to any which demanded it and although he ende avoured by all means to conceal his preparation for War yet the Embassadors found him a juggler and peceived several of his practices against their State With the Duke therefore they renewed their League procured an amity with the Genoeses compos'd the differences about the reprisal and many other things which had formerly obstructed it they tryed all ways to frustrate or break the Treaty and they went so far as to supplicate the great Turk to banish all Florentines out of his Country but that Emperour would not hearken The Florentine Embassadors were prohibited entrance into the Dominions of the Venetian because forsooth they were in League with the King of Aragon and could not send any Embssâ—â—aes without his participation The Siennesi received their Embassadors treated them well lest they should be overrun before the League could relieve them and therefore they thought it best to collogue and lull those Arms a sleep which they were not able to resist It was conjectured then that the Venetian and King both sent Embassadors to justifie the War but the Venetian Embassador being refus'd likewise to be admitted into the territories of Florence the King 's denied to do that office alone and the whole Embassie came to nothing by which the Venetians found themselves us'd with the same rudeness and contempt which not many months before they had exercis'd upon the Florentines In the midst of these apprehensions the Emperour Federigo 3. pass'd into Italy to be crown'd and on the 30th of Ianuary 1451 enter'd into Florence with an equipage of 1400 Horse He was honorably entertain'd there by the Senate and continued with them to the 6th of February upon which day he departed for Rome in order to his coronation where having performed that ceremony and celebrated his nuptials with the Empress which was come thither by Sea he departed again for Germany returned by Florence where all the old honors were retreated and having been oblig'd in his passage by the Marquess of Ferrara he gave him a grant of Modena and Reggio as a reward But the Florentines were not by all those solemnities diverted from their preparations for their own reputation and the terror of their Enemies the Duke and they had enter'd into a League with France which with great joy and ostentation they publish'd all over Italy In the month of May 1452 the Venetians not thinking it fit to dissemble any longer invaded the territories of the Duke of Milan by the way of Lodi with 16000 Horse and 6000 Foot whilst at the same time the Marquess of Monferrat upon some designs of his own or the stimulation of the Venetians assaulted him on the other side by the way of Alexandria The Duke had got an Army together of 18000 Horse and 3000 Foot with which after he had furnish'd Alexandria and Lodi with strong Garisons and fortified all places where the Enemy might offend him he fell into the Country of Brescia where he did great mischief to the Venetians both parties plundring the Countries and burning such Towns as were not able to defend themselves but the Marquess of Monferrat being defeated not long after by the Garison at Alexandria the Duke was at more leisure to infest and make his inroads into the Countries of the Venetian Whilst the War was carried on in Lombardy in this manner with various but inconsiderable accidents the Wars in Tuscany was commenced betwixt the King of Aragon and the Florentines and manag'd with as little ardour and success as the other Ferrando a natural Son of Alfonso's march'd into Tuscany with 12000 Men under the command of Federigo Lord of Urbin His first enterprize was to assault Faiano in Valdisciana for the Siennesi being their friends they enter'd that way into the Florentine dominions the Castle was weak the walls but indifferent the Garison but small yet those they had within it were valiant and faithful the whole number which were sent for the security of that place not exceeding 200. Before this Castle Ferrando encamped and either their courage was so little without or theirs so great within that it took him up 36 days before he could master it Which time gave the Florentines great convenience of providing other places of higher importance and drawing their force together and disposing them into better order than otherwise they could have done This Castle being taken the Enemy march'd into Chianti where they attempted two little Towns which were held by a few private Citizens and were repuls'd Leaving them they remov'd to Castellina a little Castle upon the confines of Chianti and sate down before it This Castle was about ten miles from Sienna weak in its works but weaker in its situation yet in neither so weak as the courage of the assailants for after 44 days seige and all the art and force they could use they were glad to draw off and leave the Castle as they found it So little formidable were the Armies in those days and so inconsiderable the Wars that those places which are now deserted as impossible to be kept were then defended as if they had been impossible to have been taken Whilst Ferrando was with his Army in Chianti he made many incursion into the Country of Florence running up with his parties within six miles of the Town to the great terror and detriment of their subjects who having got together about 8000 Souldiers under the Command of Astorre de Faenza and Gismondo Malatesta held off from the Enemy towards the Castle of Colle being unwilling to come to a Battel because they knew if they lost not their Army there was no danger of the War for the little Castles which should be taken would be restored upon the peace and the great Towns were secure the King had likewise a Fleet of about twenty Vessels Gallies and Foists in the Sea of Pisa which Fleet whilst La Castellina was assaulted by Land was imploy'd by the King to batter the Castle of Vada that stood upon the Sea and they did it so effectually that in a short time by the inadvertency of the Governor they got it into their hands from whence afterwards they ran over the whole Country thereabouts but those excursions were presently restrain'd by certain Florentine Souldiers which were sent to Campiglia The Pope in the mean time concerned himself no farther than to mediate an accord But though he was so tender in engaging abroad in any action of War he found himself at home in no little danger There was at that time in Rome a person call'd Stephano Porcari a Citizen born of good extraction and learning but most eminent for the Generosity of his mind This Stephano was ambitious as most are which are desirous of Glory to perform or at least attempt some thing that might make him memorable to posterity And nothing occur'd so honourably to his thoughts as to deliver his Country from the insolence of the
Romans had in those times much controversie with the Tuscans and their Confederates I shall enlarge my self something in the explanation of their affairs of which though there be but little Monument in History yet we are assured that before the greatness of the Romans the Tuscans were very powerful both by Sea and by Land of which power it is no small argument their sending a Colony into the Mare superum to a place called Adria which grew so considerable and famous that it denominated that whole Sea and it has been called the Mare Adriaticum ever since It is known likewise that their Empire extended from the Tyber to the foot of the Alps which comprehends the greatest part of Italy at this day though 200 years before the Romans came to any considerable strength the Tuscans received a great defeat by the Gauls who under the Command of Bollovesus either in quest of new quarters or tempted by the pleasantness of the Country having passed the Alps possessed themselves of that Province called Lombardy and gave it the name of Gallia Cisalpina after which they turn'd out the Natives settled themselves there and built several Cities which they enjoyed till in process of time they also were supplanted by the Romans And this was the method of the Tuscans proceeding and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours which was no less than XII Cities of which Clusium Veii Fesulae Aretium and Volterra were the chief but yet with all their assistance they could not exceed the limits of Italy nor indeed conquer all that for reasons which we shall mention hereafter Another way of extending your Empire is by associating with several Cities but so as that the dignity of the Command the seat of the Empire and the honour of the Enterprize may remain with you which was the way observed by the Romans The third is the way of the Spartans and Athenians who entertained no Confederates but what ever Territories they Conquered they annexed them to their own which way is undoubtedly the worst of the three as appeared by the two said Republicks who were ruined upon no other account but because they had grasped more Dominion than they were able to hold For it is a thing in it self very arduous and difficult to keep a City in subjection by a continued force especially if ever it was free wherefore unless your Citizens be very numerous and your associates very considerable by whose assistance you may be able to keep what you conquer it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much and the Spartans and Athenians miscarrying in their way miscarried likewise in their end and all their great conquest came to nothing The Romans took the second way and succeeded to that vast and extraordinary power by associating equally in many things with many States but reserving always to themselves the Seat of the Empire and the chief command in their Wars by which means it came to pass that their Confederates ere they were aware subjected themselves to the Romans at the expence of their own labour and blood For after they had carried their Arms out of Italy reduced several Kingdoms into Provinces and the Inhabitants being accustomed to live in subjection without much difficulty submitted the Romans bearing the name of the War and the Nations that were conquered knowing nothing of their Allies submitted to their dominion and would own no body else whereby it happen'd that their associates in Italy being over-powred by the multitude of provinces which had submitted to the Romans and by the strength and populousness of Rome began to find their error by degrees but too late and when they had no way left to defend themselves for if any of them conspired they were quickly suppressed and made Subjects of Associates This way of administration and enlarging their Empire was peculiar to the Romans no other people observed it and certainly no betâ—er is to be found The next way of confederating which was practised by the Tuscans Achaians and Aetolians in old time and by the Swizzers of late is the best way next to that of the Romans for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire the Confederacy consisting of so many free Cities which being all to be consulted makes their resolutions very tedious besides the Citizens are not so vigorous in a War where the prize is to be divided into so many parts yet for these reasons it has two advantages of the third First whatever it gains it keeps a long time and loses very hardly and secondly it engages not so rashly in War but enjoys with more ease and felicity the blessings of peace for they are longer in their consultations and debates where there is to be a general Dyet and Convention than where things are to be dispatched within the Walls of one City Besides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds which have not been exceeded by any example we can find For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated they admit no more into the League as holding themselves enough and sufficient for their defence nor are they much solicitous of extending their Empire because they are under no necessity of making themselves stronger and their conquest would be of little advantage to every particular State for they would be forced upon one of these two rocks either to incorporate them into their League and then the multitude would breed confusion or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue When therefore they are got to such a number in their association as that they seem safe against foreign invasion and strong enough to defend themselves They take one of these two ways either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their protection by which means they draw vast sums of Mony sometimes that are easily distributed or else they â—ight for other people and receive pay from this or that Prince as the Swizzers do now and other Nations have done of old To this purpose Titus Livius gives us an account That at a conference betwixt Philip of Macedon and Titus Quintus Flaminius an Aetolian Praetor being present there happening some words betwixt the said Praetor and King Philip King Philip reproached him by the avarice and inconstancy of his Country as a people that were not ashamed to take pay on one side and send supplies to the other by which means it was frequently seen that in both Armies the Aetolian Colours were displayed from whence we may conclude that this way of proceeding by League and Confederacies has been always the same and has had the same effects The third way of subjecting your conquests and annexing them to your own dominions is very incommodious and instable and if it were so to a Commonwealth well constituted and armed it must needs be much worse to a Government that is weak as most of the Italian States are at this day but the Roman way is the best and
dispatched in a short time And whoever considers their Wars from the beginning of Rome to the Siege of the Veientes will find that they were determined in a very short time some in six some in ten and some in twenty days For their Custom was upon the first appearance of a War immediately to draw out their Army and seeking out the Enemy they did what they could to bring him to a Battel having beaten him by reason of the surprize The Enemy that his Country might not wholly be harrassed for the most part proposed an agreement in which the Romans were sure to insist upon some part of their Territory which either they converted to their particular profit or consigned to some Colony which was to be placed there for the security of their Frontiers by which means the wars being ended in a short time their Conquests were kept without any considerable expence for the Colony had that Country for their pay and the Romans had their Colonies for their security Nor could there be any way more advantagious and safe for whilst there was no enemy in the field those guards were sufficient and when any Army was set out to disturb them the Romans were always ready with another in their defence and having fought them they commonly prevailed forced them to harder conditions and returned when they had done by which means they gained daily upon the enemy and grew more powerful at home and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before Veii where they altred their method and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war whereas before that their wars being short there was no necessity of paying their Armies Nevertheless though they paid their Souldiers from that time and maintained war at greater distance whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could with respect to the circumstances of place and time for which reason they continued their Colonies and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able the ambition of their Consuls contributed exceedingly for their Consulships being but for a year and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home they were as diligent and vigorous as possible because they were not capable of triumphing till the war was concluded and then for continuing their Colonies the great advantage and convenience that resulted from them was sufficient to prevail This practice therefore was observed perpetually among the Romans in the management of their wars only they varied something about the distribution of the prey in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times either because they thought it not so necessary when the Souldiers were paid or else because their spoils being greater than before they thought convenient that the publick should have its share that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people and by this way their Coffers were filled in a short time So that by these two ways by the distribution of their prey and the setling of Colonies Rome grew rich by its wars whereas other Princes and States without great discretion grow poor and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the Aerarium that by degrees it came to that pass no Consul was permitted to triumph unless he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold or some other inestimable commodity and put it into the treasury So that the designs of the Romans tended wholly to this to finish the war quickly by forcing the enemy to a Battel or else to harrass and tire them with frequent excursions that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions they might make their advantage and become more powerful and rich CHAP. VII What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies I Think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of Land which the Romans assigned to every single person in their Colonies for I believe they gave more or less according to the barrenness or fertility of the soil and that in all places they were sparing enough And the first reason that induces me is that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded another is because living at home indigent themselves it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich and in this I'am much confirm'd by Livy where he tells us that upon the taking of Veii the Romans sent a Colony thither and in the distribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres and a little more according to our measure They might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplyed by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Pastures and Woods to sustain their Cattel and supply themselves with firing without which a Colony could hardly subsist CHAP. VIII What it is that disposes some people to leave their native Countries to dispossess other people SEeing I have spoken already of the Military Discipline of the Romans and how the Tuscans were invaded by the French it follows properly enough that we say something of their several kinds of War which are two one sort of commenced upon the ambition of some Prince or commonwealth in hopes to extend and enlarge his Empire as those wars which were made by Alexander the Great by the Romans and by one Prince against another which wars though dangerous are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants and drive them out of their Country for the Conqueror contents himself with his Victory and the submission of the people allows them their own Laws and many times their Estates The other kind of war is much more dangerous and destructive and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children compelled either by hunger or war leaves its own Country to fix themselves somewhere else not to extend their dominion or exercise any authority as in the other but to kill or expel all the Natives and possess themselves of their Estates This war indeed is most bloody and dreadful as Salust shews very well in the end of his Bellum Iugurthinum where after Iugurtha was beaten speaking of the invasion of the Gauls he tells us Cum caeteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum cum Gallis de singulorum hominum salute With other Nations the Romans fought only for Empire and Dominion with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the first way it is sufficient if those who are at the Helm be removed or destroyed in this every mans life is in danger for when a whole Nation transplants and invades a new Province not
you have me blame them Cosimo Because several wise men have always condemn'd them Fabritio I think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of Souldiers a man may be thought wise 't is possible and be no such thing Cosimo The ill success which those Trained-bands have always had is a great argument of the truth of that opinion Fabritio Have a care the fault was not more in you than in them of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my discourse Cosimo You will do us a very great favour But I will tell you first in what it is this Militia is condemn'd that you may afterwards justifie it the better CHAP. VII Of the inconvenience and convenience of Trained-Bands or a settled Militia Cosimo IT is objected that either they are experienced and useless and then to rely upon them is to ruine the State Or else they are ready and skilful and strong and then he who has the command of them may do what he pleases They instance in the Romans who lost their liberty by these kind of men They instance likewise in the Venetian and the King of France the first of which makes use only of foreign Arms lest some time or other they should fall under the subjection of some of their Citizens and the latter has disarmed his Subjects with the more ease to keep them under command But those who are against these Trained-Bands are more fearful when they are raw and inexperienced than otherwise and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons One is because they are unskilful the other is because they are unwilling and they say that people any thing in years never learn any thing well and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars Fabritio The reasons which you have alledged are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance as I shall demonstrate plainly And first as to their unserviceableness I say there are no Souldiers more useful than ones own Subjects and no Subjects can be ordered a better way And this being clear and indisputable I will not spend time in proving it farther because I have the concurrence of all ancient History to confirm it As to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged I say and it is true that inexperience makes a man cowardly and force makes a man Mutinous but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming and exercising and accommodating them well as shall be shown in my following discourse But as to the point of force you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a Prince are neither to be altogether press'd nor altogether Voluntiers because to have them altogether Voluntiers would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before it would not be a fair election and there would be very few go a long with you and wholly to force them would be as dangerous on the other side therefore a middle way is to be taken neither too forcible on the one side nor too frank on the other but such a one as may tempt them to the War out of their respect to their Prince whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments such a course as this tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul cannot be dangerous nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mischief I do not say that an army so chosen and exercised is absolutely invincible for the Roman Armies were many times overcome and Hannibal's Army was defeated wherefore an Army cannot be so ordered and disciplin'd that one may promise himself it shall never be broken The wise men therefore of whom you speak are not to calculate the uselesness of an Army from the loss of one Battle but are rather to believe that having miscarried once they will be more cautious afterwards and do something as occasion offers to expiate their disgrace and if the business should be thorowly examined it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much as want of perfection in their Order And this as I said before is to be provided against not by blaming or exploding the way of train'd men but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss and how that is done I will show you particularly As to your doubt that such an order of Souldiers meeting with an Officer equally disposed may usurp upon you and turn you out of your Government I answer that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects never did nor will do any harm And Cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with those than any other forces nay than they are commonly without them Rome had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together and yet kept its liberty intire Sparta preserved its liberty 800 years in the same posture several Cities have been disarmed and kept their liberties but how long Not forty years any of them and the reason is because great Cities have occasion for Soldiers and when they have none of their own they are forced to entertain Strangers which commonly do much more mischief than their own for they are more easily debauched and a popular Citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as Instruments of Usurpation and Tyranny when they have nothing but naked and unarmed people to destroy Besides a City ought in reason to be more fearful of two Enemies than one For in entertaining of Strangers a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives and to prove that this jealousie is natural and reasonable remember what I said before of Francis Sforza whereas a City which employs only her own inhabitants fears nobody else But to use one reason for all let me tell you no man ever established a Commonwealth or Kingdom who did not believe that the inhabitants if arm'd would be willing to defend it And had the Venetians been as wise in this as other Counsels they would have set up a new Monarchy in the World and they are the more inexcusable that have not because their first Legislators put arms into their hands and gave them ability to defend themselves But their territory being little at land they employed their arms only at Sea where they performed many great things to the enlargement of their Country But in process of time being forced to take arms by land for the relief of vicenza they entertained the Marquess of Mantoua into their service and made him their General whereas they should rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens and sent him to have engaged the enemy at land This unhappy resolution was that which clip'd the wings of their success and kept them from extending their Empire if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not so great in Land as in Sea affairs their diffidence was imprudent for a Sea Captain accustomed to
more modern transactions will tell us what to avoid Italy by those who commanded it was reduced into such a condition that when by agreements of the Princes a Peace was made up it was presently interrupted by those who had Arms in their hands so that they neither gained honour by their Wars nor quiet by their Peace A Peace being concluded betwixt the Duke of Milan and the League in the year 1433 the Soldiers unwilling to disband turned the War upon the Church These Souldiers were at that time of two Factions the Braccescan and the Sforzescan Faction Of this latter Conte Francesco the son of Sforza was Captain the first was commanded by Nicolo Piccinino and Nicolo Forte Braccio To these two parties all the rest of the Souldiers in Italy joyned themselves Of the two Sforza's party was most considerable as well for the courage of their Conte as for a promise the Duke of Milan had made him to give him in Marriage a natural daughter of his called Madona Bianca the probability of which alliance gained him great reputation After the Peace of Lombardy was concluded both these parties upon several pretended occasions turned their Arms against Eugenius the Pope Nicolo Forte Braccio was moved by an old animosity Braccio had always retained to the Church The Conte was spurr'd on by his ambition Nicolo assaulted Rome and the Conte possessed himself of la Marca whereupon the Romans to evade the War turned Eugenius out of Rome who fled to Florence though with no little danger and difficulty Being arrived there upon consideration of the danger he was in and that he was deserted by all the Princes who reâ—used upon his score to take up those Arms again which so lately and so willingly they laid down made his Peace with the Conte and gave him the Signorie of la Marca though the Conte had added insolence to his usurpation and in his Letters to his Agents dated them in Latin as they do frequently in Italy Ex Girifalco nostro Firmiano invito Petro Paulo But not contented with the Grant of that Country he would needs be created Gonfaloniere of the Church and the Pope condescended so much â—id his Holiness perfer an ignominious Peace before dangerous War The Conte upon these terms became a friend to the Pope and converted his Arms against Nicolo Forte Braccio betwixt whom for many Months together several accidents happened in the territory of the Church so that which side soever prevailed the Pope and his Subjects suffered more than those that managed the War At length by the mediation of the Duke of Milan an agreement in the nature of a Truce was concluded betwixt them by which both of them remained Masters of several Towns in the Patrimony of the Church The War was in this manner extinguished in Rome but it brake out again presently in Romagna by the means of Battista da Canneto who had caused certain of the Family of the Grifoni in Bologna to be assassinated and drove out the Pope's Governor and many others which he suspected to be his enemies to keep by force what he had got by surprize he address'd himself to Philippo for aid and the Pope to countermine him and revenge the injuries he had received applied to the Venetian and Florentine Both parties being supplied there were two great Armies in Romagna of a sudden Philp's Auxiliaries were commanded by Nicolo Piccinino The Venetian and Florentine by Gattamelata and Nicolo da Tolentino Not far from Imola they came to a Battel in which the Venetians and Florentines were defeated and Nicolo da Tolentino sent Prisoner to the Duke where he died in a few days either by Poison or grief The Duke being either impoverished by the War or apprehending this Victory would quiet the League followed not his advantage but gave the Pope and his Confederates opportunity to recruit who choosing the Conte Francesco for their General they sent him to drive Forte Braccio out of the Lands of the Church and to try if they could put an end to that War which they had begun in favour of the Pope The Romans seeing his Holiness in the field again and his Army considerable they desired to be reconciled and having concluded the terms they received a Governor from him Among other Towns Nicolo Forte Braccio had possessed himself of Fiboli Montefiasconi the City of Castello and Ascesi not being able to keep the field Nicolo was retreated into this latter Town and besieged by the Conte The siege proving long by the braveness of Nicolo's defence the Duke began to cast about and consider he must either hinder the League from carrying the Town or look to himself as soon as it was taken To give the Conte therefore diversion he commanded Nicolo Piccinino by the way to Romagna to pass into Tuscany whereupon the League judging the defence of Tuscany of more importance than the reducing of Ascesi they sent to the Conte to stop Piccinino's passage who was at that time with his Army at Furli Upon these orders the Conte raised his siege and marched with his Forces to Cesena having left the War of la Marca and the care of his own affairs to the management of his Brother Lione Whilst Piccinino was labouring to pass and Francesco to obstruct him Nicolo Forte Braccio fell upon Lione and with great honour to himself took him Prisoner plundered his people and following his blow took several Towns in la Marca at the same excursion This news was very unwelcome to the Conte who gave all his own Country for lost nevertheless leaving part of his Army to confront Piccinino he marched himself against Forte Braccio with the rest forc'd him to an engagement and beat him In which defeat Forte Braccio was hurt taken prisoner and died of his wounds This Victory recovered all that Nicolo Forte Braccio had taken from him and forced the Duke of Milan to desire a peace which he obtained by the mediation of Nicolo da Esti Marqeuss of Ferrara by which it was agreed that the Towns which the Duke had got in Romagna should be restored and his Forces withdrawn into Lombardy and Battista da Caneto as it happens to those who owe their dominion to the courage or power of other people as soon as the Duke's Forces were drawn off despairing to remain in Bologna upon his own legs quitted the Town and left it to re-admit its old Governor Antonio Bentivogli who was chief of the contrary party All these things succeeded during the banishment of Cosimo upon whose return those persons who were active in his restauration and those who had suffered more than ordinarily before concluded without regard to any body else to secure themselves of all the Offices in the State The Senate which succeeded for the months of November and December not satisfied with what their predecessors had done in favour of their party they lengthned the time changed the places of several
Officers of his Army advis'd him to give over his enterprize of Brescia and Verona and retire to Vicenza least otherwise the Enemy should encompass him where he was yet he would not consent but resolved to try his fortune for the recovery of Verona and turning about to the Venetian Proveditori and Barnardetto de Medici who assisted as Commissioner for the Florentines he encouraged them in their doubts and assured them he would retake it if any of the castles held out for him Having put all things in order and drawn out his Men he marched towards Verona with all expedition at first sight Nicolo imagined he was marching to Vicenza as he had been counselled by his officers But observing him to march on and direct his forces towards the Castle of S. Felice he thought it time to provide for his defence but all was too late the trenches and embarrasments were not finished the Souldiers separated and plundering and could not be got together time enough to hinder the Count from getting into the Citadel and from thence into the City to the great disparagement of Nicolo and detriment of his party who with the Marquess of Mantoua retreated first into the Citadel which they had taken and from thence escaped to the City of Mantoua where rallying the remainder of their forces they joyned themselves with the Army before Brescia so that in four days time Verona was won and lost by the Duke forces Being Winter time and the weather very cold the Count having after his Victory put in some supplies of victual into Brescia though with very great difficulty he removed his quarters to Verona having given order for the building certain Gallies to Forboli that Winter to be ready against the Spring that then he might be so strong both by land and by Water as to give Brescia an effectual and total relief The Duke seeing the War at a stand for a time and his hopes of being Master of Verona and Brescia at an end all which he attributed to the Counsel and supplies of the Florentines whose affection could not be alienated by all the provocations the Venetians had given them nor gained over to his side by all the promises which he had made them that they might be sensible of their own oversight and feel the inconveniences they had pulled upon themselves he resolved to invade Tuscany to which he was much encouraged by Nicolo and the Florentine exiles Nicolo's design was upon the possessions of Braccio and to drive the Count out of La Marca the other had an itching after their own Country and a mind to be at home so that both parties animated the Duke with such arguments as were most sutable to their particular designs Nicolo told him he might send him with an Army into Tuscany and leave Brescia besieged for he was Master of the Lake was well entrenched about the Town had several strong Castles in the Country and good Officers and Souldiers enough to resist the Count if he should make any attempt in another place which was not to be imagined till he had relieved Brescia and that was impossible so that if he pleased he might make War in Tuscany and not quite his enterprize in Lombardy he remonstrated besides that the Florentines would be constrained as soon as they saw him in Tuscany to call back the Count or be ruined and whichsoever of the two happen his Victory would be certain The exiles inculcated that if Nicolo came near Florence with his Army it was impossible but the People tired out with their Taxes and the insolence of the Grandees would take arms and revolt as to his passage to Florence they promised it should be easie and Casentino open to them by the interest and correspondence which Rinaldo held with that Governor so that the Duke inclinable of himself was much fortified and encouraged by their persuasions the Venetians on the other side though the Winter was very sharp press'd the Count to the relief of Brescia with his whole Army but he refused alledging it was not to be done at that time that better weather was to be expected and that in the interim their Fleet should be got ready and then it might be attempted both by Land and by Water which answer giving no satisfaction the Venetians became slow and remiss in sending them provisions so that in their Army many People died The Florentines having advertisement of all these passages were greatly dismaid seeing the War brought home to them of Tuscany and that in Lombardy not turn'd to account nor were they less fearful of the forces of the Church not that the Pope was their Enemy but that they found that Army at the devotion of the Patriarch who was their implacable adversary Giovanni Vitelleschi Cornetano was first Apostolical Notarie then Bishop of Ricanati after the Patriarch of Alexandria and being at last created Cardinal was called the Cardinal of Florence This Cardinal was a cunning and Couragious Person so capable of business that the Pope had a strong affection for him gave him command of the forces of the Church and in all the Popes enterprizes in Tuscany Romagna Naples and Rome he was constantly his General so that by degrees he gained so great authority both over the Army and the Pope that the Pope began to be afraid to command him and the Army to refuse their obedience to any body but he The Cardinal being at that time in Rome when the news arrived that Nicolo was marching into Tuscany The fear of the Florentines was highly increased because from the time of Rinaldo's expulsion that Cardinal had been an Enemy to their state for the Articles of agreement which were by his mediation procured in Florence were not made good but rather managed to the prejudice of Rinaldo he having been the occasion of his laying down his Arms that the occasion of his banishment so that the Government of Florence began to fear the time was come for the restauration of Rinaldo if he joyned with Nicolo in his expedition into Tuscany and their apprehensions were augmented by the sudden departure of Nicolo who seemed to them to leaven enterprize which he had almost compleated to embark himself in another ther that was more dangerous and doubtful which they presumed he would never have done without some private intelligence or unknown invitation these their apprehensions they had infused into the Pope who was grown sensible of his error in having transferred so much Authority upon other People But whilst the Florentines were in this suspence fortune presented them a way to secure themselves of the Patriarch that State had scouts abroad to intercept and peruse all letters to see if they could meet with any correspondence to the prejudice of the State at Monte Pulciano it happened a pacquet was taken which the Patriarch had written to Nicolo Piccinino without the knowledg or consent of the Pope Though the Character was
their followers to secure themselves of the palace took them along with him and being come to the Palace he left some of his company below with orders upon the first noise above stairs that they should seize upon the Gate whilst he and the rest of the Perugians went up into the Castle Finding the Senate was risen by reason it was late after a short time he was met by Cesare Petrucci the Gonfaloniere di Giustitia so that entring further with him and some few of his crew he left the rest without who walking into the Chancery by accident shut themselves in for the lock was so contriv'd that without the key it was not easily to be opened either within or without The Archbishop being entred with the Gonfaloniere pretending to impart some great matter to him from the Pope he accosted him in so confused and distracted a way the Gonfaloniere from the disorder both of his looks and expressions began to suspect sprung from him out of the Chamber with a great cry and finding Giacopo di Poggio he caught him by the hair of the head and delivered him to one of the Sergeants the noise running immediately to the Senators with such arms as they had about them they set upon the Conspirators and all them who went up with the Archbishop part being shut up and part unable to defend themselves were either kill'd or thrown alive out of the windows Of this number the Archbishop the two other Salviati and Giacopo di Poggio were hang'd Those who were left below had forc'd the Guards and Possessed themselves of the Gate insomuch that the Citizens which upon the first alarm had run into the Castle were not able to assist the Senate either with their counsel or Arms. Francesco de Pazzi in the mean time and Bernardo Bandini seeing Lorenzo escaped and one of themselves upon whom the hopes of that enterprize did principally depend most grievously wounded they were much dismaid Bernardo concluding all lost thinking to provide for his safety with the same courage as he had injured the Medici he made his escape Francesco being returned to his house tried if he could get on Horseback for orders were as soon as the fact was committed to gallop about the Town and excite the People to liberty and arms but finding he could not ride by reason of the deapness of his wound and the great quantity of blood which he had lost he desired Giacopo to do that office for him and then stripping he threw himself upon the bed Giacopo though an ancient Man and not versed in such kind of tumults to try the last experiment of his fortune he got on Horseback and with about an hundred Horse well armed and formerly prepared he marched towards the Palace caying out Liberty liberty to the People as he went along but some of them being deafned by their obligations to the Medici and the rest not desirous of any change in the Government none of them came in The Senators who were on the top of the Palace and had secured themselves as well as they could threw down stones upon their heads and frighted them with threats as much as possible Giacopo was in great confusion and knew not what to do when his cousin Giovanni Saristori coming to him and reproaching him by what was done already advised him to go home to his house and be quiet assuring him there were other Citizens who would be as careful of the People and their liberties as he Being therefore utterly destitute of all hopes Lorenzo alive Francesco wounded and no body appearing for him he resolved to save himself if he could and marched out of Florence with his Party at his heels and went towards Romagna In the mean time the whole City was in Arms and Lorenzo surrounded by a strong Party of armed men was reconveyed to his Palace The Senats Palace was recovered and all those who had possess'd it were either taken or killed The name of the Medici was with great acclamation cryed about the City and the members of those who were slain were either dragged or carried upon the point of their swords about the streets every body with great anger and cruelty persecuting the Pazzi Their houses were all broken up by the People Francesco naked as they found him in his bed was hurried out of his house to the Palace and hanged up by the Bishop and his Bretheren Yet with all their contumely by the way and all their affronts when he came there they could not provoke him to give them one word only he looked grim and fixed his eyes upon every one that abused him and without any other complaint he silently expired Guglielmo de Pazzi Brother-in-Law to Lorenzo was preserved in his house both out of respect to his innocence and the intercession of Bianca his Wife There was not a Citizen in all the City but went either armed or disarmed to Lorenzo in this exigence and proffered him both themselves and their fortunes so great was the kindness and interest which that family by their prudence and liberality had gained in the People Whilst this business happend Rinato di Pazzi was retired to his Country house intending to disguise himself and and escape if he could but he was discovered apprehended by the way and brought back again to Florence Giacopo was taken likewise passing the Alps for the Alpigines hearing what happened in Florence seeing him pass that way they persued took him and returned him to Florence nor could he prevail with them though several time he mades it his earnest request to kill him by the way Four days after this accident Giacopo and Rinato were condemned and put to Death bâ—t among all who were executed and they were so many that the streets and high ways were full of their limbs none was so much lamented as Rinato for he was always esteemed an honest good Man not guilty of that pride and arrogance which was observed in the rest of his family And that this story might not pass without an extraordinary instance of the fury of the People Giacopo who was buried at first in the Sepulchre of his Fathers afterwards was torn from thence as an excommunicated Person dragged out of the walls of the City and thrown into a hole and being taken up again his body was drawn in the same halter with which he was hanged naked about the streets and having no place allowed it to be quiet at land was at last thrown into the Arnus A great example of the inconstancy of fortune to see a person of his wealth and authority pulled so ignominiously in pieces and ruined with so many circumstances of contempt They spake indeed of his vices and of a strange propensity in him to swearing and play above the degree of the most profligate person but those infirmities were abundantly recompensed in his charity and benificence for he was a great reliever of the poor and endow'd several places of devotion
difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired especially if not absolutely new but as members annexed to the territories of the Usurper in which case such a Government is called mixed The tumults and revolutions in such Monarchies proceed from a natural crosness and difficulty in all new conquests for Men do easily part with their Prince upon hopes of bettering their condition and that hope provokes them to rebel bâ—t most commonly they are mistaken and experience tells them their condition is much worse This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new Prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his Army upon them Taxes or a thousand other inconveniences which are the perpetual consequents of conquest So that you make them your Enemies who suffer and are injured by your usurpation but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation or imploy strong remedies against them by reason of your obligations wherefore though an usurper be never so strong and his Army never so numerous he must have intelligence with the natives if he means to conquer a Province For these reasons Lewis XII of France quickly subdued Milan and lost it as quickly for the same People which open'd him their gates finding themselves deceived in their hopes and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected could not brook nor comport with the haughtiness of their new Soveraign 't is very true Countries that have rebelled and are conquered the second time are recovered with more difficulty for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or respect from the Usurper he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders exposing the suspected and fortifying where ever he finds himself weak so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time only by harrasing and infesting its borders the second time he recovered it it was necessary for him to arm and confederate the whole World against the said King and that his Army should be beaten and driven out of Italy and this happened from the foresaid occasions Nevertheless the French were twice dispossess'd The general reasons of the first we have already discoursed it remains now that we take a prospect of the second and declare what remedies the said King Lewis had or what another may have in his condition to preserve himself better in his new conquests than the King of France did before him I say then that Provinces newly acquir'd and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them are either of the same Country or Language or otherwise In the first case they are easily kept especially if the People have not been too much accustomed to liberty and to secure the possession there needs no more than to extirpate the Family of the Prince which governed before for in other things maintaining to them their old condition there being no discrepancy in their customs Men do acquiesce and live quietly as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy Bretagne Gascogne and Normandy which have continued so long under the Goverment of France for though there be some difference in their language nevertheless their Laws and customs being alike they do easily consist He therefore who acquires any thing and desires to preserve it is obliged to have a care of two things more particulary one is that the Family of the former Prince be extinguished the other that no new Laws or Taxes be imposed whereby it will come to pass that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old Principality But where Conquest is made in a Country differing in Language Customs and Laws there is the great difficulty their good fortune and great industry is requisit to keep it and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it would be for the Usurper to live there himself which would render his possession more secure and durable as the great Turk has done in Greece who in despight of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection had he not fixed his Imperial residence there would never have been able to have effected it For being present in Person disorders are discovered in the bud and prevented but being at a distance in some remote part they come only by hear-say and that when they are got to a head and commonly incurable Besides the Province is not subject to be pillaged by officers by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their Prince which disposes those to love him who are good and those to dread him who are otherwise and if any foreigner attacks it he must do it with more care and circumspection in respect that the Princes residence being there it will be harder for him to lose it There is another Remedy rather better than worse and that is to plant Colonies in one or two places which may be as it were the Keys of that State and either that must be done of necessity or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those parts which is much worse for Colonies are of no great expence The Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their Houses and Land for the subsistance and accommodation of the new Inhabitants who are but few and a small part of the State they also who are injur'd and offended living dispers'd and in poverty cannot do any mischief and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd will not stir lest they should mistake and run themselves into the same condition with their Neighbours I conclude likewise That those Colonies which are least chargeable are most faithful and inoffensive and those few who are offended are too poor and dispers'd to do any hurt as I said before And it is to be observ'd Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged or utterly destroy'd because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves but for great ones they cannot so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge But if in stead of Colonies an Army be kept on foot it will be much more expensive and the whole revenue of that Province being consum'd in the keeping it the acquisition will be a loss and rather a prejudice than otherwise by removing the Camp up and down the Country and changing their quarters which is an inconvenience every man will resent and be ready to revenge and they are the most dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses In all respects therefore this kind of guard is unprofitable whereas on the other side Colonies are useful Moreover he who is in a Province of a different constitution as is said before ought to make himself head and Protector of his inferior Neighbours and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such