Prince ruâ—â—â—g over them with more authoâ—â—â—â— for in all his country there â—one acknowledg'd for superiâ—â— but himselfe and if they â—d obedience to any one else 〈◊〉 but as to his minister and ofâ—er nor beare they him any parâ—â—â—ular good will The examples â—hese two different Goverments â—w in our dayes are the Turk 〈◊〉 the King of France The Turks â—ole Monarchy is govern'd by 〈◊〉 Lord and the rest are all his â—â—ssalls and deviding his whole â—â—ngdom into divers Sangiacques 〈◊〉 Governments he sends severall â—ther and those hee chops and â—nges as hee pleases But the â—ng of France is seated in the â—â—dst of a multitude of Lords â—o of old have been acknowâ—â—â—g'd for such by their subjects â—d being belov'd by them injoy â—â—eir preheminencies nor can the â—â—ng take their States from them without danger Hee then that considers the one and the other of these two States shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State but when once it is subdu'd great facility to hold it The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him are because the Invader cannot be call'd in by the Princes of that Kingdom nor hope by the rebellion of those which hee hath about him to bee able to facilitate his enterprize which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid for they being all his slaves and oblig'd to him can more hardly bee corrupted and put case they were corrupted little profit could hee get by it they not being able to draw after them any people for the reasons wee have shewed whereupon hee that assailes the Turk must think to find him united and must rather relie upon his own forces than in the others disorders but when once he is overcome and broken in the field so that hee cannot repaire his armies there is nothing else to bee doubted than the Royall blood which being once quite out there is none else left to bee fear'd none of the others having any credit with the people And as the conquerour before the victory could not hope in them so after it ought he not to feare them The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of France for â—t is easie to be enter'd by the gainâ—ing of any Baron in the Kingdom for there are alwayes some male-contents to be found and those that are glad of innovation Those for the reasons alleag'd are able â—o open thee a way into that State â—nd to further thy victory which â—fterwards to make good to thee draws with it exceeding many difficulties as well with those â—hat have ayded thee as those â—hou hast supprest Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race for there remaine â—till those Lords who quickly will bee the ring-leaders of new changes and in case thou art not able to content these nor extinguish them thou losest that State whensoever the occasion is offerd Now if thou shalt consider what sort of gouernment that of Darius was thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominions and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly and drive him out of the field after which victory Darius being dead that State was left secure to Alexander for the reasons we treated of before and his successors had they continued in amity might have injoy'd it at ease nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults than those they themselves stir'd up But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of France it is impossible to become master at such ease and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain France and Greeâ—â— against the Romans by reason of the many Principalities those States had whereof while the memory lasted the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them but the memory of them being quite wip't out by the power and continuance of the Empire at length they injoy'd it securely and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another each one of them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein and that because the blood of their ancient Lord was quite spent they acknowledg'd no other but the Romans By the consideration then of these things no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest as Pyrrhus and many others which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour but from the difference of the subject CHAP. V. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd which before they were conquer d liv'd under their own Laws WHen those States that are conquered as it is said have been accustomed to live under their own Laws and in liberty there are three wayes for a man to hold them The first is to demolish all their strong places the other personally to goe and dwell there the third to suffer them to live under their own Laws drawing from them some tribute and creating therein an Oligarchy that may continue it in thy service for that State being created by that Prince knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force who is like to doe all he can to maintain it and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens which hath been us'd before to live free than by any other way of keeping We have for example the Spartans and the Romans the Spartans held Athens and Thebes creating there an Oligarchy yet they lost it The Romans to be sure of Capua Carthage and Numantia dismantell'd them quite and so lost them not they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them leaving them free letting them injoy their own Lawes and it prospered not with them so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under than by demolishments and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free and dismantells it not let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge and the ancient orders it had which neither by length of time nor for any favours afforded them are ever forgotten and for any thing that can bee done or order'd unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd that name is never forgotten nor those customes but presently in every chance recourse is thither made as Pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince and that whole race is quite extirpated on one part being us'd to obey on the the other not having their old Prince they agree not to make one from among themselves they know not how to live in liberty in such manner that they are much slower to take armes and with more facility
Francis Sforce or aâ— as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince thaâ— gaines it as the kingdome of Naples is to the King of Spain Thesâ— Dominions so gotten are accustomed either to live under â— Prince or to enjoy their liberty and are made conquest of eitheâ— with others forces or ones owne either by fortune or by valour CHAP. II. Of Hereditary Principalities I Will not here discourse of Republiques because I have otherâ— where treated of them at large I will apply my selfe only to a Principality and proceed whilâ— I weave this web by arguing thereupon how these Principalities can be governed and maintained I say then that in State of inheritance and accustomed to the bloud of their Princes there â—re far fewer difficulties to keep â—â—em than in the new for it sufâ—â—ces only not to transgresse the â—ourse his Ancestors took and so â—fterwards to temporize with â—hose accidents that can happen â—hat if such a Prince be but of orâ—inary industry he shall alwayes â—e able to maintain himselfe in â—is State unlesse by some extraordinary or excessive power he be â—eprived thereof and when he hath lost it upon the least sinister chance that befals the usurper he â—â—covers it again We have in Itaâ—â— the Duke of Ferrara for example thereof who was of ability to resist the Venetians in the yeer 84 â—nd to withstand Pope Julius in â—he tenth for no other reason than because he had of old continued in that rule for the natuâ—â—ll Prince hath fewer occasions and lesse heed to give offence whereupon of necessity he must â—e more beloved and unlesse it â—e that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred itâ— agreeable to reason that naturaâ—ly he should be well beloved bâ— his own subjects and in the antâ—quity and continuation of thâ— Dominion the remembrancâ— and occasions of innovations aâ— quite extinguished for evermoâ— one change leaves a kinde oâ— breach or dent to fasten the building of another CHAP. III. Of mixt Principalities BUt the difficulties consist iâ— the new Principality anâ— first if it be not all new but as member so that it may be termâ— altogether as mixt and the vâ—riations thereof proceed in thâ— first place from a naturall diffâ—culty which we commonly findâ— in all new Principalities for meâ— do willingly change their Lorâ— beleeving to better their conditâ—on and this beliefe causes theâ— to take armes against him thâ—â— rules over them whereby they deâ—â—ive themselves because they â—â—nde after by experience they â—ave made it worse which deâ—ends upon another naturall and â—rdinary necessity forcing him â—wayes to offend those whose â—rince he newly becomes as well â—y his souldiers he is put to enterâ—â—in upon them as by many other â—â—juries which a new conquest â—aws along with it in such manâ—er as thou findest all those thine â—â—emies whom thou hast endamâ—aged in the seizing of that Prinâ—â—pality and afterwards canst â—ot keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it for not being able to satisfie them accordâ—â—g to their expectations nor put 〈◊〉 practise strong remedies against â—â—em being obliged to them For â—â—wever one bee very well proâ—â—ded with strong armies yet hath 〈◊〉 alwayes need of the favour of â—e inhabitants in the countrey 〈◊〉 enter thereinto For these reaâ—â—ns Lewis the twelth King of France suddenly tooke Milan and as soone lost it and the firsâ— time Lodwick his owne forces served well enough to wrest it out oâ— his hands for those people thaâ— had opened him the gates finding themselves deceived of theiâ— opinion and of that future gooâ— which they had promised themselves could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them True it is that countreyes thaâ— have rebelled again the seconâ— time being recovered are hardâ— lost for their Lord taking occasion from their rebellion is lessâ— respective of persons but carâ— only to secure himselfe by punishing delinquents to clear all suspicions and to provide for himselfâ— where he thinks he is weakest sâ— that if to make France lose Milan the first time it was enougâ— for Duke Lodwick to make somâ— small stir only upon the confines yet afterwards before they coulâ— make him lose it the second timâ— they had neede of the whoâ—â— world together against him and â—â—at al his armies should be wasted â—nd driven out of Italy which â—roceeded from the forenamed â—auses however though both â—he first and second time it was â—aken from him The generall â—auses of the first we have treated â—f it remaines now that we see â—hose of the second and set down â—he remedies that he had or any â—ne else can have that should â—hance to be in those tearmes he was whereby he might be able â—o maintaine himselfe better in his conquest than the King of France did I say therefore that these States which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their Conquerour are either of the â—â—me Province and the same language or otherwise and when â—hey are it is very easie to hold â—hem especially when they are â—ot used to live free and to enjoy â—hem securely it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them For in other matters allowing them their ancient conditions and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them men ordinarily live quiet enough as we have seene that Burgundy did Britany Gascony and Normandy which so long time continued with France for however there be some difference of language betweene them yet can they easily comport one with another and whosoever makes the conquest of them meaning to hold them must have two regards the first that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished the other that he change nothing neither in their lawes nor taxes so that in a very short tâ—me they become one entire body with their ancient Principality But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language manners and orders here are the difficulties and here is there need of good fortune and great industry to maintain them and it would be one of the best â—nd liveliest remedies for the Conquerour to goe in person and dwell there this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable as the Turke hath done in Greece who among al the other courses taken by him for to hold that State had he not gone thither himselfe in person to dwell it had never beene possible for him to have kept it for abiâ—ing there he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings and â—orthwith can remedy them whereas being not there present â—hey are heard of when they are growne to some height and then â—s there no help for them Moreover the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thiâ—her the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince neere at hand whereupon have they more reason to love him if they meane to be good â—nd intending to doe otherwise â—o feare him and forrein Princes will be well
disposing of that which belongs to others necessarily should use this liberality otherwise would his souldiers never follow him and of that which is neither thine nor thy subjects thou mayest well be a free giver as were Cyrus Caesar and Alexander for the spending of that which is anothers takes not away thy reputation but rather addes to it only the wasting of that which is thine owne hurts thee nor is there any thing consumes it selfe so much as liberality which whilst thou usest thou losest the meanes to make use of it and becom'st poore and abject or to avoyd this poverty an extortioner and hatefull person And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of is to bee dispisd and odious to one and the other of which liberality brings thee Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable which begets an infamy without hatred than to desire that of Liberall whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner which procures an infamy with hatred CHAP. XVII Of Cruelty and Clemency and whether it is better to be belov'd or feard DEscending afterwards unto the other fore-alleadged qualities I say that every Prince should desire to be held pittifull and not cruell Neverthelesse ought hee beware that he ill uses not this pitty Caesar Borgia was accounted cruell yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in Romania settled it in union and restord it to peace and fidelity which if it be well weighd we shall see was an act of more pitty than that of the people of Florence who to avoyd the terme of cruelty sufferd Pistoya to fall to destruction Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty for to hold his subjects united and faithfull for by giving a very few proofes of himselfe the other way hee shall be held more pittifull than they who through their too much pitty suffer disorders to follow from whence arise murthers and rapines for these are wont to hurt an intire universality whereas the executions practisd by a Prince hurt only some particular And among all sorts of Princes it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruell because all new States are full of dangers Whereupon Virgil by the mouth of Dido excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdome saying Res dura Regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri et latè â—nes custode tenere My hard plight and new State force me to guard My confines all about with watch and ward Neverthelesse ought he be judicious in his giving beleefe to any thing or moving himselfe thereat nor make his people extreamly affraid of him but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome and humanity that his too much confidence make him not unwary and his too much distrust intolerable From hence arises a dispute whether it is better to be belov'd or feard I answer a man would wish hee might bee the one and the other but because hardly can they subsist both together it is much safer to be feard than be lov'd being that one of the two must needs faile for touching men wee may say this in generall they are unthankfull unconstant dissemblers they avoyd dangers and are covetous of gaine and whilst thou doest them good they are wholly thine their blood their fortunes lives and children are at thy service as is said before when the danger is remote but when it approaches they revolt And that Prince who wholly relyes upon their words unfurnishd of all other preparations goes to wrack for the friendships that are gotten with rewards and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind are dearely bought indeed but they will neither keep long nor serve well in time of need and men doe lesse regard to offend one that is supported by love than by feare For love is held by a certainty of obligation which because men are mischeivous is broken upon any occasion of their owne profit But feare restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsaks a man Yet ought a Prince cause himselfe to be belovd in such a manner that if hee gaines not love he may avoyd hatred for it may well stand together that a man may bee feard and not hated which shall never faile if hee abstaine from his subjects goods and their wives and whensoever hee should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives doe it when it is to be done upon a just cause and apparent conviction but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods for men forget sooner the death of their father than the losse of their patrimony Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods do never faile and alwayes hee that begins to live by rapine finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods but against mens lives they are seldomer found and sooner faile But when a Prince is abroad in the feild with his army and hath a multitude of souldiers under his government then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it though hee be termd cruell for unlesse hee be so hee shall never have his souldiers live in accord one with another nor ever well disposd to any brave peece of service Among Hannibals actions of mervaile this is reckond for one that having a very huge army gatherd out of severall nations and all led to serve in a strange countrey there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves nor against their Generall as well in their bad fortune as their good Which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his which together with his exceeding many vertues renderd him to his souldiers both venerable and terrible without which to that effect his other vertues had servd him to little purpose and some writers though not of the best advised on one side admire these his worthy actions and on the other side condemne the principall causes thereof And that it is true that his other vertues would not have suffis'd him wee may consider in Scipio the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd but even in the memory of man from whom his army rebell'd in Spain which grew only upon his too much clemency which had given way to his souldiers to become more licentious that was well tolerable by military discipline for which hee was reprov'd by Fabius Maximus in the Senate who termd him the corrupter of the Romane souldiery The Locrensians having been destroyed by a Lieftenant of Scipio's were never reveng'd by him nor the insolence of that Lieftenant punisht all this arising from his easie nature so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate said that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults than to correct the faults of other men which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd Scipio's reputation glory had he therewith continu'd in his commands but living under the government of the Senate this quality of his
Bentivolii grand-father of this Anniball who now lives that was Prince in Bolonia being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him none of his race being left but this John who was then in swadling clouts presenty the people rose upon this murder and slew all the Canneschâ— which proceeded from the popular affection which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia which was so great that being there remain'd not any now Anniball was dead that was able to manage the State and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him and gave the government of their City to him which was rul'd by him untill John was of fit yeares to governe I conclude then that a Prince ought to make smal account of treasons whiles he hath the people to friend but if they be his enemies and hate him he may well feare every thing and every one And well orderd States and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence not to cause their great men to fall into desperation and to content the the people and so to maintaine them for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes is that of France and therein are found exceeding many good orders whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends of which the chiefe is the Parliament and the authority thereof for hee that founded that Kingdome knowing the great mens ambition and insolence and judgeing it necessary there should bee a bridle to curbe them and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones grounded upon feare intending to secure them would not lay this care wholly upon the King but take this trouble from him which hee might have with the great men in case hee favourd the Commonalty or with the Commonalty in case hee favourd the great men and thereupon set up a third judge which was that to the end it should keep under the great ones and favour the meaner sort without any imputation to the King It was not possible to take a better nor wiser course than this nor a surer way to secure the King and the Kingdome From whence we may drawe another conclusion worthie of note that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour Here againe I conclude that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility but not thereby to incurre the Commons hatred It would seem perhaps to many considering the life and death of many Romane Emperours that they were examples contrary to my opinion finding that some have liv'd worthily and shewd many rare vertues of the minde and yet have lost the Empire and been put to death by their owne subjects conspiring against them Intending then to answer these objections I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours declaring the occasions of their ruine not disagreeing from that which I have alleagd and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times and it shall suffice mee to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus who were Marcus and Commodus his sonne Pertinax Julian Severus Antonius Caracalla his sonne Macrinus Heliogabalus Alexander and Maximin And first it is to be noted that were in the other Principalities they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles and the insolence of the people the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers which was so hard a thing that it causd the ruine of many being hard to satisfy the souldiers and the people for the people love their quiet and therefore affect modest Princes and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage that is insolent cruell and plucking from every one which things they would have them exercise upon the people whereby they might bee able to double their stipends and satisfie their avarice and cruelty whence it proceeded that those Emperours who either by Nature or by Art had not such a reputation as therewith they could curbe the one and the other were alwayes ruind and the most of them specially those who as new men came to the principality finding the difficulty of those two different humours applyd themselves to content the souldiers making small account of wronging the people which was a course then necessary for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality and when they cannot attaine therunto they are to provide with all industry to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty And therefore those Emperours who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire had need of extraordinary favours more willingâ—y stuck to the souldiers than to the people which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage or otherwise according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them From these causes aforesayd proceeded it that Marcus Pertinax and Alexander though all living modestly being lovers of justice and enemies of cruelty courteous and bountifull had all from Marcus onward miserable ends Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured for hee came to the Empire by inheritance and was not to acknowledge it neither from the souldiers nor from the people afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues which made him venerable hee held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits and was never either hated or contemnd But Pertinax was created Emperour against the souldiers wills who being accustomd to live licentiously under Commodus could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to Whereupon having gotten himself hatred and to this hatred added contempt in that hee was old was ruind in the very beginning of his government Whence it ought to be observed that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad and therefore as I formerly said when a Prince would maintaine the State hee is often forcd not to be good for when that generalty whether it be the people or souldiers or Nobility whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee is corrupted it behooves thâ—e to follow their humour and content them and then all good deeds are thy adversaries But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse that among the prayses given him had this for one that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire he never put any man to death but by course of justice nevertâ—elesse being held effeminate and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruld by his mother and thereupon fallen into contempt the
well taken would have proved lucky to him when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any errour The King then having conquerd Lombardy recoverd presently all that reputation that Charles had lost him Genua yeelded to him the Florentines became friends with him the Marquesse of Mantua the Duke of Ferrara the Bentivolii the Lady of Furli the Lord of Faenza Pesaro Rimino Camerino and Piombino the Luccheses Pisans and Sieneses every one came and offered him friendship then might the Venetians consider the rashnesse of the course they had taken who only to get into their hands two Townes in Lombardy made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had followed these afornamed rules and secured defended those his friends who because their number was great and they weak and fearefull some of the Church and others of the Venetians were alwayes forced to hold with him and by their meanes he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest but hee waâ— no sooner got into Milan than hee took a quite wrong course by giving ayd to Pope Alexander to seize upon Romania and perceivd not that by this resolution he weakned himself ruining his own friends and those that had cast themselves into his bosome making the Church puissant by adding to their Spirituall power whereby they gaind their authority and so much temporall estate And having once got out of the way hee was constrained to goe on forward insomuch as to stop Alexanders ambition and that he should not become Lord of all Tuscany of force he was to come into Italy and this sufficed him not to have made the Church mighty and taken away his own friends but for the desire hee had to get the kingdome of Naples he divided it with the King of Spain and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy he brought in a competitour to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country and all that were ill-affected to him might have otherwhere to make their recourse and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice-King of his owne hee took him from thence to place another there that might afterward chace him thence It is a thing indeed very naturall and ordinary to desire to be of the getting hand and alwayes when men undertake it if they can effect it they shall bee prais'd for 't or at least not blam'd but when they are not able and yet will undertake it here lies the blame here is the errour committed If France then was able with her own power to assaile the Kingdome of Naples she might well have done it but not being able she should not have divided it and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians deserv'd some excuse thereby to set one foot in Italy yet this merits blame for not being excus'd by that necessity Lewis then committed these five faults extinguishâ— the feebler ones augmented the State of another that was already powerfull in Italy brought thereinto a very puissant forreinner came not thither himself to dwell there nor planted any colonies there which faults while he liv'd he could not but be the worse for yet all could not have gone so ill had he not committed the sixt â—o take from the Venetians their â—tate for if he had not enlarg'd â—he Churches territories nor â—rought the Spaniard into Italy â—t had been necessary to take them â—ower but having first taken â—hose other courses he should neâ—er have given way to their deâ—truction for while they had been â—trong they would alwayes have â—â—ept the others off from venturing â—n the conquest of Lombardy For â—he Venetians would never have â—iven their consents thereto unâ—esse they should have been made â—ords of it themselves and the â—thers would never have taken it â—rom France to give it them then â—hey would never have dar'd to goe and set upon them both together And if any one should say that King Lewis yeelded Romaâ—ia to Alexander and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain to avoyd a warre I answer with the â—easons above alleaged that one should never suffer any disorder to follow for avoding of a warre for that warre is not sav'd but put off to thy disadvantage And if any others argue that the King had given his word to the Pope to doe that exploit for him for dissolving of his marriage and for giving the Cardinalls Cap to him of Roan I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words how they ought to bee kept King Lewiâ— then lost Lombardy for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd who have possessed themselves of countries and desir'd to keep them Nor is this any strange thing but very ordinary and reasonable and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinall when Valentine for so ordinarily was Caesar Borgia Pope Alexanders sonne call'd made himself master of Romania for when the Cardinall said to mee that the Italians understood not the feates of warre I answered the Frenchmen understood not matter of â—tate for had they bin wel vers'd â—erein they would never have â—ffer'd the Church to have grown 〈◊〉 that greatnesse And by expeâ—â—ence wee have seen it that the â—ower hereof in Italy and that of â—pain also was caused by France â—nd their own ruine proceeded â—â—om themselves From whence 〈◊〉 generall rule may bee taken â—hich never or very seldome fails â—hat hee that gives the meanes to â—â—other to become powerfull ruâ—es himselfe for that power is â—â—us'd by him either with his inâ—ustry or with his force and as well the one as the other of these â—wo is suspected by him that is â—rown puissant CHAP. IV. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexander rebell'd not against Alexanders Successours after his death THe difficulties being consider'd which a man hath in the maintaining of a State nâ— gotten some might marvaile hoâ— it came to passe that Alexandâ—â— the Great subdued all Asia in 〈◊〉 few yeeres and having hardlâ— possessed himselfe of it died whereupon it seem'd probable thâ— all that State should have rebell'd neverthelesse his Successours kepâ— the possession of it nor found theâ— other difficulty in holding it thaâ— what arose among themselveâ— through their own ambition 〈◊〉 answer that all the Principalities whereof wee have memory left us have been governed in twâ— severall manners either by 〈◊〉 Prince and all the rest Vassallâ— who as ministers by his favouâ— and allowance doe help to govern that Kingdom or by a Princâ— and by Barons who not by theiâ— Princes favour but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree And these kinds of Barons havâ— both states of their own and Vassalls who acknowledge them foâ— their Lords and beare them a truâ— naturall affection Those States â—t are govern'd by a Prince and 〈◊〉 Vassalls have their
with the governments of the provinces as were the armies of the Romane Empire And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the souldiers than the people it was because the souldiers were more powerfull than the people now is it more necessary for all Princes except the Turk and the Souldan to satisfie their people than their souldiers because the people are more mighty than they wherein I except the Turk he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot and 15000 horse upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people hee maintaine these his friends The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto which being wholly in the souldiers power hee must also without respect of his people keep them his friends And you are to consider that this State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities for it is very like the Papacy which cannot be termd a hereditary Principality nor a new Principality for the sonns of the deceasd Prince are not heires and Lords thereof but hee that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them And this order being of antiquity cannot be termd a new Principality because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones for though the Prince be new yet are the orders of that State ancient and ordaind to receive him as if hee were their hereditary Prince But let us returne to our matter whosoever shall consider our discourse before shall perceive that either hatred or contempt have causd the ruine of the afore-namd Emperours and shall know also from it came that part of them proceeding one way and part a contrary yet in any of them the one had a happy successe and the others unhappy for it was of no availe but rather hurtfull for Pertinax and Alexander because they were new Princes to desire to imitate Marcus who by inheritance came to the Principality and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla Commodus and Maximinus to imitate Severus because none of them were endued with so great valour as to follow his stepps therein Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus but he ought make choyce of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State and to take from Marcus those that are fitt and glorious to preserve a State which is already establishd and setled CHAP. XX. Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of are profitable or dammageable SOme Princes whereby they might safely keep their State have disarmd their subjects some others have held the townes under their dominion devided into factions others have maintain'd enmities against themselves others have apply'd themselves to gaine them where they have suspected at their entrance into the government others have built Fortresses and others again have ruind and demolishd them and however that upon all these things a man cannot well passe a determinate sentence unlesse one comes to the particulars of these States where some such like determinations were to be taken yet shall I speake of them in so large a manner as the matter of it selfe will beare It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects but rather when hee hath found them disarmd hee hath alwayes armd them For being belov'd those armes become thine those become faithfull which thou hadst in suspicion and those which were faithfull are maitaind so and thy subjects are made thy partisans and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes when thou bestowst favours on those thou armest with the others thou canst deale more for thy safety and that difference of proceeding which they know among them obliges them to thee those others excuse thee judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more who have undergon more danger and so have greater obligation but when thou disarmst them thou beginst to offend them that thou distrusts them either for cowardise or small faith and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee and because thou canst not stand disarmd thou must then turne thy selfe to mercenary Souldiery whereof wee have formerly spoken what it is and when it is good it can never bee so much as to defend thee from powerfull enemies and suspected subjects therefore as I have said a new Prince in a new Principality hath always ordaind them armes Of examples to this purpose Histories are full But when a Prince gaines a new State which as a member hee addes to his ancient dominions then it is necessary to disarme that State unlesse it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof and these also in time and upon occasions it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate and so order them that all the armes of thy State be in the hands of thy own Souldiers who live in thy ancient State neare unto thee Our ancestors and they that were accounted sages were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions and Pisa with Fortresses and for this cause maintaind some towne subject to them in differences whereby to hold it more easily This at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a certaine manner might be well done but me thinks it cannot now adayes bee well given for a precept for I do not beleeve that divisions made can do any good rather it must needs bee that when the enemy approaches them Cities divided are presently lost for alwayes the weaker part will cleave to the forreine power and the other not be able to subsist The Venetians as I think mov'd by the aforesaid reasons maintaind the factions of the Guelfes and Gibellius in their townes and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood yet they nourishd these differences among them to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels should not plot any thing against them which as it prov'd never serv'd them to any great purpose for being defeated at Vayla presently one of those two factions tooke courage and seizd upon their whole State Therefore such like wayes argue the Princes weakenesse for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace being they are able by meanes thereof more easily to manage their subjects but war comming such like orders discover their fallacy Without doubt Princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great who hath more need to gaine reputation than a hereditary Prince causes enemies to rise against him and him to undertake against them to the end he may have occasion to master them and know that ladder which his enemies have
set him upon whereby to rise yet higher And therefore many think that a wise Prince when hee hath the occasion ought cunningly to nourish some enmity that by the suppressing thereof his greatnesse may grow thereupon Princes especially those that are new have found more faith and profit in those men who in the beginning of their State have been held suspected than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents Pandulphus Petrucei Prince of Siena governd his State more with them that had bin suspected by him than with the others But of this matter we cannot speak at large because it varies according to the subject I will only say this that those men who in the beginning of a principality were once enemies if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support the Prince might alwayes with the greatest facility gaine for his and they are the rather forc'd to serve him faithfully insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancell that sinister opinion which was once held of them and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage than from those who serving him too supinely neglect his affaires And seing the matter requires it I will not omit to put a Prince in mind who hath anew made himselfe master of a State by meanes of the inward helpes he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favour'd him to favour him if it be not a naturall affection towards him for if it be only because they were not content with their former government with much paines and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends because it will bee impossible for him to content them By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and moderne affaires searching into the cause hereof wee shall find it much more easie to gaine those men for friends who formerly were contented with the State and therefore were his enemies than those who because they were not contented therewith became his friends and favourd him in getting the mastery of it It hath been the custome of Princes wherby to hold their States more securely to build Citadels which might bee bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them and so to have a secure retraite from the first violences I commend this course because it hath been usd of old notwithstanding Nicolas Vitelli in our dayes hath been knowne to demolish two Citadels in the towne of Castello the better to keep the State Guidubaldo Duke of Vrbin being to returne into his State out of which hee was driven by Caesar Borgia raz'd all the Fortresses of that Country and thought he should hardlyer lose that State againe without them The Bentivolii returning into Bolonia usd the like courses Citadels then are profitable or not according to the times and if they advantage thee in one part they do thee harme in another and this part may be argued thus That Prince who stands more in feare of his owne people than of strangers ought to build Fortresses but hee that is more afraid of strangers than of his people should let them alone Against the house of Sforza the Castle of Milan which Francis Sforza built hath and will make more war than any other disorder in that State and therefore the best Citadell that may be is not to incurre the peoples hatred for however thou holdst a Fortresse and the people hate thee thou canst hardly scape them for people when once they have taken armes never want the help of strangers at their need to take their parts In our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any Prince unlesse it were the Countesse of Furli when Count Hieronimo of Furli her husband was slaine for by meanes thereof she escap'd the peoples rage and attended aid from Milan and so recoverd her State and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people but afterwards they servd her to little purpose when Caesar Borgia assaild her and that the people which was her enemy sided with the stranger Therefore both then and at first it would have been more for her safety not to have been odious to the people than to have held the Fortresses These things being well weigh'd then I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses and him also that shall not and I will blame him howsoever he be that relying upon those shall make small account of being hated by his people CHAP. XXI How a Prince ought to behave himselfe to gaine Reputation THere is nothing gaines a Prince such repute as great exployts and rare trialls of himselfe in Heroicke actions We have now in our dayes Ferdinand King of Arragon the present King of Spain hee in a manner may be termd a new Prince for from a very weak King hee is now become for fame and glory the first King of Christendome and if you shall well consider his actions you shall find them all illustrious and every one of them extraordinary Hee in the beginning of his reigne assaild Granada and that exployt was the ground of his State At first hee made that warre in security and without suspicion he should be any wayes hindred and therein held the Barons of Castiglias minds busied who thinking upon that warre never minded any innovation and in this while he gaind credit and authority with them they not being aware of it was able to maintaine with the Church and the peoples mony all his souldiers aâ—d to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long warre which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honour Besides this to the end hee might be able here among to undertake greater matters serving himselfe alwaies of the colour of religion hee gave himselfe to a kind of religious cruelty chasing and dispoyling those Jewes out of the Kingdome nor can this example bee more admirable and rare under the same cloke hee invaded Affrick and went through with his exployt in Italy and last of all hath hee assaild France and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters which alwayes have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration and busied in attending the event what it should bee and these his actions have thus grown one upon another that they have nevâ—r given leysure to men so to rest as that they might ever plot any thing against them Moreover it much availes a Prince to give extraordinary proofes of himselfe touching the government within such as those wee have heard of Bernard of Milan whensoever occasion is given by any one that may effectuate some great thing either of good or evill in the civill government and to finde out some way either to reward or punish it wherof in the world much notice may bee taken And above all things a Prince ought to endeavour in all his actions to spread abroad â— fame of his magnificence and worthinesse
NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE ALSO The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca AND The meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliverotto of Fermo Paul and the Duke of Gravina Translated out of Italian into English By E. D. With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errours LONDON Printed by R. Bishop for Wil Hils and are to be sold by Daniel Pakeman at the signe of the Rainebow neare the Inner Temple gate 1640. To the most noble and Illustrious JAMES Duke of Lenox Earle of March Baron of Setrington Darnly Terbanten and Methuen Lord Great Chamberlaine Admirall of Scotland Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes POysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality that as destructives of Nature they are utterly to be abhord but we find many nay most of them have their medicinall uses This book carryes its poyson and malice in it yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life with advantage The Lamprey they say hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it take that out and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates Epictetus the Philosopher sayes Every thing hath two handles as the firebrand it may bee taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt the other being laid hold on will cleave to the very flesh and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart Sin hath the condition of the firy end the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule nay it is worse one sinne goes not alone but hath many consequences Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusall of this Author your judgement shal easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavours and have devoted them to your Graces service which if you shall accept and protect I shall remaine Your Graces humble and devoted servant EDWARD DACRES The Epistle to the Reader QUestionlesse some men will blame mee for making this Authour speake in our vulgar tongue For his maximes and tenents are condemnd of all as pernicious to all Christian States and hurtfull to all humane Societies Herein I shall answer for my selfe with the Comoedian Placere studeo bonis quam plurimis minimè multos laedere I endeavour to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed and no scandall to any I grant I find him blam'd and condemnd I doe no lesse my selfe Reader either doe thou read him with a prejudicate opinion out of thy own judgement tax his errors or at least if thou canst stoop so low make use of my paines to helpe thee I will promise thee this reward for thy labour if thou consider well the actions of the world thou shalt find him much practisd by those that condemne him who willingly would walk as theeves doe with close lanternes in the night that they being undescried and yet seeing all might surprise the unwary in the dark Surely this book will infect no man out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart he drawes his malice and mischiefe From the same flower the Bee sucks hony from whence the Spider hath his poyson And he that means well shall be here warnd where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares A judge who hath often usd to examine theeves becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks If mischiefe come hereupon blame not me nor blame my Authour lay the saddle on the right horse but Hony soit qui mal y pense let shame light on him that hatcht the mischiefe Nicholas Machiavelli to the Magnificent Laurence sonne to Peter of Medicis health THey that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince commonly use to offer themselves to his view with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in whereupon wee see they are many times presented with Horses and Armes cloth of gold pretious stones and such like ornaments worthy of their greatnesse Having then a mind to offer my selfe to your Magnificence with some testimony of my service to you J found nothing in my whole Inventory that I thinke better of or more esteeme than the knowledge of great mens actions which I have learnd by a long experience of moderne affaires and a continuall reading of those of the Ancients Which now that J have with great diligence long workâ— it out and throughly sifted J commend to your Magnificence And however I may well think this work unworthy of your view yet such is your humanity that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance considering that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift than to present you with the meanes whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that which I in the space of many yeares and with many sufferances and dangers have made proofe and gaind the knowledge of And this worke I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader as others use because J would not have it gaine its esteeme from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter and the â—ravity of the subject Nor can â—his be thought presumption if a man of humble and low condition â—enture to dilate and discourse â—pon the governments of Princes for even as they that with their â—ensills designe out countreys get themselves into the plaines below to consider the nature of the mounâ—aines and other high palces aâ—ove and againe to consider the plaines below they get up to the â—ops of the mountaines in like manâ—er to understand the nature of the people it is fâ—t to be a Prince and to know well the dispositions of Princes sutes best with the understanding of a subject Your Magnificence then may bâ— pleasd to receive this small present with the same mind that J send it which if you shall throughly peruse and consider you shall perceive therein that J exceedingly wish that you may attaine to that greatnesse which your own Fortune and your excellent endowments promise you and if your Magnificence from the very point of your Highnesse shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferiour places you shall see how undeservedly I undergoe an extreame and continuall despight of Fortune THE PRINCE Written by Nicholas Machiavelli Secretary and Citizen of Florence CHAP. I. How many sorts of Principalities there are and how many wayes they are attained to ALl States all Dominions that have had or now have rule over men have been and are either â—epubliques or Principalities â—rincipalities are either herditaâ—y whereof they of the bloud of â—he Lord thereof have long time been Princes or else they aâ— new and those that are new aâ— either all new as was the Dutchâ— of Millan to
may a Prince gaine them and secure himselfe of them But in Republiques there is more life in them more violent hatred more earnest desire of revenge nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them or suffer them to rest so that the safest way is either to ruine them or dwell among them CHAP. VI. Of new Principalities that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour LEt no man marvaile if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities both touching a Prince and touching a State I shall alleadge very famous examples for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others and proceed in their actions by imitation and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd nor their vertues whose patterne thou set-st before thee attain'd unto a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons and imitate those that have been the most excellent to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto at least it may yeeld some savour thereof and doe as good Archers use who thinking the place they intend to hit too farre distant knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark not for to hit so high with their arrow but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at I say that in Principalities wholly new where there is a new Prince there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser And because this successe to become a Prince of a private man presupposes either vertue or fortune mee thinks the one and the other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune hath maintain'd himselfe the better Moreover it some what facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd because hee hath not other dominions in person to come and dwell there But to come to these who by their own vertues and not by fortune attain'd to be Princes the excellentest of these are Moyses Cyrus Romulus Theseus and such like and though of Moyses we are not to reason he onely executing the things that were commanded him by God yet merits hee well to be admir'd were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God But considering Cyrus and the others who either got or founded Kingdomes wee shall find them all admirable and if their particular actions and Lawes bee throughly weigh'd they will not appeare much differing from those of Moyses which hee receiv'd from so Soveraigne an instructer And examining their lives and actions it will not appeare that they had other help of fortune than the occasion which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd and without that occasion the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd and without that vertue the occasion had been offer'd in vaine It was then necessary for Moyses to find the people of Israel slaves in Aegypt and oppress'd by the Aegyptians to the end that they to get out of their thraldome should bee willing to follow him It was fit that Romulus should not bee kept in Albia but expos'd presently after his birth that hee might become King of Rome and founder of that City There was need that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the Medes government and the Medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace Theseus could not make proof of his vertue had not he found the Athenians dispers'd These occasions therefore made these men happy and their excellent vertue made the occasion be tâ—ken notice of whereby their country became â—nnobled and exceeding fortunate They who by vertuous wayes like unto these become Princes attain the Principality with difficulty but hold it with much ease and the difficulties they find in gayning the Principality arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in to lay the foundation of their State and worke their own security And it is to be consider'd how there is not any thing harder to take in hand nor doubtfuller to succeed nor more dangerous to mannage than to be the chiefe in bringing in new orders for this Chiefe finds all those his enimies that thrive upon the old orders and hath but luke-warme defenders of all those that would doe well upon the new orders which luke-warme temper proceeds part ly from feare of the opposers who have the lawes to their advantage partly from the incredulity of the men who truly beleeve not a new thing unlesse there bee some certain proofe given them thereof Whereupon it arises that whensoever they that are adversaries take the occasion to assayle they doe it factiously and these others defend but cooly so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard Therefore it is necessary being we intend throughly to discourse this part to examine if these innovators stand of themselves or if they depend upon others that is if to bring their worke to effect it bee necessary they should intreat or be able to constrain In the first case they alwayes succeed ill and bring nothing to passe but when they depend of themselves and are able to force than seldome it is that they hazzard Hence came it that all the Prophets that were arm'd prevail'd but those that were unarm'd were too weak for besides what wee have alleadg'd the nature of the people is changeable and easie to bee perswaded to a matter but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion And therefore it behooves a man to be so provided that when they beâ—eeve no longer hee may be able to compell them thereto by force Moyses Cyrus Theseus and Romulus would never have been able to cause their Lawes long to be obey'd had they been disarm'd as in our times it befell Fryer Jerome Savanarola who perish'd in his new constitutions when the multitude began not to beleeve him neither had hee the meanes to keep them firme that had beleev'd nor to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him Wherefore such men as these in their proceedings find great difficulty and all their dangers are in the way and these they must surmount by their vertue but having once masterd them and beginning to bee honourd by all when they have rooted those out that envy'd their dignities they remain powerfull secure honourable and happy To these choice Examples I will adde one of lesse remarque but it shall hold some proportion with them and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind which is Hiero the Siracusan He of a private man became Prince of Siracusa nor knew hee any other ayd of fortune than the occasion for the Siracusans being oppress'd made choyce of him for their Captaine whereupon hee deserv'd to be made their Prince and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune that hee
who writes of him sayes he wanted nothing of reigning but a Kingdome This man extinguish'd all the old souldiery ordein'd the new left the old allyances entertain'd new and as he had friendship and souldiers that were his own upon that ground he was able to build any edifice so that hee indur'd much trouble in gaining and sufferd but little in maintaining CHAP. VII Of new Principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forâ—es THey who by fortune only become Princes of private men with small paines attain to it but have much adoe to maintain themselves in it and find no difficulty at all in the way because they are carried thither with wings but all the difficulties arise there after they are plac'd in them And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money by the favour of some one that grants it them as it befell many â—n Greece in the cities of Jonia and Hellespont where divers Princes were made by Darius as well for his own safety as his glory as also them that were made Emperours who from private men by corrupting the souldiers attaind to the Empire These subsist meery upon the will and fortune of those that have advanc'd them which are two voluâ—ble and unsteady things and theâ— neither know how nor are ablâ— to continue in that dignity theâ— know not how because unlesse iâ— be a man of great understanding and vertue it is not probable that hee who hath alwayes liv'd iâ— private life can know how tâ— command neyther are they able because they have not any force that can be freindly or faythfulâ— to them Moreover those State that suddenly fall into a maâ— hands as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly cannot well have taken roote nor have made their correspondencyes so firme but that the firâ—â— storme that takes them ruine them in case these who as it iâ— sayd are thus on a suddain clamberd up to be Princes are not oâ— that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves tâ— maintain that which Chanâ—â— hath cast into their bosomes anâ— can afterwards lay those foundations which others have cast before they were Princes For the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince by Vertue or by Fortune I will alleage you two examples which have been in the days of our memory These were Francis Sforza and Caesar Borgia Francis by â—ust meanes and with a great deal of vertue of a private man got to be Duke of Millan and that which with much payns he had gaind he kept with small adoe On the other side Caesar Borgia commonly termd Duke Valentine gott his state by his Fathers fortune and with the same lost it however that for his owne part no paynes was spard nor any thing omitted which by a discreet and valorous man ought to have been done to fasten his roots in those Estates which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him for as it was formerly sayd he that lays not the foundations first yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards however it be with the great trouble of the architect and danger of the aedifice If therfore we consider all the Dukes progresses we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power which I judge a matter not superfluous to runne over because I should not well know what better rules I might give to a new Prince than the patterne of his actions and however the courses he took availd him not yet was it not his fault but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extreame malignity of fortune Pope Alexander the sixt desiring to make the Duke his sonne a great man had a great many difficulties present and future First hee saw no way there was whereby hee might be able to make him Lord of any State that was not the Churches and if hee turnd to take that from the Church hee knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never agree to it for Faenza and Riminum were under the Venetians protection Moreover hee saw that the armes of Italy and those whereof in particular hee might have been able to make some use were in their hands who ought to feare the Popes greatnesse and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them being all in the Orsiâ—s and Colonnies hands and those of their faction It was necessary then that those matters thus appointed by them should bee disturb'd and the States of Italy disorder'd to bee able safely to master part of them which he then found easie to doe seeing the Venetians upon three considerations had us'd the meanes to bring the French men back again into Italy which hee not only did not withstand but further'd with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage The King then past into Italy with the Venetians ayd and Alexanders consent nor was hee sooner arriv'd in Milan than the Pope had souldiers from him for the service of Romania which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces The Duke then having made himselfe master of Romania and beaten the Colonnies desiring to hold it and proceed forward two things hinder'd him the one his owne souldiers which hee thought were not true to him the other the French mens good wills that is to say hee fear'd that the Princes souldiers whereof hee had serv'd himselfe would faile him and not only hinder his conquest but take from him what hee had gotten and that the King also would serve him the same turne Hee had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion when after the taking of Faenza hee assaulted Bolonia to which assault he saw them goe very cold And touching the King he discoverd his mind when having taken the Dutchy of Vrbin he â—vaded Tuscany from which â—ction the King made him retire whereupon the Duke resolv'd to â—epend no more upon fortune â—nd other mens armes And the â—irst thing hee did was to weaâ—en the Orsini and Colonnies â—actions in Rome for hee gain'd â—ll their adherents that were genâ—lemen giving then large allowâ—nces and honouring them acâ—ording to their qualities with â—harges and governments so â—hat in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht and wholly â—ent to the Duke After this â—ee waited an occasion to root â—ut the Orsini having before dispersd those of the family of Coâ—onna which fell out well to his â—and and he us'd it better For â—he Orsini being too late aware â—hat the Dukes and the Churches greatnesse was their destruction held a Counsell together â—n a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyniog to Perâ—sia From thence grew the râ—bellion of Vrbin and the troublâ— of Romania and many other dangers befell the Duke which 〈◊〉 overcame all with the help of thâ— French and having regaind hâ— reputation trusting neither Francâ— nor any forreine forces to thâ— end hee might