him 6 And because the Disastrous chance of war may sometimes light vpon the assailer be he neuer so warie and valiant it is to be presupposed that being granted that he will sell his skin at so deare a rate as the forces of the assailed shall remaine thereby so disordred as he will not be able to offend the vanquished or disturbe his affaires notwithstanding that his countrey be farre distant from the countrey assailed this may be seene by the example of the ouerthrow the French receiued and the taking of their King prisoner before Pauye insomuch as that losse besides that of their Prince did not afford ought to the victorious whereby he might aduantage himselfe vpon the kingdome of France Also it is much more easie to set a foote againe an armie discomfited abroad then at home because if fortune haue shewed her selfe aduerse and our foe at our home then is the time that such as are malecontents and mutinous lift vp their heades and that our people stand amazed and for the most part vntractable Then must we trauaile amaine to put our men in hart then must we make much of those few good men the remaines of a battell to bestowe in our Townes and trust them with the gouernment thereof On the other side if these losses betide vs far from our home and in another country the feare and the stonishment will be the lesse amongst our subiects and they more pliable and forward to succour vs were it but to keepe the danger aloofe from themselues 7 Me thinkes Machiauel much abuseth himselfe when he so opiniatiuely mainteineth that if the Romans had receiued out of Italy the blowes Hannibal gaue them by the ouerthrow of * three armies that they had neuer beene able more to haue held vp their head or re-established their affaires as they did Machiauel laieth this ground That they had neuer found meanes againe to set a foote so soone as they did the residue of their forces had it beene out of Italy Marke I praie how he erreth for it is well knowen that the ouerthrowes they had in their owne country made them lose besides their souldiours many good townes and bred reuolt in their Colonies which followed the fortunes of the victorious with diuers other accidents that shooke their estate all which had not succeeded with such disaster if the losse had befell them far from Italy for in this case both heart and meanes had serued them more abundantly then they did to assemble new forces and as great as they had lost It is also certaine that if Hannibal had knowen how to make good vse of his victory the Romans had beene vtterly ouerthrowen It must needes be that their meanes and power were very great and that God had an especiall hand in their affaires seeing that in such disorder they should recouer themselues that with such corage as they refused to serue their turns with those which had by flight escaped from their ouerthrows neither made they any account of redeeming those which were taken prisoners nay rather in stead of doing this they depriued some of them of all honour and confined others into Sicily It seemeth to me that these reasons may serue to confute those of Machiauel and that it is high time we returne to that principall point concerning the fortune of the Turke 8 We will say then that the faint-hearted slacknesse of the Christians hath made way to the Turke for the inlarging of his limits so as they abut almost of all sides vpon Europe and hath beene a meanes that he can now not only attend the enemie as Machiauel saith but goe to rowse him at his owne home It is the course he hath obserued and taken to ruine his neighbours round about him and increase his power which he hath so doone as he hath cleane bereaued vs of all stomacke to assaile him yea or once to dare to attempt it For though there be Princes enow which hold it necessary for the good of Christendome to set vpon him at his home yet to this day we see none that will begin to strike the first stroake or set first hand to the breaking of this ice 9 But if euer God gaue vs the courage vertuously to attempt this enterprise in reuenge of the oppression and wrongs Christendome hath endured at his hands we must not thinke to vndertake it by other meanes then those he hath himselfe put in practise against vs that is to seeke him out at his owne home and nobly to embrace the dessignes himselfe hath obserued which doing and hauing God to guide we shall doubtlesse obtaine those victories of him which he hath had of vs. Admit he haue beene for a time our Schoole-master and that we haue learned of him to our cost it is now high time that wee shew how we haue profited by his instructions and that we know how to put them in practise and pay the interests of our damages 10 Now to make it appeere that it is not a matter of that difficultie and danger that some imagine let vs note these examples which are in a maner familiar vnto vs. Had not Andrew Dorea the courage with a small number of ships to enter into Greece where he got Patras and Coron Don Iohn of Austria did he not affoord a notable proofe hereof in the yeare 1571. when being Generall of the league he sought the enemie out in the inmost parts of the Leuant where he gaue him battaile with that courage that though he were inrferior to him in men galleies yet failed he not assisted by God to ouerthrow the most puissant great armie that the Ottomans euer set foorth by sea against the Christians There is nothing the Turke so much feareth as to be set vpon by the Christians both because he knowes they haue valor in them as also for the iealousie he conceiueth of the great number of them vnder his obedience All which would without question rise in armes if they might but once see the Christians Coulours flying and so accompanied as that they might to some purpose make head against the Ottamans CHAP. III. That he hath made no account of Fortresses 1 We must endeuour as well to keepe as conquer 2 The reason and vse of Colonies amongst the ancient 3 Their discommodities 4 The causes of rebellions 5 An other discommoditie of Colonies 6 The Portugals manner of planting Colonies 7 Their benefite 8 Fortresses the second meanes of preseruing an estate 9 Their vse and necessitie 10 Machiauels vaine opinion confuted 11 Forces euer in readinesse the third meanes of preseruing an Estate 12 Whether is better to maintaine Fortresses vpon the borders or to haue an armie euer ready 13 How the Turks cuntries liue in peace by means of the latter 14 In keeping the second meanes in getting the third is most approoued 15 Whence the power of the Turke doth grow 16 Wars abroad beget peace at home 1
of attempting nor the inticements of peoples insurrections nor the thirst of reuenge which commonly makes Princes mighty in men and mony forget themselues when the maintenance of their authority credit is called in question especially perceiuing the law in their hands to execute more readily then can particular persons nor any such like motiues haue beene able as I said to induce the Turkes indiscreetly to skip or to ingage themselues in any enterprise far from home Rather on the contrary they haue marched faire and soft from country to country and deuoured as they continue still to doe all such as confine and are neighbours vnto them Hence hath growen the consequence of so many happie victories the benefite of so great and rich conquests the course of so easily preseruing what they haue gotten 11 I haue said that for the most part they haue not inconsideratly skipped or strid in their enterprises as the Christians doe and haue done and as we see when any of them haue taken such waies to greatnesse the fruits and effects haue not prooued answerable to their proiect and promised fortunes This vnhappinesse common with the error founded vpon the reasons formerly alledged ought hencefoorth to serue as an instruction to make vs become more wise and regardfull then we yet are to the end that after we haue by an holy and vniuersall amendment appeased the wrath of God we may war against them with the same policies and aduantages as they haue practised in raising themselues to our cost and confusion These examples also should admonish vs of what is to be feared to wit least failing to chastice humble our selues his diuine Maiesty inflict vpon vs a more seuere punishment then that we haue hitherto indured and for this cause open a more large gate to those infidels vtterly to ruine and destroy vs. 12 Now lest any one should thinke I haue against reason held that the Turkes haue not as we forgotten thus inconsideratly to skip I will recite certaine examples to that purpose The first then that did it was Mahomet the second which vnfortunatly attempted Italy Soliman performed the like against the same country after the interprise of Diu in the Indies which was vndertaken the yeare 1537. then that of the yeare 1542. that of Ormus 1552. and finally vpon good grounds the attempting of Malta which was so valiantly defended by the Knights of the order as next the honour due vnto the diuine Maiestie all those braue Gentlemen who with their grand Master Parisot made it good against the Infidels deserue to be consecrated to all praise and to a most glorious and eternall memory CHAP. X. That he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance 1 Get the greater the lesse will follow 2 The besieging of some small holde may be the hinderance of the whole expedition this exemplified 3 The Turkes discretion in their expeditions and sieges 4 The best course is to become masters of the field 5 Error in the siege of Malta 1_NAture as wise and prouident doth not busie her-selfe about the birth of euerie particular thing but rather setteth her hand to the generation of the substance which without any further paine is afterward attended on by the accidents euery where inseparably accompanying her In like sort a good and discreet Captaine in the carriage of his enterprises should not aime at ought else but to conquer the places of importance for of their consequence other inferior parts of the estate come tumbling in as it were of themselues which as vnseparable accidents or qualities vndoubtedly follow the first examples of greater moment whereon dependeth and subsisteth the others being 2 We haue often seene that a paltrie Sconce either because of the naturall strength of the situation thicknesse of the wall goodnesse of the matter couragious obstinacy of the defenders or some other accident not foreseene or dreampt of hath stopt the proceeding of a royall armie and hath prooued it selfe as able to withstand the force thereof as a citie greater richer and more peopled And though we become after masters of such blocke-houses and small fortes yet that is no furtherance to a more important conquest or helpe to the enterprise begun We finde written that the Emperour Maximilian because he to no purpose spent so much time about Asola which he striued to subdue by the way for the reputation and credit of the armie he conducted to Milan inconsiderately lost the occasion offered him to become Lord of that Dukedome and performed not any thing after to the good of his affaires The French also after they had passed the Alpes in the time of Lewes the 12. thriued not in their attempts of the kingdome of Naples hauing vpon an ill ground vndertaken Rocca-Secea where they engaged both their honors and liues for hauing besieged it certaine daies and giuen the assault in vaine they lent leasure and courage to the Spaniards to bethinke themselues made their powers lesse valued for so badde a beginning and discouraged the people for euer attempting any thing in their behalfe as no doubt they had done if they might haue seene a fortunate and better digested proceeding then theirs was the name of the Spaniard being then odious amongst them This fault made the Spaniards so bold as to say that the rest of the kingdome was reserued for them and not for the other who had so ill husbanded their opportunities In the yere 1556. holding on the said designe for the conquest of Naples did they not vainely spend time money their forces and paines at Ciuitella to the ruine of that goodly armie which Henry the 2. of France sent thither vnder the command of the Duke of Guyse who was neuerthelesse a valiant and discreet Captaine and who had perhaps done better if his particular interest or the ouermuch trust he reposed in the Popes Nephewes had not blinded him Other reasons may be alleaged for the small good this armie did the king who had conceiued of it great and honorable hopes but I will referre them to such as write that Historie The Spaniards also haue thrice attempted the I le of Gerbes and euerie time lost a goodly and florishing armie able to haue performed a farre greater matter then they could hope for by getting the henroust if I may so tearme it The yeare after the battell of Lepanto the armie of the confederates which was then in the Leuant hauing their forces augmented by the arriuall of Don Iohn made Ochiallo Generall of the Turkish armie retire to Modon as fearing those of whom he had made triall the yeere before If they had put him to it as they should haue done no doubt but they had found him dismaide and hardly bestead how to defend as well the fortresses as his armie by sea for he had not left aboue 60. gallies to garde the hauen and had bestowed the rest of his forces one yeare But when he sawe they went to besiege
atchieued Notwithstanding all that hath beene said the question is not yet fully determined rather it remaineth diuersly ballancing to and fro as appeareth by these and the following examples 12 Charles of France surnamed the Sage neuer set foot out of his studie to command his armies yet knew he so well how to make the best vse of his Captaines valour and manage his affaires sutable to the time that he finally recouered his whole kingdome and expelled thence the English who possessed the greater part thereof On the contrarie the Emperour Ferdinand who warred by his Captaines himselfe not stirring out of Vienna receiued great and dangerous ouerthrowes Charles the fift on the other side wan more honour and victories by the valour of his Captaines then euer he did in those warres and enterprises himselfe vndertooke in person If the attempt vpon Marseilles had taken effect it might haue beene truly said that his Captaines had beene in all places victorious witnesse Pauie the Bicock Landrino Naples Coron Genoua Rome and Africk but where he went in person as in Saxony at Tunis Dura and Vienna his fortune prooued indifferent betweene good and bad But at Argiers in Piemont and at Metz he encountred on all sides such misfortune as it deemed as a man may say the luster of his renowne and victories formerly gained 13 Marke the effects of successe and fortune so different as it were a hard matter to passe a sound and determined iudgement vpon this proposition so as the more I imagine by the contrarietie of these examples to inlighten it the more obscure me thinkes I make it the finall deciding thereof may be framed thus The King which vndertaketh the conduct of an armie is either a discreet and aduised Captaine or else he is altogither vnskilled in the mysterie of warre In this last case I should thinke that it were most for his good to relie vpon an others relation and execution especially if priuie to his owne imperfections he want a dexteritie to make the best vse of another mans valour wisedome and counsaile But if so be he be capable of the gouernment and conduct of an armie and that he haue courage to execute in mine opinion he cannot doe better then to vndertake the warre and attempt himselfe in person for if in all militarie vertues he equall the most valiant of his armie he will surpasse them in fortune credit and authoritie and in all the other good parts aboue mentioned Kings compounded of these excellent parts alwaies crowne their eminency with honourable triumphes Theodosius the Emperour Charles the Great and sundrie others can witnesse this sufficiently Lewes the 12. of France hauing beene alwaies conquerour and neuer conquered in whatsoeuer he vndertooke himselfe in person was put besides the kingdome of Naples by means of a battaile which his captaines lost neere the riuer of Garillion for lacke of resolution and aduice which mischance was by that good prince so lamented as he made a vow thence forward to command personally in his wars And to say the truth if the Captaine be not discreet valiant and of long approoued experience it is strange if he euer performe woorthy act in such cases the presence of one only Turnus is more auaileable then of a thousand such Captaines 14 The Turkish Emperours who goe themselues to the wars haue tasted the sweetnesse thereof by so many and so notable victories as we are at this day their admirers Selim the first was wont to say that battailes gained in the Princes absence were not to be tearmed accomplished victories and we see that they haue scarce euer enterprised ought which hath not taken effect in the ende Yea it hath beene obserued that when their Captaines haue beene ouerthrowne if they themselues went afterward in person they alwaies returned victorious Amurath the second went himselfe after Carambeius generall of his army who was ouerthrowen by Ladislaus King of Polonia to war vpon that Prince whom he ouercame and cut his whol army in peeces Mezat Bassa was imploied by Mahomet the second in the enterprise of Rhodes which he shamefully abandoned but Soliman going himselfe in person caried it by plaine force and chased thence the Knights of Saint Iohn of Ierusalem who disquieted his estate by their ordinary excursions in the Leuant Amurath Captaine of the said Mahomet receiued a notable ouerthrow at the hands of Vsumcassan King of Persia but Mahomet going after himselfe in person vanquished the enemy already victorious and put him to a desperat plunge The Mamelucks ouerthrew Querseolus and Calubeius Baiazet the second Commanders Selim the first after personally vndertaking them ouercame them and wholy rooted out both them and their Empire Amurath the third now raigning hath been so many times beaten by Cudabenda King of Persia in person and through the vnskilfulnesse of his Commanders that a man may well say that neuer any of the race of the Ottomans receiued so notable ouerthrowes as this hath Whereto may be added that he met with last of all before Taures where he lost about 80000. men together with the Bassa Generall of his army a great blot to the glory of his ancestors yet the losse being so far off from his estate he receiued not so great a shake as if it had beene neere him or in his country 15 But who will take hold of such aduantages to doe good vpon him seeing the greatest Princes of Christendome are turmoiled in ciuill wars and troubles of their owne estates surely none Nay rather he is like to gather strength more then euer which he would not so easily doe if he were to incounter the Christians well appointed resolute and in a readinesse ioyntly and with one consent to make their benifit of so goodly an occasion CHAP. XIIII That he hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars 1 That our deliberations may take good effect we must proue all courses but vndertake nothing rashly 2 Rather superfluous then but necessary prouision is to be made of what belongeth to the wars 3 Aduantages of errours committed in military prouision 4 The wisdome of the Romaines and Turkes in their prouision 1 NOthing can be imagined more contenting the spirit then the happy successe of that euery one vndertaketh answerable to his condition much more a great Prince when he hath resolued vpon anie thing espeically the war is not to forget any one thing of what soeuer may perfect his designe which he ought to conceale and keepe to himselfe all he may We haue one notable example hereof yet fresh in memory and that is of the Prince of Parma Alexander Farnese who for a time had the managing of the troubles and wars in Flanders where he almost neuer attempted any thing which according to his intent he did not performe In very truth his actes were such as he deserueth to be reckoned as one of the most iudicious wise and aduised Princes of our age particularly in this
they haue conceiued of not being discouered till such time as their proiects meete with some good successe These things happen sooner when the Prince is far off then at hand Spaine can witnesse it which was so vnhappily betraied by Count Iulian as it thereby fell into the hands of the Moores So was the Empire of the Mamelucks by the treason of Caierbeius possest by Selim Emperour of the Turkes Who would search more narowly into Christendome shall finde that the ciuill wars of France minister more examples for proofe of this then is necessary Thus wee see that small estates are most to stand in feare of forraine force since they haue not wherewitheither of or in themselues to be able to resist or to take breath That the meane estates are alwaies lesse offended by outward force then the smallest and more free from inward treason then the greatest CHAP. II. From what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered 1 Causes of the change of Estates 2 The ruine of Estates is most answearable to their beginnings 3 The rootes of common wealths how maintained 4 Security especially to be auoided 1 I Will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter nor diue into the other efficient causes of the ruine of estates for should I handle what might be farther said of this matter I should wander too far frō the propounded subiect and perhaps racke the argument beyond his due pitch I will then tie my selfe only to the coniectures of the continuance or fall of estates omitting other causes as also all that may be referred to the iudgement of the heauens the influence of the stars and to their vertue sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof as I will spare to search too far into it Though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vaine and that those celestiall bodies moue not by chance but rather by diuine order and disposition Againe the errors of their Ephimerides and the different supputation of the first masters of their profession make the knowledge to be vncertaine and their so surely grounded maximes to afford contrarie resolutions Let vs not meddle then with the aspects of the stars or the natiuities of estates but regard and consider the effects of what is at our owne home without taking so high a flight We say then that estates suffer either by the vnremoueable ordinance of God or by the naturall course of time wherewith in time they grow feeble and change or else by the wils of men so vnstable and light as they ordinarily breede an vniuersall alteration thorow out a whole estate and common-weale We will only drawe our coniectures from naturall causes not to meddle with the iudgement of the diuine Maiesty or mans inconstancy nakedly and simply to speake of them as neere and familiar to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heauenly and most remote 2 So then we are to thinke that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning It is with them as with sensible creatures which the more they hasten to arriue at the perfection of their being the sooner also they faile and die the contrarie is seene in those which with a slow and measured pase attaine to a more faire maturity and perfection as for example among beastes the horse amongst trees the willow are of no long indurance but those that as the Hart and Oliue make by degrees and slowly towards their ripenes are likewise more lasting We may say the like of Empires and Estates for as we see them slow or swift in their increase so are they more swift or slow in their ruine Haue not the French more then once conquered the duchy of Milan and the kingdome of Naples and that as a man may say almost in a moment so haue they many times lost it and all in a moment such conquests resemble Torrents tumbling downe the mountaines which in lesse then an hour by reason of the great shoutes of waters they bring with them become fearefull and dangerous when soone after in an instant we see them fallen and shallow so as a childe may wade thorow them without trouble or danger Now not to leaue this conquest of Milan and Naples we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition which to performe I will set before you the manner how the Spaniards conquered and held these prouinces I finde it hath been by a long course of time and infinite trauaile accompanied with all the paines and troubles which those who set vp their rest vpon a conquest and resolue to abide out the wars ordinarily indure Hence their labour hath taken such roote as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands howsoeuer they haue been oft times galled and put to their plunges It is requisite then that Empires haue their rootes to sustaine them which must be deepe and sound otherwise it is impossible they should long continue Now that they may be such there is an especiall wisedome and many yeeres required 3 The true rootes of an estate are the loue of the people towards their Prince the sincere and holy distribution of Iustice amongst the subiects military discipline well policed and obserued by the souldiours honours rewards and benefits bestowed according to vertue and merit that great men be not slightly set by abased or contemned that the common sort of people be intertained with all honest satisfaction necessary prouisions for the maintenance of places of strength well husbanding of the treasure friendly intelligence with neighbour Princes vncorrupt election of officers modesty in their proceedings these are the very true rootes able to fortifie and make monarchies to flourish and raise them to eternity which rootes can neuer proue setled spring or send foorth worthy fruit vnlesse they be planted in the soile of wisdome aduice and industrie and husbanded by the continuance of time 4 It is often seene that great Conquests and victories attained without losse or labour so blinde the Conquerour as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good apparance but are inwardly hollow and of fraile substance They cause him to contemne his companions and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories but more the subdued people whence ordinarily followeth that the higher is his fortune the neerer is his fall Wee haue straied sufficiently It is now high time to returne to our principall discourse and as we haue heretofore made it appeare that there are three sorts of estates so wee are now to vnfold in what ranck of the three the Turke is to be bestowed CHAP. III. That the monarchy of the Turke is comprehended within the number of great estates 1 The substance of the ensuing Chapters 2 Greatnesse of the Turkish Empire 3 Compared with the Romaines 4 The marueilous successe thereof
inwarre 1 From the diuision of estates deliuered by vs in the former chapter this is to take his foundation and by these causes wee are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the other may vndergoe a change either outwardly or inwardly and in which rank of the three wee are to lodge the Turke Some one perhaps will iudge this question superfluous and vnprofitable seeing his renowne his conquests and his long rule doe but too much teach vs what he is notwithstanding all this I should not thinke it besides the purpose a little to particularize the causes of his greatnesse 2 The estate of the Turke is held without question to bee one of the greatest and mightiest as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth as of his power he is great because of so many Prouinces reduced to his obedience and though he haue not so great a share in Europe as the Romaines sometimes had he hath to counteruaile this more aduantaged himselfe in Asia and Africke for when the fortune of the Romaines was at the greatest and that they had their armes most at libertie yet went they not beyond Euphrates It is very true that Traian went farther but all the Prouinces he subdued were soone abandoned by Adrian his successor The Turke hath not done so for he hath extended his dominion as far as Tigris he possesseth all Mesopotamia or as they terme it Diarbecke From thence he reacheth as far as Balsera or the Gulfe of Persia which the Romans neuer saw and the Gulfe of Arabia And to say better all is his from the red sea to the Cittie Aden which is in the maine continent beyond the mouth of this sea more then an hundred and fiftie miles he hath also inlarged his dominions toward the South far beyond Aegypt In Africk all is his except three places of strength which the king of Spaine holdeth Pegnon de Veles Oran and Melila Mauritania also is his only three fortresses excepted which are Tanger Arsilla and Mazagan conquered by the Portugall when I name Africk I intend that country commonly termed Barbary and not Ethiopia 3 Hauing now seene the largenes of his dominions we are next to discourse of his meanes and power I finde that he hath better established the one and the other then the Romans euer did whē they were at their intirest greatnes because in such a most large compasse of his country there is no king or common weale beareth sway to distinguish his dominions which was otherwise with the Romanes who had many such wedged in within the continent of their Empire There is not any one of his subiects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth or the land he tilleth is his owne They acknowledge to hold all they haue of him he ordinarily intertaineth diuers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land So as it must needes be granted that he is greater in his estates meanes and power then euer were the Romans for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered as he can no waies vndergoe the troubles and wars which the Romans endured at the hands of Mithridate the Parthians Farnaces and others Moreouer next Europe the Gaules are not his enemies The Cymbrians are his associats so as he fostereth such a tranquillity and obedience on all sides as he amasseth inestimable treasure 4 And more a thing worth the noting in three hundred yeeres space since he began first to reigne he hath receiued but foure notable ouerthrowes that excepted which he receiued the yeere past neere Tauris But the Romaines in lesse time receiued more and greater at the only hands of the Carthaginians In sum there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories in so short a space or to haue triumphed of the captiuity or death of so many kings and great Princes as the great Turke or that haue with such happie successe and discipline so soone raised so mightie an Empire as his is at this day Is it not a fearfull matter to heare it related that Mahomet the second an infidel hath had such fauour of the heauens as to haue beene able in the space of 32. yeeres raigne to subdue two Empires vsurpe twelue kingdomes and take by force two hundred cities That which affordeth the greatest cause of wonder is that all this hath succeeded in the very time when the art of military engines fortifications were in their perfection and wherewith we might haue armed our selues to withstand him In conclusion what shal we say of Selim the first who in lesse then foure yeeres space vanquished the Mamelucks subdued all Syria Palestina the red sea a great part of Arabia and all Aegypt These are questionlesse goodly and notable Tropheys of the Turks greatnesse but most dishonorable and dangerous for all Christendome CHAP. IIII. Whether the Empire of the Turke draw towards an end 1 The Ottaman Empire leaneth toward ruine 2 The reasons are the bordering princes vpon the Turkes estate and their prouiding for their safety 3 Made wise by others harmes they stand vpon their defensiue war 4 They are bridled by strong fortresses 5 Contrary arguments 1 WE haue discoursed as briefely as might be of the fall and ruine of estates of their efficient causes and vpon what coniectures a man might gather them It is now time that we see and examine in like sort whether the empire of the Turke be nere his end and abatement of his greatnesse according as a man may draw from coniectures it leaneth towards his declining and though the foundation heereof be built vpon reasons so cleere and euident as they are not to be contraried yet will I alledge one that carrieth more apparence then all the other and that is that the greatnesse of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruine of Princes by him expelled vanquished and made away one after an other whilest he hath in the meane time triumphed of their estates and rich spoiles but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so fauourable issue as had the other his ambition heart and courage will grow idle and languish whence in time will spring the ruine of his Empire Is he not already come to that passe The Princes that confine vpon him though more weake then he to bid him battaile assaile or defend haue neuerthelesse so ordered their affaires and meanes as they are able at this day to sheeld themselues sufficiently from his attempts 2 Amongst others the King of Persia doth he not so ballance his power as he hath giuen him many great ouerthrowes and one lately as I haue said neere Tauris The Tartarians also hold him plaie and more prouoke him then he them and of late they got from him Caffa a strong and wealthy towne moreouer whilest he was busied about the wars of Persia the Georgians took and
other whereupon will those so mighty Princes of Germany and the Imperiall townes spend their reuenues and incomparable riches what occasion can all of them finde more goodly then this to attaine to an immortall glory It is then for the inlarging the kingdome of Christ that we must imploy all we haue and for the deliuerance of those sacred places ouer which those barbarous infidels tyrannize to redeeme so many thousand of poore Christian slaues which suffer and grone vnder the yoake of that inraged dogge to giue life to an infinite number of Christians to reuenge their wrongs to punish the iniurires blasphemies which that tyrant and his helhounds haue breathed out against the glory of God his holy name and church And if humaine appetite must needs be an actor in this theater it would be an easie matter for great Princes that send their forces to vrge this consideration in the capitulations that they should haue in fauour of their contributions part of the spoiles and conquests that they might happily obtaine Againe if the loue of the seruice of God had a working in them they might vndertake in person the Generall conduct of the army or command part of the confederat troupes Godfrey a poore Prince in comparison of those that now sway Christendome alienated the Duchy of Bouillion for so godly a voyage Stephen Count of Chartres did the like with his estate as did also many great men who had no other motiue thereunto then the enterprise of the holy land Charles the seuenth King of France did he not succor the Emperour of Constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him vnder the conduct of the greatest personages of his kingdome And must we sit idle with crossed armes whilest the cruell flames of this infidels tyranny burne and consume the houses of our neighbours CHAP. X. Wherein consist the greatest forces of the Turke 1 Whether the Ianizzars be the chiefe strength of the Turke 2 That horse are more necessary in the war then foote 3 The progresse of the Turke before and after the institution of the Ianissars 4 Victories gotten by the horse 5 Ouerthrowes giuen by the enemies horse to the Christians 6 Conclusion that horse in seruice excell foote IT seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the Turke attribute his chiefe strength to the band of Ianizzars as the only sinew of his power and amongst other reasons wherewith they striue to fortify their oppinion this is one It hath hapned many times that the army of the Ottomans hath beene so hardly laide to as the battaile hath been in a manner lost yet haue they gathered strength and kept themselues on foote yea they haue gotten the victory and all through the vertue and valour of these Legionaries 2 Machiauel discourseth vpon this point and as one much passionate holdeth himselfe to this argument that foote are more necessary then horse in all exploites of war and he laieth his principall foundation vpon the example of certaine Romaine Captaines which saith he to breake into and force the enemy on foote haue caused their men at armes to alight from their horses and fight on foote against them It is a poore argument and of small importance since that for once that they made their horsemen alight an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horse backe if they had the commodity of horse he which is on horsebacke may when he please alight but a footeman cannot get vp on horsebacke when hee will This mony shall serue to pay Machiauel whom I leaue to proceed forward I affirme that in a ranged battaile and in the plaine field the forces of the Turke consist and principally rely on the horse The proofes are cleere and at hand as the processe of this discourse shall discouer 3 First no man is ignorant of the great victories the Turk got long time before the institution of the Ianizzars Amurath the second the yeere 1420. was he that first ordained them yet Ottoman had before that taken Sebasta a city of importance in Asia where he slew aboue an hundred thousand of his enemies Orcan his sonne had dispoiled the Emperour of Constantinople and of Bithinia at seuerall worthy incounters Amurath the first had passed Asia into Europe with his forces tooke Gallipoli Filipoli and Andrinople and we may thinke that he did not obtaine those victories without dangerous and bloudy incounters he conquered also diuers other cities and wan many other victories of the Princes of Seruia and Bulgaria whom he compelled to stoope vnder the yoake of his obedience Baiazet the first ouercame Sigismonde King of Bohemia and put all those French to the sword which Charles the 6. of France sent to his succour Calepin his sonne vnderstanding that Sigismond had raised an army vpon the newes of the ouerthrow giuen by Tamburlaine to Baiazet to salue his losses went to meete him at Salumbezza and so valiantly incountred him as his whole army was cut in peeces so as it cannot be said that the victories the Turke hath obtained since the institution of Ianizzars haue beene either greater or more memorable then the former rather they were the steps to these other happy atchieuements The beginning of things containe in them the efficient vertue of the whole This disputation might proue great and might ballance on either side if I did not ad waight to one of the opinions I will then say that before the institution and seminary of Ianizzars the Turks receiued but one memorable ouerthrow at mount Stella at the hands of Tamburlan the most strong enemy that euer they assaied and that after their institution they receiued more and greater as were those of Vsumcassan of Iohn Huniades of Mathew Coruin of the Mamelucks of the great Scanderbag of Don Iohn of Austria of the Kings of Persia and others 4 The second proofe which I will produce to fortifie the truth of my proposition is that all such as haue had the better hand of the Turkes euer had it by the meanes of their horse wherein they did exceed the enemy in number and strength as we haue so often saide of the Persians and of the Mamelucks The great Sophi â—â—mael had he not vanquished Selim the second with the strength of his horse if when he did set vpon the rier-ward where the Turke was in person the thunder of his Cannon had not so affrighted the horse as they ran away with their masters to the disordering of the whole armie The onely thing that ouerthrew the fortune which the Persian had almost alreadie in his possession Cudabeuda King of Persia hath many times ouercome the Turkish forces by the onely strength of his horse whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other The Hungarians in like sort haue many times put the Turkes to the woorse by their fight on horsebacke 5 The third and strongest proofe of my assertion is
long since Zacharias Patriarcke of Constantinople was like to be staked for hauing admitted the new Callender and the reformation of the course of the yeere made in the time of Gregorie the 13. 2 Now to returne to the principall point it is to be presupposed that the proiects and carriage of popular rebellions cannot be vndertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth meanes and authority in the country which we would surprise and that Princes will not bouge to set a foote these plots and enterprises but by offered occasion of some fortresse which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate and may serue for a refuge to recouer their decaied strength or else that their destigne relieth vpon some promised succour or finally vpon the consideration that those who inuite them to this conquest are so strong within themselues as they may hope for an honorable issue of their enterprise 3 These are all necessary particularities but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the Greekes abased by extreame seruitude and so far from hauing any fortresse at their deuotion as they cannot once stir without being discouered and though they were disposed to vndertake they haue at their backe so great a number of men at arms as at the least breath of a rebellion they would cut them off before they should haue meanes once to peepe forth of their shels 4 The Turke againe maketh them sure to him so many waies though all barbarous and vnciuill as he scarcely alloweth his subiects leaue to draw their breath nor suffreth his mighty men once to hold vp their heades or forraine Princes to be able in due time to attempt ought against him The end of the second Booke THE THIRD BOOKE CHAP. I. The causes of the fall and ruine of estates 1 Estates are subiect to change 2 Some of longer some of lesse continuance 3 Great small and meane estates and their causes of ruine externall internall and mixt 4 Lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes 5 The great by internall 6 The meane more durable yet subiect to alteration 1 THe order that nature obserueth in all things created doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoeuer is borne passeth and hastneth towards death and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end This proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies Hence we drawe this construction that estates change monarchies faile and the ruine of one serueth as the raising to the other 2 Againe as of humaine bodies some are more strong vigorous and of a better composition then others and so are of longer continuance so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates in as much as some preserue themselues longer either because by their nature they are more surely founded as for example the Signory of Nobles is more lasting then the popular estate and a Monarchal estate more then a common-weale because a Monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her or is policed with better lawes or because of the situation which is naturally more strong then the other as we see at this day in the Signorie of Venice 3 But because this assertion is subiect to diuers obiectiōs we will diuide it only into two propositions First then of principalities some are small some great some indifferent either in regard of their subsistance or first essence or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours Secondly the efficient causes of the vtter ruine of estates are either inward or outward or mixt The inward are to be fetched and conceiued in respect of the negligence ignorance and riot of Princes which giue themselues ouer to all voluptuousnesse whereto may be added the factions secret practises ambitions and desperate humors of subiects with sundrie other occasions all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine The outwad causes are the stratagemes armes and force of the enemie The mixt are such as participate of both as are the rebellions of the people treasons of particular men put in execution by forraine ayd and force Since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three causes we are now to vnfold what maladies may infect as well great and indifferent as small estates and draw all within the compasse of inward outward and mixt causes Now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age or by the violence of some not forseene cause 4 Returning then to our former diuision and well examining it wee shall finde that small Estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes brought in by force and violence then otherwise In as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts they are at the first incounter ouerset with the storm of his conquests in this maner the seueral Signories of Lombardy fel in subiection either of the Duke of Milan or of the Venetiās the free cities of Thoscany became a pray to the Duke of Florence The Princes of Africke to the King of Fez-Marocco and Algiers 5 On the contrarie great Empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes either by ease plenty which customarily makes Princes to swell with insupportable pride by voluptuous riot whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone or else by insolency and presumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselues much followed and reuerenced all fit inticements to dispose a hart but indifferently generous to plot for his owne raising Nec quenquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem Pompeiusue parem Then is it as one saith that Caesar cannot brooke a superior and that Pompey stomaketh an equall 6 Meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two former yet far lesse since they hold the meane as the other the extreams for they are not so vnfurnished of strength as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty or else abandon themselues immoderatly to delights pleasures or to transport themselues beyond the limits of reason This is it that so long preserued the common weales of Sparta of Venice which euermore respectiuely intertained a meane and equality The mixt causes of the ruine of Estates are inward treacheries and outward force Treason hatched within an Estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane Empire For a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon euery corner of his Kingdome and sturring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity the nourse of vices in all Estates and gouernments or with the opinion