of his wisdom and equity whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten as in the example of Solâ—man which may seem the reason why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in Place of publick justice after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate where for better performing of this Princely duty some speciall causes may be selected which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the Prince in Private with the help and advice oâ— his learned Councell and so be decided publickly as before is said by the Prince himself At least the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publick Justice that it may be known that he hath a care of justice and doing right to his people which makes the Iusticers also to be more carefull in performing of their duties 17. To be moderate in his Taxes and in positions and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse to do it by Parliament and with their consents making the cause apparent unto them and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them Finally so to use it that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects than an exaction by him 18. To stop small beginnings unto this end to compound the dissentions that rise amongst the Nobles with caution that such as are free be not drawn into parts whereby many times the Prince is endangered and the whose Common-wealth set in a combustion as in the example of the Barons War and the late Wars of France which grew from a quarrel betwixt the â—â—â—â—oâ— Faction and the other Nobility 19. To stir up the people if they grow secure and negligent of Armour and other provision for the Common-wealth by some rumour or fear of danger at home to make more ready when occasion requireth But this seldom to be used least it be supposed a false Alarm when there is need indeed 20 To have speciall care that his children especially the heir apparent have such bringing up as is meet for a King viz. in learning specially of matters pertaining to State and in Martiall exercise contrary to the practise of many Princes who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure and to spend their time in hunting c. which by reason of their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State II. Kingdoms new gotten or purchased by force are preserved by these means FIrst if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours or have the same tongue manners or fashions as have his own Countrey it is an easie matter to retain such Countries within their obedience in case the Princes bloud of the said Countrey be wholly extinct For men of the same quality tongue and condition do easily sâ—ole and combine themselves together so much the rather if the people of that Countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their own Liberty wherein especially is to be observed that the Laws and customs of that purchased Countrey be not altered nor innovated or at least it be done by little and little So the Bâ—rgundians and oquitans were annexed to France The reason because partlty they have been accustomed to serve and partly for that they will not easily agree about any other to be their Prince if the Bloud Royall be casâ— extinguished As for the invasion of a forreign Countrey where into the Prince hath no right or whereof the right heir is living It is not the part of a just Civil Prince much less a Christian Prince to enforce such a countrey and therefore the Machiavillian practises in this case to make sure work by extiguishing wholly the Bloud Royall is lewd and impertinent The like is to be said of murthering the Natives or the greatest part of them to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession A thing not onely against Christian Religion but it is inhumane injustice cruel and barbarous 2. The safest way is supposing a right that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall be thought meet be planted there in some part of the Province Castls Forts and Havens seized upon and more provided in fit places as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which Transplanted 10. Jews And of the Romans in France Tribes of the Germany Britain other places The reason 1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot are to be maintained within the Provinceâ— which cannot be done without great charge 2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victual carriages c. 3. For that Colonies are more sure and faithfull than the rest As for the Natives that are removed from their former seats they have no means to hurt and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly are content to be quiet The Turks practise in Asia where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Souldiers whom they call Timariâ—tae That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase especially for a time till things be well setled especially if the Province be great and large as the Turks in Greece The reasons 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order and get the good will of his new Subjects 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferiour Governours Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression 3. Because being present he seeth and heareth what is thought attempted and so may quickly give remedy to it which being absent he cannot do or not do in time 4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside then to take heed that the charge of Governing or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men and of other meet quality that depend wholly upon the Princes savour and not to Natives or other of their own Subjects that are gracious for their Nobility or Virtue especially if the Province be great and somewhat far distant which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects As for such Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes savour being not born but created Noble they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty and in case they would revolt yet they are not able to make any great strength for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers to keep them in Subjection and not for any ill will 5. To have the children of the chief Noble men and of greatest Authority Hostages with them in safe keeping the more the bettter For that no bond is stronger than that of nature to contain the Parents and Allies in obedience and they the rest 6 To
â—am Marti Quam Mercurio The Ho. ble and learned Knight Sr. Walter Raleigh Ro Vaughan sculp REMAINS of S ir Walter Raleigh viz. Maxims of State Advise to his Son his Sons advise to his Father His Sceptick Observation concerning the causes of the Magnificencie and Opulency of Cities His Letters to divers persons of quality With The Prerogative of Parliaments being a Dispute between a Counsellour of State and a Justice of Peace LONDON Printed for William Sheares Iunior in Westminster Hall 1657. MAXIMS OF STATE With Instructions to his SON and the SONS advice to his aged FATHER Whereunto Is added Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander and other Nations Proving that our Sea and Land Commodities inrich and strengthen other Countries against our own By Sir WALTER RALEIGH LONDON Printed for Will. Shears Junior at the Blue Bible in Bedford Street in Covent-garden 1656 The Contents OF Government Page 1 Of Policie 2 Of Monarchie 3 Of Aristocracie or Senatorie State 5 Of Free State or Popular State 6 Of Tyrannie 7 Of Olygarchie or the Government of a few ibid. Of a Common-wealth 8 Of causes of States and Common-wealths in generall 10 Of Founding a State ibid. Of Causes preserving State or Common-wealth 15 Of Mysteries or Sophisms ibid. Of Axioms or Rules of preserving a State 1-9 Rules for preserving of a Kingdom Hereditarie 25 Rules for preserving of a Kingdom Conquered 25 Kingdoms hereditarie are preserved at home by the ordering of a Prince ibid. Kingdoms new gotten or purchased by force are preserved by Rules 10 35 Rules politick of Tyrants 41 Sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny 42 Sophisms of the sophisticall or subtile Tyrant to hold up his State 46 Of preservation of an Aristocracie 53 Of preservation of an Olygarchie by Sophisms ibid. Of preservation of an Olygarchie by Rules ibid. Of Conversion of States in generall 59 Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts Generall and Particular ibid. Particular causes of Conversion of State are of two sorts 60 Of sedition 61 Causes of sedition are of two sorts ibid. Of Alteration without violence 64 A Method how to make use of the Book before in the reading of the storie 67 Old age is not ever unfit for publick Gouernment ibid. Example of the like practice in Charls the Fifth 68 Of observation for the Affirmative and the Negative ibid. Of defence for David in marrying Abishag 70 Politicall Nobility Of Adoâ—ijah aspiring to the Kingdom 71 Observations Of ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom and marks to discern them 73 Politicall Prince 75 The TABLE of the Chapters containd in Sr WALTER RALEIGH'S INSTRUCTIONS to his SON CHAP. Page VIrtuous persons to be made choice of Friends Great care to be had in the choosing of a Wife Wisest men have been abused by flatterers Prâ—vâ—â—e Quarrels to be avoided Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate What sort of servants are most fit to be entertained Brave rags wear soonest out of fashion Riches not to be sought by evil means ibid. What Inconveniences happen to such as delight in Wine Let God be thy protectour and directour in all thy Actions The Sceptick doth neither affirm neither deny any Position but doubteth of it and proposeth his Reason against that which is affirmed or denied to justifie his not Consenting Observations concerning the causes of the Magnificencie and Opulencie of Cities Safetie for defence of the people and their goods in and near a Town Causes that concern the Magnificencie of a Citie That the Seat of Government is upheld by the two great Pillars thereof viz. Civile Justice and Martiall Policie which are framed out of Husbandry Merchandise and Gentry of this Kingdom Sir Raleigh's letter to Mr Secretary Winwood before his Journey to Guiana To his Wife from Guiana To Sir Ralph Winwood To his Wife copied out of his own hand writing To his Wife after Condemnation To King James at his return from Guiana His third Letter to Secretary Winwood His Letter to Prince Henry touching the modell of a Ship His Speech immediately before he was beheaded Sir VValter Raleigh Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander and other Nations Proving that our Sea and Land Commodities inrich and strengthen other Countreys against our own FINIS MAXIMS OF STATE OF GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT is of two sorts 1. P rivate of himself Sobriety Of his Family called Oeconomy 2. Publick of the Common-wealth called Pâ—licy A man must first Govern himself ere he be fit to Govern a Family And his Family e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth Of Policie Policie is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth and some part of it according to that State oâ— form of Government wherein it is setled for the publick good State is the frame or set order of Common-wealth or of the Governours that rule the same especially oâ— the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest The State of Sovereignty consisteth in five points 1. Making or anulling of Laws 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates 3. Power over life and death 4. Making of War or Peace 5. Highest or last appeal Where these five are either in one or in more there is the State These five points of State rest either in 1. One Monarchie or Kingdom 2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom called an Aristocracie 3. Many called a Free-State or Popular State These three sorts of Government have respect to the common good and therefore are just and Lawfull States These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments viz. 1. Monarchie into 1. Tyrrannie 2. Aristocracie into 2. Oligarchie 3. Popular state into 3. Common-wealth or Government of all the common and baser sort and therefore called a Common-wealth by an usurped Nick-name These all respect their own and not the publick good and therefore are called Bastard Governments I Monarchie A Monarchie or Kingdom is the Government of a State by one head or chief tending to the common benefit of all Monarchie or Kingdoms are of three sorts touching the right or possession of them viz. 1. Hereditary by descent as the English French c. 2. Elective by suffrage of the other Orders of some of them as the Pâ—loniâ—â— 3. 〈◊〉 or of both kinds viz. descent yet not tied to the next bloud as the ancient Jewish State Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or Authority viz. 1. Intâ—re Where the whole power of ordering all State matters both peace and war doth by law custâ—â— appertain to the Prince as in the â—â—â—gest Kingdom where the Prince hatâ— power to make Laws League Waâ— To create Magistrates to pardon life Of appeal c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees thâ—â— have a suffrage in making Laws yâ—â— ever subject to the Princes pleasure nor Negative will 2. 〈◊〉 or restrained that haâ—â— no full power in all the points or matters of State as the
as Caesar in Rome In a Kingdom that there be no Senate or Convention of equall power with the Prince in State matters as in Poland 4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled and take heed of the contrarie practise as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom or Aristocracie And secondly to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve and what hurreth or altereth the present State 5. To that end to have certain Officers to pay abroad and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort agreeable to the present State but desire rather to bee under some other form or kind of Government 6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money nor bribe in their Offices which especially to be observed in that Common wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees the common sort and such as want honour take in good part that they be not preferred and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters the common people are doubly grieved both because they are debat'd of those preferments and of that gain they see to grow by them which is the cause that the German Oligarchies continue to firm for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth and the richer sort are by that means freed and secured from being under the poor 7. To take heed that the State as it is setled and maintained be not over-strict nor exceed in his kind viz. That a Kingdom be not too Monarchicall nor a Pâ—â—ulâ— State too Pâ—â—uâ—ar For which cause it is good that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour and bahave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts though inferiour for place and office And sometimes popularly with the common people which is the cause that some Common wealths though they be very simply and un kilfully set yet continue firm because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely and with due respect toward the rest that are without honour and therefore some kind of Moderate Popularity is to be used in every Common-wealth 8. To take heed of small beginnings and to meet with them even at the first as well touching the breaking and altering of Laws as of other rules which concern the continuance of every severall State For the desease and a teration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but grows by degrees which every common wit cannot discern but men expert in POLICIE 9. To provide that that part be ever the greater in number and power which favours the State as now it stands This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths 10. To observe a mean in all the degrees and to suffer no part to exceed or decay overmuch As first for preferments to provide that they be rather small and short than great and long and if any be grown to overmuch greatness to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour Where these Sophisms are to be practised viz. to do it by parts and degrees to do it by occasion or colour of law and not all at once And it that way serve not to advance some other of whose virtue and faithfulness we are fully assined to as high a degree or to a greater honour and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth above that which is meet As touching wealth to provide that those of the middle sort as before was said be more in number and if any grow high and over charged with wealth to use the Sophisms of a Popular State viz to send him on Embassages and Forreign Negotiations or imploy him in some Office that hath great charges and little honour c. To which end the Fâ—â—â—â—ful served in some Common-wealths 11 To Suppress the Factions and quarrels of the Nobles and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions 12. To increase or remit the Common Taxes and Contributions according to the wealth or want of the People and Commonwealth If the people be increased in Wealth the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased If they be poor and their Wealth diminish specially by dearth want of Traffick c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions or to take little Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow The Sophisms that serve for impositions are these and other of like sort To pretend business of great charge as War building of Ships making of Havens Castles Fortifications c. for the common defence sometimes by Lotteries and like devises wherein some part may be bestowed the rest reserved for other expences but Princely dealings needs no pretences 13. To Provide that the Discipline Training of youth of the better sort to such as agreeth with that Common-wealth As that in a Kingdom the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince In the Senatory State that the sons oâ— the Senatours be not idly nor over daintily brought up but well instructed and trained up in Learning Langues and nartiall exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth which their Father held and câ—nt any wise in a Popular State 14. To take heed least their Sophisms or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State be not discovered least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves but wisely used and be with great secrecie Particular Rules Rules and Axioms for preserving of a Kingdom Hereditary Conquered Kingdoms Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering 1. HImself viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Answer and Prerogative For the less and more Temperate their Power and State is the more firm and stable is their Kingdom and Government because they seem to be further off from a Master like and Tyrannte all Empire and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree to wit the Nobility and so lesse subject to grudge and envy 2. Nobility c. By keeping that degree and due proportion that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm or State can bear as the Scottish Kingdom and sometime the English when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes Earls and other Noble whereby the Authority of the Prince was eclipsed and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions Nor that any one excel in Honour power or wealth as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom as the house of Lancaster within this Realm To that end not to load any with too much Honour or preferment because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to bear their greatnesse and high Fortune temperately as appeareth by infinit examples in all States The Sophisms for preventing or reforming this inconvenience are to be
Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time peace as the making of Laws But in War only as the Pâ—loniâ—â— Kings II. Aristocracy or Senatory State AN Aristocracie is the Government of a Common-wealth by some â—ompetent number of the better sort â—referred for wisdom and other virtues â—f the publick good 1. Aristocracie are of three sorts viz. There the Senatours are chosen for Virtu Riches and the common good as the Venetian 2. Virtue and the publick good without respect of wealth as sometimes the Roman when some of the â—enatours were fetched from the â—ough and some from the Schools 3. Virâ—ue and wealth more respecting their private than their publick good which inclineth towards an Oligarchie or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort as in Rome towards the end III. Free-State or Popular State THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the choisest sort of people tending to the publick good of all sorts viz. w th due respect of the better Nobler and Richer sort In every Just State some part of the Government is or ought to be imparted to the people As in a Kingdom a voice or suffrage in making Laws and somtimes also in levying of Arms if the charge be great and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves So consultations and some proceedings in Iudicial matters may in part be referred to them The reason least seeing themselves to be in no number nor of reckoning they mislike the state or kind of Government And where the multitude is discontented there must needs be many Enemies to the present State For which cause Tyrants which allow the people no manner of â—ealing in State matters are forced to bereave them of their wits and weaâ—ons and all other means whereby they may resist or amend themselves â—â— in Rushland Turkey c. IV. Tyrannie A Tyrannie is the swerving or distorting of a Monarchie or the Government of one tending not the publick good but the private benefit of himself his followers As in the Russ Turkish Government where the State and Wealth of other orders are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperour This is the worst of all the â—astard States because it is the pervering of the best Regiment to wit of a Monarchie which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself V. Oligarchie or the Government of a few AN Oligarchie is the swerving or the corruption of an Aristocracie or the Government of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort without any respect of the publick good The chief end of these Governours is their own greatness and enriching And therefore their manner is to prepare fit means to uphold their Estate This State is not wholly so bad as if the Tyrannie and yet worse than the Common wealth because it respecteth the good of a few VI. Common wealth A Common-wealth is the swerving of depravation of a Free or popular State or the Government of the whole multitude of the baâ—e and poorer sort without respect of the other Orders These two States to wit The Oligarchie and Common-wealth are very adverse the one to the other and have many bickerings between them For that the Richer or Nobler sort suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect because they are superiour but in some respects onely to wit in Riches Birth Parentage c. On the other side the Common people suppose there ought to be an equality in all other things and some State matters because they are equall with the Rich or Noble touching their Libertie whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching Government and fitness thereunto because they are such to wit because they are Rich Noble Free c. But because they are Wise Virtuous Vaâ—ant c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State The severall States are sometimes mixed and inter-wrought one with the other yet ever so as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other as in the humours and complexions of the body So in the Roman State the people had their Plebescita and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates Yet the Senate as the State stood for the most part swayed the State and bare the chief rule So in the Venetian State the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch and the Senate to be his Councell Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters but is like a head set on by art that beareth no brain And so that State is Senatoricaâ—l or Aristocraticall Causes of States and Common-wealths in general Causes of States or of Common-wealths are of 3. sorts viz. 1. Founding or setling a State where to be considered 1. Measure 2. Parts and their Qualities 2. Preserving a State 3. Changing and altering a State Founding a State In founding a State are to be considered 2. things 1. Proportion 2. Parts PRoportion is a just measure or Mediocritie of the State whereby it is framed kept in that Order as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind to wit so that a Monarch be not too Monarchical nor strict or absolute as the Russe Kings nor Aristocratical that is overâ—mated or eclipsed by the Nobilitie as the Scottish Kingdom but ever respective to the other degrees That Aristocracie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government the Venetians and sometimes the Roâ—â— allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves to have a Tribune to make Plebiscita c. So a Free State or Common-wealth that it is not over popular viz. That it depress not too much the richer wiser nor leaneder sort but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and masteries of that State That they seek no alteration of the present State The reason because the moderate States in their several kinds as all other things that observe the mean are best framed for their continuance because they give less cause or grudge envy and affecting the Wealth Honour and 〈◊〉 which they see in others that 〈◊〉 the State and so are less subject to stirs and commotions and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set Parts THe parts of the State or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick Government Parts or partakers of Publick Government are 1. Councel or Senate which consulteth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace Magistrates c. in admiâ—ting of whom there ought to be a moâ—â— special care that they may be men expert in matter of Policie because it iâ— their Trade and Voâ—ation as men use to chuse Pilots and Masters of Ships such as know the Art of Navigation and noâ— Husband men c. And so the
used with great caution and wisdom If any great person be to be abated not do real with him by calumniation or forged â—atter and so to cut him off without desert especially if he be gratious among the people after the â—â—chiavâ—an Place which besides the injustice an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince Not to withdraw their Honour all at once which maketh a desperate 〈◊〉 in the party and a commiseration in the people and so greater love he be gracious for his virtue and publick service Not to banish him into Forreign Countries where he may have opportunity of practising with Forreign States whereof great danger may â—nâ—e as in the example of â—ortulanus Henry the fourth and such like But to use these and the like Sophisms viz. To abate their greatnesse by degrees as David Joabs faâ—â—â—â—a Bellisarius c. To advance some other men to as great or greater Honour to shadow â—â— over-mate the greatnesse of the other To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers by â—â—veferâ—â—â— rewards and other good and lawfull means especially to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the Common wealth whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State 3. People viz. So to order and behave himself that he be loved and reverenced of the People For that the Prince need not greatly fear home conspiracâ—es or forreign Invation she be firmly loved of this own people That reason for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise not any refuge being discovered put to flight â—t the multitude affect their Prince But the common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving both at home and abroad This may be affected by the Prince the use means and art of getting the favour of the people and avoid those things that breed have and contempt viz. if he seem as Tutor or a Father to love the people and to protect them if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom For that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people than is peace 4. If he shew himself oftentime graciously yet with State and Majestie to his people and receive complaint of his suppliants and such like 5. If he sit himself sometimes in Open Courts and place of â—ustice that he may seem to have a care of Iâ—â—stice among his people If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that Citie which he maketh the seat of his Lâ—â—â—â— and to make it sure and faithfull unto him which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom as the heart in the middle of the body or the Sun in the middle of Heaven both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions and least the furthest parts at one end move whilest the Prince is in the other If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces especially those that are remite 6 If he gratifie his Couâ—tiers and â—â—â—â—ians in that sort and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt injury of his people as with Mâ—nâ—â—olâ—es and such like 7 If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy or seem grievous to his Ministers but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himself as the French Kings who for that purpose as may seem have erected their Court at Paris which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy both with the Nobles and the scope 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people though he have no need and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officer 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed hâ—treâ— or contempt of his person which may be done if he shew himself not too light unconstant hard cruel esteminate fearfull and â—asterdly c. But contrariwise Religious Grave Just Valiant c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie with far the better means to keep the people in obedience than love and reverence of the people towards the Prince 10. If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision which is to be rumoured and made known abroad if it be known that he is reverenced and obeyed by his peoples at home 11. If he provide so much as lieth in him that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominior which if it happen he is to joyn speedily with other Princes which are in like danger to abate that greatness and to strengthen himself and the rest against it An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain 12 If he get him Intelligencers by reward or other means to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince with whom he hath differences if any thing be intended against his State Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court under colour of Embassage or some other pretence which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn 13. To observe the Laws of his Country and not to encounter them with his Prerogate nor to use it at all where there is a Law for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts especially if it tender to take from them their commâ—dâ—tâ—es and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers 14. To provide especially That that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change 15. To make speciall choise of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates especially of such as assist the Prâ—â—â—â—â— on Couâ—sels and Policieâ— and not to lean overmuch to his own advise contrarie to the rule of Maâ—liâ—â— who teacheth That a Prince can have no good â—â—â—â—sul except it be in himself his reason â—â— use if he use the 〈…〉 is in dangâ—r to be over w 〈…〉 d by him and if he counsel with more then he shall be 〈…〉 in opiâ—iâ—â—s As if a Prince of great or mean wisdom could not take the Judgement of all his câ—ncâ—llours in any point of Poâ—â—â—â— or of so many as he himself thinke he good and to take it either by word or in writing and himself then in private peruse them all and so after good and mature deliberation make choise of the best without any distraction of binding himself to the direction of one For the Proverb is true that two eyes see more than one and therefore the advises and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast or dinner where many contribute towards the â—â—â—t by which means they have more variety of dishes and so better fare and yet every mean may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his 〈…〉 e. 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publick justice and to give an experiment
years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage because that men that have been infirm at the first by reason of sicknesse or some other accident afterwards proved to be sufficient De repudiis leg in causis Defence for David in marrying Abishag IT was rather a Medicine than a marriage without any evil or disordered affection 2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Physitians 3. It was for the publick good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince 4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmity and to what end she was married unto him who if she diâ— it for the common good and for â—â—â—â—tes sake having withall the gift of continency she is to be commended if for ambition or some vain respect it is her own and not Davids fault Politicall Nobilitie Adonijah aspiring to the Kingdom FIrst took the advantage of Davids affection and kindnesse towards him and make him secure of any ill dealing Secondly of his age and infirmities disabling his Father as unfit for Government Thirdly blazed his title and Right to the Crown Fourthly got him Chariots Hors-men and Foot men and a guard to make shew of State Fifthly being a comly and goodly Person made a popular shew of himself and his qualities Sixtly joyned to himself in Faction Joab the Generall of the Army who was in displeasure for murthering of Abner and Amaza and feared that David would supply Bâ—najah in his place and so was discontented And Abiather the high Priest that was likewise discontented with David for the preferment of Zadok Seventhly bad meetings with them and other his confederates under pretence of a vow and offering at the Fountain of Raguel in the confines of Judea Eigthly made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing c. Ninthly made himself familiar with the Nobles and people and entertained them with feasting Tenthly drew into his part the chief Officers of the Court and Servants to the King by rewards Familiarity c. Eleventhly disgraced and abased the Competitour and such as he knew would take part with him and concealeth his ambition and purpose from them Twelfthly had Ionathan a Favourite of the Court and near about the King to give him intelligent if any thing were discovered and moved at the Court whilest himself was in hand about his practise OBSERVATIONS Ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom and marks to discern them FIrst they wind into the Princes favour by service officiousnesse flatterie c. to â—lant him in a good oâ—â—â—â—on of that loyaltie and faithfulnesse hereby to make him him secure of their practises 2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities age impotencie negligence sex c. And work upon that be disabling the Prince and secret detracting of his State and Government 3. They blaz their Title and claim to the Crown if they have any with their friends and favourites 4. They provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces and furniture for the wars make much of god Souldiers and have a pretence if it be espied of some other end as for the Kings honour or service and to be in readinesse against forreign enemies c. 5 They make open shew of their best qualities and comlinesse of their persons which though it be vain as a dumb shew it is very effectuall to win the liking of the popular sort which according to the rule of the election of Kings in the Bâ—es Common wealth think that Forma est digna imperare Activitie Nobilaie Ancestrie c. 6 To have their blazers abroad to see out their virtues and to prepare their friends in every Province 7. To draw into their part and make sure unto them of the chief Peers and men of best quality such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers and the Militarie men and most subtile and politick especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State 8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place not too near nor too far off but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition 9. To take up a shew and pretence of Religion more than before and beyond the practise of their former life 10 They use popular courtesie which in a great person is very effectuall feasting liberality gaming c. 11. To be over liberal win to them by gifts familiaritie c. the chief Officers of the Court and Governours of State 12. To have some near about the Prince to keep them in credit and common suspition if any arise 13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince present State or to the competitour and to bring them into contempt by slander detraction and all means they can and to conceal the designs from them left they be discovered before they be too ripe 14. To have some spie near about the Prince to advertise them if any inckling suspition arise whilest themselves are practising Note the practises of Absolom 2 Sam. 16. And of Cyrus minor in Xenophon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cap. 1. Politicall Prince David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom valour religion and justice and so highly deserving of the Common-wealth yet grown into age grew withall into contempt had many both of his Nobles common people that fell from him first with Absolom then with Adoniiab who affected the Kingdom and rebelled against him For remedie whereof he stirred up himself to publick actions which might shew his vigour sufficiencie to manage the affairs of his Kingdom 1. AFter the victorie against Absolom he forced himself to forbes mourning and shewed himself to his discontented Army when all were like to fall from him for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his Son 2. After the victorie he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole Nation to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem which was a renowing and re-establishing of him 2 Sam. 19. 12. 3. He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie by deposing a person of great author 〈…〉 estimation to wit Ioab General Captain of the Armie and advancing Amasa to his place 4 He sent kind pssages to Ierusalem and to other chief and head towns and special men of Iudea his contributes puting them of their alliance with him with these word That they were of his own flesh and bloud with protestarian of his special love and affection towards them 〈…〉 them with the like kindness 〈…〉 towards him 5. He â—â—mbled a Parliament of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and took occasion upon the â—â—â—â—gâ—â—ing of his successour to commend into them he succession of his house into the conâ—inuance and maintenance of Gods â—â—â—mor in and â—â—â— good the established and gave a grâ—ve and publick charge to his Suâ—cessour nâ—w designed â—ucâ—ing the manner of his government and maintaining of religion 1. Chron.
the North the fift penny In the two and thirtyeth year he had a subsedy freely granted In the three and thirtyeth year he confirmed the great Charter of his own Royall disposition and the states to shew their thankfulnesse gave the King for one year the fift part of all the revenues of the land and of the Citizens the sixt part of their goods And in the same year the King used the inquisition called Trai le Baston By which all Justices and other Magistrates were grievously fined that had used extortion or bribery or had otherwise misdemeaned themselves to the great contentation of the people This Commission likewise did enquire of entruders barators and all other the like vermine whereby the King gathered a great masse of treasure with a great deal of love Now for the whole raigne of this King who governed England 35 years there was not any Parliament to his prejudice COUNS. But there was taking of armes by Marshall and Hereford JUST That 's true but why was that because the King notwithstanding all that was given him by Parliament did lay the greatest taxes that ever King did without their consent But what lost the King by those Lords one of them gave the King all his lands the other dyed in disgrace COUNS. But what say you to the Parliament in Edward the Seconds time his successor did not the house of Parliament banish Peirce Gaveston whom the King favoured JUST But what was this Gaveston but an Esquier of Gascoine formerly banisht the Realme by King Edward the first for corrupting the Prince Edward now raigning And the whole Kingdome fearing and detesting his venemous disposition they besought his Majestie to cast him off which the King performed by an act of his own and not by act of Parliament yea Gavestones own father in Law the Earle of Glocester was one of the chiefest of the Lords that procured it And yet finding the Kings affection to folow him so strongly they all consented to have him recalled After which when his credit so encreased that he dispised and set at naught all the ancient Nobility and not onely perswaded the King to all manner of outrages and riots but withall transported what he lifted of the Kings Treasure and Iewels the Lords urged his banishment the second time but neither was the first nor second banishment forced by Act of Parliament but by the forceable Lords his Enemies Lastly he being recalled by the King the Earle of Lancaster caused his head to be stricken off when those of his party had taken him prisoner By which presumptuous Act the Earle and the rest of his company committed Treason and murder Treason by raising an Army without warrant murder by taking away the life of the Kings Subject After which Gaveston being dead the Spencers got possession of the Kings favour though the younger of them was placed about the King by the Lords themselves COUNS. What say you then to the Parliament held at London about the sixt year of that King JUST I say that King was not bound to performe the acts of this Parliament because the Lords being too strong for the King inforced his consent for these be the words of our own History They wrested to much beyond the bounds of reason COUNS. What say you to the Parliaments of the White wands in the 13th of the King JUST I say the Lords that were so moved came with an Army and by strong hand surprized the King they constrained saith the story the rest of the Lords and compelled many of the Bishops to consent unto them yea it saith further that the King durst not but grant to all that they required to wit for the banishment of the Spencers Yea they were so insolent that they refused to lodge the Queen comming through Kent in the Castle of Leedes and sent her to provide her lodging where she could get it so late in the night for which notwithstanding some that kept her out were soon after taken and hang'd and therefore your Lordship cannot call this a Parliament for the reasons before alleadged But my Lord what became of these Lawgivers to the King even when they were greatest a Knight of the North called Andrew Herkeley assembled the Forces of the Countrey overthrew them and their Army slew the Earle of Hereford and other Barons took their generall Thomas Earle of Lancaster the Kings cozen germane at that time possessed of five Earledomes the Lords Clifford Talbort Moubray Maudiut Willington Warren Lord Darcy Withers Knevill Leybourne Bekes Lovell Fitz williams Watervild and divers other Barons Knights and Esquiers and soon after the Lord Percy and the Lord Warren took the Lords Baldsemere and the Lord Audley the Lord Teis Gifford Tucoet and many others that fled from the battaile the most of which past under the hands of the hangman for constraining the King under colour and name of a Parliament But this your good Lordship may judge to whom those tumultuous assemblies which our Histories falsely call Parliaments have been dangerous the King in the end ever prevailed and the Lords lost their lives and estates After which the Spencers in their banishment at York in the 15th of the King were restored to the honors and estates and therein the King had a subsedy given him the sixt penny of goods throughout England Ireland and Wales COUNS. Yet you see the Spencers were soon after dissolved IUST It is true my Lord but that is nothing to our subject of Parliament they may thank their own insolencie for they branded and dispised the Queen whom they ought to have honored as the Kings wife they were also exceeding greedy and built themselves upon other mens ruines they were ambitious and exceeding malicious whereupon that came that when Chamberlain Spencer was hang'd in Hereford a part of the 24th Psalm was written over his head Quid gloriaris in malitia potens COUNS. Well Sir you have all this while excused your self upon the strength and rebellions of the Lords but what say you now to King Edward the third in whose time and during the time of this victorious King no man durst take Armes or rebell the three estates did him the greatest affront that ever King received or endured therefore I conclude where I began that these Parliaments are dangerous for a King JUST To answer your Lordship in order may it please you first to call to mind what was given this great King by his subjects before the dispute betwixt him and the house happened which was in his latter dayes from his first year to his fift year there was nothing given the king by his Subjects in his eight year at the Parliament at London a tenth and a fifteenth was granted in his tenth year he ceased upon the Italians goods here in England to his own use with all the goods of the Monkes Cluniackes and others of the order of the Cistertians In the eleaventh year he had given him by Parliament a notable
Hold you contented Sir the King needs no great disswasion IUST My Lord learn of me that â—here is none of you all than can â—erce the King It is an essentiall property of a man truely wise not to oâ—en all the boxes of his bosome even â—o those that are near'st dear'st unto him for when a man is discovered to the very bottome he is after the lesse esteemed I dare undertake that when your Lordship hath served the King twice twelve years more you will find that his Majesty hath reserved somewhat beyond all your capacities his Majesty hath great reason to put off the Parliament at his last refuge and in the mean time to make tryall of all your loves to serve him for his Majesty hath had good experience how well you can serve your selves But when the King finds that the building of your own fortunes and factions hath been the diligent studies and the service of his Majesty but the exercises of your leasures He may then perchance cast himself upon the generall love of his people of which I trust he shall never be deceived and leave as many of your Lordships as have pilfered from the Crown to their examination COUNS. Well Sir I take no great pleasure in this dispute goe on pray IUST In that Kings 5th year he had also a subsedy which is got by holding the house together from Easter to Christmas and would not suffer them to depart He had also a subsedy in his ninth year In his eleventh year the commons did again presse the King to take all the temporalities of the Church men into his hands which they proved sufficient to maintain 150. Earls 1500. Knights and 6400. Esquiers with a hundred hospitals but they not prevailing gave the king a subsedy As for the notorious Prince Henry the fift I find that he had given him in his second year 300000. markes and after that two other subsedies one in his fifth year another in his ninth without any disputes In the time of his successor Henry the sixt there were not many subsedies In this third year he had a subsedy of a Tunnage and poundage And here saith Iohn Stow began those payements which we call customes because the payement was continued whereas before that time it was granted but for a year two or three according to the Kings occasions He had also an ayde gathering of money in his fourth year and the like in his tenth year and in his thirteenth year a 15th He had also a fifteenth for the conveying of the Queen out of France into England In the twenty eight year of that King was the act of Resumption of all honours towns castles Signeuries villages Manors lands tenements rents reversions fees c. But because the wages of the Kings servants were by the strictness of the act also restrained this act of Resumption was expounded in the Parliament at Reading the 31th year of the Kings reigne COUNS. I perceive that those 〈◊〉 of Resumption were ordinary in former times for King Stephen resumed the lands which in former times he had given to make friends during the Civill wars And Henry the second resumed all without exception which King Stephen had not resumed for although King Stephen took back a great deal yet he suffered his trustiest servants to enjoy his gift IUST Yes my Lord and in after times also for this was not the last nor shall be the last I hope And judge you my Lord whether the Parliaments doe not only serve the King whatsoever is said to the contrary for as all King Henry the 6. gifts graunts were made void by the Duke of York when he was in possession of the Kingdome by Parliament So in the time of K. H. when K. Edw. was beaten out again the Parliament of Westminster made all his acts voyd made him and all his followers traytors and gave the King many of their heads lands The Parliaments of England do alwayes serve the King in possession It served Rich. the second to condemne the popular Lords It served Bollingbrooke to depose Rich. When Edw. the 4. had the Scepter it made them all beggars that had followed H. the 6. And it did the like for H. when Edw. was driven out The Parliaments are as the friendship of this world is which alwayes followeth prosperity For King Edw. the 4. after that he was possessed of the Crown he had in his 13. year a subsedy freely given him and in the year following he took a benevolence through England which arbitrary taking from the people served that ambitious traytor the Duke of Bucks After the Kings death was a plausible argument to perswade the multitude that they should not permit saith Sir Thomas Moore his line to raigne any longer upon them COUNS. Well Sir what say you to the Parliament of Richard the third his time IUST I find but one and therein he made diverse good Laws For King Henry the seventh in the beginning of his third year he had by Parliament an ayde granted unto him towards the relief of the Duke of Brittain then assailed by the French King And although the King did not enter into the warre but by the advice of the three estates who did willingly contribute Yet those Northern men which loved Richard the third raised rebellion under colour of the money impos'd and murthered the Earle of Northumberland whom the King employed in that Collection By which your Lordship sees that it hath not been for taxes and impositions alone that the ill disposed have taken Armes but even for those payments which have been appointed by Parliament COUNS. And what became of these Rebels IUST They were fairly hang'd the money levied notwithstanding in the Kings first year he gathered a marvailous great masse of money by a benevolence taking pattern by this kind of levie from Edw. 4th But the King caused it first to be moved in Parliament where it was allowed because the poorer sort were therein spared Yet it is true that the King used some art for in his Letters he declared that he would measure every mans affections by his gifts In the thirteenth year he had also a subsedy whereupon the Cornish men took Armes as the Northern men of the Bishoprick had done in the third year of the King COUNS. It is without example that ever the people have rebelled for any thing granted by Parliament save in this Kings dayes IUST Your Lordship must consider that he was not over much beloved for he took many advantages upon the people and the Nobility both COUNS. And I pray you what say they now of the new impositions lately laid by the Kings Majesty do they say that they are justly or unjustly laid IUST To Impose upon all things brought into the Kingdome is very ancient which imposing when it hath been continued a certain time is then called Customes because the subjects are accustomed to pay it and yet the great taxe upon wine is
and unanswerable COUNS. But to execute the Laws very severely would be very grievous IUST Why my Lord are the Laws grievous which our selves have required of our Kings And are the Prerogatives also which our Kings have reserved to themselves also grievous How can such a people then be well pleased And if your Lordship confess that the Lawes give too much why does your Lordship urge the Prerogative that gives more Nay I will be bold to say it that except the Lawes were better observed the Prerogative of a Religious Prince hath manifold lesse perils then the Letter of the Law hath Now my Lord for the second third to wit for the appointing of Treasures and removing of Councellors our Kings have evermore laught them to scorn that have prest either of these after the Parliament dissolved took the money of the Treasurers of the Parliament and recalled restored the Officers discharged or else they have been contented that some such persons should be removed at the request of the whole Kingdom which they themselves out of their Noble natures would not seem willing to remove COUNS. Well Sir Would you notwithstanding all these arguments advise his Majesty to call a Parliament IUST It belongs to your Lordships who enjoy the Kings favour are chosen for your able wisedome to advise the K. It were a strange boldnesse in a poor and private person to advise Kings attended with so understanding a Councell But be like your Lorpships have conceived some other way how money may be gotten otherwise If any trouble should happen your Lordship knows that then there were nothing so dangerous for a K as to be without money A Parliament cannot assemble in haste but present dangers require hasty remedies It will be no time then to discontent the subjects by using any unordinary wayes COUNS. Well Sir all this notwithstanding we dare not advise the King to call a Parliament for if it should succeed ill we that advise should fall into the Kings disgrace And if the King be driven into any extremity we can say to the King that because we found it extremely unpleasing to his Majesty to hear of a Parliament we thought it no good manners to make such a Motion IUST My Lord to the first let me tell you that there was never any just Prince that hath taken any advantage of the successe of Councels which have been founded on reason To fear that were to fear the losse of the bell more then the losse of the steeple and were also the way to beat all men from the studies of the Kings service But for the second where you say you can excuse your selves upon the Kings own protesting against a Parliament the King upon better consideration may encounter that fineness of yours COUNS. How I pray you IUST Even by declaring himself to be indifferent by calling your Lordships together and by delivering unto you that he heares how his loving subjects in generall are willing to supply him if it please him to call a Parliament for that was the common answer to all the Sheriffes in England when the late benevolence was commanded In which respect and because you come short in all your projects because it is a thing most dangerous for a King to be without treasure he requires such of you as either mislike or rather fear a Parliment to set down your reasous in writing which you either mislike or feared it And such as with and desire it to set down answers to your objections And so shall the King prevent the calling or not calling on his Majesty as some of your great Councellers have done in many other things shrinking up their shoulders and saying the K. will have it so COUNS. Well Sir it grows late I will bid you farewell onely you shall take well with you this advice of mine that in all that you have said against our greatest those men in the end shall be your Iudges in their own cause you that trouble your self with reformation are like to be well rewarded hereof you may assure your self that we will never allow of any invention how profitable soever unlesse it proceed or seem to proceed from our selves IUST If then my Lord we may presume to say that Princes may be unhappy in any thing certainly they are unhappy in nothing more then in suffering themselves to be so inclosed Again if we may believe Pliny who tels us that 't is an ill signe of prosperity in any kingdome or state where such as deserve well find no other recompence then the contentment of their own conseiences a farre worse signe is it where the justly accused shall take revenge of the just accuser But my good Lord there is this hope remaining that seeing he hath been abused by them he trusted most he will not for the future dishonour of his judgement so well informed by his own experience as to expose such of his vassals as have had no other motives to serve him then simply the love of his person and his estate to their revenge who have onely been moved by the love of their own fortunes and their glory COUNS. But good Sir the King hath not been deceived by all IUST No my Lord neither have all been trusted neither doth the world accuse all but believe that there be among your Lordships very just and worthy men aswell of the Nobility as others but those though most honoured in the Common-wealth yet have not been most imployed Your Lordship knows it well enough that three or 4 of your Lordships have thought your hands strong enough to beat up alone the weightiest affairs in the Commonwealth and strong enough all the Land have found them to beat down whom they pleased COUNS. I understand you but how shall it appear that they have onely sought themselves IUST There needs no perspective glasse to discern it for neither in the treaties of Peace and Warre in matters of Revenue and matters of Trade any thing hath hapned either of love or of judgement No my Lord there is not any one action of theirs eminent great or small the greatnesse of themselves onely excepted CO. It is all one your Papers can neither answer nor reply we can Besides you tell the King no news in delivering these Complaints for he knows as much as can be told him IUST For the first my Lord whereas he hath once the reasons of things delivered him your Lordships shall need to be well advised in their answers there is no sophistry will serve the turn where the Iudge the understanding are both supreme For the second to say that his Majesty knows and cares not that my Lord were but to despaire all his faithfull Subjects But by your favour my Lord we see it is contrary we find now that there is no such singular power as there hath been Iustice is described with a Balance in her Hand holding it even and it hangs as even now as ever it did in any Kings dayes for singular authority begets but generall oppression COUNS. Howsoever it be that 's nothing to you that gave no interest in the Kings favour nor perchance in his opinion and concerning such a one the misliking or but misconceiving of any one hard word phrase or sentence will give argument to the King either to condemne or reject the whole discourse And howsoever his Majesty may neglect your informations you may be sure that others at whom you point will not neglect their revenges you will therefore confesse it when it is too late that you are exceeding sory that you have not followed my advise Remember Cardinall Woolsey who lost all men for the Kings service when their malice whom he grieved had out-lived the Kings affection you know what became of him as vvell as I. IUST Yea my Lord I know it well that malice hath a longer life than either love or thankfulnesse hath for as we alwaies take more care to put off pain than to enjoy pleasure because the one hath no intermission with the other we are often satisfied so it is in the smart of iniury the memory of good turns Wrongs are written in marble Benefits are sometimes acknowledged rarely requited But my Lord we shall do the K. great wrong to judge him by common rules or ordinary examples for seeing his Majesty hath greatly enriched and advanced those that have but pretended his service no man needs to doubt of his goodnesse towards those that shall performe any thing worthy reward Nay the not taking knowledge of those of his own vassals that have done him wrong is more to be lamented than the relinquishing of those that do him right is to be supected I am therefore my good Lo held to my resolution by these 2 besides the former The 1 that God would never have blest him with so many years and in so many actions yea in all his actions had he paid his honest servants with evill for good The 2d where your Lordship tels me that I will be sorry for not following your advice I pray your Lordship to believe that I am no way subject to the common sorrowing of worldly men this Maxime of Plato being true Dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus nascuntur But for my body my mind values it at nothing COUNS. What is it then you hope for or seek IUST Neither riches nor honour or thanks but I onely to seek to satisfie his Majesty which I would have been glad to have done in matters of more importance that I have lived and will die an honest man FINIS The Authors Epitaph made by himself EVen such is Time which takes in wast Our Youth and Ioy 's and all we have And payes us but with age and dust Which be the dark and silent grave When we have wandred all our wayes Struts up the story of our dayes And from which Earth and Grave Dust The Lord shall raise me up I trust Chief Other degrees Other degrees Seeing Touching Hearing Smelling Tasting Situation for Safety Plenty Multitude of Inhabitants Religigion Academies Courts of Justice Artificers Privledge The first devises of Rome to allure strangers as is Sanctuarie Triumps Huband men Merchant Gentry Two things Sâ— W. Raleigh accused of