concludes thus So much does fortune blind mens eyes when shee would not have her force withstood Nor can this conclusion be more true Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse for we shall many times see those led to their destruction and these advanc'd to an extraordinory greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously quite bereaving the other of them And we may well say fortune does this for she makes choyce of a man when she purposes to bring great matters to pass of such judgement and spirit that knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him So in like manner when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any Place she there preferrs men to that purpose that they may help to draw on that ruine And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes shee either brings him to his end or else deprives him of all abilities to do any goood This we very well know by our Authors discourse how that fortune for to amplify Rome and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to deemd it necessary to scourge it as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following but yet would not wholly ruin it And this appears in as much as shee banished Camillus but put him not to death shee made Rome be taken but not the Capitoll shee ordein'd that the Romaus should not think out any thing of avayle to save Rome yet for defence of the Capitoll they wanted of no good advice To the end Rome should be taken she causd the greater part of those Soldiers that were routed at Allia to go to Vejum And as for defence of the City of Rome she cut off all the waies to order it so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again having conducted an intire Roman Army to Vejum and Camillus to Ardea whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet throughly whole in his reputation for the recovery of his Country Wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said but because I think it unnecessary being this may well suffice I shall omit it I avow therefore this to be very true as by many histories wee may see it that men may well follow fortune but not oppose it they may well weave her webs but not break them Wherefore let men never abandon themselves being they know not what shall become of them in the end the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies they should ever hope and so hoping put on still and never give over in despaire whatsoever chance or trouble they be faln into CHAP. XXX Republicks and Princes that really are mighty seek not by monies to make alliance with others but by their valour and repute of their Forces THe Romans were straightly besiegd in the Capitoll and however they lookt for ayd from Vejum and from Camillus being forc't by famine they came to termes of agreement with the French to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money upon which agreement as they were weighing the gold Camillus arriv'd with his Army which fortune brought to pass saies our Historian to the end that the Romans should not live redeemd by gold Which thing is not only remarkable in this part but in the procese of this Commonwealths actions where it is evident that they never vanquished Towns with moneys nor ever bought peace by mony but by prowesse in the warres Which I think never befell any other Republick and among other signes by which a man discerns the power of a State he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States And when it is so orderd that they become tributaries thereunto to keep friendship with it there is an assured sign that that State is powerfull But when the said neighbours though inferious to it draw money from thence there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof Read all the Roman Stories and ye shall see how the Massilians the Aeduans the Rhodians Hiero the Siracusan Enmenes and Massinissa Kings joyning upon the confines of the Roman Empire to have friendship with it concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was seeking after no other requitall thereof but to be protected by it Wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States and so beginning at ours of Florence in the times past even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest there was never a great Lord in Romania that had not some allowance from thence and besides she gave to those of Perugia and Castella to all the rest of her neighbours For had this City been warlick and strong the contrary would have followd for all those to have been under the protection of it would have given money and have sought to buy its friendship and not to sell their own Neither have the Florentines alone liv'd in this baseness but the Venetians and the King of France who though a Prince of great Dominions lives tributary to the Swisses and the King of Engl. The cause whereof is in that he disarmes his subjects and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeese them and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy Which disorder though some while it may produce quiet yet in time it proves the cause of want losses and unrecoverable ruine And it would be too long to relate how many times the Florentines the Venetians and this Kingdome have redeemd themselves even in the warrs and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace which the Romans were only once like to have done It would be tedious to tell how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found and how that those things that are bought with gold men know not how to desend with the sword The Romans observd this brave way and manner of living while they were free but after they came under their Emperors governments and that those Emperors grow naught and lov'd the shade and could not endure any toyle in the Sun they began also to redeem themselves somtimes from the Parthians somtimes from the Germans and now and then also from some others of their neighbours which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarm'd their people from whence also proceeds another greater that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee the weaker he finds thee for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above treats evill those subjects he hath
when they did not give colour to a bad designe with a good success CHAP. XIX A very mean Prince may easily subsist succeeding a brave and valourous Prince but a mean one following a mean brings a State into great hazzard WHen we consider the valour and the manner of Romulus Numa and Tullus proceedings the first Roman Kings we shall find that Rome hit upon a very great fortune having the first King fierce and warlick the second peaceable and religious the third of like courage to Romulus and a lover of war rather then peace For in Rome it was necessary that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other Kings should betake themselves again to Romulus his valour otherwise that City would have become effeminate and been prey'd on by her neighbours Whence we may observe that the successor though not of so great valour as the predecessour is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before and enjoy the fruits of his labour but if it come to pass either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine So on the contrary if two of great valour successively follow one the other it is often seen they effect mighty things and eternize their names David was a man for armes for learning and judgement excellent and such was his valour that having overcome and subdued his neighbours he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes without any war and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue But he could not leave it now to Roboam his sonn who not resembling his Grandfather in vertue nor having the like good hap his father had with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom Bajazet the Turkish Sultan although he gave himself rather to peace then war yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomets labors who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a setled Kingdom easie to be continued by peace but if his sonn Selimus now raigning had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather that Kingdom had gone to wrack But we see this man like to outgoe his Grandfathers glory Whereupon I agree with these examples that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another unless it be such a one as France which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances And those are weak Princes that are not in the exercise of war And therefore I conclude with this discourse that such was Romulus his valour that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern Rome But him followed Tullus who by his courage recover'd Romu'us reputation after him came Ancus so endowed by nature that he knew how to use peace and support war And first he addrest himself in a peaceable way but presently when he knew that his neighbours thinking him esseminate undervalu'd him he consider'd that to maintain Rome he was to apply himself to the warres and rather follow Romulus his steps than Numas Hence let all Princes that hold a State take example that he that resembles Numa shall either keep it or lose it as the times prove and fortunes wheele turns but he that takes after Romulus arm'd as he with wisdom and force shall hold it in any case unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him And certainly we may well think if Rome had light upon a man for her third King who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation she could never afterwards or not without much adoe have taken root or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King CHAP. XX. Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous succession And therefore are their gains and increases great AFter Rome had banisht her Kings she was deliver'd of those dangers which as is before said she hazzarded a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls who came not to the government by inheritance or treachery or by extream ambition but by the voices of the Citizens and they were alwaies very worthy men whose vertue and fortune Rome enjoying could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness in but so many more years as she had been under her Kings For we see that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world as was Philip of Macedon and Alexander the great Which so much the rather ought a Republick do having the means to choose not only two successions but an infinite number of valorous Princes who follow one the other which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth CHAP. XXI What blame that Prince or Republick deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects THE Princes of these times and the modern Republicks who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own may be ashamed of themselves and consider by the example of Tullus that this defect is not for want of men fit for war but by their fault who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers For Tullus Rome having been forty years in peace found not when he succeeded in the Kingdom a man that had been ere at war Yet he intending to make war serv'd not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans nor of others train'd up in armes but advis'd as a very prudent man to make use of his own people And such was his vertue that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers Truer it is than any other truth if where men are there want soldiers it is the Princes fault not any other defect either of scituation or nature Whereof we have a very late example For every one knows how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France and took no other soldiers than his own people And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnisht with Captains and good Armies who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man and that Kingdom well govern'd which in time of peace neglected not military discipline Pelopidas and Epaminondas Thebans after they had set Thebes at liberty and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude and in the
defend themselves to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines also did who when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites sent their Ambassadours to the Roman Consul to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betweene those two people and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refuâ—e it So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition caus'd the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadours and so made his army march towards the enemy shewing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserv'd And having now discours'd in this Chapter against some courses Princes take amisse for others defence I will in that that followes speake touching those they take for their owne defence CHAP. XII Whether it be better for a Prince fearing to be assail'd by his enemy himselfe first to begin the warre with him or to expect while it comes home to him I Have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline if there be two Princes neare of equal force and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other which were the best course for that other either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him or else to goe finde him at home and there assaile him And I have heard them alledge arguments on both sides and those that argue for this going to assaile him produce the counsell that Croesus gave Cyrus when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Messagetes to make warre against them their Queene Thomyris sent him word that he should take his choice either to enter into her kingdom where she would awaite him or if he would rather that she should come and siâ—nde him in his owne And when the matter came to dispute Croesus advis'd against the opinion of the rest to goe seeke her in her owne country urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines he could not take her kingdome from her because she would have time to repaire her losses but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories he might pursue her just upon her slight so giving her no time of recovery take the state from her Moreover they alledge the advice that Hanniball gave Antiochus when that King had a purpose to make warie against the Romans where he shewes how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy for there another might availe himselfe of their armes their wealth and their friends also But whosoever fought with them out of Italy leaving Italy free to them left them that strength that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions And concluded that it was easier to take Rome from them then the Empire and Italy rather than their other provinces Agathocles also is alleadg'd who not being able to support the war at home assail'd the Carthaginians who then had made warre against him and brought them to aske peace The example of Scipio is likewise urg'd who to take the warre out of Italy assail'd Affricke They that maintaine the contrary say that he that would bring his enemy to destruction should withdraw him from home The Athenians are brought for example who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes remain'd victors but when they departed out of their country and transported their army into Sâ—cily they quite lost their liberty They alledge the poeticall sables withall where it is shew'd how that Anteus King of Lybia assail'd by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable whiles he staid for him within the confines of his owne Kingdome but when by Hercules subtilty he was trained out of it he lost both state and life Whereby occasion was given to the fable of Anteus that while he was upon the ground he recovered forces from his Mother which was the ground which Hercules perceiving took him up in his armes and held him from the earth Moderne advices also are alledged every one knowes that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his dayes held a very wise Prince and some two years before his death fame flying that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and assail him after he had made much preparation fell sick when on his death-bed among other memorials he left his sonne Alphonsus was this also that he should attend his enemies comming within his Countrey and upon no case should drâ—w any of his forces out of his state but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire Which was not followed by him but there was an army sent into Romania which without any combat lost both it self and the state The arguments which besides the things abovesaid are brought on each side are these that he that assailes comes on with more courage then he that attends which gives the army more confidence Besides this it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own for he cannot help himself upon those subjects whose houses have first bin sackt and their goods pillaged and for having the enemy in the house the Prince is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them and vexes them so that he comes to dry that fountain as Hannibal sayes which furnishes him with means to sustain the war To this may be added that the souldiers being in a forrain countrey are forced to fight and of that necessity makes a vertue as we have often said on the other side they say when one awaits his enemy he does it with much advantage for without any discommodity to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions and other necessaries belonging to an army Thou canst also better hinder his designs because thou knowest the countrey better then he Thou canst also incounter him with more forces because there they may easily be united which thou canst not draw all from home Thou canst also being routed recover thy self with more ease because many of thy army will save themselves in that they have their places of refuge near as well because the supplies are not to come from far thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces and not all thy fortune whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces And some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie suffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey and take divers townes to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them he may weaken his army and so they may afterwards fight with him at more ods But to give my opinion herein what I think I beleeve this distinction is to be made Either my countrey is armed as was that of the Romans or that of the Switzers is or it is disarmed as that of the Carthaginians was or else that of the
years after they began to make war HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those who now a daies inlarge their dominions we have formerly discours'd enough and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly race to live with their own laws as well those that yeelded to them as subjects as those that came under their protection as associates And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire but tied them to some certain conditions which whiles they observ'd they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy and that they reduc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces Whereof the example is very clear for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua whether they sent him not through their own ambition but upon the Capuans intreaty who being they were at discord one with another judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them that might put them in order again and reunite them The Antiates also mov'd by their example and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them And T. Livius saies upon this occasion and upon this new way of ruling That now not only the Roman armes but their lawes also were in great repute We see therefore how much this course taken further'd the Romans advancement for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free or to be govern'd by their own Citizens are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not though it may bring some burden with it too rather than under that which they having every day in their view continually reproaches them with their slavery Besides this the Prince gains hereby another advantage that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies whereby they were to regulate those Cities there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away And that this is true besides ancient examples which we could alledge we have one of late memory in Italy for as it is well known Geneva having been several times possessed by the French that King did alwaies except at this present time send them a French Governor who under him should govern them For this present only but upon any intention of the Kings but it seem'd necessity so order'd it he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them gives the people most satisfaction would the rather alow of this latter Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty by how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to aske a Prerour of the Romans but had the Romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher they would presently have been in jealousie of them and started from them But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yeelded it self to the government of Florence It is as well known also what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans the Luckeses and the Seneses and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty as well as others do but because the Florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers but the others they treated as enemies This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them and the others struggle with all might and main as yet they do also not to come under them And doubtless had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours and not have alwaies scar'd them they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany But hereupon I advise not that armes and force are not to be us'd but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place where and when other meanes will not serve CHAP. XXII How erroneous many times the opinions of men are when they give their judgements touching great affaires HOw false oftentimes mens opinions are they well see who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations which many times unless they be determined of by able men are contrary to all truth And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths especially in peaceable times both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned such adwise is follow'd as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good This error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled if not well experienced in affaires the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible whereof in such a case men are perswaded These words are spoken upon that which Numicius the Pretour after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans perswaded them and upon that which few years since many beleeved when Francis the first King of France came to the Conquest of Milan which was defended by the Swissers Therefore I say that Lewis the Twelfth being dead and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdome of France and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the Switzers had of late possessed themselves by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement desired to have some aid in Italy which might further his undertakings so that besides the Venetians whom King Lewis had gain'd he tried the Florentines and Pope Leo the tenth thinking his enterprise much facilitated by having them to side with him because the King of Spains soldiers were in Lombardy and some of the Emperors forces in Verona Pope Leo yeelded not to the Kings desire but by those that counselled him he was perswaded as it was said to stand neuter showing him that herein consisted certain victory for it was nothing at all for the Churches good to have either mighty in Italy the King or the Swissers But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty it was fit to free it from the one and the other And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other divided
others were built by some Prince not to make his seate there but for his glory and so was Alexandria by Alexander and because these cities have not their beginning free they seldome attain to that greatness as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdomes The like beginning had Florence whither it was built by Syllaes Souldiers or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesola who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian came down dwelt in the plain upon the Arne for it was built under the Romau government neither could it in the beginning make greater increase then what the Princes favour allow'd it The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free when any people either led by a Prince or of themselves are forc'd by contagion famine or war to abandon their native Soyle and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered as Moses did or build new as did Aeneas In this case appeares the ability of the founder and the fortune of the City founded the which is more or less admirable as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities which is seen in two kindes the first in choyce of the situation the second in making the lawes And because men act some things upon necessity others by their own election and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power it is to be consider'd whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance might live the better in agreement the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord as it was in Raugia and in many other Cities built in like places which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable of men were content to live of their own and not seek to rule over others but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle and to plant themselves in fruitful places where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them and over-master all that would oppose their greatness And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines the situation doth not and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries and apt to breed men given to Luxury loth to use that industry vertue requires and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers as by means of their strict discipline they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce such was the Kingdome of the Aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies the laws strictness prevail'd so far as there were bred by them many great personages and if time had not worne out their names it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise as did Great Alexauder and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us and whosoever had considered the Soldans Kingdome and the Mamalucks order with their military discipline before they were ruin'd by Selimus the great Turke would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises and therein have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory Dinocrates the Architect came to him and shewed him how it might be built upon Mount Athos which place besides that it would be strong he could so order that the City should be made in forme of a man which would be a wonder worthy his greatness and being askd again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet whereat having laught he left the mountain alone built Alexandria so that people might resort thither as well for the farness of the soyle as the commodity of of the sea and the River Nilus Whoever then shall examine the beginning of Rome if Aeneas be taken for the first founder it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers If Romulus among those that were built by the Natives And in what manner soever It were it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus Numa and others kept it under in an exact obedience as hereafter shall be said so that neither the fruitfulness of the country the commodity of the Sea the osten victories nor the vastness of the Empire could in many ages corrupt it but maintained it so eminent for vertue that never any commonwealth came near it And because those exploits she did and are recited by T. Livius were acted upon publique or private Counsel and either within or without the city I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice which I shall think worthy of remarke adding likewise all the dependences thereupon with which the first book or first part shall end CHAP. II. How many kinds of Commonwealths there are and what was that of Rome I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain serviâ—ude having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands either as a Commonwealth or as a Principality which have had as divers beginnings so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances for some either in their beginning or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone and that at once as the Spartans did theirs from Lycurgus others had their 's casually and at several times and upon occasion as Rome so that it is a great happiness for a Common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the State as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years And on the contrary that City may in some degree be termd unhappy which having not met with a judicious founder is forc'd to give it self a new frame and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances hath much mistaken the right way to perfection for
was the Principality Nobility and Commonalty as parts of the governments Among those who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most commendations is Lycurgus who made his laws after such a manner in Sparta that giving the King the Nobility and the people their shares he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares to his great credit and that Cities quiet The contrary befell Solon who made the laws in Athens which because it was a popular state prov'd but short liv'd and he before he died saw the Tyranny of Pisistratus begun and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence and Athens recover'd its liberty because it took again a popular government according to Solons institutions it maintain'd it not above a hundred years notwithstanding that to hold it there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general which were never provided for by Solon yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility Athens continu'd but a short time in respect of Sparta But let us come to Rome which though it had not a Lycurgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate that what their founder had not provided for chance did for if Rome lit not upon the best fortune it lit upon the next to the best for though the first ordinances were defective yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection because Romulus and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdome and not of a Commonwealth when the City became free there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty but were never ordain'd by those Kings And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alledged yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the Kings stead chas'd out of Rome the Regal title only not the Regal power so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities that is to say of the Principality Nobility There remain'd only to give the Commonalty a place in the government whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon the occasions which shall be hereafter told the people rose up against them so that rather then to lose all they were constrain'd to allow the people their part on the other side the Senate the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth so began the creation of the Tribuns of the people after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firme all the three kinds of governments having their shares And fortune did so much favour them that though they proceeded from the rule of a King of the Nobility to that of the people by the same degrees and for the same reasons set down before yet to give power to the Nobility they never took away all the authority from the Royalty nor was the power of the Nobility quite diminish'd to give it to the people but being mingled it made an exact Commonwealth to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following Chapters CHAP. III. Vpon what occasions the Tribuns of the people were created in Rome whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect ACcording as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government and so every History is full of examples to that purpose it is necessary that he who frames a Common-wealth and ordaines Laws in it should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds so oft as occasion shall serve and that when any mischief lies covert for a time it proceeds from an occasion unknown which is not come to light because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made but time afterwards discovers it which they say is Father of the truth It seem'd that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate when the Tarquins were banisht and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride were become of a popular disposition and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke This deceit lay hid nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the Tarquins liv'd of whom the Nobility being afraid and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people they might side with them behav'd themselves with good respect towards them But no sooner were the Tarquins dead and the Nobility delivered of that feare but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them which thing confirmes what I said before that men never do good unless inforc'd thereto but where choice is abundant and liberty at pleasure confusion and disorder suddenly take place Wherefore it is said that hunger and poverty make men laborious and Laws make them good But where one thing alone by it self without a Law does good there is no need of the Law but when that good custom failes the Law becomes necessary forthwith Yet the Tarquins being foil'd who with feare of them kept the Nobility in awe it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the Tarquins did when they were alive And so at length after many broyles tumults and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility at length for the peoples assurance the Tribuns were created and they bore such sway and had such credit that they could alwaies after mediate between the people and the Senate and stop the Nobilities insolency CHAP. IV. That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome made the Commonwealth both free and mighty I Must not fail to discourse upon these tumults which were in Rome from the Tarquins death till the creation of the Tribuns and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth and full of such confusion that if good fortune and military vertue had not supplyed their defects it would have been inferiour to any I cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the Roman Empire but methinks they do not consider that where good discipline is it is likely too that there is good order and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune But let us come to the other particulars of that City I say that they who condemne the troubles between the Nobility and the people
it s not so ordein'd to last long when it rests upon the shoulders of one man well may it indure being committed to the care of many to whom it belongs to maintain it For even so as many are not proper for the framing of one thing because all of them hit not on the true good of it by reason of their several opinions among them so after they have known it neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage And that Romulus was one of those who for the death of his brother and companion might be excus'd and that what he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition it appears in that he forth with ordain'd a Senate with whom he might take counsell and by their opinions be advis'd And he who considers well the Authority Romulus reserv'd himself will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies when they had resolv'd on War and to assemble the Senate which was apparent afterwards when Rome became free upon the banishment of the Tarquins whereupon the Romans were never brought in any new order unless that in lieu of a King during life they made two Consuls yearly Which confirms that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Government then to one absolute and Monarchical To verifie the thing abovesaid we might bring many examples as Moses Lycurgus Solon and other founders of Kingdomes and Commonwealths who could well having an absolute power in their hands ordain laws for the common good but I will let them pass as well know I shall alleadg only one not so famous but well worthy their consideration who desire to be good Law-makers which is That Agis King of Sparta advising to reduce the Spartans within those bounds the Laws of Licurgus had included them thinking that because they had broken out of that strictness his City had lost very much of the ancient vertue and by consequent of force and government was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the Spartan Ephores as one that aim'd to possess himself of the Tyranny But Cleomenes afterwards succeeding him in the Kingdom upon his reading of Agis Records and Writings which fell into his hands he understood his intention and grew desirous himself to bring the same thing to pass but found it was impossible to do that good to his Country unless he became absolute of authority it seeming to him by reason of mens ambition that he was unable to do good to many against the will of a few And taking a fit opportunity at length hee brought in all the Ephores and every one else that could withstand him and afterwards restor'd into force Licurgus his Lawes Which deliberation had bin able to have a new reviv'd Sparta and gain'd Cleomenes the reputation Licurgus had if then the Macedons power had not grown so vast and the other Grecian Republick been so weake For after such order given being set upon by the Macedons and finding himself single too weak to deale with them there being none could give him assistance was overcome and his project though just and commendable became unperfect Wheresore upon the weighing of all these things together I conclude it necessary that a founder of a Republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority and that Romulus for the death of Remus and Tatius deserves rather excuse than blame CHAP. X. As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are exceedingly praise-worthy so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy AMongst all commendable men those deserve esteem in the first place who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship and true Religion the next belongs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms After those are they famous that commanding over Armies have inlarg'd either their Kingdom or Country To these wee may adjoyn learned men And because they are of different dignities every one of them are valued according to their degree And to all other men whose number is infinite wee use to give that share of commendations which their Art and Skill deserves On the contrary infamous are they and execrable that are the perverters of Religion the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republicks enemies of vertue and learning and of any other art that brings profit and renown to mankind as also are the irreligious the mad-braind the ignorant the slothful and base And there will never be any so foolish or so wise so mischievous or so good that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him will not commend that which is commendable and blame the blameable Notwithstanding seeing that the most part as it were beguiled by counterfeit good and vain glory suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame then praiseâ— And having meanes with their perpetual honor to frame a Republick or Kingdom yet affect they a Tyranny neither are they advis'd by this course what reputation what glory what honor security quiet and satisfaction of mind they flie from and into what infamy dispraise blame danger and unquietness they plunge themselves And it is impossible that they that live private men in a Common-wealth or that by fortune or by their vertues become Princes if they read the histories or make any account of antiquities therein related that those private men I say had not rather be Scipioes in their native Country than Cesars and those that are Princes rather Agesilaus Timoleon or Dion than Nabis Phalaris or Dionysius for they would perceive these execedingly in all mens hatred and these as much beloved They would see also how Timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their Country then had Dionysius or Phalaris but they would find also they had far more security Nor let any be deeeived by Cesars glory seeing his memory much celebrated by writers for they that Praise him were corrupted by his fortune and frighted by the continuance of the Empire which being govern'd under that name gave not writers leave to speak freely of him But he that would know what free writers would say of him let him look upon that they say of Cataline and Cesar is so much the more to be disprais'd in that he executed the ill the other did but intend Let him see also how much they praise Brutus so that not daring to blame the other because of his power they attributed much honor to his Enemy Let him consider also him that is become Prince in a Republick what praises after Rome was made an Empire those Emperors rather deserv'd that liv'd under the Laws as good Princes than they that went a contrary course to them and he shall find that Titus Nerva Trajan Adrian and Antonius and Marcus had no need of Praetorian soldiers nor a multitude of the legions to guard them for their own vertues the good will of the people and the love of
among his people and withall diligence to shew that his valour got not the victory but rather it came by chance or by the enemies cowardise or by the direction of the other Captaines who were together with him in that imployment After that Vespasian being in Judea was by his army declar'd Emperor Antonius Primus who was then with another army in Illiria took his part and came thence into Italy against Vitellius who commanded at Rome and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies and made himself Master of Rome so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor and all difficulties surpassed The reward Antonius gain'd hereby was that Mutianus took away his command of the army and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian who was yet in Asia by whom he was so coldly receiv'd that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire And of these examples stories are full In our daies every one living knows with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon brought that Kingdom under his obedience and how he had for reward of his conquest that Ferdinand parted from Arragon and came to Naples and first discharged him of his command of soldiers afterwards took from him the fortresses and then brought him away with him into Spain where a while after he dyed in disgrace Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes that they cannot escape it and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those who by victory have under their banners made great conquests And from that which a Prince is not free 't is no marvaile nor a thing worthy of greater note that a people is not free For a city living free hath two ends the one to gain the other to keep it self free and it cannot be but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre Touching the errors in getting they shall be spoken of in their place as for the errors in maintaining their liberty there are these among others to hurt those citizens they should reward and to suspect those they should repose upon And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption cause great evils and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny as at Rome it befell Caesar who by strong hand took away that which unthankfulness denied him yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted are they causes of great good and make it live more free keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious It is true that of all people that ever reign'd upon the causes above alleadg'd Rome was the least ungratefull for of her ingratitude we may say there is no other example but that of Scipio for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury the one and the other had done the people But the one was not pardoned because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people the other was not only recall'd but all his lifetime after ador'd as a Prince But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him which was never conceived of the others which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him from the quick dispatch of it from those favours which youth wisdome and other his memorable vertues had gotten him Which things were so great that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men as a matter not accustomed in Rome And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary that Priscus Cato reputed a man of great integrity was the first that stir'd against him and said that a city could not be called free where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion they deserve that excuse which I said before those Princes and people merit who through suspicion prove unthankfull Wherefore concluding this discourse I say that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness and upon suspicion less than Princes having less cause to be suspicious as quickly it shall be declared CHAP. XXX What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude or what A Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion or being ungratefull ought personally go to the warrs as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors and in our daies the Turk does and as those that are valorous have done and yet do For overcoming the glory and the gain is all their own And when they are not there in person the glory of the action belonging to another they think they cannot well make that conquest their own unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get and so become ungratefull and unjust And without doubt greater is their loss than their gain but when either through negligence for lack of judgment they stay idle at home and send out a Commander I have no other precept to give them than what they know of themselves But I advise that Commander because as I think he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness that he betake himself to one of these two expedients either presently upon his victory let him leave his army and put himself into his Princes hands abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him or at least not hurt him Or when he likes not to do thus let him resolutely take part against him and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills let him make friendship with his neighbors possess with his men the strong places corrupt the Chief of his army and assure himself of those he cannot and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him Otherwaies there are not but as it was said before men know not how to be wholly vicious nor wholly good And alwaies it comes to pass that presently after the victory they will not part with their army behave themselves with modesty they cannot and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how So that being irresolute which way to take between delay and doubt they are suppressed But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude we cannot apply the same remedy we may to a Prince that is that she go herself and not send out in her imployments being necessitated to make use of some one
him rather of treason or ignorance and so either put him to death imprison or confine him as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains and Athenians Nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten afterwards shelter them for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past as it befell Antoni Giacomini our countrey man here who not having overcome the Pisans as the people presupposed and he had promised fell into such disgrace with the people that for all his many good services past he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people protected him then by any assurance else was given him CHAP. LIV. What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude THe second thing remarkable upon the text alleadged in the former Chapter is that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude inraged as the reverence of some grave man comming among them as Virgil sayes to the same purpose and not without reason Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere silent arrectisque auribus astant And therefore that man of worth and merit that either hath the command of an army or that abides in a city where a tumult arises ought represent himself upon the occasion with the greatest grace and in as honorable termes as may be cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality to gain him the more reverence A few years agoe Florence was divided into two factions of the Frateschi and Arrabiati for so they were called and comming to blowes the Frateschi were overcome among whom was Paul Antonius Sodorini a citizen of great esteem in those dayes and the people in the time of those tumults going in armes to sack his house Franciscus his brother then Bishop of Valterra and now Cardinal was by chance in his house who presently having perceived the stir and seen the multitude comming clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet and so met these armed people where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them Which thing throughout the City for many dayes was much noted and celebrated I conclude then that there is not a more setled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude then the presence of such a man who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him And thereupon we see to return to the text formerly alleadged with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party to go to Veium thinking it advantagious to them but never considering the mischief therein involved and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion there would have bin harme done had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages restrained their fury CHAP. LV. How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity and where that is not a Republique cannot be ALthough that heretofore we have sufficiently treated what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are corrupted yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took touching the vow Camillus made to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Veientes to Apollo Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it the Senate made an edict that every one should publiquely produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Veium And though this resolution took not place the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the people yet we perceive by these determinations how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict And on the other side how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict by giving less then was due but rather to free themselves therefrom by shewing their open distaste at such course taken This example with many others above alleadged give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people and what might be hop'd for of them And truly where this goodness is not little can be hop'd for as we can hope for nothing in those countreys which in these daies we see corrupted as in Italy above others so France and Spain retain a part of the same corruption and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness which is very much fail'd as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union not onely by his vertue but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes which is not yet quite perverted This goodness is yet seen in Germany and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people which is the occasion that many Republiques continue free and do so strictly observe their own laws that no forrain enemy abroad nor ambitious man at home dares offer to seize on them And to proove this true that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness I will give another example like to that abovesaid of the Senate and of the people of Rome Those Republiques use when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good that the Magistrates or the Consuls having authority should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred of that which every man is worth And such a resolution being made according to the order of the town every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax and having first taken an oath to pay a convenient sum he throws into a chest appointed to that purpose what in his conscience he thinks he should pay Of which payment there is no other witness but he that payes Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men And we may well think that every one payes the due sum for if it were not paid the imposition would not yeeld that quantity as those of old time were wont to do which failing the deceipt would appear whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys then this Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times because it is very rare or rather remains onely in this countrey Which proceeds from two things the one because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors for neither have these gone into their countreys nor they come to visit these because they have bin contented with those goods to feed on those victuals and to be clad with those wools which the
than any mans which warn'd him to tel the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things which I profess not Yet it may be as some Philosophers will have it that the ayre being full of spirits who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men and advertise them by such like signes to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence But however it is we may find it true that alwaies after such strange accidents new and extraordinary chances befall countreys CHAP. LVII The Common people united are strong and vigorous but taken apart and separated vile and contemptible MAny Romans the countrey all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome were gone to dwell at Veyum contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate who to remedy this disorder commanded by their publique edicts that every one within a set time under a certain penalty should return to inhabite at Rome At which edicts at first they against whom they were directed scoffed but afterwards when the time drew near that they were to obey they all yielded their obedience And Titus Livius uses these words Of fierce that they were all in general each one out of his particular fear became obedient And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open than here in this Text it is shewed for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Princes decrees Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain not trusting to one another they hasten all to obedience so that it plainly appears that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him if it be good to take such order that it may still continue if ill to provide so that it cannot hurt him This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion than for the loss of their liberty or for the love of their Prince who is yet living For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure and have need of great remedies to restrain them Their other indispositions will be easy when they have not made choyce of any heads to whom they may have their recourse for on oneside there is not a more dreadfull thing than a dissolute multitude and without a head and on the other side there is nothing weaker then it for though they have their weapons in their hands yet will it be easy to reduce them provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home they begin then a little to doubt of themselves and to take a care for their safety either by flight or agreement Therefore a multitude up in armes desiring to escape these dangers is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them keep them united and provide for their defence as did the common people of Rome when after the death of Verginia they departed from Rome and for their own preservations they chose 20 Tribuns from among themselves which if they do not there allwaies befalls them that which Titus Livius saies in his above written discourse that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger they become weak and contemptible CHAP. LVIII The multitude is more wise and constant then a Prince THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude as well our Author Titus Livius as all other Historians do affirm for we find it often in the relations of mens actions that the multitude hath condemned some man to death whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus whom after they had condemn'd to death they much desir'd again And these are the words of the Author The people after that by his death they perceiv'd themselves free from danger wished him alive again And in another place when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of Hieronymus Hie 〈…〉 nephew he sayes This is the nature of the multitude that they are either slavish in their obedience or insolent in their auihority I know not whether herein I undertake not too hard a task so full of difficulties that I must either give it over with shame or continue it with blame having a desire to defend that which as I have said is accused by all writers But however it be I do not judge it nor ever will a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons without any intention to use either authority or force Therefore I say that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude all men in particular are guilty and especially Princes for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does And this we may easily know for there are and have bin many evil Princes and vertuous and discreet ones but a few I speak of Princes that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes nor those of Spavta nor those that in our daies are in France which Kingdom is order'd more by the laws than any other which in these times we have knowlege of And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself and discerne if he be like the multitude for in parallell with them we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes as they are and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them and we shall see they neither insolently domineere nor slavishly serve as the people of Rome which whilest the Republique continued uncorrupted never serv'd basely nor rul'd proudly but with their own customes and Magistrates held their own degree honorably And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull they did it as it appear'd in the example of Manlius and in that of the ten and others who went about to oppress them And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators and the Consuls for the common safety they did it likewise and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead it is no marvail for they desired his vertues which had bin such that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion and might be of force likewise to work the same
King of France or the Italians countrey is In this case the enemy is to be kept off from comming in because thy advantage than consists in thy revenue and not in thy men so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee thou art quite spoil'd nor doth any thing so much hinder thee as the war within thy doores The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof who whiles they had their own home free were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans which when it was assaild could not supply them against Agathocles The Florentines had not any remedy against Castruccius Lord of â—ucca because he warr'd with them in their owne country so that they were faine for their defence to yeeld themselves to Robert King of Naples But Castruccius being dead the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his owne home and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars and such cowardise in their domestick But when countries are armed as that of Rome was and as the Switzers are the nearer thou commest to them the harder they are to vanquish for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence then they are to assail an enemy abroad Neither in this case does the authority of Hanniball move me because his passion and his own interest made him say so to Antiochus â—r if â—hâ— Romans had in that space of time received those three routs in France which they had in Italy by Hanniball without doubt they had bin quite undone for then they could not have helped themselves by the remainders of their armies nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did We never find that to afsail any countrey they sent out an army passing the number of 50000. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Punicke war they armed eighteen hundred thousand men Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy as they did in Tuscany because against so great a maltitude of enemies they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out nor fight with them upon the like advantage The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany nor could the Romans any way help themselves But when they came into Italy that they once united their forces together they presently dispatched them The Switzers it is easy to vanquish our of their own Countrey whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men but to overcome them at home where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men is exceeding difficult I conclude therefore anew that that Prince who hath his people armed and addrest for war may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home neither let him goe to meet it But he whose subjects are unarmed and his countrey unaccustomed to war let him alwaies keep it as far from home as he can And so the one and the other each in their degree will better defend themselves CHAP. XIII That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes rather by the help of guile than force I Take it to be very true that seldome or never it comes to pass that men of meane fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud unless that dignity which a man hath gotten came to him by gift or was cast on him by inheritance Neither do I think we ever find that force alone suffices but we often see that guile alone avails as he shall clearly perceive that reads Philip of Macedons life and that of Agathocles the Sicilian and many others such like who from very vile and poore fortunes have gain'd either a Kingdome or some other great dignities Xenophon in Cyrus his life declares this necessity of deceit being that the first expedition which he makes Cyrus to undertake against the Armenian King is full of guile and how by deceit and nor by force he makes him seize on his Kingdom by which Action he concludes nothing else but that it is necessary for a Prince that will atcheive great matters to learn to be a cunning deceiver Besides this he makes him deceive Ciaxares King of the Medes his Mothers uncle many waies without which fraud he shews Cyrus could never have attain'd to that greatness he afterwards came And I beleeve that there was never any plac'd in a low condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force and ingenuously though I grant that by guile alone one well may as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy And that which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase Republiques are likewise forc'd to till they are become mighty then force alone suffices And because Rome in every part lit either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great it failed not also of this nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly than to take the course we formerly discoursed of to make her some companions for under this name she brought many to be her servants as were the Latins and other people neare about her for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round about and in taking upon her self the reputation of the state afterwards when she had brought them under likewise she came to such growth that no power was able to withstand her And the Latins never perceived their own servitude til after that they saw the Samnites twice broken and forced to agreement Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with forrain Princes whereby they heard of the Romans name though they never felt their armes so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength among which were the Latins And so far prevailed this envie and fear that not onely the Latins but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended conspired all against the name of the Romans And the Latins mov'd that war in that manner as is formerly said that for the most part wars are mov'd not assailing the Romans but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave And that it is true that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit T. Livius declares it by the mouth of Annius Setinus a Latin Pretour who told them in their assemblie thus For if yet we can endure servitude under the name of an equal league Wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile which they had need to make use of that from low beginnings aim to mount high which the more covert it is is the less discommendable as was this of
thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war as for example sake against the Latines they left all the rest to the Consuls discretion who had free power either to fight a batttel or to leave it and to besiege either this or any other town else as he pleas'd Which things by many examples are verified and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans for Fabius the Consul having overcome them near unto Sutrium and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina and go into Tuscany he did not onely not advise with the Senate but gave them no notice at all of it though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers which is witnessed by a resolution of the Senate taken directly against this very course who having understood of the victory Fabius had gotten and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany thinking it would be well not to try that war nor ruin that hazzard sent two Deputies unto Fabius to give him notice they would not have him pass into Tuscany who came thither when he had already past and gotten the victory and in liew of hindring the war they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten And whosoever considers these termes will find them discreetly used for if the Senate would have had the Consull to proceed on forwards in the war onely as they gave him order they had made him less circumspect and slower in his actions for he would have thought that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his but that the Senate had participated with him by whose counse he had bin governed Besides this the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand For notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars yet being they were not upon the place and therefore ignorant of very many particulars which are needfull for him to know that will advise well by interposing their Councell they would have committed many errors And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself and that the glory thereof should be entirely his the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well I have the more willingly marked this place because I see that the Republiques now adayes as the Venetian and the Florentine understand it not so and if their Commanders Proveditours and Commissioners are to plant any battery they will know it first and advise thereupon Which course deserves the same praise the others do which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer THE THIRD BOOKE CHAP. I. For the maintenance of a Religion or a Common-wealth long in being it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds IT is most true that all things in the world have an end of their life but those things eninjoy that course that is generally ordaind them by heaven whichdisorder not their body but govern it in such a regular course that either it changes not or if it does it is for the better and not for the worst And because I speak of mixt bodies such as are Republiques and sects I say that those changes are for the health thereof which bring them back to their first beginnings and therefore are they the best order'd and subsist the longest which by the help of their own orders may often be renewed or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation And it is more clear than the light that these bodies not being renewed last not and the way to renew them is as is said to reduce them to their first beginnings for all beginnings of Sects Commonwealths and Kingdoms must needs contain some goodness in them by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase for in process of time that goodness growes corrupt and unless something happen that reduces it to the just mark that body must needs be destroyed And our Doctors of Physick say speaking of the bodies of men That a man daily gathers some evil which sometimes hath need of cure This reducing to the beginning speaking of Commonwealths is done either by some outward accident or by some prudence within Touching the first we see it was necessary that Rome should be taken by the French if we would have her spring again and thus springing again should recover a new life and a new vertue and take her self a new to the observance of religion and justice which began in her to be much blemish'd which we may easily gather by the Story of Livie where he shews that in drawing gut the army against the French and in creating the Tribunes with Consular power they observed not any religious ceremonie so in like manner they did not onely not punish the three Fabij who against the law of nations had fought against the French but created them tribunes And we may well think that of other good laws also ordained by Romulus and their other sage Princes they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable or necessary to maintain a free government This forrain blow therefore lit on them to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their City and to shew that people that it was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice but to esteem well of their good Citizens to make more account of their vertue than of those profits which they thought they lost or got by their means Which we see came directly to pass for presently after Rome was recovered from the French they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion they punished those Fabij who fought against the Law of Nations and afterwards made such account of Camillus his vertue and goodness that the Senate all others wholly laying envy aside gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into hit hands It is necessary therefore as I have said that men who live together in any order should often revise themselves either upon occasion given by outward or else by inward accidents And for these last they must either proceed from a law which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body or else from some good man that may arise among them who by his example vertuous actions may work the same effect which that law or order can This good then arises in Common-wealths by the vertue of some man or the force of some order And touching this last those orders that reduc'd the Roman Republick to its own beginning were the Tribuns of the people the Censors all those other laws which were made against the ambition or insolence of men which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of some one Citizen that couragiously joynes with
Servius Tullus was nothing wise to think that Tarquins sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law whose King they thought by right they ought to be And this desire of reigning is so great that it not only enters their breasts that look to succeed in the Kingdome but they also who no waies expect it As in Tarquinius his wife Servius his young daughter who would wish this rage against that piety shee ought her father set her husband against him to take his life from him and his Kingdome thereby so much more accounted she to be a Queen than the daughter of a King If then Tarquininus Priscus and Servius Tullus lost the Kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurpd Tarquinius the proud lost it for not observing the ancient Kings Customes as shall be shewd in the Chapter following CHAP. V. What it is that makes a King lose his Kingdome which he enjoyes by right of inheritance TArquinius the proud having stain Servius Tullus and of him no heirs remaining behind came to possess the Kingdom securely having no cause to feare those things that had hurt his predecessours And however his way of getting the Kingdom had been so extraordinary and odious yet had he observd the ancient customes of the other Kings he would have been borne with nor would the Senate nor the Commonalty have risen against him to wrest the State out of his hands Hee was not then banished because his son Sextus ravisht Lucretia but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdome and ruld tyrannously having taken all authority from the Senate and reserved it wholly to himself and those affaires which had been dispatcht in publick by the Senate of Rome with generall satssfaction he reduc'd to be treated in his own Palace which gain'd him both blame and envie so that in a very short time he despoyld Rome of all that liberty which she had alwaies maintained under others Nor was this enough to make the Senate his enemy but he provok'd the people also against him tiring them out in base mechanick services and such as were far different from that wherein his ancestors had imployd them so that having replenish'd Rome with examples of his cruelty and pride he had now dispos'd all the Romans minds to rebellion whensoever occasion should be off r'd And had not that accident of Lucretia fallen out so soon as any other should have chanc'd it would have produc'd the same effect for if Tarquinius had liv'd as the other Kings did and Sextus his son had committed that offence Brutus Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarquinius for revenge against Sextus and not to the people of Rome Therefore let Princes know that at the same houre they begin to lose the State when they begin to violate the Laws and those manners customs that are ancient under which men have liv'd a long time And in case they come to lose their State and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their Principalities who follow good counsell they themselves would much more lament their loss blame themselves more than others would for it is much easier to be belov'd by the good than by the bad to obey the Laws than command over them And if they would understand what course they were to take whereby to put this in practice and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good Princes take them for looking-glasses such as were Timoleon the Corinthian Aratus Sicioneus such like in whose lives they shall find security satisfaction as well of him that rules as of him that is ruled they would have a desire to become like them being able for the reasons alledgd to do so for men when they are well governd seek after no other liberty as it befell the people that were governd by the two were named before who were constraind to be Princes whiles they liv'd however they tryed many times to retire themselves to a private life And because in this the two precedent Chapters we have discoursed of humors stird up against Princes and of the conspiracy made by Brutus his sons against their Country of those against Tarquinius Priscus Servius Tullus methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following Chapter being a matter whereof Princes and private men may worthly take notice CHAP. VI. Of Conspiracies I Would not omit to discourse somewhat touching Conspiracies being they are dangerous for Princes and private men also for wee see that more Princes have lost their lives thereby and States too than by open war because few are able to make open war against Princes but every one may conspire against them On the other side private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this for it is full of difficulties and exceeding perillous every way From whence proceeds it that many of them are practisd but few succeed To the end there of that Princes may learn to beware of these dangers and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them I shall speak thereof more at large not omitting any thing remarkable that may serve for instruction of the one or the other And truly that of Tacitus is well termd a golden sentence where he saies that men are to reverence things past and submit to what is present and should wish for good Princes but whatsoever they are endure them and verily he who does otherwise ruines both himself and his Country Wee must then entring into the matter consider against whom Conspiracies are made and wee shall find they are plotted against amans Country or against his Prince of which two I intend this present discourse for touching those that are practis'd to deliver a Town into the enemies hands that besiege it or that have likelihood with this for any cause wee have already sufficiently spoken And wee will treat in this first part touching that against a Prince and first we will examine the reasons thereof which are many though one there is of more importance than all the rest And this is general hatred for that Prince that hath provok'd general hate must needs have netâ—ed some particulars somwhat more than others insomuch that they long to be revengd on him and they are the more incited hereto by the general hatred they find conceivd against him A Prince then ought to avoyd these publick blames and how he should behave himself to avoid them having treated otherwhere I will not now middle for if he beware well of them offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him one reason is because Princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extream hazard to revenge
the dangers belonging to the practise thereof and oftentimes the others also or rather have they all had good success and I think every one that is wise should endeavor to carry the matter thus I will content my self to produce only two examples Nelematus not being able to indure the tyranny of Aristorimus Tyrant of Epirus assembled together in his house many of his friends and kinsfolke and having encourag'd them to set their Country at liberty some of them requir'd time to be advised and prepared whereupon Nelematus causd his servants to shut the doors and told those he had cald together That they should either swear presently to do this or if not he would deliver them all prisoners to Aristotimus whereby all of them being mov'd swore and so without more delay went and put in execution what Nelematus had orderd One of the Magi having by treachery seisd upon the kingdom of Persia Orthanus a great man had notice thereof and found out the deceit and thereupon conferd with six other Princes of that State saying he was now underraking to vindicate the Kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magician and when some of them demanded time Darius rose up one of the six that was cald by Orthanus and said Either wee will all now go and execute this or else I will go and accuse you all so rising all by consent and not giving any one time to repent himself they happily effected what they desir'd Like unto these two examples also is the course the Aetolians took to put Nabis the Spartan Tyrant to death who sent Alessamenes a Citizen of theirs with 300 horse and 1000 foot to Nabis under colour of giving him ayd the secret they communicated to Alessamenes only the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatsoever matter it were under pain of banishment This man went into Sparta never communicating his Commission to any till just he was to put it in execution whereupon it fell out that he slew him They then by these means escap'd the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of Conspiracies and whoever shall do as they did shall alwaies be sure to escape them And that every one also is able so to do I will shew by the example of Piso alledged before Piso was a very great man and of much esteem and very familiar with Nero on whom we much rely'd And Nero went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens Piso therefore might have procur'd himself friends of spirit and courage and willing too to put such a thing in execution being a matter easie for any great man to compass and when he had had Nero in his gardens then communicated the business to them and with fit words perswaded them to it so that they could not have had time to refuse and impossible had it bin but that it must have taken effect And if we shall examine all the others we have mentiond we shall find very few could have bin otherwise carried But men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world often commit very great errors and the greater in those actions that have something of extraordiry in them as this The matter then is never to be communicated but upon necessity or even at the very acting of it and yet if thou wilt communicate it let that be but unto one of whom thou hast had long experience or that therein is interested upon the same reasons thou art It is easier to find one man of that condition than many and thereby also is less danger Moreover when he should deceive thee there were some means left yet to desend thee which could not be where the conspirators are many for it is the saying of a wise man that with one alone a man may speak any thing for one man I is as good as another mans No provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing And of writing any thing a man shouldbe as wary as of a perilous rock for nothing convicts thee sooner than thine own hand Plautianus having a mind to skill Severus the Emperor Antonius his son committed the execution of it to Saturninus a Tribune who purposing to accuse and not obey him yet doubting when he should come to the tryal Plautianus would be beleev'd before him asked him a note under his hand that might give him assurance of his Commission which Plautianus blinded with ambition gave him whereupon it follow'd that he was accus'd and convicted by the Tribune without which and certain other tokens Plautianus had carried it clear against him so boldly he deny'd it Therefore when one only accuses there may be some remedy especially in case thou beest not convicted by any writing of thiue or countermarks whereof a man should be well aware In Pisoes conspiracie there was a woman called Epicaris which formerly had bin one of Neroes Mistresses who thinking it would serve well to purpose to joyn with the conspirators one that was a Captain of some galleys which Nero kept for his safeguard opened to him the conspiracie but not who were the conspirators whereupon that Captain contrary to his word given accus'd her before Nero but such was her boldness in denying it that Nero was astonish'd thereat condemned her not There are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuse thee alledging some proof against thee the other that he detect thee not constraind and forc't thereunto by torture having been apprehended upon some conjecture or suspition had of him but in either of these two dangers there is some remedy being that in the one it may be deny'd by saying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee and in the other by alledging that the extremity of torture compell'd him to utter any thing though false It is wisdome then to make no man privy to such a secret but rather to order it conformably to the above alledged examples or in case thou revealst it not to exceed one where though there be somwhat more danger yet is there much less than when it is discoverd to divers Near unto this course is when a necessity constrains thee to do that to the Prince which thou seest he would do unto thee which necessity is so excessive that it gives thee leisure only to provide for thy security This necessity brings the business ordinarily to a good end and to prove it two examples shall suffice mee Cammodus the Emperor did use Lettus and Elettus Captains of his guard among his familiar and principal friends and Martia among his chief Concubines and Mistresses but because sometime he had been reprehended by them for some things done whereby he had disgrac'd his person and the Empire he resolve'd to put them to death and writ in a list the names of Martia Lettus and Eletius and some others who the night following he meant should die and so put
of his soldiers clad like shepherds with much cattel through the plain and they being taken by the Romans and required of where the Samnites army was agreed all according to the order received from Ponutis to say that it was gone to the siege of Nocera Which thing the Consuls believing gave them opportunity to shut them up in those precipices of Caudium wherein as soon as they entred they were presently besieg'd by the Samnites and this victory gained by fraud would have proved very glorious to Pontius if he had followed his fathers counsel who advised either to set the Romans freely at liberty or put them all to the sword and in no case take the middle way Which neither gaines friends nor takes foes out of the way Which middle way was always pernicious in matters of state as other where it hath formerly been said CHAP. XLI That the defence of ones country ought to be undertaken either with ignominy or with glory or whatsoever way it be done it is well defended THe Consul and the Romane Army as is above said were besieged by the Samnites who having propounded to the Romans exceeding dishonorable terms as was that to make them go under the gallows and send them without Arms to Rome and hereupon the Consuls standing amazed and the whole army in despair Lucius Lentulus the Romanc Lieutenant said that as he thought no conditions were to be refused to save their country for the safety of Rome consisting in the life of that Army he thought it good to save it in any case and that the Country is well defended by what means soever it be either with disgrace or with glory for that Army being saved Rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy but in case it were not saved however it should dye gloriously Rome and her liberty was utterly lost and so his advise was followed Which thing deserves well to be noted by any Citizen that chances to be called to counsel his country for where the deliberation is wholly touching the safty of the country there ought no consideration to be had of just or unjust pitiful or cruel honorable or dishonorable but rather all other respect being laid aside that course is to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof which thing is followed by the sayings and deeds of the French in defence of the Majesty of their King and the power of their Kingdom for they heat nothing with more impatience then that it should be said Such a course was dishonorable to their King for say they their King cannot suffer dishonor in any resolution taken by him either in prosperous or adverse fortune for whether he wins or loses they commend the action and say it was done like a King CHAP. XLII Promises extorted by force ought not to be kept WHen the Consuls were return'd to Rome with their disarm'd army and the disgrace which was put upon it the first that spake in the Senate that the peace made at Candium should not be observ'd was the Consul S. Posthumius saying that the people of Rome was not tied thereunto but that he himself indeed was bound and the rest that had promis'd the peace and therefore the people if they would free themselves from all tyes were to yeeld up him and the rest that had promis'd it with him into the Samnites hands and this conclusion he held with such obstinacy that at length the Senate was content therewith and so sending him and the others to Sanmiam protested to the Samnites that the peace was of no force And in this case so favourable was fortune to Pesthumius that the Samnites held him not and when he was returned to Rome among the Romans he was more glorious by his loss then Pentius was among the Samnites by his conquest Where two things are to be noted The one is that in what action soever glory may be gotten for in victory it is ordinarily gain'd but in loss it is obtained either by shewing that loss came not by thy default or by the atcheivement of some valorous action which may cancell it The others is that it is no dishonour to violate those promises which by force thou wert constrain'd to make and always premises extorted regarding the publick when there is want of strength shall be broken and that without the disgrace of him that breaks them Wherefore in all histories we read several examples and every day in these moderne times we see many of them and not only among Princes promises forc'd when they want strength are not kept but also all other promises are not observed when the occasions faile that mov'd them to promise Which if it be a thing commendable or no or whether such like ways are to be followed by a Prince or no it is at large disputed by us in our treaty concerning a Prince so that for this present we shall not touch it CHAP. XLIII Those men that are bred in the same country do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and disposition WIse men are wont to say and not by chance nor without reason that he who will see what shall be let him consider what hath been for all things in the world at all times have their very incounter with the times of old Which comes to pass because those things are wrought by men who were always are subject to the same passions therefore follows it of necessity that they take the same effect It is true that their actions sometimes in this province are more vertuous then those in that so sometimes in that more then in this according to the forme of their education wherein those people have taken their manner of living It gives a facility also in the knowledge of future things by those that are past to see one Nation a long time hold the same customes and conditions being either alwayes covetous or always treacherous or having some other such vice or vertue And whosoever shall read the things past belonging to our City of Florence and consider also what hath happened in the latter times shall finde the Germans and French very covetous proud cruel and unfaithful for in all these four several times have they much wronged our City And touching their small faith every one know monies were given to King Charles the 8. of France and he promised to render the Cittadels of Pisa and yet he never did it Wherein that King manifested his small faith and muth avarice But let us pass over these matters of late memory Every one may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the Florentines had with the Vicounts of Milan when Florence being deprived of all other expedients thought to bring the Emperor into Italy by his reputation and forces to assail Lombardy The Emperor promised to bring a good Army with him and undertake that war against the Vicounts and defend Florence against
to confine eight or ten thousand men with extraordinary hard conditions had it been to one man alone much more to so many As it befell those souldiers who had fought unfortunately at Canna whom she confined to Sicily and layd this on them that they should never lodge in any Townes andshould always eate standing But of all the other execution the most terrible was that decimation of armies where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death Nor could there to chastise a whole multitude a more horrible punishment be found for when a multitude offends where the author is not certain all cannot suffer because they are too many and to punish one part and let the other go scotfree were to wrong those they should punish and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time But to put to death the tenth part by lot when all deserve it he that suffers blames his evill fortune and he that escapes is afraid least that another time the lot may fall on him and so is wary not to offend Those empoisoners then Baccanalls were punished as their offences deserved And however these diseases in a republick produce evill effects yet are they not deadly for that almost alwayes there is time given to correct them but there is hardly any leasure in those that regard the state which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man ruine the City There was in Rome by reason of the liberality the Romans used in bestowing the Burgeouship freedom of their City upon strangers so many new people borne that they began to have such a part in the suffnages that the government began to vary and parted with those things and from those men by whom it was accustomed to walke Which Q. Fabius who was then Censor perceiving the placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended under four Tribes to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome This thing was well understood by Fabius and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change which was so well accepted by the City that they always after gave him the title of Maximus Nicolas Machiavel to Zanobius Buondelmontius and Cosimus Rucelayus health I Send you a present which if it answers not my obligations to you yet certainly is it the greatest that Nicolas Machiavel could commend unto you for herein I have expressed what I know and what I have learned by a long experience and continnal reading of the affairs of the world And being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me you have no reason to complain I have given you no more Well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding being that these relations of mine here are but weake and at the errour of my judgment being that I my self several times in my discourses am deceived Which being so I know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other either I to you who have forced me to wriâ—e that which of my own self I should never have undertaken or you to me who have given you but smal satisfaction in my writings Receive this then so as things should be taken by friends where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends then to the worth of what is sent And beleeve that herein I have one alone satisfaction when I think that however perchance I may have erred in many circumstances herein in this alone I know I have not fail'd in making choise of you to whom before all others I may dedicate these my discourses partly because in thus doing I have shewed some thankfulness for the good turnes you have done me and partly for that me thinks I have quit the common custome of those that write who use alwayes to dedieate all their works to Princes and blinded by ambition and covetousness attribute to him the commendations of all vertuous qualities whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him Whereupon that 's I may not run into this error I have made choice not of those that are Princes but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so nor of those that are able to bestow preferments honours nor wealth upon me but of those who though they are not powerfull yet are they willing to do well for me for men if they would carry a right judgment should esteem of those that in themselves are and not of those that have the means to be liberall and so of those that understand how to governe and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom And writers commend rather Hieron of Siracusa when he was a private man then Perse of Macedon when he was a King For Hieron wanted nothing else of being a Prince then a Principality that other had no part of a King but a Kingdome Enjoy therefore that good or that evill which you your selves have desired and if you shall continue still in this error that these my opinions be acceptable to you I shall not faile to proceed in the rest of the story as in the beginning I made my promise FINIS Nicholas Machiavel's PRINCE ALSO The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca AND The meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliverotto of Fermo Paul and the Duke of Gravina Translated out of Italian into English By E. D. With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errors LONDON Printed for Daniel Pakeman 1661. To the most noble and Illustrious JAMES Duke of Lenox Earle of March Baron of Setrington Darnly Terbanten and Methuen Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes POysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality that as destructives of Nature they are utterly to be abhord but we find many nay most of them have their medicinal uses This book carries its poyson and malice in it yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life with advantage The Lamprey they say hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it take that out and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates Epictetus the Philosopher sayes Every thing hath two handles as the fire brand it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt the other being laid hold on will cleave to the very flesh and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart Sin hath the condition of the fiery end the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule nay it is worse one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author your judgement shall easily
get the Kingdome of Naples he divided it with the King of Spain and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy he brought in a competitor to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country and all that were ill affected to him might have otherwhere to make their recourse and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice King of his own he took him from thence to place another there that might afterward chace him thence It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary to desire to be of the getting hand and alwaies when men undertake it if they can effect it they shall be prais'd for it or at least not blam'd but when they are notable and yet will undertake it here lies the blame here is the error committed If France then was able with her own power to assail the Kingdome of Naples she might well have done it but not being able she should not have divided it and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians deserv'd some excuse thereby to set one foot in Italy yet this merits blame for not being excus'd by that necessity Lewis then committed these five faults extinguisht the feebler ones augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner came not thither himself to dwell there nor planted any colonies there which faults while he liv'd he could not but be the worse for yet all could not have gone so ill had he not committed the sixt to take from the Venetians their State for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy it had bin necessary to take them lower but having first taken those other courses he should never have given way to their destruction for while they had been strong they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy For the Venetians would never have given thoir consents thereto unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves and the others would never have taken it from France to give it them and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together And if any one should say that King Lewis yeelded Romania to Alexander and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain to avoid a war I answer with the reasons above alledged that one should never suffer any disorder to follow for avoiding of a war for that war is not sav'd but put off to thy disadvantage And if any others argue that the King had given his word to the Pope to do that exploit for him for dissolving of his marriage and for giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words how they ought to be kept King Lewis then lost Lombardy for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd who have possessed themselves of countries and desir'd to keep them Nor is this any strange thing but very ordinary and reasonable and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinal when Valentine for so ordinarily was Caesar Borgia Pope Alexanders son call'd made himself master of Romania for when the Cardinal said to me that the Italians understood not the feats of war I answered the Frenchmen understood not matters of State for had they been well vers'd therein they would never have suffer'd the Church to have grown to that greatness And by experience we have seen it that the power hereof in Italy and that of Spain also was caused by France and their own ruine proceeded from themselves From whence a general rule may be taken which never or very seldom fails That he that gives the means to another to become powerful ruines himself for that power is caused by him either with his industry or with his force and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant CHAP. IV. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexder rebelled not against Alexanders Successors after his death THe difficulties being consider'd which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new gotten some might marvaile how it came to pass that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years and having hardly possessed himself of it died whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it nor found they other difficulty in holding it than what arose among themselves through their own ambition I answer that all the Principalities whereof we have memory left us have been governed in two several manners either by a Prince and all the rest Vassals who as ministers by his favor and allowance do help to govern that Kingdom or by a Prince and by Barons who not by their Princes favor but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords and bare them a true natural affection Those States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals have their Prince ruling over them with more authority for in all his countrey there is none acknowledged for superior but himself and if they yeeld obedience to any one else it is but as to his minister and officer nor beare they him any particular good will The examples of these two different Governments now in our dayes are the Turk and the King of France The Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord and the rest are all his Vassals and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments he sends several thither and those he chops and changes as he pleases But the King of France is seated in the midst of a multitude of Lords who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects and being belov'd by them enjoy their preheminencies nor can the King take their States from them without danger He then that considers the one and the other of these two States shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State but when once it is subdu'd great facility to hold it The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him are because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him to be able to facilitate his enterprize which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid for for they being all his slaves and oblig'd to him can more hardly be corrupted and put case they were corrupted little profit could he get by it they not being able to draw after them any people for the reasons we have shewed whereupon he that assails the Turk must think to find him united and must rather relie upon his own forces than in the others disorders but when once he is overcome and broken in the field so that he cannot repair his armies there is nothing else to be
dangerous in the auxiliaries their valonr Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes and betaken himself to his owne and desired rather to loss with his owne than conquer with anothers accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes I will not doubt to alleadge Caesar Bargia and his actions This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes s bringing with him all French souldiers but afterwards not accounting those armes secure bent hinselfe to mercenaries judging lesse danger to be in those and tooke in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli which afterwards in the proof of them finding wavering unfaithful and dangerous he extinguishd and betook himselfe to his owne and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes confidering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation when he had the French men alone and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli but when he remaind with his own and stood of himselfe we shall find it was much augmented nor ever was it of grate esteeme but when every one saw that he wholly possessed his owne a mes I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the Siracusan being one of those I formerly nam'd This man as I said before being made general of the Siracusans forces knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings as our Italians are and finding no way either to hold or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces and afterwards waged warre with his owne men and none others I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose When David presented himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistims Champion Saul to encourage him clad him with his owne armes which David when he had them upon his back refus'd saying he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword In summe others armes either fall from thy shoulders or cumber or streighten thee Charls the seventh Father of Lewis the eleventh having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes and infantry Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry and began to take the Swissers to pay which errour follow'd by the others is as now indeed it appeares the cause of that Kingdomes dangers For having given reputation to the Swissers they have renderd all their own armes contemptible for this hath wholly ruind their foot and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers they think they are not able to overcome without them From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers and without them also against others they use not to adventure Therefore are the French armies mixt part more naries and part natives which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries and much inferiour to the natives and let the said example suffice for that for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable if Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind but men in their small wisdome begin a thing which then because it hath some favour of good discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder as I before said of the hâ—ctick feavers Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes but as they grow up is not truely wise and this is given but to few and if we consider the first ruine of the Romane Empire we shall find it was from taking the Goths first into their pay for from that beginning the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them I conclude then that without having armes of their owne no Principality can be secure or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune not having valour to shelter it in adversity And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men that nothing is so weak and unsetled as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces which are those that are composed of thy subjects or Citizens or servants all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary and the manner how to order those well is easie to find out if those orders above nam'd by me shall be but run over and if it shall be but consider'd how Philip Alexander the Great his Father and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly CHAP. XIV What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline A Prince then ought to have no other ayme nor other thought nor take any thing else for his proper art but warr and the orders and discipline thereof for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands and is of so great excellency that not only those that are borne Princes it maintains so but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity And it is seene by the contrary that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights than to the warres they have lost their States and the first cause that makes thee lose it is the neglect of that arte and the cause that makes thee gaine it is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte Francis Sforza by being a man at armes of a private man became Duke of Milan and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of Princes became private-men For among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee it causes thee to be contemnd which is one of those disgraces from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe as hereafter shall be sayd for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion and reason will not that he who is in armes should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls for there being disdaine in the one and suspicion in the other it is impossible these should ever well co-operate And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre besides the other infelicities belonging to him as is said cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers nor yet trust in them Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre which he may be able to doe two wayes the one practically and in his labours and recreations of his body the other theorically And touching the practick part he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well traind
directed by the examples of those two famous Romans Regulus and Posthumius I shall close this with the answer of Charles the fifth when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for his safe return from Wormes Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet Though truth be banisht out of the whole world yet should it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors beast CHAP. XIX That Princes should take a care not to incurre contempt or batred BUt because among the qualities whereof formerly mention is made I have spoken of those of most importance I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware as in part is abovesaid and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile and when ever he shall avoid this he shall fully have plaid his part and in the other disgrace he shall find no danger at all There is nothing makes him so odious as I said as his extortion of his subjects goods and abuse of their women from which he ought to forbear and so long as he wrongs not his whole people neither in their goods nor honors they live content and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some sew which many waies and easily too is restrain'd To be held various light effeminate faint-hearted unresolv'd these make him be contemnd and thought base which a Prince should shun like rocks and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity courage gravity and valor and that in all the private affairs of his subjects he orders it so that his word stand irrevocable and maintain himself in such repute that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself is much esteemed and against him who is so well esteemed hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects or by forreiners any invasion when once notice is taken of his worth and how much he is reverenced by his subjects For a Prince ought to have two fears the one from within in regard of his subjects the other from abroad in regard of his mighty neighbors from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends and alwayes he shall have good friends if he have good armes and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home when those abroad are firme in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them and however the forrein masters stand but ticklishly yet if he have taken such courses at home and liv'd as we have prescribed he shall never be able in case he forsake not himself to resist all possibility force and violence as I said Nabis the Spartan did but touching his subjects even when his affairs abroad are setled it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily from which a Prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion which it is necessary for him to compass as formerly we treated at large And one of the powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies is net to be hated nor dispised by the universality for alwaies he that conspires beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the subject but when he thinks it displeases them he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side are infinite By experience it is plain that many times plots have been laid but few of them have succeeded luckily for he that conspires cannot be alone nor can he take the company of any but of those who he beleeves are malecontents and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent thou givest him means to work his own content for by revealing thy treason he may well hope for all manner of favour so that seeing his gain certain of one side and on the other finding only doubt and danger either he had need be a rare friend or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince if he keeps his word with thee And to reduce this matter into short termes I say there is nothing but jealousie fear and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him but on the Princes part there is the majesty of the principality he laws the defences of his friends and the State which do so guard him that to all these things the peoples good wills being added it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe in this case he is also to feare afterwards having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited and therefore for this cause not being able to hope for any refuge Touching this matter many examples might be brought but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers Annibal Bentivolii grand Father of this Annibal who now lives that was Prince in Bolonia being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him none of his race being lest but this John who was then in swadling clouts presently the people rose upon this murder and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia which was so great that being there remain'd not any now Anniball was dead that was able to manage the State and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him and gave the government of their City to him which was rul'd by him untill John was of fit yeares to governe I conclude then that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons whiles he hath the people to friend but if they be his enemies and hate him he may well feare every thing and every one And well ordered States and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence not to cause their great men to fall into desperation and to content the people and so to maintaine them for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes is that of France and therein are found exceeding many good orders whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends of which the chiefe is the Parliament and the authority thereof for he that founded that Kingdome knowing the great mens ambition and insolence and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones grounded upon feare intending to secure them would not lay this care wholly upon the King but take this trouble from him which he might have with the great men in case he favourd the Commonalty or with the Commonalty in case he favourd the great men
and thereupon set up a third judge which was that to the end it should keep under the great ones and favour the meaner sort without any imputation to the King It was not possible to take a better nor wiser course then this nor a surer way to secure the King and the Kingdome From whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour Here againe I conclude that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred It would seeme perhaps to many considering the life death of many Romane Emperours that they were examples contrary to my opinion finding that some have liv'd worthily and shewd many rare vertues of the minde and yet have lost the Empire and been put to death by their owne subjects conspiring against them Intending then to answer these objections I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours declaring the occasions of their ruine not disagreeing from that which I have alledgd and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus who were Mercus and Commodus his sonne Pertinax Julian Severus Antonius Caracalla his sonne Macrinus Heliogabalus Alexander and Maximin And first it is to be noted that where in the other Principalities they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles and the insolence of the people the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers which was so hard a thing that it caused the ruine of many being hard to satisfy the souldiers and the people for the people love their quiet and therefore affect modest Princes and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage that is insolent cruell and plucking from every one which things they would have them exercise upon the people whereby they might be able to double their stipends and satisfie their avarice and cruelty whence it proceeds that those Emperous who either by Nature or by Art had not such a reputation as therewith they could curbe the one and the other were alwayes ruind and the most of them specially those who as new men came to the principality finding the difficulty of those two different humours applyed themselves to content the sholdiers making small account of wronging the people which was a course then necessary for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one ought first endeavour that they incurse not the hatred of any whole universality and when they cannot attaine thereunto they are to provide with all industry to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty And therefore those Emperors who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire had need of extraordinary favours more willingly stuck to the soldiers than to the people which neverthelesse turned to their advantage or otherwise according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them From these causes aforesayd proceeded it that Marcus Pertinax and Alexander though all living modestly being lovers of justice and enemies of cruelty courteous and bountifull had all from Marcus on ward miserable ends Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured for he came to the Empire by inheritance and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers nor from the people afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues which made him venerable he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits and was never either hated or contemnd But Pertinax was created Emperour against the soldiers wills who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to whereupon having gotten himself hatred and to this hatred added contempt in that he was old was ruind in the very beginning of his government Whence it ought to be observed that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad and therefore as I formerly said when a Prince would maintaine the State he is often forced not to be good for when that generality whether it be the people or soldiers or Nobility whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee is corrupted it behoves thee to follow their humour and content them and then all good deeds are thy adversaries But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse that among the prayses given him had this for one that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire he never put any man to death but by course of justice neverthelesse being held effeminate and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother and thereupon fallen into contempt the army conspird against him Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus Severus Antonius Caracalla and Maximinus you shall find them exceeding cruell and ravinous who to satisfie their soldiers forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people and all of them except Severus came to evill enâ—s for in Severus there was such extraordinary valour that while he held the soldiers his freinds however the people were much burthend by him he might alwayes reigne happily for his valour rendred him so admirable in the soldiers and peoples sights that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd and those others reverencing and honoring him And because the actions of this man were exceeding great being in a new Prince I will briefly shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts the conditions of which two I say as before are very necessary for a Prince to imitate Severus having had experience of Iulian the Emperours sloth perswaded his army whereof he was commander in Solavonia that they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Portinax his death who was put to death by the Imperiall guard and under this pretence not making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire set his army in march directly towards Rome and was sooner come into Italy than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station Being ariv'd at Rome he was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare and Julian slaine After this beginning two difficulties yet remaind to Severus before he could make himselfe Lord of the whole State the one in Asia where Niger the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour the other in the West with Albinus who also aspird to the Empire and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both he purposed to set upon Niger and cozen Albinas to whom he writ that being elected Emperour by the Senate he would willingly communicate it with him and thereupon sent
matters to himself and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality adornd and strengthnd it with good lawes good arms good friends and good examples as he shall have double shame that is born a Prince and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it And if we shall consider those Lords that in Italy have lost their States in our dayes as the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and others first we shall find in them a common defect touching their armes for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length Afterwards we shall see some of them that either shall have had the people for their enemies or be it they had the people to friend could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones for without such defects as these States are not lost which have so many nerves that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld Philip of Macedon not the father of Alexander the Great but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the Romanes and of Greece that assail'd him neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people and assure himself of the Nobles for many yeares he made the warre good against them and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities for having afterwards lost them let them not blame Fortune but their own sloth because they never having thought during the time of quiet that they could suffer a change which is the common fault of men while faire weather losts not to provide for the tempest when afterwards mischiefes came upon them thought rather upon flying from them than upon their defence and hop'd that the people weary of the vanquishers insolence would recall them which course when the others faile is good but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that for a man wou'd never go to fall beleeving another would come to take him up which may either not come to passe or if it does it is not for thy security because that defence of his is vile and depends nor upon thee but those defences only are good certaine and durable which depend upon thy owne selfe and thy owne vertues CHAP. XXV How great power Fortune hath in humane affaires and what meanes there is to resist it IT is not unknown unto me how that many have held opinion and still hold it that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune and by God that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them or rather that there is no remedy for them and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing but leave all to be governd by chance This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes by reason of the great alteration of things which we have of late seen and do every day see beyond all humane conjecture upon which I sometimes thinking am in some paret inclind to their opinion neverthelesse not to extingush quite our owne free will I think it may be true that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half or little lesse And I liken her to a precipitous torrent which when it rages over-flows the plaines overthrowes the trees and buildings removes the earth from one side and laies it on another every one flyes before it every one yeelds to the fury thereof as unable to withstand it and yet however it be thus when the times are calmer men are able to make provision against these excesses with banks and fences so that afterwards when it swels again it shall all passe smoothly along within its channell or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull In like manner befals it us with fortune which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her and thither turnes she all her forces where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her And if you shall consider Italy which is the seat of these changes and that which hath given them their motions you shall see it to be a plaine field without any trench or bank which had it been fenc'd with convenienent vertue as was Germany Spain or France this inundation would never heave causd these great alterations it hath or else would it not have reach'd to us and this shall suffice to have said touching the opposing of fortune in generall But restraining my selfe more to particulars I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long fince run over that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune runnes as her wheele turnes I beleeve also that he proves the fortunate man whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ for we see that men in the things that induce them to the end which every one propounds to himselfe as glory and riches proceed therein diversly some with respects others more bold and rashly one with violence and the other with cunning the one with patience th' other with its contrary and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto we see also two veby respective and wary men the one come to his purpose and th' other not and in like maner two equally prosper taking divers course the one being wary the other headstrong which proceeds from nothing else but from the quality of the times which agree or not with their proceedings From hence arises that which I said that two working diversly produce the same effects two equaly working the one attains his end the other not Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience times and affaires turne so favourably that the carriage of his businesse prove well he prospers but if the times and affaires chance he is ruind because he changes not his manner of proceeding not is there any man so wise that can frame himselfe hereunto as well because he cannot go out of the way from that whereunto Nature inclines him as also for that one having alwayes prosperd walking such a way cannot be perswaded to leave it and therefore the respective and wary man when it is fit time for him to use violence and force knows not how to put it in practice whereupon he is ruind but if he could change hi disposition with the times and the affaires he should not change his fortune Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions
with very great violence and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia even while John Bentivolio lived the Venetians were not well contented therewith the King of Spain likewise with the French had treated of that enterprises and nowithstanding al this he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse personally undertook that expedition which action of his put in suspence and stopt Spaine and the Venetians those for feare and the others for desire to recover the Kingdome of Naples and on the other part drew after him the King of France for that King seeing him already in motion and desiring to hold him his friend whereby to humble the Venetians thought he could no way deny him his souldiers without doing him an open injury Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done for it he had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled and all his affaires ordered before hand as any other Pope would have done he had never brought it to passe For the King of France would have devised a thousand excuses and others would have put him in as many feares I will let passe his other actions for all of them were alike and all of them prov'd lucky to him and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary for had he litt upon such times afterwards that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects there had been his utter ruine for he would never have left those wayes to which he had been naturally inclind I conclude then fortune varying and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes prove happy while these accord together and as they disagree prove unhappy and I think it true that it is better to be heady than wary because Fortune is a mistresse and it is necessary to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her and we see that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those than by others that proceed coldly And therefore as a mistresse shee is a friend to young men because they are lesse respective more rough and command her with more boldnesse I have considered the 25 Chapter as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things The life of man is like a game at Tables skill availes much I grant but that 's not all play thy game well but that will not winne the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play Examine this play never so surely play never so probably unlesse the chance thoucastest lead thee forward to advantage all hazards are losses and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap 9. v. 11. The race is not to the swift nor the battell to the strong neither yet bread to the wise nor yet riches to men of understanding nor yet favour to men of skill but time and chance hapeneth to them all Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books could not fence against the despight of Fortune as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke Nor that great example of policy Duke Valentine whome cur Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune that he could keep her in obedience Man can contribute no more to his actions that vertue and wisdome but the successe depends upon a power above Surely there is the finger of god or as Prov. 16. v. 33. The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was nor Josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand but because the Lord was with him that which he did the Lord made it to prosper Gen 39. Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes as that their effects prove answerable and sometimes that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes the success returns with such a supereminency of worth that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes CHAP. XXVI An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians HAving then weigh'd all things above discours'd and devising with my self whether at this present in Italy the time might serve to honor a new Prince whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince to introduce such a forme that might do honor to him and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new Prince that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose And if as I said it was necessary desiring to see Moses his vertue that the children of Israel should be inthrald in Aegypt and to have experience of the magnanimity of Cyrus his mind that the Persians should be oppress'd by the Medes and to set forth the excellency of Theseus that the Athenians should be dispersed so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an Italian spirit it were necessary Italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in and were in more slavery than the Hebrews were more subject than the Persians more scatterd than the Athenians without head without order battered pillaged rent asunder overrun and had undergone all kind of destruction And however even in these later dayes we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one whereby we might have conjectur'd that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof yet it prov'd afterwards that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life attends still for him that shall heal her wounds give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of Lombardy to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdome and of Tuscany and heal them of their soars now this long time gangren'd We see how she makes her prayers to God that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolencies We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours provided there be any one take them up Nor do we see at this present that she can look for other than your Illustrious Family to become Cheiftain of this deliverance which hath now by its own vertue and Fortune been so much exalted and favored by God and the Church whereof it now holds the Principality and this shall not be very hard for you to do if you shall call to mind the former actions and lives of those that are above named And though those men were very rare and admirable yet were they men and every one
them the other is that though they were of such resolution and force as might serve to do it yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it The injuries must be either touching the fortunes lives or honors Of those that are touching mens lives the threats are more dangerous than the execution or rather the threats are very dangerous but in the execution there is no danger at all for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge and those that remain alive most commonly leave to think of him that is dead but he that is threatned and sees himself put to a point either to do or suffer becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince as we shall say particularly in due place The fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity touch men more nearely then any other offence where of a Prince should be wel aware for he can never strip a man so bare but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himself nor so much dishonour any one but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance And touching honours the dishonoring of women is of most importance and after this the scorne and disgrace of their persons This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers Princes And in our dayes Julius Belanti had no other motive to conspire against Pandulphus the tyrant of Siena but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him as in its place we shall relate The greatest cause the Pazzi had to conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of John Bonrosnei whereof they were dispossess'd by their order And another cause and a very great one too why men plot treachery against a Prince is a desire which they have to free their countrey which hath bin seis'd on by him This mov'd Brutus and Cassius against Caesar This incited many others against Falaris Dionysius and such other usurpers of their Countries Nor can any Tyrant free himself from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his Tyranny And because we find none will doe this there are but few of them that come not to ill ends Which gave Iuvenal occasion to say Few Tyrants unto Plutoes Court do goe But that are thither sent by bloody blow The dangers that as I said before accompany conspiracies are great and continual for in such cases there is danger in plotting them in executing them and after they are executed too Those that conspire are either one or more that of one cannot be termed a conspiracy but a setled resolution bred in a man to slay a Prince This alone of all the three dangers which conspiracies hazard is free from the first For before the putting it in execution it carries no hazard with it being none is made privy to his secret nor is there any danger that his purpose come to the Princes eare A resolution after this sort may happen to be found in any man of any condition little or great Noble or ignoble familiar or not familiar with he Prince for at some times it is permitted to any man to speak with him and he that comes to speak with him may vent this passion of his minde Pausanias of whom we have otherwhere spoken slew Philip of Macodon as he was going to the Temple environ'd with a thousand armed men and between his own son and son in law but he was one of the Nobles and well known to the Prince A poore and abject Spaniard strook Ferdinand King of Spain with a knife in the neck however the wound was not mortal yet hereby it appeared that he had both courage and opportunity to do it A Turkish Priest nam'd Dervis drew a scimitarre against Bajazet father of this present Turk but hit him not yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose Of this sort of resolutions thus bent I think there are many that would do it for in willing this there is neither punishment nor danger at all but few venture to act it and of those that do exceeding few or none there are that are not slaine in the act Therefore no man willingly will thrust himselfe upon a certaine death But let us leave these single resolutions and come to consider the conspiracies have bin made by great men or those that are very familiar with the Prince for others unless they be stark mad will never offer to conspire for mean men and not familiar with the Prince want all those conveniencies which are required in the executing of a conspiracy Firstâ— mean men cannot find those that will be true to them for no one man can apply himself to their wills for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons some one of them becomes an accuser and ruines all But in case they should be so happy that none should discover their plots yet in the execution are they beset with such difficulties having not free access unto the Prince that it is impossible but that there in they must perish for if great men who ordinarily come near him are oppress'd with such difficulties which we shall presently mention it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase Therefore men because where there is losse both of life and fortunes they are not stark mad when they find themselves weak are well aware of what they do and when they are very weary of a Prince they are contented onely to curse him and expect while those that are of higher quality then themselves do avenge them And yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing the design they had might well be laudable but not their wisdome We see therefore that those that have conspired were all great men or familiar with the Prince Whereof many have conspired as well being mov'd by too many favors as by too many injuries As Perennius was against Commodus Plautianus against Severus Sejanus against Tiberius All these were by their Emperors so enriched with wealth and dignified with titles and honours that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire it self which they meaning not to fail of betook themselves to conspire against their Prince and their treasons all had that end which their ingratitude well deserved However that among those of this sort in these latter times that of Iacob Apianus against Petrus Gambacorti Prince of Pisa succeeded fortunately which Iacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him afterwards took the state from him Of this sort was that of Coppola in our dayes against Ferdinand King of Arragon which Coppola having attained to that greatness that he thought he wanted nothing but the
Kingdom meaning not to go without lost his life And indeed if any conspiracie against Princes made by great men be ever like to take effect this was very probable being made by one that might have been termed a King for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will But that greedy ambition which blinds them in their desire to rule blinds them as well in the mannaging of this enterprise for if they know how to act this villany with discretion it were impossible but it should succeed A Prince then that would be well wary of conspiracies should be more jealous of those to whom he hath afforded most favours then of those to whom he hath done most wrongs for these want the means and those have them at pleasure and the will is a like for the desire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge Wherefore they are to confer but so much authority upon their favourites that still between it and the Principality they keep a distance and leave as it were some obstacle in their way otherwise seldome falls it out but that it chances to them as to the forementioned Princes But let us return to our order I say that being they are to be great men that plot these treasons and have easie access unto the Prince we are to discourse upon the successes of these their undertakings what they have been and point at the reason that hath caus'd them to prove happy or unhappy And as I formerly said at three severall times herein are dangers found In the plotting in the acting and after Therefore are there very few that prove lucky for it is almost impossible to pass all these happily And beginning to treate touching the dangers of the the first that are of most importance I say there had need be much circumspection and advisement which likewise had need be seconded by good fortune that in the contriving and ordering of a conspiracy it be not disclosed for that is done either by relation or by conjecture This relation proceeds from the small faith or small discretion of those men with whom thou communicatest thy secret And it is a thing ordinary to find but small saith for thou canst not communicate it but to thy confidents who for love of thee may adventure death or to men that are discontented with the Prince Of confidents possible it is that one or two may be found but when thou openest thy self to more it is impossible thou shouldest find them Besides the good will they beare thee had need be very great to the end they be not affrighted at the punishment and peril they incurre Moreover men are often deceived touching the love which thou beleevest another bears thee nor canst thou ever assure thy self of it unless thou hast had experience thereof and to make proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous and though thou hast had proof thereof in some other dangerous exploit where they have stuck close upon thee yet canst thou not from thence measure them for this being this danger surpasses all others If thou measurest their faith by their discontent against their Prince therein thou mayest easily deceive thy self For so soon as thou hast revealed thy mind to that malecontent thou givest him a subject whereupon to work again his own content and either his hatred had need be great or thy power with him of much force to keep him faithful Hereupon it arises that very many of them are discover'd crush'd even in the egge and when one of them among many men hath bin kept secret any time it hath bin thought of as a miracle as was that of Piso against Nero in our daies that of Laurence and Iulian of Medici whereunto above fifty persons were made privy who met together all to discover themselves in the execution thereof As for the discovery for want of discretion that falls out when a conspirator is not wary in his talk so that a servant or another third person comes take notice thereof as it befe Brutus his sonnes who in contriving the business with Tarquins Ambassadors were understood by a slave who accused them or else through a certain lightness of thine own thou communicatest it to a woman or a child which thou lovest or some such slight person as Dimus did one of those that conspir'd with Philotas against Alexander the Great who told the treason to Nicomacus a child which he lov'd who presently told it to Ciballinus his brother and Ciballinus to the King Touching discovery by conjecture we have an example for it where Piso conspired against Nero at which time Sceuinus one of the conspirators the day before that he was to slay Nero made his will and gave order that Milichius his freeman should cause his old and rusty dagger to be scoured he made all his slaves free and gave them money he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared by which conjectures Milichius being assured of the business accused him before Nero. Scevinus was taken and with him Natalis one of the Conspirators who had bin seen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company who not agreeing concerning the discourse they held were forc'd to confess the truth So that the treason was bewraied and the conspirators utterly ruin'd From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to beware but that through malice indiscretion or fondness all comes to light whensoever the complotters thereof pass the number of three or four and in case that more then one of them chance to be taken it is impossible but that it must be so for two cannot be so well agreed of all their discourses together but that in some things they shall jarre When one alone that is resolute is laid hold on he may through the strength of his courage be able to conceal the rest of his complices but then must his consors shew no less resolution than he in standing firm and not discovering themselves by flight for on which side soever courage failes either on his that is taken or his that is at liberty the conspiracy is disclosd And the example alleadgd by T. Livius is very rare in the treason that was plotted against Ier lamus King of Siracusa where Theodorus one of the conspirators being taken with a stout courage conceald all his companions and accused the Kings friends and on the other part all the confederates were confident of Theodorus his resolution that not one of them forsook Siracusa or made any shew of fear Wherefore all these dangers are to be passed in the ordering of a conspiracy before the acting of it Against which these are the remedies The first and truest whereof or better to term it the only one is not to give leisure to our complices to accuse us nor communicate the matter unto them till just when thou meanest to put it in execution and not before They who have thus done assuredly escape