in whatsoever is meant by the word protection is the King therefore boâ—…nd to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command I wonder how you can now apprehend this word protect under so large a notion or is it possible were you not resolved to cavill that these words should give you ground for it certainly if my reason faile me not politicall happinesse hath reference only to the body politike and that is not capable of any advancement to any hoâ—…our office or power and to take the words in other sense were to make them impossible for can it be thought or expected that his Majestie should be bound to advance all his Subjects to places of honor or power since if all should be in authority they might command themselvs there would be none left to obey The sence of the Observator is plainely this that the King by this word protect is not only to intend a shielding us from all evill but likewise a promoting of the commoâ—…wealth to all kinde of politicall happinesse by endeavouring to inrich not impoverish his Kingdom by maintaining peace and establishing good and wholesome laws amongst his people and by putting of such in place of power and authority that may see the due execution of the same Though all single 〈◊〉 ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole State ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore saith the Author the greatest happinesse of a Prince that 〈◊〉 was able and his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capeable of doing any courtesie VVhen he hath done all he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant Whatsoever hath beene or could be attributed to any Prince in point of grace or humble acknowledgement that we ascribe unto our gracious Soveraigne with all humilitie and we shall alwayes account it our happinesse to have a Prince not only able but willing to engage his people by his grace and goodnesse But must it therefore be thought to be a dishonour or derogation from his gracious and publike favours to say that hee doth but fungi officio discharge his office or duty according as the law of God and man obligeth him certainly had Rhehoboams Sages thought that their Councell had carryed the least badge of irreverence or disrespect to their Prince they would not have advised him in such rough and unacceptable language that if he would be a servant to that people and serve them c. that then they would be his servants for ever Good Princes have acknowledged themselves servants to the common wealth And t is the councell of young men only that suggest the contrary But it is a certaine position that that Prince will never discharge his trust aright that sacrifices too much to his Royaltie Here the Author may see that other ages have beene guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect as this Sycophantean Coâ—…tier is pleased to stile it to Princes Againe he saith That if all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace Then they truly are so for no obligation can lye upon any man to believe things â—…therwise than they are T is true things that are simply good or simply evil cannot be varied by circumstances and therefore no obligation may constrain a man to believe them otherwise But that which is not in it selfe good or bad but varies according to its severall object in such case for one and the same act to produce good to one and ill to another is no novelty and here the application denominates the action So in this case one and the same action may be matter of grace to one and yet but matter of dâ—…ty to another As when a Iudge doth Justice to a man as to him t is grace and favour but with reference to the law tâ—…s but his dutie I but he saith That this ground destroyes the power of beneâ—…nce in a Priâ—…ce and the duty of gratitude in subjects Under favour nothing lesse for as it is his Maâ—…esties office and duty by all meanes of grace and favour as also by justice and right to endeavour the happinesse of the common Wealth so it is our duty by all meanes of humble acknowledgement to bee gratefull t is a great mercy for to have a Prince that will governe his people according to Law and right And it were a great judgement for the people not to bee thankfull The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought â—…ee to thinke that peâ—…sht to him which is gained to the people By the same Argument the people may share all that be hath and he is â—…ound to believe that be hath lost nothing All that the observator here drives at is but this that the Kings strength and riches aâ—…e imbarked in the happinesse and prosperity of hâ—…s people and therefore that it is not their debilitating or impoverishing that will any way 〈◊〉 or enrich his Majestie but the contrary Blest be the King in his portion may it increase to nonplus Arithmeticke and his dayes time But yet let him know that the misery or happinesse of his people are by way of râ—…flection made his Is King anâ—… people have severall â—…ghts saith the Author what law is there which binds the King suo jâ—…re cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his No doâ—…bt the King and people have severall rights happy State when they doe not intrench upon each other but in this they vaâ—…y the King for the most part is seized or possâ—…ssed in jure 〈◊〉 and the people in their owne right so that the King hath nâ—… that 〈◊〉 of property that the people hath And no doubt the King at first as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Author received his demesnes from his people as a recompence of his care to whom they owed their securitie and therefore if it were law for 〈◊〉 no question the people might most colourably justifie an incroachment Aâ—… the King by the Law of God and man is bound to doe justice and to protect and deâ—… his people and therefore if he have any right or priviledge that is inconsistent wiâ—…h these he is obliged suo jure cedere But againe doth any one goe about to take away the Kings right or to divest any property of his Nay rather doe they not in defect of his 〈◊〉 and in his right imploy and mannage them according to the trust reposed in him or if they did doe it ought not the King rather to loose his right
argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
writt and their oathes they are bound to preserve and defend and therefore clearely not out of their â—…gnizance for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so farre forget himselfe as to think that authorâ—…ty of any moment when he doth produce the Record I will then give him an answer So that I take this as an undeniable position that where the King doth duely execute the trust reposed in him there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act and the Parliament in such caâ—…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction Bâ—…t if on the coâ—…trary the King infring his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom there the Parliament may are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing oâ—… the King 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 will not passe over thâ—…s râ—…le thus for saith he if quod omnes tangit ab 〈◊〉 opprobâ—…ri debet with what equity then may the Clergie who are a considerable part of this Kingdome be excluded Why yes by the same eqâ—…ity that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth exclâ—…de them from being Farmers that those who have devoted themselves soly to Gods service might not miscere se secularibus negotijs incumber themsâ—…lves with secular affaires for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function 'T was neâ—…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousnesse so possessed the Clergie and temporall jurisdiction was dispensed by Ecclesiasticall persons And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines they â—…arved their flocke and made them more like wolves than Sheepe and Heathens than Christians I wish they would not desire temporall preâ—…erment but keepe themselves as they ought in their proper Spheare ponder on this that it is no small happines to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 molestations that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God The Author saith that the King tells them their writt may direct them to know their power which is to counsell not to command I wish with all my heart that he and his associates could pleade as cleare a conscience from this as his Parliament can though certainely they may make a more colourable pretence to it than the Cavalliers if begging and intreating with all the submissivenesse that possibly can be be a commanding then are the Parliament highly guilty if it otherwise not Againe saith the Author the writt runnes super dubijs negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri So that the cleare meaning is their advise is not law except the Royall assent established it into an Act. If the Authour please but to advise with the learned he will finde that tractare is of a more large signication than to treat of or debate onely But was it ever said that their advise should be Law without the Regall assent They have power to declare what the law of the land is in case of publique concernement as now but it was never so much as thought on that they could make a new law or alter the old without his Majesty We must distinguish betweene the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law and the making of a new law the one they may doe without his Majesties consent the other they cannot 'T is alleadged that the King callâ—…th them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Queene Elizabeth but for proposing they might advise the Qâ—…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to doe to mâ—…ddle with To which the Observator answereth a meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law 'T is true saith the Author but when grounded upon Authority I pray where is it and no way excepted against by those who have beene alwaies earnest defendors of their priviledges it may bee reckoned among sound presidents Happily there was never the like occasion to except against iâ—… as having never beene urged how then could it be answered I am confident that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments But pray heare the Parliament and as you ought so rest satisfied who say that some Presidents ought not to be rules this you must agree to for that some are not lawfull But furthey they say that no presidents can bee bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament because some ought not to be followed and all may â—…all short and be different from the case in question The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when be withdraweth himselfâ—… to bee rightly named a Parlâ—…ament or to have any power of any Court and consequenâ—…ly to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsely imposed on his Majesty his answers and massages speakes the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Had it not beene doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage or at least have deniâ—…d them that acceptance that his Majestiâ—…s Messages do dâ—…serve I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oâ—…her name and style would have beene found out for doth he not in these very Mâ—…ssages call thâ—…m an inconsiderable number and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the likâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the stiles of a Parliament and for thâ—…ir powâ—…r if they can doe nothing wiâ—…hout his Mâ—…jesties consent and that not to be obtained neither what are they more thâ—…n a Cipher or a meere convâ—…ntion of private men And is this a falsity But our Authours language shâ—…ll not provoke to a retaliation The King doth assert that because the law hath trusted him with a Pâ—…erogative to discontinue Pâ—…aments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in 〈◊〉 of Law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by his writt 〈◊〉 is grosse 〈◊〉 saith the Authour Howevâ—…r I am sure the language is grosâ—…e I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author but this I am certaine of that his Mâ—…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and â—…lection thereby which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedome and power therein But why is it false because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdome hee acâ—… he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writts T is not to be 〈◊〉 â—…hat whâ—…n the people granted this Prerogative to his Majestie that they would give him so vast a power as to make him the sole Judge of the necessitie of a Parliâ—…ment for if so upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellers be the Kingdome in never so imminent never so appaâ—…ent danger it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament certainly this was never the intention of this trust
fraudes holy salsehoods and religious untruth stood the Church of Rome c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine whether this policy worke not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falsehoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth for he is revolted againe into his pretences deceipts and falsehoods And I wish from my very heart that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man and such as he is than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived I but then the Observator sayes It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in law to be done by force not onely when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this workes on the minde as strongly as the other on the body I but with the Authors favour this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera such as they use to bugbearâ—… Children withall It remaines then we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults I marry Sir here is onâ—… of the imaginary Spiriâ—…s that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men Doubtlâ—…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare were it true which I much question to a resolved and setled judgement neither doth the law tâ—…ke hold of any such feare as thiâ—… is I but then he goes on whether that they were not poasted with directions to thâ—…ir perticular lodgings I here you have another of these Hobgoblins and deformed Images more fit to fray children with than men Because if that were true they were directed to their Chambers and never intended as the event cleares it to approach them therefore they complied or were silent and so that faction prevailed I but he goes yet further whether the way to the House were not set with clamarous multitudes that they must passe through the middest of them whilâ—…st they insorme them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur it is their bâ—…sinesse that is there transacted have recourse thi her with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament and how thingâ—… succeed for their good but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Assâ—…mblies and clamorous multitudes For their inquiring what their names were and which sâ—…de they tooke certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 and that can be no cause to make me dread a man because he knowes my name No nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 if I am conscious to my self that they are such as are just and honourable â—…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted that is as like to be true as that they shoâ—…ld vote what they had informed them For the other two of absence and accident he sayes they may be reduced to this I t is no wondâ—…r many stay away since they must be absent even whilest thâ—…y are there If their wills were absent by being a verse from the publique good whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers better in such case their rome than their company The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom pâ—…blique affaires shâ—…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the â—…eason why each man preserves his owne right bâ—…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies No but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them I but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament one may manâ—…ge a trust well and yet no dishoâ—…â—…hat a whole Kingdom may doâ—… it better With equall reason sayes he they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops 〈◊〉 Sherâ—…ffes 〈◊〉 c. and dispose of all the preserments of England For thâ—… Bishops thouâ—…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us that they have been very bad yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be that they likewise should be nominated by the great counsell for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons But now for the Sheriffes Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred for the nominating of these as for the other for though they may be corrupt in their way yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests no danger to the publike The truth of it is this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the heaâ—… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Staâ—…e who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike have and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it Was not then their reqâ—…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence who by their sedulous care honest and direct counsell and which is above all by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future But to passe this had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to hâ—…s people If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie and 〈◊〉 himselfe of
the conclusion deduced thence he may finde as much difference between the tenses as betweene Democracy and Monarchy Give me leave to make the Premisses and doe you raise what conclusion you will The Observator who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author seems to intend only thus much that if elegerit be taken in the future tense well and good it makes for him for then the King according to the very letter of his oath is bound under the heavy sinne of perjury to grant such lawes as aâ—…e requested of him by his people and then hee can have no negative voyce But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense and not in the future why yet saith the Observator it matters not for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request is an act of justice necessary as well as the dispencing of the old therfore there being the same necessitity the publike trust must needs equally extend to both But the Aethor will shew us why elegerit must of necessity bee taken in the preterrerfect not in the future as this case is for saith he the word consuetudines which cannot referre to the future undenyably evinces it was meant of the time past Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense for no more then the King can grant such customes as the people shâ—…ll chuse for that it must be time not the Kings Patent that can create a custome so neither can the King grant such lawes or customs unto a people which they have already chosen and which have beene established and ratified unto them by all his predecessors for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest that which is mine owne already cannot be given unto me So that the oath must bee construed reddendo singula singulis as we say in law that is that he will confirme their ancient customes which they doe already enjoy and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choyce of other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his Magisties oath where demand is made whether his Majestie will grant and coâ—…firm unto his people their ancient lawes and customes who answers that he will And contrary to that which the Author doth assert the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published how that elegerit hath been alwayes rendered in the future tense and not in the preter perfect tense So that I shall passe this over without any further trouble conceaving that the Author may if he have not resolved to the contrary upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular The King is bound to consent to new Laws â—…f they be necessary as well as defend the old His Majestie never thought otherwise but he is not bound to an implicit faith to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so This is in plaine termes to invert the method for the King to chuse Lawes not the people for if he will consent to none be they of never so great necessity but such as hee himselfe holds convenient what then is become of the peoples election this is to prescribe and enforce lawes upon the people â—…ot to consent to them upon their election Besides who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publiâ—…e law as the republike those that knowe the want of the benefit must needs be most sensible of the necessity The word elegerit if it be in the preterperfect tense yet shews that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient â—…aâ—…es and customes and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive noâ—… of any representative body that with the tacit consent of the Prince and so os much other authority Under favour it is of no other authority for though it should be conâ—…essed that at first the diffusive body did chuse their Lawes which had the tacit consent of the Prince and that since the people have granted the King a negative voyce in his Parliaments which is the representative body of the Kingdome yet being with this qualification that his Majesty grant all necessary lawes desired by the people hence it followes that the representative body having as great power and as good judgement to discern of laws necessary as the diffusive have the same power of election which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever For the representative their ancient right is not denyed no law shall be abrogâ—…ted none â—…acted without their assenâ—… But there is a meane betweene doing nothing aâ—…d all I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and knowne falsities How often have the priviledges of Parliament beene infringed even to amazement and wonder that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like and is there not an illegall commission of Array though not enacted yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament But whtch is yet above all and strikes at their very essence are they not because others doe neglect their duty and the trust reposed in them by the publike denyed even the very name of a Parliament and therein the power and vertue of it and whether this be not a denying of their right let the world judge The Author saith true that there is a meane betweene doing nothing and all But I would faine know how we shall be assured of this meane if his Majestie upon pretence of unnecessary shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the Parlament The result of all is Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all tâ—…e subjects lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertaining as subjects have in the Kings dignitie The Author saith That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and hâ—…gh 〈◊〉 in the Kings dignity surpasses his understanding 〈◊〉 not the Author loved division he would not have thus severed the Observators words thereby to puâ—… a dylemma upon himselfe and others for the Observator saith before that the King was made for the people and not the people for the King and thence raiseth this conclusion which under savour is very naturall that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest as they have in his Majestie and his possession and now will any man except our Author who understands not deny this for a truth I but he sa th it seemes to sâ—…eake this wicked doctrine that subjects may dispose of the
Soveraignty as â—…hey please T is strange that our Author will passe his judgement especially so severe an one upon any thing that he doth not understand because happily it may conclude thus much that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great councell the Parâ—… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced that they may dispose of his Soveraignty at pleasure this is the Authors meaning not ours If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expoâ—…e his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to doe so What a strange 〈◊〉 is this is it not lawfull for a man by the hazzard of his person to defenâ—… his properâ—…y which cannot be maintained without the defense of his Countrey But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects that he might expose hâ—…s life and forâ—…une for their defence for no doubt hee that looseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer and if the people had beene made for the King not the King for the people what Law could have warranted the hazzarding of his person â—…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But to disprove this conclusion he saith That the people have as great 〈◊〉 gâ—…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…or the King and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 that I become your Leâ—…ge of life 〈◊〉 gâ—…ds c. as 〈◊〉 by â—…he Proâ—…station and 〈◊〉 of Ligeance which are to the same effect He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath for the preservation of his King anâ—… Soveraâ—…e we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to doe it But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the Kings oath and the Law of the Land which engage the King to protect and defend his Kingdome and people are equalâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Observator had shewen the efficâ—…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people anâ—… he finall cause safety and libertie he descends to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments not to be attained to by oâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied â—…nd Kings better counselled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high deâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 Monarchs who knew no Parliaments Thâ—…s possibly may be 〈◊〉 but I â—…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉 I believe indeede that this is that the Author would faine perswade us to These are the maine grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments God enable us to maintaiâ—… both for if wee part with either we shake hands and bid adue to all happinesse The Author saith that two â—…her 〈◊〉 might have beene named as assentiall as the former which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies and assent to the abrogation of old Lawes and enacting new The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so but I never heard before that the supplying of his Majesties wants by Subsidies was one of the essentiall ends of the calling of Parliament It was accounted formerly the maiâ—… end of calling of a Parliament the ease or Releife of the subject and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankfull acknowledgment of the Kings grace and favour towards them in that Parliament and is it now become one of the maine ends I suppose the Author speakes out of a late experience 'T was never happy with England since this Law was broached And wheresoever Kings advance their owne profit or but make it â—…quall with that of the publique the people will never enjoy true happinesse In the Summes of Edward 1. â—…laus 7. in 3. dors We see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writt that whatsoeveâ—… affaire is 〈◊〉 publique concernment ought to receive publique approbation Quod ownes tangit 〈◊〉 omnibus appâ—…obari debet tractari The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution lest wee reduce our selves to our primirive estate by dissolving the bonds of Government and therefore saith he the policie of all estâ—…tes for the avoydiâ—…g of all confusion hath been to leave the transaction of publique affaires to some certaine number and their suffrages doe in Law binde the rest So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all and hee makes the result of all to be this Those things which the Law doth require shall be transacted onely by Parliament the people doe handle and approve of by their Knights and â—…rgesses those things which the law hath intrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the whoâ—… what bee doth is their act I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments whose power is vaste and incognit as my Lord Cooke speakes And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them as to give them juâ—…isdiction in all cases They themselves who best know their power have in their late Declaration protested against it for they say they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in perticular cases before them then not in all cases But who shall bee Judge of those cafes by which they are intituled to jurisdiction can therâ—… be any one a Competent Judge of this but themselves and they having past their judgement who ought or dare to contradict it no reversing of their judgement but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament why then since none can know their power or if they could they are not competent Judges of it how dare any one goe about to dispute their power or call in question their judgement The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. was that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matter in debate then concerning the setling of intestine commotions guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas concludes no more than this that they thought themselves not competent Counsellours in thiâ—… case happily by reason of their unskilfulnesse in that way or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction But to give a more full and satisfactory answer at that time the King complyed with his Parliament and would not be advised by others and then there being no breach of trust there 〈◊〉 the lesse reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affaires of that nature But if the King had then deserted the Counsell of his Parliament and cleaved to the advise of his young men like Rehoboam certainely then they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-wâ—…alth which by their
owe it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and viâ—… of the Parliament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 have 〈◊〉 by this time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ruine and destruction Besides there is no 〈◊〉 the cause or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 shall we conclude the clouds which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vapours 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 down 〈◊〉 us or that our 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 an idle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 happily our care or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impediment hath 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 the ground and cause of our jealousie The Observator having shewed how that Kings are 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith what 〈◊〉 is it then in 〈◊〉 when they will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conscience and reason in things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people No Man justifies pretended conscience no man can condemne reall T is true but conscience 〈◊〉 not to oppose or contradict that which is good and behoovefor the people I but there is no ground of objecting of pretences saith the Author and why so because the people are deceived and if they looke upon his actions they will 〈◊〉 unto them as 〈◊〉 as the day I am so 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 piety and goodnesse that I 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 so T is his evill 〈◊〉 that causes this misunderstanding and breach 〈◊〉 his sacred person and his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that their 〈◊〉 will prejudice his right and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with honour and a good 〈◊〉 grant 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to would injure 〈◊〉 I but againe 〈◊〉 saith hee hee that hath 〈◊〉 so much in this 〈◊〉 and that in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as put all 〈◊〉 Royall 〈◊〉 acts 〈◊〉 grace together they 〈◊〉 much short of his And no wonder the 〈◊〉 was sick of many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the long 〈◊〉 of Parliaments and all these which by their happy continuance might have beene prevented must now apply 〈◊〉 to the Soveraigne 〈◊〉 of his Royall Grace and favour for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Would not have 〈◊〉 any thing which was 〈◊〉 not anything since 〈◊〉 wants 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them but 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 him into farre worse 〈◊〉 than that of poverty T is not his Majesties necessity that can 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a complyance with his Parliament what is his necessity to them if theirs finde a supply 〈◊〉 Rex 〈◊〉 regnum they care not But t is strange would setling of the 〈◊〉 by the advise of his Parliament put the King in a worse 〈◊〉 than poverty why yes he that gives away part of his 〈◊〉 is poorer 〈◊〉 if he had divested himsefe of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plus 〈◊〉 a pretty fallacy The vertue of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beene denyed to the Commons and a 〈◊〉 hath 〈◊〉 made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties 〈◊〉 and so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 that immovable 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 and power whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 right of all the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of England hath 〈◊〉 attempted to be 〈◊〉 and disturbed There may be a 〈◊〉 in the imputation of Severance and 〈◊〉 of representation to the Commons For put the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 men of a county present a 〈◊〉 to the House against â—…ed lawes and the 〈◊〉 discipline of the 〈◊〉 this is received and thankes returned if 〈◊〉 another petition modestly and 〈◊〉 expressing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that most excellent petition of Kent be presented 〈◊〉 by men more 〈◊〉 then the 〈◊〉 c and this in 〈◊〉 of the present government c. t is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 it this by no 〈◊〉 is to bee called a 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 of representation T is neither number nor 〈◊〉 of persons though I confesse these may 〈◊〉 somewhat the better glosse upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 a petition either good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of it And they that shall dare to make one 〈◊〉 against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and â—…terminations of the House t is no 〈◊〉 if they be put to make a second for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in so doing t is they not the House that deny the 〈◊〉 of representation Most of our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Parliaments have proceeded 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 the people upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 accusations have beene so 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 themselves from their representatives and 〈◊〉 there can be nothing under Heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…cing God which can be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 Here we may see the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And 〈◊〉 you may d'scover the over powring of 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for saith he certainely we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oath of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…ther did ever as I have made 〈◊〉 good before the body 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it 〈◊〉 evidently follow saith 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If one 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…wise it will prove 〈◊〉 This he grants as 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 power of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King and 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 can make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Law without the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King This one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constantly 〈◊〉 to would 〈◊〉 prevented 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might restore the Kingdome to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author never read any Law that knowes not what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must receive an equitable favourable 〈◊〉 according as 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the case administers occasion for summum jus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law may 〈◊〉 be unlawfull And therefore the 〈◊〉 doth make a good qualification of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…ing onely in 〈◊〉 cases but if the safety of the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto them then an extraordinary course may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is it which hath so mâ—…serably rent this Kâ—…ngdome and raised these sad divisions Most malicious and scandalous 't is not this but the want of its due observance and neglâ—…ct of our duty thâ—…t hath raised thes â—…ad distracâ—…ions Fiâ—…st the People are made beleive they are in danger Strange that a Parliament should infringe their trust and so easily deceive a whole Kingdome Then a prevention of thâ—…se danges is promised Good reason â—…oo a whole Kingdome ought not to be sold to misery and destruction upon an easie rate The 〈◊〉 is this in case of apparent and immiâ—…ent danger the peoples sasety is not 〈◊〉 be neglâ—…cted they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy therefore most â—…it they should be put into a posture of defence Well what could reason or malice it selfe object against this I but then none so fit judges of this apparent and imminent danger as the two Houses Is any one so fit Or can any discover more than the râ—…presentative body of the whole Kingdome Wherefore they to order this Militia Had onâ—… Author intended to have dealt fairely and candidly he would have showne the man humble Petitions and requests of the Parliament to
his Majesty for the ordering of the Militia according to their advise â—…or the better security of his people and His Majestiâ—…s negative returne unto them before they according to their duty undertooke in his Majestiâ—…s and his people behalâ—…e the trust and maâ—…age of the same And now it must be in their power to command men 〈◊〉 horses seise on all the Ammunition send for what supples of money they thinke necessary for the repelling those dangers This is but a consequence of the other it were but in vaine to lay a foundation if they had not power â—…o raise the Structure I but here wee are fallen backe againe into what we so much complained of Arbitrary poweâ—… 'T is much that one who pretends to be Mâ—…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity which justice requireth should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law as not being within the intention of it for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule is a prosecution of an arbitrary power The manage of a businesse in case of necessity neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule neithâ—…r that to be stileâ—… Arbitrary which necessitâ—… makes lawsull Was not this the very case of Ship-money there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity and none so compelent a judge of this as the King and therefore for the securing of the people money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel for will it therefore follow that because the King cannot upon no pretence whatsoever take away the Subjects propâ—…rty without their consent that the Parliamâ—…ent may not take it with their conâ—…ent Most inconsequent The Parliament represent the people which the King doth not And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 â—…he people whâ—…ch the Kings cannot But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money which he saith will hold in our case It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason that it was better for the Kingdome though it were in reall danger in arena 〈◊〉 capere to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it wâ—…s able by a suddaine defence than that the King should prâ—…vide such a remedy which would be so easily so â—…quently abused upon every preâ—…ence of dâ—…nger to pâ—…event such an evill which could extremly seldome oâ—… almost never hapâ—…en for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So 〈◊〉 â—…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old waâ—… and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion upon I know not what vaine pretences I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parliâ—…ment O the power and vertue of this great Assembly that can so Metamorphize men as to makâ—… thâ—…m spâ—…ak accoâ—…ding to the dictate of reasâ—…n not affâ—…ction But for his Argument the ground of the obâ—…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money was the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy upon eveâ—…y pretence of danger which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it And when our Aâ—…thor can make it good as he hâ—…th strongly 〈◊〉 but much failed in it that a Communitâ—… maâ—… have those many private ends to mislead it that a King may then shâ—…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel untill then we must â—…ell him thâ—…t there is â—…oure hundrâ—…d to one against him I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir Iâ—…hn Ho hams act Treason be not contrary to the cleareâ—…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason and the â—…trongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defind himselfe by force if 〈◊〉 though by the force of his Majestrate or his owne 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not without all confidence by flâ—…ght Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him Did his Majesty drive him into Hull No But his Mejesty would have driven him out he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament for the securing of him and his people And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence yet having got it by a lawfull authority he may defend himselfe and it against any assault by the same power Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors was their resistance a just defence Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre His conclusion is very just For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull if their resistance were a warrantable defence But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him that the cases are more different then a Papist and a Protâ—…stant they agree in somewhat the cases in nothing for they had neither lawfull cause nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance as Sir Iohn Hotham had Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor But enough of this in a case so manifest He may as soone convince a man of common sense that black and white are the same colour as that these cases runne parallel Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is a great difference betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe and offending his King His feaâ—…es are over witty if they will not permit him to thinke himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security Without question he that may defend may offend for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe if I may not offend my enemy What a sensles thing and void of reason is it to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act but stand like so many stocks immoveable what is this but opposiâ—…um in objecto a flâ—…t contradiction or a taking up of Armes in iest to make me capable of losing my life in earnest If this were all we could doe the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends would be â—…his by Tyranny and oppression to ingage the people in this imaginary defensive warre thereby to disarme them and force obedience to their unjust desires or slay them with their owne weapons But to passe this If a King shall take up armes
power Is this will contâ—…nt them thâ—…y shall havâ—… as much power as be â—…rants to his Courtiers If this might be obtained I am consident they neede not make a second requâ—…st Nay could they be perswaded thâ—…t whatâ—… they could propose would be conceed by his Majesty I dare say 〈◊〉 owne modesty judgement and 〈◊〉 would not permit them to be guilty of so great dishonour to their King as to extend their peâ—…itions so farre for inâ—…rease of power as some lately to our sad experience have enjoyed I but he sayes 〈◊〉 must be like the outward senses and make a true represent at con the 〈◊〉 of reason is 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 to make judgement therein 〈◊〉 informatâ—…n is not alwayes faithfull This 〈◊〉 no way 〈◊〉 have deprived the King of the Office of reason for their 〈◊〉 did not 〈◊〉 away 〈◊〉 Majesties power of refusall upon just caâ—…se rendered If by his last words 〈◊〉 intends the information of the Court there he is in the right this age can 〈◊〉 to him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not beene alwayes faithfull But if he do intend his great 〈◊〉 the Parliament there he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 against common judgement and understanding for that no age is able to wâ—…tnesse any unfaithfulnes or 〈◊〉 in a Parliament I but he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to their King and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their owne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to expresse their 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And why so pray 〈◊〉 his reason For saith hee they must 〈◊〉 to suffer 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoped for in a 〈◊〉 divided in it 〈◊〉 This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Very tragically 〈◊〉 though without any 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 that if 〈◊〉 Author 〈◊〉 but to make a 〈◊〉 he will easily informe himselfe 〈◊〉 that it is very 〈◊〉 to have great 〈◊〉 of State of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it will be very difficult to 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that danâ—… incurred to by 〈◊〉 of such a power to the Parliament 〈◊〉 since there can be no absolute 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 on this side heaven but that all humane inventions whether of law or whatever else will retaine or contract either more or lesse some mixture or tincture of ill in them Why then sâ—…uld 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 benefit for a possible inconvenience or reject the unquestionable commodum for â—…are of a casuall incommodum the bread that a man doth now eat may choak him and his house that he now lives in fals upon his head shall he therefore deny himselfe the certain nutriment of the one or the secure habitation of the other for feare of these visible dangers t were phanatick â—…nd rediculous By this râ—…le a man should 〈◊〉 and declâ—…ne all terrene and sublunary happinesse whatsoever for that there is not so 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 condition that is not subject to a possible pollution and corruption Now I bâ—…lieve it doth fully appeare that the Law of that Remonstrance laid down by his Majesti by way of 〈◊〉 in seven positions is just and without offence â—…eing such as will bring unquestionable happinesse both to Church and 〈◊〉 not denying our obedience to the King 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 and faithfull service to God 1 That the Parliament hath an absolute and 〈◊〉 power of declaring Law This power must rest in 〈◊〉 or in the king or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Courts or 〈◊〉 all suite must bee endlesse and it can no where rest more safely than in Parliament 〈◊〉 two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates If deserted by the King they are otherwise not I but he sayes some things are cleare and evident in law and want 〈◊〉 if otherwise all 〈◊〉 subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Iudge Very just and some things are dubious in law and want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is the case betweene the King and Parliament and this must rest upon the breast of the 〈◊〉 whiâ—…h in this case is the Parliament I but hâ—… sayes If the Houses should vote youâ—…ger brothers ought to 〈◊〉 by the law of England could this 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the first 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but most easily answered and resolved It is very manifest it could not for 〈◊〉 this is a case which is evident and cleare and here the law may be its owne judge and needs no other interpreter or declarer Besides this is a destroying or repealing of the old law and an intâ—…oduction of a new which canâ—…ot be done without the three estaâ—…es But they may declare what the common law of the land is without the King which is only a passing senâ—…ence upon the 〈◊〉 and reasoning of a new case by the old law so that the Judges are guided by this rule of law 〈◊〉 eadem ratio ibi idem 〈◊〉 where there is the same reason there ought to be the same law pray observe and this will correct your mistake though the case be new 〈◊〉 if it may be brought to the 〈◊〉 of the old law tis idem jus not 〈◊〉 the same no new law The truth of it is that law is but a more pure and 〈◊〉 reason and as reason is alwayes one and the same so of necessity must the law be That the Parliament are bound 〈◊〉 no Presidents Statute are not binding 〈◊〉 them why then should Presidents Yet there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 This is an excellent ground to justifie their owne innocâ—…ncy against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound â—…o keepe 〈◊〉 law no 〈◊〉 can accuse 〈◊〉 for the breach of any Our Author thinks he hath here got a strong hold and advantage against us Why wee shall allow as without 〈◊〉 the Law is that 〈◊〉 are binding to the two Houses of Parliament as well as others till repealed But doth this any way disprove 〈◊〉 position that they are not bound to Presidents You know what they say who are best acquainted with the bounds and 〈◊〉 of their owne power some Presidents are not to be followed 〈◊〉 being not 〈◊〉 and all may fall short and be different from the 〈◊〉 case and condition of things and therefore t is no reason that they should be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity withâ—…ut the King and dispose of any thing They may not 〈◊〉 the King but being 〈◊〉 by the King when the Kingdome is in 〈◊〉 they may judge of that