now That the popular Assembly could not debate Pub. Not orderly and maturely but upon such an occasion as this they will do as they can nor is it avoidable Val. Nay if there be some occasion in which you allow that the popular Assembly must and ought to debate there will hardly be any in which they will be perswaded that they may not So this will come to the pulling down of the Senate as often as the people please Pub. Which is so much the rather to be feared because you shall never find that popular Assembly which did ever actually depose their Senate Val. Our Army hath pull'd down a good many Parliaments Pub. What is that to the purpose is our Army a popular Assembly yet let them pull down a Parliament as often as they please they must set up another and in this indeed there may be some resemblance for let a popular Assembly pull down the Senate as often as they please they must set up another Val. Or a Single person Pub. Right for that holds both waies too and as to our case will stand neither Val. The people of Athens debated yet in that was not their Senate deposed Pub. Not formally but it remained little better then a Warrain wherein great men did as it were start Hares to be hunted in the tumult of the popular Assembly Val. Verily Publicola this model of yours is a most intire thing Pub. This with the necessary consequences as the division of the Senate into Senatorian Councils the adorning and actuating of this and the other Assembly with fit Magistrates whereof I have sufficiently Discoursed in other places amounteth unto an intire thing Val. And you offer it freely Pub. I do Val. Would it not grieve you to see them crop a little of it and spoil it Pub. They had better take it to some purpose Val. Nay what they take will be to some purpose I warrant you Come there is a party a select a refined party a Nation in a Nation must and will govern Pub. That is it which I desire to see Val. You are of a rare temper happy in unhappiness Pub. O I love often changes Val. Is that any of your virtues Pub. Yes where we are certain never to go right while there remains a way to go wrong Val. They are confident men They cannot be perswaded but they can govern the world Pub. Till they have tried Such as can govern the world are such as can be governed by reason Now there is no party refin'd select or what you will in England amounting to one twentieth part of the whole people Val. One twentieth part of the people for ought I know may amount unto one hundred thousand there is no party any thing neer this account I dare say Pub. A twentieth part of the people can never govern the other nineteen but by a perpetual Army Val. They do not like that the worse Pub. The people having been governed by a King without an Army and being governed by a Commonwealth with an Army will detest the Government of a Commonwealth and desire that of a King Val. Yes such is the spirit of the Nation Pub. Such is the spirit in this case of any Nation Val. And yet they make it a particular quarrel Pub. They make every thing particular if you speak of Israel Athens Rome Venice or the like they hear you with volubility of countenance and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of Government till he brought them in play Nay though they have come heels overhead for this very thing I know not how often yet they are resolved to take no warning Val. Publicola you will be shent Pub. I am to perform my duty To flatter is not my duty Val. But between you and me do you not think that the spirit of the Nation or the main body of the people of this Land desires the restitution of their antient Government Pub. I make little doubt of it Val. How then in case of a Commonwealth are they to be trusted Pub. In case of a Commonwealth it is not the people that are trusted but the orders of the Commonwealth Val. The Commonwealth must consist of the people Pub. The people under the Monarchy when that invaded them invaded it Val. True and in such manner as hath caused the ruine of it Pub. What was the spirit of the people then Val. But it is now another thing Pub. Nay the very same for then it invaded a Government that invaded their liberty and now it would invade a Government that invadeth their liberty Val. But how should this be mended Pub. Do you not see that this should not be mended but encouraged Val. How should it be encouraged then Pub. By giving them a form that must preserve their liberty Val. I little doubt but there is in your form a full security unto the people of their liberty but do you think that there is in it any full security that the people shall not cast off this form Pub. If it secure their liberty why should they Val. My question is not why they should but whether they can Pub. They cannot without going against their own interest Val. But they can go against their own interest Pub. Nay remember your self whether the form shewn be not such as you have already granted can in no wise go besides the interest of the whole people Val. They that are now in power have no trust at all in forms Pub. Do they sail in Ships not upon planks do they ride Horses not Hogs do they travail in Coaches not upon Hurdles do they live in Houses not in Ditches do they eat Bread not Stones Val. Enough enough Pub. But in so doing they acknowledge such a form to be security for such an use or action And must the forme of a Commonwealth be the onely forme in which they can allow no security for the proper use and action Tal. They observe none of this Pub. Do they observe that there is any security in men Val. That especially in our times were somewhat an hard matter Pub. And how many securities are there Val. I know no more then one personal or in men another real or in things Pub. Chuse you whether you would have Val. Well be the necessary action or use of your form what it will I would see it more plainly and particularly demonstrated how the spirit of the Nation or the whole people being freely eligible into your Assemblies must presently lose that inclination which now plainly they have to set up Monarchy or to persecute for Conscience Pub. You will allow no weight in the Argument that a people in liberty unless the orders of their Commonwealth were first fundamentally ruined that is broken in the balance or foundation did never do either of these Val. What weight soever I allow unto this Argument it is no wise to my present purpose Pub. You will put me then besides experience and to
have you try something of this kinde and begin upon some known principle as this All power is in the people Pub. Content But the diffusive body of the people at least in a Territory of this extent can never exercise any power at all Val. That is certain Pub. Hence is the necessity of some form of Government Val. That is the people of themselves being in a natural incapacity of exercising power must be brought into some artificial or political capacity of exercising the same Pub. Right Now this may be done in three ways as first by a single person Val. How Pub. Nay I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point but as you were intimating very now there are Royalists who derive the original right of Monarchy from the consent of the people Val. There are so Pub. And these hold the King to be nothing else but the Representor of the People and their Power Val. As the Turk Pub. Yes as the Turk Val. The peoples power at that rate comes to the peoples slavery Pub. You say right and so it may at other rates too Val. As how Pub. Why as I was about to say The power of the people may be politically brought into exercise three ways by a single person by an Assembly consisting of a few or by an Assembly consisting of many Val. Or by a mixture Pub. Nay I pray you let that alone yet a while for which way soever you go it must come at length to some mixture seeing the single person you named but now without his Divan or Council to debate and propose to him would make but bad work even for himself But as the Government cometh to be pitched fundamentally upon one of these three so it differ's not only in name but in nature Val. I apprehend you as Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy Pub. Nay you are out with your learning when you have forbidden it me But in Countries where there is not a Nobility sufficiently balanced or enriched there can be none of your Aristocracy and yet there may as long as it will last be a Government in a few Val. What call you that Pub. Nay what say you Val. Come it is Oligarchy when all is done some words of Art we must use Pub. I thought you would come to it and yet seeing I have promised I will be sparing But with your pardon you have disordered my Discourse or by this I had shewed that if the Power of the people be committed to a single Person the common interest is submitted unto that of a Family and if it be committed to a few it is submitted to the interest of a few Families Val. Which so many times as they are more then one is so many times worse then Monarchy Pub. I am not sorry that you are of that mind For there is no such thing as a Commonwealth or as you say Democracy in nature of it be not pirched upon a numerous Assembly of the people Val. What call you numerous Pub. Why an Assembly such for number as can neither go upon the interest of one single Person or Family nor the interest of a few Persons or Families Val. How will you constitute such an Assembly Pub. Commonwealths for the constitution of their Popular Assemblies have had two waies The first by inrolling all their Citizens and stating the Quorum in such sort that all to and above the stated number repairing at the time and place appointed are impowered to give the Vote of the whole Commonwealth Val. The Athenian Quorum was six thousand which towards the latter end of that Commonwealth came to five Pub. So so you may quote Authors But you may remember also that Athens was a small Commonwealth Val. How many would you advise for England Pub. Put the case I should say ten thousand Val. They will laugh at you Pub. What can I help that or how many would you advise Val. I would not go above five thousand Pub. Mark you then they only that are nearest would come and so the City of London would give Law unto the whole Nation Val. Why really that same now is clear but would there be less danger of it in case you stated your Quorum at â—en at twenty or though it were at an hundred or two hundred thousand Pub. No for which cause as to England it is a plain case that this is no way for the institution of a popular Assembly Val. Which way then Pub. For England there is no way but by Representative to be made rise equally and methodically by stated election of the people throughout the whole Nation Val. Need this be so numerous as the other Pub. No Val. Why Pub. Because it is not obnoxious unto a party to any certain rank or such as are soonest upon the spur or make least account of their pains or of their mony Val. Will you be so curious Pub. Hold you this a curiosity How else will you avoid improvement in the interest of the better sort to the detriment of those of meaner rank or in the interest of the few to the detriment of that of the many Val. Even this way then there is danger of that foul beast the Oligarchy Pub. Look about you The Parliament declares all power to be in the people is that in the better sort only Val. Stay the King was to observe Leges constitutiones quasâ— vulgus elegerit that vulgus is to be understood of the Parliament and the Parliament consisted wholly of the better sort Pub. It is true but then that Commonwealth went for the rest accordingly Val. It was you will say no Democracy Pub. And will you say it was Val. No truly yet this derived in part from the free election of the people Pub. How free seeing the people then under Lords dared not to elect otherwise then as pleased those Lords Val. Something of that is true but I am perswaded that the people not under Lords will yet be most addicted unto the better sort Pub. That is certain Val. How then will you prevent the like in your institution Pub. You shall see presently The diffusive body of the People in which the Power is and is declared to be consisteth in the far greater part of the lower sort wherefore their Representative to rife naturally and to be exactly comprehensive of the common interest must consist also in the far greater part of the lower sort Val. Of what number will you have this Representative Pub. Say a thousand or there about Val. What proportion will you have the meaner sort in it to hold unto the better Pub. Say about six to four Val. How will you order it that it shall be so constituted Pub. Why thus let the people in every Precinct or Shire at Election chuse four under one hundred pounds a year in Lands Goods or Money together with three at or above that proportion Val. I see not but this Representative must be exact Pub. It is
yet none at all that is unless you presume Changes for one thousand without change governing the whole people amounteth neither to a Representative nor to a Commonwealth but comes still unto your hard name Val. How do you order your changes Pub. By annual election of one third part for three years Val. So that every year one third part of your Assembly falls out of it and a new third part at the same time enters into the same Pub. Even so Val. This causeth the Representative to be perpetually extant Pub. It doth so But to respite that a little I should be glad before I stir farther to know which way the Vote of a Representative thus constituted can go one hairs beside the common and publick interest of the whole diffusive body of the people Val. No way in the earth that I can imagine except through ignorance Pub. No Humane Ordinance is infallible and what is done through meer ignorance or mistake at one time will be found and amended at another Val. A thousand men and six to four of the lower sort perpetually extant this must be a grievous charge to the most of them it will be hard to bring them and impossible to hold them together Pub. Upon such as are elected and come not considerable Fines must be levied and such as come and stay together must have good Salaries Val. Salaries to so many what will that come to Pub. Not with the rest of the Pomp of the Common-wealth unto three hundred thousand pounds a year Val. Why the Kings have rarely had above six Pub. And did England ever grudge them of that proportion Val. I must confess the quarrel grew when they would not be contented with so little Pub. Now if England never did nor needed grudge a King of six hundred thousand pounds a year to be spent among Courtiers why should we imagine she should grudge a Commonwealth of three hundred thousand pounds a year to be spent among Magistrates Val. But Parliament-men have taken nothing Pub. Have the people given nothing Val. That was for the maintenance of Armies Pub. And whether had you rather maintain Armies or Magistrates Val. But putting the case that this Assembly needed not to be perpetually extant this charge in the whole or in the far greater part might be abated Pub. I cannot tell for how often think you fit that this Assembly should convene Val. Parliaments at the most met not above once a year Pub. If they had been perpetually extant there would have been no King Val. No truly except in name only Pub. Therefore the popular Assembly in a Common-wealth ought not to be perpetually extant Val. To the end you will say that there may be some King Pub. Mock not or what other guard of liberty is there in any Commonwealth but the popular Assembly Val. Come let them assemble twice a year upon their ordinary guard Pub. And what if there be extraordinary occasion Val. Then as often as there is any such occasion Pub. How much will this abate of their necessary charge or of the Salaries And how much better were it for a Representative to lead the life of States-men then of Carriers Val. Commonwealths whose Assemblies have been of the former kind have called them no otherwise then at stated times or upon extraordinary occasions Pub. But then their Assemblies were not equal Representatives but consisted of such as being next at hand were still ready upon any occasion Val. That makes indeed a considerable difference But were this Representative always extant I cannot see but it would have nothing to do Pub. And in case it be not always extant you imagine that it may have something to do Val. Yes Pub. Then whether goeth it better with the Common-wealth when the Representative hath something to do or when it hath nothing to do Val. This is very quaint Pub. No truly Valerius it is plain that the guard of Liberty perpetually extant in doing nothing must do much and not perpetually extant in doing much may do nothing Val. I am affraid that having nothing to do they will make work Pub. Such I warrant you as the Parliament and the Army made the other day Val. Nay I am not so wide A civil Council and a standing Army must needs have interests much more distinct then two civil Assemblies and where there is not like cause I know well enough there cannot be the like affect Pub. I shall desire no more then that you will hold you to this and then tell me what disputes there use to be between the Senate of Venice and the great Council which is perpetually extant and consisteth of about two thousand Val. Nay certain it is that between those two there never was any dispute at all Pub. Then tell me for what cause such a thing should any more happen between the Assemblies proposed or according to your own rule from like causes expect like effects Val. You put me to it Pub. Nay it is you that put me to it for you will be presuming that this Assembly can have nothing to do before we come to consider what are their proper businesses and Functions Val. Cry you mercy and what are those Pub. Why surely no small matters for in every Commonwealth truly popular it is inseparable from the Assembly of the people that first they wholly and onely have the right of result in all matter of Law-giving of making peace and War and in levying men and money Secondly that the ultimate Result in Judicature lie unto them and thirdly that they have right to call unto account and to punish their Magistrates for all matter of Male-administration of Government Val. I assure you this must amount unto a great deal of business Pub. Certain it is that in some Commonwealths the popular Assembly by this means hath been perpetually employed Val. And so I think it might be in England Pub. It might but I do not think it would However if it be in the undoubted right of the popular Assembly to proceed against their Magistrates for Male-administration would you leave it upon the hand of those Magistrates whether this Representative should assemble or no Val. Come you have said enough it were not prudent but as to the matter of Appeals it is certain that in Israel the ultimate resort was to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders Pub. I know it very well nevertheless you shall find that the Congregation judged Benjamin and if you mark the appeal unto the 70 Elders you shall find that it was not an appeal of the party for relief but of the Judges in inferiour Courts for further light and direction in difficult cases of the Law Val. Let me but know in what manner this Assembly is to perform these Functions and I have done Pub. Why as to matter of Law-giving I told you that they wholly and onely have the right and power of result Val. But to Result there must necessarily go precedent Debate seeing