Whoever can carry an Election when they are met and chuse shall also govern in the time of meeting if there be any difference about it and that is not the Mayor but the Major pars eorum c. Now this agrees with the Rule of the Law in the like Cases In a Commission of the Peace to try Felonies c. And to hold a Court of Quarter-Sessions Who shall issue out the Summons and appoint the Time Answ Those that constitute the Court and are to Exercise the Power must issue out the Summons If twenty Iustices of the Peace not having one of the Quorum amongst them should issue out a Summons for a General Quarter-Sessions it would be void for twenty Iustices of the Peace cannot hold such a Sessions if there be not one of the Quorum among them Nor can the Custos Rotulorum alone do it though he is commonly most Eminent Thus is it in the Commission of Gaol-Delivery and of Dyer and Terminer We may see the Forms of them in Crompt Jurisd of Courts f. 121 125. The express words of their Commission for appointing time and place Ad certum diem quem vos tres vel duo vestrum Quorum vos A. B. C. D. unum esse volumus ad hoc provederitis And therefore there was no need of any more express Provision in the Charter for a Summons for an Election of an Alderman or the appointing of a time In the next place for the necessity of the Mayor's being present as well as their meeting by his Summons I see no reason for it It is true there is a Case in Print that seems to make for it tho' I never yet heard it so much as mention'd either at the Trial for I was not there or throughout the whole Case yet it is fit for me to take notice of it for I make no doubt but before we have done we shall hear of it It is in Serjeant Rolls's Abridgment Part I. Tit. Corporation f. 513 514. Case 5 6 7. Between Hicks and the Borough of Launceston in Cornwal Resolved per Curiam which were only two Iudges viz. the Chief Iustice Richardson and Iustice Croke no other of the Iudges being there That if a Corporation consists of a Mayor and eight Aldermen with a Clause in the Patent That if any of the Aldermen dye that then the Mayor and the rest of the Aldermen within eight days after shall Elect another though it be not limited that they or the greater number of them may elect yet the greater number of them may elect And if the Mayor at the time of the death of an Alderman be absent at London till after the eight days and the rest of the Aldermen within eight days come to the Deputy Mayor and require him to make an Assembly of them to elect another within the eight days and he refuse and upon that the greater number of the Aldermen meet without the Mayor or his Deputy and Elect an Alderman that it is a void Election for the Mayor ought to be present at it by the Words of the Grant This seems to be a stronger Case than ours for there is a certain time limited by which they must make their Election viz. eight days I first Observe That this Case as far as I can find was not a Case depending by any Suit or Action for in that Case it is said That a Writ was granted to make a new Election of an Alderman So that I suppose it was upon a Motion only I have a Copy of the Rules which shews it to be so as I take it Then it does not appear to be upon an Argument for had it beén so two Iudges I presume would not have determin'd it but have put it off till the Court had been full as usually they do therefore it was not so solemn nor has not so great Authority But take it as it is The time of eight days being limited by which the Election was to be made makes the Case never a whit the stronger for there the Iudges declare that there may be an Election after the eight days and the limiting that time was to quicken them Then observe the ground those two Iudges went upon they do not say it ought to be so at the Common Law as doubtless they would had they thought that the Common Law would have ruled it for if the Common Law serves for it it was idle to resort to any other ground But the Iudges in the Case of Launceston say that the Mayor must be present at the Election by the Words of the Grant So that they went by that Rule which I have urged which is the words of the Grant 't is the Charter only must give the Rule as I have Argued all this while Now what the words of the Charter were in the Case of Launceston does not appear in the Report of that Case Perhaps there was an express Provision in the Charter requiring the meeting of the Aldermen by the Summons of the Mayor and in his presence which if so then there is no disputing against it And the drawer of the Indictment against us has so drawn it as if the Charter in our Case did so require it too But there is nothing to that purpose nay as I have observ'd there are concomitant Clauses that give another construction and argue to the contrary Therefore the Case of Launceston differs from ours But there is another thing wherein the Case of Launceston and ours differs I am no Enemy to the Government I Live under if any man think otherwise of me I care not because I cannot govern another Man's Thoughts I do agree that this Sovereign Court of the King's Bench as is resolv'd in James Bagg 's Case hath a super-intendency and a special Authority in Cases of this nature which more concern matter of Government and the publick Peace and Order than any Man 's private Right or Property And in such Cases this Court governs it self much by the Circumstances of the Case Now let us mind the Circumstances of the Case Reported by Serjeant Rolls and of our Case and let them be compar'd and there will be a very wide difference between them And therein I dare appeal to any rational unbiass'd Man in the World for the Innocency of our proceedings in the whole matter The Mayor in the Case of Launceston happen'd to be in London at the death
for to such the Defendant Preached and to them he declared the power given unto him by God to heal them by Prayer Then he tells them that their King is wicked and having insinuated this Doctrine into their Minds he then bids them stand to their Principles in opposing and subduing wicked Kings 'T is objected that there ought to have been a precedent Discourse of the King but the Presidents are otherwise In 33 H. 8. Rot. 17. There was an Indictment against the Lord Grey for words spoken against the King without setting forth any precedent Discourse of him So was my Lord Cobham 's Case in 12 Jac. for that he proditorie dixit pro palavit haec verba viz. It will never be well for England until the King and his Cubbs are killed without an Avernient that the words were spoken de Rege And in William 's Case 2 Roll Rep. 88. Reported by my Lord Rolls who was Indicted for High Treason for writing two Books in which were many Traiterous Assertions but no Averment of any previous Discourse concerning the King all these Indictments were thus viz. Dixit such words de Domino Rege Therefore the Indictment is good in form if the words therein contained amount to Treason now they do import Treason or not if they do import it then 't is unnecessary to aver that they were spoken de Rege because it cannot be intended to be Treason against any other King If a Man should say that he would go to Whitehal and kill the King 't is not necessary to averr any precedent Discourse de Rege In Actions on the Case for Words there must be an Averment of the person because many men are of the same Name but in Indictments the form will govern the Case Several Traitors have suffered Death in such Cases as this at Bar and many learned Men in all Ages have attended this Court and this Objection was never made till now and therefore the Presidents being without this Averment de Rege where the overt Act is by words Iudgment was prayed against the Prisoner Curia Words may be an overt Act but then they must be so certain and positive as plainly to denote the intention of the speaker If a Man should tell another that he would drive the King out of England there needs no averment that such words were spoken de Rege because they tend immediately to depose the King but if he had said that he would go to Whitehal and destroy his Enemies that is not Treason without an Averment c. Iudgment was arrested DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Pool versus Trumbal THE Defendant was sued in the Spiritual Court for Dilapidations 25 Car. 2. cap. 5. and pleaded the general Pardon by which all Offences Contempts Penalties c. were pardoned and for this reason he prayed a Prohibition but it was denied because the Statute never intended to pardon any satisfaction for Damages but only to take away Temporal Punishments Dorrington versus Edwin Mich. 36 Car. II. Rot. 277. SCire Facias against Pledges in a Replevin brought by Pleint Sci. Fac. will lye against pledges in Replevin by pleint setting forth that John Temple did levy a Pleint in the Sheriffs Court of London for the taking of three Baggs of Mony in which Suit he found Pledges de prosequendo de retorno habendo if it should be awarded That this Pleint was transmitted out of that Court into the Hustings and by * If it had not been a Court of Record it might have been remov'd by Re falo Dalt 425. 9 Hob. 6.58 13 Ed. 1. cap. 2. F. N. B. 74. F. Dalt 273. Certiorari removed into the Kings-Bench where the Plaintiff declared as aforesaid c. Dorrington avowed the taking c. and Temple was Non-suited and thereupon a Retorn ' Habend ' was awarded to the Sheriff who returned elongat ' c. Then a Sci. Fa. was brought against the Pledges upon the Statute of Westm 2. which provides that where Lords upon Replevins cannot obtain Justice in Inferiour Courts against their Tenants when such Lords are attached at their Tenants Suits they may have a Recordari to remove the Plea before the Justices c. and the Sheriff shall not only take Pledges of the Plaintiff to prosecute his Suit but also to return the Cattle if a Return be awarded c. The Defendants appeared and prayed Oyer of the Certiorari which was returned by the Mayor and Sheriffs only without the Aldermen And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether a Scire Facias will lie against them by virtue of this Statute they being only Pledges in Replevin brought by Pleint without Writ This Case was argued by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendants And for the Defendants it was said that they could not be charged by this Scire Facias because the Pleint was removed by Certiorari and thereby the Plaintiff Dorrington had lost the benefit he had against the Pledges in the Sheriffs Court This Case was compared to other Actions in inferior Courts which if removed by Habeas Corpus the Bail below are discharged of course By the Common Law there were no Pledges of Retorn ' habend Dyer 246. for before this Statute the Sheriff could not make a Replevin without the King 's Writ Now he hath power to take Pledges but if he will make deliverance of the Goods ad querelam alicujus sine brevi the fault is still in him for he may * Dalt 434. compel the Party to bring a Writ and then the Pledges will be liable because it will appear who they are And therefore it hath been adjudged Cro. Car. 446. that where a Replevin is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without taking Pledges because if the Plaintiff should recover he hath a remedy against them by Scire Facias but if he recover upon a Replevin brought by Pleint Cro. Car. 594. the Iudgment shall not be avoided by assigning the want of Pledges for Error because in such Case the Sheriff is not by Law obliged to take Pledges 2. This Scire Facias is brought too soon for there ought to go an Alias Pluries Retorn ' habend before the Return of Elongata and then and not before the Scire Facias is properly brought The Pledges are answerable E contra and the Scire Facias is well brought and this grounded upon the Statute of W. 2. which directs Pledges to be taken before the delivery of the Goods It takes notice that Replevins were sued in inferior Courts by the Tenants against their Lords who had distrained for Rents due for Services or Customs and that such Lords could not have Iustice done in those Courts and therefore to remedy this mischief the Statute gives the Writ Recordare c. to remove the Pleint before the Iustices and because such Tenants after they had replevied their Cattle did usually
Daughters for the Testator having two Sons and four Daughters it cannot be collected by these words how they shall take and by consequence it cannot be an Estate Tail by implication Now suppose one of the Daughters should dye without Issue 't is uncertain who shall have her part and therefore there being no appointment in what order this Estate shall go it cannot be an Estate Tail and to maintain this Opinion this Case was cited One Collier was seised in Fee of three Houses 2 Cro. 655. Gilbert versus Witty and had Issue three Sons John Robert and Richard he devised to each of them a House in Fee Proviso if all my Children dye without Issue of their Bodies then the Houses to be to his Wife The two eldest Sons died without Issue the younger had Issue a Daughter who married the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Question was Whether by the death of the eldest Son without Issue there was a cross Remainder to Richard and the Heirs of his Body or whether the Wife shall take immediately or expect till after the Death of all the Sons without Issue And it was adjudged that the Wife shall take immediately and that there were no cross Remainders nor any Estate by implication because it was a devise to them severally by express limitation So that if no Estate tail ariseth to the Daughters in this Case by implication Cro. Eliz. Taylor versus Sawyer then 't is no more than a devise to his Issue which extends to them all and gives only an Estate for Life For the Defendant it was argued Ex parte Def. that the Sons and Daughters have no Estate Tail by implication It was agreed that Nicholas had only an Estate for Life and that the word Estate in this case means the Houses and not the Interest in them 'T is true there is no express Limitation of any Estate to them but there is an express determination of it Now if this be not an Estate Tail by implication then the words dying without Issue are void A devise to his Son More 127. and if he dye not having a Son then 't is devised over This is an Estate tail in Remainder It cannot be a doubt who shall take first for the Daughters shall take it Dyer 333. and after them as 't is most natural the eldest Son for where there is the same proximity of Blood the Estate shall go to the eldest As for instance Hob. 33. one Chapman being seised in Fee of two Houses and having three Brothers devised the House which A. dwelt in to his said three Brothers and the House in which his Brother Thomas Chapman did dwell he devised to the said Thomas paying so much c. or else to remain to the Family of the Testator provided that the Houses be not sold but go to the next of the Males and the blood of the Males Thomas died without Issue the eldest of the two surviving Brothers had Issue a Daughter and died the Question was whether that Daughter or the youngest Brother of the Testator should have the House It was adjudged that the Daughter should have it in tail For the Proviso that the Houses be not sold c. made it a tail and the words viz. to remain to the Family must be intended to the eldest If this be not an Estate tail then the Devise over to Anne Warner is void As to the Case of Gilbert and Witty that moves upon another reason for there every one took by a distinct and separate Limitation Curia In that Case all the Estate was limited distinctly to the three Sons but in this 't is otherwise for the Testator had two Sons and no Estate was limited to one of them before then he saith If all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then c. And thus the Cases differ which creates the difficulty But no reason can be given why this Court should not construe Wills according to the Rules of Common Law where an Estate by implication is so incertain for when Men are sick and yet have a disposing power left they usually write Nonsense and the Iudges must rack their Brains to find out what is intended This cannot be an Estate tail in the Daughters and therefore the Heir must come in for his fourth part Iudgment for the Plaintiff Dixon versus Robinson THIS was a special Issue directed out of Chancery Wayhil Fair. and tried this day at the Bar by a Middlesex Iury. The Question was Whether Ballivus probi homines Burgenses Burgi de Andover in Hampshire had power to keep a Fair at Wayehil in any one place where they please the Bill being Exhibited to confine the Fair to a particular place which Fair was granted to them by Charter from Queen Elizabeth They who would have it confin'd to a certain place gave in Evidence that the Hospitaller of Ewelme in Oxfordshire was seised in Fee of the Manor of Rambridge within which Manor the place was where the Fair was always kept and that the Parson of Andover had Glebe there That this place was called Wayehil and that the profits did arise by Piccage and Stallage to the yearly value of 200 l. That it was an ancient Fair held there by Prescription before the Town of Andover had a Charter That upon the late Surrender of Charters the Town of Andover did likewise surrender and took a new Charter in which liberty was given to them to keep this Fair in what place they would That both the Hospitaller and Parson petitioned the King in Council and obtained an Order to Try where the Fair ought to be kept which was tried accordingly at the Exchequer Bar and a Verdict for the Parson Chief Justice If the Fair belongs to Andover they may chuse whether they will keep it at any place and that may create another Question Whether they may not forfeit this Franchise by disuser But certainly if the place be not limited by the King's Grant they may keep it where they please or rather where they can most conveniently and if it be so limited they may keep it in what part of such place they will Dawling versus Venman AN Action on the Case was brought against the Defendant Action for a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery for making a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery in which were these words Viz. Mr. Dawling is a Rogue and a Knave and I will make it out before my Lord Chancellor and I will have him in the Pillory Vpon not Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages entire It was moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the truth of on Oath shall not be liable to a Trial in an Action on the Case for the Law intendeth every Oath to be true Before the Statute of 3 11 H. Cro. Eliz. 521 2 Cro. 607. Sid. 50. Hutt 11. 7. which gives power to examine Perjury there was not any Punishment at
the person who made Oath before them The Commissioners sign the Depositions and they ought to produce them so signed to the Court and prove it for Depositions are often suppressed by Order of the Court. If a true Copy of an Affidavit made before the Chief Iustice of this Court be produced at a Trial 't is not sufficient to convict a Man of Perjury This is not like the Case of Perjury assigned in an Answer in Chancery taken in the Country for that is under the Parties Hand but here is nothing under the Defendant's Hand and therefore the Commissioners ought to be in the Court to prove him to be the Man The Court were equally divided The Chief Iustice and Wythens Iustice were of Opinion that it was not Evidence to convict the Defendant of Perjury it might have been otherwise upon the Return of a Master of Chancery for he is upon his Oath and is therefore presumed to make a good Return but Commissioners are not upon Oath they pen the Depositions according to the best of their skill and a man may call himself by another name before them without any offence The Commissioners cannot be mistaken in the Oath tho' they may not know the person for this Court may be so mistaken in those who make Affidavits here but not in the Oath if the Commissioners or the Clerk to the Commission had been here they would have been good Evidence If an Affidavit be made before a Iustice of the Peace of a Robbery as enjoyned by the Statute if you will convict the person of Perjury you must prove the swearing of the Affidavit The Attorney General perceiving the Opinion of the Court rather than the Plaintiff should be nonsuit because no Evidence could be given offered to enter a Nolle prosequi which the Court said could not be done because the Iury were sworn but he insisted upon it and said he would cause it to be entred Sir John Knight's Case AN Information was exhibited against him by the Attorney General upon the Statute of 2 E. 3. Information upon the Statute for going armed 2 E. 3. c. 3. Which prohibits all persons from coming with Force and Arms before the King's Justices c. and from going or riding armed in affray of Peace on pain to forfeit his Armour and suffer Imprisonment at the King's Pleasure This Statute is confirmed by that of R. 2. 20 R. 2.1 with an Addition of a farther punishment which is to make a Fine to the King The Information sets forth that the Defendant did walk about the Streets armed with Guns and that he went into the Church of St. Michael in Bristol in the time of Divine Service with a Gun to terrifie the King's Subjects contra formam Statuti This Case was tryed at the Bar and the Defendant was acquitted The Chief Iustice said that the meaning of the Statute of Ed. 3. was to punish People who go armed to terrifie the Kings Subjects 'T is likewise a great Offence at the Common Law as if the King was not able or willing to protect his Subjects and therefore this Act is but an affirmance of that Law and it having appointed a Penalty this Court can inflict no other Punishment than what is therein directed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 2 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686 7. Kingston versus Herbert A Common Recovery was suffered Anno 22 Jacobi primi Where a Scire Facias must go to the Tertenants before Judgment be reversed and a Writ of Error was brought about five years since to reverse it and Iudgment was given for the Reversal and it was now moved to set aside that Reversal because there was no Scire Facias against the Tertenants Mr. Williams who argued for the Reversal said that the want of a Scire Facias must be either in Law or in Fact it cannot be Error in Law for that must appear upon the Record it self which it doth not here It cannot be Error in Fact because there is no necessity of such a Writ 't is only discretionary in the Court and not ex necessitate juris But on the other side it was insisted that the Court cannot proceed to examine Errors before a Scire Facias is awarded to the Tertenants Dyer 320 331. for they may have a Matter to plead in Barr to the Writ as a Release c. and the Party cannot be restored to all which he hath lost by the suffering of the Recovery unless the Defendant be brought in upon the Scire Facias Curia The only Question is whether this Iudgment be well given without a Scire Facias The Secondary hath reported that the Practice is so Then as to the Ojection that such a Scire Facias is not ex necessitate juris but only discretionary 't is quite otherwise for 't is not only a cautionary Writ as all other Scire Facias but 't is a legal caution which in a manner makes it necessary 'T is true if there had been a Iudgment corruptly obtained this Court might have set it aside but if Erronice 't is a doubt whether it may be vacated but according to the Forms and Methods of Law Adjornatur Baldwin versus Flower BAron and Feme brought an Action on the Case for Words spoken of the Wife Words where actionable without special damage The Declaration was that the Defendant having some discourse with another person called the Wife Whore and that she was his Whore and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum c. The Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the Words were not actionable without alledging special damage But it was answered Rol. Abr. 35. placit 7. that the Action was well brought To say A Man is rotted with the Pox is actionable without alledging special damage because the person by such means will lose the Communication and Society of his Neighbours As to the Conclusion ad dampnum ipsorum 't is good for if she survive the Husband the Damages will go to her and so are all the Presidents Curia The Words are actionable And three Iustices were of Opinion that the Conclusion of the Declaration was as it ought to be which Iustice Wythens denied for if an Innkeepers Wife be called a Cheat and the House loses the Trade the Husband hath an injury by the Words spoken of his Wife but the Declaration must not conclude ad dampnum ipsorum Sir Thomas Grantham's Case HE bought a Monster in the Indies which was a Man of that Country who had the perfect Shape of a Child growing out of his Breast as an Excrescency all but the Head This Man he brought hither and exposed to the sight of the People for Profit The Indian turns Christian and was baptized and was detained from his Master who brought a Homine Repleg ' the Sheriff returned that he had replevied the Body but doth not say the Body in which
and not of Murder prout patet per Recordum that he was Clericus paratus fuit legere ut Clericus if the Court would have admitted him and that he is the same person c. To this Plea the Appellant demurred The truth of this Case was that after the Conviction and before the Sentence an Appeal was brought so that the Defendant had not an opportunity to pray his Book It was argued by Mr. Pollexfen for the Appellant and by Sir George Treby for the Appellee If the Statute of 3 H. 3 H. 7. c. 1. 7. was not in the way this Plea might be a good Barr to the Appeal because before the making of that Law Auterfoits convict c. had been a good Plea but now that Statute deprives the Defendant of that benefit for 't is enacted That if any man be acquitted of Murder at the King's Suit or the Principal attainted the Wife or next Heir to him so slain may take and have their Appeal of the Murder within a year and a day after the said Murder done against the said persons so acquitted or attainted if they be alive and the Benefit of * Nota At this time Clergy was allowed for Murder but now taken away by the Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 1. Hales Pl. Cor. 232. Clergy before not had Now though the Party be neither acquitted or attainted but is only convicted of Manslaughter yet the word Attaint in this Statute signifies the same with Convict and this appears by the penning of the Act in that Clause which mentions the benefit of Clergy viz. That if any man be attainted of Murder the Heir shall have an Appeal if the benefit of Clergy be not had Now an Attainder supposeth a Conviction for one is the consequence of the other and if it should not signifie the same thing in this place then that Clause would be in vain because if it should be taken for the Iudgment given upon the Conviction then 't is too late for the Party to have any benefit of his Clergy Thus it was held in the second Resolution of Wrot and Wigg's Case that the word Attaint in this very Act shall not be intended only of a person who hath Iudgment of Life 4 Co. 46. a. but also of one Convict by Confession or Verdict 'T is true 2 Anders 68. 't is said in that case and so likewise in Holecroft's Case that Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter upon an Indictment of Murder is a good Bar to an Appeal at the Common Law as well as if the Clergy had been allowed the reason may be because in both those Cases the Iudgments were by Confession so that the Court ought to have granted the Clergy but this is a Conviction by Verdict which alters the Case E contra Auterfoits convict is a good Plea at the Common Law in all other Cases Treason only excepted at this day it appears by the Statute of H. 7. that the year and day which was the time allowed for the Appeal and in which time the Kings Indictment could not be tried was an usage but not a Law therefore that Act provides that the King shall proceed upon the Indictment within the year and a day and not stay for the Appeal of the Party If the Party be attainted or acquitted the Wife or next Heir shall have an Appeal but not if he be convicted But now admitting that the word Attaint hath the same signification with the word Convict yet this is a good Plea both within the Words and the Equity of the Statute This appears upon the Construction of that Law which must be expounded according to the vulgar Sense and signification of the words and therefore where the Statute saith That an Appeal lies where the benefit of Clergy is not had is that it is not had de Jure but the Clergy in this Case was de Jure and the Defendant was ready to read if he had been admitted thereunto by the Court. Thus is the Statute of Malbridge about the taking away of Wards viz. Si parentes conqueruntur that is if they had cause to complain 2. This Statute hath been expounded according to Equity for though it gives an Appeal to the Wife or next Heir of him slain yet if a Woman be killed her next of Kin shall bring an Appeal Therefore by the same Equity these words viz. The benefit of Clergy not had shall be construed had by the Grant of the Court Co. Ent. 355. for if a Man be indicted without the addition of Clerk he cannot demand his Clergy unless the Court ask him but if he be indicted with that addition then he may demand it because 't is supposed by the Court that he can read That this Appeal was not well brought these Exceptions were taken grounded upon the Statute of Gloucester by which seven things are required in an Appeal of Murder 6 E. 1. ca. 9. That the Appellor declare the Fact the Year the Day the Hour the Year of the King the Town where the Fact was done and with what Weapon the Party was slain Now in this Case there is a defect in two of the things required by that Statute 1. That of the Hour which is laid too general for 't is circa horam octavam which is not certain enough 2. They have laid no Vill for 't is that the Defendant did assault the Husband of the Appellant in Parochia Sancti Martini in Campis now though that word Parochia has crept into Fines and Recoveries and likewise into Indictments it must not be allowed in Appeals There may be several Vills in one Parish and though this is ruled good in Indictments it ought not to be so here because of the difference between an Indictment and an Appeal Stamf. 80. b. Doct. Stud. 48. for in Indictments you need not mention the Hour but it must be done in Appeals A Parish is an Ecclesiastical Division and though such may be a Vill 't is not necessary Ex vi termini that it should be so But afterwards in Trinity-Term 4 Jac. the Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of all the Iudges except Iustice Street who were assembled for that purpose at Serjeants-Inn that this was no good Plea and that the Court ought not to ask the Prisoner what he had to say and so to let him into the benefit of his Clergy Tamen quaere for 't is otherwise resolved The Company of Horners versus Barlow DEBT upon a By-Law wherein the Company set forth A By-Law restrained to London and not to extend farther that they were incorporated by Letters Patents of King Charles I. and were thereby empowred to make By-Laws for the better Government of their Corporation and that the Master Warden and Assistants of the Company made a Law viz. That two Men appointed by them should buy rough Horns for the Company and bring them to the Hall there to be distributed every Month by
the said Master c. for the use of the Company and that no Member of the Company should buy rough Horn within four and twenty miles of London but of those two Men so appointed under a Penalty to be imposed by the said Master Warden c. That the Defendant did buy a quantity of rough Horn contrary to the said Law c. There was Iudgment in this Case by default And for the Defendant it was argued that this was not a good by-By-Law 1. Because it doth restrain Trade 11 Co. 54. Hob. 210. for the Company are to use no Horns but such as those two Men shall buy and if they should have occasion for more than those Men should buy then 't is plain that Trade is thereby restrained 2. The Master c. hath reserved a power which they may use to oppress the Poor because they may make what Agreements they will amongst themselves and set unreasonable prices upon those Commodities and let the younger sort of Tradesmen have what quantity and at what rates they please To which it was answered by Serjeant Thompson First This By-Law is for the encouragement of Trade because the Horns are equally to be distributed when brought to the Hall for the benefit of the whole Company But the material Objection was that this being a Company incorporated within the City of London they have not Iurisdiction elsewhere but are restrained to the City and by consequence cannot make a By-Law which shall bind at the distance of four and twenty miles for if they could make a Law so extensive they might by the same reason enlarge it all over England and so make it as binding as an Act of Parliament and for this reason it was adjudged no good By-Law Sir John Wytham versus Sir Richard Dutton ASsault and False Imprisonment 14 Octob. 36 Car. 2. c. The Defendant as to the Assault before the 6th day of November pleads Not-Guilty and as to the False Imprisonment on the said 6th day of November in the same year he made a special Iustification viz. That 28 Octob. 32 Car. 2. c. the King by his Letters Patents did appoint the Defendant to be Captain general and Chief Governour of Barbadoes and so sets forth the Grant at large by which he appoints twelve Men to be of the King's Council during pleasure of which the Plaintiff Wytham was one that the Defendant had also power by the advice of that Council to appoint and establish Courts Iudges and Iustices and that the Copies of such Establishments must be sent hither for the King's Assent with power also to establish a Deputy-Governour that by vertue of these Letters Patents the Defendant had appointed Sir John Wytham to be Deputy-Governour of the said Island in his absence and that he being so constituted did male arbitrarie execute the said Office That when the Defendant returned to Barbadoes viz. 6 Novemb 35 Car. 2. he called a Council before whom the Plaintiff was charged with male Administration in the absence of the Defendant viz. That he did not take the usual Oath for observing of Trade and Navigation that he assumed the Title of Lieutenant Governour and that Decrees made in Court were altered by him in his Chamber Vpon which it was then ordered that he should be committed to the Provost Marshal until discharged by Law which was done accordingly in whose Custody he remained from the 6th day of November to the 20th of December following which is the same Imprisonment c. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen argued for the Plaintiff and Serjeant Thompson for the Defendant 1. It was said for the Plaintiff that the Causes of his Commitment if any yet were such which they ought not meddle withal because they relate to his Mis-behaviour in his Government for which he is answerable to the King alone But supposing they might have some cause for the committing of him this ought to be set forth in the Plea that the Plaintiff might answer it for to say he did not take the Oath of Deputy Governour in what concerned Trade and Navigation is no cause of Commitment because there was no Body to administer that Oath to him for he was Governour himself Then to alledge that he did alter in his Chamber some Decrees made in the Court of Chancery that can be no cause of Commitment for the Governour is Chancellor there Besides the Defendant doth not shew that any Body was injured by such alterations neither doth he mention any particular Order but only in general so 't is impossible to give an Answer to it 2. He doth not alledge that the Plaintiff had made or done any of these things but that he was charged to have done it and non constat whether upon Oath or not The Governour hath a large power given by these Letters Patents to make Laws such as he by consent of a general Council shall enact Ex parte Def. The Fact is set forth in the Plea the Plaintiff was committed by vertue of an Order of Council until he was brought to a general Court of Oyer and Terminer by which Court he was again committed That the Court had power to commit him is not denied for the King is not restrained by the Laws of England to govern that Island by any particular Law whatsoever and therefore not by the Common Law but by what Law he pleaseth For those Islands were gotten by Conquest or by some of his Subjects going in search of some prize and planting themselves there Calvin 's Case The Plaintiff being then committed by an Order of Council till he should be discharged by due course of Law this Court will presume that his Commitment was legal The Court were all of Opinion that the Plea was not good so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but afterwards 5 Willielmi Mariae this Iudgment was reversed by the House of Peers Sir Robert Jefferies versus Watkins THIS was an Action brought for a Duty to be paid for weighing of Goods at the Common Beam of London Verdict cures a defective Declaration setting forth that the Lord Mayor c. time out of mind kept a common Beam and Weights and Servants to attend the weighing of Goods That the Defendant bought Goods c. but did not bring them to the Beam to be weighed per quod proficuum amisit Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff had not brought himself within the Prescription for he doth not say that the Defendant sold the Goods by Weight and this is a fault which is not helped by a Verdict This had been certainly naught upon a Demurrer and being substance is not aided by this Verdict This is Substance for the Duty appears to be wholly in respect of the Weights which are kept now Weighing being the Principal and it
Case Plea where it amounts to the general Issue wherein the Plaintiff declared that the Defendant exhibited a Peittion against him and Sir R. H. before the King in Council by reason whereof he was compelled to appear at his great Expence and that he was afterwards discharged of the matter alledged against him which was the erecting of Cottages in Kingswood Chase in the County of Gloucester This Action was first laid in Gloucestershire and the Defendant moved that it might be laid in Middlesex where the Petition was exhibited But it was insisted for the Plaintiff that where a cause of Action ariseth in two places he hath his Election to lay it in either The Court held that the exhibiting of the Petition was the ground of the Action and though it conteined matter done in another place yet it shall be tried in the County where the Petition was delivered for suppose the Petition had contained Matter done beyond Sea c. Now in this Case the Action being brought in Middlesex the Defendant pleaded that the Chase was injured by the erecting the said Cottages by the digging of Pits and by the making of a Warren by Sir John Newton and that the other person Sir R. H. being then a Iustice of the Peace for the County of Gloucester upon Complaint to him made did not impose Penalties upon the Offenders but did abet the said Plaintiff by reason whereof the Deer were decreased from 1000 head to 400. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred Mr. Pollexfen argued against the Plea first that it charged Sir R. H. with no particular Crime but enlargeth the Matter upon the Plaintiff and amounts to no more than the general Issue for the Question is whether the Defendant hath fasly prosecuted the Plaintiff before the King in Council which is only matter of fact and which is charged upon the Defendant and therefore he ought to have pleaded Not-Guilty 'T is true where the Defence consists in matters of Law there the Defendant may plead specially but where 't is purely fact the general Issue must be pleaded E contra E contra It was insisted upon that what is alledged in this Plea might be given in Evidence upon the general Issue but the Defendant may likewise plead it specially and not trust the Matter to the Lay-gents As in Conspiracy for procuring of the Plaintiff to be falsly and maliciously indicted of a Robbery Cro. Eliz. 871 900. 21 E. 3.17 27 Ass 12. Kelway 81. Moor 600. Rast Ent. 123. Sed nota This Defence was matter of Law the Defendants plead that they were robbed and suspecting the Plaintiff to be guilty procured a Warrant in order to have the Plaintiff examined before a Iustice of the Peace of which he had notice and absented himself but was afterwards committed to the Gaol by a Iudge of this Court who advised them to preferr a Bill of Indictment c. quae est eadem conspiratio this was adjudged a good Plea though it amounted to no more than the general Issue and all this matter might have been given in Evidence at the Trial. The Court except Iustice Allybon advised the Plaintiff to waive his Demurrer and the Defendant to plead the general Issue But Iustice Allybon took an Exception to the Declaration for that the Plaintiff had not alledged any damnification but only that he was compelled to appear and doth not shew how either by the Petition of the Defendant or by Summons c. He ought to set forth that he was summoned to appear before the King in Order to his discharge but to say coactus fuit comparere is incertain for that might be in the vindication of his Honour or Reputation He complains of a Petition exhibited against him which the Defendant hath answered by shewing to the Court sufficient matter which might reasonably induce him so to to and for that reason he held the Plea to be good Sed adjornatur Rex versus Hockenhul AN Information was exhibited against him for a Riot Misprision of a Clerk amended of which he was found guilty and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Memorandum quod ad general ' quarterial ' Session ' Pacis tent ' c. die Sabbati prox ' post quindenam Sancti Martini praesentat ' existit quod the Defendant 27 die Januarii in such a year vi armis c. So the Fact is laid after the Indictment which was exhibited against the Defendant at the Michaelmas Sessions and the Fact is laid to be in January following in the same year But the Attorny General said this was only a Misprision of the Clerk in titling the Record viz. in the Memorandum 8 Co. 156. 4 H. 6.16 10 Ass 26. Cro. Car. 144. and there was no fault in the Body of the Information and that it was amendable at the Common Law He cited some Cases to prove where amendments have been in the Cases of Subjects of greater Mistakes than here a fortiori it ought to be amended in the King's Case 'T is not only amendable at the Common Law 4 H. 6. c. 3. 8 H. 6. c. 12. Jones 421. but by several Statutes which extend to all Misprisions of Clerks except Treason Felony and Outlawry wherefore this mistake of Quinden ' Martini was amended and made Quinden ' Hillarii Rex versus Sellars THE Defendant was indicted at the Sessions in London for not attending at the Wardmote Inquest being chosen of the Iury for such a year Indictment quashed To this Indictment he pleaded the King's Grant to the Company of Cooks of which he was a Member by which Grant that Company is exempted from being put or summoned upon a Iury or Inquest before the Mayor or Sheriffs or Coroner of London c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Cooks are discharged by this Grant from their Attendance at the said Wardmote Inquest And for the King it was argued that they are not discharged Before the Iudgment upon the Quo Warranto brought against the City of London these Courts there were like the Hundred Courts in the County for as these were derived out of the County 4 Inst 249. so those were derived from the Lord Mayor's Court which is a Court of Record and erected for the better Government of the City and the Aldermen of every Ward had right to hold Leets there 1. But now the words of this Grant do not extend to this Case for the Cooks are thereby discharged only from being of a Iury before the Mayor Sheriffs or Coroner c. but the Court of Wardmote is held before neither for 't is held before the Alderman of the Ward 2. Dyer 269. The words in this Grant ought to be taken strictly viz. that Cooks shall be exempted if there be other sufficient Men in the Ward to serve besides and if this doth not appear the Grant is void but this is not alledged E contra E
on the 29th day of April seize the Goods of the said Toplady that after the seizure and before any Venditioni exponas viz. 4 Maij an Extent which is a Prerogative Writ issued out of the Exchequer against two persons who were indebted to the King and by inquisition this Toplady was found to be indebted to them whereupon parcel of the Goods in the Declaration was seized by the Sheriffs upon the said Extent and sold and the Mony paid to the Creditors but before the said Sale or any execution of the Exchequer Process a Commission of Bankrupcy was had against Toplady and that the Commissioners on the second of June assigned the Goods to the Plaintiff The Question was whether this Extent did not come too late And it was held it did or whether the Fi. Fa. was well executed so that the Assignees of the Bankrupts Estate could not have a Title to those Goods which were taken before in Execution and so in Custodia Legis And it was held that they had no Title Fitzgerald versus Villiers WRIE of Error upon a Iudgment in Dower Infant must appear by Guardian and the Error assigned was that the Tenant in Dower was an Infant and no Warrant was alledged of the admission of any Guardian 29 Assise pl. 67. Bridg. 74. Lib. Entr. 45. Hut 92. 4 Co. 53. Lit. 92. Hetl. 52. 3 Cro. 158. Moor 434. Hob. 5. that it might appear to be the act of the Court 't is true an Infant may sue by Prochein Amy but shall not appear by Attorny but by Guardian because 't is intended by Law that he hath not sufficient discretion to chuse an Attorny therefore 't is provided that he appear per Guardianum which is done by the Court who are always careful of Infancy and a special Entry is made upon the Roll. Viz. Per Guardianum ad hoc per Curiam admissum c. 2. The Appearance is by the Guardian in his own Name Viz. Et praedicta Katherina Fitzgerald per Richardum Power Guardianum suum venit dicit quod ipse c. it should have been in the name of the Party quod ipsa c. Adjurnatur Harrison versus Austin A Settlement was made as followeth Viz. What words amount to a Covenant to stand seised That if I have no Issue and in case I dye without Issue of my Body lawfully begotten then I give grant and confirm my Land c. to my Kinswoman Sarah Stokes to have and to hold the same to the use of my self for Life and after my decease to the use of the said Sarah and the Heirs of her Body to be begotten with Remainders over c. The Question was whether this did amount to a Covenant to stand seised so as to raise an use to Sarah without transmutation of the possession The Objection against it was Sid. 26. Moor 687. Dyer 96. 2 Roll. Abr. 786. Winch 59. Plowd 300. that Vses are created chiefly by the intention of the Parties and that by these words grant and confirm the Feoffor did intend the Land should pass at Common Law so it could not be a Covenant to stand seised 't is like the Case where a Letter of Attorny is in the Deed or a Covenant to make Livery there nothing shall pass by way of use but the possession according to the course of the Common Law and therefore there being neither Livery and Seisin or Attornment no use will pass to Sarah It cannot be a Bargain and Sale for that is only where a Recompence is on each side to make the Contract good besides 2 Inst 672. the Deed is not inrolled To this it was answered 1 Vent 137. that it shall be construed to be a Covenant to stand seised though the formal words are wanting to make it so and for that purpose it was compared to Fox 's Case 8 Co. 93. who being seised in Fee devised his Land to C. for Life remainder over for Life reserving a Rent and afterwards by Indenture in consideration of Mony did demise grant and set the same Lands to D. for 99 years reserving a Rent the Lessee for Life did not attorn in which Case there was not one word of any use or any attornment to make it pass by Grant and the Question was whether this Lease for years shall amount to a Bargain and Sale so that the Reversion together with the Rent shall pass to the Lessee without Attornment Hob. 277. and it was held that by construction of Law it did amount to a Bargain and Sale for the words import as much And in this Case it was adjudged that it was a Covenant to stand seised Hexham versus Coniers IN Ejectment the Plaintiff declared de uno Messuagio sive Tenemento An Ejectment will lye for a Tenement and had a Verdict but Iudgment was arrested because an Ejectment will not lye of a Tenement for 't is a word of an uncertain signification it may be an Advowson House or Land but it is good in Dower so is Messuagium sive Tenementum vocat ' the Black Swan for this addition makes it certain that the Tenement intended is a House Rex versus Bunny A Motion was made for a Melius inquirendum to be directed to a Coroner who had returned his Inquisition upon the death of Bunny that he was not compos mentis when in truth he was Felo de se But it was opposed by Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Law gives great credit to the Inquest of a Coroner and that a Melius inquirendum is seldom or never granted tho' it appear to the Court upon Affidavits that the Party had his Senses Mod. Rep. 82. It hath been granted where any fault is in the Coroner or any incertainty in the Inquisition returned That there is such a Writ it cannot be denied Cro. Eliz. 371. but 't is generally granted upon Offices or Tenures and directed to the Sheriff 3 Keb. 800. but never to a Coroner in the case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum Corporis DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. In Trinity-Vacation last Mr. Justice Holloway and Mr. Justice Thomas Powell had their Quietus and Mr. Serjeant Baldock and Mr. Serjeant Stringer were made Justices of this Court And Mr. Justice Allibon who was a Roman Catholick died in the same Vacation and Sir John Powell one of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of this Court Sir Thomas Jennor another of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of the Common-Pleas and Mr. Serjeant Rotheram and Mr. Serjeant Ingoldby were made Barons of the Exchequer Wright Chief Justice Powel Justices Baldock Justices Stringer Justices Shuttleworth versus Garnet Intratur Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 965. THE Defendant was Tenant of Customary Lands held of the Manor of A. of which Manor B. was Lord
and that before the Pardon for these Reasons it cannot be revested in the party Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. E contra Finch contra The Question is what Interest the King hath by this Verdict for as to the Offence it self 't is within the Body of the Pardon for all Misdemeanours and Offences are pardoned and the Exception doth not reach this Case for that excepts Misdemeanours in answering of the Revenues Now that which arises by a Forfeiture can never be taken to be part of the King's Revenue because the Revenue is properly a stated Duty originally setled on the King and the Penalty to be inflicted for this Misdemeanour cannot be a Revenue because the Court have not yet given Iudgment so that 't is incertain what Fine they will set and this appears more plain because the King may assign his Revenue but cannot grant over a Penalty The Information is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament which establishes the Revenue but for concealing of a thing forfeited to prevent the Seisure thereof which indeed may be a casual Revenue as all Fines are so that if this should be taken as an Offence committed against the King in deceiving him of this Revenue then the first part of the Pardon dischargeth all such Offences and the Exception pardons none 'T is for these Reasons that the Case cannot fall under any of the words in the Exception no not under these Words viz. Mony due or to be due to the King because no Mony is yet due to him 'T is true the Iury have found it a Misdemeanour which is finable but until the Fine is set no Mony is due because the Court may set a greater or less Fine as they shall see cause And if any other Construction should be made of this Exception then every thing for which a Fine may be set is excepted and this will be to make the Pardon signifie nothing for what is meant by Offences and Misdemeanours if they should be pardoned and yet the Fine arising thereon should not But admitting that all Offences relating to the Concealment of collecting of the Revenue are excepted then this Revenue must be either antecedent or it must arise by the Fine 'T is no antecedent Revenue this appears by the Book of Rates wherein the King 's stated Revenue is set down and no mention of this so that the Revenue to which this relates must arise upon the Offence and what an absurd thing is it to say that all Offences are pardoned by one part of this general Pardon and by the Exception none are pardoned Besides the Information is not grounded upon that part of the Statute which inflicts a Penalty upon the person who exposeth prohibited Goods to Sale for then they would sue for the 50 l. therefore it must be upon the Forfeiture which is expresly pardoned and though there is a Conviction yet nothing is vested in the King before Iudgment because it may be arrested and therefore Tooms's Case is in no wise applicable to this for the Debt which was due to him was actually vested in the King by the Inquisition returned here which found him to be Felo de se Adjornatur Anonymus A Libel in the Admiralty against a Ship called the Sussex Ketch A Ship was pawned for necessaries and a Libel was exhibited in the Admiralty though the pawning was at the Land setting forth that the said Ship wanted Necessaries super altum Mare and that the Master took up several Sums of the Plaintiff at Roterdam for which he did hypothecate the said Ship and upon a Suggestion that this Contract was made at St. Katherines infra Corpus Comitatus Council moved for a Prohibition upon which a Question did arise whether a Master of a Vessel can pawn it on the Coast for Necessaries and the person to whom 't is pawned shall sue for the Mony in the Admiralty here By the Common Law a Master of a Ship had neither a general or special property in it Sid. 453. and therefore could not pawn it but by the Civil Law in cases of necessity he may rather than the Voyage should be lost and if any such cause appear 't is within the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty but then the pawning must be super altum Mare Now the Statute of 28 H. Cap. 15. H. 8. which abridgeth the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty in Trials of Pyrates and which appointeth Offences committed on the Sea to be tried by a Commission under the great Seal directed to the Admiral and others according to the course of the Common Law and not according to the Civil Law gives a remedy in this very Case Molloy de Jure maritimo 62. for it provides that it shall not be prejudicial to any person for taking of Victuals Gables Rapes c. in cases of necessity upon the Sea paying for the same So that this is an excepted Case because of the Necessity and 't is like the Cases of suing for Mariners Wages in this Court The Service was at Sea so that the Admiralty hath no proper Iurisdiction over this Matter 'T is true Prohibitions have been denied for Mariners Wages the first is reported by Iustice Winch Winch. f. 8. but the reason seems to be because they proceed in the Admiralty not upon any Contract at Land but upon the Merits of the Service at Sea and allow or deduct the Wages according to the good or bad performance of the Services in the Voyage Besides there is an Act of Parliament which warrants she Proceedings in the Court of Admiralty for Mariners Wages Cotton Abr. f. 340. nu 37. For in a Parliament held in the 14th year of Richard II. the Commons petititioned for remedy against great Wages taken by Masters of Ships and Mariners to which the King answered that the Admiral shall appoint them to take reasonable Wages or shall punish them Now the reason of the Civil Law which allows the pawning of a Ship for necessaries upon the high Sea seems to be plain because there may be an extraordinary and invincible necessity at Sea but not at Land So that this being a Contract beyond Sea and at Land the Court of Admiralty cannot have any Iurisdiction over it 4 Inst 134. Cro. Car. 603. Latch 11. 2 Brownl 37. for where the Common Law cannot relieve in such Cases the Admiralty shall not because they are limited to Acts done upon the Sea and in cases of necessity for if the Law should be otherwise the Master may take up as much Mony as he will Mr. Pollexfen contra 1 Rolls 530. That things arising upon Land may be sued for in the Admiralty is no new thing for so it is in all Cases of Stipulation Mariners Wages are also recoverable in that Court not by vertue of any Act of Parliament Exton Mant. Diraeologiae f. 192. but because it grows due for Services done at Sea which is properly a Maritime Cause though the
visitation of God by which he was disabled for a time to do any reasonable thing whatsoever and this may be as well done as to plead duress from Men which the Law allows to make compulsary Acts void My Lord Coke in Beverly's Case taking notice of the great reason of the Civil Law in Cases of this nature 4 Co. 123. which maketh all Acts done by Ideots void without their Curator's concurrence and that it was objected as a defect in the Common Law that Tutors were not assigned to such persons he answereth that our Law hath given the custody both of them and their Lands to the King which is directly contrary to his own Opinion in his 2d Institutes 2 Inst 14. where paraphrasing upon the fourth Chapter of Magna Charta which prohibits Wast in the Land of Wards from thence he inferrs that at that time the King had no Prerogative to entitle him to the Lands of Ideots for if he had that Act would have as well provided against Wast in their Lands as in those of Wards He farther adds that the Guardianship of Ideots did belong to the Lords according to the course of the Common Law Be it how it will 't is clear by all the Books that both by the Common and Civil Law their Acts are void and my Lord Coke esteemed it as a very unreasonable thing that they should not be avoided even during the life of the Party himself but it was never yet denied that they may be avoided after his death by his Heir or Executor and by parity of reason the Law will prevent Strangers from being prejudiced by such Acts. There is an Objection that some Acts done by Ideots are unavoidable as Fines levyed by them c. 'T is true such are not to be avoided not because they are good in themselves but the reason is because they are upon Record against which the Law will not suffer any Averment to be made presuming that the Courts and Iudges in Westminster-Hall would not admit an Ideot or Infant to levy a Fine This being therefore a void Surrender by a person Non compos the Estate is still in the Surrenderor and so the contingent Remainder upon his death is well attached in Charles Leach the Lessor of the Plaintiff But supposing 't is not void yet there will be scintilla juris left in Simon Leach to support the Contingency and to prove this the Case of Lloyd and Brookin was relied on which was this viz. Thomas Bradshaw was Tenant for Life 1 Mod. 92. 1 Vent 188. 2 Keb. 881. the Remainder in Tail to his first Son c. the Remainder to Paul for Life the Remainder to his first second and third Sons in Tail Thomas accepted a Fine from Paul who had then a Son born then he made a Feoffment and afterwards Paul had another Son born His eldest Son died without Issue and it was adjudged that the contingent Remainder to his second Son was not destroyed by this Feoffment because it was preserved by the right of Entry which his elder Brother had at the time it was made 2. If this Surrender is only voidable then whether Charles Leach claiming by a collateral Title can avoid it It was argued that he may for it would be absurd that he should have a Right to the Remainder and yet have no Remedy to recover it My Lord Coke in Beverly's Case tells us that there are four sorts of Privities 1. In Bloud as Heir 2. In Representation as Executor 3. In Estate as Donee in Tail the Reversion or Remainder in Fee 4. In Tenure as Lord by Escheat He affirms that the two first may shew the Disability of their Ancestor and Testator and avoid their Grants 'T is true in the third Article he is of Opinion that Privies in Estate shall not avoid the Acts of their Ancestors and he puts the Case of a Donee in Tail making a Feoffment in Fee within age and dying without Issue the Donor shall not enter because no Right did accrew to him by the death of the Donee there being only a Privity of Estate between them But this Opinion is denied to be Law by Iustice Dodderidge in his Argument of the Case between Jackson and Darcy Palm 254. who said that the Donor might enter because otherwise he would be without remedy for he could not maintain a Formedon because the Feoffment made by the Infant was no Discontinuance Besides 't is not possible there should be any Privity in Blood between the Donee in Tail and the Reversioner in Fee so that Article must be intended where they are Strangers in Blood and Privies in Estate which doth not at all concern the Case in question because William Leach is privy in Blood to his Father who made the Surrender and my Lord Coke tells us in the first Article of his distinction that such a Privy may avoid the Acts of his Ancestor It may be objected that this distinction was not then the Iudgment of the Court for it was not material to the Point in Issue which was no more than thus viz. Snow gave Bond to Beverley and exhibited his Bill in the Court of Requests to be relieved against it because at the time of the sealing and delivery thereof he was Non compos mentis But the like distinction was made in Whittingham 's Case many years afterwards 8 Co. 42. which was thus viz. Whittingham being seised of Lands held of the Queen in Soccage devised the same to Prudence his Bastard Child and her Heirs she during her Infancy made a Feoffment thereof to another and died in her Nonage without Issue the Question then was whether that Feoffment should prevent the Queen of the Escheat And adjudged it should not In which Case it was held that Privies in Blood inheritable shall take advantage of the disabilities of their Ancestors as if an Infant who is seised in Fee maketh a Feoffment and afterwards dieth his Heir may enter and avoid it The Law is the same in the Case of one Non compos mentis as in that of an Infant as to the avoiding of the Acts of their Ancestors so that Mr. Leach being privy in Blood according to my Lord Coke's Opinion in those Cases shall avoid the Acts of his Father he being Non compos at the executing of this Surrender If it should be objected that this part of the distinction ought to be taken restrictively and must be tied up to such an Heir at Law who takes an immediate possession by descent from his Ancestor the Answer is that if this Surrender is avoided Mr. Leach will take by immediate descent from his Father for though nothing but a Reversion in Fee descended to him yet he is a compleat Heir But after all this distinction made by my Lord Coke is founded upon no manner of Authority 't is only his extrajudicial Opinion for there is no reason to be given why Privies in Estate should
not avoid such Acts done by their Ancestors as well as Privies in Blood because the Incapacity of the Grantor goes to both Those who argued on the other side held that the Acts of Infants and persons non compos were not void in themselves but only voidable E contra 'T is true some Deeds made by an Infant are void not meerly Cro. Car. 502. because executed by him for some are good and those only are void which are made to his prejudice Such also are void which give Authority to a third person to do an Act as if an Infant enter into a Bond Perk. Sect. 139. March 141. and give it to a Stranger to deliver to the Obligee when he shall attain his full Age this is void because the person derived his Authority from an Infant who by reason of his Nonage could not give such a Power but if the Infant himself had delivered the Bond to the Obligee it had been only voidable Lit. Sect. 259. The Father of the Demandant was an Infant when he sold his Estate 46 E. 3.34 his Son brought the Writ Dum fuit infra-aetatem against the Alienee and it was held good which would not have been allowed if the Grant had been void All the old Authorities prove that the Acts of Infants and Ideots are not void but voidable If an Infant is bound in an Obligation 't is not void Cro. Eliz. 127. 2 Inst 483. for he may agree to it when of Age he cannot plead Non est factum and he may refuse to plead his Infancy If he be entituled to a Term for years Cro. Eliz. 126. Cro. Car. 502. and maketh a Surrender by the acceptance of a new Lease 't is good if 't is for his advantage either by the lessening of the Rent or the encreasing of the Term but if he hath no benefit by it 't is voidable only So he may purchase Lands because the Law intends it for his benefit and he can receive no damage by such a Purchase for he may either perfect or avoid it at his full Age which shews that such Acts are not voidable ab intio but only voidable as the Case shall require The Statute of 23 H. 6. Enacts 23 H. 6. c. 10. That Sheriffs shall take no Bonds upon an Arrest but for the Appearance of the Party and to themselves only and that a Bond otherwise taken colore officii shall be void that is not in its self but by pleading the Statute for 't is not to be avoided by pleading Non est factum So upon the Statute of Additions 1 H. 5. c. 5. 3 Co. 59. a. where a Man is outlawed without the addition of his condition or place of abode in the original Writ such Outlawry shall be void not of its self but it may be avoided by Writ of Error In like manner there are many Authorities to prove that the Acts of a person non compos are not void but voidable So is the first Resolution in Beverly 's Case that a Deed or Feoffment made by him is to be avoided by any other person but not by himself Thus stood the Law in the time of E. 35 Ass pl. 10. 3. For in an Assize the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff had released to him by Deed who replied that at the time of the making of the Deed he was Non compos The Court of Common Pleas seemed then to be of Opinion that the Replication was not good which shews that the Deed in its self was not void 't is true the Assize was then adjourned because that Opinion was directly against the Register which is that the Writ of Dum non fuit compos may be brought by the person himself notwithstanding his own Alienation But this hath since been denied to be Law Cro. Eliz. 398. for in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded that he was Non compos and upon a Demurrer the Plea was over-ruled And of this Opinion was Sir William Herle Chief Iustice of the Common Pleas in 5 E. 5 E. 3.70 3. which was long before the Book of Assize So the Law continued till the Reign of H. 35 H. 6. f. 42. 6. viz. that the person himself could not avoid his own Feoffment either by Entry or Action The Writs de Ideota inquirendo and Dum non fuit compos import the same thing viz. that Acts done by them are not void for the first recites that the Ideot alienavit and the other that the Lunatick * Dimisit is there intended where the Estate is conveyed by Livery or for life and Alienavit is a Conveiance by Feoffment 17 E. 2. Stamf. Praerog 34. Dimisit terras Now if their Acts had been void ab initio then they cannot be supposed either to alien or lease their Lands which shews that such Acts are only voidable And as a farther Argument to enforce this the Statute de Praerogativa Regis was mentioned which gives the Custody of the Ideots Lands to the King during their Lives provided that afterwards it be given to their right Heirs ita quod nullatenus per eofdem fatuos alienetur Now to what purpose were these Words added if such an Alienation was void in it self Besides the Cases of Ideots mentioned on the other side and Lunaticks are not parellel for an Ideot hath a different incapacity from one Non compos 't is perpetual in an Ideot and for that reason the Law gives the King an Interest in him But a person non compos may recover his Senses Co. Lit. 2. b. Fitz. tit Issue 53. he may purchase Lands may grant a Rent-charge out of his Estate and shall not plead his insanity to defeat his own act If therefore this Surrender was not void at the time of the execution thereof but voidable only during the Life of the Surrenderor by office found then the Question cannot properly be whether the Lessor of the Plaintiff shall avoid it for that would be to revest the Estate in some body but the Surrender was good and the Estate for Life was utterly determined so that nothing being left to support the contingent Remainders those are also destroied And to prove this Chudleigh 's Case was relied on which was Co. 120. Sir R. C. was seised in Fee of the Manor of Hescot in Devon and having Issue Christopher and three other Sons made a Feoffment to the use of himself and his Heirs on the Body of Mary then the Wife of Mr. Carew to be begotten and for default of such Issue then to the use of his last Will c. for ten years and after the Expiration of that Term then to his Feoffees and their Heirs during the Life of Christopher Remainder to the Issue Male of Christopher in Tail with like Remainder to his other Sons Remainder to his own right Heirs He died without Issue by Mrs. Carew But before Christopher had any Son born the
The Third PART OF Modern Reports BEING A COLLECTION Of Several SPECIAL CASES IN THE COURT OF King's-Bench In the last Years of the Reign of King Charles II. In the Reign of King James II. And in the two first Years of his present MAJESTY TOGETHER WITH The Resolutions and Judgments thereupon None of these Cases ever Printed before Indignor quicquam reprehendi non quia crassè Compositum illepidéve putetur sed quia nuper Hor. Epist 2.1 Carefully Collected by a Learned Hand LONDON Printed by the Assigns of Rich. and Edw. Atkins Esqrs for Charles Harper at the Flower de Luce over-against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet 1700. Mr Ambrose Holbech of Mollington. in the County of Warwick 1702 TO THE PROFESSORS OF THE Common Law OF ENGLAND Gentlemen ALL Human Laws are either Natural or Civil The Law of Nature which is also the Moral Law is at all times and in all places the same and so will always continue By Civil Laws I mean such as are established by Human Policy which with us are either Customs or Statutes and these have also some resemblance to Natural Laws because they are for the most part introduced by the concurrent Reason of Men and Reason is the Law of Nature Customs are made by Time and Usage and do thereby obtain the force of Laws in particular places and Nations but no otherwise than upon supposition that they were reasonable at the beginning To these may be added such Laws which are usually called Responsa Prudentum which together with Customs make a great part of our Municipal Laws And because 't is impossible that future Evils should be foreseen by the Wisdom of Mankind so as to prevent them therefore 't is very reasonable that positive Laws should be instituted by the Legislative Power which we call Statutes and those are either Commands or Prohibitions always enacted upon some present Emergencies and may be altered or repealed according as the Manners of Men change or as the Conjuncture of Affairs require for the publick Good I do not find this Nation was governed by any settled Laws from the time of William called the Conqueror till 9 H. 3. but by the irregular Power of the Norman King and of those who immediately succeeded him 'T is true he swore to preserve approbatas antiquas Leges Angliae but 't is as true that the same Force which compelled our Forefathers to submit did likewise exact their Obedience to the Customs of Normandy some of which we retain to this very day It was then a term of Reproach to be called an Englishman as if that denomination imported to be a Slave This made the lesser Barons that is the Freeholders or those which had such Lordships which are now called Court-Barons take up Arms to regain their ancient Rights and by that means they obtained a Grant of their old Laws from some of those Kings which was called Magna Charta Libertatum but living in a tumultuous Age they did never quietly enjoy those Liberties for notwithstanding that Charter many Infringements were made upon them which they continued in Arms to defend insomuch that in the Seventeenth Year of King John they delivered to that King a Schedule of their ancient Customs in Writing desiring that he would establish them by another Grant which was done accordingly But this Charter was as little observed as the former for the Norman Customs did still interfere with St. Edward's Laws and the People were miserably divided by those Innovations till Anno 9 H. 3. the Great Charter was established by Authority of Parliament From that time those ancient Laws and Customs were had again in repute they were revived by that Grant which was only declaratory of them and because a more exact Obedience and Conformity might be given to them for the future therefore did his Successor the good King Edward I. encourage the Lawyers in his time to reduce them into Order and Writing which was done accordingly about the middle of his Reign by John Breton not the Bishop of Hereford but a Judge of the King's Bench for as Mr. Selden has observed the Bishop of that Name died Anno 3 E. 1. And in that Book which is now called Breton the Statute of W. 2. is cited which was made 13 E. 1. and therefore it could not be penned by the Bishop unless he could quote a Statute which was not made till above ten years after his Death This is one of the first Systems extant of our Laws 'T is true the Book called The Mirror of Justice was written before but many Additions were made to it in this King's Reign by Andrew Horn a learned Man in that Age. There was likewise a small Tract then written by Sir Ralph Hengham Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas which only treats of Essoins and Defaults in Writs of Right Writs of Assize and Dower and therefore cannot be called a Body of our Laws I must admit that two such Books were written by the Lord Chief Justice Glanvil and Justice Bracton the one in the Reign of Henry the Second and the other in the time of Henry the Third but not one more of that Nature almost in the space of two hundred Years for I do not think the Book which the Lord Chancellor Fortescue wrote in the Reign of King Henry the Sixth can be properly called a System of Law It was published by him for these purposes first to obviate the design of two great Favourites the Dukes of Exeter and Suffolk who had used some endeavours to introduce the Imperial Law and therefore he shewed the Excellency of the Common Law above that and in the next place it was intended to soften the warlike Temper of the young Prince Edward by inclining him to the Study of those Laws by which he was to govern his People and to instruct him in some Occurrences therein The Abridgment by Baron Statham and the Year-Books are for the most part made up with Cases then depending in the several Courts at Westminster and with the Opinions and Resolutions of Judges which I rather call Responsa Prudentum than Systems of Law The next Attempt in that kind was made by Justice Littleton in the Seventh Year of Edward the Fourth who hath taught succeeding Ages with great Judgment and Learning in his Profession but 't is now two hundred and thirty Years since he wrote and many alterations have been made in the Law since his time I only mention these things to shew the necessity of new Books and that the old Volumes are not so useful now as formerly because many of the great Titles of which they were composed are now quite disused they are mentioned by my Lord Hales in his Preface to the Lord Chief Justice Roll's Abridgment which I shall not repeat and those very Titles make the greatest part of Justice Littleton's Tenures But amongst all the Old Tenures and Customs I admire that of Burrough English should still
of the Clauses yet he is repeated over again when they come to make him of the Quorum This shews the naming him before by his Office did not do it if it did the naming of him again in the Quorum will be a Tautology and a vain Repetition But perhaps it will be said It belongs to the Office of a Mayor at the Common Law to summon the Corporation and amongst the rest the Aldermen when he sees there is occasion and he must as Mayor be present among them or nothing can be done Let us examine the truth of this Those that advis'd the Indictment were not of this Opinion and I heard it was said at the Tryal that it was drawn with good advice for the Indictment it self challenges this Right to the Mayor upon another ground It would intimate as if the Words of the Charter gave it him as I have already observ'd which says that secundum privilegia concessa est therefore they thought it was not his due at the Common Law 1. For his Name of Mayor that imports no such thing He is Major that is the Greater the more Eminent this notes his pre-eminence in Respect and Reverence but gives him little more of power than what the rest of the Aldermen have The like Office among the old Romans was the Praetor which as Minsheu says comes from prae-itor a prae-eundo he does praeire or praecedere or praesidere He goes first and sits uppermost but it gives him no more power But the Mayor in our Case would neither lead nor drive But if there can be no Election of an Alderman without his Summons and Presence and if he be wilful as the Mayor in our Case was he is not only Major Maximus but Dominus fac totum as the vulgar Saying is or Dominus faciens totum The twelve Aldermen without him will be but so many Cyphers the Mayor will be the Great Figure and the Aldermen will signifie only in conjunction with him We may then say of every Alderman as the one Grecian Captain said of the other of Ulysses Nihil est Diomede remoto Mr. Mayor will be that which the Logicians call Causa sine qua non quae per se nihil facit sed tantum esse aliquid sine qua Reliquae causae non faciunt So much for his Name and Title Then for the Office it self That does not require his Summons nor Presence in all the meetings of the Aldermen for the Business of the Corporation it is not incident nor essential to his Office of Mayor by the Common Law The Common Law looks upon him as the Head or Chief of a Corporation but he is no Officer of the Common Law to whom the Common-Law limits or prescribes any Duty as it does to a Iudge a Sheriff a Conservator of the Peace a Coroner or a Constable These are all Officers at the Common Law and the Common-Law instructs them in their Power and Duty But the Mayor being the Head of a Corporation and a Corporation having its essence by Charter or Prescription which presupposes a Charter he has no power but what the Charter expresly gives him The Common Law takes no farther notice of him Let us examine the Ground and Nature of a Corporation and there we shall find the true Nature and Office of a Mayor or any other Head for 't is all one The true Ground and Original of Corporations in Cities and great Towns is this Those are generally the Staples of Trade and Merchandize and Trade as is said in the Case of the City of London 8 Co. 125. a. cannot be maintain'd without Order and Government And therefore the King for the Publick Good may exect Gildam Mercatoriam a Fraternity or Society or Incorporation of Merchants to the end that good Order and Rule shall be by them observ'd for the Encrease and Advancement of Trade and Merchandizing Suppose the King should by his Charter Encorporate a Town by the Name of Mayor and twelve Aldermen and should not set out their Duty and Office What power would the Law give them in that Case They would have no power as Conservators of the Peace or as Iustices of the Peace They could neither Fine or Imprison If they should take upon them to meddle in these matters without express power given them by the words of the Charter It would be Sutor ultra Crepidam Therefore Charters usually add these Powers by express Clauses to those purposes and make the Mayor a Iustice of Peace or a Iudge of Goal-Delivery but then he acts in those Powers not Quatenus Major nor eo nomine but because of the express power given him as it might have done to any other Man The uniting the Powers in one person does not confound the several and different Capacities of that person That the Charter gives the only Rule in these Cases and that a Corporation is a meer Creature of the Charters that does constitute it and gives it it's Being and therefore the Bounds and Limits of it's working appears by this Suppose that neither this nor any other Charter had given to this Corporation of Bristol any power to choose a new Mayor or new Aldermen upon the Death of the old they could then have made no new Election but when the Mayor and Aldermen had died the Corporation had been dissolv'd The Charter that gives them their Being must provide for their Continuance and Succession Thus it is held in the Case of the Corporation of Dungannon in Ireland in those Reports that go by the Name of the Lord Coke 's 12 Rep. 120 121. So that the Charter must provide for an Election in order to a Succession or otherwise the Law will not help them And though the Mayor is the more Eminent and Excellent and ought to have greater respect and reverence yet the subject matter that we are upon is to be consider'd in the nature of it viz. The Election of an Alderman It is not a matter of Interest or of Privilege or of Power for then the Mayor ought to be preferr'd in it But it is matter of Duty and Labour and Trust and Trouble It is Officium not Dominium to choose an Alderman It is rather a Burthen than a Power or Authority as is said in the Mayor of Oxford 's Case in Latches Rep. 231. But then it will be ask't that if it depend upon the Charter and not upon the Common Law Who shall appoint the time of Election if the Charter be silent in it as here it seems to be This will be a great defect and so there will be no meeting nor no Election and so the Corporation will expire To this I Answer That the Charter does provide for it for those whose Duty it is to make an Election it is their Duty to agree to meet for that purpose and to appoint the time or else they do not discharge their Duty They break their Oath and are punishable for their Omission and
sees his own time and advantage he will have his own choice do what they can for before they can complain of him which is a work of time and charge and trouble he will have done his work and so prevent them And then where is the freedom of Election This could never appear more plainly than in this Case of ours where the Election by the majority is set aside and the choice made by a lesser number and in effect by Mr. Mayor only is that which carries it It plainly appears that we had no sinister design to do any thing without the Mayor for we did all we could to get him to join with us and he thrice denied us but it as plainly appears that the Mayor had a design in refusing to do it till some of us must be gone and then to steal an Election behind our backs by a lesser number when he had the advantage After all that I have said I do agree that had eleven Aldermen of us gone about an Election without so much as desiring the Mayor to join with us or it may be upon once or twice being refused or when the Mayor had been occasionally absent or had it any way appeared that we meant a surprise in it or had we made a Choice subject to the least Exception and had he not obstinately gone away from us being in person upon the place without so much as giving us the least reason for his refusal I should have held my tongue and not have concern'd my self any farther in it I hope it sufficiently appears that I have been no Enemy to Government and Order But to choose an Alderman was our Duty and we were under an Oath to do our Duty and we did but discharge our Trust I may I think save my self the labour of arguing that however if we were mistaken in the Construction of the Charter and in the point of Law in the making of our Election yet here is no Riot in the Case for we are indicted for a Riot for a Riot is the doing of an unlawful act with force and violence neither are we an unlawful Assembly for that is where there is an intent to do an unlawful Act but still with force and violence but they go away without doing it as appears by Poulton de Pace Reg. Regin fol. 25. And in case the Election we made be adjudged duly made then the pretence of a Riot vanishes of it self as is held in Eden's Case Cro. Eliz. 697. If the Indictment be void for the principal matter which in the Case there was an unlawful Entry against the Statute of 8 H. 6. where that Statute was mis-recited they were not allowed in that case to stand upon the Riot I have but a short word more I have been the Recorder of Bristol these one and twenty years longer I think than any Man can be remembred I have sworn all the Aldermen that are now upon the Bench in my time and many more who are now dead I can say it without vanity till the time of this unhappy Election of Members to the Oxford Parliament which I sought not I had the good Will of all sides even of this Mr. Mayor who was Sir Richard Hart for I never would join with any Party but did all I could when I came amongst them to join them together and unite them For ever since they grew rich and full of Trade and Knighthood too much Sail and too little Ballast they have been miserably divided And unless this Court to whom I think it properly belongs upon complaint in such Cases will examine their Dis-orders and command Peace and Order to be observed in our Proceedings I cannot safely attend there any more nor hold any Gaol Delivery I submit what I have said to the Court. Whereupon the Court arrested the Iudgment Lord Grandison versus Countess of Dover IN a Prohibition the Case was Where an Administration once granted ought not to be repealed Charles Heveningham died Intestate leaving an only Sister Abigail then an Infant The Countess of Dover who was her Great Grandmother came into the Prerogative Court and prayed to be assigned her Guardian Ex officio which was granted and thereupon she obtained Administration durante minore aetate Afterwards my Lord Grandison brought a Prohibition suggesting that the Court had granted Administration upon a surprise and being Grandfather to the Children and so nearer of kinred prayed that Administration might be committed to him The Lady replyed that it was obtained after great deliberation and without any surprize and upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether this Administration was well granted to the Lady It was argued now by Dr. Master for the Plaintiff and afterwards by a Common Lawyer on the same side in Hillary Term following And by Dr. Reines and Sir William Williams for the Defendant The Civilian argued That the Father of both the Children died intestate and that their Mother administred and afterwards made a Will of which she appointed my Lord to be Executor and thereby committed the Infant to his Custody which being in Fact true the Curatorship of the Living Child by the Civil Law draws to it the Administration of the Estate of the dead Child There is a Statute Law which empowers the Father by Deed or Will to dispose the custody of his Child under Age 12 Car. 2. cap. 24. to any in Possession or Remainder who may take the Profits of his Lands and possess himself of the said Infant 's personal Estate and bring Actions in relation thereunto as a Guardian in Socage might have done And wherever a Father or †Quare of the Mother Mother has made such a disposition a Iudge cannot assign a Guardian The Spiritual Courts have power to repeal this Administration granted to my Lady Dover the Right is not in question for whoever has it reaps no advantage because 't is for the benefit of the Infant the contest is who ought to be admitted by the Spiritual Court to Administer It cannot be denied but that the Great Grandmother is a degree more remote than the Grandfather If therefore that Court hath entrusted one who ought not to have Administration they have an undoubted power in such case to make an Alteration If my Lord had been Administrator it had been agreeable to the common-Common-Law for he is Guardian in Socage durante minore aetate E contra E contra It was said That my Lord was really indebted to the Estate of the Infant intestate and therefore as this Case is the Spiritual Court ought not to repeal the Administration once granted for 't is for the benefit of the Infant 'T is not material who shall be Administrator for he who is so durante minore aetate hath no power over the Estate he is only a Curator in the Civil Law which is in the nature of a Bayliff in our Law who hath only power to sell bona peritura Probate
Trust as in the Case of Wardship formerly which always went to the Executor of the Grantee and which was of greater consideration in the Law than the feeding or clothing of an Ideot and of that Opinion was the Court that the King had a good Title to dispose of both the Ward and the Ideot one till he was of Age and the other during his Ideocy Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Reeves versus Winnington THE Testator was a Citizen and a Freeman of London A Devise of all his Estate passed a Fee and being seised in Fee of a Mesuage c. and likewise possessed of a considerable personal Estate made his Will in which there was this Clause viz. I hear that John Reeves is enquiring after my Death but I am resolved to give him nothing but what his Father hath given him by Will I give all my Estate to my Wife c. The Question was Whether by these words the Devisee had an Estate for Life or in Fee in the Mesuage It was argued that she had only an Estate for life because the Words All my Estate cannot be construed to pass a Fee for it doth not appear what Estate was intended and Words in a Will which go to disinherit an Heir must be plain and apparent A Devise was in these Words viz. Sid. 191. Bowman versus Milbank I give all to my Mother all to my Mother and it was adjudged that a Fee did not pass which is as strong a Case as this for by the word All it must be intended All that was in his power to give which is as comprehensive as if he had said All my Estate 'T is true Kerman and Johnson Stiles 281. 1 Rol. Abr. 834. Cro. Car. 447. it hath been adjudged that where a Man devised his whole Estate to his Wife paying his Debts and Legacies that the word Estate there passed a Fee because it was for the benefit of the Creditors there being not personal Assets sufficient to pay all the Debts But that is not found in this Case therefore the Word Estate being doubtful and which will admit of a double construction shall not be intended to pass a Fee Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra The first part of this Sentence consists in negative words and those which are subsequent explain the intention of the Testator viz. That John Reeves should take nothing by the Will The Word Estate doth comprehend the whole in which the Owner hath either an Interest or Property like a Release of all Actions which is a good discharge as well of real as personal Actions In common understanding it carries an interest in the Land and then 't is the same as if he had devised all his Fee-simple Estate In the Case of Bowman and Milbank it was adjudged that a Fee-simple did not pass by the Particle All because it was a Relative Word and had no Substantive joined with it and therefore it might have been intended All his Cattle All his Goods or All his personal Estate for which incertainty it was held void yet Iustice Twisden in that Case said that it was adjudged that if a Man promise to give half his Estate to his Daughter in Marriage that the Lands as well as the Goods are included The Testator devised all his Tenant-right Estate held of such a Manor 3 Keb. 245. Mod. Rep. 100. and this being found specially the Question was Whether any more passed than an Estate for Life because he did not mention what Estate he intended but it was held that the Devisee had a Fee-simple because the Words were as comprehensive as if he had devised all his Inheritance and by these Words a Fee-simple would pass Curia It plainly appears that the Testator intended nothing for John Reeves therefore he can take nothing by this Will and that the Devisee hath an Estate in Fee-simple for the Words All my Estate are sufficient to pass the same Rex versus Sir Thomas Armstrong Saturday June 14th THE Defendant was outlawed for High-Treason and being taken at Leyden in Holland was brought into England and being now at the Bar he desired that he might have leave of the Court to reverse the Outlawry and he tried by virtue of the Stature of Ed. 6. which Enacts 5 6 E. 6. cap. 11. That if the Party within one year after the Outlawry or Judgment thereupon shall yield himself to the Chief Justice of England and offer to traverse the Indictment upon which he was outlawed he shall be admitted to such Traverse and being acquitted shall be discharged of the Outlawry He alledged that it was not a year since he was outlawed and therefore desired the benefit of this Law But it was denied because he had not rendered himself according to the Statute but was apprehended and brought before the Chief Iustice Whereupon a Rule was made for his Execution at Tyburn which was done accordingly DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Hebblethwaite versus Palmes Mich. 36 Car. II. in B. R. Rot. 448. AN Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas Possession is a sufficient cause to maintain an Action against a wrong doer for diverting of a Watercourse The Declaration was That the Defendant Primo Augusti c. injuste malitiose did break down an ancient Damm upon the River Darwent by which he did divert magnam partem aquae ab antiquo solitu cursu erga molendinum ipsius quer c. ad dampnum c. The Defendant pleaded that before the said Breach made he was seised in Fee of an ancient Mill and of six Acres of Land adjoyning upon which the said Damm was erected time out of mind to turn the Water to his said Mill which Damm was always repaired and maintained by the Defendant and the Tenants of the said Land that his Mill was casually burnt and he not intending to Re-build it suffered the Damm to be broken down and converted the Timber to his own use being upon his own Soil prout ei bene licuit c. The Plaintiff replied that by the breaking of the Damm the Water was diverted from his Mill c. The Defendant rejoyned and justified his Plea and Traversed that the Mill of the Plaintiff was an ancient Mill. And upon a Demurrer to this Rejoynder Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error now brought to reverse that Iudgment and for the Defendant in the Action it was argued 1. That the Declaration is not good because the Plaintiff had not set forth that his Mill was an ancient Mill. 2. Because he had not entituled himself to the Watercourse 3. That the Plea was good in Bar to this Action because the Defendant had sufficiently justified having a Right to the Land upon which the Damm was erected and always repaired it As to the first Point it
sell them so that a Retorn could not be made to the Party distraining therefore it directs that the Sheriff shall take Pledges for returning the Beasts if a Return should be awarded which would be to little purpose if such Pledges were not liable upon the Retorn of Elongar Now as to the removing of the Pleint by Certiorari that makes the Case more strong in the Plaintiffs behalf because the Record it self una cum omnibus ea tangen is removed but by an Habeas Corpus the person is only removed and the Court hath thereby a Iurisdiction over his Cause which the inferior Court hath lost because it hath lost his Person 2. This Scire Facias is not brought too soon as hath been objected for 't is in vain to bring an Alias Pluries after the Sheriff had returned Elongat ' 't is like the common Case where a Scire Facias is brought against the Bail and Non est inventus is returned after which there never was an Alias or Pluries Capias And afterwards in Michaelmas-Term following Iudgment was given that the Pledges are liable Palmer versus Allicock BY the Statute of Distribution of Intestates Estates 't is provided 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. That in case there be no Wife then the Estate of the Husband dying intestate shall be distributed equally amongst the Children and if no Child then to the next of Kin of the Intestate in equal degree and to those who legally represent them A Man died intestate having no Wife at the time of his death and but one Child who was an Infant afterwards Administration was granted of the Fathers Estate durante minore aetate of the Child who died before the Age of seventeen Then Administration was granted by a peculiar to the next of Kin of the Infant and an Appeal was brought in the Arches by the next of Kin of the Father to revoke that Administration In a Prohibition the Question was Whether Administration de bonis non c. of the first Intestate shall be granted to the next of Kin of the Father or the Child Mr. Pollexfen argued this Term for the Plaintiff in the Prohibition viz. That the Statute gives a power to the Ordinary to take Bonds of such persons to whom Administration is committed the Forms of which Bonds are expressed in the Act and the Conditions are to make a true and perfect Inventory and to exhibit it into the Registry He hath also a power to distribute what remains after Debts Funeral Charges and Expences Thus the Law stands now Then as to the Case at the Barr three things are to be considered 1. If a Man dies intestate leaving two Sons and no Wife each hath a Moiety of his personal Estate immediately vested in him so that if one Brother should afterwards die intestate the other shall have the whole 2. If an Interest be vested in two then by this Statute the like Interest is vested in one so that if he die Intestate his Administrator shall have the Estate 3. If so then the consequence will be that in this case Administration de bonis non of the first Intestate shall go to the next of Kin of the Infant By Interest is meant a Right to sue for a share after Debts paid which Interest every person hath in a chose in action As if a Man doth covenant with two that they shall have such an Estate after Debts paid an Interest vests in them by this Covenant and if they die it goes to their Executors such also is the Interest of every Residuary Legatee Now if any of them die before the Residue can be distributed the Wife or Children of him so dying shall have it And to make this more clear it will be necessary to consider how the Law stood before the making of this Act. At the Common Law neither the Wife Child or next of Kin had any Right to a Share of the Intestates Estate but the Ordinary was to distribute it according to his Conscience to pious Vses and sometimes the Wife and Children might be amongst the number of those whom he appointed to receive it but the Law entrusted him with the sole disposition of it 2 Inst 399. Afterward by the Statute of Westm 13 E. 1. c. 19. 2. he was bound to pay the Intestate's Debts so far as he had Assets which at the Common Law he was not bound to do and an Action of Debt would then and not before Pl. Com. 277. Greisbrook versus Fox lie against him if he did alien the Goods and not pay the Debts Then the Statute of * 31 E. 1. c. 11. 31 E. 1. was made by which he was impowred to grant Admstration to the next of Kin and most lawful Friend of the Intestate 1 Inst 133. b. 2 Inst 397. 9 Co. Hensloes Case and by this Statute the person to whom Administration was committed might have an Action to recover the Intestate's Estate for at the Common Law he had no remedy But then afterwards the Statute of 21 H. 8. cap. 5. Enacts That the Ordinary shall grant Administration to the Widow or next of Kin of the person deceased or to both and this was the first Law which gave any Interest to the Wife to whom Administration being once granted the power of the Ordinary was determined Hob. 83. 1 Cro. 62 202. and he could not repeal it at his pleasure as he might at the Common Law But after the making of this Statute many mischiefs did still remain because the Administration being once committed the person to whom it was granted had the whole Estate and the rest of the Relations of the deceased were undone and therefore if his Children were under Age or beyond the Seas and a Stranger had got Administration it would have been a Bar to them And thus it continued many years the Ordinary still making distribution as he thought fit taking only a Bond from the person to whom he granted Administration for the purposes aforesaid and sometimes to dispose the Surplus after Debts and Legacies as he should direct and no Prohibition was granted to remedy these inconveniences till about the 12th year of King James the First Hob. 83. But now by this Act a good remedy is provided against these mischiefs and 't is such which takes away the Causes thereof which is that the Administrator shall not have the whole Estate but that a Distribution shall be made The Title of the Act shews the meaning thereof to be for the better Settlement of Intestates Estates and the Body of it shews how Distribution shall be made so that such Bonds which were usually given by the Administrator before this Law to make Distribution as the Ordinary should direct are now taken away and other Forms are prescribed and there can be no remedy taken upon such new Bonds till the Ordinary hath appointed the Distribution so that in effect this Act makes the Will
of a person dying intestate and tells what share his Relations shall have and 't is probable that the Custom of London might guide the Parliament in the making of this Law which Custom distributes the Estate of a Freeman amongst his Wife and Children This shews that an Interest is vested in them which goes to the Administrator the consequence whereof is very considerable for if such Children should marry they have a Security by this Act that a Portion shall be paid and if the Wife should take another Husband he will be entituled to her share and this may be a means of giving credit in the World when the certainty of their Portions are so well known and secured 'T is such an Interest which is known in the Law and may be compared to that in Sir Thomas Palmer's Case 5 Co. 24. who sold 1600 Cord of Wood to a Man who assigned it to another and afterwards the Vendor sold 2000 Cord to one Maynard to be taken at his Election the Assignee of the first person cutt 600 Cord and Maynard carried it away thereupon an Action was brought and the Plaintiff had Iudgment because the first Vendee had an Interest vested in him which he might well assign This Case is a plain proof that a Man may have an Interest in a Chattle without a Property and such an Interest which gives the person a remedy to recover and where there is a remedy there must be a Right for they are convertibles 'T is not a new thing in the Law that a contingent Interest in the Ancestor shall survive to the Heir Wood's Case cited in Shelleys Case 1 Co. 99. as if a Man be seized of the Mannor of S. and covenants that when B. shall make a Feoffment to him of the Mannor of D. then he will stand seized of the said Mannor of S. to the use of the Covenantee and his Heirs who dyed leaving Issue an Heir who was then an Infant B. made a Feoffment to the Covenantor accordingly it was held that no Right descended to the Heir of the Covenantee but only a possibility of an Vse which might have vested in the Ancestor and therefore the Heir shall claim it by descent 'T is like a Debt to be paid at a day to come Lit. Sect. 512. which is debitum in praesenti though solvendum in futuro and though the Obligee cannot have an Action before the day is come yet such an Interest is vested in him that he may release it before that day and so bar himself for ever Now if this Act makes a Will it ought to be construed as such and it cannot be denied that if this Case had happened upon a Will the Executor of the Son would have a very good Title 'T is a weak Objection to affirm that this Law was made to establish the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts and that 't is only explanatory of the Statutes of Ed. 3. and H. 8. because 't is plainly introductory of a new Law for Distribution is now made otherwise than it was before 2. An Interest is vested where there is but one Child For the better understanding of this Point the Clause in the Act ought to be considered which is viz. If there be no Wife then to be distributed amongst the Children if no Child then to the next of Kin of the Intestate upon which Clause these Objections have been made Object 1. That 't is insignificant because the Statute of H. 8. gives the right of Administration to the Child 2. That Distribution cannot be made where there is but one 3. That this Clause ought to be construed according to the Law in the Spiritual Courts Answ Now as to the first Objection 't is true that before this Act the Child had a Right of Administration but that Right was only personal so that if he had died before he had administred his Executor or Administrator could not have it Besides many inconveniences did attend this personal Right of Administration which are now prevented by the vesting of an Interest For when the Right was personal and the Administrator gave Bond with Sureties to administer truly and the Ordinary had appointed Distribution to be made the Administrator was bound to perform it though not in equal degree and if he died before the Estate was got in it was lost for ever But now by this Clause Distribution must be made equally viz. one third part of the Surplus to the Wife the rest by equal portions to the Children so that what was very incertain before and almost at the Will of the Ordinary is now reduced to a certainty and therefore an Interest must vest in such persons to whom such equal Distributions of filial Portions are given 2. Object That Distribution cannot be made where there is but one Child Answ This also is true in propriety of Speech and taking the Word distribute in the strict sense But this was never intended by the Statute as may plainly appear upon the construction of the whole for the Word Children doth comprehend a Child and more and the form of the Bond directed by this Statute is that the Administrator shall deliver the Goods to such person and persons c. which shews that one is comprehended and therefore Distribuere in this Case is no more than Tribuere and must be so taken The Parliament never intended that Distribution should not be made where there is but one Child as may be easily collected from the reason of the thing and the inconveniences which would ensue 1st If a Man should die leaving a Wife and one Child the Wife would be entituled to one third and the Child to the other two thirds of the personal Estate now if the Child shall have two thirds being comprehended under the Word Children what reason can be given why he should not have the whole where there is no Wife which he could not have if the Word Children did not comprehend Child in this Case 2dly If a Man hath a personal Estate to the value of 2000 l. and dieth leaving Issue three Sons but hath in his life time made provision for the second Son to the value of 1000 l. the eldest Son dies intestate shall the youngest be totally excluded from the remaining 1000 l. because there is none left to have distribution his second Brother being preferred in the life time of his Father by an equal portion with what remains 3dly If the Father hath a Son married and two Brothers and dies intestate now if his Estate should not be vested in the Son then if he should also die intestate his Wife could have nothing but it would go to the Vncles and this would be a very hard construction of this Law to carry the Estate to the Vncles and their Executors from the Son and his Administrator But there is a Case which proves that a Child is intended by the Word Children 8 Co 96. 't is between Amner
and Lodington cited in Mathew Manning's Case which was A Man being possessed of a Term for years devised it to his Wife for life and after her death to her Children unpreferred and made her Executrix and died she married again and had but one Daughter unpreferred and after the death of the Mother this Executory Devise was held good to the Daughter though it was by the Name of Children and she enjoyed the Term. 3. Object That this Act should be construed according to the Spiritual Law Answ That cannot be for all Statutes ought to be expounded according to the Rules of the Common Law and not according to their Law for they have no Law which gives power to sue nor to distribute to the Wife or next of Kin but the usual course was for the Ordinary to dispose of Intestates Goods to pious uses Then admitting this to be an Interest vested the consequence will be that it shall go to the Administrator and then Administration must be granted where the Estate legally ought to go The Administration of the Husband to the Goods of the Wife is grounded upon this reason 4 Co. 51. Ognel's Case 1 Cro. 106. because the Marriage is quasi a gift to him in Law It was not the only mischief before this Law that the Administrator run away with the whole Estate for if a Man died intestate leaving but one Son then beyond Sea and Administration was granted to a Stranger he who had right could not appeal after fourteen days which the Son could not do at that distance and so by this means a wrongful Administrator was entituled to the whole and he whose right it was had no remedy to recover at his return But now this inconvenience is likewise redressed by the Statute of Distributions for when the Son returns he may put the Bond in suit and for these reasons it was prayed that the Prohibition might stand Mr. E contra Williams argued for the Defendant in Easter-Term 2 Jacobi the substance of whose Argument was that though the Plaintiff had gotten Administration yet no Interest was thereby vested in him but that the Appeal was proper and for this he cited the Case of Beamond and Long Cro. Car. 208. which was Baron and Feme Administratrix of her former Husband recover in Debt the Feme died the surviving Husband brought a Scire Facias to have Execution and upon a Demurrer all the Court but Hide agreed that the Scire Facias would not lie for the Husband alone because it was a debt demanded by the Administratrix in auter droit This Statute hath not wholly altered the Common Law in this matter it only limits the Practice of Ecclesiastical Courts and makes provision for particular purposes viz. That Distribution shall be made to the Wife and Children and their Children which is so far introductory of a new Law but no farther so that the Right of Administration is as it was before and therefore must be granted to the next of Kin of the Father This Court hath no power to grant a Prohibition in such a Case and if it should 't is the first which ever was granted of this kind for it ought not to be determined here but in an Ecclesiastical Court which hath an original Iurisdiction of this Cause and the Appeal is in proprio loco To which Mr. Pollexfen answered that the contrary was very plain for here have been many Prohibitions granted even upon this very Act and the Question now before the Court is not concerning the manner of Distribution but the Right of Administration whether any Interest is vested in the Son or not 'T is true the Estate in Law goes to the Administrator but the Interest and Right to sue for and to recover the Estate goes to the Son so that if he should die before he is in actual possession his Administrator shall have it to pay Debts and to distribute c. In the Case of a Will if a Man should devise his Estate to his Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an Interest vests in those Children which doth not differ from the Case at the Bar but that in the one Case the Testator makes the Will and in the other 't is made by an Act of Parliament Some Inconveniencies have been already mentioned if the Law should be otherwise taken but there be many more for if no Interest should vest in the Child till actual Distribution he could neither be trusted for his Education or Necessaries whilst living and no body would bury him if he should happen to die before the year and a day for the Funeral Charges would be lost It will likewise occasion delays in Administrators to make Distribution in hopes of gain neither will any honest man take an Administration upon himself because he can neither pay Mony safely or take a Release for if the Infant die before distribution it is void But notwithstanding these Reasons the Court gave Iudgment in Michaelmas-Term following That a Consultation should go the Chief Iustice being absent DE Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Coram Georgio Jefferies Mil ' Capital ' Justic ' Francisco Wythyns Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis Rex versus Marsh and others JAmes Marsh Information for a Forgery John W. and John L. were indicted upon the Coroners Inquest for the Murder of R. D. at H. in Kent and upon this Indictment they were arraigned and tried at the Barr this Term. The Fact upon the Evidence appeared to be that the Prisoners were Custom-House Officers who suspecting that some Wool would be transported went to the Sea-side in the Night time where there happened an Afray and the Prisoner Marsh was twice knocked down and recovering himself shot the deceased they were all acquitted of the Murder and then upon complaint made that Marsh was only found guilty upon the Coroners Enquest two of the said Iury were now sworn in Court who deposed that they upon the Coroners Enquest found the Indictment against Marsh alone which Indictment was in English but that one J.D. who was then Mayor of H. and who by virtue of that Office was also Coroner took the Indictment and told the Iury it must be turn'd into Latin which was done and he then inserted the Names of the two other Prisoners now at the Barr whereupon the said Mr. D. was now called and he appearing was bound in a Recognizance to answer this matter and the two Prisoners who were acquitted were likewise bound to prosecute him and the Iury Men were ordered to put their Affidavit in writing and swear it in Court An Information was afterwards exhibited against Mr. D. which was tried at the Barr in Trinity-Term following and he was found guilty but having spoke with the Prosecutor in the long Vacation he was only fined 20 Nobles in Michaelmas-Term Roberts versus Pain IN a Prohibition to
the Court of Arches the Case was Prohibition not granted where a temporal loss may ensue The Plaintiff was presented by the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol to the Parish Church of Christ-Church in the said City and the Defendant libelled against him because he was not 23 years of Age when made Deacon nor 24 when he entred into the Orders of a Priest 13 Eliz. c. 12. and the Statute requires that none shall be made a Minister or admitted to preach being under that Age. The reason now alledged for a Prohibition was because this Matter was triable at Law and not in the Spiritual Court because if true a Temporal Loss viz Deprivacion might follow But the Court denied the Prohibition and compared this Case to that of a Drunkard or ill Liver who are usually punished in the Ecclesiastical Courts though a temporal loss may ensue and if Prohibitions should be granted in all Cases where Deprivation is the consequence of the Crime it would very much lessen the Practice of those Courts David Burgh 's Case THE Parishioners of St. Leonard Foster Lane gave this Man who had a Wife and five Children 5 l. in Mony to remove into another Parish upon Condition that if he returned in 40 days that he should repay the Mony he removed accordingly and stayed away by the space of 40 days the Parish to which he removed obtained an Order upon an Appeal for his settlement in the last Parish where he was lawfully an Inhabitant which Order being removed into this Court and the Matter appearing thus upon Affidavits they declared their Opinion only upon the Order to remove viz. That the Man had gained a Settlement in the Parish to which he removed for he being an Inhabitant there for so long time as was required by Law to make a Settlement and not disturbed by the Officers they were remiss in their Duty and the Court would not help their negligence DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Dominus Rex versus Dangerfield THE Defendant was convicted of publishing a Libel wherein he had accused the King when Duke of York that he had hired him to kill the late King Charles c. And on Fryday June 20. He was brought to the Barr where he received this Sentence viz. That he should pay the Fine of 500 l. That he should stand twice in the Pillory and go about the Hall with a Paper in his Har signifying his Crime That on Thursday next he should be whipped from Algate to Newgate and on Saturday following from Newgate to Tyburn which Sentence was executed accordingly and as he was returning in a Coach on Saturday from Tyburn one Mr. Robert Frances a Barrister of Greys-Inn asked him in a jeering manner whether he had run his Heat that day who replied again to him in scurrilous words whereupon Mr. Frances run him into the Eye with a small Cane which he had then in his Hand of which wound the said Mr. Dangerfield died on the Monday following Mr. Frances was indicted for this Murder and upon Not-guilty pleaded was tried at the Old-Bayly and found guilty and executed at Tyburn on Fryday July the 24th in the same year Mr. Baxter's Case HE was a Nonconformist Minister against whom an Information was exhibited for writing of a Book which he Entituled A Paraphrase upon the New Testament and the Crime alledged against him in the said Information was That he intending to bring the Protestant Religion into contempt and likewise the Bishops innuendo the Bishops of England did publish the Libel in which was contained such words c. setting forth the words He was convicted And Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment that the words in the Information and the Bishops therein mentioned were misapplied to the Protestant Religion and the Bishops of England by such Innuendoes which could not support this Charge against the Defendant That the Distringas and Habeas Corpora were inter nos Richardum Baxter which could not be because the Information was exhibited in the name of the Attorney General But the Court over-ruled these Exceptions and said that by the word Bishops in this Information no other could be reasonably intended but the English Bishops thereupon the Court fined him 500 l. and ordered him to give Security for his Good Behavior for seven years Procter versus Burdet AN Action of Covenant was brought by an Apprentice setting forth the Indenture by which the Defendant In Covenant the Breach was generally assigned and held good his Master had covenanted to find and allow the Plaintiff Meat Drink Lodging and all other things necessary during such a time and the Breach was as general as the Covenant viz. That he did not find hind him Meat Drink Lodging alia necessaria The Plaintiff had Iudgment by Nil dicit and upon a Writ of Enquity brought entire Damages were given against the Defendant And in a Writ of Error upon this Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Breach was too general and that entire Damages were given amongst other things for alia necessaria and doth not say for what 2 Cro. 436. Astel versus Mills and a Case was cited in the Point in Trinity-Term 16 Jacobi where the Iudgment was reversed for this very reason The Council contra argued that that which is required in an Action of Covenant is that there may be such a certainty as the Defendant may plead a former Recovery in Barr if he be sued again and therefore one need not be so particular in assigning of the Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for in a Bond for performance of Covenants where there is a Covenant to repiar if it be put in suit 't is not sufficient to say That the House is out of repair but you must shew how but in a Covenant 't is enough to say That it was out of repair If in this Case the Plaintiff had shewed what necessaries were not provided for him Kelway 85. it would have made the Record too long and therefore 't is sufficient for him to say that the Defendant did not find alia necessaria That Case in 2 Cro. 2 Cro. 304 367. 1 Rol. Rep. 173. 3 Bulst 31. 2 Saund. 373. has since been adjudged not to be Law for many contrary Iudgments have weakened the Authority of it viz. That the Breach may be assigned as general as the Covenant as where a Man covenanted that he had a lawful Estate and Right to let c. the Breach assigned was that he had no lawful Estate and Right to let c. and doth not shew that the Lessor had not such Right or that he was evicted yet it was held good Curia In a Quantum meruit they formerly set out the Matter at length but now of late in that Action in general Words and also in Trover and Conversion pro diversis aliis bonis hath been held good which is as
Paper Book by the then Attorny General but by reason of a stroak cross them the Clerk omitted them in engrossing the Iudgment But upon a Motion the Court held this amendable at the Common Law Curia The Error is only a Misentry of the Writ of Enquiry and amendable without paying of Costs Mr. Aston the Secondary said that Costs were never paid in this Court upon such Amendments nor in the Common Pleas until my Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time but he altered the Practice and made that Rule that if you amend after a Writ of Error brought you must pay Costs Holcomb versus Petit. A Devastavit was brought against an Administrator of a rightful Executor who pleaded an insufficient Plea Administrator of a rightful ful Executor is liable to a Devastavit 30 Car. 2. c. 7. and upon a Demurrer the Question was upon the Statute of 30 Car. 2. The Title whereof is An Act to enable Creditors to recover Debts of Executors and Administrators of Executors in their own wrong which is introductory of a new Law and charges those who were not chargeable before at the Common Law but it enacts That when Executors of persons who are Executors de son tort or Administrators shall convert the Goods of any person deceased that they shall be liable as their Testator or Intestate would have been Gold held that he shall not be charged for where an Act of Parliament charges an Executor in such case an Administrator shall be likewise charged but if an Administrator be charged that shall never extend to an Executor The Rule is A majori ad minus valet Argumentum sed non e contra therefore the rightful Executor shall not be charged by this Act which only makes Executors of Executors de son tort lyable Pollexfen contra There can be no reason given why the Act should make an Administrator of an Administrator lyable to a Devastavit and not an Administrator of an Executor de son tort for the mischief will be the same and therefore a rightful Executor who wasts the Testator's Goods ought to be charged The Recital of this Act is large enough the Preamble is general and the enacting Clause expresseth Executors and Administrators of Executors de son tort but then it also mentions Administrators but not such who are their Administrators de son tort Now the Word Administrator is in it self a general Word and extends to any one who meddles with the personal Estate so that the Preamble being general and the Act remedial 't is within the same mischief Curia The Word Administrator is very comprehensive for when an Executor pleadeth he saith Plene administravit If a rightful Executor waste the Goods he is a kind of an Administrator de son tort for abusing of the Trust There is no Superiority between an Executor or an Administrator for by this Act they are both equal in power as to the Goods of the deceased Iudgment was given that the Administrator of the rightful Executor shall be liable Jenings versus Hankeys 'T IS enacted by the Statute of 13 Car. Where an Informer shall be a Witness though he hath part of the Penalty 13 Car. 2. c. 10. 2. That they who kill course hunt or take away Red or Fallow Deer in any Ground where Deer are kept c. or are aiding therein if such are convicted by Confession or Oath of one Witness before one Justice of the Peace within six Months after the Offence done shall forfeit 20 l. one Moiety to the Informer the other to the Owner of the Deer to be levied by Distress by Warrant under the Justice's Hand The Defendant was convicted by the Oath of the Informer and Mr. Shower moved that it might be quashed because the Informer is not to be admitted as a Witness he being to have a Moiety of the Forfeiture The Party to an usurious Contract shall not be admitted as an Evidence to prove the Vsury 12 Co. 68. 2 Rol. Abr. 685 because he is Testis in propria causa and by their Oath may avoid their own Bonds Mr. Pollexfen contra The Statute gives power to convict by the Oath of a credible Witness and such is the Informer 'T is not a material Objection to say That the Informer shall not be a Witness because he hath a Moiety of the Forfeiture for in Cases of the like nature the Informer is always a good Witness As upon the Statute for suppressing of Conventicles the Informer is a good Witness and yet he hath part of the Penalty for otherwise that Act would be of little force for if who sees the People met together be not a good Witness no Body else can Curia In the Statute of Robberies a Man swears for himself because there can be no other Witness he is a good Witness Harman versus Harman DEBT upon a Bond against an Administrator Notice of a Debt must be given to an Administrator who pleaded Fully administred and that he had not notice of this Bond before such a day In this Case a special Verdict was found upon which the Question was Whether Notice was necessary to be given of Debts of an inferior nature The Court gave no Opinion but they agreed that a Iudgment upon a simple Contract may be pleaded in Barr to an Action of Debt upon a Bond and that 't is no Devastavit in an Executor to pay a Debt upon such a Contract before a Bond Debt Vaughan 94. of which he had no Notice So where an Obligor did afterwards enter into a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute 2 Anders 159. 1 Mod. 157. and Iudgment was against him upon the Bond and then he dyed his Executrix paid the Creditor upon the Statute and the Obligee brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment on the Bond Debt and she pleaded payment of the Recognizance this was held a good Plea for she is not bound to take Notice of the Iudgments against the Testator without being acquainted therewith by his Creditors for she is in no wise privy to his Acts. DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Anonymus AN Information was exhibited against the Defendant for Perjury Perjury in a Deposition taken before Commissioners in Chancery setting forth that a Bill in Chancery was exhibited by one A. B. and the Proceedings thereon The Perjury was assigned in a Deposition made by the Defendant 30 Julii 1683. and taken in that Cause before Commissioners in the Country It was tried this day at the Barr and the Question was Whether the Return of the Commissioners that the Defendant made Oath before them shall be a sufficient Evidence to convict him of Perjury without their being present in Court to prove him the very same person Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendant admitted an Information will lie in this Case against him but the Commissioners must be here or some other person to prove that he was
Sir Edward Herbert who was removed into the Common Pleas and made Chief Justice there and Sir Francis Wythens had his Quietus the Night before The same 21st day of April after this Removal the Souldier was brought again to the Barr and upon the Motion of Mr. Attorny was ordered by the new Chief Iustice to be executed at Plymouth which was done accordingly Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Monday May 2d NOTA. A Writ of Error was brought upon a Iudgment given in this Court returnable in Parliament which was Prorogued from the 28th day of April to the 22d day of November following Sir George Treby moved that it might be discharged for it could not be a Supersedeas to this Execution because there was a whole Term which intervened between the Teste and Return of the Writ of Error viz. Trinity-Term On the other side it was said that the Proclamation was no Record it only shews the present Intention of the King which he may recal at any time But the Court made no Rule DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General The Company of Merchant Adventurers versus Rebow IN a special Action on the Case Whether the King hath a Prerogative to restrain Trade to a particular number of Men. the Plaintiffs declared that in the Reign of H. 4. there was a Society of Merchants Adventurers in England and that afterwards Queen Elizabeth did by her Letters Patents incorporate them by the Name of the Governour and Company of the Merchants Adventurers c. and gave them Priviledge to trade into Holland Zealand Flanders Brabant the Country belonging to the Duke of Lunenburgh and Hamburgh prohibiting all others not free of that Company by virtue whereof they did trade into those parts and had thereby great Priviledges and Advantages that the Defendant not being free of the said Company did trade into those Parts without their authority and imported Goods from thence into this Kingdom ad damnum c. The Defendant pleaded as to Hamburgh Not-guilty 15 E. 3. c. 3. and as to the other places he pleaded the Statute of Ed. 3. That the Seas shall be open to all Merchants to pass with their Merchandize whither they please The Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joined in Demurrer This Case was now argued by Councel on both sides The Councel for the Plaintiff in their Arguments made these Points 1. What Power the King had by his Prerogative to restrain his Subjects from trading to particular places 2. Admitting he had such a Prerogative whether an Action on the Case will lie As to the first Point it was said Magna Charta cap. 30. 2 Inst 57. that all Trades must be under some Regulation and that the Subject hath not an absolute power to trade without the leave of the King for it is said in our Books Omnes Mercatores nisi publice prohibiti fuerint habeant salvum securum conductum which is meant of Merchant Strangers in Amity with us and nisi publice prohibiti must be by the King Now if Merchants Strangers may be prohibited from coming into England by the same reason the Kings Subjects may be restrained to go out of the Kingdom and for that purpose the Writ of Ne exeat Regnum was framed F. N. B. 85. 3 Inst 179. which is grounded upon the Common Law and not given by any particular Statute The Kings Prerogative in this and such like Cases is so much favoured by Law 1 Leon. 9. More 172. that he may by his Privy Seal command any of his Subjects to return out of a Foreign Nation or seize their Lands The first Statute which regulates Trade is 27 E. 3. cap. 1. that which confined the Staple to certain places that persons might not go about in Companies to trade without the King's Licence and from thence came Markets and if such were kept without the King 's Grant a Quo Warranto would lie against them who continued it and the People who frequented those Markets were punishable by Fine The Law is plain F. N. B. 125. 2 Roll. Abr. 140. that the King is sole Iudge of the place where Markets shall be kept for if he grant one to be kept in such a place which may not be convenient for the Country yet the Subjects can go to no other and if they do the Owner of the Soil where they meet is liable to an Action at the Suit of the Grantee of the Market A Custom to restrain a Man from the exercising of his Trade in a particular place hath been adjudged good Sir G. Farmer 's Case cired in 8 Co. 127. as to have a Bake-house in such a Mannor and that no other should use that Trade there And as a Man may be restrained by Custom so he may restrain himself from using of a Trade in a certain place 2 Cro. Brown versus Joliffe as if he promise upon a valuable consideration not to use the Trade of a Mercer in such a place And 't is very necessary that Trade should in some measure be restrained so as to be managed only by Freemen because 't is of more advantage to the King that it should be carried on by a Company especially in London who may manage it with Order and Government that is by some power to restrain particular persons from that Liberty which otherwise they would use and therefore such Companies have always power to make By Laws to regulate Trade which is the cheif End of their Incorporation And if such Corporations have power to judge and determine who are fit persons to exercise Trades within their Iurisdiction the King hath certainly a greater Prerogative to determine which of his Subjects are fit to trade to particular places exclusive from the Rest That the Governors of Corporations have taken upon them such Authority appears in Townsend's Case Sid. 107. who served an Apprentiship to a Taylor in Oxford and was refused by the Mayor to be made a Freeman of that City which shews that if a person be not qualified he may be excluded This is a very ancient Company for Cloth was first brought into this Realm in the Reign of Ed. 3. and was always under some Government My Lord Rolls quoting the Parliament Roll of H. 1 H. 5. no. 41. 2 Abr. Roll. 174. placit 39. 5. wherein the Commons pray that all Merchants might import or export their Goods to any place except such as were of the Staple paying the Customs takes notice that this Prayer was made against the Companies which prohibited such Trading This shews that even in those days Trade was under a Regulation King Ed. 34 E. 3. c. 18. 38 E. 3. c. 11. 3. gave Licence to all Merchants Denizens who were not Artificers to go into Gascoigne for Wines
and that Aliens might bring Wines into this Realm and that all Merchandizes might be carried into Ireland and exported from thence which shews that without such leave persons could not trade thither and Denizens could not import Wines from those parts The Case of sole Printing is a Manufacture and so not in the power of the King to restrain for 't is a piece of Art and Skill but when once it becomes of publick concernment then the Prerogative interposeth 'T is a vain Objection to say that every Subject hath a Right to trade which Right is grounded upon the Common Law for that Law can give no such Authority against any King's Prohibition For suppose a foreign Prince should forbid the Subjects of England to trade within his Dominions what Right can the Common Law give them so to do Or suppose any Foreign Prince should restrain Trade to a peculiar number of Men exclusive from the rest how would the Common Law help them So that if this Trade depend upon the Will of a Foreign Prince why may not the King of England prohibit his Subjects from using of it He who hath the sole power of making Leagues and Treaties is the foundation of Trade and can that Right which the Subject hath at the Common Law be independent on this The Question now is about the Regulation of a Trade by Letters Patents which the King hath power to do 1. By his Prerogative 27 E. 3. c. 1. 43 E. 3. c. 1. 47 E. 3. 1 H. 5. num 40. for the appointment of the Staple is not by vertue of any Act of Parliament but 't is the effect of Leagues and Treaties 2. By Acts of Parliament which have allowed such Grants and from other Acts which take notice of the Kings Prerogative In 12 H. 7. 12 H. 7. c. 6. a Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers in London made an Order to restrain all persons to sell at such a Mart without their consent The Statute of 3 Jacobi recites Letters Patents of the Incorporation to certain Merchants to trade into Spain and 4 Jac. 3 Jac. c. 6. Cap. 9. recites the like Letters Patents granted to the Merchants of Exeter by the Queen The next thing to be considered is what Acts of Parliament have either taken away or abridged the King's Prerogative The first is Magna Charta viz. That all Merchants shall stay here nisi publice antea prohibiti the meaning of which hath been already explained The second Statute is that which the Defendant hath pleaded In answer to which 't is to be observed that a Preamble of any Statute Law is the best Expositor of it because it usually mentions the occasion of its making and this Act amongst other Things and Petitions recites that the King had granted to the Men of Flanders that the Staple of Wool should be at Bruges which Town had ordered that no Wool should be sold to Strangers which was much to the damage of trading Merchants Now what is the Remedy in this Case Why the King grants that they may buy Wool at such prizes as they can agree and carry it where they please let the Seas be open c. So that this Act had only a prospect to remedy the abuse of the Staple which hath in no sort abridged the King's Prerogative If there should be no Regulation of Trade by the Power and Prerogative of the King what would become of the Turkey Company when it might be in the power of one Man to ruine all the Effects of our English Merchants there by a Misdemeanour Therefore it ought to be looked after very strictly All Arguments which may be deduced from Monopolies will have no influence upon this Case because this Grant doth not barr the Subject of any precedent Right 2. As to the second Point 't is not to be doubted but that since they are abridged in Interest an Action on the Case will lie Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra These Letters Patents extend to a great part of Europe and the consequence of this Iudgment if for the Plaintiffs must be that all Merchants trading thither must be of this Company or excluded from Trade in those Parts Now supposing that several Men may be of this Company 't is impossible that all Merchants who trade into those parts of Europe should be Members thereof for where should they meet to make By-Laws Neither is it probable that other Merchants who live remote from London will adventure their Stock and Estates with the Citizens What will become of the Clothiers must they sell their Cloth at the Rate imposed by this Company The Question is not whether the King may restrain his Subjects from trading to particular places or that the Trade of the People is not under the Government of the King nor whether he may make Leagues and Treaties for 't is certainly his Prerogative nor how the Staple was formerly which hath been long since discontinued and not easie to find out nothing will follow from either of these considerations which may be of any use in this Case But the Question is whether the King can make such a Grant excluding all others from trading for 't is expresly provided by the Statute of H. 7. 12 H. 7. c 6. that no Englishman shall take of another any Fine or Imposition for his Liberty to buy and sell The Case of the East-India Company is not like this for they who argued then did admit that if the Grant to that Company had restrained the Subjects from trading to Christian Countries it had been void but it only prohibiting a Trade with Infidels with whom we should have no Communication without the King's Licence lest we should forsake the Catholick Faith and turn Infidels for that reason it was held good And such a Licence was seen by my Lord Coke 2 Brownl 296. as he tells us in Michelburn's Case which was granted in the Reign of Ed. 3. But a Patent to exclude all others is void both by the Common Law and the Statute Law As to the Argument that the Common Law gives no Priviledge to Trade against the King's Prohibition because Foreign Princes may restrain the Trade to a particular number of Men can any Inference be made from thence that the Kings of England may therefore restrain Trade to a like number of Men All Patents prohibiting Trade are void 1 Rol. Rep. 4. 13 H. 4.14 If a Man would give give Lands in Mortmain or would have a new Way by taking in the Common High-way this may be done with the King's Licence and the Escheator or Sheriff is to examine the Fact and if it be ad dampnum alterius such a Licence is void as being prejudicial to the Subject F. N. B. 222. and if 't is void a fortiori a Grant to restrain Trade must be so All Engrossing and Monopolizing are void by the Common Law the one is a Species of the other 't is defined by
my Lord Coke to be an allowance by the King 's Grant to any person for the sole buying or selling of any thing restraining all others of that Liberty which they had before the making of such a Grant 3 Inst 181. and this he tells us is against the ancient and fundamental Rights of this Kingdom This Patent agreeth exactly with that Definition 9 E. 3. cap. 1. 18 E. 3. c. 3. 25 E. 3. c. 2. Roll. Abr. 180. 2 R. 2. c. 1. 11 R. 2. c. 7. and therefore it must be against Law 't is against an Act of Parliament which gives Liberty to Merchants to buy and to sell in this Realm without disturbance and 't is expresly against the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 3. which declares all such Letters Patents to be void That which may give some colour to make such Grants good 2 Inst 540. 11 Rep. is a pretence of Order and Government in Trade but my Lord Coke was of Opinion that it was a hinderance to both and in the end it produced Monopolies There is a great difference between the King's Grant and his Prohibition for the one vests an Interest which is not done by the other and all Prohibitions determine by the King's death but Grants still remain in force Adjornatur Langford versus Webber IN Trespass for the taking of a Horse Justification upon a bare possession good against a wrong doer the Defendant justified for that Joseph Ash was possessed of a Close c. and that the Defendant as his Servant took the Horse in that Close Damage fesant And upon a Demurrer to this Plea for that the Defendant did not shew what Title Ash had to this Close The Councel for the Defendant insisted that it being in Trespass 't is sufficent to say that Ash was possessed because in this Case possession is a good Title against all others But it might have been otherwise in Replevin The Title of the Close is not in question Cro. Car. 138. Yelv. 74. Cro. Car. 571. pl. 10. the possession is only an inducement to the Plea and not the substance thereof which is the taking of the Horse and the Law is plain that where the interest of the Land is not in question a Man may justifie upon his own possession against a wrong-doer Mr. Pollexfen on the other side alledged that damage fesant would bring the Title of the Land in question But the Court gave Iudgment for the Defendant Perkins versus Titus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given in the Common-Pleas Fine upon an Admittance where it must be certain in Replevin for taking of the Plaintiff's Sheep The Defendant avowed the taking damage fesant The Plaintiff replied that the Lands where c. were Copy-hold held of the Manor of Bushy in Com. Hertf. the Custom whereof was that every Tenant of the said Manor qui admissus foret to any Copyhold Estate should pay a years Value of the Land for a Fine as the said Land is worth tempore Admissionis And upon a Demurrer the Question was 1. Whether this be a good Plea or not as 't is pleaded 2. If it be good as pleaded then whether such a Custom may be supported by Law 1. It was for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error now and in Michaelmas Term following argued that it was not a good Custom The substance of whose Arguments were that Fines are either certain or incertain those which are incertain are arbitrary and therefore cannot be due of Common Right nor by Custom for there can be no Custom for an incertain Fine and such is this Fine for the value of the Land cannot be known because as this Custom is pleaded it doth not appear whether it shall be a years value past or to come at the time of the admittance of the Tenant A Custom to assess rationabilem denariorum summam for a Fine upon an admittance that is to say 13 Rep. 1. being two years Rent of a Tenant of the yearly value of 53 s. 4 d. is no good Custom A Lease is made for so many years as a third person shall name this is altogether incertain 13 Edw. 3. Fitz. Abr. 273. but when the Term is named then 't is a good Lease but this can be done but once How can this Fine be assessed It cannot be by Iury for then it stands in need of the Common Law and will be therefore void for a Custom must have nothing to support it but usage 1. Neither can this be a good Custom as 't is pleaded because all Customs are made up of repeated Acts and Vsages and therefore in pleading them it must be laid time out of mind which is not done here for admissus foret hath a respect to future admissions and are not to those which are past 2. Here is no time laid when this Fine shall be paid for 't is said Quilibet tenens qui admissus foret c. solvet tantam denariorum summam quantum terra valebat per Annum tempore admissionis c. which last words must be taken to relate to the value of the Land and not to the time when the Fine shall be paid so that if there be such a Custom which is Lex loci and not fully set forth and expressed the Common Law will not help it by any Construction 2. Point Whether such a Custom can be good by Law And they argued that it cannot Where the Fine is certain the Lord may refuse to admit without a tender of it upon the prayer of the person to be admitted 4 Rep. 27. b. but where 't is incertain the Lord is first to admit the Tenant and then to set the Fine the reasonableness whereof is to be determined by Iudges before whom the Case shall depend or upon Demurrer or by a Iury upon proofs of the yearly value of the Land but for non payment of an unreasonable Fine the Lord cannot enter Cro. Eliz. 779. Cro. Car. 196. The Law admits of no Custom to be good but such as is very certain for incertainty in a Custom as well as in a Grant makes both void and therefore 't is held a void Custom for an Infant to make a Feoffment when he can measure an Ell of Cloth Rol. Abr. 565. 6 Rep. 60. Davies Rep. 37. It may be objected that certum est quod certum reddi potest the meaning of which saying must be quod certum reddi potest by something which is certain for if this Rule should be taken to be an answer to incertainties it would destroy all the Books which say a Custom must be certain The Law is very clear Fitz. Bar. 177. 2 Rol. Abr. 264. that a Custom is void for the incertainty therefore this Custom must be void for the value of Land is the most incertain thing in nature and therefore Perjury will not lye for swearing to the value Serjeant Fuller and Mr.
day afterwards viz. the 10th day of August a Trust of the said Office was declared by another Deed viz. to himself for Life with Remainders over and that by virtue thereof and the consent of the Trustees he took upon him the execution of the said Office and was thereof possessed either by himself or his Deputy until the time of the Inquisition taken then he traversed that the Escapes were voluntary but did not answer the concealing of the Grant and concludes viz. per quod petit that the King Hands may be amoved c. The Attorny General demurred to the Plea of the Trustees he likewise demurred to the Plea of Mr. Lenthal and took issue that the Escapes were voluntary It was argued this Term and Trinity following by Council on both sides and as to the matter of Law they made these Points 1. That this Office cannot be granted in Trust 2. The Escapes found in the Inquisition and not answered by the Trustees are sufficient causes of Forfeiture of this Offce 3. Another Point was raised whether the assignment of this Office to Trustees admitting it could be so granted and their declaration of the Trust did create an Estate at will in Mr. Lenthal If it was a Tenancy at will 1. Then whether Mr. Lenthal had done any thing to determine his will 2. Whether he can by Law make a Deputy 3. Whether the assigning of this Trust without giving notice thereof to this Court be a Forfeiture 1. This Office cannot be granted in Trust Jones 128. because 't is a personal Inheritance and will not pass by such Conveyances as are used to convey Lands so is my Lord of Oxford 's Case in which it was held that a Covenant to stand seised of an Office is void neither can Mr. Lenthal take upon him the execution of this Office by the consent of the Trustees for that cannot be without Deed. If the Law should be otherwise this inconvenience would follow viz. Mr. Lenthal might grant the Office to another without leave of the Court and the Grantee might suffer voluntary Escapes having no valuable Interest to answer the parties injured who must then sue Mr. Lenthal and he hath no Estate in him for he hath conveyed the Inheritance to the Trustees and if they should be likewise sued no recovery could be against them because they are only nominal 'T is almost like the Grant of an Office of chief Prothonotary of the Court of Common-Pleas to two persons for Life 18 Ed. 4. f. 7. which cannot be good because the Rolls of the Court cannot be in the keeping of two persons at one time It hath been adjudged that this very Office cannot be granted for years Cro. Car. 587. Jones 437. because 't is an Office of Trust and daily Attendance and such a termor for years may dye intestate and then it would be in suspence 'till Administration is committed which is the act of another Court 2. Point That the Escapes found in the Inquisition and the non-attendance of the Trustees are sufficient cause of Forfeiture 'T is true at the Common-Law Debt upon an Escape will not lie against the Goaler that Action was afterwards given by the Statute of W. 2. For before that Act the only remedy against the Goaler was to bring an Action on the Case against him founded upon a wrong done Dyer 273. But now Debt will lie and if the party is not sufficient at the time of the Escape 2 Inst 382. respondeat superior The Marshal who executes this Office be it by right or wrong is answerable to the King and his People for Escapes If they are voluntary 't is a Forfeiture of his Office nay if a Deputy suffer such Escapes 't is a Forfeiture by the Principal unless such Deputation be made for Life and then the Grantee for Life only forfeits the Office As to the non-attendance of the Trustees if Mr. 39 H. 6.32 Lenthal be Tenant at will and hath granted this Office to another for Life this is a determination of the Tenancy at will and a Forfeiture as to him Now this Grantee for Life cannot be said to be a Deputy for such a Grantee himself cannot make a Deputy and therefore a fortiori a Tenant at will cannot do it But admitting he should be Deputy yet a Forfeiture by him is a Forfeiture by his Superior and therefore Mr. Lenthal 's tenancy at will being gone the Trustees ought to attend and their non-attendance ought to be a Forfeiture The non-attendance of an Officer Cro. Car. 491. who was only a Searcher in a Port Town was adjudged a Forfeiture much greater is the Fault of that Officer who hath the administration of Iustice if he do not give his attendance Besides 39 H. 6.34 a. 9 Co. 46. Dyer 198. Sid. 81. Dyer 150 151. if they do not attend by consequence they cannot act in the Office and non-feazance is as sufficient a cause of Forfeiture as any other mis-behaviour whatsoever But if the Trustees had given attendance they are persons inexperient and therefore incapable to execute this Office for which they may be lawfully refused by this Court Mr. Pollexfen chiefly insisted upon the point of Pleading that the matter found by the Inquisition was not answered by the Plea First he excepted that the Defendant had not by his Plea entituled himself to any Estate in this Office 1 Leon. 202. 2 Inst 695. Stamf. 62 64. 2 Leon. 123. and therefore he could not traverse the Title of the King without making a Title to himself for why should he desire that the Kings Hands may be amoved and he restored to his Office if he hath not shewen a Title to it His pleading of this Deed of Trust by which he is permitted to receive the Profits c. during Life cannot create such an Estate in him as will be executed by the Statute of Vses therefore he can have no Estate for Life for if a Man is seised in Fee of an Estate and makes a Declaration thereof in Trust for J. S. this is no colour to make an Estate for Life in J. S. The Defendant hath therefore no more than a Trust in this Office which is nothing in the Eye of the Law and for which there is no remedy but by Subpoena in Chancery so that being only a Cestui que trust he hath neither jus in re nor ad rem He cannot be Tenant at will for he is not made so by the Deed of Trust There is a great deal of difference between Evidence and Pleading for this very Deed may be an Evidence of an Estate at will but 't is not so in pleading therefore he ought to have pleaded that coram praetextu he was possessed of the Office and took the Profits c. but he having otherwise pleaded and not entituled himself to any Estate therein he ought to be laid aside as an incompetent person The Plea of Sir Edward Norris
question as forfeited to the Lady who entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-entred The single Question upon this special Verdict was whether this was a Forfeiture and so a good seisure to bind the right of an Infant It was argued for the Plaintiff in the Action that it was a good Seisure and a Forfeiture till the Infant should come of Age for as a Copyhold is established by Custom so likewise 't is Custom which obligeth the Infant to the Conditions thereof and therefore where one under Age hath an Estate upon a Condition to be performed by him 8 Co. 44. b. Whittingham 's Case Latch 199. Jones 157. and that Condition is broken during his Minority the Estate is lost for ever In this Case the Custom obligeth the Heir to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine which if he should lose because his Tenant is an Infant then that priviledge of Infancy works a wrong which the Law will not permit 'T is true an Infant shall not be prejudiced by the Laches of another but shall be answerable for himself and therefore if he is Tenant of Lands and the Rent should be unpaid for two years and no Distress can be found a Cessavit lies against him and the Lord shall recover the Land because of the Non-performance which arises by his own default So if one under Age be a Keeper of a Gaol and suffer a Prisoner to escape out of Execution 2 Inst 382. an Action of Debt will lie against him upon the Statute of W. 2. It was agreed that such a Custom and Non-claim will not foreclose an Heir 8 Co. 100. Sir Rich. Letchford 's Case who is an Infant and beyond Sea at the time of his Ancestors Death though he is bound by the Custom to claim it at the next Court but that if he will come over and tender himself though after a Seisure he shall be admitted and so shall the person in this Case if after his Minority he offer himself to be admitted But it cannot be denied 2 Cro. 226. but that the Lord may seize when the Heir is beyond Sea till he return and tender himself to be admitted and by the same reason he may also seize in this case during the Minority A Temporary Forfeiture is no new thing in the Law Cro. Car. 7. for if a Feme Covert be a Copyholder and marrieth and her Husband makes a Lease for years without License of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture and shall bind her during the Coverture So the Law is Cro. El. 351. that the Lord may seize the Land till a Fine is paid for 't is a reasonable Custom so to do It hath been a good Custom for the Lord to assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate descended to the Infant during his Minority without rendring an Accompt when he came of Age. 1 Leon. 266. 2 Leon. 239. So that all taht is to be done in this Case is to enforce the Infant to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine The Inheritance is not bound but the Land is only seized quousque E contra It was argued that here is a general Seizure E contra which cannot extend to an Infant for he is not bound in a Writ of Right much less in an inferior Court after three Proclamations but if this had been a Temporary Seisure the Iury ought to have found it so which is not done There are many Authorities in the Books which affirm that an Infant is not obliged to be admitted during his Non-age 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. or to tender the Fine in order to an Admittance that the Law was settled in this Point and therefore without any further Argument he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Afterwards in Hillary-Term 1 Willielmi Mariae this Case was argued seriatim at the Bench three Iudges being of a contrary Opinion to the Chief Iustice for the affirming of the Iudgment Iustice Eyre premised two things 1. That he could not intend but that this Verdict had found an absolute Forfeiture the Iury having no way qualified it as to a certain time and therefore he would give a Iudgment upon the whole Record 2. He agreed that a Feoffment of an Infant was no Forfeiture at the Common Law and that as a particular Custom may bind an Infant for a time so it may barr him for ever but whether this Custom as 't is found in general words shall bind an Infant after three Proclamations is now the Question he not coming then to be admitted And he held that it shall not and that for these reasons 1. The Right of Infants is much favoured in the Law and their Laches shall not be prejudicial to them as to Entry or Claim upon a Presumption that they understand not their Right 1 Inst 380. 2 Inst 401. and therefore in a Cessavit per biennium which is a remedy given by the Statute of W. 2. and which extends to Infants Westm 2. c. 31. who have not the Land by descent for if a Cesser be in that Case the Infant shall have his Age because the Law intends that he doth not know what Arrerages to tender 'T is admitted that if an Infant doth not present to a Church within six Months or doth not appear within a year that his Right is bound but this is because the Law is more tender of the Church and the life of a Man than of the Priviledges of Infancy So if an Office of Parkship be given or descends to an Infant if the Condition in Law annexed to such an Office which is skill be not observed the Office is forfeited But that a Proclamation in a base Court should bind an Infant when he is not within the reason of the Custom is not agreeable either to Law or Reason 2. Cro. Jac. 80. Cro. El. 879. Noy 42. 1 Rol. Abr. 568. All Customs are to be taken strictly when they go to the destruction of an Estate and therefore a Custom was that if a Copyholder in Fee surrender out of Court and the Surrendree doth not come in after three Proclamations the Lord shall seize it A Copyholder in Fee surrendred to another for Life the Remainder over in Fee if the Tenant for Life will not come in he in the Remainder shall not be barred for the Custom shall be intended to extend only to those in possession But the Infant in this Case is not within the Letter of the Custom for 't is found that the Surrender was made to one Freeman who died before the next Court-day and that John Freeman the Infant was his Son and Heir so they have found a Title in him for the word Heir is not here a word of Purchase but of Limitation 3. Jones 157. Noy 92. Infants are not bound by other Customs like this as a Custom that every Copyholder
and now he brought a Scire Fac. against the Bail who pleaded that no Declaration was delivered or filed against the Principal within two Terms after the Action commenced and the Bail entred and upon a Demurrer the Plaintiff had Iudgment against them for the Bail are liable so as the Principal in the Action declare soon after the Injunction dissolved and it s no fault in the Plaintiff that he did not declare sooner for if he had he would have been in contempt of the Court of Chancery for a Breach of the Injunction Anonymus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Recovery suffered in the grand Sessions of Wales Error to reverse a Recovery there must be a Scire Fac. against the Heir and Tertenants Dyer 321. The Question now was whether there ought to be a Scire Fac. against the Tertenants and the Heir It was said that t is discretionary in the Court and that the first Case of this nature was in my Lord Dyer where a Writ of Error was brought in B. R. to reverse a Fine levyed in the County Palatine of Chester and a Scire Facias was brought against the Heir but not against the Tertenants But the Heir in this Case is an Infant so that if he be admitted to be a Defendant he ought not to appear during his Minority and there is no remedy till his full Age. Curia 'T is not necessary in point of Law but it seems to be the course of the Court and that must be followed and 't is reasonable it should be so because the Errors upon a Recovery should not be examined before all the Parties are in Court therefore there should be a Scire Facias against the Heir and the Tertenants Sid. 213. Lambert versus Thurston TRespass Quare vi armis clausum fregit c. Trespass Quare vi Armis lies for small Damages which the Plaintiff had laid to his Damage of 20 s. The Defendant demurred to the Declaration and for cause shewed that B. R. hath not cognizance either by the Common Law or by the Statute of Gloucester to hold Plea in such an Action where the Damages are laid to be under 40 s. But the Court were of another Opinion That an Action of Trespass Quare vi armis will lie here let the Damage be what it will So the Plaintiff had Iugment DE Termino Paschae Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Whitehal versus Squire TRover for a Horse What shall be a Conversion what not the Defendant pleaded Not Guilty and a special Verdict was found viz. That John Mathers was possessed of this Horse who on the 4th day of December in the first year of King James the II. put him to Grass to the Defendant who kept him till the first day of May following That John Mathers died Intestate and before Administration was granted the Plaintiff desired the Defendant to Bury the said Mathers and that he would see him satisfied for his Expences and accordingly the Defendant did Bury him Then the Plaintiff gave this Horse to the Defendant in part of satisfaction for the Charges of the Funeral and a Note under his Hand to pay him 23 l. more The Plaintiff afterwards took out Administration and brought his Action against the Defendant for this Horse and whether this was a conversion or not was the Question Iustice Dolben and Eyre held that it was not but the Chief Iustice was of another Opinion Cole versus Knight Hill 1 2. Rot. 810. SCire Fac. upon a Iudgment of 6000 l. Release by one Executor of a Legacy is not a good bar to a Sci. Fa. upon a Judgment brought by the Plaintiffs Knight and Donning as surviving Executors of John Knight against the Defendant Cole and his Wife as Executrix of John Lawford setting forth That Sir John Knight Mr. Eyre and John Knight had recover'd a Iudgment of 6000 l. against John Lawford That John Knight survived who made his Will and appointed John Kent Thomas Knight and William Donning to be his Executors that he died the Debt and Damages not being satisfied that they the said Knight and Donning proved the Will that John Kent died and that John Lawford made his Will and appointed his Daughter Mary now the Wife of Thomas Cole to be sole Executrix and soon after departed this Life that Cole proved Lawford's Will and that the Debt was not yet paid The Defendant Cole and his Wife pleaded a Release from Donning one of the Plaintiffs by which he acknowledged to have received of the said Cole and his Wife as Exetutrix of the last Will and Testament of John Lawford the Sum of 5 l. being a Legacy given to him by Lawford and then in general words he released the said Cole and his Wife of the Legacy and of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever which he had or might have against the Defendants Cole and his Wife as Executrix of John Lawford or may or can have for any matter or thing whatsoever To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Question was whether the Release is a good Bar or not It was argued to be no Bar for it being given upon the receipt of the Legacy is tied up to that only and shall not be taken to release any other thing If a Man should receive 10 l. and give a Receipt for it and doth thereby acquit and release the person of all Actions Debts 2 Roll. Abr. 409. Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. because the last words must be limited to those foregoing 'T is no new thing in the Law for general words to be restrained by those which follow as for instance if a Release be of all Errors Actions Suits and Writs of Error whatsoever Het 15. it hath been held that an Action of Debt upon a Bond was not released but only Writs of Error And this seems to be the intent of the Parties here that nothing but the Legacies should be released and therefore those general words which follow must be confined to the true meaning and intention of him who gave the Release So 't is if a Man promise to pay 40 s. Yelv. 156. to another during Life a Release of all Quarrels Controversies and Demands which he had or may have will not discharge this Annuity because the Execution of the Promise was not to be 'till the Rent should be due So likewise a Release of all Demands will not discharge a growing Rent 1 Sid. 141. 2. If this should be a good Release it discharges only such Actions which he hath in his own Right for by the words all Actions which he had are released Cro. Eliz. 6. 1 Leon. 263. now if an Executor grant omnia bona sua the Goods which he hath as Executor do not pass E contra E contra It was argued that this is a good Bar for by
ought to be left out and of that Opinion was the Court and therefore a Rule was made that he might discontinue this Action without Costs Mordant versus Thorold Hill 1 2 Gulielmi Rotulo 340. THE Plaintiff brought a Scire Fac. upon a Iudgment The Case was thus Viz. Ann Thorold recovered in Dower against Sir John Thorold in which Action Damages are given by the Statute of Merton 20 H. 3. c. 1. Sir John Thorold brought a Writ of Error in B. R. and the Iudgment was affirmed Then the Plaintiff in Dower brought a Writ of Enquiry for the Damages and married Mr. Mordant and died before that Writ was executed Mr. Mordant takes out Letters of Administration to his Wife and brought a Sci. Fa. upon the Iudgment and the question was whether it would lie This depended upon the construction of the Statute of King Charles the II. which enacts That in all personal Actions 17 Car. 2. c. 8. and real and mixt the death of either party between the Verdict and the Iudgment shall not hereafter be alledged for Error so as such Iudgment be entred within two Terms after such Verdict Serjeant Pemberton insisted that this was a judicial Writ and that the Administrator had a right to it though the Wife died before the Profits were ascertained by the Writ of Enquiry 't is no more than a plain Sci. Fa. upon a Iudgment which an Executor may have and which was never yet denied though this seems to be a Case of the first Impression The Council on the other side argued that 't is true an Executor may have a Scire Facias upon a Iudgment recovered in the life of the Testator by reason only of such Recovery but this Scire Facias is brought for what never was recovered because the Wife died before any thing was vested in her for the Iudgment will stand so as to effect the Lands but not for the Damages Curia When a Statute which gives a remedy for mean Profits is expounded it ought to be according to the Common Law Now where entire Damages are to be recovered and the Demandant dies before a Writ of Enquiry executed the Executor cannot have any remedy by a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment because Damages are no duty till they are assessed Sed adjornatur DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Shotter versus Friend Vxor ' Hill 2 Willielmi Rot. 39. THE Plaintiff and his Wife declared upon a Prohibition setting forth Proof by one Witness good in the Spiritual Court that John Friend on the 13th of October 22 Car. 2. made his Will by which he bequeathed to Mary Friend 10 l. to be paid to her within two years after his decease and that he made Jane the Wife of the Plaintiff Shotter Executrix and dyed that the said Executrix whilst sole and unmarried paid the said Legacy to Mary Friend who is since dead that Thomas Friend the Husband of the said Mary did after her death demand this Legacy in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of Winton that the Plaintiff pleaded payment and offered to prove it by one single Witness which Proof that Court refused though the Witness was a person without Exception and thereupon Sentence was given there against the Plaintiff which Sentence was now pleaded and upon Demurrer to the Plea The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Defendant should have a Consultation or whether a Prohibition should be granted because the proof by one Witness was denied by that Court. It was argued that the Defendant should not have a Consultation because Matters Testamentary ought to have no more favour than things relating to Tythes in which Cases the Proof by one Witness hath been always held good So 't is in a Release to discharge a Debt which is well proved by a single Testimony and it would be very inconvenient if it should be otherwise for Feoffments and Leases may come in question which must not be rejected because proved by one Witness A Modus decimandi comes up to this Case upon the Suggestion whereof Prohibitions are never denied and the chief reason is because the Spiritual Court will not allow a Modus to be any discharge of Tythes of Kind The Courts of Equity in Westminster-Hall give Relief upon a Proof by one Witness so likewise do the Courts of the Common Law if the Witness is a good and credible person 'T is true a Prohibition shall not go upon a Suggestion that the Ecclesiastical Court will not receive the Testimony of a single Witness If the Question is upon Proof of a Legacy devised or Marriage or not or any other thing which originally doth lie in the Cognizance of that Court but payment or not payment is a matter of Fact triable at the Law and not determinable there if therefore they deny to take the Evidence of a single Witness a Prohibition ought to go 2 Inst 608. 2. The Sentence is no obstacle in this Case because the Plaintiff had no Right to a Prohibition until the Testimony of his Witness was denied and Sentence thereupon given and this is agreeable to what hath been often done in cases of like nature As for instance Cro. Eliz. 88. Moor 907. Prohibitions have been granted where the Proof of a Release of a Legacy by one Witness was denyed So where the Proof of payment of Cythes for Pidgeons was denied upon the like Testimony Cro. Eliz. 666. Moor 413. 2 Rol. Rep. 439. 2 Rol Abr. 300. pl. 9. 299 pl. 14 17. Yelv. 92. Latch 117. 3 Bulst 242. Hutt 22. So where a Suit was for Subtraction of Cythes and the Defendant pleaded that he set them out and offered to prove it by by one Witness but was denied a Prohibition was granted And generally the Books are that if the Spiritual Court refuse such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law they shall be prohibited There is one Case against this Opinion which is that of Roberts in 12 Co. 12 Co. 65. Rep. but it was only a bare Surmise and of little Authority Those who argued on the other side held that a Consultation shall go E contra and that for two Reasons 1. Because a Prohibition is prayed after Sentence 2. Because the Ecclesiastical Court have an original Iurisdiction over all Testamentary things As to the first Point 'T is plain that if that Court proceed contrary to those Rules which are used and practised at the Common Law yet no Prohibition ought to go after Sentence but the proper remedy is an Appeal 2. It cannot be denied but that that Court had Cognizance of the principal matter in this Case which was a Legacy and Payment or not is a thing collateral Now wherever they have a proper Iurisdiction of a Cause both that and all its dependences shall be tried according to their Law which rejects the Proof by a single Witness
This was the Opinion of Iustice Popham and Williams in those times when most of the Cases cited on the other side were under debate In the Case of Brown and Wentworth a Revocation of a Will was offered to be proved by a single Witness in the Spiritual Court which being denied a Prohibition was prayed in B. R. Yelv. 92. but denied because the Will being the principal matter of which that Court had an original Iurisdiction therefore the Revocation thereof which was a collateral matter but depending upon the Principal shall be tried there for when the Original belongs properly to their determination all dependences thereon shall follow it and be tryed by them according to their Law In Easter-Term 4 Car. 1. this came to be a Question again 2 Cro. 264. 12 Co. 67. it was upon a Libel for a Legacy and Plene administravit pleaded which they endeavoured to prove by the Testimony of a single Witness and denied In that Case Croke and Yelverton Iustices were against the Prohibition because a Suit for a Legacy was a thing meerly Spiritual and Payment thereof is of the same nature so that the Ecclesiastical Court hath a proper Iurisdiction both of the Matter and the Proof By these Instances it may be seen that 't is not yet a settled Point that a Proof by one Witness in that Court is good Her 87. Sid. 161. for Prohibitions have been both granted and denied It cannot be a reason to grant a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court for refusing such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law because though the Proof by a single Witness is allowed at the Law yet 't is not a conclusive Evidence because the Iury who are of the Vicinage are supposed to know the Fact and may give a Verdict upon that knowledge without Proof or Witness as well as where there is but one In Michaelmas-Term following the Court were all of Opinion that no Consultation ought to go for as where the Ecclesiastical Court proceeds upon things meerly Spiritual no Prohibition is to be granted as in Suits about Probates of Wills c. so where they meddle with Temporal Matters or refuse to admit such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law no Consultation shall go If the Law should be otherwise it would be inconvenient for all Executors and Administrators for if they should be compelled to prove payment of Debts by two Witnesses they might often fail of that Proof and so pay the Mony twice Such Proof which is good at the Common Law ought to be allowed in their Court and at the Common Law 't is not necessary to prove a Payment of a Debt by two Witnesses They may follow their own Rules concerning things which are originally in their Cognizance but if any collateral Matter doth arise as concerning a Revocation of a Will or Payment of a Legacy if the Proof be by one Witness they ought to allow it Tythes are of Ecclesiastical Cognizance now if a Libel should be brought for Subtraction of Tythes and the Defendant proves by one Witness that he set them out from the nine parts tho' the Parson had not any notice of it which he is not to have at the Common Law though 't is otherwise by their Law that Court must allow this Proof otherwise a Prohibition must go 2. As to the other Point a Prohibition may be granted as well after as before Sentence but the Sentence in this Case is the very ground of the Prohibition Iustice Dolben cited a Case between Richardson and Desborow in B. R. Hill 1675. which was a Devise of a Legacy of 100 l. The Executor was sued who pleaded that the Testator owed another person the like Sum of 100 l. upon Bond which being paid he had not Assets ultra And upon Proof in the Spiritual Court it appeared there was but one Witness to the Bond which not being a good Proof of it in their Law there was a Sentence for the Payment of the Legacy and afterwards a Prohibition was granted upon the suggesting of this Matter Ashcomb versus Inhabitantes Hundredi de Elthorn Hill 1. Rot. 901. AN Action was brought upon the Statute of Winton for a Robbery done in the Parish of Hamonsdworth in Longford Lane in the said Hundred The Case was thus viz. A person was robbed who refused to make Oath whether the Hundred may be sued The Plaintiff employed one Coxhead his Servant to sell fat Cattle in Smithfield who sold them for 106 l. which Mony he delivered up in two Bags to one Strange a Quaker who was robbed in the Company of Coxhead he being also robbed of 12 s. They both gave notice of this Robbery to the Inhabitants of the next Village and Coxhead was examined by the Iustice of the Peace dwelling in the County and Hundred where the Robbery was committed pursuant to the Statute c. before whom he made Oath that he did not know any of the Robbers 27 El. c. 13. but Strange being a Quaker refused to be examined upon Oath Mr. Ashcomb the Master brought an Action against the Hundred and all this Matter was found specially Now the Question was whether the Action was well brought in the name of the Master and so whether the Hundred should be liable to pay the Mony of which the Quaker was robbed he refusing to be examined upon Oath In this Case the Statute of Queen Elizabeth was considered which was made in favour of the Hundred for it enacts That the Party robbed shall not maintain any Action against the Hundred except he give notice of the Robbery with convenient speed to the Inhabitants of some Town Vill or Hamlet near the place where he was robbed and except within twenty days next before the Action brought he be examined upon Oath before a Justice of the County inhabiting in the Hundred where the Robbery was committed or near the same whether he knew the Parties who robbed him or either of them It was agreed that the Master may have an Action for a Robbery committed upon the Servant but that is by vertue of the Statute of Winton Mich. 1658. The Case of Jones against the Hundred of Bromley is to that purpose which was a Robbery upon himself Wife and Servant the Mony being taken from the Servant and the Master made Oath that he did not know any of the Robbers but it happened the Servant did know one of them whose Name was Leonard of which he did then inform his Master and this Matter appearing to the Iury it was found specially and upon the Argument of that special Verdict these Points were resolved 1. That the Oath of the Master without the swearing of his Servant is good because the Servant had only the bare Custody of the Mony 2. That the Information then given by the Servant to the Master of his Knowledge of one of the Robbers did not oblige the Master because the Mony shall be said to
be in his possession and not of the Servant the Master being then present which is all the difference between that Case and this at the Barr so that the Master is the person robbed within the meaning of the Statute of Winton although the Mony be in the hands of the Servant Suppose the Servant had received 1000 l. and not being able to carry it himself had employed ten Men each to carry 100 l. and they had been all robbed the Owner may have an Action against the Hundred upon the Affidavit of one of the persons robbed the reason is because the possession shall follow the property and the possession of the whole will follow every part There are Authorities to prove that if the Servant is robbed the Master may give Evidence what Mony was delivered to him 2 Roll. Abr. 685. though that might be as well proved by another Witness Now though all this be admitted yet an Action will not lie against the Hundred by the Master in the Case at the Barr for the Statute of Queen Elizabeth being made so much in favour of the Hundred ought to be pursued The Reasons why an Oath is injoyned by that Statute are 1. That the person robbed should enter into a Recognizance to prosecute the Robbers if he knew them or any of them 2. That the Hundred might be excused upon the Conviction of such person or persons 3. To prevent a Robbery by Fraud Now suppose the Servant is entrusted with Mony and robbed by Confederacy shall the Hundred be answerable because the Servant hath broke his Trust Cro. Eliz. 142. 1 Leon. 323. No the Servant ought to be sworn for the purposes mentioned in that Act which if he refuse the Master hath lost his Action But if the Servant is robbed in the Company or presence of his Master the Mony is still in Iudgment of the Law in the possession of the Master Stiles 156 319 and that was the reason of the Iudgment in Jones's Case This is not like the Case of a common Carrier who though he may be said to be a Servant yet he is entrusted by this Law Curia This Action might have been well brought for the whole by Coxhead alone but 't is now too late the year being expired for where a Servant is robbed of part of his Master's Goods and part of his own he may have an Action Brownl 155. and recover Iudgment for the whole and therefore at another day the Plaintiff had Iudgment for 26 s. only Pain versus Patrick and others Pasch 2 Gulielmi Rot. 43. THIS was a Special Action on the Case brought by Isaac Pain against Edward Patrick and William Boulter for hindring the Plaintiff to go over a Ferry Action on the Case will not lie for disturbing or hindring a passage in a Common High-way but it must be by Indictment The Declaration sets forth that the Vill of Littleport in the Isle of Ely is an ancient Vill within which there is a River called Wilner River over which there was an ancient passage in a Ferry-Boat from the North East part of the said Vill to the end of Ferry-Lane and from thence to another place called Adventurers Bank that this passage was for all People at a certain price c. excepting the Inhabitants of Littleport living in ancient Houses there who by reason of an ancient Custom in the said Vill were to pass ad libitum suum with paying Coll c. That the Plaintiff was an Inhabitant in an ancient Mesuage in the said Vill and that there was an ancient Ferry-Boat kept there by the Owners thereof till the first day of May in such a year after which day the Defendants did not keep the same per quod the Plaintiff lost his Passage c. The Defendants protestando that the Passage was not in a Ferry-Boat protestando etiam that there was no such Custom c. and that the Plaintiff was not an Inhabitant in an ancient Mesuage in Littleport Pro Placito dicunt that before the exhibiting of the Bill they did erect a Bridge over the said River where the Passage was anciently and this was done and maintained at their own Costs and that the Plaintiff melius celerius could pass over the said Bridge c. This was pleaded in Barr. The Plaintiff replied that he per aliquem Pontem libertatem passagii trans ultra Rivum praedict ' secundum consuetudinem praed in narratione mentionat ' habere non permissus fuit contra consuetudinem praed Et hoc paratus est verificare c. The Defendants demurred and the Plaintiff joined in Demurrer The Questions were 1. Whether this was a good Custom as laid in the Declaration for the Inhabitants of a Vill to claim to be discharged of Coll ratione comorantiae 2. If the Custom is good then whether the Defendants Plea in Barr is also good to discharge themselves from keeping of the Boat 3. Whether the Plaintiff can maintain this Action This Case was argued now and in Easter-Term following by Council for the Defendants and in the same Term by Council for the Plaintiff Those who argued for the Defendants said that as to the first Point though this is set forth by way of Custom yet 't is in the nature of a Prescription which is always alledged in the person but here 't is for the Inhabitants of a Vill c. Now this cannot be good by way of Prescription because in such Case there must be a certain and permanent Interest abiding in some person which cannot be here for a meer Habitation or dwelling in an House will not give a Man such an Interest That which makes a Prescription good is Vsage and reasonableness 1 Leon. 142. 3 Leon. 41. but it cannot be ex rationabili causa to prescribe ad libitum suum for the Ferry-Man hath neither any consideration or recompence for the keeping of his Boat when the Inhabitants may pass over at their pleasure without paying Toll 'T is true a Man may prescribe to have Common sans nombre which in strictness is to put in as many Cattle as he will but if he lays his prescription ad libitum suum 't is not good If therefore this is not good by way of Prescription it cannot be supported by Custom because that also must extend to what hath some certainty and which must likewise have a reasonable beginning Now there can be no certainty in this Custom Hob. 86. 6 Co. 60. because the Plaintiff claimeth it only during his Comorancy in a Mesuage in which he had neither a certain time or Estate and this is such a transitory interest which is not allowed in the Law And therefore it hath been adjudged that a Custom for an Infant to sell his Lands when he can measure an Ell of Cloth is void 1 Rol. Rep. 32. because 't is incertain of what Age he may then be and 't is equally as incertain how
3 Willielmi Judicium Iudgment was given for the Defendant absente Dolbin Iustice who was also of the same Opinion It was held that the Custom was well alledged both as to the manner and matter 't is true all Customs must have reasonable beginnings but it would be very difficult to assign a lawful commencement for such a Custom as this is so it would be for the Custom of Gavelkind or Burrough English which are circumscribed to particular places and since 't is sufficient to alledge a Custom by reason of the place where t is used it may be as reasonable in this Case to say that there hath been an ancient Ferry-Boat kept in this place 't is but only an inducement to the Custom which did not consist so much in having a Right to the Passage as to be discharged of Toll This might have a lawful beginning either by a Grant of the Lord to the Ancestors of the Defendant or by the agreement of the Inhabitants A Custom alledged for all the Occupiers of a Close in such a Parish to have a Foot-way Cro. Car. 419. Co. Lit. 110. b. Cro. Eliz. 746. 1 Roll. Rep. 216. c. is not good the reason is because the Plaintiff ought to prescribe in him who hath the Inheritance but where a thing is of necessity and no manner of profit or charge in the Soil of another but only a thing in discharge or for a Way to a Market or to be quit of Toll in such cases not only a particular person but the Inhabitaints of a Vill may alledge a Prescription This may be as well alledged as a Custom to turn a Plow upon another mans Land or for a Fisherman to mend his Nets there 'T is good as to the matter for 't is only an easment 't is like a Custom alledged for a Gateway or Watercourse and for such things Inhabitants of a Vill Cro. Eliz. 441. or all the Parishioners of a Parish may alledge a Custom or Vsage in the place 2. Point But as to the Plea in Bar 't is not good because the execting of a Bridge is but laying out a Way t is a voluntary act and no man by reason of his own act can be discharged of what he is to do upon the interest he hath in the Ferry If the Defendant had petitioned the King to destroy the Ferry and got a Patent to erect a Bridge and had brought a Writ ad quod dampnum and it had been found by inquisition to be no damage to the People then he might safely have built this Bridge 3. But notwithstanding the Plea is not good yet the Plaintiff can have no advantage of it because he cannot have an Action on the Case for this matter for by his own shewing 't is a common Passage Cro. Car. 132 167. 1 Inst 56. a. Cro. Eliz. 664. 13 Co. 33. Davis 57. which is no more than a common High-way now for disturbing him in such a Passage no Action on the Case will lie unless he had alledged some particular damage done to himself for if he could maintain such an Action any other person is entituled to the like and this would be to multiply Suits which the Law will not allow but hath provided a more apt and convenient remedy which is by presentment in the Leet If Toll had been extorted from him F. N. B. 94. 22 H. 6.12 then an Action on the Case had been the proper remedy but no such thing appeared upon this Declaration Prince 's Case THE Suggestion in a Prohibition was that Prince was seized of the Rectory of Shrewsby ut de feodo jure and that he being so seised de jure ought to present a Vicar to the said place but that the Bishop of the Diocess had of his own accord appointed a person thereunto This Exception was taken to it viz. He doth not say that he was Impropriator but only that he was seised of the Rectory in Fee so it not appearing that he had it Impropriate he ought no to present the Vicar Iustice Dolben replied That in several places in Middlesex the Abbots of Westminster did send Monks to say Mass and so the Vicaridges were not endowed but he put in and displaced whom he pleased That he had heard my Lord Chief Iustice Hales often say that the Abbot had as much reason to displace such Men as he had his Butler or other Servant Curia Declare upon the Prohibition and try the Cause Harrison versus Hayward Pasch 2 Gulielmi Rot. 187. AN Agreement was made to assign a Stock upon Request When a thing is to be done upon request the performance must be when the person requires it and the Defendant cannot plead that he was ready to assign after the promise made and for non-performance an Action was now brought setting forth the Agreement and that the Plaintiff did request the Defendant at such a time c. The Defendant pleaded that he was ready to assign the Stock after the promise made c. and upon a Demurrer it was ruled if the thing was not to be done upon Request then the Defendant was bound to do it in a convenient time after the promise but it being to be done upon request the time when the Plaintiff will require the performance of the Agreement is the time when the Defendant must do it Iudgment pro Quer. Thompson versus Leach WRit of Error upon a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Surrender not good without acceptance of the Surrendree 2 Vent 198. the Case upon the special Verdict was thus Viz. Simon Leach was Tenant for Life of the Lands in question with Remainder in contingency to his first second and third Son in Tail Male Remainder to Sir Simon Leach in Tail c. This Settlement was made by the Will of Nicholas Leach who was seised in Fee The Tenant for Life two months before he had a Son born did in the absence of Sir Simon Leach the Remainder man in Tail seal and deliver a Writing by which he did Grant Surrender and Release the Lands which he had for Life to the use of Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs and continued in possession five years afterwards and then and not before Sir Simon Leach did accept and agree to this Surrender and entred upon the Premisses But that about four years before he thus agreed to it Simon Leach the Tenant for Life had a Son born named Charles Lessor of the Plaintiff to whom the Remainder in contingency was thus limited The Tenant for Life died then Sir Simon Leach suffered a Common Recovery in order to bar those Remainders 1. The Question was whether this was a legal and good Surrender of the Premisses to vest the Freehold immediately in Sir Simon Leach without his Assent before Charles Leach the Son of Simon Leach the Surrenderor was born so as to make him a good Tenant to the Precipe upon which the Recovery was
and Title set forth but no Iudgment was then given Boson versus Sandford THE Plaintiff declared that the Defendant and seven other persons were Proprietors of a Vessel Where there are several Proprietors of a Vessel and Goods are dampnified by carriage the Action must be brought against them all in which they used to carry Goods for a reasonable hire from Port to Port. That he had loaded the said Vessel with Boards which were agreed to be safely transported from London to Topsam and that the Defendant by neglect suffered them to be dampnified c. Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded a special Verdict was found the substance whereof was viz. That the Plaintiff did load the Ship with Boards of which Ship the Defendant and seven other persons were Proprietors that the said Ship did usually carry Goods for hire that the Plaintiff delivered the Goods to Daniel Hull who was Master of the Vessel and that they were loaded therein but that none of the Proprietors were present That there was no actual Contract between the Plaintiff and the Proprietors or any Negligence in them but the Boards were dampnified by the neglect of the said Master c. The Questions upon this special Verdict were two 1. Whether this Action would lie against the Defendant alone as one of the Proprietors or whether it must be brought against them all 2. If the Action ought to be brought against them all then Not-Guilty was not a proper Plea because the Defendant ought to have pleaded in Abatement that the rest of the Owners super se susceperunt simul cum the Defendant absque hoc quod he super se suscepit tantum It was argued for the Plaintiff that the Action may be well brought against any single person of the Proprietors because 't is grounded upon a Tort as well as upon a Contract which in this Case is only an Inducement to the Action and therefore the Plaintiff hath liberty to bring it either the one way or the other for 't is both joint and several So it is in Trover where a Man declares that he was possessed of such Goods that the Defendant found them and promised to deliver them but converted them to his own use the Contract is but Iuducement for the cause of Action arises upon the Conversion This is a remedy given by the construction of the Law and if so it must be certain and effectual to all intents and therefore it hath been ruled in an Action brought against a common Carrier upon the Assumpsit in Law Sid. 244. and likewise upon the Tort that the Declaration was ill and though the Plaintiff had a Verdict yet the Iudgment was arrested because he had declared both ways Agreeable to this was that Iudgment which was given upon the Statute of 2 Ed. Hutt 121 122. 3. for not setting out of Tythes in an Action of Debt brought against two Tenants in Common it happened that one of them set out the Tythes and the other carried them away and because the Action was brought against both it was held to be ill for it lies only against him which did the wrong 2. If the Action ought to be brought against all then the Defendant should have taken advantage of it by pleading and to have shewed who were the Proprietors with himself for 't is impossible for the Plaintiff to know who they are and for this reason the Plea is not good E contra E contra The Plaintiff ought to have brought his Action either against the Master alone or all the Proprietors 't is true if this had been only an Action of a simple Trespass he might have brought it against all or one but this sounds not only in a Wrong but 't is in Breach of a Covenant or Duty and so ought to be commenced against all of them as common Carriers Now the great reason why all are liable to an Action is because they all have a reward for the Hire of the Vessel and it seems very unreasonable that one should bear the burthen and the rest run away with the profit The principal Case in Hutton is an Authority directly to this purpose though it was otherwise quoted by the Plaintiffs Council it was Debt upon the Statute of Ed. 6. brought against one Lessee for not setting out of Tythes and it appeared upon the Evidence that two were jointly possessed of the Term and for that reason it was held that the Action would not lie against one alone 2. The Defendant ought not to have pleaded in Abatement that the rest of the Proprietors super se susceperunt simul cum the Defendant c. because such a Plea would not have been good here for he shall never be compelled to plead in Abatement either in Debt or Contract but in one single Case and that is where two are bound jointly and one is sued he may plead in Abatement 5 Co. 119. but cannot say Non est factum for the Bond is his Deed since each of them have sealed it Afterwards in Hillary-Term the Defendant had Iudgment Judicium that the Action ought to be brought against all the Partowners because they have all an equal benefit and the ground of the Action is upon a Trust reposed in all and every Trust supposeth a Contract 2 Cro. 202. Palm 523. and in all Cases grounded upon Contracts the Parties who are Privies must be joyned in the Action The Master of the Ship is no more than a Servant to the Owners he hath no Property either general or special but the Power he hath is given by the Civil Law There are many Cases where the act of the Servant shall charge the Master as for instance viz. King Ed. 6. sold a quantity of Lead to Renagre Dyer 161. and appointed the Lord North who was then Chancellor of his Court of Augmentations to take Bond for payment of the Mony The Lord North appointed one Benger who was his Clerk to take the Bond which was done who delivered it to the Lord and he delivered it back again to his Clerk in order to send it to the Clerk of the Court of Augmentations Benger suppressed this Bond and it was the Opinion of all the Iudges of England that the Lord North was chargeable to the King because the possession of the Bond by his Servant and by his Order was his own possession So where an Officer of the Customs made a Deputy Dyer 238. b. who concealed the Duties and the Master being ignorant of the Concealment certified the Customs of that part of the Revenue into the Exchequer upon Oath he was adjudged to be answerable for this Concealment of his Servant So where the Lessor was bound that the Lessee should quietly enjoy and it was found that his Servant by his command 4 Leon. 123. and he being present entred this was held to be a Breach of the Condition for the Master was the principal Trespasser Therefore though
Proctor 2. Whether a sufficient cause was returned to displace Mr. Leigh As to the first It was held that a Mandamus doth lie because 't is a publick Office and concerns the Administration of Iustice and the Proctors being limited to a certain number viz. 28. if many of them should be displaced it would be a means to hinder Iustice This Court doth judicially take notice of the Ecclesiastical Courts by prohibiting them by taking notice of their Excommutions or of any proceedings when they are against the Law of the Land A Proctor doth the Business in that Court as as Attorney in B. R. and Notice is taken of his place as judicially as of any other Officer Sid. 94 152. and as to this purpose those Officers cannot be distinguished if therefore a Mandamus hath been granted to restore an Attorny why not a Proctor The Plaintiff hath no remedy but by a Mandamus because an Assize will not lie of this Office 't is admitted that an Action on the Case may be brought but then Damages only are to be recovered and not the Office and it would be very inconvenient to leave it to a Iury to give such Damages as the Party may sustain for the loss of his Livelyhood 'T is no Objection to say that there is a proper Visitor in this Case to whom to appeal viz. to the Archbishop for they have not set out any such visitatorial power in the Return or if any that he had power to restore him But if such Power had appeared upon the Return yet a Proctor ought not to appeal to the Archbishop or to the Guardian of the Spiritualties Sede vacante because ' is in effect to appeal to themselves for the Dean of the Arches before whom the Appeal must be brought is an Officer appointed by the Archbishop himself and hath the same Iurisdiction with him Besides the Proctors there are not properly under any Visitatorial Power they have a particular Iurisdiction within themselves and their Courts have been held in several places as at Bow Christchurch c. Then as to the Causes of this removal 't is returned 1. For receiving and prosecuting of a Cause without the advice of an Advocate contrary to a Statute made by the Archbishop Abbot 2. For refusing to pay 10 s. set upon him as a Tax towards the Charges of the House Now neither of these are sufficient Causes to displace him As to the first Cause if that Statute gives them any such Power 't is void because it deprives a Man of his Freehold which cannot be done but by the Law of the Land 'T is not said when this Offence was committed for it may be before a general Pardon and then 't is discharged But if it is an Offence that will not make a Forfeiture without warning and no such thing appears upon the Return 11 Co. 99. a. for if he had notice publickly he might have offered something in excuse of himself as Sickness c. which might have been allowed by the Court. 'T is as unreasonable a Law to put the Clients to unnecessary Charges to advise with an Advocate upon an ordinary Libel as it would be for an Attorny of the King's Bench to advise with Council to draw a Declaration on a Bond. 2. They do not shew by what Authority they may levy a Tax neither do they set forth what Tax was made in the whole so that it might appear that 10 s. was a proportionable part for him to pay neither doth it appear when this Tax was made or that Mr. Leigh was a Proctor when it was made E contra E contra This is not an Offence in matter of Iudgment but 't is a Misdemeanour and punishable 'T is very like the Case of Fellows of Colleges who have proper Visitors and therefore the King's Bench will not grant a Mandamus in such Cases A Proctor is an Officer of a Court different from the Courts of Law and therefore the King's Bench cannot take notice of his Office judicially they have no other way of punishing of a Proctor but by displacing of him and if this should be remedied by a Mandamus then those persons may offend without punishment 'T is not like the Case of an Attorny for he being an Officer of the King's Bench the Court doth judicially take notice of him but not of a Proctor 'T is more like the Case of a Steward of a Court Baron which is of private Iurisdiction and for which a Mandamus hath been denied 'T is like Midleton 's Case who was Treasurer of the New River Water 't is true a Mandamus was granted to restore him to that Office but it was only de bene esse to bring the Matter before the Court though that was a Corporation settled by Act of Parliament 'T is also like the Cases of Abbots Priors and Monks for whom a Mandamus was never granted because they are Ecclesiastical Corporations and have proper Visitors which is now by Law devolved upon the Archbishop So also Lay Corporations have Visitors which are their Founders and their Heirs 'T is an Objection of no force to say that this Appeal must be to the Dean of the Arches which is to appeal to the same person because though 't is true that the Dean is constituted by the Archbishop yet when once he is invested with that Office he is in for his Life and the Archbishop cannot afterwards come into that Court and execute the Office of Dean himself so he is not the same person neither hath he the same Iurisdiction Curia A Proctor is not an Officer properly speaking 't is only an Employment in that Court which acts by different Laws and Rules from the King's Bench they have an original Iurisdiction over this matter and a Mandamus is in the nature of an Appeal which will not be granted where they have such a Iurisdiction but when they exceed it and encroach upon the Common Law then Prohibitions are granted 'T is for this reason that in cases of Divorce which are of a higher nature than this case is no Appeal can be to the King's Bench for it would be an endless business for persons to Appeal ab uno ad aliud examen and therefore credit must be given to the determinations of those Courts who have such Original Iurisdiction Officers are incident to all Courts 1 Roll. Abr. 526. and must partake of the nature of those several and respective Courts in which they attend and the Iudges or those who have the supream Authority in such Courts are the proper persons to censure the Behaviour of their own Officers and if they should be mistaken the King's Bench cannot relieve for in all cases where such Iudges keep within their Bounds no other Court can correct their Errors in Proceedings Now for a Church-Warden of a Parish Clerk an Attorny or the like all these are Temporal Officers and are to be ordered by the Temporal Laws
Demise and the Word Assignes is in the Deed yet they are not bound if they have no Estate so that 't is not the naming of them but by reason of the Estate in the Land they are made chargeable No Iudgment is entred upon the Roll. FINIS ERRATA FOlio 88. Line 13. for Defendant read Plaintiff f. 106. l. 26. for no r. an f. 119. l. 7. after must be r. Error f. 147. l. 13 18 38. for coram r. quorum f. 189. l. 23. for reasonable r. unreasonable f. 196. l. 28. for devises r. demises f. 199. l. 1. for 23. r. 13. f. 201. l. 14. before merged r. not f. 218. l. 17. for 1672. r. 1679. f. 203. l. 31. after Berkley r. and Mr. Killigrew f. 222. l. 31. leave out and marrieth f. 226. l. 21. leave out she marrieth f. 237. l. 29. for devise r. demise f. 255. l. 31. for Father r. Nephew f. 256. l. 12. for joyned r. tryed f. 287. l. 6. after delivered r. tied f. 303. l. 16. for Grantee r. Guarantee f. 307. l. 36. for voidable r. void A TABLE to the Third Part of Modern Reports A. Abatement See Ioint Action 8. 1. DEBT was brought by four Plaintiffs one of them died before Judgment the Action is abated as to the rest 249 2. Waste is brought against Tenant pur auter vie and pending the Writ Cestui que vie dieth the Writ shall not abate because no other person can be sued for the Damages ibid. 3. Two Jointenants are Defendants the death of one shall not abate the Writ for the Action is joint and several ibid. 4. Where two or more are to recover in a personal thing the death of one shall abate the Action as to the rest ibid. 5. But in Audita Querela the death of one shall not abate the Writ because it is in discharge ibid. Abeiance See Acceptance 1. Resignation of a Benefice passes nothing to the Ordinary but putteth the Freehold in Abeiance till his acceptance 297 See Acceptance Resignation Surrender Acts of Parliament See Iustice of Peace 2 Pardon 2 Ought to be construed according to the intention of the Law-makers and ought to be expounded according to the Rules of the Common Law 63 2. Where a particular punishment is directed by a Statute Law it must be pursued and no other can be inflicted upon the Offender 78 118 3. When an Act is penal it ought to be construed according to Equity 90 157 312 4. Preamble is the best Expositor of the Law 129 169 Action upon the Ease Assumpsit A Feoffment was made upon Trust that the Feoffee should convey the Estate to another the Cestuy que Trust may have an Action if the Feoffee refuseth to convey 149 2. In consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink c. he promised to pay as much as it was reasonably worth the word valerent was in the Declaration it should have been quantum valebant at the time of the Promise but held good after Verdict 190 3. Where a personal promise is grounded upon a real Contract the Action will lie 73 4. It will not lie for Rent reserved upon a Demise but where a Promise is made to pay Rent in consideration of occupying a House it will lie 240 Action on the Case See Bankrupts 2 Indictment 2 Slander where it lieth 1. He is a Papist spoken of a Deputy Lieutenant 26 2. Where the words injure a person in his Profession or bring him in danger of punishment 27 3. He stole the Colonel's Cupboard Cloth there being no precedent Discourse either of the Colonel or his Cloth 280 4. He is broken and run away and never will return again spoken of a Carpenter 155 5. He is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his door but he spoken of a Merchant who made a Bonefire at the Coronation of King James 103 6. He owes more Mony than he is worth he is run away and is broak spoken of an Husbandman 112 7. The Wife was called Whore and that she was the Defendant's Whore the Husband and she brought the Action and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum it lies without allegding special Damages 120 8. Sir J. K. is a buffle headed Fellow and doth not understand Law he is not fit to talk Law with me I have baffled him and he hath not done my Client Justice spoken of a Justice of Peace 139 9. J. P. is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest men of my sort and I will make him give satisfaction for plundering me spoken of a Justice of Peace no Colloquium was laid the Court was divided 163 Where it doth not lie Words were laid to be spoken ad tenorem effectum sequen ' which is not an express allegation that they were spoken 71 72 Action on the Case against a Common Carrier Where it was brought against him upon an Assumpsit in Law and likewise upon a Tort the Declaration is not good 322 Action on the Case for a wrong See Pleading For diverting of a Water-course the Antiquity of the Mill must be set forth 49 2. It lies against a wrong doer upon the bare possession only and the Plaintiff need not set forth whether he hath a Title by Grant or Prescription for that goes to the right 51 52 132 3. If the Declaratien is for the diverting of the Water ab antiquo solito cursu this amounts to a Prescription which must be proved at the Trial or the Plaintiff will be non-suited 52 4. Whether it lieth for the making of a scandalous Affidavit in Chancery 108 5. For selling of Oxen affirming them to be his own ubi revera they were not but doth not say sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them fraudulenter or deceptive 't is naught upon a Demurrer but good after Verdict 261 6. Where several are guilty of a wrong the Action may be brought against either 321 7. Debt upon the Statute of Ed. 6. for not setting out Tithes brought against two Tenants in Common one of them did set out the Tithes and the other carried them away it ought to be brought only against the wrong doer 322 8. For disturbing of a Man in a Common Passage or Common High-way no Action on the Case lieth without a particular damage done to himself for the proper remedy is a Presentment in the Leet 294 Administrator Vide Infant 18 Ordinary Interest 2 Pleading 2 Administrator durante minore aetate hath no power over the Estate 24 2. Administration could not be granted by the Spiritual Court before the Statute of Ed. 3. 24 3. Where 't is once granted whether it ought to be repealed 25 4. Administrator had the whole Estate in him before the Statute of Distributions 60 5. He then gave Bond to distribute as the Ordinary should direct ibid. 6. The Father died
intestate leaving one Son an Infant Administration was granted durante minore aetate he died before 17. whether Administration de bonis non of the Father shall be granted to the next of Kin of him or his Son 61 62 7. Whether an Interest is vested in an Infant where Administration is granted durante minore aetate so that if he die before 17. it goes to his Executor 61 8. Before the Statute of Distribution if there was but one Child he had a right of Administration but it was only personal and if he died before it was granted to him by the Court it would not go to his Executor 62 9. Husband hath a right of Administration to the Goods of the Wife because the Marriage is quasi a Gift in Law 64 10. If Administration had been granted to a Stranger before the Statute of Distributions and no Appeal within fourteen days he who had right though beyond Sea was barred 64 11. Husband and Wife Administratrix to her first Husband recover in Debt the Wife died and the Husband brought a Scire Facias to have Execution it will not lie by him alone because it was a Demand by the Wife as Administratrix in auter droit ibid. 12. Judgment was had in Somersetshire the Plaintiff died intestate Administration is committed by an inferior Diocess 't is void because the Entry of the Judgment in Middlesex where the Records are kept made him have bona notabilia in several Diocesses and so Administration ought to be granted in the Prerogative 324 13. If the Intestate hath two Sons and no Wife each have a Moiety of the personal Estate if but one an interest is vested in him 59 14. At Common Law none had a Right to an Intestate's Estate but the Ordinary was to distribute it to Pious Uses ibid. Admiral and Admiralty There was a Sentence in the Admiralty for taking of a Ship and afterwards Trover was brought for taking of the same Ship whether it lies or not 194 2. Pawning of a Ship for Necessaries at Land and a Libel was exhibited in the Admiralty whether good or not 244 3. Where things arising upon Lands may be sued for in the Admiralty 245 Addition See Indictment Where it makes a thing certain as an Ejectment de Tenemento is incertain but with the addition vocat ' the Black Swan 't is made certain 238 Admittance See Baron and Feme 9. A Custom cannot warrant an incertain Fine upon an Admittance to a Copyhold 133 2. The Lord may refuse to admit without a tender of the Fine where 't is certain ibid. 3. Where 't is incertain the Lord is to admit first and then to set the Fine ibid. 4. Custom that upon every Admission the Tenant should pay a years value of the Land as it was worth tempore admissionis t is good 132 5. For a Fine upon an Admission an Action of Debt will lye for though it favours of the realty yet 't is a certain duty 230 6. Before Admittance the Estate is in the Surrenderor and he shall have an Action of Trespass against any person who enters before another is admitted 226 7. Before an Admittance the Surrendree cannot enter but by special Custom to warrant it 225 Affidavit See Action on the Case for a Wrong 4. See Baron and Feme 11. Infant 21. Agreement and Disagreement Whether assent is necessary to a Surrender it being a Conveyance at the Common Law 't is not necessary in Devises or in any Conveyances directed by particular Statutes or by Custom 298 2. Whether the Estate shall be in the Surrendree immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some disassent to it 300 3. Agreement is not so much necessary to perfect a Conveyance as a Disagreement is to make it void ibid. 4. A Feoffment to three and Livery is made to one the Estate is in all till disagreement 301 Alien Leases made to Alien Artificers are void by the Statute of 32 H. 8. This Statute was pleaded by an Alien who was a Vintner and held to be no Artificer 94 Amendment See Mistrial Costs 2. 1. Of the Distringas by the Roll after a Verdict the Day and Place of Assizes being left out 78 2. In matters of Form the Court have sent for a Coroner to amend his Inquisition 101 3. Of a Mis-entry of a Writ of Enquiry without paying of Costs 113 4. Return to an Homine Replegiando amended by Rule of Court 120 5. A Riot was laid to be committed after the Indictment it was amended being only a Misprision of the Clerk 167 6. Where matter of Form is cured by a Verdict but 't is not amendable upon a Demurrer 235 7. Scire Facias upon a Recognizance to have Execution for 1000 l. juxta formam Recuperationis it should have been recognitionis amended after a Demurrer 251 Amerciament See Court 3. 1. Differs from a Fine for that is the act of the Court but an Amerciament is the act of the Jury 138 2. It need not be to a Sum certain for that may be affered 138 3. A Bailiff of a Liberty cannot distrein for an Amerciament Virtute officii but he ought to set forth the taking Virtute Warranti ibid. Appeal Against three for a Murder the Count was that O. gave the wound of which the person died the Jury found that L. gave the wound and that O. and M. were assisting this varies from the Count and yet held good 121 2. The Wound was given in one County and the Death ensued in another and the Party was Tryed where the Wound was given and held good ibid. 3. At Common Law it was at the Election of the Appellant to bring the Appeal in either County and the Tryal to be by a Jury of both but now it may be brought in the County where the Party died 122 4. Whether Auter foitz Convict of Man-Slaughter is a good Plea to an Appeal of Murder 156 157 5. If a Woman be slain her next of Kin shall maintain an Appeal 157 6. How many things are required by the Statute of Gloucester to be alledged in an Appeal of Murder 158 7. The Appellee pleaded in Abatement but did not plead over to the Felony whether good or not 267 8. Where the Appellee must plead in propria persona and where per Attornatum 268 Apportionment Where a Contract under Hand and Seal for a Sum certain shall not be apportioned in an Action pro Rata as if it be for a Years Service the Plaintiff must serve a Year and aver it tho' the Contract is executory 153 2. But if a Promise is for a Years Board an Action may be brought for three Quarters of a Year for if there is a Variance between the Agreement and the Declaration 't is for the benefit of the Defendant 154 Apprentice Whether Justices of Peace have any power to compel men to take poor Children Apprentices since the Statute gives power to Church-wardens to raise
IT lies to remove Causes and Orders from an inferior Jurisdiction where 't is not prohibited in express words by any Statute 95 2. Will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes quaere whether it lies to the Royal Franchise of Ely 230 Charter Usage shall expound ancient Charters 9 2 The Common Law doth operate with it ibid. 3. One Clause of a Charter may expound another 10 4. A Charter which establishes a Corporation must provide for a new Election in order to a Succession otherwise the Common Law will not help 13 Church See Prohibition Commitment By the Lord Chancellor and several others Dominos Concilii for a Misdemeanour whether it should not be Dominos in Concilio 213 2. Of a Peer for a Misdemeanour which amounts to a Breach of the Peace for which Sureties are to be given 214 3. When a person is brought in by a Capias for any offence he ought to plead instanter 215 Common and Commoner See Ioytenancy 4 Ioynt Action 7 Prescription 7 A Common cannot pass without Deed and if the Plaintiff sheweth a Que Estate he must produce the Deed 52 2. If a Prescription is made for a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant 't is not good 162 246 3. But this fault is cured by a Verdict 162 Confederacy See Indictment Condition See Infant 2. Notice 2 4. A bare denial without doing any more is no Breach of the Condition 31 2. How it differs from a Limitation 32 3. To restrain Marriage to the consent of particular persons is void ibid. 4. Where 't is of two parts in the disjunctive and both possible at the time of the Bond given and one becomes impossible afterwards by the Act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part for the Condition being made for his benefit shall be taken very beneficially for him who had election to perform either part 233 5. When the Condition is but of one part 't is otherwise as if A. promise B. that if C. do not appear such a day at Westminster he will pay 20 s. C. died before the day the Mony must be paid 234 6. Condition was to pay Rent at Michaelmas or Lady-day during the Life of a Woman or within thirty days after she died after the Feast but within the thirty days the payment which was due at the Feast was discharged thereby ibid. 7. To save harmless Non damnificatus generally is a good Plea but if it be to save harmless acquit and discharge then 't is not good without shewing how acquitted and discharged 252 Confederacy See Agreement Consideration See Action on the Case Construction Where it shall be made of an Act of Parliament according to the intent of the Law-makers 33 2. Where it shall be made of an entire Sentence so as the intent of the Law may appear 220 3. Where particular words are in the first part of a Sentence and general words follow both shall stand 278 279 Contract Where an Agreement is entire to do or perform a thing for a certain Sum it shall not be apportioned pro rata for the performance of part 153 2. There must be a recompence of each side to make the Contract good 237 Copyhold and Copyholders See Baron and Feme 8 9. Lord may seize the Land of a Copyholder till a Fine is paid 222 2. A Man by Custom may assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate during the Minority of an Infant without rendring an accompt when he comes of Age ibid. Corporation See Charter 4. In all proceedings which concern a Corporation it must be alledged that there is one and how erected whether by Grant or Prescription 6 2. Mayor hath no more Power than an Alderman in the Coporation where he is Mayor 9 3. Is not of the Quorum for electing of an Alderman 10 4. The Mayor is named in the Grant as part of the Name of the Corporation and is not of the Quorum without naming him to be so 9 10 5. He is a Mayor in respect of Reverence but not of Power 11 6. At the Common Law neither his Name or Office require his presence at the choosing of an Alderman 11 14 7. He cannot act eo nomine but by the express Power given in the Charter 12 8. Elections of Officers of a Corporation must be free 21 9. Mayor of a Corporation is no Officer at the Common Law 12 10. Original of Corporation was preservation of Trade ibid. 11. Corporation by Charter without setting forth their Duty or Office hath no Power ibid. 12. A Company in London made a By-Law that none of them should buy such a Commodity within 24 Miles of London but two Men 't is too large to bind at such a distance out of their Jurisdiction 159 Costs See Amendment 3. Trespass for breaking of a Close and impounding of Cattel and Damages given under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall have his Costs 39 2. Amendment after a Writ of Error brought Costs must be paid 113 Covenant See Local Action Where a thing is lawful at the time of the Covenant made and afterterwards prohibited by Law yet the Covenant is binding 39 2. To find Meat Drink and other Necessaries the Breach was assigned in not finding Meat Drink alia necessaria and entire Damages though this Breach was too general yet 't is good for it may be as general as the Covenant 69 3. There must be such certainty in it that if the Defendant should be sued again he may plead the former Recovery in Bar ibid. 4. Need not so much certainty in assigning a Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for performance of Covenants ibid. 5. For quiet enjoyment the Breach was that a Stranger habens jus titulum and doth not say what Title for it may be under the Plaintiff himself therefore not well assigned 135 6. To make an Assignment according to an Agreement between the Partis as Council should direct whether the Council of the Plaintiff or Defendant should advise 192 7. Give grant and confirm are words at the Common Law where they shall be taken to amount to a Covenant to stand seized 237 Court Cause not to be removed out of an inferiour Court unless the Habeas Corpus is delivered to the Steward before Issue or Demurrer joyned so as 't is joyned within six Weeks after Arrest or Appearance 85 2. If the Cause is tried in an inferior Court the Steward not being an Utter Barister an Attachment shall go ibid. 3. Amerciament in a Court Leet is a Duty vested in the Lord for which he may distrain 138 4. Presentment in a Court Leet is the proper remedy when a Man is disturbed in a common Passage or Way 294 Custom See Admittance Infant 10. Prescription 8. Pleading 12. Must have nothing to support it but Usuage 133 2. 'T is made of repeated Acts ibid. 3. Must be very
computation of the price of Provisions and other Necessaries in 2 H. 5. and how they encreased in Value from that time till the Queen's Reign it may be reasonably affirmed that 40 s. per Annum about the time when that King lived would bear an equal proportion to 40 l. a year in her Reign and if so it may as reasonably be said that 4 l. per Annum in her days would almost bear the like proportion to 80 l. per annum now because of the vast encrease of Riches by Commerce and otherwise in this last Age and such an Estate doth now qualifie a Man to be of the Grand Jury The 40 s. per annum in King H's Reign was esteemed a sufficient Estate to supply all the common Necessities of Life Wheat being then sold for 12 d. per Quarter and good Gascoign Wine for 40 s. per Tun. It was an Age when 20 Marks per Annum was a very good Allowance to maintain a Student at the Inns of Court but too great a Charge for a Commoner to bear and therefore the Lord Chancellor Fortescue tells us that none but the Sons of Noblemen in Hospitiis illis Leges addiscebant The Jurors in those days were all Knights but are now mean and illiterate persons for 't is a very poor Estate which qualifies them for that Service How can Matters of Fact which often require great Examination be tryed by Men of such narrow Capacities which are generally found amongst Men of 10 l. per Annum for so it will be so long as the Degrees of Fortune make such a vast inequality amongst us Experience teacheth us that Men of such low Fortunes and whose Education is generally amongst the Beasts of the Plow have not the same sense of Honour and Vertue with Men of more elevated Qualities and Conversation there must be danger of Subornation and Perjury among such Jurors And what will the villanous Judgment in Attaint signifie I mean in respect to their Estates viz. That their Goods be confiscate their Lands and Possessions seised into the King's Hands their Houses demolished their Woods felled and their Meadows plowed This is a very dreadful Sentence to a Man of a good Estate which by the very Form of this old Judgment every Juror was supposed to have but 't is an empty sound to a Man of 10 l. per Annum who cannot have all those Possessions and but a very small proportion of either It may be therefore thought necessary that a farther Provision be made that none should be impanelled to try such Issues but Men of 40 l. per Annum or at least such as like the Jurors in Attaint qui multa majora habent Patrimonia than what will qualifie a Petty Juror at this day Gentlemen The following Collection is the Product of your Labours It was borrowed from you at the Bar and 't is but just to restore it I know Men have generally very faint Inclinations to approve any Writings beside their own and seldom declare in favour of a Book till they hear what success it has in the World and even then are biassed by the Multitude who very often condemn without reading or read without Understanding I have heard it often objected though I am still to learn upon what accompt that we have too many Printed Books of the Law already and that it was more certain and intelligible when fewer Volumes of it were published I must confess some of the late Reports are collected with very little Judgment But still there is a necessity of new Books tho' not of such for I would feign know how any Lawyer can now be able to advise his Client with the help and direction only of the Old Books 'T is true we have but few of them but 't is because in former Ages all Causes where the thing in demand did not exceed 40 s. were tried either in the County Court in the Hundred Court or in the Court Baron of the Mannor In those days the great Courts of Record at Westminster were not so full of Suitors as now When Bracton wrote the Justices in Eyre who had the same Power with our Justices of Assise went their Circuits but once in seven years and a long time afterwards even in the Reign of King Henry the Eighth the Judges would often rise from the Bench in Term-time without hearing a Motion or trying of a Cause and I think the Practice did not much encrease till this last Age for Anno 10 Eliz. there was but one Serjeant at the Common-Pleas Barr for a whole Term together and that was Serjeant Bendloes and I do not read that he had any Business there Nay at that time the Court of Chancery had no greater share of Practice than the Courts of the Common Law for in the two and twentieth Year of King Henry the Eighth Sir Thomas Moor being then Lord Chancellor did usually read all the Bills which were exhibited into that Court but Business is now so much encreased that all the Council can scarce find time enough to read the Briefs of such Bills which are filed every Term. But the Law hath now its Residence in Westminster-Hall most Causes of Value are there determined and the great Number of Country Attornies in our days who according to my Lord Coke's Opinion by dayly multiplying Suits have so wonderfully encreased the Business of those Courts that it seems very necessary that the judicial determinations there should by new Books be transmitted to future Ages And though some Cases in this Collection which were adjudged in the late Reign may not have the Authority of Presidents because they taste a little of the Times wherein the Administration of Justice was not so nicely regarded as the Dispensation of such things which were then thought Political Rights yet the Reader will find some good Arguments of Learned Men then at the Bar who endeavoured to support our sinking Laws I do acknowledge that if Men were just honest and impartial to themselves and others there would be no occasion for Books of this nature and because they are not so I will not make an Apology for the Publishing of this I think the Book being done with so much Care may be of good use to the Professors of the Law but submit it to your Judgments I confess I am led by my Profession to Affairs of this nature though my Circumstances disingage me from the suspicion of being an Author Vale. A TABLE OF THE CASES Contained in the THIRD PART OF Modern Reports A. ALdridge versus Duke 110 Ashcomb versus Inhabitants Hundred de Eltham 287 Ayres versus Huntington 251 B. BAxter's Case 68 Baldwyn versus Flower 120 Ball versus Cock 140 Barker Mil ' versus Damer 336 Barnes versus Eggard 39 Beak versus Tyrrwhite 194 Banson versus Offley 121 Bishops their Case 212 Bisse versus Harcoutt 281 Blaxton versus Stone 123 Boyle versus Boyle 164 Boson versus Sandford 321 Bowyer versus Lenthal 190
grounded upon these Letters Patents I shall apply my self to speak to it for our Crime is in the undue electing of an Alderman namely not being summoned together for that purpose by the Mayor and doing it in his absence I must desire the Court to observe in what manner the mention of these Letters Patents is introduced The Matter and Question before us is concerning the Election of an Alderman for the City of Bristol which concerns the very being and succession and continuance of the Corporation Nothing can more nearly concern it The defects I observe in the frame of this Indictment are these 1. It does not so much as say or alledge that Bristol is antiqua Villa or antiqua Civitas or that there was or yet is any Corporation at all there nor what it does consist of if there be any nor by what name they are called whether there ought to be a Mayor or not whether their Corporation be by Charter or Prescription And this Court cannot judicially take notice that there is any Corporation there or what it is unless it had been shewn Now if there be no Corporation and no Mayor of right then our meeting to choose an Alderman without his Summons and in his absence is no undue nor irregular Proceeding It cannot appear to the Court whether the Mayors Summons and presence at the Election be necessary or not Now in all legal Proceedings that any way concern a Corporation it is constantly averr'd and alledged that there is a Corporation and what it is and how erected and the least that can be in any Case is to say that it is antiqua Villa or antiqua Civitas where the Corporation extends to a Town or City which make any Prescription or set forth any Custom Thus we find it in the Case of the City of York Dyer 279. plac ' 10. in the Case of a Custom of Foreign bought and Foreign sold They Prescribe in being a Corporation So in Latches Rep. 229. Harris's Case In James Bagg's Case 11 Co. f. 94. A Case of a Writ of Restitution to Restore a Capital Burgess to his Place and Office of a Capital Burgess in Plimouth the Writ was directed to the Mayor and Commonalty of Plimouth the very Words of the Writ suppose a Corporation and shew what their Name is The Return thereupon by the Mayor and Commonalty is That Queen Elizabeth granted to the Mayor and Commonalty that the Mayor and Recorder should be Iustices of the Peace and that James Baggs was a Capital Burgess and did misdemean himself towards the Mayor and thereupon he was disfranchised In the printed Margent of that Case which I suppose is my Lord Cokes own Opinion it is said That in their Return they first ought to prescribe That there hath been a Corporation of a Mayor and Commonalty time out of the Memory of Man and not to begin with the mention of a Grant made to a Coporation as the Indictment does in our Case and not shew the Original and Erection of it either by Prescription or Charter And Mr. Trotman a Learned Man in his abridging of James Bagg's Case bids his Reader observe this Marginal Note Yet in that Case the Return was but in answer to the Writ of Restitution which Writ it self admitted there was a Corporation and directs the Writ to them by Name yet by the Opinion there it was a defect in the Return not to shew that they were by Prescription And if it be necessary upon a Return of a Writ of Restitution to set forth how they came to be incorporated to which Return there can be no Traverse taken nor no pleading to it as has been held by some how much more in such a Case as ours of an Indictment which must be traversed and pleaded to and therefore ought to be more exact That was in a Case of removing of a chief Member a Capital Burgess of a Corporation ours is in a Case of the choosing in of a chief Member an Alderman into a Corporation so that ours is much resembling that Case in that respect 2. Another thing wherein the Indictment is faulty is this viz. In the manner of introducing the mention of these Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth upon which the Indictment is grounded and upon the Construction of which the Case depends The Indictment does not say positively and directly that Queen Elizabeth made or granted any Letters Patents to the Mayor and Commonalty of Bristol That there should be twelve Aldermen and for the appointing how they should be chosen upon which our Case arises nor does it so much as say continetur which would not have been enough neither but it introduces the mention of those Letters Patents no otherwise than by these Words viz. Secundum Privilegia concessa per Literas Patentes c. There were or ought to be twelve Aldermen Et secundum eadem Privilegia sic ut praefertur concessa per totum tempus praedictum after the death of an Alderman the Mayor and the surviving Aldermen eorum major pars ad summonitionem ejusdem Majoris convocati eligerunt eligere consueverunt c. Now this is no positive and direct shewing that there ought to be any Aldermen nor how they should be chosen but it is no more than the Opinion and Conceit of the Iury that found the Indictment upon their perusal of the Letters Patents which were produced in Evidence to them the Iury take it by way of Collection out of a Record of which they are no proper Iudges And this being in an Indictment which is the Kings Declaration and ought to be very exact and certain and which is in a criminal proceeding to which the Parties must plead and if convict are liable to Fine and Imprisonment the Law is more curious in this than where Parties do agree civiliter That all Criminal Proceedings must be very exact and certain is proved by this viz. None of the Statutes of Jeofails would ever help them but by express Words except and exclude them from the benefit of them It is said in Long 's Case 5 Co. 120 121. That If in Declarations between Party and Party for Lands or Goods there must be great certainty expres'd a fortiore says that Case must it be so in Indictments which are the Kings Counts or Declarations to which the Party shall answer they ought to be full and not taken by Intendment or to be by way of Argument so it is held in Leeches Case Cro. Jac. 167. and in Sir William Fitz-Williams's Case Cro. Jac. 19 20. Object If it be objected That the Indictment is but the finding of a Iury who are the Lay-gentz as we call them and they know not the forms of Law Answ The Fact indeed is found by the Iury but the constant course is to have the Iury consent to mend the Form and the Kings Council are addised-with in the drawing of it and after 't is found and sometimes the Iudges
of the Alderman to supply whose place there needed the Election He was not in the Town that was to chuse whereof he was Mayor when the Election was made The Aldermen were under an apprehension that they should be guilty of a great omission and neglect of their Duty and perhaps had some thought of their being under an Oath too and that they might be liable to punishment if they did not chuse within the eight days prescrib'd by their Charter nay 't is likely they thought they could make no choice at all if they did it not within the eight days Tho' all this was but their mistake of the Law yet it was very pardonable in them The Iudges in their Resolution upon that Case rectifie that Mistake and a new Election is thereupon order'd by this Court The Mayor there was not wilfully absent for he was at London when the Alderman died he was at a very great distance from his Town too viz. Launceston about 200 miles as I take it so that he could hardly hear of the death of the Alderman in the eight days time and go down thither before the end of the eight days there was no great necessity of an Election so soon And the Aldermen had done what they did out of a zeal for the Publick though it were a zeal without knowledge But I do not find that the void Election and the Aldermens meeting about it was held a Ryot or an unlawful Assembly No they were not so much as blam'd for what they did nay sure they were rather to be commended for their just intentions But our Case was quite another thing And all our Circumstances and the very plain words of our Charter that appoints the manner of our Election we had to our great charge and upon good advice drawn up in a special Plea for the Question truly arises upon the words of the Charter and the construction of them How it happen'd I cannot tell but a Iudge ruled us to plead not Guilty our chargeable special Plea came in a little too late It was a matter of Record and of Law and fitter to be determin'd by the Iudges than by a Iury. But these in truth were our Circumstances as I shall briefly relate them and I am ready to make out the truth of them An Alderman of Bristol tho' chosen yet cannot officiate till he be sworn he cannot be sworn by the express words of the Charter but before the Mayor and Recorder both I being the Recorder of Bristol happenn'd to be there some time before the day of chusing Members to the Oxford Parliament not long after Sir John Lloid's death I was indeed invited thither Sir Richard Hart the then Mayor and all of us I think not one Alderman absent were then met in the Council Chamber the usual place for that purpose we had nothing else to do It was mov'd that we might then make choice of a new Alderman while not only Mr. Mayor was present but while the Recorder was there too So that the Party chosen might instantly have been sworn and enter'd upon his charge for they have their distinct Wards And the Recorder many times comes not thither in a year or two for I live forty Miles from them and I seldom tarry above two nights at a Gaol-Delivery but then as it fell out I was there upon another occasion None oppos'd it but Mr. Mayor and he did it upon a Ceremony and Complement as he pretended because Sir John Lloid as he said was not yet buried Out of respect to Mr. Mayor we did forbear Some good time after and after Sir John Lloid had been buried I happen'd unexpectedly to be there again and Mr. Mayor was earnestly press'd again then to go to an Election upon the former reason that the new Alderman might presently be sworn Mr. Mayor still refus'd I do not remember but all the rest were very willing to have gone to an Election We did the second time forbear tho' I think we were all there I am sure a great number I tarried then four or five days it was at the Election to Parliament the Poll lasted six days but I left them at the Poll I was not fond of being chosen The Evening as I take it before I went away we were again upon the place and the Mayor with us and he was again press'd to it but wilfully went away and we still forbore But that night some of us sign'd a Writing desiring Mr. Mayor to joyn with us and we declar'd in it if he did not joyn we would proceed without him being the major pars This shews we had no design to chuse in his absence nay it plainly appear'd that the design was on the Mayor's part for he knew I could not stay and he was desirous to chuse in the absence of some of us that he might carry the Election against the person next in course to be chosen and every way qualified viz. Alderman Day I consulted the Charter and found it as I have now observ'd upon it and was clearly of Opinion for the Reasons I have offer'd that in such Circumstances the major part might chuse We gave notice to the Mayor and all the Aldermen then in Town and tho' the Government is most miserably divided yet in this Business there was nothing of Faction and the different Parties were not engag'd only the Mayor had his Design For we were six Aldermen at the Choice Sir Robert Cann an intimate Friend of the Mayor's being lame of the Gout sent us an Excuse but would approve of our Choice Another of our number one of our six is a zealous Man of Mr. Mayor's way yet not taking that to be now concern'd joyned with us and voted the same way We were six and this appears by the Indictment and we were unanimous in the person we chose No other person was so much as nam'd nor I believe thought on by any Body unless by Mr. Mayor there were but four Aldermen more in being for Mr. Mayor was none And the person chosen was not only next in course but every way qualifi'd has a great Estate worth three or four of some of the Aldermen no Tang of a Fanatick a constant Churchman he had but one great Fault he gave his Vote at the Election to Parliament for my self and Sir John Knight against Mr. Mayor and Sir Tho. Earl The person is not sworn to this day nor does desire the Office but rather declines it being fit for it He should have been Mayor this Year in course but is put by it and he is contented There has been another since chosen in his place by the Votes of five only Sir Richard Hart the Mayor being one I am sure they are not major pars And for this choice by six who are Iustices of the Peace as well as Mr. Mayor and the other four we who are four of six are all Indicted for a Ryot upon the account of this
eldest Son for sixty years if he so long lived Remainder to Thomas for Life and that John made a Lease to the Plaintiff for a year The Defendant replied that after the Devise R. Frances made a Feoffment in Fee of the same Lands amongst others to the use of himself for Life Then as to the other Lands to divers Vses contained in the Deed but as to those Lands in which the Distress was taken to the same Vses as in the Will in which Conveyance there was this Priviso That if John should disturb his Executors in the quiet Enjoyment c. or if he shall not suffer them to carry away the Goods in his House then the Uses limited to him should be void He did hinder the Executors to carry away the Goods yet it was adjudged that he should keep his Estate because being a Stranger to the Feoffment he shall not lose it without notice of the Proviso But in answer to that Case notice was not the principal matter of that Iudgment it turned upon a point in Pleading for the Avowant had not shewed any special act of disturbance and a bare denial without doing any more was held to be no breach of the Condition Some other Authorities may be cited to prove notice necessary Green's Case 6 Co. 24. as where Tenant for Life of a Mannor to which an Advowson was appendant did in the year 1594. present Durston who neglecting to read the Articles was deprived nine years afterwards by the Ordinary at the Suit of the Patron who presented him who also dyed two years after the Deprivation then the Queen presented by Lapse whose Presentee was inducted and six years afterwards Durston dyed after whose death he in Remainder presented Green now though the Patron was a Party to the Suit of Deprivation and thereby had sufficient notice that the Church was vacant yet it was adjudged that a Lapse should not incurr but only after notice given by the Ordinary himself and not by any other person whatsoever But this Case may receive this Answer viz. That notice had not been necessary at Law but it was provided by a particular Act of Parliament 13 Eliz. ca. 12. that no Title by Lapse shall accrue upon any deprivation but after six months notice thereof given by the Ordinary himself to the Patron 'T is true the Law is very tender in divesting the Rights of the Subject but where an Estate is created by the Act of the Party and restrained by particular limitations without any appointment of notice there the Law will not add notice and make it necessary because the person who made such a disposition of his Estate might have given it upon what conditions he pleased Therefore it may seem hard that this Estate should be determined by the neglect or omission of the Trustees to give notice of this Proviso but 't is apparent that it was the intent of the Father it should be so for by this Limitation the Estate is bound in the Hands of an Infant the reason is because there is a Privity between an Heir and an Ancestor and therefore the Heir is bound to take notice of such Conditions which his Ancestor hath imposed on the Estate 2. This Estate is determined by the Marriage of the Daughter with Mr. Villiers because there is an express Limitation in the Deed for that very purpose she is enjoyned to marry a Fitzgerald or one who should take upon him that name which is still more extensive and she having neglected to do the one and her Husband having refused to do the other the Aunt in Remainder shall take advantage of this Non-performance And 't is this Remainder over which makes it a Limitation 1 Ventr 202. Owen 112. Goldsb 152. Lit. Sect. 723. for if it had been a Condition then the intent of the Father had been utterly defeated for none but the Heir at Law can enter for the breach of a Condition and such was Katharine in this Case The Proviso in this Deed depends upon another Sentence immediately going before 2 Co. 70. to which it hath reference and then by the express resolution in Cromwel's Case 't is a Limitation or Qualification of the Estate and not a Condition which Estate is now determined without Entry or Claim It was argued that in this Case three things are to be considered E contra 1. The Nature of the Proviso 2. That Notice is absolutely necessary 3. That the Notice given was not sufficient being not such as is required by Law As to the 1st The very nature of this Proviso is condemned by the Civil Law and because it works the destruction of Estates it hath never been favoured at the Common Law All Conditions to restrain Marriage generally are held void by both Laws so likewise are such which restrain people from marrying without the consent of particular persons because they may impose such hard terms before they give their consent that may hinder the Marriage it self and therefore a bare request of such without their subsequent assent has been always allowed to preserve the Estate 2. And which was the principal Point Notice in this Case is absolutely necessary both by the intent of the Father and by the construction of the Law There are three things of which the Law makes an equal Interpretation viz. Uses Wills and Acts of Parliament in which if the intention of the Parties and of the Law makers can be discerned the Cases which severally fall under the direction of either shall be governed by the intention without respect to the disagreeing words nay sometimes the Law will supply the defect of words themselves The Books are full of Authorites where Constructions have been made of Acts of Parliament according to the intent of the Makers and not according to the Letter of the Law As in Eyston and Stud's Case in the Commentaries Plowd Com. 2 pt 463. where the Husband and Wife levyed a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and declared the Vses to their Heirs in Tail the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife they had Issue and the Husband died the Widow married a second Husband and he and his Wife join in a second Fine and declared the Vses thereof to themselves for Life the Remainder to the Husband and his Heirs for sixty years the Remainder in Tail to their Issue the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife the Issue of the first Husband entred supposing the Estate had been forfeited by the Statute of H. 7. 11 H. 7. c. 20. which Enacts That if a Woman hath an Estate in Dower or in Tail jointly with her Husband or to her self of the Inheritance or Purchase of him and she doth either sole or with another Husband discontinue it shall be void and he in the Remainder may enter Now this Case was directly within the words of the Statute for the Woman had an Estate Tail in possession jointly with her first Husband
which she had discontinued by joining in the Fine with her second Husband but yet it was adjudged no Forfeiture because it was not within the intent of the Statute to restrain Women to dispose of their own Estates but only such as came from the Husband So here Vses are in the nature of private Laws and must be governed by the like intention of the Parties now 't is not to be supposed that the Father did intend to disinherit his only Daughter and Heir without notice of this Settlement therefore though he had not appointed any person in particular to give her notice yet it must of necessity be presumed that his intention was that she should have the Estate unless she had refused upon notice to comply with those Conditions imposed upon her Now the Daughter being Heir at Law and so having a good Title by descent if there be any Conveiance made by her Ancestor to defeat that Title and to which she is a Stranger she ought by the Rules of Law and Reason to have notice of it and so is the express Resolution in Frances's Case where the Devise and the Feoffment were both made to the Heir at Law And the reason why in Fry and Porter's Case notice was not held necessary was because the Devise was to a Grandaughter who was not Heir at Law for the Earl of Newport had three Sons then living and therefore the Parties whom it concerned had the same means to inform themselves upon what Conditions they were to have the Estate 3. The notice here given was not sufficient for as the Ordinary himself in Green's Case ought to have given the Patron notice of the Deprivation before a Lapse should incurr so the Trustees here ought to give the Daughter notice of this Proviso before she shall lose her Estate for Non-performance of the Conditions on which she should take it especially since the notice she had of this Proviso was not certain for 't is said she had notice not to marry without the consent of the Trustees but 't is not shewed who they are or how she should apply her self to them Besides there is something in this Proviso which the finding in the Verdict will not supply for it may be literally true that the Daughter married without the consent of the Trustees and yet no breach of the Condition because the Proviso is to restrain her from marrying without the consent of them or their Heirs now it was not found that the Feoffees were then living and if they were dead their Consent cannot be required and she might have the consent of their Heirs Mr. Franklyn who was the Husband of Laetitia the Aunt in Remainder hath likewise forfeited that Estate which he hath or may have in right of his Wife if she had any right by not taking upon him the name of Fitzgerald for if the Father would have disinherited his Daughter for Non-performance of this Proviso a fortiori he shall be intended to disinherit his Sister for making frustrate his desire in the settlement of his Estate In Easter-Term following Iudgment was given That the Estate Tail was not determined for want of notice according to the resolution in Frances's Case Hinton versus Roffey AN Action of Debt was brought against the Defendant In pleading the Statute of Usury the Agreement and the Sum taken must be set out 12 Car. 2. c. 13. who pleaded the Statute of Usury but did not shew any particular Agreement only in general that he was indebted to the Plaintiff in a Sum not exceeding 180 l. neither did he seth forth when the Interest of the Mony did commence and on what day it became due And upon a Demurrer it was objected that this Plea was too general because the Defendant ought to shew in particular what the Sum was in which he was indebted and how much the Plaintiff took above 6 l. per Cent. for if the certainty thereof did not appear there could be no Fact applied to it But on the other side it was alledged that it was not material to shew the certain Sum which the Plaintiff took above 6 l. E contra per Cent. and therefore not necessary to set forth the particular Agreement between them for having pleaded and made a substantial Averment to bring his Case within it 't is well enough without shewing how much he took above six in the hundred And this Case was compared to Debt against an Administrator Moon versus Andrews Hob. 133. who pleaded in Bar a Iudgment c. and that he had fully administred and had not Assets praeterquam bona c. non attingen to 5 l. and upon Demurrer this was held a good Plea for though in strictness of Pleading the Defendant ought to have shewed the certain value of the Goods and not to have said non attingen to 5 l. yet the substance sufficiently appears that he had not more than 5 l. to satisfie a Debt of an 100 l. for which that Action was brought Jefferies Chief Iustice and the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff because the Defendant ought to have set forth the Agreement and to apply it to the Sum in the Declaration Smith versus Goodier IN Ejectment for the Mannor of Heythorpe Attornment must be proved where an Ejectment is brought for a Mannor parcel in Rent and Services c. Vpon Not-guilty pleaded there was a Trial at Bar by an Oxfordshire Iury. The Title of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was That Edmund Goodier Esquire was seized in Fee of the said Mannor part in Demesnes some part in Leases for years with Rent reserved and some part in Services and being so seized made a Feoffment in Fee to Sir John Robinson and Sir William Rider and their Heirs in Trust for Sir Robert Masham This Deed was dated in 1647. and the consideration was 5000 l. paid to Goodier there was a Letter of Attorny of the same date with the Deed and Livery and Seisin endorsed Serjeant Maynard who was of Council for the Defendant put the Plaintiff to prove an Attornment of the Tenants for having declared for a Mannor Lit. Sect. 553. 1 Roll. Abr. 293. parcel in Rents and Services those would not pass without an Attornment and of this Opinion was the whole Court but the Plaintiff would not prove an Attornment The Defendant made a Title under the Marriage Settlement of the said Goodier who in 17 Jacobi married Elizabeth Mees and then he setled the said Mannor upon himself for life and upon his Issue in Tail Male and that the Defendant was the Heir in Tail But on the other side it was insisted that this Settlement was fraudulent against the Purchasor Evidence of a Fraudulent Settlement and that it could not be thought otherwise because both the Original and Counterpart were found in Mr. Goodiers Study after his death and because he had made Oath before a Master in Chancery that there was no incumberance
upon the Estate which Affidavit was produced in Court but not suffered to be read but as a Note or Letter unless the Plaintiff would produce a Witness to swear that he was present when the Oath was taken before the Master And an Objection was made to the Settlement it self which recited That whereas a Marriage was intended to be had between the said Edmund Goodier and Elizabeth Mees now in consideration thereof and of a Portion he conveyed the said Mannor to the Feoffees to the use of himself for life and after his decease to the use of the said Elizabeth for life but doth not say from and after the Solemnization of the said Marriage so that if she had not married Mr. Goodier yet after his decease she would have enjoyed the Estate for life Vpon the whole matter the Iury found for the Defendant Dominus Rex versus Coney and Obrian THE Defendants were convicted for the Murder of Mr. Murder was pardoned by the name Felonica interfectio and held good 10 E. 3. c. 3. 13 R. 2. c. 1. Tyrrwhite and Mr. Forster in a Duel and now pleaded their Pardon in which there was a Clause Non obstante the Statute of Ed. 3. which appoints him that hath a Pardon of Felony to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour before it shall be allowed and another Non obstante to the Statute of R. 2. which enacts that if the Offence be not specified in the Pardon it shall not be allowed Now the Word Murdrum was not in this Pardon the Offence was expressed by these general Words Felonica interfectione and whether it did extend to pardon Murder was the Question Mr. Astry the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that one Alexander Montgomery of Eglington pleaded the like Pardon for Murder but it was held insufficient and the Court gave him time to get his Pardon amended which was done likewise in this Case The Defendants came again on another day and Councel being allowed to plead for them insisted that the Pardon was good and that the Murder was sufficiently pardoned by these Words that it is in the power of the King to pardon by general Words and his intent did plainly appear to pardon the Defendants That the murther of a person is rightly expressed by felonious killing though not so properly as by the word Murdrum it self the omission of which word will not make the Pardon void And to prove this he cited the Sheriff of Norfolk's Case 2 R. 3. 7. a. who was indebted to the King during the time he was Sheriff and was pardoned by the Name of J. W. Esquire who was the same person de omnibus debitis computis c. Afterwards he was charged in the Exchequer for 100 l. where he pleaded this Pardon and it was held good though he was not named Sheriff and so not pardoned by the name of his Office yet the Kings intention appearing in his Charter and having pardoned him by his right Name that was sufficient and in that Case the King himself was concerned in point of interest The Books all agree More 752. Lucas's Case 8 Co. 18. 3 Inst 234. that before the Statute of R. 2. the King might pardon Murder by the word Felony now this Prerogative being incident to the Crown and inseparable from the person of the King was not designed to be wholly restrained by that Act for the Parliament only intended that by specifying the Offence in the Pardon the King should be rightly informed of the nature of it and when he understands it to be Murder he would not grant a Pardon But admitting his power to be restrained by that Statute Stamf. 101. yet a Non obstante is a dispensation of it and therefore this Pardon ought to be allowed The Pardon was held good by the whole Court And Jefferies the Chief Justice said that he had proposed this Case to all the Judges of England Sid. 366. and they were all of the same Opinion and that he remembred Dudley's Case where a Pardon in general words was allowed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683 4. Brason versus Dean A Covenant upon a Charter Party for the Freight of a Ship A thing lawful to be done when the party did covenant to do it and afterwards prohibited the Covenant is binding The Defendant pleaded that the Ship was loaded with French Goods prohibited by Law to be imported and upon Demurrer Judgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Court were all of Opinion That if the thing to be done was lawful at the time when the Defendant did enter into the Covenant though it was afterwards prohibited by Act of Parliament yet the Covenant is binding Barnes versus Edgard TRespass for breaking his Close and impounding of his Cattle Where Damages are under 40 s. the Plaintiff must have ordinary Costs Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict but Damages under 40 s. Whereupon Mr. Livesay the Secondary refused to tar full Costs alledging it to be within the Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. by which 't is Enacted 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 9. That in all Actions of Trespass Assault and Battery and other personal Actions wherein the Judge shall not certifie upon the back of the Record that a Battery was proved or the Freehold or Title of the Land chiefly in question if the Jury find the Damages under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall recover no more Costs than Damages Mr. Pollexfen moved for Costs alledging that this Act doth not extend to all trespasses but only to such where the Freehold of the Land is in question If the Action had been for a Trespass in breaking his Close and Damages given under 40 s. there might not have been full Costs but here is another Count for impounding the Cattle of which the Defendant is found guilty and therefore must have his Costs The like Case was adjudged in this Court in Hillary Term last Smith versus Batterton Raym. 487. Jones 232. which was Trespass for breaking and flinging down Stalls in the Market place The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 2 d. damages and upon a debate whether he should have full Costs the Court were of Opinion that it was not within that Statute because the Title could not come in question upon the destruction of a Chattle In the principal Case the Plaintiff had ordinary Costs DE Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Marsh versus Cutler THE Plaintiff obtained a Iudgment in an Hundred Court for 58 s. and 4 d. If Debt be brought upon a Specialty for part of the Sum the Plaintiff must shew how the other is discharged 2 Cro. 498 499 529 530. and brought an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment in this Court for 58 s. only and did not shew that the 4 d. was discharged and upon Nultiel Record pleaded and a Demurrer to that Plea the
Declaration was held to be naught for that very reason for if a Debt upon a Specialty be demanded the Declaration must be for the whole Sum if for less you must shew how the other was satisfied The Earl of Macklefield's Case THE Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Statute de Scandalis Magnatum against Sir Thomas Grosvenor Special Bail denied in a Scandalum Magnatum for that he being Foreman of the Grand Iury in Cheshire spoke these Words of the Plaintiff viz. That he was a tedious Man and a Promoter of Sedition and tedious Addresses The Plaintiff desired that the Defendant might put in Special Bail but the Court would not grant it and said it was a discretionary thing and not to be demanded of right It was denied to the Duke of Norfolk unless Oath made of the words spoken and therefore the Court ordered Common Bail to be filed Holloway's Case HE was taken at Nevis in the West-Indies and brought over hither and now appeared in Custody at the Barr being outlawed for High-Treason in the late Conspiracy Sir Samuel Astry Clerk of the Crown read the Indictment upon which he was outlawed and the King by his Attorney General consented that the Outlawry should be reversed which could not have been done without such consent and that he might come to his Trial but he having nothing to alledge in his defence other than that he had made an ingenuous Confession to the King and hoped that he might deserve Mercy the Court made a Rule for his Execution to be on Wednesday following and did not pronounce any Sentence against him and he was executed accordingly Dominus Rex versus Barnes al' THE Defendant Barnes and others were excommunicated for not coming to their Parish Churches who pleaded the Statute of 5 Eliz. 5 Eliz. c. 23. which inflicts pecuniary Penalties for not appearing upon the Capias but enacts That if the excommunicate person have not a sufficient addition according to the Statute of 1 H. 1 H. 5. c. 5. 5. or if in the Significavit it be not contained that the Excommunication proceeds upon several causes in that Statute mentioned and amongst the rest for refusing to come to Divine Service he shall not incurr the Penalties Now Mr. Pollexfen made these Objections 1. The Defendant was excommunicated for not coming to his Parish Church which is not required by this Statute for if he doth not tefuse to hear Divine Service in any Church the Penalties are saved 2. The Statute of Additions requires that the Condition and Dwelling place of the Defendant shall be inserted which was not done in this Case for they are excommunicated by the Names of A. B. Mercator B. C. Scissor ' E. F. de Parochia c. which last Addition of the Parish shall referr to him only last mentioned and not to all the rest and so it was always ruled in Indictments Attorney General contra The Statute of 5 Eliz. is grounded upon that of 1 of the Queen which enjoins every person to resort to his Parish Church or upon lett thereof to some other or to forfeit 12 d. every Sunday and Holy day to be levied by the Churchwardens there for the use of the Poor Now though the Parish is not named in this Act yet the Law must be interpreted as it was then 2. The word Parish goes to all so 't is in Informations for Riots And by Astry Clerk of the Crown t is always so in Significavits Tamen quaere Curia If the Defendant had pleaded below or here that he had heard Divine Service in any other Church though not in his own Parish the Penalties should not have went out but being now incurred there is no remedy and the word Parish goes to all preceding Prodgers versus Frazier IN Trespass The Defendant pleaded The Grant of the Custody of an Ideot passeth an Interest to the Executor of the Grantee that before the time of the Trespass supposed to be committed Bridget Dennis was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who by a Writ de Indeota inquirendo was found to be an Ideot not having any lucid intervals per spacium octo annorum c. by virtue whereof the King was entituled who granted the Custody to Sir Alexander Frazier who died and that the Defendant Mary Frazier was his Executrix The Plaintiff replyed and confessed the Ideocy but that the King granted the Custody of the Ideot to the Plaintiff And upon this Replication the Defendant demurred In this Case it was agreed by the Council on both sides that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole interest in him of granting the Estate of an Ideot to whom he pleaseth without any account but 't is otherwise in case of a Lunatique for there the Grantee shall have nothing to his own use but must put in Security to account to the Lunatick if ever he comes to be capable or else to his Executors or Administrators Vide Frances's Case in Moor fol. 4. But the Questions that did arise in this Case were 1. That there was not sufficient Title found for the King for by the Inquisition the Ideot was found to be so per spatium octo annorum c. which is incertain because before that time she might have lucida intervalla and then she cannot be an Ideot without being naturally so therefore the Iury ought to have found her an Ideot a nativitate for that is the only matter which vests an interest in the King But it was answered and agreed by the Court that the finding her to be an Ideot was sufficient without the addition of any other words and therefore per spacium octo annorum shall be surplusage for in this Case Words are not so much to be regarded as the reason of the Law which doth not allow of Ideocy otherwise than a nativitate But supposing a seeming incertainty in this Office found yet it being said generally that she was an Ideot the subsequent words shall not hurt because the general finding shall be taken in that sense which is most for the advantage of the King As for Example Dyer 155. b. 161. b. 306. b. It was found by Office that a person died seised of two Mannors and that he held one of the Queen by Knights Service generally and the other of a Mesne Lord in Chivalry which is the same Tenure now it was held that the first general finding shall be intended Knights Service in Capite because it was most for the King's benefit that he might thereby be entituled to the Wardship of the Heir who was found to be under Age. 2. Whether the Grant of the Custody of an Ideot will pass any Interest to the Executor of the Grantee because such a Grant carries a Trust with it and the King may have some knowledge and consideration of the Grantee but not of his Executor To which it was answered that here was an interest coupled with a
general as this Case There are many instances where Breaches have been generally assigned and held ill that in Croke is so but the later Opinions are otherwise Affirmetur Judicium Pye versus Brereton A Lease was made of Tythes for three years rendring Rent at Michaelmas and Lady-day and an Action of Debt was brought for Rent arrear for two years Vpon Nil debet pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was too general for the Rent being reserved at two Feasts 2 Cro. 668. the Plaintiff ought to have shewed at which of those Feasts it was due But the Council for the Plaintiff said That it appears by the Declaration that two years of the three were expired so there is but one to come which makes it certain enough Curia This is helped by the Verdict but it had not been good upon a Demurrer DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. MEmorandum That in Trinity-Vacation last died Sir Francis North Baron of Guilford and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England at his House in Oxfordshire being a Man of great Learning and Temperance And Sir George Jefferies Baron of Wem and Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench had the Seal delivered to him at Windsor and was thereupon made Lord High Chancellor of England And Sir Edward Herbert one of the Kings Council succeeded him in the Place of Chief Justice There died also this Vacation Sir Thomas Walcott one of the Justices of the Kings-Bench and he was succeeded by Sir Robert Wright one of the Barons of the Exchequer Sir John Newton al' versus Stubbs IN an Action on the Case for Words Words laid to be spoke ad tenorem effectmu sequen ' not good The Plaintiffs declared that they were Iustices of the Peace for the County of Gloucester c. and that the Defendant spake these scandalous Words of them Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie Men out of their Estates postea eodem die c. they spoke these words Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie me and Mr. Creswick out of our Estates And afterwards these words were laid in Latin without an Anglice ad tenorem effectum sequen ' c. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiffs and entire damages and now Mr. Trindar moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the words in the Declaration are laid in Latin Roll. Abr. 74. pl. 2. without an Anglice and without an Averment that the hearers did understand Latin 2. 'T is not expressly alledged that the Defendant spoke those very words for being laid ad tenorem effectum sequen ' something may be omitted which may alter the sense and meaning of them Cro. Eliz. 857. and for this very reason Iudgment was staied though the Court held the words to be actionable Rex versus Ayloff al' THey were Outlawed for High-Treason Treason and on Tuesday the 27th day of October they were brought to the Bar and a Rule of Court was made for their Execution on Fryday following The Chief Iustice said that there was no hardship in this proceeding to a Sentence upon an Outlawry because those Malefactors who wilfully flie from Iustice and a new Crime to their former Offence and therefore ought to have no benefit of the Law for tho' a Man is Guilty yet if he put himself upon his Tryal he may by his submissive Behaviour and shew of Repentance incline the King to mercy In Felonies which are of a lower nature than the Crimes for which these persons are attainted flight even for an Hour is a forfeiture of the Goods of the Criminal so likewise a Challenge to three Iuries is a defiance to Iustice and if that be so then certainly flying from it is both despising the mercy of the King and contemning the Iustice of the Nation They were both Executed on Frday the 30th of October following Dominus Rex versus Colson al' AN Information was exhibited against the Defendants Information for a Riot not good setting forth that they with others did riotously assemble themselves together to divert a Watercourse and that they set up a Bank in a certain place by which the Water was hindred from running to an antient Mill in so plentifull a manner as formerly c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded it came to a Tryal and the Iury found that Quoad factionem Ripae the Defendants were Guilty and quoad Riotum not Guilty And now Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment because that by this Verdict the Defendants were acquitted of the charge in the Information which was the Riot and as for the erecting of the Bank an Action on the Case would lie and the Iudgment was accordingly arrested Mason versus Beldham Trin. 1 Jac. Rot. 408. THE Plaintiff brings his Action against the Defendant Quantum meruit will lie for Rent and sets forth That in consideration that he would suffer the Defendant to enjoy a House and three Water-Mills c. he promised to pay so much yearly as they were reasonably worth and avers that they were worth so much And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether this Action would lie for Rent It was argued for the Defendant that it would not lie Cro. Eliz. 242. 786 859. 2 Cro. 668. because it was a real Contract 'T is true there is a Case which seems to be otherwise 't is between Acton and Symonds Cro. Car. 414. which was in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to the Defendant certain Lands for three years at the Rent of 25 l. by the year he promised to pay it this was held to be a personal Promise grounded upon a real Contract and by the Opinion of three Iudges the Action did lie because there was an express promise alledged which must also be proved But Iustice Croke was of a contrary Opinion Mr. Pollexfen contra If a Lease be made for years reserving a Sum in gross for Rent and which is made certain by the Lease in such case an Action of Debt will lie for the Rent in arrear But if where no Sum certain is reserved as in this Case a Quantum meruit will lie and no reason can be given why a Man may not have such an Action for the Rent of his Land as well as for his Horse or Chamber And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus THere was a Libel in the Spiritual Court for scandalous Words Prohibition for words where some are actionable and others not Viz. She is Bitch a Whore an old Bawd And a Prohibition was now prayed by Mr. Pollexfen because some of the words were actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court and therefore prayed that it might go Quoad those words which were actionable at Law The Chief Iustice granted
shall not alien or sell the Lands given to her from the Heirs Male of her Body lawfully to be begotten but to remain upon default of such Issue to W. and the Heirs Males of his Body to be begotten according to the true intent and meaning of this my Will Dorothy Hopkins had Issue Richard who had Issue Henry who had Issue a Daughter now the Defendant The Question was Whether the Son of Dorothy did take an Estate Tail by this Will to him and to the Heirs of his Body in general or an Estate in Tail Male This Case was argued in Michaelmas Term 36 Car. II. And in the same Term a year afterwards by Council on both sides Those who argued for the Plaintiff held that the Son had an Estate in Tail Male and this seems plain by the intention of the Testator that if Dorothy had Issue Daughters they should have no benefit for no provision is made for any such by the Will and therefore the Daughter of her Son can have no Estate who is more remote to the Testator This is like the Case of Conveyances Turnam vers Cooper 2 Cro. 476. Poph. 138. id 25 Ass pl. 14. wherein the Habendum explains the generality of the precedent words as if Lands be given to Husband and Wife and to their Heirs habendum to them and the Heirs of their Bodies Remainder to them and the Survivor to hold of the chief Lord with Waranty to them and their Heirs this is an Estate Tail with a Feé expectant So it is here tho' the first words in the Will extend to Heirs which is general yet in the Memorandum 't is particular to Heirs Males and the words Heirs and Issues are of the same signification in a Will The Memorandum is a confirmation of the Will Ex parte Def. and the construction which hath been made of it is not only inconsistent with the Rules of Law but contrary to the intent of the Testator and against the express words of his Will Cases upon Wills are different from those which arise upon Deeds because in Conveyances subsequent words may be explanatory of the former but in Wills the first words of the Testator do usually guide those which follow As if Land be devised for Life Dyer 171 a. 1 And. 8. id Golds 16. Moor 593. Remainder to F. and the Heirs Males of his Body and if it happen that he dye without Heirs not saying Males the Remainder over in Tail this was held not to be a general Tail but an Estate in Tail Male therefore the Daughter of F. could not inherit Now to construe this to be an Estate Tail Male doth not only alter the Estate of the Sons of Dorothy but of the Issue of W. and nothing is mentioned in this Memorandum of the Limitation over to Jones so that the whole Will is altered by it But this Memorandum cannot enlarge the Estate of Dorothy because 't is inconsistent with the intention of the Testator who gave her only an Estate for Life by the Will but if she should have an Estate Tail she might by Fine and Recovery bar it and so alien it contrary to his express words Besides there is no Estate limited to Dorothy by this Memorandum and she having an express Estate for Life devised to her by the Will it shall never be enlarged by such doubtful words which follow As where a Man had 100 Acres of Land 2 Leon. 226. Moor 593. called by a particular Name and usually occupied with a House which House he lett to S. with 40 Acres parcel of that Land and then devised the House and all the Lands called by that particular Name c. to his Wife Adjudged she should only have the House and the 40 Acres and that the Devise shall not be extended by implication to the other sixty Acres So that to make the design of this Will and Memorandum to be consistent the latter words must be construed only to illustrate the meaning of the Testator in the former Paragraph of the Will and must be taken as a farther declaration of his intention Viz. that the Heirs Males mentioned in the Memorandum is only a description of the Persons named in the Will The Law doth usually regard the intention of the Testator and will not imply any contradictions in his Bequests The Court was of Opinion that it was a plain Case Judicium for in the Limitation 't is clear that 't is a general Tail and it doth not follow that the Testator did not design any thing for his Grandaughters because no provision was made for Daughters For where an Estate is entailed upon the Heirs of a Man's Body if he hath a Son and a Daughter and the Son hath Issue a Daughter the Estate will go to her and not to the Aunt Now this Memorandum doth not come to make any alteration in the Limitation because it directs that the Estate shall go according to the true intent and meaning of the Will and is rather like a Proviso than an Habendum in a Deed. And therefore Iudgment was given accordingly for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Hicks versus Gore ON Tuesday the 17th day of November there was a Trial at the Barr by a Somerset-Shire Iury in Ejectment The Case was thus The Plaintiff claimed the Lands by virtue of the Statute of 4 5 Ph. Mar. cap. 8. by which 't is enacted That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away any Maid or Woman Child unmarried and within the Age of sixteen years from the Parents or Guardian in Soccage and that if any Woman Child or Maiden being above the Age of twelve years and under the Age of sixteen do at any time assent or agree to such person that shall make any Contract of Matrimony contrary to the Form of the Act that then the next of Kin of such Woman Child or Maid to whom the Inheritance should descend return or come after the decease of the same Woman Child or Maid shall from the time of such Assent and Agreement have hold and enjoy all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments as the said Woman Child or Maid had in Possession Reversion or Remainder at the time of such Assent and Agreement during the Life of such person that shall so contract Matrimony and after the decease of such person so contracting Matrimony that then the said Land c. shall descend revert remain and come to such person or persons as they should have done in case this Act had never been made other than him only that so shall contract Matrimony Benjamin Tibboth being seised in Fee of the Lands in question to the value of 700 l. per annum had Issue a Son and four Daughters the Son had Issue Ruth his only Daughter who was married to the Defendant Gore her Father died in the time of her Grandfather and her Mother
day of Appearance he is to see that he appear at the day either by keeping of him in Custody or letting of him to Bail the end of the Arrest is to have his Body here If he had not been bailed then he had still remained in Custody and the Plaintiff would have his proper remedy but being once let to Bail and not appearing in Court according to the Condition of the Bond that seems to be the fault of the Defendant who had his Body before the day of Appearance Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Serjeant Hampson's Case BY the Statute of Queen Elizabeth 't is Enacted 5 Eliz. c. 23. That if the person excommunicated have not a sufficient Addition or if 't is not contained in the Significavit that the Excommunication proceeds for some cause or contempt or of some original Matter of Heresie refusing to have his Child baptized to receive the Sacrament to come to Divine Service or Errors in Matters of Religion or Doctrine Incontinency Usury Simony Perjury in the Ecclesiastical Court or Idolatry he shall not incurr the Penalties in the Act. Serjeant Hampson was excommunicated for Alimony and now Mr. Girdler moved that he might be discharged because none of the aforesaid Causes were contained in the Significavit Curia He may be discharged of the Forfeiture for that reason but not of the Excommunication Anonymus ONE who was outlawed for the Murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey now brought a Writ of Error in his Hand to the Bar praying that it might be read and allowed It was read by Mr. Astry Clerk of the Crown The Errors assigned were viz. That it did not appear upon the Return of the Exigent in the first Exact ' that the Court was held pro Comitatu That the Outlawry being against him and two other persons 't is said in the last Exact ' that Non comperuit but doth not say nec eorum aliquis comperuit For these Reasons the Outlawry was reversed and he held up his Hand at the Barr and pleaded Not-guilty to his Indictment and was admitted to Bail and afterwards he was brought to his Trial and no Witness in behalf of the King appearing against him he was acquitted The Mayor and Commonalty of Norwich versus Johnson A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given for the Plaintiff in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Waste Waste lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term. The Declaration was that the Plaintiff demised a Barn to one Took for a certain Term by vertue whereof he was possessed and being so possessed died that the Defendant was his Executor who entred and made Waste by pulling down of the said Barn The Defendant pleaded that Took died intestate and that he did not administer The Plaintiff replyed that he entred as Executor of his own Wrong and to this Plea the Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joined in the Demurrer This Case was argued by Mr. Appleton of Lincolns-Inn for the Plaintiff who said That an Action of Waste would not lie against the Defendant because the Mayor and Commonalty c. had a remedy by an Assise to recover the Land upon which the Barn stood and a Trover to recover the Goods or Materials and that such an Action would not lie against him at the Common Law because he neither was Tenant by the Curtesie nor in Dower against whom Waste only lay So that if the Plaintiff is entituled to this Action it must be by vertue of the Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. 1. c. 5. but it will not lie against the Defendant even by that Statute because the Action is thereby given against the Tenant by the Curtesie in Dower for Life or Years and treble Damages c. But the Defendant is neither of those and this being a penal Law which not only gives treble damages but likewise the Recovery of the place wasted ought therefore not to be taken strictly but according to Equity Tenants at sufferance or at Will by Elegit or Tenants by Statute Staple 11 H. 6. c. 5. and also Pernors of Profits were never construed to be within this Statute and therefore a particular Act was made to give him in Reversion an Action of Waste where Tenant for life or years had granted over their Estates and yet took the Profits and committed Waste Then the Question will be Co. Lit. 371. what Estate this Executor de sontort hath gained by his Entry And as to that he argued that he had got a Fee-simple by Disseisin and that for this reason the Plaintiff was barred from this Action for if the Son purchase Lands in Fee and is disseised by his Father who maketh a Feoffment in Fee to another with Warranty and dieth the Son is for ever barred for though the Disseisin was not done with any intention to make such a Feoffment 1 Roll. Abr. 662. yet he is bound by this Alienation So where a man made a Lease for life and died and then his Heir suffered a Recovery of the same Land without making an actual Entry this is an absolute Disseisin because the Lessee had an Estate for life but if he had been Tenant at Will it might be otherwise But admitting that the Defendant is not a Disseisor then the Plaintiffs must bring their Case to be within the Statute of Gloucester as that he is either Tenant for life or years If he is Tenant for Life he must be so either by right or by wrong He cannot be so by right because he had no lawful Conveyance made to him of this Estate besides 't is quite contrary to the Pleading which is that he entred wrongfully Neither can he be so by wrong for such particular Estates 6 Co. 25. as for life or years cannot be gained by Disseisin and so is Heliar's Case in 6 Co. Then if this should be construed an Estate for years it must be gained either by the Act of the Party or by the Act of the Law but such an Estate cannot be gained by either of those means First it cannot be gained by the Act of the Party Moor 126. Kendrick versus Burges because an Executor de son tort cannot have any interest in a Term and for this there is an express Authority in this Court which was thus viz. A Lease in Reversion for years was granted to a man who died intestate his Wife before she had administred sold this Term to the Defendant and afterwards she obtained Letters of Administration and made a Conveiance of the same Term to the Plaintiff and Iudgment was given for the last Vendee because it was in the case of a Reversion of a Term for years upon which no Entry could be made and of which there could be no Executor de son tort though it was admitted by the Court that such an Executor might make a good sale of
the Goods before Administration granted Neither can any Entry or Claim make the Defendant an Executor de son tort of a Term for years because a wrongful Entry can never gain any Estate but a Fee-simple for 't is not to be satisfied with any particular or certain Estate as for life or years It cannot be gained by Act of Law because that abhors all manner of wrong If it should be objected that though this Executor doth not gain any Estate for his own benefit yet he in the Reversion may take him for a Disseisor and it shall be in his election either to make him so or a Tenant for years To this it may be answered that the Defendant doth not claim by colour of any Grant if he did then he might be a Disseisor at the Election of him in the Reversion and this was the very difference taken in the Case of Blunden and Baugh Cro. Car. 302. 1 Roll. Abr. 661. Jones 115. Latch 53. So likewise if it be objected that the Defendant is an Occupant and therefore punishable for Waste but the reason is not the same because the Entry of an Occupant is lawful and he gains an Estate for life which is not this Case An Executor de son tort is not a person taken notice of in the Law in respect to him in the Reversion but in respect of the Creditors of the Intestate and therefore if what he doth may be advantageous to them the Law will make a Construction upon it for their benefit but if such a person should be within the intention or meaning of this Statute then the natural Consequences will be 1. That the place wasted would be recovered 2. That the Plaintiff would also have treble damages Both which would be a manifest means to defeat the Creditors of their Debts for which reasons he prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff in the Errors It was argued by the Council on the other side E contra That it is plain that the Defendant was Executor de son tort for such must that person be who intermeddles with the Intestates Estate where there is no rightful Executor or Administrator Now a Man may be Executor of his own wrong of a Term for years as appears even in that case cited out of Moor on the other side and if so the Defendant must be liable to this Action The Statute may be expounded as well against a wrongful as a rightful Executor 't is plain here is a Dissesin and the Law is now settled that it shall be in the election of him in the Reversion to make it so This Defendant would justifie one wrong by another for he confesseth that he hath committed a Disseisin and therefore will not be answerable for committing of Waste As to the Objection that an Executor de son tort is liable only in respect of Creditors and that if he should be punished for Waste it would be an injury to them because of the treble damages recovered against him Resp Such damages must be answered out of his own Estate for even in the Case of a rightful Executor if he commit Waste 5 Co. Poulter's Case he will be chargeable in a Devastavit de bonis propriis This is not properly a penal but a remedial Law and as such may be construed according to Equity 'T is true Tenants by Elegit or by Statute are not within this Statute because Waste by them committed is no wrong for if they should fell the Timber it sinks the Debt and the Cognizor may have a Scire Facias ad computandum Curia It would be an infinite trouble for him in the Reversion to seek his remedy for Waste done if the Law did oblige him to stay till there was a rightful Administrator and 't is not to be doubted but that there may be an Executor de son tort of a Term for years This is a remedial and yet a penal Law and therefore shall have a favourable Construction The Iudgment was affirmed Bridgham versus Frontee DEBT upon a Bond for performance of Covenants in a Lease of a House for a certain Term of years rendring Rent c. And the Breach assigned was That there was 66 l. Rent in arrear The Defendant pleaded the Statute of H. 32 H. 8. c. 16. 8. That all Leases of Dwelling-Houses or Shops made to any Stranger or Alien Artificer shall be void and sets forth that the Defendant was a Vintner and an Alien Artificer And upon a Demurrer Mr. Thompson for the Defendant said that a Vintner was an Artificer within the meaning of the Act which was made to prevent a mischief by Foreigners encroaching upon the Trades of the King's Subjects by which they gained their Livelihood and therefore shall be expounded largely and beneficially for them A Mercer a Draper or Grocer are not properly Artificers yet they are within the meaning of this Act. Chief Iustice 1 R. 2. cap. 9. This Statute refers to another of R. 2. Which prohibits Alien Artificers to exercise any Handycraft in England unless as a Servant to a Subject skilful in the same Art upon pain to forfeit his Goods so that 't is plain that such who used any Art or manual Occupation were restrained from using it here to the prejudice of the King's Subjects Now the Mystery of a Vintner chiefly consists in mingling of Wines and that is not properly an Art but a Cheat so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Rex versus Plowright and others A Distress was taken for Chimny-Mony and the Parties distrained apply themselves to the two next Iustices of the Peace before whom it did appear that Plowright let a Cottage to Hunt which was not of the yearly value of 10 s. The Collectors of this Duty distrained upon the Land-Lord which the said Iustices thought to be illegal and therefore they ordered a Restitution And a Certiorari being brought to remove the Order into this Court Mr. Attorny prayed that it might be â—â—â—d But it was opposed by Mr. Pollexfen for that the Statute of King Charles II. enacts 16 Car. 2. c. 3. That no person inhabiting an House which hath more than two Chimnies shall be exempted from the payment of the Duty c. and then these Words do follow viz. That if any question shall arise about the taking of any distress the same shall be heard and finally determined by one or more Justices of the Peace near adjoining c. Now here was Mony levyed by virtue of this Act and a Controversie did arise by reason of the Distress and an Order was made by the Iustices which according to the letter and meaning of the Act ought to be final the intention whereof was to prevent the charge and trouble of poor Men in Suits at Law about small Matters and therefore it gave the Iustices power to determine particular Offences and Oppressions Mr. Attorney contra If the Iustices of Peace have power to determine c.
' Francisco Wythens Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis MEmorandum That the First day of this Term Sir Thomas Jones Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus and Sir Henry Beddingfield one of the Justices of the same Court succeeded him in that Office Likewise the Honourable William Mountagu Esq Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer had his Quietus and Sir Edward Atkyns one of the Barons of the same Court succeeded him Sir Job Charleton one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus but was made Chief Justice of Chester and Sir Edward Lutwich the King's Serjeant was made one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas and Serjeant Heath was made one of the Barons of the Exchequer Okel versus Hodgkinson THE Father and Son join in a Fine in order to make a Settlement upon the second Wife of the Father who was only Tenant by the Curtesie the Remainder in Tail to his said Son One of the Cognizors died after the Caption and before the Return of the Writ of Covenant and now a Writ of Error was brought to Reverse it and this was assigned for Error Curia If it had been in the Case of a Purchasor for a valuable Consideration the Court would have shewed him some favour but it being to do a wrong to a young Man they would leave it open to the Law THE first day of this Term being the 22th day of April there was a Call of Serjeants viz. Sir John Holt of Grays-Inn Recorder of London who was made Kings Serjeant Sir Ambrose Phillips made also Kings Serjeant Christopher Milton John Powell John Tate William Rawlinson George Hutchins William Killingworth Hugh Hodges and Thomas Geers They all appeared that day at the Chancery-Bar where having taken the Oaths the Lord Chancellor Jefferies made a short Speech to them after which they delivered a Ring to him praying him to deliver it to the King They went from the Inner-Temple-Hall to Westminster and Counted at the Common-Pleas and gave Rings the Motto whereof was DEUS REX LEX Dominus Rex versus Saloway SAloway drowned himself in a Pond and the Coroners Enquest found him Non Compos Mentis because 't is more generally supposed that a Man in his Senses will not be Felo de se The Kings Councel moved for a Melius Inquirendum and that the Inquisition might be quashed for that it sets forth Quod pred Defend circa horam octavam ante meridiem in quoddam stagnum se projecit per abundantiam aquae ibidem statim suffocat emergit ' erat which is insensible Pemberton Serjeant contra Here is no Exception taken to the substance of the Inquisition and the word suffocat had been sufficient if the word emergit ' had been left out The Court were of Opinion that there being another word in this Inquisition which carries the sense 't is therefore sufficient but if it had stood singly upon this word Emergit ' it had not been good And this Fact happening about the time of the general Pardon the Court was of Opinion that where an Interest is vested in the King a Pardon of all Forfeitures will not divest it but that nothing was vested here before Inquisition found 2. It was objected that this Inquisition ought to set forth that Saloway came by his death by this means Et nullo alio modo quocunque To which it was answered by Pemberton that in matters of Form only the Iudges have sent for the Coroner into Court and ordered him to amend it Rodney versus Strode AN Action on the Case was brought against three Defendants one of them suffered Iudgment to go by default In a joynt Action the Jury may sever the Damages and the other two pleaded Not Guilty The Cause was tryed the last Assises at Exeter and it was for imposing the Crime of Treason upon the Plaintiff and for assaulting and imprisoning of him there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and 1000 l. damages against Mr. Strode and 50 l. against the other Defendant who pleaded The Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi against him who let the Iudgment go by default and against the other Defendant for the 50 l. damages and took judgment only against Mr. Strode Serjeant Pemberton moved for a new Trial by reason of the excessive Damages which were not proportioned to the quality of the Plaintiff he being a Man of mean Fortune But it was opposed by the Plaintiff for that the Defendant pursued him as a Traytor and when he was apprehended for that Crime he caused him to be arrested for 1000 l. at the Suit of another person to whom he was not indebted so that upon consideration of the Circumstances of the Case the Court refused to grant a new Tryal Then Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendants moved in arrest of Iudgment and for cause shewed that the Iury have found both guilty and assessed several Damages which they cannot do because this is a joynt Action to which the Defendants have pleaded jointly and being found guilty modo forma the Iury cannot assess the damages severally for the damage is the same by the one as the other Cro. Eliz. 860. Austen vers Millard al' and therefore it hath been adjudged that where an Action of Battery was brought against three and one pleaded not guilty and the other two Son Assault demesne and several damages found against them it was held ill for that very reason because it was a joint offence 'T is true where there are divers Defendants and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff hath his election to take execution de melioribus damnis but this is when the Trials are at several times So 't is where they plead several Pleas Cro. Car. 239. Walsh versus Bishop as in an Action of Battery one pleads not guiity and the other justifies and both Issues are found for the Plaintiff in such case he may enter a non pros against one and take Iudgment against the other because their Pleas are several but where they plead jointly the Iury cannot sever the Damages But Mr. 1 Bulst 157. Sampson vers Cramfield al' Rast Entr. 677. b. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff insisted that even in this case damages may be assessed severally for where two Defendants are sued for the same Battery and they plead the same Plea yet damages may be assessed severally So was Trebarefoot and Greenway 's Case in this Court which was an Action for an Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment one of the Defendants pleaded not Guilty and the other justified Issue was joined and there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi as to one and took judgment against the other and upon this a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the Iudgment was affirmed So if an Action of Trespass be brought against two for taking of 100 l.
Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
is likewise insufficient for it sets forth the Deed of Settlement c. coram praetextu the Defendant juxta fiduciam in eo positam was possessed of the Office ad eorum voluntatem Now an Office is a thing which lies in Grant 1 Leon. 219. and cannot be transferred from one to another without Deed and here is no Deed pleaded and as no Estate at will can be granted of an Office without Deed so likewise there cannot be a deputation of such Offce without it If then there can be no Tenant at Will of an Office but by Deed and no such Deed is pleaded then Mr. Lenthal had no power to make a Deputation to Cooling but neither Tenant at will nor Tenant for Life can make a Deputy if in the very Grant made to them there is not an express Clause for the execution of the Office per se vel sufficientem Deputatum suum The substance of all which is viz. First here is no Tenant at will But admitting him to be so he hath no authority to make a Deputy and if he should appoint a Deputy he executes the Office without Authority and may suffer Escapes Lastly by pleading of this Deed he hath alledged that the Estate was in the Trustees and that they permitted him to enjoy the Office coram praetextu he did execute it and receive the Profits now this is too general and an issue cannot be taken upon such a Plea he should have pleaded positively that it was demised to him at will and that he made a Deputy and then also the authority in rolls is against him where 't is held 2 Rol. Ab … that the Marshal of the Kings-Bench may grant the Office for Life but cannot give power to such grantee to make a Deputy Now if a Tenant for Life cannot make a Deputy certainly a Tenant at will hath no power so to do But suppose a Deputy might be made his neglect in the execution of the Office shall make a Forfeiture of the Estate of the Grantee for Life It cannot be reasonably objected in this Case Rol. Abr. 155. that 't is any hardship for Mr. Lenthal to lose this Office for any defect in Pleading for admitting the Plea to be good yet there is a cause of Forfeiture because the Marshal of the King's Bench being a ministerial Officer is required by Law to be a person of such Ability as to answer all Escapes that so Men may have the benefit of their Suits for otherwise he having nothing to answer they may lose their Debts Now here by a secret Grant Mr. Lenthal hath conveyed the Estate out of himself and yet still continues Officer in possession by which means the People are deprived of the Remedy which the Law provides for them and this is a sufficient cause of Forfeiture Then as to the Trustees they have not said any thing of the Escapes 't is true Mr. Lenthal hath traversed those which are alledged to be voluntary but that signifies nothing to them because they cannot take any benefit by the Plea of another for every one must stand and fall by his own Plea If therefore their non-attendance be a Forfeiture the entruders shall not help them because they come in without any colour of Right But the Council on the other side argued this last Point first E contra which was thus Viz. A Man seised of the Inheritance of the Office of Marshal of this Court conveys it in Trust the cestui que trust enjoys it and receives the Profits the Question now is whether the non-attendance of the Trustees being never required by the Court be a Forfeiture of this Office And as incident to this Question it was debated whether Mr. Lenthal was Tenant at will T is no Forfeiture for they are not bound to attend It cannot be denied but that this Office doth concern the Administration of Iustice but 't is to be considered what Estate Mr. Lenthal hath in it He had once an Estate in Fee but if it had been for Life or in Tail it may be setled as this is done but not for years because it may then come to an Administrator If Mr. Lenthal be the cestui que use Co. Lit. 404. Godb. 64. then he hath an Estate of which the Law takes notice for he may be a Iuror at the Common Law 'T is plain that he hath an Estate created by operatian of the Law for he is Tenant at Will and for that reason the attendance of the Trustees is not necessary but if the Estate had been directly granted to them then the Office had been forfeited for Non-attendance It cannot be denied but that this Office may be granted at Will for so is Sir George Reynell's Case 9 Co. 98. now if it may be granted at Will by the Possessor it may likewise be so granted by him who hath an Estate created by the Law for fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis and in this Case no Inconveniency would happen for if the Will be determined then the Grantor is the Officer When Mr. Lenthal had assigned this Office to the Trustees and they by a subsequent Deed had declared it to be in trust for him and that he should take the Profits during life he hath thereby a legal Estate at Will for a Cestuy que Trust by Deed is a Tenant at Will It hath been objected that a Tenancy at Will of an Office is void and to prove this a Case in Jones's Rep. was cited Jones 128. but the reason of that Case is guided by the particular nature of that Office which could not be aliened without the consent of the King If this Office is not alienable in its nature then Mr. Lenthal hath still the Fee-simple but that will not be admitted But this is not only a bare Estate at Will but a Trust for Life and such a Trust which hath a legal construction Godbolt 6◠for if a Feoffment be made in Trust that he should convey the Estate to another which the Feoffee afterwards refused to do the Cestuy que Trust may bring an Action against him so if he should be returned on a Iury 't is no Exception to say that he hath not liberum tenementum and therefore he is not an incompetent person to have the charge of Prisons if he may be impannelled on a Iury to try men for their Lives 1. Then as to the first Question upon the last point whether Mr. Lenthal had done any thing to determine his Tenancy at Will The Grant of this Office by him to Cooling will not amount to a determination of his Will because 't is a void Grant 'T is true this is denied by my Lord Coke in his Comment upon Littleton Sect. 71. where he saith If Tenant at Will grant over his Estate and the Grantee entreth he is a Disseisor for though the Grant be void yet it amounts to a determination of his Will What
to Sir Edward Biggs against the Countess as Administratrix of the Earl of Plymouth wherein the Plaintiff sets forth a Writing by which the Earl had given power to Sir Edward to be the Collector and Receiver of his Mony and Rents and that he promised to allow him 100 l. per Annum for his pains and in default of payment thereof that Sir Edward should detein the same which Writing was in these Words following viz. I do direct and appoint Sir Edward Biggs to take and receive to his own use 100 l. of lawful Mony of England out of the first Mony which he shall receive of mine The Action was brought for 75 l. being his Salary for three quarters of a year and Iudgment by Nil dicit It was argued this Term and in Easter Term by Councel on both sides It was agreed on all sides that the Earl left sufficient Assets to satisfie all his Bond Creditors but not enough to pay Debts upon simple Contract First it was said for the Plaintiff in the Errors that no Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 11 Co. Godfreys Case because the Testator might have waged his Law but this was not much insisted on 2. That admitting an Action would lye yet this is an erronious Iudgment because the Suit was for 75 l. for three quarters Salary when by the Writing Sir Edward was to serve the Earl a whole year and this being an entire Contract shall not be seperated Therefore he cannot be well entituled to the Actionn unless his Testator had served a year and he had averred it so in his Declaration As where a Covenant was to pay 2 s. Yelv. 133. 7 Co. 10. Allen 9. for copying every Quire of Paper and the Breach assigned that he copyed 4 Quire and 3 sheets for which 8 s. and 3 d. was due to the Plaintiff 't is true he had Iudgment but it was reversed because it was an entire Covenant of which no apportionment could be made pro rata 3. That which was chiefly insisted on was to make these words amount to an Obligation that so it might be satisfied amongst the Bond Creditors But those who argued for the Plaintiff in the Errors said that it cannot be an Obligation for it was only a bare Letter of Attorney and an Authority and no more for there were no words to oblige the Earl or which can make a Warranty and therefore if the Mony was not received the Party to whom the Note was given could not resort back to him who made it had they been both living neither shall the Plaintiff now to his Administratrix Like the common Cases of the assigning of Iudgment if the Assignee doth not receive the Mony he cannot have an Action against the Assignor who only directs and appoints him so to do But on the other side Ex parte Def. the second Objection was thus answered viz. That this being only an Executory thing the Plaintiff may now bring an Action for so long time as his Testator served and this may be apportioned secundum ratam if the Law should be otherwise the Case of all Servants would be bad for they are generally hired for a year and not usually serve so long In an Assumpsit to pay for a years board Sid. 225. and the Plaintiff had declared only for three quarters of a year but yet had Iudgment because as the Book saith if there be any variance in the Agreement 't is for the advantage of the Defendant The 3d. Vaughan 92 93. Pl. Com. 182. Dyer 21. Objection answered viz. When a Man is indebted to another by simple Contract which is aknowledged by Deed an Action of Debt will lie against his Executor for any thing which is under Hand and Seal will amount to an Obligation especially where the Debt is confessed Now there are words in this Deed to shew that Mony was due and that makes it a Bond. But the Court was of Opinion that this was an entire Agreement and therefore the Action not well brought for three quarters Salary and for this reason the Iudgment was reversed Nisi c. Chapman versus Lamphire AN Action on the Case was brought for scandalous words spoken of the Plaintiff Words spoken of a Carpenter where actionable who declared that he was a Carpenter and a Freeman of the City of London and that he got great Sums of Mony by buying of Timber and Materials and by building of Houses and that the Defendant having discourse of him and of his Trade spoke these words viz. He is broken and run away and will never return again There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and a Motion was now made in arrest of Iudgment for that a Carpenter was not a Trade within the Statute of Bankrupts and a day being given to speak to it again Mr. Pollexfen argued that before the Statutes made against Bankrupts words spoken reflecting upon a man in his Trade were actionable even at the Common Law because it might be the occasion of the loss of his Livelyhood 1 Rol. Abr. 59. pl. 6. Hutton 60. and therefore it was actionable to say of a Scrivener that he is broken and run away and dares not shew his Face and yet a Scrivener was not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy before the Act of 21 Jac. therefore the Action must lie at the Common Law because words disparage him in his Trade But the Councel for the Defendant said that these words were not actionable for they do not tend to his disparagement he may be broke and yet as good a Carpenter as before The Case of one Hill in 2 Car. Latch 114. in this Court was much stronger than this the words spoken of him were viz. Hill is a base broken Rascal and hath broken twice already and I will make him break the third time the Plaintiff had Iudgment but it was arrested A Carpenter builds upon the Credit of other men and so long as the words do not touch him in the skill and knowledge of his Profession they cannot injure him Chief Iustice The Credit which the Defendant hath in the World may be a means to support his skill for he may not have an opportunity to shew his Workmanship without those Materials for which he is entrusted The Iudges were divided in Opinion two against two and so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment there being no Rule made to stay it so that he had his Iudgment upon his general Rule for Iudgment but if it had been upon a Demurrer or Special Verdict then it would have been adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber Goring versus Deering IN an Appeal for the Murder of Henry Goring Esq Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter no good Plea in an Appeal for Murder brought by his Widow The Defendant pleaded that he was indicted for the said Murder at the Sessions-house in the Old Bayly in Middlesex that he was found guilty of Manslaughter
' ac qd ' Record ' ill ' in nullo vitiosum aut defectivum existit Ideo considerat ' est qd ' Judicium praed ' adjudication ' executionis superinde in omnibus affirmetur ac in omni suo robore stet effectu dict' causis materiis superius pro Error ' assign ' in aliquo non obstante Et ulterius per Cur. Judgment affirmed Domini Regis Dominae Reginae nunc hic cons est qd ' praedict ' Abel Ram recuperet versus praefatum Donatum Obrian octodecim libras eidem Abel per Curiam Domini Regis Dominae Reginae nunc hic secundum formam Statuti in hujusmodi casu edit ' provis adjudicat ' pro mis custag ' dampn ' suis quae sustin ' occasione dilationis executionis Judicij praedict ' praetextu prosecutionis praedict ' Brevis de Errore Et qd ' praedictus Abel habeat inde executionem c. Obrian versus Ram. ERror to reverse a Iudgment given in Ireland Whether a Sci. fa. will lie against the Husband alone after the death of the Wife upon a Judgment had against her dum sola upon a Scire Fac. brought against the Plaintiff in the Errors setting forth that Debt was brought upon a Bond against Elizabeth Grey and a Iudgment was thereupon obtained for 800 l. dum sola That the said Elizabeth afterwards intermarried with Mr. Obrian That a Scire Facias was brought upon that Iudgment against Husband and Wife to shew cause why the Plaintiff should not have execution That upon this Scire Facias there were two Nichils returned and thereupon Iudgment was had against Husband and Wife It rested for a year and a day and then the Wife died and the Plaintiff brought a new Scire Fac. against the Husband alone to shew cause why he should not have Execution upon the first Iudgmont The Defendant pleaded that there was another Scire Fac. brought against him and his Wife for the same Cause c. And upon a Demurrer to this Plea Iudgment was given in Ireland against him The Question now was whether this Scire Fa. will lye against the Husband alone after the death of his Wife This Case was argued by Mr. Finch and Mr. Pollexfen that the Husband was not chargable It was admitted on all sides that if a Feme sole is indebted and marries that an Action will lye against the Husband and Wife and he is lyable to the payment of her Debts It was agreed also that if a Iudgment be had against a Feme sole and she marries and afterwards dies that the Husband is not chargable because her Debts before Coverture shall not charge him unless recovered in her Life-time In like manner no Debts which are due to her dum sola shall go to the Husband by virtue of the inter-marriage if she dye before those are recovered but her Administrator will be entituled to them which may be the Husband but then he hath a Right only as Administrator 1 Roll Abr. 351. and the reason is because such Debts before they are recoverd are only choses in Action And from hence the Council did inferr that the Iudgment in this Case against the Wife dum sola did not charge the Husband Then the Question will be if the Husband is not chargeable by the Original Iudgment whether the Iudgment on the Scire Fac. had not made an alteration and charged him after the death of his Wife And as to that it was said that this Iudgment upon the Scire Fac. made no new charge for 't is only quod habeat executionem c. and carries the first Iudgment no farther than it was before for 't is introduced by the Sci. Fac. At the Common Law no Execution could be had upon a Iudgment after a year and a day and there was then no remedy but to bring an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment This Inconvenience was remedied by the Statute of Westm W. 2. cap. 45. the 2. which gives a Scire Fac. upon the Iudgment to shew cause why Execution should not be had which can be no more than a liberty to take Execution upon the Original Iudgment which cannot charge the Husband in this case because 't is only a consequence of that Iudgment and creates no new charge for a Release of all Actions will discharge this award of Execution But the Reasons why the original Iudgment shall not be carried farther by the Iudgment in the Scire Fac. are as follow 1. By considering the nature of a Scire Fac. which lay not at the Common Law but is given by the Statute in all persosonal Actions the words whereof are these Viz. 2 Inst 469. Sid. 351. Observandum est de caetero quod ea quae inveniuntur irrotulat c. Vpon which words it is evident that the execution of the first Iudgment on Record is all which is given by this Act after the year and day and it takes off that bar which was incurred by the lapse of time and gives a speedy Execution of the Iudgment recorded 2. The Proceedings upon a Scire Facias shew the same thing for the Writ recites the first Iudgment and then demands the Defendant to shew cause why the Plaintiff should not have Execution thereon juxta vim formam effectum recuperationis praed but prays no new thing 3. A Scire Facias is not an Original but a Iudicial Writ which depends purely upon the first Iudgment 1 Roll. Abr. 777. pl. 6. 8 Co. 143 Dr. Drurie's Case and a Writ of Error suspends the execution of both so likewise if the Original Iudgment be reversed even a Iudgment obtained upon a Scire Facias will be reversed in like manner 4. The Law doth not charge a Man without an Appearance but here is none and the Statute can never operate upon this Case because that extends only to such Iudgments upon which there has been a Recovery and here is nothing recovered upon this Scire Facias for 't is only to have Execution upon the first Iudgment If the Law should be otherwise this absurdity would follow Viz. There would be a Recovery without a Record for the purport of the Scire Facias is only to have Execution according to the form and effect of the Record and the very Record it self doth not charge the Husband Besides the first Iudgment did charge the Lands of the Wife which are still liable to satisfie the Debt why therefore must the Lands of the Husband be charged Cannot the Administrator of the Wife bring a Writ of Error to reverse this Iudgment and if it should be reversed shall the Husband pay the Debt and the Administrator of the Wife be restored The Objections made by the Council on the other side against this Opinion were viz. That if an Action of Debt will lie upon a Iudgment in a Scire Facias the Original Iudgment is by this means carried farther for without
a new Recovery Debt will not lie F.N.B. 122. E. and to prove this there is and Authority in Fitzherbert where a Prior had Iudgment for an Annuity and brought a Scire Fac. upon that Iudgment against the Successor of the parson who was to pay it and obtained a Iudgment upon that Scire Fac. to recover the arrearages and afterwards brought an Action of Debt upon the last Iudgment and the Book says fuit maintein There is another Case in 2 Leon. 2 Leon. 14. 4 Leon. 186. 15 H. 7.16 where 't is held that an Action of Debt will lye upon a Iudgment in a Scire Facias upon a Recognizance Which Objections may receive this Answer First As to the Case in Fitzherbert 't is admitted to be Law but 't is not an Authority to be objected to this purpose because the first Iudgment for the Annuity charges the Successor but the Original Iudgment in this Case doth not charge the Husband so the Cases are not parallel The like answer may be given to the Case in Leonard for a Recognizance is a Iudgment in it self and Debt will lie upon it without a Sci. Fa. upon that Iudgment But on the other side it was argued E contra that the award of execution is absolute against Husband and Wife for 't is a Recovery against both whereas before it was only the Debt of the Wife but now 't is joynt against the one as well as the other The Iudgment upon the Sci. Fa. is a distinct Action It cannot be denied but that if a Woman be indebted and marrieth the Husband is chargable during the Coverture Bro. Ab. tit Baron and Feme pl. 27. 49 E. 3.35 b. which shews that by the Marriage he is become the principal Creditor As to the Sci. Fa. t is true at the Common Law if a Man had recovered in Debt and did not sue forth Execution within a year and a day he must then bring a new Original 1 H. 5. 5. a 43 Ed. 3.2 b. and the Iudgment thereon had been a new Recovery but now a Sci. Fa. is given by the Statute instead of an Original and therefore a Iudgment thereon shall also be a new Iudgment for tho' t is a Iudicial Writ yet 't is in the nature of an Action because the Defendant may plead any matter in Bar of the Execution upon the first Iudgment 1 Inst 290. b. and 't is for this reason that a Release of all Actions is a good bar to it Besides Rast Ent. 193. 4 Leon. 186. Dyer 214. b. an Action of Debt will lie upon a Iudgment on a Sci. Fa. which shews that 't is an Action distinct from the Original and upon such a Iudgment the Defendant may be comitted to Prison several years afterwards without a new Sci. Fa. The Husband may have execution of a Iudgment recovered by him and his Wife after the death of his Wife without a Sci. Fa. 1 Mod. Rep. 179. for the Iudgment hath made it a proper Debt due to him and he alone may bring an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment and it seems to be very reasonable that he should have the benefit of such a Iudgment and yet not be charged after the death of his Wife when there hath been a Recovery against both in her life-time This is like the Case where a Devastavit is returned against Husband and Wife as Executrix Moor 299. 3 Cro. 216. Cro. Car. 603. Sid. 337. and a Iudgment thereon quod querens habeat executionem de bonis propriis the Wife dies yet the Husband shall be charged for the Debt is altered If it should be otherwise this inconvenience would follow that if the Wife should die F.N.B. 121. c. 1 Rol. Abr. 351. 10 H. 6.11 the Husband will possess himself of her Estate and defraud the Creditors so that he takes her but not cum onere But the Law is otherwise for if a Feme being Lessee for years doth marry and the Rent is behind and she dies the Husband shall be charged with the Rent arrear because he is entituled to the Profits of the Land by his marriage To which it was answered that if a Man should marry an Exerecutrix and then he and his Wife are sued and Iudgment obtained against them to recover de bonis testatoris and thereupon a Fi. Fa. is awarded to levie the Debt and Damages and the Sheriff returns a Devastavit and then the Wife dies the Husband is not chargeable because the Iudgment is not properly against him who is joyned only for conformity but if upon the return of the Devastavit there had been an award of execution De bonis propriis that would have been a new Iudgment and the old one De bonis testatoris had been discharged 1 Roll. Abr. 351. and then the Husband must be charged for the new wrong Adjornatur Afterwards in 1 Will. Mar. the Iudgment was affirmed Bowyer versus Lenthal INdebitatus Assumpsit quantum meruit ad insimul computasset Valerent for Valebant good after Verdict The Plaintiff had a Iudgment by default in the Court of Common-Pleas and a Writ of Enquiry was brought and entire Damages given and now the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and it was argued that if any of the Promises be ill Iudgment shall be reversed the Error now assigned was in the second Promise Viz. That in consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink and Lodging he promised to pay so much Quantum rationabiliter valerent it should have been valebant at the time of the Promise made Sed non allocatur So the Iudgment was affirmed DE Termino Paschae Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General NOTA Wednesday May 2. being the first day of this Term Sir Bartholomew Shower Recorder of London was called within the Bar. Heyward versus Suppie IN an Action of Covenant which was to make such an Assignment to the Plaintiff Covenant to make an Assignment as Council should advise according to an Agreement made between him and the Defendant as Council should direct and advise and for non-performance thereof this Action was brought the Defendant pleaded non est factum and Iudgment was obtained against him Vpon which a Writ of Error was brought and the common Error assgned It was objected that the Plaintiffs Council should give the advice because he is the person interested This Objection was answered by Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Defendant had likewise an interest in this matter for 't is an advantage to him to make the Assignment that his Covenant might be saved 't is true it had been otherwise if the Covenant had been to make such a Conveyance as Council should advise for then the person to whom the Covenant is made may chuse whether he will have a Feoffment
Release or Confirmation and then his Council should advise what sort of Conveyance is proper But here it is to make an Assignment and such as the Parties had agreed on If a Man should be bound to give another such a Release as the Iudge of the Prerogative Court shall think fit 5 Co. 23. Lambs Case 1 Rol. Abr. 424. pl. 8. the person who is so bound must procure the Iudge to direct what Release shall be given because the Condition is for his benefit and he hath taken upon him to perform it at his Peril 'T is usual for Men to have Council on both sides to put their Agreements into method but in this Case it being left generally as Council shall direct what reason can be given why the Defendants Council shall not be intended especially when it seems by the penning of the Covenant he shall For an Assignment is to be made as Council shall direct and here being a Verdict for the Plaintiff it must now be presumed that the Defendants Council was first to give the advice and then he was to make the Assignment E contra E contra It was argued that first as to the Verdict 't is not materially objected in this Case because the Plea is non est factum so that nothing of the special matter could come in Evidence Now admitting this Covenant to be general yet one of the Parties must make his choice of Council before he can entitle himself to an Action All Deeds are taken according to the general intendment and therefore by this Covenant his Council is to advise to whom the Assignment is to be made 3 Bulstr 168. for if the Council of the Defendant should advise an insufficient Deed that would not have saved his Covenant Befides the Plaintiff hath not averred that Council did not advise and therefore the Defendant could not plead any thing but non est factum Adjornatur Anonymus A Pleint was removed out of the Lord Mayors Court by Habeas Corpus the Return whereof was Exceptions to a By-Law that the City of London was an ancient City Incorporate and that time out of mind there was a Custom that the Portage and unlading of all Coals and Grain coming thither should belong to the Mayor and Aldermen c. That there was a Custom for them to regulate any Custom within the City c. Then they set forth an Act of Common-Council by which the Porters of Billingsgate were made a Fellowship and that the Meeters of Corn should from time to time give notice to the Porters to unlade such Corn as should arrive there and that no Bargeman not being Free of the said Fellowship shall unlade any Corn upon the Forfeiture of 20 s. to be recovered in an Action brought in the Name of the Chamberlain and that the Party offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law Then they set forth the Iudgment in the Quo Warranto and the re-grant and that the Defendant not being of the said Fellowship did unlade one hundred Quarters of Malt c. Serjeant Thompson took many Exceptions to this By Law but the most material were 1. It appears upon the Return that the City of London hath assumed an Authority to create a Fellowship by Act of Common Council which they cannot for 't is a Prerogative of the Crown so to do and they have not averred or shewed any special Custom to warrant such an Authority 2. They have made this By-Law too general for if a Man should carry and unlade his own Goods there he is lyable to the Forfeiture in which Case he ought to be excepted 3. This Act of Common Council prohibits Bargemen not being Free of the Fellowship of Porters to unlade any Coals or Grain arriving there and they have not averred that the Malt unladed did arrive c. so they have not pursued the words of the By-Law 4. They say in this Law Godb. 107. that the person offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law which is a Parliamentary Power and such as an inferiour Iurisdiction ought not to assume Adjornatur Beak versus Thyrwhit THere was a Sentence in the Court of Admiralty Whether Trover will lie for a Ship after Sentence in Admiralty for the same Ship concerning the Taking of a Ship and afterwards an Executrix brought an Action of Trover and Conversion for the same The Defendant after an Imparlance pleads that at the time of the Conversion he was a Servant to King Charles the Second and a Captain of a Man of War called the Phoenix and that he did seize the said Ship for the Governour of the East-India Company she going in a trading Voiage to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition c. And upon a Demurrer these Exceptions were taken to this Plea 1. The Defendant sets forth that he was a Servant to the King but hath not shewed his Commission to be a Captain of a Man of War 2. That he seized the Ship going to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition and hath not set forth the Prohibition it self It was Argued by the Council contra That it may be a Question whether this was the Conversion for which this Action is brought for it was upon the Sea and the Defendant might plead to the Iuisdiction of this Court the Matter being then under the Cognizance of the Admiralty But as to the Substance of this Plea 't is not material for the Defendant either to set forth his Commission or the King's Prohibition he hath shewed enough to entitle the Court of Admiralty to a Iurisdiction of this Cause and therefore this Court cannot meddle with it for he expresly affirmeth that he was a Captain of a Man of War and did seize this Ship c. which must be intended upon the Sea so that the Conversion might afterwards be upon the Land Cro. Eliz. 685. yet the original cause arising upon the Sea shall and must be tried in the Admiralty and it having already received a determination there shall not again be controverted in an Action of Trover The Case of Mr. 3 Keb. 785. Hutchinson was cited to this purpose who killed Mr. Colson in Portugal and was acquitted there of the Murder the Exemplification of which Acquittal he woduced under the great Seal of that Kingdom being brought from Newgate by an Habeas Corpus to this Court notwithstanding the King was very willing to have him tried here for that Fact the consideration whereof he referred to the Iudges who all agreed that he being already acquitted by their Law could not be tryed again here Adjornatur Smith versus Pierce A Special Verdict was found in Ejectment A Term for years was devised for payment of Debts the Remainder over in Tail he in Remainder enters and levies a Fine and settles the Land upon his Wife for life and dies the Wife surviving and the Debts not paid whether this Term is barred by
Where an Averment may be made of another person so as it consists with the Condition of a Bond. in which Bond the said A. B. the elder and A. B. the younger were joyntly and severally bound in the penal Sum of 1000 l. conditioned that if the above bounden A. B. omitting the word younger do and shall forbear knowingly and wittingly to come to or write Letters unto C. the Wife of D. that then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleaded that he did not come to or write Letters to the said C. knowingly c. The Plaintiff replied that he exhibited an Information against A. B. the younger shewing in what Term and that it was agreed between them that in consideration that he would forbear to prosecute the same the said A. B. the elder together with A. B. the younger should become bound to the Plaintiff in 1000 l. that the said A. B. the younger should not knowingly or wittingly come into the Company c. then sets forth the Bond and the Condition thereof at large and avers that A. B. in the Condition mentioned is A. B. the younger and farther that the said A. B. the younger did afterwards knowingly come into the Company c. The Defendant re-joyned and said that the Plaintiff ought not to averr that the aforesaid A. B. the younger is the person in the Condition of the said Bond c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Plaintiff was estopped by the words in the Condition to make such an Averment It was argued for the Plaintiff that he might make such an Averment which is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was very incertain before if it be not repugnant in it self nay sometimes an Averment doth reduce contradictory things to a certainty 'T is plain that A. B. the younger is bound in this Bond the Objection is that A. B. the elder being of the Name and being likewise bound that the Condition might referr to either 'T is agreed there are many Cases where a Man shall be estopped to averr against a Record but this Averment is not contradictory to any thing in the Record for it appears by the Pleadings that the Information was prosecuted against A. B. the younger and therefore he must be intended to be bound not to come to the said C. knowingly c. If an Estate should be devised to A. and the Name of the Testator omitted in the Will 2 Leon. 35. yet the Devise is good by averring of the Name and by proof that it was his intention to give it him by his Will So if the Plaintiff should claim a Title under the Grant of such a person Knight and the Iury find he was an Esquire Lit. Rep. 181 223. but that the Knight and the Esquire are both the same person this is a good Declaration 'T is usual to make an Allegation even against the express words of a Condition to shew the truth of an Agreement Cro. Car. 501. as if Debt be brought upon a Bond of 100 l. conditioned to pay 50 l. within six Months the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Vsury the Plaintiff replied that he lent the Mony for a year and alledged that by the mistake of the Scrivener the Bond was made paiable in six Months The Defendant rejoyned that it was lent for six Months only And upon a Demurrer this was adjudged to be a good Allegation though it was against the very words of the Condition which is a stronger Case than this at the Barr because the Averment consists with the Condition of the Bond. If a Man should levy a Fine and declare the Vses thereof to his Son William and he hath two Sons of that Name 4 Co. 71. 8 Co. 155. a. Dyer 146. then an Averment is made that he intended to declare the Vses to his youngest Son of that Name this Averment out of the Fine hath been adjudged good for the same reason given already which is because it standeth with the words thereof and 't is a good Issue to be tried It cannot be objected that the Bond is illegal being entred into for the not prosecuting of an Information because a Nolle prosequi was entred as to that Matter so 't is the Act of the Court. Lastly It was said that every Estoppel must be certain to every intent which cannot be in this Case for by the words of this Condition 't is incertain which of the Obligors shall be intended E contra It was argued that an Estoppel is as well intended by Law as expressed by Words that if an Averment can be taken yet this is not well because the Plaintiff hath absolutely averred that A. B. in the Condition is A. B. the younger he should have said that A. B. in the Condition is intended A. B. the younger which might have been traversed and Issue taken thereon No Iudgment was given for this Case was ended by Compromise Hoil versus Clerk In the Common-Pleas THIS was a special Verdict in Ejectment for Lands in Wetherfield A subsequent Will though not made pursuant to the Statute is a Revocation of a former in the County of Essex upon the demise of Abigail Pheasant The Iury find that one John Clark was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will in writing bearing date the 14th day of September in the year 1666. devised the same to Benjamin Clark for Life so to his first and second Sons c. in Tayl Male and for default of such Issue then to his two Sisters for Life Remainder over c. This Will was attested by one Witness only They find that the said John Clark made another dated the sixth day of February 1672. which was 13 years after the making of his first Will and that by this last Will he revoked all former Wills and Testaments by him made They find an Endorsement on this Will written by the Testator himself in these words Viz. My Will and Testament dated the 6th of February 1679. and then published by me in the presence of three Witnesses They find that this last Will was so published and attested by three Witnesses in his presence but that it was not signed by the Testator in their presence They find that Benjamin Clark entred and devised the Lands to Mary Micklethwaite who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff for three years upon whom the Defendant entred This Case was argued at the Bar and in this Term at the Bench Seriatim The single Question was 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. whether this last Will not being duly executed according to the Statute is a Revocation of the first Will or not It was admitted by all that it was a good Will to pass the personal Estate but as to the point of Revocation the Court was divided Iustice Lutwitch argued that it was not a Revocation He agreed that if the last Will hath any respect to the first it must be as a
Contract for that Service with the Master was at Land But the principal reason why Mariners Wages are sued for in the Admiralty is because the Ship is liable as well as the Master who may be poor and not able to answer the Seamen Curia Take a Trial upon the necessity in this Case Anonymus THE Plaintiff recovered a Verdict against the Defendant in an Action upon the Case The Defendant now moved by his Council The Court will not order a Plaintiff to file the Venire Facias that the Plaintiff should file the Venire Facias and Distringas because all Writs which are returnable in this Court ought to be filed otherwise a Damage may ensue to the Officers and a Wrong to the King upon the Forfeitures of Issues by the Iurors which are always estreated upon the coming in of the Distringas The Council insisted upon it that it was the Common Law of this Realm and that it was the Right of the Subject that all Writs which issue out of the King's Courts should be filed that the Panel of the Venire Facias is part of the Record and that an Attaint could not be brought against the Iury if these Writs were not filed because non constat de personis This matter was referred to some of the ancient Clerks of the Court and to the Secondary Aston who reported that the Court never ordered a Plaintiff to file a Venire Facias against his Will Davies 's Case TRespass against Davies and Powel for breaking of the Plaintiffs Close and chasing and killing of Fowl in his Free Warren Prescription for all the Tenants of a Mannor to fowl in a Warren good though it was objected that it was too large The Defendant as to all the Trespass but chasing and killing of the Fowl pleaded Not-Guilty and as to that he sets forth that the Dean and Chapter of Exeter were seized in Fee of the Mannor of Brampton of which the said Warren was parcel and that they and all those whose Estates they had c. had liberty for themselves their Tenants and Farmers to fowl in the said Warren that the Dean and Chapter did make a Lease of parcel of the said Mannor to the Defendants for one and twenty years reserving a Rent c. and so they justifie as Tenants c. they did fowl in the said Warren The Plaintiff replied de injuria sua propria Vpon which they were at Issue and there was a Verdict for the Defendants Mr. Pollexfen moved in arrest of Iudgment because 't is an unreasonable Prescription for an interest in every Tenant of the Mannor to fowl in that Warren It hath been so ruled for a Common Roll. Abr. 399. without saying for his Cattle Levant and Couchant for it must be for a certain number In this Case the Prescription is not only in the person of the Lord but for all his Farmers and Tenants who cannot prescribe to have a free Warren in alieno solo E contra E contra It was argued that such a Prescription might not be good upon a Demurrer but 't is well enough after a Verdict 'T is not an Objection to say that this Prescription is too large for all Tenants as well Freeholders as Copyholders to prescribe in the Soil of another and so there may not be enough for the Lord himself Yelv. 187. 2 Cro. 256. because this is a Profit apprender in alieno solo and for such the Tenants of a Mannor may prescribe by a Que estate exclusive of the Lord and of that Opinion was the Court so the Defendant had his Iudgment Anonymus NOTA. An Information was brought in this Court for throwing down of Hedges and Ditches in which there were several Defendants who pleaded specially and the Clerk of the Crown Office demanded 13 s. and 4 d. for every Name which came to 17 l. for his Fees in this Plea and by reason of the great charge the Defendants did not plead but let Iudgment go by default Mr. Pollexfen moved that the Plea might be received and that it might be enquired what Fees were due which the Court would not try upon a Motion but advised an Indictment of Extortion if their Clerk was guilty Rex versus Inhabitantes de Malden SErjeant Shaw moved to affirm an Order made upon an Appeal to the Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the County of Essex The Case was viz. Order of Sessions quashed for settling a poor Man because he had not given formal notice in writing John Pain served an Apprentiship at Malden where he married and had several Children His Wife died he marryed another Woman who had a Term for years of an House in the Parish of Heybridge where he lived for a year and left Malden Afterwards he returned to Malden was rated to the Poor and lived there two years then he dyed In a short time after his death his Widow and Children were removed by an Order of two Iustices to Heybridge from which Order they appeal and by the Order of Sessions they were declared to be Inhabitants of Malden It was now moved by Mr. Pollexfen to quash it because it doth not appear that he gave any formal Notice in Writing to the Overseers of Malden when he returned from Heybridge and therefore ought to be settled there and not at Malden for being taxed to the Poor will not amount to Notice and he cited a stronger Case which was viz. The Churchwardens of Covent Garden certified under their Hands that such a person was an Inhabitant within their Parish but because no Note was left with them pursuant to the Statute notwithstanding such Certificate he was held to be no Inhabitant within their Parish and of that Opinion was all the Court. Anonymus IN Replevin three persons made Cognizance as Bayliffs to A. Whether an Infant should make Cognizance per Attorn or per Guardianum and so justifie the taking of the Cattle Damage Feasant in his Ground The Plaintiff replied that the Cattle were taken in his Ground and traverseth the taking in the place mentioned in the Cognizance There was Iudgment for the Defendant upon which a Writ of Error was brought and the Error assigned was that one of the Bayliffs was an Infant and made Cognizance per Attornatum when he ought to do it per Guardianum Mr. 2 Cro. 441. 2 Sand 212. 1 Rol. Abr. 228. 3 Cro. 441. Pollexfen This might be pleaded in Abatement but 't is not Error for an Infant Administrator may bring an Action of Debt per Attornatum because he sues in the Right of another and so his Infancy shall be no impediment to him The Bayliff in this Case is as much a Plaintiff as the Administrator in the other for he makes Cognizance in the Right of another and in such case if two are of Age and one is not they who are of Age may make an Attorney for him who is not So if there are two
so his Son is justly and rightly sued as Son and Heir In some Cases the persons are to be named not by way of a Title but as a Pedigree as if there be Tenant for Life the Reversion in Fee to an Ideot and an Vncle who is right Heir to the Ideot levied a Fine and died living the Ideot leaving Issue a Son named John who had Issue William who entred the Question was whether the Issue of the Vncle shall be barred by this Fine It was the Opinion of two Iudges that they were not barred because the Vncle died in the life-time of the Ideot and nothing attached in him March 94. Cro. Car. 524. and because the Issue claim in a collateral Line and do not name the Father by way of Title but by way of Pedigree But Iustice Jones who hath truly Reported the Case Jones 456. was of Opinion that the Issue of the Vncle were barred because the Son must make his Conveyance from the Father by way of Title The Iury have found that the Reversion did descend to the Defendant as Heir to the last John 't is true it descends as a Reversion but that shall not charge him as Heir to the Father Jenk's Case 1 Cro. for the other was seised of the Estate Tail which is now spent and the last who was seised of the Fee was the Father and so the Defendant must be charged as his Heir 'T is likewise true that where there is an actual Seisin you must charge all but in this Case there was nothing but a Reversion Tremaine Serjeant for the Defendant In this Case the Plaintiff should have made a special Declaration for the Estate-Tail and the Reversion in Fee are distinct and seperate Estates John the Nephew might have sold the Reversion and kept the Estate Tail if he had acknowledged a Statute or Iudgment it might have been extended and if so then he had such a Seisin that he ought to have been named A Man becomes bound in a Bond and died Debt is brought against the Heir it is not common to say that he had nothing by descent but only a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tayl. In the Case of Chappel and Lee Covenant was brought in the Common-Pleas against Judith Daughter and Heir of Robert Rudge She pleaded Riens per descent Issue was joyned before Sir Francis North then Chief Iustice and it appearing upon Evidence that Robert had a Son named Robert who died without Issue a Case was made of it and Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Plaintiff took out a new Original and then the Land was sold so the Plaintiff lost his Debt Adjornatur Afterwards in Hillary Term a Gulielmi Mariae Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff by the Opinion of three Iustices against Iustice Eyre who argued that the Defendant cannot be charged as immediate Heir to his Father 't is true the Lands are Assets in his Hands and he may be charged by a special Declaration Dyer 368. pl. 460. In this Case the intermediate Heirs had a Reversion in Fee which they might have charged either by Statute Iudgment or Recognizance they were so seised that if a Writ of Right had been brought against them they might have joyned the Mise upon the Mere right which proves they had a Fee and though it was expectant on an Estate Tail 3 Co. 42. Ratcliff's Case yet the Defendant claiming the Reversion as Heir ought to make himself so to him who made the Gift The person who brings a Formeden in Descender must name every one to whom any Right did descend 8 Co. 88. F.N.B. 220. c. Rast Ent. 375. otherwise the Writ will abate A Man who is sued as Heir or who entitles himself as such must shew how Heir The Case of Duke and Spring is much stronger than this 2 Rol. Abr. 709. 2 Cro. 161. for there Debt was brought against the Daughter as Heir of B. She pleaded Riens per descent and the Iury found that B. died seised in Fee leaving Issue the Defendant and his Wife then with Child who was afterwards delivered of a Son who died within an hour and it was adjudged against the Plaintiff because he declared against the Defendant as Daughter and Heir of the Father when she was Sister and Heir of the Brother who was last seised But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion The Question is not whether the Defendant is lyable to this Debt but whether he is properly charged as Heir to his Father or whether he should have been charged as Heir to his Nephew who was last seised It must be admitted that if the Lands had descended to the Brother and Nephew of the Defendant in Fee that then they ought to have been named but they had only a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail which was incertain and therefore of little value now though John the Father and Son had this Reversion in them yet the Estate Tail was known only to those who were Parties to the Settlement 'T is not the Reversion in Fee Bro. Fit Descent pl. 30.37 Ass pl. 4. but the Possession which makes the party inheritable and therefore if Lands are given to Husband and Wife in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Husband then they have a Son and the Wife dies and the Husband hath a Son by a second Venter and dies the eldest Son enters and dies without Issue and his Vncle claimed the Land against the second Son but was barred because he had not the Remainder in Fee in possession and yet he might have sold or forfeited it But here the Reversion in Fee is now come into possession and the Defendant hath the Land as Heir to his Father t is Assets only in him and was not so either in his Brother or Nephew who were neither of them chargeable because a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Young versus Inhabitants de Totnam AN Action was brought against the Hundred for a Robbery in which the Plaintiff declared that he was Robbed apud quendam locum prope Faire Mile Gate in such a Parish He had a Verdict And now Serjeant Tremaine moved in arrest of Iudgment and the Exceptions taken were these viz. 1. That it doth not appear that the Parish mentioned in the Declaration was in the Hundred 2. Neither doth it appear that the Robbery was committed in the High-way 3. The Plaintiff hath not alledged that it was done in the day time for if it was not the Hundred is not lyable by Law But these Exceptions were all disallowed because it being after a Verdict the Court will suppose that there was Evidence given of these Matters at the Trial so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Eggleston al' versus Speke alias Petit.
Intratur Trin. 1 W. M. Rot. 249. THis was a Trial at the Bar A Will shall not be revoked by a subsequent Writing unless that be also a good Will by a Wiltshire Iury in an Ejectment brought by the Plaintiffs as Heirs at Law to Ann Speke who died seized in Fee of the Lands in Question Vpon not Guilty pleaded this Question did arise at the Trial Whether the Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall be read as Evidence in this Court to conclude the Infant There being some Opinions that it ought to be read and the Defendants Council insisting on the contrary Mr Iustice Eyres being the Puisne Iustice was sent to the Court of Common-Pleas then sitting to know their Opinions who returning made this Report That the Judges of that Court were all of Opinion that such Answer ought not to be read as Evidence for it was only to bring the Infant into Court and to make him a Party Then the Plaintiffs proceeded to prove their Title as Heirs at Law viz. by several Inquisitions which were brought into Court and by the Heralds Office The Defendants Title likewise was thus proved viz. That the Lady Speke being seised in Fee c. did by Will dated in March 1682. devise the Lands to John Petit for Life Remainder to the Defendant and his Heirs for ever That the Lady Speke died so seised that John Speke the Tenant for Life and Father to the Defendant was also dead c. This Will was proved by several Witnesses one of which likewise deposed that my Lady Speke made two other Wills subsequent to this now produced and a Minister prov'd that she burnt a Will in the Month of December which was in the year 1685. Then the Plaintiffs produced another Will made by her at Christmas 1685. attested by three Witnesses but not in the presence of my Lady so that though it might not be a good Will to dispose the Estate yet the Council insisted that it was a good Revocation of the other for 't is a Writing sufficient for that purpose within the sixth Paragraph of the Statute of Frauds The Case of Sir George Sheers was now mentioned whose Will was carried out of the Chamber where he then was into a Lobby and signed there by the Witnesses but one of them swore that there was a Window out of that Room to his Chamber through which the Testator might see the Witnesses as he lay in his Bed Vpon which Evidence the Iury found this special Verdict viz. That Ann Speke being seised in Fee c. did on the 12th day of March 1682. make her Will and devised the Lands to John Pettit for Life and afterwards to George his Son and to his Heirs for ever upon condition that he take upon him the Name of Speke That the 25th of December 1685. she caused another Writing to be made purporting her Will which was signed sealed and published by her in the presence of three Witnesses in the Chamber where she then was and where she continued whilst the Witnesses subscribed their Names in the Hall but that she could not see them so subscribing They find that the Lessors of the Plaintiff are Heirs at Law and that they did enter c. This matter was argued in Easter Term following and the Question was whether this Writing purporting a Will was a Revocation of the former or not and that depended upon the Construction of the sixth Paragraph in the Act of Frauds viz. All Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the party or some other in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested by three or four Witnesses c. and that such devise shall not be revocable but by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing c. declaring the same Now the want of Witnesses doth not make the last Will void in it self but only quoad the Lands therein devised it hath its operation as to all other purposes It must therefore be a Revocation of the former and this is agreeable to the Resolution of the Iudges in former times for there being nothing in the Statute of Wills which directs what shall be a Revocation 32 H. 8. cap. 1. Dyer 143. the Iudges in Trevilian's Case did declare that it might be by word of mouth or by the very intention of the Testator to alter any thing in the Will for before the late Statute very few words did amount to a Revocation Moor 429. 1 Roll. Abr. 614 615 616. If Lands are devised and afterwards a feoffment is made of the same but for want of Livery and Seisin 't is defective yet this is a Revocation of the Will though the Feoffment is void The Council on the other side argued that this Will was not void by any Clause in the Statute of Frauds E contra for if this is a Revocation within that Statute then this second Writing purporting a Will must be a good Will for if 't is not a good Will then 't is not a good Revocation within that Law No Man will affirm that the latter Writing is a good Will therefore the first being a Devise of Land cannot be revoked but by a Will of Land which the second is not This Statute was intended to remedy the mischief of parol Revocations and therefore made such a solemnity requisite to a Revocation It cannot be denied but that this latter Writing was intended to be made a Will but it wanting that perfection which is required by Law it shall not now be intended a Writing distinct from a Will so as to make a Revocation within the meaning of that Act. If a Man hath a power of Revocation either by Will or Deed and he makes his Will in order to Revoke a former this is a Writing presently but 't is not a Revocation as long as the person is living Therefore a Revocation must not only be by a Writing but it must be such a Writing which declares the intention of a Man that it should be so which is not done by this Writing Vpon the first Argument Iudgment was given for the Defendant that the second Will must be a good Will in all Circumstances to Revoke a former Will Cross versus Garnet THE Plaintiff declared that on such a day and year there was a discourse between him and the Defendant concerning the Sale of two Oxen then in the possession of the Defendant and that they came to an agreement for the same that the Defendant did then sell the said Oxen to the Plaintiff and did falsly affirm them to be his own ubi revera they were the Oxen of another Man The Plaintiff had a Verdict Cro. Eliz. 44. 1 Rol. Rep. 275. 2 Cro. 474 1 Roll. Abr. 91. More 126. Yel 20. Sid. 146. and Serjeant Thompson moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good because the Plaintiff hath not alledged that the Defendant did affirm the
Cattle to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them to the Plaintiff fraudulenter deceptive or that there was any Warranty for this Action will not lie upon a bare Communication But notwithstanding these Exceptions the Plaintiff had his Iudgment it might have been good upon Demurrer but after Verdict 't is well enough Lea versus Libb IN Ejectione firmae for Lands in Hampshire Two Witnesses to a Will and two to a Codicil one whereof was a Witness to the Will these are not three Witnesses to the Will it self the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was this viz. That the Lessor of the Plaintiff was Heir at Law to one John Denham his Ancestor who being seised in Fee of the Lands in question did by Will bearing date the 28th day of January in the year 1678. devise the same to the Defendant which he subscribed and published in the presence of two Witnesses and they likewise attested it in his presence They find that on the 29th day of December 1679. he made another Will or Codicil in Writing reciting that he had made a former Will and confirming the same except what was excepted in the Codicil and declared his Will to be that the Codicil should be taken and adjudged as part of his Will They find that he published this Codicil in the presence likewise of two Winesses one of which was Witness to the first Will bue the other was a new Man They find that these were distinct Writings c. The Question was whether this was a good Will attested by three Witnesses since one of the Witnesses to the Codicil was likewise a Witness to the Will so that the new Man if any must make the third Witness Serjeant Thompson argued that it was not a good Will The Clause of the Statute is That all Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses and they to attest it in his presence But here are not three subscribing Witnesses in the presence of the Testator so that the first Will must be void for one of the Witnesses to the Codicil did never see that Will Besides the Codicil is not the same thing with the Will 't is a confirmation of it and this being in a Case wherein an Heir is to be disinherited ought not to have a favourable Construction Attorney General contra A Will may be contained in several Writings and yet but one entire Will 'T is true if it be attested only by two Witnesses 't is not good but if the Testator call in a third person and he attests that individual Witing in his presence this is a good Will though the Witnesses were not all present together and at the same time for there is the Credit of three persons to such a Will which is according to the intent of the Statute And therefore it cannot be objected that these are distinct Wills or that the Papers are not annexed for no such thing is required by Law for a Man may make his Will in several Sheets of Paper and if the Witnesses subscribe the last Sheet 't is well enough or if he doth put up all the Sheets in a blank piece of Paper and the Witnesses attest that Sheet 't is a good Will In these Cases the intent of the Law-makers must and ought to be chiefly regarded and for what reasons and purposes such Laws were made and what Iudgments have been given in parallel Cases If a Man grants a Rent-Charge to his youngest Son for Life 2 Cro. 144. Noy 117. and afterwards devises that he shall have the Rent as expressed in the Grant Now though the Writing was no part of the Will but of another nature yet the Will referring to the Deed is a good Devise of the Rent-charge within the Statute of Wills But in this Case the Codicil is part of the Will 't is of the same nature and being made animo restandi the end of the Statute is performed for both Will and Codicil joined together make a good Devise the first was a Will to all purposes it only wanted that circumstance of a third Witness to attest it which the Testator compleated after by calling in of a third person for that purpose Curia If a Man makes a Will in several pieces of Paper and there are three Witnesses to the last Paper and none of them did ever see the first this is not a good Will Afterwards in Hillary-Term Iudgment was given that this was not a good Will Tippet versus Hawkey TIppet the Elder and his Son covenant with John Hawkey to sell and convey Land to him free from all Incumbrances and that they will levy a Fine c. and deliver up Writings Where two covenant the Action may be brought in the name of one Item 'T is agreed between the Parties that the said Hawkey shall pay to Tippet the younger so much Mony c. The Action is brought in the name of both and upon a Demurrer to the Declaration it was held ill for the Duty is vested in Tipper the younger and he only ought to have brought this Action Iudgment for the Defendant Rees versus Phelps DEBT upon a Bond conditioned for performance of an Award Award where good Vpon nullum fecerunt arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replied and shewed an Award that the Defendant should pay 5 l. to the Plaintiff presently and give Bond for the payment of 10 l. more on the 29th day of November following and that this should be for and towards the Charges and Expences in and about certain differences then depending between the Parties and that they should now sign general Releases And upon a Demurrer it was argued to be a void Award because mutual Releases were then to be given which would discharge the Bond payable in November following 1 Roll. Abr. 259 260. But the Court held it to be good for the Releases shall discharge such Matters only which were depending at the time of the Submission Godfrey al' versus Eversden THere was a Parish Church and a Chappel of Ease in the Parish of Hitchen Prohibition denied upon Suggestion that there was a Chappel of Ease and so ought not to repair the Parish Church the Defendant was taxed towards the Repairs of the Church and a Livel was brought against him for the refusing of the payment of that Tax He now suggests that there was a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish to which the Inhabitants do go and that they have always repaired that Chappel and so prayed a Prohibition But Serjeant Tremain moved for a Consultation because the Parishioners of common right ought to repair the Church and though there is a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish yet that ought not to excuse them from repairing of the Mother Church He produced an Affidavit that there had been no Divine Service there for
afterwards suffered If so then the contingent Remainders to the first and other Sons is destroyed 2. If the Estate was not vested in the Surrendree till his actual assent such assent shall not relate though after the execution of the Deed so as to pass the Estate at the very time it was sealed and delivered Iudgment being given in the Common-Pleas by the Opinion of three Iustices against Iustice Ventris that the contingent Remainder was not destroied by this Surrender because it was not good without the acceptance and till the actual assent of the Surrendree this Writ of Error was now brought upon that Iudgment This Case depended several Terms and those who argued to maintain the Iudgment insisted that here was neither a mutual agreement between the Parties or acceptance or entry of the Surrendree which must be in every Surrender these being solemn acts in such Cases required to the alteration of Possessions and to prevent Frauds That the Law hath a greater regard to the transmutation of Possessions than to the alteration of Personal things and therefore more Ceremonies are made requisite to that than to transfer a Chattel from one to another In all Feoffments there must be Livery and Seisin Quaere For if Tenant for Life surrender to him in Reversion the Surrendree hath a Freehold in Law before Entry Co. Lit. 266. b. 1 Inst 266. b. so in Partitions and in Exchanges which are Conveyances at the Common Law no Estate is changed until an actual Entry though in the Deed it self such Entry is fully expressed Here the Surrendree is a Purchaser of the Estate and yet did not know any thing of it than which nothing can be more absurd 'T is admitted that every Gift and Grant enures to the benefit of the Donee and Grantee but not where the assent of the Parties is required to compleat the act Assent and Dis-assent are acts of the Mind now 't is impertinent to say that a Man gave his Assent to a thing which he never heard A Lease for years is not good without Entry nor a Surrender without Acceptance Lane 4. 3 Cro. 43. 'T is no new thing to compare a Surrender to a resignation of a Benefice 2 Cro. 198. Dyer 294. Br. Abr. tit Bar 81. Yelv. 61. Sid. 387. now if an Incumbent should resign to the Ordinary and the Patron should afterwards present to that Living such presentation is void if the Ordinary had not accepted the resignation the reason is because a resignation doth not pass the Freehold to the Bishop but puts it only in Abeyance till his acceptance and 't is not an Objection to say that this is grounded upon an Ecclesiastical Right and not at the Common Law or that a Formedon will not lie of a Rectory for tho' 't is of Ecclesiastical Right yet 't is of Temporal Cognizance and shall be tried at Law The president in Rastal may be objected where the surviving Lessee for years brought an Action of Covenant against the Lessor for disturbing of him in his possession Rast Ent. tit Covenant 136. b. Owen 97. Dyer 28. Rast Enttit Debt 183 176. b. 177. a. Br. Sur. 39. Cro. Car. 101. Fitz. Abr. tit Bar 262. Co. Ent. 335. and the Lessor pleaded a Surrender to himself without an acceptance but the Plaintiff in that Case said nothing of a Surrender In the same Book a Surrender was pleaded ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Plaintiff agreavit so in Fitzherbert 's Abridgment issue was joyned upon the acceptance which shews 't is a material point No inconvenience can be objected that an Assent is made a Legal Ceremony to a Surrender for 't is not inconvenient even in the Case of an Infant who by reason of his non-age is not capable to take such a Conveyance because he cannot give his assent but he may take the Land by way of Feoffment or Grant or any Conveyance of like nature without his Assent By the very definition of a Surrender Co. Lit. 337. b. Bro. tit Surrender pl. 45. Dyer 110. b. Fitz. 39. it plainly appears that there must be an assent to it for 't is nothing else but a yielding up of an Estate to him who hath the immediate Reversion or Remainder wherein the Estate for Life or Years may drown by mutual Agreement between the Parties 'T is true an Agreement is not necessary in Devises nor in any other Conveyances which are directed by particular Statutes or by Custom but 't is absolutely necessary in a Surrender which is a Conveyance at the Common Law 't is such an essential Circumstance that the Deed it self is void without it 't is as necessary as an Attornment to the Grant of a Reversion or an Entry to a Deed of Exchange which are both likewise Conveyances at the Common Law There are various Circumstances in the Books which declare what acts shall amount to an Acceptance or Agreement Cro. Eliz. 488. Owen 97. 31 Ass pl. 26. but it was never yet doubted but that an acceptance was necessary to a Surrender So in the Entries Fitz. tit Debt 149. 9 E 3.7 b. contra Rast Ent. 136. a Surrender is sometimes pleaded without an Acceptance but 't is always that the Surrendree by vertue of the Surrender expulit ejecit the Plaintiff which amounts to an Agreement The Law is so careful in these Conveyances Kelwway 194 195. Dyer 358. pl. 48. that it will not presume an assent without some act done if therefore a Deed cannot operate as a Surrender without an acceptance then in this Case no such shall be presumed because the Iury have found it expresly otherwise then by the birth of Charles Leach the contingent Remainder is vested in him which arising before the Assent of the Surrendree makes such assent afterwards void for there can be no intermediate Estate Besides if an Assent should not be necessary to a Surrender this inconvenience would follow viz. if a Purchaser should take in several Mortgages and Extents and keep them all on foot in a third persons name which is usual to prevent mean incumbrances and the Mortgagor should afterwards Surrender his Estate without the assent of the Purchaser if this should be held a good Conveyance in Law it would be of very mischievous consequence 2. If the Estate is not immediately transferred to the Surrendree at the sealing of the Deed without the assent of the Surrenderor it shall not pass afterwards when he gives his consent and that by way of Relation for if that should be allowed then the Surrenderor might have kept the Deed in his Pocket as well fifty as five years after the execution thereof which would be so prejudicial that no Man could be assured of his Title 'T is true when a Bargain and Sale is made of Land 2 Inst 675. 3 Co. 36. such a day c. and two days afterwards the Bargainor enters into a Recognizance then the Deed is inrolled within
the six Months by this means the Conusee of the Statute is defeated for after the inrollment the Land passeth ab initio and the Bargainee in Iudgment of Law was seised thereof from the delivery of the Deed but not by way of Relation but by immediate Conveyance of the Estate by vertue of the Statute of Vses But the Law will not suffer contingent Remainders to waver about and to be so incertain that no Man knows where to find them which they must be if this Doctrine of Relation should prevail Now suppose the Surrendree had made a Grant of his Estate to another person before he had accepted of the Surrender and the Grantee had entred would this subsequent assent have divested this Estate and made the Grant of no effect if it would then here is a plain way found out for any Man to avoid his own acts and to defeat Purchasors Therefore 't is with great reason that the Law provides that no person shall take a Surrender but he who hath the immediate Reversion and that the Estate shall still remain in the Surrenderor until all acts are done which are to compleat the Conveyance Those who argued against the Iudgment E contra held that the Estate passed immediately without the assent of the Surrenderor and that even in Conveyances at the Common-Law 't is divested out of the person and put in him to whom such Conveyance is made without his actual assent 'T is true in Exchanges the Freehold doth not pass without Entry nor a Grant of a Reversion without an Attornment but that stands upon different Reasons from this Case at the Bar for in Exchanges the Law requires the mutual acts of the Parties exchanging and in the other there must be the consent of a third person But in Surrenders the assent of the Surrendree is not required for the Estate must be in him immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some dissent to it If a Man should plead a Release without saying ad quam quidem relaxationem the Defendant agreavit yet this Plea is good because the Estate passeth to him upon the execution of the Deed. It may be a Question whether the actual assent must be at the very time that the Surrender was made for if it should be afterwards t is well enough and the Estate remaineth in the Surrendree till dis-agreement Presumption stands on this side for it shall never be intended that he did not give his Assent but on the contrary because t is for his benefit not to refuse an Estate Therefore where a Feme Sole had a Lease and married Hob. 203. the Husband and Wife surrendred it to another in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and her Sons c. this Estate vests immediately in her tho' a Feme Covert and that without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it to be her Estate till he dissent 't is true in that Case his assent was held necessary because the first Lease could not be divested out of him without his own consent So a Feoffment to three 2 Leon. 224. and Livery made to one the Freehold is in all 'till disagreement So if a Bond be given to a Stranger for my use and I should die before I had agreed to it my Executors are entituled to an Action of Debt and will recover A Feme Covert and another were Ioint-tenants for Life 1 Rol. Rep. 401 441. she and her Husband made a Lease for years of her moiety reserving a Rent during her Life and the Life of her partner then the Wife died this was held to be a good Lease against the surviving Ioint-tenant till disagreement which shews that the agreement of the Parties is not so much requisite to perfect a Conveyance of this nature as a disagreement is to make it void And this may serve as an answer to the second point which was not much insisted on that Mens Titles would be incertain and precarious if after the assent of the Surrendree the Estate should pass by Relation at the very time that the Deed was executed and that it was not known where the Free-hold was in the mean time for if he had agreed to it immediately it had been altogether as private Then as to the Pleadings 't is true that generally when a Surrender is pleaded 't is said ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Party adtunc ibidem agreavit which implies that the Surrendree was then present and in such Case he ought to agree or refuse Besides those Actions to which an Agreement is thus pleaded were generally brought in disaffirmance of Surrenders and to support the Leases upon which the Plaintiffs declared and then the proper and most effectual Bar was to shew a Surrender and express Agreement before the Action brought It might have been insufficient pleading not to shew an Acceptance of the Surrendree but 't is not substance for if Issue should be taken whether a Surrender or not Cro. Eliz. 249. and a Verdict for the Plaintiff that defect of setting forth an Acceptance is aided by the Statute of Ieofails In this Case there is not only the Word Surrender but * Grant and Release which may be pleaded without any consent to it and a Grant by operation of Law turns to a Surrender because a Man cannot have two Estates of equal dignity in the Law at the same time Neither can it be said that there remained any Estate in Simon Leach after this Surrender executed for 't is an absurd thing to imagine that when he had done what was in his power to compleat a Conveyance and to divest himself of an Estate yet it should continue in him Therefore the Remainder in Contingency to the Lessor of the Plaintiff was destroyed by this Surrender of the Estate to him in reversion for by that means when it did afterwards happen there was no particular Estate to support it But notwithstanding the Iudgment was affirmed and afterwards Anno quarto Gulielmi Mariae upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords it was reversed Idem versus Eundem THIS Point having received a legal determination the same Plaintiff brought another Action of Trespass and Ejectment against the same Defendant Surrender by a person Non compos is void and at a Trial at the Barr in Easter Term nono Gulielmi Regis another special Verdict was found upon which the Case more at large was viz. That Nicholas Leach being seised in Fee of the Lands in question made his Will in these Words viz. In the Name of God Amen c. I devise my Mannors of Bulkworth Whitebear and Vadacot in Devonshire and Cresby Goat and Cresby Grange in Northallerton in Yorkshire unto the Heirs Males of my Body begotten and for want of such Issue Male I devise the same unto my Brother Simon Leach for Life and after his decease to the
first Son of the Body of the said Simon Leach my Brother lawfully to be begotten and to the Heirs Males of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten with like Remainder in Tail Male to the second third fourth c. Sons and for default of such Issue to Sir Simon Leach my Kinsman being Son and Heir of Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon ' Esquire deceased and to the Heirs Males of his Body lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of me the said Nicholas Leach for ever They find that Nicholas Leach died without Issue that Simon Leach his Brother and Heir with Remainder over in Contingency as aforesaid entered and afterwards married Anne the Daughter of Unton Croke and that after the said Marriage viz. 20 August 25 Car. 2. he executed a Deed purporting a * Two months before a Son was born Surrender of the said Lands and Tenements to Sir Simon Leach in manner following viz. To all Christian People c. I Simon Leach of Elsefield in the County of Oxon Esquire send greeting Know ye that I the said Simon Leach for divers good Causes and valuable Considerations me hereunto moving have granted surrendred remised released and for ever quit claimed and confirmed and by these Presents do grant surrender remise release and for ever quit claim and confirm unto Sir Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon Knight of the Bath and his Heirs and Assigns for ever all and every the Mannors c. To have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach for ever They find that Simon Leach Brother of the Testator was not compos mentis at the time of the sealing and delivery of the said Surrender That on the 10th day of November 25 Car. 2. which was two Months after this Surrender made the said Simon Leach had Issue of his Body Charles Leach who is his Son and Heir that he after the death of his Father entred and made a Lease to Tompson by vertue whereof he was possessed until the Defendant Sir Simon Leach entred upon him c. Two Questions were made upon this Special Verdict 1. Whether this Surrender by a person Non compos mentis was void ab initio and so could pass no Estate to the Surrendree for if so then though the Ideot himself is estopped by his own Act yet that can be no Barr to him in the Remainder because the Act being void the Estate in Law still remains in him 2. If it is not void in its self then whether it is voidable after the death of the Party by Charles Leach he claiming by virtue of a collateral Remainder and not as Heir at Law to the Devisor As to the first Point it was argued that the Cases of Lunaticks and Infants go hand in hand and that the same Reasons govern both that the Law is clear that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore a Surrender made by a person Non compos mentis is also void Fleta lib. 1. c. 11. num 10. the reason is because they know not how to govern themselves And as Fleta saith Semper judicabuntur infra aetatem F.N.B. 202. a. Regist 238. b. if he makes any Conveyance of his Land the Law hath provided a remedial Writ even for himself to avoid his own Alienation His Feoffments are void 39 H. 6.42 Bract. fol. 12. no. 5. fol. 100 120. Brit. cap. 34. fol. 88. Perk. 5. pl. 21. and if Warranties are annexed those they are also void if he granteth a Rent-Charge out of his Land that is likewise void and if the Grantee should distrain for this Rent after the death of the Grantor his Heir shall have an Action of Trespas against him and therefore by parity of Reason this Surrender must be void In Fitzherbert Tit. Grantee pl. 80. there is a Case to this purpose viz. An Assize was brought against the Tenant supposing that he had no right of Entry unless under a Disseisor by whom the Brother of the Demandant was disseised The Tenant pleaded that the supposed Disseisor was the Father of the Demandant whose Heir he then was and that his said Father made a Feoffment of the Land to the Tenant with Warranty and demanded Iudgment c. The Demandant replied that his Father at that time was Non compos mentis and the Tenant was compelled to rejoin and take Issue upon the Insanity which shews that if he was Non compos he could not have made such a Feoffment So if he maketh a Feoffment in Fee and afterwards taketh back an Estate for Life Fitz. Remitter pl. 23. the Non compos shall be remitted to his ancient Title which shews likewise that such Feoffment was void for the Remitter supposeth a former Right 'T is incongruous to say that Acts done by persons of no discretion shall be good and valid in the Law such are Infants and Lunaticks and it stands with great reason that what they do should be void especially when it goes to the destruction of their Estates Therefore 't is held that if a person Non compos releaseth his right that shall not barr the King in his Life time but he shall seize the Land and if he die his Heir may bring the Writ Dum non fuit compos mentis and may enter 'T is for this reason that a Release made by an Infant Executor is no barr because it works in destruction of his Interest 5 Co. 27. Russel 's Case 34 Ass pl. 10. the reason is the same where a person Non compos maketh a Feoffment for that likewise destroys his Estate So likewise an Infant can neither surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease Cro. Car. 502. nor make an absolute Surrender of a Term of which he is possessed for such a Surrender by Deed is void 'T is agreed that if a Man Non compos maketh a Feoffment by Letter of Attorny 't is meerly void because 't is not delivered to the Feoffee by the hands of the Feoffor but 't is said that if it be delivered by him in person then 't is only voidable at any time by Action or Entry Finch 's Law 102. And of this Opinion was Sir Henry Finch in his Discourse of the Law who in the Margen of his Book quotes several Authorities in the Year Books to justifie this Opinion and amongst the rest he cites Sir Anthony Fitzherberts Natura Brevium 35 Ass pl. 10. who taking notice of the old Authorities seems to reject their Reasons who affirm a person Non compos shall not avoid his own Act when he recovers his memory because he cannot then tell what he did when he was in his former Condition But certainly when he recovers his Iudgment he is then of Ability to consider what was done during his Insanity and to avoid such Acts by shewing how his indisposition came by the
said Feoffees made a Feoffment of the Land in Fee without any consideration afterwards Christopher had Issue two Sons Now the Vses limited by the Feoffment of Sir R. C. being only contingent to the Sons of Christopher and they not being born when the second Feoffment was made to their Father the Question now was whether they shall be destroied by that Feoffment before the Sons had a Being in Nature or whether they shall arise out of the Estate of the Feoffees after their Births And it was adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber that the last Feoffment had divested all the precedent Estates and likewise the Vses whilst they were contingent and before they had an existence and that if the Estate for Life which Christopher had in those Lands had been determined by his death before the birth of any Son the future Remainder had been void because it did not vest whilst the particular Estate had a being or eo instanti that it determined So in this Case Mr. Leach cannot have any future Right of Entry for he was not born when the Surrender was made so that the contingency is for ever gone Suppose a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and his Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor The Husband afterwards makes another Feoffment of the same Lands Cro. Car. 102. and dies and the Wife enters the Fee shall not vest in her by this Entry for she had no right the Husband has destroyed the contingent use by the last Feoffment so that it could not accrew to her at the time of his death Nay tho' the particular Estate in some Cases may revive yet if the contingency be once destroyed it shall never arise again As where the Testator being seized in Fee of Houses 2 Sand. 380. devised the inheritance thereof to such Son his Wife should have after her Life if she baptized him by his Christian and Sir-Name and if such Son dye before he attain the Age of 21 years then to the right Heirs of the Devisor He died without Issue the Widow married again then the Brother and Heir of the Testator before the birth of any Son conveyed the Houses thus Viz. To the Husband and Wife and to their Heirs and levied a Fine to those uses Afterwards she had a Son baptised by the Testator's Christian and Sir-Name Then the Husband and Wife sold the Houses to one Weston and his Heirs and levied a Fine to those Vses It was adjudged that by the Conveyance of the Reversion by the Brother and Heir of the Testator to the Baron and Feme before the Birth of the Son her Estate for Life was merged and tho' by reason of her Coverture she might waive the Joint-tenancy 2 Roll. Abr. 796. Wigg versus Villiers and reassume the Estate for Life yet that being once merged the contingent Remainders are all destroied Curia Cro. Car. 502. The Grants of Infants and of persons non compos are parallel both in Law and Reason and there are express Authorities that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore this Surrender by a person non compos is likewise void If an Infant grants a Rent-charge out of his Estate 't is not voidable but ipso facto void for if the Grantee should distrain for the Rent the Infant may have an Action of Trespass against him In all these Cases which have been cited where 't is held that the Deeds of Infants are not void but voidable the meaning is that non est factum cannot be pleaded because they have the form though not the Operations of Deeds and therefore are not void upon that account without shewing some special matter to make them of no efficacy Therefore if an Infant maketh a Letter of Attorny though 't is void in it self yet it shall not be avoided by pleading non est factum but by shewing his Infancy Some have endeavoured to distinguish between a Deed which giveth only authority to do a thing and such which conveys an interest by the delivery of the Deed it self that the first is void and the other voidable But the reason is the same to make them both void only where a Feoffment is made by an Infant 't is voidable because of the solemnity of the Conveyance Now if Simon Leach had made a Feoffment in Fee there had still remained in him such a Right which would have supported this Remainder in Contingency This Surrender is therefore void and all persons may take advantage of it Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought to reverse this Iudgment in the House of Lords but it was affirmed Cases Adj. 150. Hall versus Wybank THE Statute of Limitations is Statute of Limitations whether it extendeth to the Defendant being beyond Sea six years 21 Jac. cap. 16. that if any person be entituled to an Action and shall be an Infant Feme Covert Imprisoned or beyond Sea that then he shall bring the Action at full Age Discovert of saue Memory at large and returned from beyond Sea The Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit to which the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant was all that time beyond Sea so that he could not prosecute any Writ against him c. And upon a Demurrer Serjeant Tremaine argued that the Plaintiff was not barred by the Statute which was made to prevent Suits by limiting personal Actions to be brought within a certain time and it cannot be extended in favour of the Defendant who was a Debtor and beyond Sea because 't is incertain whether he will return or not and therefore there is no occasion to begin a Suit till his return 'T is true the Plaintiff may file an Original and Outlaw the Defendant and so seise his Estate but no Man is compelled by Law to do an act which is fruitless when 't is done and such this would be for if the Plaintiff should file an Original 't is probable the Defendant may never return and then if the Debt was 1000 l. or upwards he would be at a great Expence to no purpose or if the Party should return he may reverse it by Error 'T is a new way invented for the payment of Debts for if the Debtors go beyond Sea and stay there six years their Debts would by this means be all paid The words of the Statute do not extend to this Case for the Proviso is That if the Plaintiff be beyond Sea when the cause of Action doth accrew Cro. Car. 246. 333. that then he have shall liberty to continue it at his return yet 't is within the equity of Law for him to bring his Action when the Defendant returns who cannot be sued 'till then That Statutes have been expounded according to Equity is not now a new Position 2 Roll. Rep. 318. for Constructions have been made according to the sense and meaning and not according to the Letter of many Statutes
the Neglect in this Case was in the Servant the Action may be brought against all the Owners for it is grounded quasi ex contractu though there was no actual Agreement between the Plaintiff and them And as to this purpose 2 Sand. 345. Hob. 206. Hutt 121. 1 Mod. 198. 't is like the Case where a Sheriff levies Goods upon an Execution which are rescued out of the hands of his Bailiffs this appearing upon the Retorn an Action of Debt will lie against him though there was no actual Contract between the Plaintiff and him for he having taken the Goods in Execution there is quasi a Contract in Law to answer them to the Plaintiff 2. As to the second Point it was ruled that Not-Guilty was a good Plea to any Mis-feazance whatsoever and that a Plea in Abatement viz. that the rest of the Owners super se susceperunt simul cum Defendente absque hoc quod Defendens super se suscepit tantum had been no more than the general Issue 3 Cro. 554. Vering versus More but he hath not pleaded thus Iustice Dolben agreed that the Action ought to be brought against all the Proprietors it being upon a Promise created by Law but he was Opinion that this Matter might have been pleaded in Abatement Gold versus Strode AN Action was brought in Somersetshire and the Plaintiff recovered and had Iudgment and died Intestate Gold the now Plaintiff took out Letters of Administration to the said Intestate in the Court of the Bishop of Bath and Wells and afterwards brought a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment against the Defendant to shew Cause quare Executionem habere non debeat He had Iudgment upon this Scire Facias and the Defendant was taken in Execution and escaped An Action of Debt was brought by the said Gold against this Defendant Strode who was then Sheriff for the Escape and the Plaintiff had a Verdict It was moved in arrest of Iudgment and for Cause shewen that if the Administration was void then all the dependencies upon it are void also and so the Plaintiff can have no Title to this Action Now the Administration is void because the entring upon Record of the first Iudgment recovered by the Intestate in the County of Middlesex where the Records are kept made him have bona notabilia in several Counties and then by the Law Administration ought not to be committed to the Plaintiff in an inferior Diocess but in the Prerogative Court Curia The Sheriff shall not take advantage of this since the Iudgment was given upon the Scire Fac. and the Capias ad satisfaciendum issuing out against the then Defendant directed to the Sheriff made him an Officer of this Court and the Iudgment shall not be questioned by him for admitting it to be a Recovery without a Title yet he shall take no advantage of it till the Iudgment is reversed 'T is not a void but an erronious Iudgment and when a person is in execution upon such a Iudgment and Escapes and then an Action is brought against the Goaler or Sheriff 8 Co. 141. and Iudgment and Execution thereon though the first Iudgment upon which the party was in execution should be afterwards reversed yet the Iudgment against the Goaler being upon a collateral thing executed shall still remain in force The Ca. Sa. 21 E. 4. 23. b. Cro. El. 164. Moor 274. 2 Cro. 3. 1 Rol. Abr. 809 God b. 403. 2 Leon. 84. was a sufficient authority to the Sheriff to take the Body though grounded upon an erronious Iudgment and that Execution shall be good till avoided by Error and no false Imprisonment will lie against the Goaler or Sheriff upon such an Arrest Coghil versus Freelove In the Common-Pleas DEBT for Rent was brought against the Defendant as Administratrix of Thomas Freelove her late Husband deceased Debt for Rent incurred after an assignment by an Administrator for the privity of Contract is not determined by the death of the intestate 2 Vent 209. in which Action the Plaintiff declared That on the 1st of May 21 Car. 2. he did by Indenture demise to the said Thomas Freelove one Messuage and certain Lands in Bushey in Hertfordshire Habendum from Lady day then last past for and during the term of 21 years under a yearly Rent that by virtue thereof he entred and was possessed That on the 7th of March 1685. the said Thomas Freelove died Intestate and that the next day Administration of his Goods and Chattels was granted to the Defendant and that 78 l. was in arrear for Rent due at such a time for which this Action was now brought in the Detinet The Defendant confessed the Lease prout c. and the death of the Intestate and that the Administration was granted to her but saith that before the Rent was due she by Articles made between her of the one part and Samuel Freelove of the other part did assign the said Indenture and all her right title and interest thereunto and which she had in the Premisses unto the said Samuel Freelove who entred and was possessed that the Plaintiff had notice of this Assignment before he brought this Action but nothing was said of his acceptance To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joined in Demurrer And Iudgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court for the Plaintiff against the Authorities following Viz. Cro. Eliz. 555. 'T is true in Overton and Sydal 's Case it was resolved that if an Executor of Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt for Rent will not lye against him after such Assignment the reason there given was because the personal privity of the Contract is determined by the death of the Lessee as to the Debt it self and for the same reason the Executor shall not be lyable to the Rent after the death of the Lessee if such Lessee doth make an assignment of his Term in his life-time My Lord Coke mentioning this Case 3 Co. 24. a. in his third Report affirms that it was resolved by Popham Chief Iustice and the whole Court that if an Executor of a Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt will not lye against him for Rent due after such an Assignment Pop. 120. but my Lord Popham himself in Reporting that very Case tells us he was of another Opinion which was that so long as the Covenant in the Lease hath the nature and essence of a Contract it shall bind the Executor of the Lessee who as well to that as to many other purposes represents the person of the Testator and is privy to his Contracts T is true my Lord Popham held in that Case that the Action did not lye but because it was brought by the Successor of a Prebendary upon a Lease made by him in his life-time who being a single Corporation the personal Contract was determined by his death But the same Case reported by others Moor 251.
Latch 262. is said not to be adjudged for the Court was divided in Opinion The Case of Marwood and Turpin is the same Moor 600. Cro. Eliz. 715. but there the Defendant pleaded the acceptance of the Rent after the assignment which was not done here Now if both those Cases should be admitted to be Law Sid. 240 266. Allen 34 42. Palm 118. Latch 260. Noy 97. 2 Cro. 334. Mooo 392. and parallel with this yet the later Resolutions have been quite contrary for 't is now held and with great reason that the privity of Contract of the Testator is not determined by his death but that his Executor shall be charged with all his Contracts so long as he hath Assets and therefore such Executor shall not discharge himself by making of an Assignment but shall still be liable for what Rent shall incur after he hath assigned his Interest nay if the Testator himself had assigned the term in his life-time yet his Executor shall be charged in the Detinet so long as he hath Assets Newton versus Trigg Mich. 1. Jac. Rot. 226. TRespass for breaking and entring of his Close Statute of Bankrupts do not extend to an Inn-kepeer treading down of his Grass c. and taking away of his Goods Vpon not Guilty pleaded a special Verdict was found That the Plaintiff was an Inn-Keeper and a Freeman of the City of London that he bought Oates Hay c. which he sold in his Inu by which he got his Living that he with others built a Ship and he had a Share therein and a Stock of 50 l. to Trade withal that he was indebted to several persons and departed from his House and absconded from his Creditors that thereupon a Commission of Bankrupcy was taken out against him at the Petition of the Creditors that the Plaintiff was indebted to Trigg and that the Commissioners found him to be a Bankrupt and by Indenture bearing date the 25th day of June made a Bargain and Sale of the Goods of Trigg who did take and carry them away c. The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Plaintiff was a Bankrupt or not Serjeant Thomson argued that he was not within any of the Statutes of Bankrupcy for an Inn-Keeper is under many obligations and circumstances different from all other Trades-men for he is to take care of the Goods of Travellers and if he set any unreasonable Price upon his Goods 't is an Offence which the Iustices of Peace and Stewards in their Leets have power to hear and determine 2. He doth not buy and sell by way of Contract for most of his Gains arise by the entertaining and lodging of his Guests by the attendance of his Servants and by the Furniture of his Rooms and by uttering of Commodities as in other Trades Cro. Car. 548. And therefore by the Opinion of three Iudges in the Case of Crisp and Prat it was held that an Inn-holder doth not get his Living by Buying and Selling for though he buyeth Provision he doth not sell it by way of Contract but utters it at what gain he thinks reasonable which his Guests may refuse to give Iustice Berkley in the arguing of that Case agreed that he who getteth his Living by Buying and Selling and not by both is not within the Statutes but the Iury having found that he got a livelyhood by both and using the Trade of an Inholder therefore he was a Bankrupt But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion because an Inn-Keeper cannot properly be said to sell his Goods As to his having a Share in a Ship 't is no more than a Stock to Trade which may go to an Infant or to an Executor after his decease and if either of these persons should Trade with it they cannot be made Bankrupts because 't is in auter droit E Contra. E contra It was argued that he who keepeth an Inn is a Trades-man and may be properly said to get his Living by Buying and Selling. The Goods of a Traveller are not distrainable for the Rent of an Inn-Keeper the reason is because he is more immediately concern'd as a Trades-man for the benefit of Comerce It was the Opinion of my Lord Rolls 2 Roll. Abr. 84. that an Inn-Keeper was a Trades-man therefore any Man might build a New Inn for it was no Franchise but a particular Trade to keep an Inn. And as a Trades-man he selleth his Goods to his Guests by way of Contract 39 H. 6.18 19. for he is not bound to provide Hay and Dates for the Horses of his Guests without being paid in hand as soon as the Horses come into the Stable for the Law doth not oblige him to trust for the payment The Case of Crisp and Prat as Reported by Iustice Croke seems to be against this Opinion Jones 437. March 34. but 't is mis-reported for Jones who mentions the same Case says that it being found that the Inn-Keeper got his Living by Buying and Selling it was the Opinion of two Iudges that he was within the Statute but the other two Iudges as to this Point were of a contrary Opinion for they held that an Inn-Keeper could be no more a Bankrupt than a Farmer who often Buys and Sells Cattel and other Goods Tho' a Man is of a particular Trade yet if it doth not appear that he got his Livelyhood by Buying and Selling 't is not actionable to call such a person Bankrupt Now certainly if the Plaintiff had declared that he was an Inn-Keeper Stiles 420. Sid. 299. and got his living after that manner and that the Defendant to scandalize him said He was a Bankrupt the Action would lie as well as for a Dyer Farmer Carpenter or such like Trades of manual Occupation Most of the Inn-Keepers are Farmers and if it had been so found in this Case it would not have been denied but that he had been within the Statute of Bankrupts Afterwards in Trinity Term 3 Willielmi Judgment Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for taking the whole matter as found by this Verdict 't is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt 1. That he had a Ship which he let to Freight this was not much insisted on at the Bar to make him a Bankrupt for 't is no more than for a Man to have a Share in a Barge Hackney-Coach or Wagon all which are let for Hire Besides in this Case 't is found that the Plaintiff was but a Partner with another And as to the 50 l. which he had in this Trade that is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt Cro. Car. 282. Sid. 411. for he must be actually a Trader at the time that the Debt was contracted which is not found so it must be to make the word Bankrupt actionable for it must be found that he was a Trader at the time of the words spoken All the Question of difficulty is that the Plaintiff was
4. It will lie for such words for which an Action will not 139 5. For a Riot in unduly electing of an Alderman of Bristol not being summoned by the Mayor 5 6. Exception to it viz. doth not say that 't is antiqua Villa or whether it was a Corporation by Charter or Prescription of which the Court cannot judicially take notice if not shewn 5 7. Doth not say that any Charter was granted to the City of Bristol where the Riot was supposed to be committed 7 8. Must be very exact and certain for 't is not aided by any Statute of Ieofails ibid. 9. For treasonable words preached in a Sermon viz. We have had two wicked Kings together c. whether good without some preceding discourse of the King 53 54 69 10. For Subornation of Perjury in perswading another to swear and doth not set forth that the Oath was made that it might appear that the thing sworn was false 122 11. Quashed because the words per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out ibid. 12. For using a Trade not being an Apprentice upon 5 Eliz. and doth not averr that it was a Trade used before the making of the Act 152 13. For not serving upon a Wardmote Enquest quashed for incertainty 168 14. For Perjury by the Name of A. B. de Parochia de Algate and did not shew in what County it was for which reason it was held not good 139 15. In Indictments there must be an addition to the person and place viz. To the person of what Estate and Degree he is To the place viz in what Hamlet Town Place and County he liveth 139 16. Caption was coram Justiciariis ad pacem dicti Domini Regis conservand ' and did not say nunc whether good ibid. 17. For Burglary the very day need not be set down for if it be either before or after the Offence the Jury ought to find according to the truth 141 18. 'T is sufficient to lay the Fact to be committed in Parochia c. without laying a Vill though Parish is an Ecclesiastical division 158 19. Per Sacramentum 12 praesentat ' existit modo forma sequen ' Midd. viz. Juratores pro Domino Rege praesentant it should have been praesentat ' existit quod c. and not modo forma quashed 201 20. The certainty of the Fact ought to be particularly alledged if for Murder it must be alledged that a Stroak was given 202 21. Pardon was pleaded and Judgment quod Defendens eat sine die but being convicted of Manslaughter his Goods were forfeited and though he was out of the Court by this Pardon and Judgment yet the Indictment was quashed upon a Motion for a fault in it and this was to prevent the Seisure 202 22. Two were indicted for a Confederacy one of them was acquitted and the other found guilty the acquittal of one is the discharge of the other 220 Inducement In Trover the Contract is but Inducement the Cause of Action is upon the Conversion 322 Inferior Court See Court Infant See Copyhold 2. Custom 5 7. Evidence 3. After three Proclamations in a Court Baron of a Mannor he did not come to be admitted to a Copy-hold Estate and held no Forfeiture 223 2. Had an Estate upon Condition to be performed by him and 't is broken during his Minority the Estate is gon for ever 222 224 226 3. The Law will not allow the Priviledge of Infancy to work a wrong to any body 222 226 4. Shall not be prejudiced by the Latches of another but shall be answerable for himself 222 223 5. Custom to be admitted after three Proclamations will not barr him if beyond Sea 222 6. He is not obliged to be admitted during his Infancy 223 7. His Feoffment is no Forfeiture at the Common Law ibid. 8. If he doth not present to a Church within six Months it shall lapse ibid. 9 He may be admitted to a Copy-hold but not obliged to pay the Fine during his Nonage 224 10 May be bound by acts of Necessity and by some Customs ibid. 11 Where he hath a right it shall be preserved after a Fine and Non-claim but he hath no right before admittance to a Copyhold 226 12. Cases of Coverture and Infancy are guided by the same reason of Law so are Cases of Infants and Lunaticks ibid. 13. Where he brought an Audita Querela to avoid a Statute entred into by him in his minority 229 14. A Surrender made by an Infant is void 303 15. Where Acts done by him are void in themselves where voidable 307 16. When he is made Defendant he must appear by Guardian and not by Attorny for he hath not capacity to choose one the appearance by Guardian is the Act of the Court when he is Plaintiff he may sue per Prochein Amy 236 17. Whether in Replevin one of them who made Cognizance being an Infant may do it per Attornatum it may be pleaded in Abatement 248 18. If he is Administrator he may bring an Action of Debt per Attornatum because he sueth in the right of another 248 19. Where he recovers as Plaintiff the Defendant shall not assign infancy for Error ibid. 20. Answer of his Guardian in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence at Law to conclude him 259 21. He is not capable to take a Surrender because he cannot give his assent which is an essential requisite to a Surrender 298 22. Release by an Infant Executor is no bar for it worketh the destruction of his Estate 303 23. Cannot surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease or make an absolute Surrender of a Term by Deed 304 Information For a Forgery brought against a Coroner who inserted the Names of two persons in an Indictment upon his Enquest for a Murder whom the Jury had not found Guilty 66 2. For a Riot in breaking a Bank and diverting a Watercourse the Jury found quoad fractionem Ripae guilty and quoad Riotam not guilty for which reason the Judgment was arrested 73 3. For going Armed to terrifie the People 't is an Offence at Common Law 118 4. For forging quoddam scriptum per quod A. was bound which cannot be if the Bond was forged 104 5. For Perjury in a Deposition taken before Commissioners in Chancery whether they ought to be present to testifie that the Defendant is the same person 116 6. An Information of Perjury will not lye against a Person for Swearing to the value of Lands if not true 134 7. Upon the 5th of Eliz. against a Turkey-Merchant for imploying Men in his House to dress Cloath it was held to be exercising the Trade of a Cloath-Worker 315 Inn-Keeper See Pleading 11. Inquisition See Melius Inquirendum Found to be an Ideot per spatium octo Annorum those words are surplusage for he must be so a nativitate 44 2. Quashed because the year of the King was omitted 80 3. Taken
before a Coroner the person having drowned himself it was suffocat ' emergit fuit if it had stood singly upon the word emergit it had been insensible but the word suffocat ' expressing the sense it was held good 100 4. Where nothing is vested in the King before Office found ibid. 5. It must always be found that there is an Estate in the person offending and a cause of Forfeiture of that Estate to vest it in the King 336 Interest in a thing See Pardon 4. Where a Man may have an interest in a Chattel without a Property 61 2. Devise to a Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an interest vests in the Devisees but 't is otherwise in case of Administration for there no Interest vests till actual distribution 65 3. A Man may have a Property tho' not in himself as in the Case of Joyntenancy 97 Intestate See Administration Innuendo The proper office of it is to make the subject matter certain 53 2. It will not help insensible words 54 Joyntenancy and Tenancy in Common See Abatement 3. Baron and Feme 12. Interest 3. If one Joyntenant bring an Action against the other unless he pleads the Jointenancy in abatement the Plaintiff will recover 97 2. If two Coparceners lease a House and the Rent is arrear and one brings an Action and recovers Judgment shall be arrested because both ought to joyn 109 3. Tenants in Common must join in the personalty but 't is otherwise in real Actions for though their Estates are several yet the Damages to be recovered survive to all 109 251 4. Where one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow 251 Joint Action See Action for a wrong 6. Ioyntenancy 2 3. Where an Action may be joint or several at the Election of the Plaintiff 86 2. Where 't is brought against three Defendants who plead jointly the Jury may sever the Damages and the Plaintiff may take Execution de melioribus damnis as well as where their Pleas are several and Tryals at several times 101 102 3. Judgment against two and one brought a Writ of Error and assigned the Infancy of the other for Error the Writ was abated because both did not joyn 134 4. The Defendants in the original Action must joyn in a Writ of Error but it seems otherwise where the Plaintiffs bring Error 135 5. Two covenant to sell Lands and the Purchasor agreed to pay the Mony to one of them he alone ought to bring the Action 263 6 Where there are several Proprietors of a Vessel for carriage of Goods which are damaged by carrying the Action must be brought against all or against the Master alone 321 322 7 Where two Tenants in Common were sued for not setting out of Tythes the Action ought to be brought not against him who set them out but against the other who carried them away 322 8. Two are bound joyntly one is sued he may plead in Abatement that he was bound with another but cannot plead Non est factum 323 9 In all Cases which are grounded upon Contracts the Parties who are Privies must be joyned in the Action ibid. 10 Action must be brought against all where a promise is created by Law 324 Issue Must be joyned upon an affirmative and a negative by concluding to the Country 80 Iudges The making altering and displacing of several Judges Serjeants at Law and King's Council 71 99 100 104 125 143 191 239 Iustices of Peace Offences against the Statute of 23 Eliz c. 1. for not coming to Church may be enquired of by them in their Sessions 79 2. Where a Statute appoints a thing finally to be done by them yet the Court of King's Bench may take Cognizance of it 95 3. Conviction for keeping of a Gun before a Justice of Peace the time when he had not 100 l. per Annum must be precisely alledged 280 Iustification See Pleading 4 5. Where 't is pleaded by way of Excuse to an Action of Trespass for the taking of any thing the Defendant must averr the Fact to be done and set forth the Warrant to him directed and the taking virtute Warranti and not generally that he took it by a Mandate c. 138 2. In Replevin where the Defendant made Conusance in right of the Lord he may Justifie the taking generally ibid. Iudgment 1. At the Common Law no Execution could be of a Judgment after a year and a day but the remedy was to bring an Action of Debt upon Judgment 187 189 2. Now a Scire Fac. is given upon a Judgment after the year by the Statue of W. 2. 189 3. When a Judgment is once execucuted the Goods are in custodia legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or by the Commissioners of Bankrupts 236 L. Lapse See Notice Lease A Covenant in a Lease for years that the Lessee should pay the Rent without obliging his Executors or Administrators 't is determined by his Death 231 2. For 99 yeas if three persons or any of them so long live reserving a Rent and an Herriot upon the death of either the Beast of the Assignee shall not be taken for a Herriot for the Lessee is to pay his best Beast and that shall not be carried further than to the person named 231 Libel Where a Fine and Corporal punishment was imposed upon the Offender after Conviction 68 Limitation An Estate was setled upon Trustees to the use of A. and her Heirs provided she marry with the consent of Trustees remainder over to B. This is a Limitation and not a Condition 32 Limitation of Action See 21 Jac. 16. Where a Trespass is laid with a continuando for more than six years and the Statute pleaded and entire Damages it must be intended only for that which falls within the six years and that the Jury rejected the beginning of the Trespass 111 2. This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Account 112 3. It provides a Remedy when the Plaintiff is beyond Sea at the time when his Right accrews and saves it till he returns whether it may be extended in a Case where the Defendant is beyond Sea longer than six years from the time the Plaintiff was entituled to the Action 311 312 Local Actions Whether Covenant will lie by an Assignee of a Reversion against an Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land lieth 337 2. Debitum contractus sunt nullius loci ibid. 3. Debt for Rent upon a Lease for years brought upon the Contract and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory ibid. 4. If Privity of Contract is gone by making an Assignment and only a privity in Law remains the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth ibid. M. Mayor See Corporation Marriage See Condition 3. Evidence 7. Limitation Notice A Maid above 12 and under 16 taken from Parents or Guardian and Married forfeits her Estate to the next in
An Administrator pleaded a Judgment in Bar to an Action of Debt for 100 l. brought against him and that he had not Assets praeterquam bona non attingen to 5 l. but did not shew the certain value of the Goods and yet held good ibid. 3. A Judgment upon a simple Contract may be pleaded in Barr to an Action of Debt upon a Bond 115 4. A Possession where 't is only an Inducement to a Plea and not Substance the Defendant may justifie upon such a possession against a Wrong-doer 132 5. Where a special Justification is to an Action of Assault and false Imprisonment the cause of Commitment must be set forth in the Plea 160 6. Where the defence consists in matter of Law the Defendant may plead specially but when 't is Fact he must plead the geneal Issue 166 7. Where special matter which might be given in Evidence at the Trial and which amounts to no more than the general Issue may be pleaded ibid. 8. When a Man is brought into Court by Capias he ought to plead instanter because he hath given delay to the Court 215 9. So where he appears upon Recognizance or in propria persona or is in Custody for any Misdemeanour he ought to plead instanter ibid. 10. In Covenant to pay so much Mony to the Plaintiff or his Assigns as should be drawn upon the Defendant by Bill of Exchange he pleaded that the Plaintiff secundum legem mercatoriam did assign the Mony to be paid c. it ought to have been secundum consuetudinem mercatoriam 226 227 11. If an Action is brought against an Inn-keeper or Common Carrier the Declaration must be secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae 227 12. In Trespass the Plaintiff prescribed as to the Freehold and alledged a Custom in the Copyholders to have solam separalem pasturam c. whether he could make a joynt Title in the same Declaration by virtue of a prescription and Custom 250 13. If the Plea is double the Plaintiff ought to demurr 251 14. The Condition of a Bond was to acquit discharge and save harmless Non damnificatus generally is not a good Plea without shewing how acquitted and discharged 252 15. Mutuatus for 400 l. the Defendant pleaded an Attainder of Treason in Abatement the Plaintiff replied that after the Attainder and before the Action he was pardoned c. and concludes unde petit Judicium dampna sua for this cause Replication was held ill 281 Pledges See Replevin Replevin in an inferior Court by Pleint removed in B. R. the Plaintiff was nonsuited and a Sci. Fac. brought against his Pledges and held good 58 2. There are no Pledges of Returno Habend ' at the Common Law the Sheriff was not obliged to take Pledges in a Replevin by Plaint 75 Poor A Man had 5 l. to remove out of one Parish into another who gave Bond to repay it if he returned within forty days he stayed there so long and it was held a good Settlement 67 2. A Note in writing must now be left pursuant to the Statute to make a Settlement 247 Possession 'T is sufficient to maintain an Action against a Wrong-doer 48 Prerogative Whether a Lease was made pursuant to a Power in a Proviso to make Leases for three Lives or 21 years or for any Term upon three Lives the Lease made was for 99 years determinable upon three Lives 268 269 Power In granting of Letters Patents of the sole printing exclusive of all others 76 129 2. Where no individual person can claim a Right or Property it must be vested in the King by Law 76 3. Whether the King hath a Prerogative to restrain Trade to a particular number of Men in particular places 127 4. He may command his Subjects to return out of a Foreign Nation ibid. 5. He may regulate Trade by Letters Patents Prescription See Common 2. Pleading 12. For a way he may set forth his Estate without shewing how he came by it 52 2. Where it cannot be by a Que Estate to have Retorna Brevium 200 3. Where it may be to hold Pleas Leets and Hundreds without matter of Record 201 4. For all the Tenants of a Mannor to fowl in a Free Warren this Prescription is not too large it might not be good upon a Demurrer but 't is otherwise after a Verdict 246 5. For a Profit apprender in alieno solo the Tenants of a Mannor may prescribe by a Que estate exclusive of the Lord ibid. 6. There must be a certain and permanent Interest abiding in some person to maintain a Prescription and therefore it will not lie ratione commorantiae 290 7. To have Common sans numbre is good but ad libitum suum which is almost the same thing is void ibid. 8. It may be joyned with a Custom in the same Declaration 251 9. Where 't is laid in a discharge as to be exempted from Toll or for an easment as for a Way to a Church not only a particular person but the Inhabitants of a whole Vill may prescribe but where it relates to the Profit or Interest in the Land it self 't is not so 292 Presentment In a Court Leet which concerns the person and not the Freehold whether traversable 137 138 Privity of Contract See Local Action 4. Action against an Administratrix of a Term for Rent incurred after the Assignment of the Lease the Privity of Contract of the Intestate was not determined by his death but Administratrix shall be charged with his Contracts as long as she hath Assets 326 'T is not gone either by an Assignment of the Term or death of the Lessor neither is it transferred to the Assignee by the Statute of H. 8. for that Statute only annexeth such Covenants which concern the Land with the Reversion 337 338 Proof See Prohibition Prohibition Not to be granted because a Temporal Loss may ensue 67 2. Where some words are actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court a Prohibition shall be granted for otherwise it would be a double vexation 74 3. Libel causa jactationis maritagii the Suggestion for a Prohibition was that he was indicted at the Old Bayly for marrying two Wives that he was convicted in a Court of that Offence which had a proper Jurisdiction c. and a Prohibition was granted 164 4. A person lived in one Diocess and occupied Lands in another where he was taxed towards the finding of Bells for that Church for which a Suit was commenced in the Bishop's Court where the Lands were and he suggested the Statute of H. 8. that no Man shall be cited out of his Diocess except for some Spiritual Cause neglected to be done there and a Prohibition was granted for this was not a Spiritual Cause neglected to be done because Church Ornaments are a personal Charge upon the Inhabitants and not upon the Land Owners who dwell else where but the repairing of the Church is a real Charge upon
the Land 211 5. Not granted for Mariners Wages 244 6. Libel for a Tax upon the Parishioners for not repairing of their Church who suggest that they had a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish the Prohibition was denied for of common right they ought to repair the Mother Church 264 7. Proof of Matter of Fact by one Witness denied to be allowed in the Spiritual Court is a good cause for a Prohibition 284 8. Where the Release of a Legacy offered to be proved by one Witness was denied in the Spiritual Court ibid. 9. Proof of Payment or Subtraction of Tythes denied and a Prohibition granted ibid. 10. Whether a Prohibition ought to be allowed after Sentence an Appeal being then the more proper remedy 284 Property See Interest Q. Quorum MUst be one Justice of the Peace of the Quorum otherwise cannot be a Sessions 14 152 Quantum meruit Will lie for Rent reserved upon a real Contract where the Sum is not certain but if a Sum in gross is reserved then Debt must be brought 73 R. Record ERror shall not be assigned against the Essence of a Record 141 Recovery Common Reversed without a Scire Facias to the Tertenants but it seems not to be good 119 2. For there must be a Scire Facias against the Heir and Tertenants when a Writ of Error is brought to reverse it 274 Relation Where an Estate shall pass by Relation where not 299 300 Release Of a Legacy by one Executor and also of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever those general words which follow are tied up to the Legacy and release nothing else 277 2. Of a Demand will not discharge a growing Rent 278 3. A Receipt was given for 10 l. in which there was a Release of all Actions Debts Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. 277 4. Judgment against four Defendants who all joyned in a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff pleaded a Release of Errors by one it shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing but if there had been four Plaintiffs to recover the Release or death of one is a Barr to all 109 135 249 5. A Release of all Actions will discharge an Award of Execution upon a Scieri Facias 185 187 6. Of all Actions and Demands doth not discharge a Legacy it must be by particular words 279 7. One of the Defendants who made Conusance released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattle this was held void upon a Demurrer for he had no Demand or Suit against the Plaintiff having distrained in the right of another ibid. Remainder See Entry 3. Fines levied 4. Must take place eo instanti the particular Estate is determined or else it can never arise 309 2. By the Conveyance of the Reversion in Fee to him who had the Estate for Life before the Birth of a Son the particular Estate is merged and all contingent Remainders are thereby destroyed 311 Replevin Where 't is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without the taking of Pledges de prosequendo retorn ' Habend ' 35 Replication Where the Plaintiff confesseth and avoideth he ought not to traverse for that would make his Replication double 318 Request When a thing is to be done upon Request the time when the person requires it to be done is the time of the performance 295 Reservation Of a Rent upon a Lease for three years payable at Michaelmas and Lady-Day Debt was brought for 2 years without shewing at which of the Feasts it was due 't is good after Verdict but ill upon a Demurrer 70 Resignation See Abeiance To the Ordinary and Patron presented 'ts void if the Ordinary did not accept the Resignation 297 Reversion See Bargain and Sale Surrender 2. Tenant in Tail who had likewise the Reversion in Fee if he acknowledge a Judgment the Reversion may be extended 256 2. But a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets until it comes into possession 257 3. By what words a Reversion in Fee passeth in a Will 228 Revocation A Will shall not be revoked by doubtful words 206 2. It might be revoked by Word without Writing before the Statute of Frauds 207 3. Before that Statute a Will might be revoked by a subsequent Will which was void in it self yet good to revoke the former 207 218 4. A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be any Revocation of a written Will which doth appear 204 205 206 5. Whether a subsequent Will which is void in it self may revoke another since the Statute of Frauds 218 6. Such a Will must be good in all circumstances to revoke a former 260 261 Riot See Information Robbery The Hundred was sued and it did not appear that the Parish where the Fact was laid to be done was in the Hundred or that it was done upon the High way or in the day time this was helped after Verdict 258 2. A Servant delivered Mony to a Quaker to carry home for his Master they were both robbed viz. the Servant of 26 s. and the Quaker of 106 l. the Servant made Oath of the Robbery and the Quaker refused the Master brought the Action it doth not lie for him 287 288 S. Scire Facias See Bail 3 4. Baron and Feme 1 4 5. Iudgment 2. Pledges 1. Recovery MUst be to the Tertenants before the Common Recovery shall be reversed by Writ of Error 119 2. Scieri Facias quare Executionem non habet recites the first Judgment but prays no new thing only to have Execution upon that Judgment 187 3. 'T is not an original but a judicial Writ and depends upon the first Judgment 187 4. 'T is suspended by Writ of Error and if the original Judgment is reversed that is so also ibid. 5. Debt will lie upon a Judgment had on a Scire Facias 188 189 6. A Judgment upon a Scire Facias is a distinct Action from the original cause 189 7. Judgment in Dower and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages the Woman marries and dies before the Writ of Enquiry executed the Husband administred and brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment whether it lieth or not 281 Serjeants at Law See Iudges Surplusage See Inquisition Steward See Court Supersedeas See Parliament Surrender See Assent 1 2. Where it may be pleaded without an acceptance 297 2. No man can take it but he who hath the immediate Reversion 299 3. If pleaded without an Acceptance 't is aided after Verdict which shews 'tis no Substance 301 4. By one Non compos mentis 't is void ab initio 303 T. Tail DEvise to D. for Life the Remainder to her first Son and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son endorsed thus viz. Memorandum that D. shall not alien from the Heirs Males of her Body she had a Son who had Issue a Daughter 't is not an Estate Tail Male for the Memorandum shall not alter the Limitation in the Will
Comissarius especially in the Case of a Fellow of a College which is a thing of private design and doth not concern the Publick 265 Vse If a Letter of Attorny is in a Deed or a Covenant to make Livery nothing passes by way of Use 237 W. Waies See Action for wrong 9. Prescription 1. IN Actions for not repairing them it must be alledged that the Defendant reparare debet 291 2. Action on the Case doth not lie by any particular person for not repairing unless he hath a particular damage but an Indictment is te proper remedy ibid. 3. Custom for all occupyers of a Close in such a Parish to have a Foot-way not good for the Plaintiff ought to prescribe in him who hath the Inheritance 294 Waste See Baron and Feme 7. It lay at Common-Law only against Tenant by the Curtesie or in Dower 90 2. It was given by the Statute of Gloucester against Tenant for life or years and treble Damages ibid. 3. It lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term for years 93 4. It lies against an Administrator of a rightful Executor though the Statute doth charge only Executors de son tort and Administrators that they shall be liable as the Executor or intestate 113 Wills See Exposition Devise A subsequent Will may be made so as to consist and stand with a former 204 2. It may also revoke part and confirm part of aformer Will ibid. 3. If two Wills are made without Dates they are both void otherwise of Codicils 208 4. Two Witnesses to a Will and two to a Codicil annexed to the same Will one of the Witnesses to the Codicil was a Witness to the Will the third person is not a good Witness to the Will for he never did see it 262 Witnesses A Witness at a Trial had made a Bargain with the Plaintiff who promised her 1000 l. if she recovered she was not allowed to be sworn 85 2. Informer shall be a good Witness to convict a Man for Deer-stealing tho' he has a Moiety of the Forfeiture 114 115 3. The Patry to an Usurious Contract shall not be a Witness to prove the Usury for he is testis in propria causa 114 BOOKS Printed for and Sold by Charles Harper at the Flower-de-Luce over against St. Dunstan 's Church in Fleet-Street Law-Books THE Reports of Sir Peyton Ventris Knight late one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas in two Parts The first containing select Cases adjudged in the Kings-Bench in the Reign of King Charles II. The Second Part containing choice Cases adjudged in the Common Pleas in the Reign of King Charles II. and King James II. and in the three first years of his now Majesty King William and the late Queen Mary while he was a Judge in the said Court with the Pleadings to the same with the allowance and Approbation of the Lord Keeper and all the Judges Tho Volumes Folio Price 1 l. 10 s. The Second Part of Modern Reports being a Collection of several special Cases most of them adjudged in the Court of Common-Pleas in the 26 27 28 29 and 30 Years of the Reign of King Charles II. when Sir Francis North was Chief Justice of the said Court To which are added several select Cases in the Courts of Chancery Kings-Bench and Exchequer Carefully collected by a Learned Hand Printed 1698. Price 12 s. The Lord Coke's Reports in English Folio Judge Crook's Reports in three Volumes the third Edition with Reference to all the Late Reports The Lord Coke's Commentary on Littleton Folio His Commentary on Magna Charta Folio His Pleas of the Crown or the third part of the Institutes Folio His Jurisdiction of Courts or fourth part of the Institutes His Eleven Reports in French Folio Bulstrode's Reports with new References Folio Leonard's Reports in Four Parts with New References Folio The Year-Books in ten Volumes the last Edition with new Notes and Tables to them all Folio The Reports of the Lord Keeper Littleton in the time of King Charles the First Folio The Reports of the Learned Judge Sir Henry Hobert the Fourth Edition corrected and amended Folio Reports in the Court of King's-Bench at Westminster from the 12th to the 30th Year of King Charles the Second By Joseph Keble of Grays-Inn Esq In three Volumes Folio Kelway's Reports with new References to all the late Reports By Joseph Washington Esq Reports of several especial Case in the Court of Common Pleas in the Reign of King Charles the II. By S. Carter of the Inner-Temple Esq Folio An Assistance to Justices of the Peace for the easier performance of their Duty the first part containing the particular Clauses of all such Statutes from Magna Charta until the first of King James II. that do any ways concern a Justice of Peace in the other Part the whole Office of a Justice of Peace is methodically digested with the most approved Presidents under proper Heads to which is now added a Table for the ready finding out the Presidents with a large Table of the Matters never before Printed By Jos Keble of Grays-Inn Esquire An exact Abridgment of the Records in the Tower of London being of great Use for all that are concerned in Parliamentary Affairs and Professors of the Laws of this Realm Collected by Sir Robert Cotton Knight and Baronet Folio The Commentary of Edward Plowden Esq with References whereunto is added his Quaeries Fol. The Laws of Jamaica in II. Parts in Fol. with a large Map of the Island An exact Abridgment of the Statutes of King William and Queen Mary and of King William III. in Force and use Begun by Joseph Washington of the Middle-Temple Esp and since his Death revised and continued to the End of the last Sessions of Parliament April 27. 1696. And thence continued to the 5th of July 1698. 8vo Price 6 s. 6 d. The Scrivener's Guide being choice and approved Forms of Precedents of all sorts of Business now in Use and Practice in a much better Method than any yet Printed being useful for all Gentlemen but chiefly those who Practice the Law 8vo Price 5 s. Styles's Practical Register begun in the Reign of King Charles the First Consisting of Rules Orders and principal Observations concerning the Practice of the common-Common-Law in the Courts of Westminster particularly the King's-Bench as well in Matters Criminal as Civil Carefully continued down to this time The third Edition 8vo Price 6 s. An exact Abridgment of all the Statutes in Form and Use from the begining of Magna Charta begun by Edmund Wingate and since continued by J. Washington to the Year 1689. In this Impression many hundred of false References are corrected Price 7 s. Two Dialogues in English between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the Laws of England of the Grounds of the said Laws c. Price 2 s. 6 d. The New Natura Brevium of the most Reverend Judge Mr. Anthony Fitzherbert Corrected and revised The Laws against
of Wills did not Originally belong to the Spiritual Courts de jure they had that Authority per consensum Regis Magnatum And as those Courts had not original Iurisdiction in such Cases so they had no power to grant Administration 'till enabled by the Statute of Edw. 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. 3. For before that time the Kings of England by their proper Officers solebant capere bona intestatorum in manus suas 'T is plain that the Ordinary had no power by the Common Law over an Intestate's Estate for he could not maintain an Action to recover any part of it now if the Law had given him a power over the Goods it would likewise have given him an Authority or Remedy to recover them An Action would have lain against him at the Common Law 13 E. 1. cap. 19. and by the Statute of Edw. 1. which was made in affirmance thereof if he had possessed himself of such Goods and refused to pay the Debts Then since he hath no original Power in this Case and this being a special kind of Administration when he hath once executed that power he shall not repeal it and the Court enclined to that Opinion vid. 9 Rep. Henslow's Case DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683. Roe versus Sir Thomas Clargis IN a Writ of Error Papist is actionable Raymond 482. upon a Iudgment in the Common-Pleas in an Action upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declar'd That the King had made him one of his Privy Council in Ireland and that he was a Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Middlesex and had serv'd in several Parliaments for the Burrough of Christ-Church in Hampshire and that the King having summon'd a Parliament to meet at Westminster he did stand to be a Member of that Burrough and that the Defendant Roe did then speak these words of him Viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is a Papist Vpon a Tryal there was a Verdict and a Iudgment for the Plaintiff This Case was argued by Sir Francis Winnington for the Plaintiff in the Errors and by Mr. Roger North for the Defendant The Questions were these 1. Whether the words abstracted from the Offices set forth in this Declaration were actionable or not 2. Whether they are actionable as joined to those Capacities The Councel for the Plaintiff in the Errors held the Negative in both Points 1. The word Papist is not defin'd either by the Common Law or the Statutes of this Realm for from the first of the Queen to the 25 Car. 2. it is not to be found what a Papist is There are several Statutes between those times which provide against the Iurisdiction of the Pope and which inflict particular Punishments upon committing Offences therein prohibited but none of those Laws give any definition of a Papist If by a Papist is meant him who embraces the Doctrine of the Pope it was punishable before the Reformation to be of a contrary Opinion Now in the vulgar acceptation of the word a man may hold the same Opinion with the Church of Rome and yet not profess the Popish Religion so as to bring himself in danger of any of the Penalties in these Laws There was never yet an Indictment against a person for being a Papist but many have been indicted upon the breach of those Laws made against Recusants by which they incurred the Penalties thereby appointed In Michaelmas 27 H. 8. 27 H. 8. 14. B. an Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas for calling of the Plaintiff Heretick and Willoughby the King's Serjeant argued That the Action would not lye because the word did import a Spiritual Matter of which the Temporal Courts had no knowledge and of that Opinion were the Chief Justice Fitzherbert and Justice Shelley The same may be said in this Case that the word Papist relates to something which is Spiritual of which this Court hath no cognizance Words which are actionable must immediately injure the person of whom they are spoken either in his Profession or bring him in danger of some Punishment Hob. 8. as to call an Attorney Bribing Knave which are adjectively spoken yet 't is an Injury done to him in his Profession It was said at the Trial in the Common-Pleas That 't is actionable to call a Man Papist at this time though it might not be so at another time This seems to be a very vain assertion for though the Times may alter the Law is still the same It would be a very great inconvenience if Men should be deterr'd by Actions to call another Man a Papist for this would be an encouragement to Popery and a check upon the Protestant Religion to punish the Professors thereof for saying a Man is a Papist who is really so both in his Iudgment and Profession But admitting the word to be actionable Not actionable to call a man Papist Cro. Eliz. 191. 't is not so before Conviction for 't is very improperly used and of no signification or discredit before that time 2. These words are not actionable as coupled with his Offices because he hath alledged no particular damage or Loss and his Offices are only Honorary and of no Profit and therefore he could receive no Damage by speaking these words if true when they in no sort relate to his Offices and are too remote to be applied to them 1. E contra The words are actionable in themselves for they scandalize the Plaintiff in his Reputation and may be a means to bring him to corporal Punishment for by several Acts of Parliament many Punishments are inflicted upon Popish Recusants which is the same thing with a Papist they are disabled from holding any Office or Imployment in the Kingdom they are not to come into the Kings presence or within five Miles of the City of London and the calling of him Papist subjects him to the danger of being Indicted for a Traytor for the words are Synonimous When H. 8. took upon him the Supremacy which the Pope had unlawfully Vsurped there were certain Papists in those days who called themselves Roman Catholicks that they might be distinguished from those who bore Allegiance to their lawful King which general appellation was afterwards changed into the word Papist so that both signifie the same thing The Objection that tho Times change the Law is still the same may receive this Answer That when the force of words is changed with the Times those words shall be actionable now which were not so at another time As for Example the proper and genuine signification of the word Knave is a Servant but now the Times have altered the sense of that word and made it to be a term of Reproach so that 't is actionable to call an Attorny Knave who is but a Servant to his Client 1. Then as to the Objection that the word Papist is not defin'd in our Law There is a Statute which disables a
that is to make them Iudges whether this Duty is payable or not and so the Courts of Westminster who are the proper Iudges of the Revenue of the King who by this means will be without an Appeal will be excluded Curia This Court may take Cognizance of this Matter as well as in Cases of Bastardy 't is frequent to remove those Orders into this Court though the Act says That the two next Justices may take order as well for the punishment of the Mother as also for the relief of the Parish where it was born except he give Security to appear the next Quarter Sessions The Statute doth not mention any Certiorari which shews that the intention of the Law-makers was that a Certiorari might he brought otherwise they would have enacted as they have done by several other Statutes that no Certiorari shall lie Therefore the meaning of the Act must be that the determination of the Iustices of the Peace shall be final in Matters of Fact only as if a Collector should affirm that a person hath four Chimnies when he hath but two or when the Goods distrained are sold under the value and the Overplus not returned but the Right of the Duty arising by virtue of this Act was never intended to be determined by them Then the Order was filed and Mr. Pollexfen moved that it might be quashed for that by the Statute of 14 Car. 2. 14 Car. 2. c. 10. the Occupier was only chargeable and the Land-Lord exempted Now by the Proviso in that Act such a Cottage as is expressed in this Order is likewise exempted because 't is not of greater value than 20 s. by the year and 't is not expressed that the person inhabiting the same hath any Lands of his own of the value of 20 s. per annum nor any Lands or Goods to the value of 10 l. Now there having been several abuses made of this Law to deceive the King of this Duty occasioned the making of this subsequent Act. The abuses were these viz. The taking a great House and dividing it into several Tenements and then letting them to Tenants who by reason of their poverty might pretend to be exempted from this Duty The dividing Lands from Houses so that the King was by these Practices deceived and therefore in such Cases the charge was laid upon the Land-Lord but nothing of this appearing upon the Order it was therefore quashed Brett versus Whitchot IN Replevin Lands not exempted from repairing of the High-ways by grant of the King The Defendant avowed the taking of a Cup as a Fine for a Distress towards the repairing of the High-way The Plaintiff replyed and set forth a Grant from the King by which the Lands which were chargeable to send Men for the repairing c. were exempted from that Duty And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether the Kings Letters Patents are sufficient to exempt Lands from the Charge of the repairing of the High-ways 2 3 Ph. Mar. c. 8. which by the Statute of Philip and Mary and other subsequent Statutes are chargeable to send Men for that purpose And it was argued that such Letters Patents were not sufficient because they were granted in this Case before the making of the Statute and so by consequence before any cause of Action and to prove this a Case was cited to this purpose In 2 E. 2 Inst 569. 3. an Action was brought against an Hundred for a Robbery upon the Statute of 13 E. 1. The Bishop of Litchfield pleaded a Charter of R. 1. by which that Hundred which was held in Right of his Church was exempted c. But it was held that this Charter could not discharge the Action because no such Action was given when the Letters Patents were made but long afterwards Iudgment was given for the Avowant Upton versus Dawkin TRespass quare vi armis liberam piscariam he did break and enter and one hundred Trouts ipsius Quer. Trespass for taking Fish ipsius querentis in libera piscaria not good in the Fishery aforesaid did take and carry away Vpon Not guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment viz. For that the Plaintiff declared in Trespass for taking so many Fish ipsius Quer. in libera piscaria which cannot be because he hath not such a property in libera piscaria to call the Fish his own Pollexfen contra If there had not been a Verdict such a Construction might have been made of this Declaration upon a Demurrer but now 't is helped and the rather because a Man may call them pisces ipsius in a free Fishery for they may be in a Trunk so a Man may have a property though not in himself as in the Case of Iointenants where 't is not in one but in both yet if one declare against the other unless he plead the Iointenancy in Abatement the Plaintiff shall recover But notwithstanding the Iudgment was reversed Dominus Rex versus ...... THE Defendant was indicted for Barretry Barretry the Evidence against him was that one G. was arrested at the Suit of C. in an Action of 4000 l. and was brought before a Iudge to give Bail to the Action and that the Defendant who was a Barrister at Law was then present and did sollicite this Suit when in truth at the same time C. was indebted to G. in 200 l. and that he did not owe the said C. one farthing The Chief Iustice was first of Opinion that this might be Maintenance but that it was not Barretry unless it appeared that the Defendant did know that C. had no cause of Action after it was brought If a Man should be arrested for a trifling Cause or for no Cause this is no Barretry though 't is a sign of a very ill Christian it being against the express Word of God But a Man may arrest another thinking he hath a just cause so to do when as in truth he hath none for he may be mistaken especially where there hath been great dealings between the Parties But if the design was not to recover his own Right but only to ruine and oppress his Neighbour that is Barretry A Man may lay out mony in behalf of another in Suits at Law to recover a just Right and this may be done in respect of the Poverty of the Party but if he lend mony to promote and stirr up Suits then he is a Barretor Now it appearing upon the Evidence that the Defendant did entertain C. in his House and brought several Actions in his Name where nothing was due that he was therefore guilty of that Crime But if an Action be first brought and then profecuted by another he is no Barretor though there is no cause of Action The Defendant was found guilty DE Termino Paschae Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Coram Edwardo Herbert Mil ' Capital ' Justic