of Politick Governments and sayings of men These arguments also are to be found here You shall find that even certain of your Poets Kings Law-makers Historians Orators Philosophers have said so as saith this Treatise And that this Government is neither new-found out nor usurped nor bad and dangerous but by example of the first and best the oldest sweetest and most to be desired and by lawful practises of old far from usurpation But if thou imaginest that thou art engaged by the League and Covenant to stand for Monarchy and so canst not take a contrary Engagement That case also is answered and cleared here I counsel thee who doubtest to search whether the things which are laid down in the Treatise as truths be so or not That is Nobility indeed O! if the sons of men could learn to be Berean-like more noble then those of Thessalonica Shut not thine eyes stop not thine ears at the seeing and hearing of things of such use and concernment But possibly courteous Reader thou art fully perswaded in thy mind of the truths spoken-of in this Book and therefore apprehendest it to be useless or born out of due time Well but art thoâ— so full of knowledge and so clear in the thing that thou canst not receive any more Be not deceived It may be thou shalt receive greater information therein if it pleaseth thee diligently to weigh and consider Dâ—st thou engage thy life estate name or pains one way or other in defence of that truth which here by arguments is defended thou shalt do well to inform thy self well and to strengthen thy self with good and sound grounds that with the better and cleaner conscience or greater courage thou mayest go on thy way Moreover if the Book had come forth when first it was written thou couldst not but have said it had been born in the due time But hitherto it hath been hindered Yet I suppose it is born in a due time if we look upon the greatest part of men And if the spirits of men chiefly of such as know not this truth were so framed as in moderation impartiality and simplicity to read the Treatise they should rejoyce at the birth thereof and say it is very seasonable Yea and find more perhaps in it then in ethers of that same nature They would see the adversaries of these truths discomfited and overthrown by their own weapons in which they so much glory even by Reason the testimonies of men and that of all stations and conditions and example of the most refined Policies and Governments And what obscurity or obstrusness is in the Book it is because of such boasters whose mouthes the Author judged expedient to stop with arguments of that kind and so to beat them from that place in which they thought their strength did lie I have no more to adde but do again wish that without prejudice malice envie hatred selfishness in moderation and sobriety thou wouldst peruse the Treatise and I dare say thou shouldst receive more good thereby then possibly thou in the least expectest And for thine ease I have written the heads of it as so many Assertions or Conclusions I leave thee and it to the disposal of Him who ruleth all things in the Army of Heaven and among the Inhabitants of the Earth whose Kingdom and Dominion are everlasting in whose hand the hearts of the most mighty are as the rivers of water and He turneth them whithersoever he will And do remain Thy ingenuous wel-wisher DAVID PIERSON ANAGRAM MONARCHIE and DEMOCRACIE described under the names of ΜοναÏχικοσ ΔημοκÏατικοσ ΜΟÎΑΡΧΙΚΟΣ μονοσ alone αÏχικοσ desirous of reigning ὀνοσ an Asse and the upper part of an Asse-mill αÏχαιοσ ancient ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΣ δημοσ People κÏατιστοσ most strong á¼€Ïιστοσ best δικη right κÏιμα or κÏισισ judgment ΜΟΠHe MilstONe like weighs-down and grinds the state The people poor Asse-like enslaveth and He Reigns alone and Hath an AnCIEnt date ΔΗΜ People Do rule Electing who command MOst strong and best he 's and from Clear debate Makes Right Appear and Causeth IudgmEnt stand And if αÏιστοσ best Doth signifie This is me thinks Pure ARISTOCRACIE THE CONTENTS Of the whole BOOK SECT I. THe Power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot belaw fully contraveened pag. 2 The King hath not a Power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason p. 6 SUBSECT 1. The Jewish Sanhedrin had power over the Kings of Israel and Judah p. 11 Because of extraordinary Heroicism and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law 29 The first erecters of Kingdoms and planters of Colonies were of an absolute power altogether unsubject to Law 34 Personal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an absolute and full power without all reservation upon some men 40 Conquering Kings in old were of an absolute power 47 Vsurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an absolute power 47 Except for some of these causes there was never any King so absolute but his power one way or other according to Law was restricted Ibid. SUBSECT 2. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion and the People of GOD. 120 The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republick Ibid. The good Kings of the Jews because of personal endowments had exemption and immunity from Law 121 The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power 125 SECT II. Royal Power ectypically is the choicest of Governments 135 Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the best Government 136 Monarchy demotically in respect of the disposition of people is the choicest Government Ibid. Kingly Government consecutively in respect of its fruits and consequences may be hic nunc the best of all Governments 138 Regulated and mixed Monarchy per se and in it self is the sweetest Government 140 Monarchy consecutively in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce simply absolutely is of all Governments most dangerous and least to be desired 41 SECT III. Democracy arightly constituted simply absolutely is the sweetest Government and most for the good of the People 152 Moses before the counsel of Jethro had a Kingly power 155 After the accomplishment of Jethro's counsel and the institution of the seventy Elders neither Moses nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power 157 No man by Nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government 165 Nature per accidens and in a secondary way intendeth Government 169 SECT IV. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly power as the Kingly power 171 It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power Ibid. Kingly Government may very
this is rather said then proved But afterward nolis velis we shall evidence That Samuel thought no such thing Thirdly If Kings had been subjected to the Sanhedrin and ought to have been arraigned before it either to have been accused or condemned then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes But the latter is false Ergo. This is Salmasius his great gun And for proof of the Major he faith The Judges of the people of Israel did judge led forth their Armies made Lawes executed judgement and did exercise all other such-like functions which are exercised by Kings Therefore unlesse the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Israel The Assumption he maketh it good thus It had been altogether in vain saith he to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings if they had been both one Thus the difference had onely been in name and not in reality Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Assumption more largely and most pertinently There saith he the Judges amongst the people of the Jews were subject to the Sanhedrin And so he saith the Judges amongst the Jews were called in the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophetim Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes Now the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes And Festus observeth that Sufetes in the Punick language signifieth and denotateth a Consul And out of Caelidus he citeth these words Senatus censuit referentibus Sufetis So the Roman Consuls referred to the Senat and the Senat judged of their refer Therefore seing the Judges of Israel were but like Consuls who were subject to the Senat as the case was amongst the Carthaginians and Romans they were not of a kingly power but subject to the Sanhedrin though they retained the government so long as they lived whereas the Roman Consuls and Carthaginian Sufetes were only but yearly Magistrates And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghost's contradistinguishing Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech who took upon him a kingly government from the government of the rest of the Judges Yea the Israelites Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that same power over them which his son Abimelech usurped This was a kingly government that they offered to him Which Gideon refused And yet neverthelesse he was a Judge And consequently if both Judges and Kings amongst the people of Israel had one and the same power not onely the people of Israel had offered to Gideon no new power but what he had before but also Gideon had refused to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy Ans We heartily subscribe to the Minor and do much cry-up Salmasius in the probation thereof I wish the man were as solid and pertinent in all the rest as in that Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major And I think I have good reason to do so for he only differenceth absolute Kings from Judges imagining that none properly can be a King essenitally distinct from a judge but he who is absolute and unlyable to the Law He far mistaketh the point It is one thing to be an absolute King not subject to the Sanhedrin and Senat and another thing to be a non-absolute King and subject to Law And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge The non-absolute King is essentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet the Judge because he is major singulis but minor universis in syuedrie But the Judge is but of equal authority with the rest of his collegues in the Senat though because of his eminencie and personall endowments he may praeside and be as a leading man amongst the rest Such was the case of the kings and Judges amongst the Jewes as after ward shall be shewed There are some accidentall differences also between the Judges amongst the people of the Jewes and their kings as namely 1. The Judges were in a most speciall immediat and extraordinary manner designed and appointed by GOD himself to govern his people Kings were not so if we look to them in an ordinary way and for the most part 2. The Judges of Israel had no hereditary power and government over them Such had their kings 3. The kings of Israel both in their ordination and afterward were attended with prodigall sumptuous and Royall Dignities which were denied to their Judges And whereas Salmasius essentially distinguisheth Melech a king from Sophet a Judge because the one is of an absolute power and the other is not he shal do well to advert that he lose not more this way then he gaineth for so he putteth the essentiall frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power But in our first argument against this we have shewed the incongruity and absurdity thereof Which afterward shall more appear from what is spoken as followeth Fourthly There can be no example alledged in the Book of God whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law We read not that ever the Sanhedrin or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminall faults as namely David and Solomon Def. Reg. cap. 5. Ans This argument is like the first Both of them speak much de facto but nothing de jure This is a very bad consequence The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them and did set-up such a King over them Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawfull and Kings de jure are not subject to Law Friend you break-off too soon Though I should grant you the Antecedent yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence you must prove the validity of their practice You count your reckoning too soon whileas you thus conclude There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement on any of their Kings who transgressed the Law and did violate it Ergo Kings are not subject to Law What if I should grant the Antecedent You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulnesse of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence Philosophs know though many Humanists do not that à facto adjus non statim valet consequentia Aye they can tell you that argumentum negativum nihil concludit Well as I deny your consequence so I do not admit your Antecedent I illustrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture both ordinary and extraordinary Ordinary Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah and kill her 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against your purpose yet I pray you what can you say of that practice in killing Amasiah We have shewed elsewhere that such a thing was done in a
by Royall birth she had no title to the Crown But she conquered the Crown to her-self and did reign six years with the consent of the People But sure I am Salmasius and all the Royallists as they hold the consent of the People as a necessary ingredient to make-up the lawfulness of the title to the Crown so they maintain conquest without all exception to be a just and lawful title thereto But what need I thus to stand do not I know that Salmasius and the whole nation of Royalists will have the formall and essentiall being of the King to consist in an absolute and illimited power But any person whether man or woman usurper or non-usurper is capable of such a power and may be invested therewith And consequently though Athaliah was but a woman and an usurper it doth not follow that because she was such therefore she was not of an absolute and arbitrary power The greatest of Tyrants and the worst of women is capable of such a power And the power is not changed because of the change of the person and of such and such qualifications in him Such things are meerly extrinsecal to the nature of the power it-self So then if the King be formally a King because he is of an illimited and arbitrary power I see no reason why Athaliah did not reign as a King for she was capable of such a power wherein according to the doctrine of Royallists the essentiall frame of a King doth consist And consequently seing she did reign in stead of the King of Judah and exercised his authority there is no reason why she was not absolute and unsubject to Law as well as he Therefore Salmasius must either leave-off his opinion and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were absolute and not subject to Law or else he must cry-down the laudable practice of Jehojadah and of the People in killing Athaliah For shame he will not do this Propos 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom there was no kingdom in old wherein absolute and uncircumscribed Monarchy was not erected though in some more remiss and in others more intense For proof of this Salmasius sheweth what was the condition of Monarchy in the Assyrian Egyptian Jewish Median Persian Grecian and Roman kingdoms Of the Jewish kingdom we have spoken already and more of it afterward in a more convenient place As for the Assyrian kingdom together with the Median he proveth that kings in them were absolute and un-subject to Law because such was the condition of the kings of Persia This he maketh good from Ottanes the Persian 〈…〉 Monarchy to be that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably Herod lib. 3. Yea Artabanus averreth That no Law amongst the Persians was more commendable then that whereby they enacted that the King should be honoured as the Image of God Plut. in vit Themist And Claudian saith That they gave a like obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings Therefore saith Salmasius seeing the Medians succeeded to the Assyrians and the Persians to the Medians it appeareth that as the Kings of Persia so the Kings of Assyria and Media were absolute and not subject to Law And though the Egyptian Kings before they were subdued by the Persians were hemmed-in by the bonds of Law in every thing that they did yet notwithstanding we never reade that at any time they brought any of their Kings upon the stage and caused them to suffer for their Delinquencie They did bear the yoke of two cruel tyrants Busiris and Cambyses most patiently without reluctancie Which Cambyses because of his cruelty the Jews called Nebuchodonozor He desired in marriage his german sister and so calling a Councel be demanded at his Counsellors if there was any Law in Persia which did permit such a marriage They desirous to gratifie their King told him That they found a Law whereby the King of Persia was permitted to do any thing be pleased Herod lib. 3. As for the Grecian Empire it is known saith Salmasius that Agamemnon had an absolute power over that Army which be led on against the Trojans And therefore he is called Rex Regum And Aeschylus calleth the King of the Argives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an uncensurable Governour So Homer calleth the Grecian Kings Kings made by Jupiter reigning by and holding their Crown of him He calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divine Kings trained-up by Jupiter Philip saith that the King hath equal power with GOD Diogenes in lib. de Reg. writeth that the King is just so in respect of the Commonwealth as GOD is in respect of the Universe And so as GOD hath power over the whole world in like manner the King hath power on earth In like manner Ecphantas calleth it a thing proper to the King to govern himself and to be governed by none Lastly he stepeth-in to shew how that the Roman Kings of old were of a vast and arbitrary power Romulus saith Tacitus governed the Romans as he pleased Pomponius writeth that Kings at the begining of Rome had all poâ—er Dio saith they are unsubject to any Law Plutarch and Justinian will have the Laws subjected to them Which maketh Severus and Attoninus to say Licet legibus soluti simus attamen legibus vivimus Instit lib. 2. tit 17. Plinius in his Panegyricks saith to Trojanus that he subjecteth himself to the Laws And yet as Dio saith he had power to do every thing by himself to command both himself and the Laws to do every thing that he would and not do what he would not And Salust saith that to do every thing unpunishably that is to be a King Def. Reg. cap. 5. Answ I suppose there is not plena enumeratio partium here There were moe Kingdoms then what Salmasius hath reckoned-up Howsoever I shall do my endeavour to find him out And that I may take away the strength of all that he objecteth and leave not so much as the ground-stone thereof I lay down these following Conclusions Conclus 1. Because of extraordinary heroicisme and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law This we make good from the condition of some Kings both before and after the Flood Before the Flood the point is clear About the 500 year of Noah's age which was in the 1556. year of the world Policy began to have some footing for then men began to follow after their own inventions hearts desires and so men then a-dayes being of huge strength and undaunted courage given to pleasure and renown those amongst them who by strength of hand could carry the pre-eminence and precedency over others no less performed it then endeavoured it And Noah was five hundred years old Gen. 5. There were Giants in the earth in those dayes and also after that when the sons of God came-in unto the daughters of men and they bear children unto them the same became mighty men who were of old men of
That Jeroboam was a vile idolater and was not worthy to be a King 2. That the people justly defired Rehoboam to dimit of the power which his father had and that the old men did arightly counsel Rehoboam to do so Neither of these doth Salmasius deny And so I gain the point as is already proved Fourthly from the People of the Jews processing their Kings So did they against Athaliah 2 King 11.2 Chron. 23. and Amaziah 2 King 14.2 Chron. 25. See subsect 2. prop. 1. And as they processed their Kings so did they resist them as afterward is shewed But I pray you could they have done such things lawfully if their Kings had had an arbitrary power over them And that they did such things according to Law and Reason is proved by us Fifthly If Ahab had had an absolute power I see no reason how he could have been refused of Naboth's Vineyard 1 King 21. Sure I am if he had had a prerogative above Law and a power to dispose according to his pleasure either upon the goods or the person of the subject he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard at his own hand without so much as demanding it with Naboth's leave And yet the text saith That Naboth having refused to give it him he went home much dismaid and refused to eat bread because Naboth had denied it to him And which is more he could not get it till a false processe was led against Naboth by the crast of Jezebel But is it imaginable that ever such things would have been done if Ahab's power had been arbitrary and uncircumscribed No verily No question if his power had been boundlesse by vertue of a Royal Act he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard either without grieving himself or without leading a false processe against Naboth And therefore Mr. Withers 〈◊〉 Tom Plain-man saith notably Why I pray Did Ahab grieve that Naboth said him nay Why made he not this auswer thereunto If what the Prophet said some Kings would do Were justly to be done Thy Vineyana's mine And at my pleasure Naboth all that 's thine Assume I may Why like a Turkey-chick Did he so foolishly gro◠sullen sick And get possession by a wicked fact Of what might have been his by Royal Act If such Divinity as this were true The Queen should not have needed to pursue Poor Naboth as she did or so contrive His death since by the King's Prerogative She might have got his Vineyard nor would God Have scourge that murder with so keen a kod On Ahah had be asked but his due For he did neither plot nor yet pursue The murder nor for ought that we can tell Had knowledge of the dead of Jezebel Till God 〈◊〉 it by the Prophet to him Nor is it said that Naboth wrong did do him Or disrespect in that he did not yeeld To sell or give or to exchange his field Brit. Remembr Cant. 8 Now hereby is made to appear That the Kings of the Jews were not absolute whether according to the Law of God or the Law of the Kingdom And why then do Royallists plead so much for the King 's arbitrary power seing the Jewish Kings de jure had it not Which maketh me think other Kings far lesse should have it for the ordination of the Jewish Kings did depend from God in a most special way and God there in was most intimatly concerned We must not think that the Kings of Judah after the captivity de jure had any priviledge above Law more then those who preceded them According to the Law of God they had no such priviledge as is shewed already And that according to the Law of the Nation they had it not is also evident 1. Because after the captivity the store of the Government was changed And they had not so much as Kingly Government much lesse absolute Monarchy till Aristobulus firstly usurped the Crown Jos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 19. 2. Because the people did withstand the tyrant Alexander And whileas he was dying he was necessitate to exhort his wife who succeeded to him to dimit of his power and to promise to govern according to the advice and counsel of the Senatouis and Pharisees Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 22. 23. Which she did accordingly cap. 21. And at her death she desired the Sanhedrin to dispose upon the Kingdom as they pleased even while her son Aristobulus was in arms for bringing the Kingdom to himself Yea the Sanhedrin not onely accused Antipater but also arraigned Herod before them who for fear of them was constrained to slee Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 17. And what arbitrary power Herod had was by 〈◊〉 concession whom Herod blinded and deluded with gifts Ant. Jud. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confesse whileas Herod was cited before the Sanhedrin he was not King but Governour of Galilee But what then I hope Salmasius will not deny which indeed he confesses that his father Antipater did reign as King And yet the Elders of the People did accuse him before Hyrcanus But neither Hyrcanus who indeed was King of the Jews nor Antipater who was Procurator and managed the matters of the Kingdom because of his weakness were able to absolve Herod notwithstanding Caesar the President of Syria wrote some Letters to Hyrcanus threatning him if he did not absolve him The Sanhedrin went-on so precisely against Herod that they went about to condemn him to death So that Hyrcanus was necessitate in satisfying Caesar's desire to cause Herod flee quietly away Now I would fain know of Salmasius if either Hyrcanus or Antipater had had an absolute and arbitrary power might they not have absolved Herod at their pleasure the Sannedrin nilling or willing and not basely for fear of the Sanhedrin have dismissed Herod secretly Therefore Salmasius must give me leave to say though he imagineth the contrary that Sichardus very pertinently urgeth this example to prove that the power of the Sanhedrin was above the King And Salmasius himself denieth not Def. Reg. cap 2. 5. but the strain and current of Rabbinick Writers doth run this way Inst Nay but saith he in the Jewish Talmud it is spoken otherwise And therefore it is said Rex neque judicat neque judicatur non drest testimonium nec in ipsum dicitur in Cod. San. cap. 11. Def. Reg. cap. 2. Answ Verily this Gentleman needeth not brag much of this for the Jewish Writers pull this out of his hands by a distinction Some of them understand it concerning the Kings of Israel and some of them refer it to the Samaritan Kings But they deny it to have place in the Kings of Judah and those who came of David I admire much that he should cite the authority of Jewish writ for him He doth not deny but the Jewish Writers are no friends to Kingly Government And they positively say which he denieth not himself that the King of the Jews was subjected to Law And which is more they particularity
be asked Whether or not ought the People to resist the Magistrate Say I The lawfulness or unlawfulness of their resisting only dependeth from the nature of the quarrel It is clear to me as is fully evinced in the following Treatise not only the whole Power but also any considerable power of the People may vâ—ry justly resist the Magistrate in maintaining and promoting their own just Liberty and freedom for as the whole Power of the People is superiour so any considerable part thereof is not inferiour to the Magistrate's power And thus my judgment leadeth me no other wales to resist a tyrannous Magistrate but as I am added by Providence to that Body whose Quarrel is not only just but also whose Power is either superiour to the Magistrate's Power or at least so far equal to it as that it is in a capacity of resisting it Now if I either mistake the Quarrel or the considerable capacity of resisting 't is my rashness to engage against the Ruler and just with God to punish my seditiousness though my engaging be upon zealous and conscientious accompts Let a very Pâ—ter be rebuked though in zeal he smile Malchus not being able to maintain his act of Resistance As to example had I a year or two since spoken or acted against the late Parliament me thinks I had not only done unwisely unless as I said before I had been raised up extraordinarily as were the Prophets of old in speaking and acting against the tyranny of the Magistrate but also seditiously But now it is high time for me or any wel-wisher of the People's Liberty to speak and act in our several employments and vocations against the late Power As it is time to sail when tide and wind make and no sooner so it is time to engage and no sooner for Freedom and Liberty when either the People's willingness or a standing Power call for it Then let every man according to his ability whose ambition is to promote just Freedom and Liberty improve his time letting no occasion slip but strike the iron while it is yet hot Sooner it is folly and latter it is but a beating of the air And thus let every cordial wel-wisher of Freedom walk wisely neither going a step before nor a step behind the willingness and power of the People in promoting the foresaid Interest The Quarrel of just Freedom not arightly timed is lost labour and an untimely birth This possibly will be called Policy rather then Piety But it matters not if this Policy be true Divinity as is already shewed to be He is worthy of all commendation who neither resisteth the Ruler's superiority nor thwarteth but promoteth the People's Liberty Thus is he neither rebellious nor malignant but obedient to his superiour during his Command and faithful to the Interest of the People Let me obey the Tyrant so long as he commandeth but side with the People when they oppose him Beside what I have spoken if I may be called to counsel I would willingly offer some of my earnest wishes unto your Lordship O that constrained maintenance for upholding Priests Chaplains and Masters in Universities were at an end Oh that all who are able and willing to preach the Gospel might be encouraged with all due freedom and protection therein upon all occasions and in all convenient places without molestation whether in private or in places of publick meeting All which shall come to passe when that is accomplished which is foretold in Isa 26.12 14 15. As for annual Representatives the levelling of the Law subjecting all to it without exception the disposing so of all Rents Revenues Forfeitures Sequestrations and such like as that competences may be provided out of them for all that want they be things too high for me I only take liberty to speak in order to such things as immediatly relate to the Freedom of Saints and the Fall of Babylon As to Religion's Interest every wel-wisher of Zion may use freedom Howsoever I judge it needless for me to speak any thing of these last particulars seeing as I conceive they are already taken into consideration by all these who mind the true and just Interest of the People Nay but my Lord J cannot forget how that one day after another J hear large discourse of Levelling But though the most part be for it excepting the Rich as it was of old in the dayes of Agis and Gracchus J cannot well learn what is intended thereby Only J do find in it these two things which be either redundant or defective as to the nature of right Levelling First some understand no more but the levelling of the Law Secondly others overturn propriety so much as that they intend no more use of the Creation but here to day and yonder to morrow J shall not dispute this case at present but only adde some few words to what is spoken in this matter As J understand people so much the more cheerfully ought to engage to promote their just Civil Freedom and Liberty how much the more the fall of Babylon and the interest of Zion are concerned therein 'T is a debate to me to engage for the one the other not being linked therewith though self-defence be lawful upon all accompts Howsoever the Quarrel of the Lamb is that which J heed most But if your Lordship and others in power will allow me in this case to remonstrate to the world the practice of the Jewish Athenian Lacedemonian Roman and of other ancient and notable Commonwealths J shall be most willing to do so at command And J shall endeavour to publish nothing but what is according to the Scriptures the practice of the chiefest Commonwealths the judgment yea and practice of the chiefest States-men Philosophers Orators and Historians O! but all of us will be prevented in these things by the sudden approach of the Ancient of dayes who being come will level spirits powers and estates Till then there will be no more but the beginnings of Liberty the earnest of what shall be when the Lord alone shall be exalted staining the pride of all Glory and bringing into contempt all the Honourable of the Earth Yea as I conceive it is impossible a solid and entire Freedom can be established till His approach for then He shal judge among the Nations becoming our Lord our King and Law-giver the Law going out of Zion and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem I rest satisfied in the expectation thereof not exercising my self in great matters nor in things too high for me When he cometh crooked things shall be made straight and mountains shall be made valleys The Lord will hasten it in his time Lastly J would offer my judgment to your Lordship concerning the Power of the People in choosing Rulers J shall only hint at this in a word To me it is clear that as Nature in the state of fallen-man unlesse all should go to ruin cannot be without Government even though all men
confound that which is ordinary and extraordinary together and illustrate them both by one and the same example As for the fourth species taken in this sense I do verily imagine that his words deserve a distinction Whereupon the question may be moved whether or not doth Aristotle by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he maketh the fifth species of royall government understand an all-commanding power according to law or both according to and against law it cannot be imagined as afterward shall appear that Aristotle understandeth an all-commanding power above Law Therefore is it that Polit. 3. cap. 10. he interlaceth the fifth species of Monarchy with the fourth Without any clear and formall distinction as he doth cap. 11. he passeth from the one to the other in a continuat way linking the one with the other And so taking up the fourth and the fifth species under a continuat notion we easily resolve Aristotle's meaning by this distinction In the former part of the fourth species he a verreth That Monarchy in the dayes of the Heroes was in some things restricted wanting this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power And in the latter part of it he saith that in ancient times kings had that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Verily the man in this is very cryptick and unclear He speaketh of the dayes of the Heroes indesinitly So doth he of ancient times But opposing ancient times to the days of the Heroes they can be relative to no times but to the golden age which was immediately after the Deluge about 131 years All this time as is shewed already there was not so much as any politick government at all And to this Age immediately succeeded the time of Heroicisme Nimrod and many other heroick Blades immediately after that Age did breakforth who erected kingdoms and did many valiant acts And if we speak of the ancient times before the Flood we find also as is shewed already that contradistinguishing ancient times from the time of Heroicisme there was no kingly power set-up till men of renown and heroick spirits did erect it about the 1556 year of the world And all the while before which was the Golden Age before the Flood there was no kind of Politick government at all as is shewed already So then whether before or after the Flood the times of the Heroes did immediatly succeed to the ancient times And as in the ancient times there was no Monarchy or Regall power so it was firstly erected and set-up by the Heroes Therefore you may see that is very hard to purge Aristotle's meaning in this from errour Yet for respect I bear to the man I will put upon his words the best sense they can bear And so I suppose that he referreth both the parts of the fourth species to the dayes of the Heroes Now it cannot be denied but even amongst Heroes of the secondary kind there was difference of power some being of a more intense and some of a more remisse power No question those of them who in respect of time were prior to others were also in dignity and power prior to them I cannot think but how much more Regall power was in request so much more the power of it was extended Therefore was it as is shewed already that some kings were altogether illimited and uncircumscribed in power But in the fore-times of Heroicism Monarchy was more in request then in the after-times thereof And consequently those ordinary Heroes who had the first start of time before others of that same kind were of a more vast and intense power then they As they were superiour to them in time so likewayes in power In this sense Aristotle's words hold good if he refer the former part of the fourth species to the after-most times and ultimat center of Heroicisme and the latter part to the prior though not to the first times thereof You cannot say that the former part is relative to ordinary and the latter part to extraordinary Heroes It is already proved by us Conel 1. That extraordinary Heroes had more then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power They had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an arbitrary power to do what they listed These two Caligula speaking of himself to Antonia pertinently distinguisheth Remember saith he that I may do all things and that I have power to do to all men what I please Sucton in Calig cap. 29. Thus he putteth a difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power And beside this even ordinary Heroes namely the founders of primary Colonies had an absolute power without al restriction Con. 2. Where also is shewed that Heroes in after times as founders of after-Colonies had an absolute power though not so intense and uncircumscribed as founders of primary Colonies Such indeed had power to do all things though not to undo all things And so according to the rules of proportion as the after-Heroes were of lesse power then the former so the last of them had lesser power then any of them Aristotle saith That at last the power of Kings became exceedingly lessened This was after the flower of heroicism was quite faded This could not be at the first but hath come on by degrees After 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the erectors of primary Colonies had in-stepped 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which Aristotle saith was in ancient times i. e. in the times of the after-Heroes in and about the dayes of the founders of the secondary Colonies And then toward the close or in and about the middle time of Heroicism the Kingly power in some things became restricted as Aristotle saith And so he subjoyneth that at last it became exceedingly lessened Now you see that in reason no better construction can be put upon this fourth species of Monarchy assigned by Aristotle And for reverence of the man's memory I suppose that the third species of Royal power is taken by him both in an ordinary and extraordinary acceptation And he only illustrateth it as it is taken in an extraordinary sense because that way it is more material then the other way He passeth the illustration thereof as it is taken in an ordinary notion because so it is not only lesse material but also that way it is more clear then the other way Or I may say that Aristotle confoundeth these two notions together because comparitively aesymnetick Monarchy taken in an extraordinary notion may be called ordinary The reason of this is because men at least may be because of personal endowments more frequently called to govern in an absolute and ordinary way then for extraordinary Heroicism and such like Howsoever this I know that Aristotle reckoned-up no other kinds of Monarchy but such as have power to and do govern according to Law But these who are advanced to an illimited power because of personal endowments are not precisely called thereto to govern whether
tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty They seek nothing but their own ease and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion as the tyrant Cambyses did in seeking his german sister in marriage What Such hold will for Law They know nothing but Hoc volo sic jubeo sit pro ratione voluntas Juv. Satyr 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any They act will-way and not Law-way They were not judged because they did take power to themselves above all Law It cannot be denied but Salmasius concludeth well from 1 Son 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert that though this be true Rex judicat concerning the King of Israel according to God's institution the Law of the Nation and the practice of some of their Kings yet this is as true Rex non judicat concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings And it is very observable that Jannoeus whom they called Alexander all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews acted nothing according to Law but tyrannized over them fos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22 But in Gem. tract de Syned cap. 11. it is said that because of Jannoeus it was enacted that the king should neither judge nor be judged And if it be true that it was enacted then then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius of which the Rabbinick writers speak but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man who did not govern law-way but will-way And as Alexander so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius Jos Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments had exemption and immunity from Law This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law 1. Multrplication of wives Whereof David had very many 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2 Murder upon the back of adultery 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver 2. Horses and Charets 1 Kin. 10.2 Chron. 9.3 Wives And 4 he fell into adultery 1 Kin. 11. And yet we read no that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the 〈◊〉 And what I pray you could be the reason of this Not because the king de jure hathimmunity from Law Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes We read nothing of that And you shall not make me believe that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion if you alleadge that the Sanhedrin which de jure as both already and afterward doth appear had power over them durst not for fear of their resistance execute judgment on them That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers Which the Holy Ghost condemneth Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah And the people did so against Athaliah 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power that David and Solomon were spared Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them And why not also on David and Solomon They were all Kings alike And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death ten tribes declined the house of David because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke that therefore they did revolt from his son it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear of his power Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions because of his rare and singular qualifications Otherwise I can see nothing for it why the people did not make a mutiny against and revolt from Solomon as against and from Rehoboam 3. Because as both already and afterward doth appear the Sanhedrin both according to GOD's institution and the Law of the nation had authority and jurisdiction above the king But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it It had been all one to have wanted that authority with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served And this had been a having and a non-having power Which is ridiculous and repugnant Neither can you alleadge that they were spared because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt and knew not what it was to exerctse justice for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State that was under the reign of both these Kings Therefore seing David and Solomon were spared not because they were absolute nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute not knowing the way of exercising justice to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by because of their personall endowments The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me to voice for a David's off-cutting O! how much would my soul be grieved to sentence against a Solomon And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like I cannot think that I am singular in this In the interim observe that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them unlesse they could not have done otherwayes if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth But onely my meaning is that because of their eminent qualifications they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency Neither do I speak that they had this priviledge de jure but de facto Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists who object the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon as a ground of the King 's arbitrary power And in this none is more ready then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall
him and his own friends Putting him in mind how that Bias one of the Wisemen had desired him to come to Priene And if he did so he told him they meaning himself the rest of the Sages would flock about him I suppose their sympathizing in affection with Solon doth also insinuat their sympathizing with him in the matter of judgement 'T is storied that the Wiseman Chilo was the first who instituted the Lacedemonian ephori the representative of the people This is controverted Sosicrates saith Chilo did firstly institute the Ephorick Magistracy To this enclineth Laertius de vit Phil. lib. 1 in Chil. Herodot Xenophon and Satyrus say it was instituted by Lycurgus Aristotle and Val. Maximus by Theopompus Howsoever I may determine on either of these two 1. That Chilo was one of that Magistracy himself Which made his brother envie him 2. That not onely Lycurgus and Theopompus but also Chilo acted much for the maintenance and preservation of that Magistracy And in an epistle to Periander he spareth not to say that nothing is secure to a King nor is he happy though he should die in his bed without blood Pittacus one of the Sages after he had reigned about ten years over the Mityleneans willingly resigned the Kingdom Tell me if that man desired not people's liberty who though able to do so would not so much as keep them under an easie yoke for he did govern them according to most wholesome laws and constitutions And in his answer to Craesus he avoucheth that Law is the greatest commander Compare this speech with his practice and you will find he was a great friend to Democracy and people's liberty Cleobulus greatly sympathized with Solon in his exile And in his Epistle to him he desireth him to come and dwell beside him in Lind which he calleth a free City not subjected to Kings and Princes And there saith he you shall be free of all fear at Pisistratus hands Periander one of the Wise-men also though at the first both a King and Tyrant yet at last he appointed a Councell to govern at Corinth Which I must needs think was popular because in even-down terms he saith that popular government is better then Royall And how much he was taken with high and noble thoughts of the Sages and Wise-men doth more then appear from his Epistle directed to them Epimenides in his epistle to Solon saith that the Athentans before Pisistratus reigne being free and governed by most notable laws would not still lye under slavery and bondage Observe he calleth Kingly government servitude and bondage And in the interim he intreateth him to come and dwell beside him in Crete where there was no King to trouble him Anaximenes in his Epistle to Pythagoras commendeth him much for departing from Samos into Croton for avoiding the yoke of Monarchy And withall he regrateth his own condition for being not onely subjected to the Milesian Kings but also threatned by the Median King with bondage albeit the Ionians did contend for the liberty of all This made him dolefully cry out Oh how can I Anaximenes search out Heaven 's secrets being exposed to the hazard of death and bondage And it cannot be denied but Pythagoras was all the way for Democracy 1. Because Anaximenes writing to Pythagoras speaketh of liberty But sure I am Aristocracy doth as much if not more take-away liberty as Monarchy What it is the government of many Kings And the tyranny of many is worse then the tyranny of one 2. Because he went into Crete and Lacedemonia And being fully instructed in their Laws he returned from thence into Croton where he set-up a Councell consisting of a thousand members This could not but be popular if he followed the plat-form of the Cretian and Lacedemonian Commonwealths His government is called Aristocracy not as it is different from Democracy but because it was managed by the best It is evident from Anaximenes epistle to him that in the matter of government they were both of one judgment Secrates is onely for popular government He runneth so far on this way that he determineth upon these things 1. All within the Kingdom have capacity of governing 2. All things are common 3. All the people are either ground-tillers or souldiers I shall not stand here to repeat Aristotle's examination and censure on these things But shortly you shall have our judgment of them The first cannot be denied caeteris paribus for we suppose all who are fit to govern as occasion serveth should be admitted thereto And passing all carnall and naturall priviledges there is none of the people who per se and from nature hath any more power to govern then another Only qualification for conveniency of and vocation to governing do make the difference amongst men The second I cannot away with The community of wives and children I understand not It hath no ground either in the Law of GOD or of Nature But as for communication of riches I shall elswhere offer my judgement We heartily subscribe to the third for by ground-tillers he understandeth men of every trade and vocation contra-distinct from these who serve in the wars Thus I take the man not to be for idleness and Nobility And he holdeth idle men and Noble-men so called as unprositable yea as non-members in the Common-wealth So do I too He is for none such So am 1. From these three things Socrates concludeth That the Governours of the Commonwealth are that same way in respect of the people and these whom they govern even as other threeds are in respect of silk He would have the Magistrate shining and glorious in vertue far beyond the people Plato is fully of Socrates judgment De Rep. Arist Pol. 2. cap. 4. 'T is reported of him That the Arcadians and Thebans having desired him to institute and set-up Government amongst them he did it not because they would not admit equality as he learned And it is known that by Aristocracy he doth not understand that which is contradistinguished from Democracy No verily But he opposeth it not only to the consused multitude but also to the Government of these who are set-apart to govern because of some natural priviledges Thus by Aristocracy he understandeth the Government of the best And it is the very quintesscence and compleat form of Popular Government 'T is the square and mid-way of removing the tyranny of Monarchy and Oligarchy and the confusion of the popular multitude This kind of Government he desired Dion to promote and set-up amongst the Syracusians 'T is observable while as Dion was setting forward against Dionysius for restoring the Syracusians to liberty and the up-setting of Popular Government amongst them he was incited thereto and encouraged not only by Eudamus and the Governours of the Republick but also by Philosophers All of these unanimously assisted him Aristotle also in this is not wanting He concludeth Popular Government to be the best because it enclineth to mediocrity It