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A57691 The bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, A vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our Solemne League and Covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of The grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate Presbyterians. Rous, Francis, 1579-1659. 1649 (1649) Wing R2013; ESTC R15008 51,239 74

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supreame Command we of the People may not obey any but the Husband or the King why then did the Presbyterian party for so many years oppose and not totally submit to their now supposed Husband Why did they Commissionate so many thousand Men who by accidents of Warre had the power though not the chance to kill him Nay in the Parliaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them that it was he the Husband that would have killed them the supposed Wife for which reason the Kirke of Scotland long ago sent him a bill of Divorce unlesse he satisfied for the blood of three Kingdoms Which of the two parties it was that at last killed him belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more if he will further argue it then dim n●tio and obtruncatio capitis doe for they who after a long Warre and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that regall power here so much argued for did according to the terme of the civill Law diminuere caput Regis and they who in consequence of his civill Death tooke away his naturall life did obtrune are Caput Regis If he had been kill'd in an action of Warre before should the Souldier or he who gave the Souldier commission have answered for his life As for the submission of a Wife to a stranger as to her Husband which is indeed a sin I earnestly pray the Author seriously to consider whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin ever since this Kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an usurping king if this his way of arguing be true As for the second Demurrer I consider he hath given account to another very worthy Pen which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field however I shall see what hath escaped his hand that the world may witnesse at last that truth hath lovers as well as errour and passion have Cham ions This Author and the grand case of Conscience begin with St. Paul Ro. 13. That wee must submit to higher powers not that wee may lawfully submit and that not for wrath onely but for Conscience sake which is of things necessary not of things lawfull Wherefore say they it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things obedience as a matter of Conscience being a thing necessary I grant it either in lawfull or necessary things when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole Sepremacy of power in themselves If I hold this lawfull and he hold it necessary we are not contrary He onely makes what I allow more allowable But the reason wherefore the Apostle requires obedience to such Not onely for wrath which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreàme have to destroy us but for Conscience sake is least by our resisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw calamity on others and likewise in regard of their Authority from God Tyrants even in title not arriving to the great Dominions of the Earth without Gods secret order God having clearly stated the Government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife Prerogative he not being known or feared any way so much as by Dominio n which made St. Augus in C. Dei rightly say Potestates omnes sunt a Deo non omnes voluntates so that the reason wherefore God permits sometimes such Princes to attaine to these powers is the same wherefore he permits Devils in his Government of the world a Nimrod or a Pharaoh a Caesar or a Herod an Antichrist or a Turke who as bad and as usurping as they are and seeme to us in exercising so severe though so secret a part of Gods Justice yet fulfill severall prophecies which shewes they come not to what they are meerely by humane contrivance by chance or accident The grand case of Conscience P. 3. distinguisheth betwixt Authority or Power and Rulers deputed to the exercise of that Authority The first is by Gods positive Ordinance the other bu● by his permission Here he grants enough as to our case which is of obedience for if he can assure me that it is consonant to Gods permissive will that such persons be my Magistrates I am well satisfied then that Gods will is I must be their Subject Gods free admission of one being the necessary exclusion of all the rest so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice but of my necessity But the Demurrer P. 3 would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers and unlawfull powers if obedience be necessary to both I answer If the powers here supposed by him agree equally in their supremacy and absolutenesse and differ onely as one is got lawfully the other unlawfully then the difference of our obedience to either is onely in the difference of things commanded as they are either lawfull or unlawfull neither can the Author now arguing so much for a lawfull power conscienciously tell us that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlawfull and worse to us of the People then if we were under the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things The knot of this point lies here Whither a civill circumstance such as is the Magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull can vitiate an Act of morall duty I believe his distinction P. 2 of a Government constituted or constituting serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe For I hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin though with rooting or without rooting Not but that God and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary Almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression the receipt whereof they do not justify the Title of such Estates much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull Title of a supreame Magistrate from whose care we receive necessary protection I say much lesse because cases of Estates are juris privati and have Courts to judge of them but the other is so much juris publici that there is no mortall Court to judge of it for which reason how will these Authors what Governours soever they desire evidently prove that they originally had lawfull Titles or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves but that the people voluntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in Nimrods Case From whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of Conscience p. 3. That if he had that desired Governour yet according to himselfe he would not owne him long because he were not sure
THE Bounds bonds OF Publique Obedience OR A Vindication of our lawfull submission to the present Government or to a government supposed unlawfull but commanding lawfull things Likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne League and Covenant In all which a Reply is made to the three Answers of the two Demurrers and to the Author of the grand Case of Conscience who professe themselves impassionate Presbyterians London printed for Iohn Wright at the Kings Head in the Old-Bayley 1649 THE Bounds and Bonds OF publique obedience OR A vindication of our lawfull submission to the present Government or to a Government supposed unlawfull but commanding lawfull things I know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to passe that in the disquisition of a truth though a simple uniforme thing yet the contests about it are usually infinite and it is as difficult a thing to disincumber it feom errours as it is a good field from weeds and brambles which when the country man hath burnt to ashes and thinks he hath quite destroyed the next yeare to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous then before Surely our unhappinesse in the E●adication of civill errours is that we speake more to the affections then to the Iudgement and therefore offer passion in stead of reason or make one but the counterfeit of the other or else not affecting one anothers persons we fling headily into opposite paths or principles in which not treading together at first we cannot possibly meet together at last and in this aberration we loose both truth and our selves Thus we finde it in these three severall answers to the first Treatise in which and the unhappilier to give foundation to practicable errors they at the very entry of the controversie mistake principles in jure publico in the riginall of Magistracy and Government in the nature of possession prescription right of extream necessity of assertory promissory Oaths c. things which were otherwaies stated and proved in that discourse to which they have bin referred I should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers that they do suponere quodlibet ut Probetur quidlibet were it not but that I see them so Majesterially peremptory to prescribe to others and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man man that I finde one of them give such a losse to his passion that it carries him into direct Blasphemy advising that a Committee might treat with God yea sentence the blessed Trinity Lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attaine publique desolation they will not allow toothers wherefore as the subtilties of the vop●●rs are so fine and delicate that they passe upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we heare them over our heads formd into Thunder Lightning and Tempests even so the fumes of these private mens Passions passe so subtilly through their soft words that if we who converse with them be not maturely advisd of them their insinuation will draw us into fire and flame into blood and desolation into the Calamities of a war which perhaps may end as distantly from our and their now Covenant intentions as the two former have already done The Question which was first asserted stands still unshaken and almost untoucht and in all th●se answers it is evidently granted That we of the people may lawfully give obedience to an unlawfull power this onely is denied That it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right which is very uncasuistly and unconscientiously inserted here because that is not the Peoples present case but the Governours these onely asserting that contenting themselves with simple obedience from us The first Argument of the first Demurrer is formed against the incapacity of the persons governing and it runs thus Ob. That which is now termed a Parliament is neither formally materially nor effectually a Parliament such as is requisite for this Kingdom either according to the mind of God or the necessities of the State First because the change which is made in it is not made by those who first constituted it unlesse it be by conquest The modern modell containes not the whole nor the major part of the peoplee Secondly the alteration is made by the Commons only the Nobility as illustrior pars populi appeared not in it Ans. Though this Argument with the rest relates more to the Commanders then to the obeyers of whom our controversie onely is and that we of the People have a right to do lawfull things though there were no Magistrate lawfull or unlawful to oversee us yet I shall not stop at these advantages but oppose to the main of this Argument the main of our Creation and conservation For we have nothing else to doe in the world but to praise God and love our neighbour The circumstance of the Magistrate is onely to be an encouragement of this and to see that it be done with security and if he doe this whatever he be we are beholding to him and should praise God for him and then why not obey him Though this were granted That one Magistrate was unjustly ejected by another and one government by another yet that relates onely to those who co-operated in it whilst it was doing How can such a supposed guilt in them be in any part continued upon and ascribed to us of the low ranke of the people or now especially that we come into it after it is done and after we are under the full possession of a present Power People by the effects of it sustaine punishment enough if they lose a good Magistracy must they likewise be punisht because it is lost though they were no con-cause of it The Authour of the Grand Case of Conscience p. 10. infers Yes and therefore makes our new commotions necessary because we can do nothing just in a State where through the defect of a legal Magistracy we can have no justice yea though the things we do be in themselves just For quoth he judgement is then onely just when it is exercised by the higher Powers the legall Magistracy of that Kingdome where it is acted I answer things are considerable onely so far as they may reach the ends for which they are The end of every Magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated Iusto enim non ponitur lex The end of justice is to be a measure of equity that is of equality Justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive But neither of these relate so essentially to the legall Magistrate that nothing may be done truly and conscienciously just without he co-operate in it As for commutative equality if Titius lend Sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity which bushels have the publique mark upon them and Sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality but that
there wants the former mark or that the said bushels have another mark will you say Sempronius hath not intrinsically done Titius justice or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity especially if in the mean time no more of that former marke can be had As for distributive justice we know that St. Paul advised the Corinthians to avoyd the Iegall Magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that Countrey and rather to end things by arbitrement among themselves which had been an advice unjust and to the scandall of Christianity if things in themselves just might not be done but by the justice of the legall Magistrate This therefore is but according to an old Axiome of justice Provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis Thus much I have thought fit to answer in generall to this objection but now more particularly I answer to its terms And first why is not this effectually a Parliament seeing it is the Supream present power of the whole Nation no part excluded which in this controversie is the very term of the question I hope he means no Criticisme by the word Parliament if he doth it signifies onely a publique speaking or consulting together for the Publique Moreover the Authour would be I am sure much perplext if I should aske him how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a Parliament or supreame Power requisite for this Kingdome according to the mind of God He must pardon us if we thinke formes no more then persons are to last here alwaies or that the changes which have been and still are to be of both must never be done but according to the customary formalities of a quiet people but rather according to the extreame necessity of a State For if he aske me what it is that forms in-organizd people into a Government of what sort soever I answer Necessity If what makes or takes away a Law in a Government established I answer Necessity If what takes away a Government it selfe I answer according to himselfe page 2. that which first gave it being viz. Necessity Of which there are severall degrees for in a peaceable State a word may take away that which in a disturbd State must be taken away by the Sword after which it is but equall that he who gives the last blow should in that quarrell give the last word and leave us to a peremptory obedience unlesse we would have no quarter in the world or be like the old servati in bello who were sold confind to chains all their lives or condemnd to dig perpetually in Mynes All which it seems this Authour would have the conclusion of this argument or else we are more beholding to the charity of enemies then to his If we will not be perswaded by the States arguments yet let us hear what Grotius among others determined long agoe for all the world in this case If a King have but part of a supream power which consists in making and taking away Lawes in laying universall Taxes and the People or Senate have the other the King may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his because for so much he hath no right nor power This is to hold although such a King have the Militia alone for that in his hand relates onely to forraigne warre it being unconceivable how they who share in supreame Rights can be exempt from a right of defending them When war shall happen betwixt such Fundamentall and Supreame parties the King may loose all his share by the right of War Lib. 1. c. 4. 13. de Jubel pa. Which Right of Warre betwixt those who divide a whole Kingdome if it end clearly to the Reduction of one party is not called so properly conquest as victory This Authour uses the name of the first onely for the hatred every one bears to it because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole Whereas victory relates onely to a part of either as beginning and ending in Civill Warres where disputes of Right arise betwixt those of the same Jurisdiction and Country and of the same Common Law But we have Arguments more Authentique then these to shew that such changes may be according to the mind of God and the Demurrer all his life will never prove the contrary Dan. 4.31 32. Gods power is an everlasting power and his Kingdome is from heneracion to generation All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing and according to his will he worketh in the army of Heaven and in the inhabitants of the earth and none can stay his hand nor say unto him what dost thou That is God as Universall Lord and King of Kings governes both Angels men and Divels and all must submit to him because of his supreame irresistibility Psalm 75.7 God is the Iudge he maketh low and he maketh high It must be confest that by him Princes raigne but our Authour had rather perpetually imbroile our bodies and soules then clearly say by whom it is that Princes cease to reign For then this Controversie would easily he reconc●l'd and we as easily one to another Wee have shewn how the reason of Constituting and of changing Governments is still one and the same viz. Supreame Necessity But the Demurrer objects that our change hath not beene done by the same order of persons who were in the old viz. By major part of Lords and major part of the Commons Although he is againe besides the state of the Question shewing onely how they who are the Supream Power of the Land ought not to command us rather then that we may not obey them in lawfull things yet I shall here make another sort of reply which will be very short to those who profess themselves Presbyterians that is originally Parliamentarians Kingdoms which are Supream in themselves and communicate not in one anothers Lawes are all of them Iure Gentium in a state of War unless they be mutually bound by Leagues to the contrary which Leagues if they come to be broken usually have the conditions of Invasion annexed and the time and places nominated for beginning it and because there is nothing any longer due by Law or League from the party injured where now the Sword is onely to end the Controversie therefore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring rightly changes all Titles in Iure publico and in the right of governing what is acquired but in one and the same Kingdome where the Supremacie of Power and Right lies divided as Grotius page 7. states it there if they differ fundamentally denying one anothers Rights and Powers they are then immediately in the same state of War with those other separate Kingdoms here onely is the difference that these in their Concurrence and Constitution making but one have none of those ordinary Cautions as Leagues have for their Right of invading one another
by the way of war a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them then that in the marriage of two persons a Lawyer should come after the Minister hath conjoyn'd them and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to Divorce and after their Divorce what kinde of marriages they should make next Even so war is suppos'd in that case as well as Divorce in this But because War begins there where Law ends and reciprocally and hath nothing but necessity for its equity and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen nor where security may at the end of all be presum'd off therefore there neither is nor ever was any fixt rule in any Countrey what people should be bound to do at the end of a a VVar. I hope the Presbyterians neither of England nor Scotland intend to deny what all the world knowes that they concluded the King under the necessity of VVar as well as others who conjoyned with them and having stated his case there they of the Kirke long agoe frankly declared that he not satisfying for the blood of three Kingdoms was not to touch the Scepter any more but as Mr. Hinderson applyed in his Newcastle Conference the 4th of Hester 14. That if his Majesty reforme not according to their way he and no lesse then his Fathes House were to perish by which what could hee and they understand lesse then change of Government a thing why now so horrid for the other party to think on seeing they gave first intimation of it They joyntly declared that the King was not to judge any thing for himselfe nor upon what tearms his readmittance to simple liberty could stand with their security for his VVar when it ended as they said who imprisoned him continued the same necessity upon them which made them take Armes at the beginning Therefore they themselves concluded that nothing could be changed in the Kings concernment according to the old forme and constitution of the Kingdom which relates to a time of Peace and not to a time of War But the Nobility whom he here stiles illustrior pars populi concurred not to this change therefore it is formally and fundamentally unlawfull In the first place I understand not and I beleeve the Lords doe as little what he meanes by putting them into such improper Latine For they alwaies understand themselves to be rather of the two Comites Regis then partem populi and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the Kingdome form'd to themselves a separated House a Jurisdiction over the people lay as a Barre betwixt the King and them whether that power of their's had any congruity with the other supreame and Legislative rights of the people or no is not now the question but rather this Whether according to their mutuall engagements their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the House of Commons or no This is by them affirmed and the state of Venice as profound Platonists deny the other for otherwise Noble men would be as difficulty reformed as Kings and therefore they rarely conferre illustrious Titles of Nobility on any but those who are in illustrious Offices things separable from persons by which meanes all Offices with them are questionable But to return that which according to themselves thus excluded the King by the same Logicke excluded the Lords and if they either directly or indirectly concurred to the ruine of the rest of the Kingdome then the argument runs strong that the House of Commons were bound to preserve it and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under God to them But because I will suppose nothing here the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other Wherefore if any will aske whether there was not a Warre undertaken last yeare very eminently dangerous to the whole Parliament and their Party the Army and Country Committees and that by the contrivance of the Royall Party here the Scots Nation in the North Ormond in Ireland it will be past denying Likewise whether the House of Lords in that extremity declared with the Commons that the Scots were Enemies to the Kingdome or upon the first or second request gave their Concurrence for Counties to arme themselves for their defence The ●oyce of all parties must needs say no So that that House undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the Parliament as they did who were actually in Armes against their party every where And how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them and to their securities who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessities As for the exclusion of some Members of the house of Commons I hope the sincere Presbyterians wonder not at that act because the Kirk and State of Scotland was preserved by such an act last year and by the concourrence of the same meanes which did this here Yea though they who from thence invaded our Nation declared as much for the Covenant and Presbytery as the Kirke it selfe save only that the Kirke had the good luck to speake the last word They who sit at top in the State are tanquam in nubibus to the eyes of us of the People Wee know not how they manage their Counsels nor contrive their tran●actions that is best determined by and amongst themselves It is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act and be persons who enter by vertue of free Election and s●t in the legall place For in a case where five are chosen to a businesses and that any three of them are to be of the Qu●rum though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained yet what the other three doe is to all intents and purposes valid which is the present case By this Gentlemans favour we have an Axiome of Law which saith that in Partner-ship or Society as the Civill Law calls it when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equall contribution either of Art or Mony then Potior est conditio negantis nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the negatives though fewer in number which was the Parliaments case when after the equall provocations of a Prince by Warre and imprisonment some of the same House thought he might have been securely readmitted into the Government again and others thought it evidently dangerous In this case the difference was as it were legall betwixt the Members but not to be decided any way but by force there being no other Tribunall to judge them and their house might not judge of it because there they were parties and judges a thing allowed no where and if otherwise then the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure But what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place seemes not out of form to us of the people
which was the case of the House of Lords when most of them many of the Commons at the beginning of the first War fled to the King under pretence of force from Westm. Yea when the five members were forc't from sitting yet the rest of the House sat and acted without them and voted a Committee Ian. 5. To sit in London and there to take into consideration the breach of Priviledges the safety of the King and Kingdome and preservation of Ireland which was accordingly done by vertue of those Votes made when Members were thus forct away All our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawfull or unlawfull in themselves As for the will of the Major part of the people how will the Demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present Power then seeke to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another War They usually looke after nothing but their Rents Markets and reasonable subsistances they are the luxurious and ambitious part onely which pretends to new troubles The peoples question thereof is not how the change was made but an sit whether it be so changed or noe For if according to its formality that be not rightly done it concerneth not their consciences no more then the Thunder or lightning over their heads doth which are things totally out of their power much lesse may they lawfully desolate Neighbours for them But he hath found one firme Axiome That when part of any thing is cut off the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma cessat formatum ergo the late force on the Parliament hath made this no Parliament I wish he had taken the paines to give either a distinction or an instance in his Axiome or have drawn up his inference into a Syllogisme for I feare we shall finde wide impertinence in the first and a grosse non sequitur in the last as he hath ordered it The question disputed here is not whither the denominated Parliament now sitting at Westminster be a Parliament according to the old forme and composure of Parliament or no but whither tht Parliament now sitting at Westminster be the supreame power of the Kingdome or no and to be obeyed in lawfull things His Argument runs thus The surpeme power of the Kingdome consists in a Parliament of King Lords and Commons But at Westminster there is not a Parliament consisting of King Lords and Commons Ergo at Westminster there is no true Parliament at all nam dum cessat forma cessat formatum I thought he had been so good a Logician as to have understood that the conclusion of his Syllogisme ought to have been contradictory to the question from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five which is very true but how is it any thing to the purpose However I will doe him the favour to deny his Major For we speake of powers which now are and he himselfe hath all along condoled the e●ection of the King and of house of Lords as things which are not Sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones so consequently they who are now nothing make nothing now at Westminster or anywhere else But doth it follow however that there can not be now any supream power at Westminster at all If he had proved this he had proved something But pe●●aps the very word Parliament poses him or else he would thereby impose on others I must confesse words are dangerous when they are not fully explained and possibly the King mistook himselfe very much upon the very Alphabet and word of his Title supposing he could not be named King unlesse he were ab●olute as he observed other Kings were whereas by our constitution he was but one of three who concurred to the making and abrogating a Law and it belong'd to the Commons alone to lay an universall taxe so that he was in most things rather Prince by office then King by power in tanto non in toto Even so the word Parliament as it hath been popularly understood signifies the assembly of severall houses deliberating and concluding what was judged for the good of the publique But it is a contradiction to say a Parliament cannot at all be truly so called unles so understood we know there are eight Parliaments in France which are not of such a constitution though of the same Denomination And if severall persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the publique good of the people sit now at Westminster and that the other concurrent powers be civily dead why may not we congruously enough still call them a Parliament His axiome therefore serves onely against himselfe and the true English of dum cessat form● cessat formatum is this That seeing the old forme of this state as it was in the supremacy of Kings Lords and Commons hath in that relation ceased to be and is civilly dead not being able any longer to act any thing and that a civill body as well a naturall cannot live without a head one day it followes then by this position that the Regall Government is gone and that we are in the state of a Republique no other power now informing or actuating us besides that which pretends to such a state and where I pray you is that to be found now but at Westminster In the next place he offers a case If the King when hee came to accuse the five Members had detained all but forty and the Speaker and had forc't them to Vote that the whole Legislative power resided in himselfe would we have deemed this a valid Vote Especially seeing some Votes since this Session were adjudged Null because the House was under a force By which it seemes quoth he that with some new veritas non est perpetua and Duo dum faciunt idem non estidem To the first I answer positively That such a Vote attained by the King had beene no wayes duely valid But what is this to the purpose For the question should have beene after the King had detained such a Vote and had got us all into his full possession whether we of the people might have obey'd him ever after in lawfull things Secondly if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel to the late exclusion of the Members he prevaricates grosly againe For he supposes the very forty in the House with the King to have been under a force whereas in the Parliaments late case none but those who were out of the House were under restraint the former were supposed to be forc't to a particular Vote the latter were kept from Voting at all Besides they who de facto Voted in the House have publiquely declared that they past their Votes with all wonted freedome and were rescued as it were from an overawing power which concludes against his Argument abundantly As in this Argument he hath done
to have in him a supreame power such as the Apostle Ro. 13. in his sence understands necessary for the Kingdome of England But in our sence of plenary possession which was the case of the Apostles time we can easily see first how our present power is the higher the whole Kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate Magistracy from them and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the same Apostle and to the duty of our Creation and being in this world The case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a Government may be altered but it must be done still by the higher powers whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered as to a continued for me But it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low and exact obedience as to the legall authority I thought that he who in his sence understood the Covenant in terminis Eternall would not have allowed a change of Government here no more then he might allow the Scots though upon never so much reason to themselves to change their Doctrine or discipline because we swore during all our lives to preserve that which was established among them at the time of our swearing But I now see we may well distinguish betwixt the Covenant it selfe and some Covenanters the Covenant being as open for one change as for the other Secondly If a Government though never so reasonably reformed or altered be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed termes which he did ill to leave out of his Argument unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers then farewell all the old consequences of Solis populi suprema lex and the Presbyterians form● Armes are unjustifiable How corrupt and Tyrannicall are most of the Governments of the world and yet how many of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves or diminish any thing in themselves to alter for the better although the taking away of something in a Government may be as necessary as continuing any old or new thing in it Certainly these Authors have read but few of Ionases who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a Tempest Thirdly Our Alteration was made by the present supreame power of the people and the reason wherefore both Houses laid the exercise of Regall power aside for some yeares made the Commons as they have agrued it lay it aside for altogether viz. Salus populi suprema lex The laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people that it might be laid aside for more yeares and that one King might be laid aside as well as another For to us it seemes effectually all one Non esse non operari for a thing not to be at all and in this world to doe nothing at all If they sinned who did this is that any thing to any but themselves It is an Axiome of good Law Noxa sequitur caput Thus whilst his Argument should have been against our lawfull obedience it is against their exacting it as to the legall authority which yet is grosly false for they exact it not as to the old legall authority but as to the present supreame power of the people Non nomine Regis sed nominepopuli And yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall Authority because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before and continued in life by them as our lives themselves are Case of Cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obeying those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power is fit onely to destroy States for then should none Governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up I conceive according to what is already proved that nothing can befound either more consonant to Christian charity or to the preservation of States then this our principle of obedience besides he knowes no Kingdome in the world where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession Allegiance alwayes relating to protection And if according to his consequence we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that Per●on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact because according to these Authors intermediate intrusions are violations of rights and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull then I pray you of what can we resolve lesse then certainly to extirpate one another which will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully must we resolve of doing all unlawfull things by warre our selves and desert unnecessarily the cares of Wife and Children of Church and Neighbour For non-obedience in a State is but a Chimaera neutrality a State without relation there is no subsistence for it in any State and unlesse you will allow me to concurre with others and under others in lawfull things I must leave the world my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction The two Demurrers p. 3. p. 7. Except against this our present obedience beeause the present powers is yet new neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery Philosophers hold that the Definition of a man belongs to an infant as well as to one of many yeares Because after the Organization of the parts he is informed with the same principle of life and reason as a growne man is and having the same forme is the same thing Even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this Kingdome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection which are the soule of a State and the power which preceded this what did it infuse more vitall then this And now that that is taken away if this other did not presently enter into its place the Common-wealth were dead and each man were left in his naturals to subsist of himselfe and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre defend himselfe from all the rest of the world every man in this State having an equall right to every thing Wherefore let every man especially they who would informe consciences take heed of affecting popular revenge vvhich must also reach themselves at last for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull actions vvhat can they th●n commit but the un'avvfull Into what an unhappy transport are we fallen that such a principle should be derived from our Church the very Papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull though the State seemed to them unlawfull These will judge better of the State now then of the Church the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things the other deterring us from them But to return to the Argument I
of Cons. answers obliquely still That notwithstaning such authority can never illegally get the legall p●wer nor can it exclude others from their authority In which answer he plainely contradicts himself p. 7. For Caesars power was according to himselfe legall and yet got by a Circumstance very illegall the Senate being empty and intimidated and not so much in their own as in his power This argument is so farre from concerning us that it is directed onely against those Princes who ab origin drive from illegall acquisitions Of which he will doe well to speake largelyer when he can assure my conscience by infallible evidence of right that I may safely sweare or destroy men upon it that there was ever such a man in England as William the Conquerour or any other ancient King from whom Titles are said to be derived either legally or illegally This is a proposition which I beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off no more then I now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the Kingdom is for which reason they assert their Authority and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indubitable right ab origine But because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right Title none are so blind as the people who among other burthens have the imposition of other mens judgements cast upon them therefore an usurped Title to them is true enough to exact obedience Hence the grand case of Cons. answers p. 10. That then by the rule of contraries it followes That when titles are visibly unlawfull people are disengaged from obedience to them To this I reply that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it the very question being this conclusion viz. Whether obedience be lawfull to Titles visibly unlawfull Secondly It hath been shown that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible every man in a state stands in a Relation and must either command or obey and owes something to him by whose care he● sleepes quietly in his Bed Thirdly If by disengagement from obeying a lawfull Title he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no then though disengag'd wee ma● obey These answers helpe us halfe way over the next dificulty We may not any way affirme the right of the Vsurper or deny interpretatively the just title of the Heire without the guilt of treachery lying and falsenesse if not of vow-breaking In suffering a Theife to take my purse I cannot helpe it If I must part with that or my life I chuse to loose my Purse not for feare least I breake the fifth or eight Commandement but least I breake the sixt in being guilty of selfe murther yet rather then say he hath authority to take it I must loose my life In point of protection among theeves I may desire some to preserve mee from others yet may I not say their robbery is just or joyne or ply with them in robbing others To say no more of the certaine evidence and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall Titles which is here the maine of the Argument I answer that simple obedience to an establisht Vsurper doth not alwaies interpretatively affirme his right or deny anothers but affirmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power God is the supream magistrate of al the world and by reason of his Omnipotent presence every where we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of or right to any of our Actions but our earthly Magistrates may fall into such circumstances that they may have neither personall or virtuall presence with us and therefore may be said to be civilly dead according to the former Axiome Idem est non esse non operari to doe nothing and be nothing is to us the same thing motion being the chiefe evidence of life In his case of the Thiefe I desire any man to consider whether as he hath put it he hath not clearely broken one Commandement besides those which he hath named viz. the third because it is an untruth to say the Parliament requires not obedience from any of us unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their authority which is the second false supposition here When Officers gather Taxes for the State they have no commission to demand our Declarations of the States authority first but onely to receive the money Taxed which this Author knowes is a truth knowne to every one As for the peoples conjoyning and complying with the State to Robbe another by obeying to the prejudice of another he must meane it in a Robbery either of power or of Riches For power the people aime not at it their condition alwaies is l●rge who ever sits at top And for getting by the warre I hope the Presbyterian party which had the authorizing of Taxes as well as others knowes as well as the people themselves that this is a grosse prevarication Last of all there is difference betwixt willing compliance and necessary subjectiion which is the peoples case He objects againe p. 6. If obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery Here he is started suddainly into two other questions First how a Title may be recovered and secondly How we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any Titles These two relate to the future which is of Gods secret disposing our question is of the present only But I pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous What are the people of France or the people of Spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two Kings Or what was the world better for Alexanders Conquering it The Houses which are burnt and the millions of bodies left dead in the field are the peoples and Princes scorning to derive from them still trample them to dung We talke of some Titles wronged as if their rights were so certaine and so necessary to live under as God almighties is who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe Officers and not we Who is it then that can right wronged Titles but he alone who makes all Titles right To that case where it is argued that if the Masters mate had throwne him over-board and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himselfe if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it It is answered by the Grand Case of Cons. p. 9 That the case should not have been of a Mate as a partner which is false but of a party of the Seamen who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment especially
a supreame law there But at that time the supreamest humane law which according to these gentlemens opinions was ever made in England or Scotland or perhaps in all the world was made without the King in those Kingdomes and against his dissent For which reason the Covenant engages not so positively for King or Kingly Government as for the Vnion of the Covenanters in any forme and against any opposition Whereupon the Presbyterians when it was as most conceiv'd in their power to restablish King or Kingly Gove●nment they omitted both for many dayes of their lives without question because they conceiv'd it not a Government absolutely necessary by Covenant When D. Hamilton entred England so hostilely for that end and as he thought by vertue of Covenant yet he was excommunicated for it by the Oracles of the Covenant Lastly The reigne of the Covenant since the first day of its birth and obligation was never yet a R●gall reigne no not for one day anywhere so that the change which is is not determinatly contrary to that principle out of which according to the circumstances of security any Government may be moulded for any place For which reason if I should grant you that the Covenant were not expir'd and had not beene so palpably broken as it was betwixt the Nations yet Scotland if they had pleas'd might have beene Govern'd by a King and England by a free State yet both consonantly enough to Covenant and without any contrariety because the circumstances of securitie in one might have been different from the circumstances of security in the other which though different might as well have been mutually maintained as their discipline differing from ours might have beene preserv'd by us From all which it appears that that Oath is Cloudy in the positive or set Government which we ought to have and so cannot be justly called it's owne interpreter besides a reformation according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed Churches supposes such a latitude of Logick as would if all sides should be heard give us as much exercise as all our wa●res have And certainly the Covenant is alike undefin'd in Religion and in civill Government For we swore to bring the Church Discipline in the three Kingdoms to as neer a similitude as the constitution of the places would bear not into the very same and as for the civill Government it was to receive its forme in the security of that just as water doth receive not onely the figure of the Pot or Glasse into which it is put but its conservation from being totally lost and spilt But how then will you free your selfe from this contradiction in asserting that the civill State is unalterable by Covenant when that of the Church which formes the other is so much alterable and seeing that of the State receives from this not only its form and being but what ever else you alone please to attribute to your security in it From whence I conclude again that a change of Government is consistent with Covenant that a submission to it in lawful things is much more and consequently it ingages not to any one determinate Government and so is not against this of ours I beleeve it hath been a frequent observation of many who have calmely converst with our Divines and others zealous for Presbytery That they have found them little satisfied with that sort of Presbytery which our Parliament modelled for us of this Nation as having little affinity with the Couenant My beliefe is that they in that discernd not the consequence of their own dissatisfaction For if their consciences regulated by Covenant can admit no civill Government but the Kingly which they so much argue for here and if the Covenant and a Scotch Presbytery whose right they hold to be Divine be essentially linkt together Then we and they may all of us learne not onely from direct inferences but from the declar'd experience of the Sonne the Father the Grandfather and great GrandMother that is of the three last Scotch Kings and one Queene That if the Scotch Presbitery come out of the Covenant then Kingly government cannot derive from it because they are jurisdictions incompatible and inconsistant in the same place and if one can conserve it then may we say as much of the other How much Mary Queene of Scotland experienced of this let the world judge by that which she wrote both with inke in her Letters and with her blood on the Scaffold For how came she to be Beheaded in England but by Mr. Knox and the Kirkes having done little better than put her into the hands of those who could not keepe her long alive with security to themselves King Iames hath writ and argued largely concerning his dangers sufferings under it it is yet remembred in what Dialect they of the Presbytery were wont to Preach and Pray against him to his face and he not know how to remedy it or by what right to top theirs When he came into England he profest his deliverance from that subjection not of small satisfaction to his minde and therefore at this di●tance he contrived how to extinguish or check that ●ate there after some progresse in that worke he himselfe dyed peaceably in a milder Country But K. Charles with that Crown inherited the consequences of that undertaking for his first troubles began in the controversie of that Presbytery and what a preservation he thought the Covenant from which it seemes their Presbytery is so inseparable might be to him and what his fate was and who helpt it on nay who diverted him from agreement here all the world knowes and in his writings likewise he hath showne to the world that he himselfe was not ignorant of it This only is the wonder that in the midst of this their specious zeale for Kingly Government the Covenant should be so silent concerning Royall Posterity or for their succession in case the Scots or English Souldiers had kill'd the King casually before he had given them the satisfaction which they required the consideration of all this with some other lately offer'd to the young Prince at the Hague by the Scotch Commissioners and the satisfaction which they in their late Declaration require from him as they did from his Father have questionlesse made him scruple so long at his adventure into that Country though so much invited For they told him p. 14.15 That for longer then these eight yeares yea ever since that Queene Mary their fundamentall priviledge hath beene to assemble in Parliament and to conclude there of themselves either without King or Kings Commissioners and that if his Majesty refuse those their reasonable desires they shall be constrained in so great an extremity to doe what is incumbent on them to preserve Religion and the Kingdom from ruine Here they plainly acknowledge and assume that supreame power and right
which shall be proved here more evidently towards the conclusion But because I intend truth here in the simplicity of my Heart and no way to swell this Argument either with passion in my selfe or with scandall to any man else therfore I shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mistery to my selfe and for confirmation of what I have asserted here so positively I shall give the reader the expresse word of our great English Covenant-champion and of Master Hinderson especially the Scotch Champion betwixt whose fingers the Covenant it selfe was moulded O●●t ●●ind cafe of Oonscience p. 14 saith But they who are now for the right of the Son and continuance of the Government are as much against the vices in and about him as about the Father And should he doe as his Father hath done they who are now for the performance of this Oath and Covenant would as truly joyne against him as against the Father Who can call this Regall Language which yet will be lookt on as the English Presbyterian-alarum though but by one man Hee had done well in speaking of the performance of Covenant by us all if he had offered a Catalogue of all that which would fulfill the Covenant in all its termes without any further interpretation But that which is supposed eternall for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the application of humane Logick Mr. Hinderson in his Newcastle conference with the King p. 24.25 saith That the reforming power is in Kings and Princes Quibus deficientibus it comes to the inferiour Magistrates Quibus deficientibus it descends to the gr●sse of the people but yet supposing still as he saith that they be all of them rightly inform'd For which reason though he conceal'd it from the King yet he meant that the reformation of any of those three powers according to the Covenant must be judged reformed afterwards by some other body of men here not named For I conceive that he who is ultimatly to judge of the Reformation and of its publique obligation judgeth likewise of the reformers themselves though never so high or never so low and to this strange opinion he would faine intitle two English Episcopall Champions Bilson and Iewell Here I must confesse I was at a stand concerning the nature and interest of the Covenant and was sorry to see that I was no plainlyer told whether it would carry me laden with so great a curse nor where it would set me downe At last I found in the same Author 32.33 Speaking of the subordination of powers under which people were finally to obey That he would not willingly tell his Majesty whether the Church was subordinate to the civill power either to King or to Parliament or to both For quoth he I utterly desol●ima such a headship as the Kings of England have claimed or such a supremacy as the Houses of Parliament crave with appeales from Ecclesiastiall Iudicature to themselves No man may thinke but Mr. Henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of England as well as of Scotland for hee spake of Houses of Parliament which were plurall in England onely and though it may seeme strange at the first view to heare one say that the Scotch Nation state the supremacy of England in their Country or that they endeavour a direct change of Government here which they have indirectly attempted for a long while let every man judge not by our subtilties but by the Kirkes Declaration 27 July 1649 p. 11.12 Their words are That their King after his Oath of Coronation in Scotland shall assure them under his hand and seale to injoyne the solmne League and Covenant establish and practise the Prerbyteriall Government Directory Confession and Catechisme as they are approved by the severall Assemblies of their Kirke and Parliament in ALL HIS DOMINIONS and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof No man will say but States like judges ought to act ex bono aequo conjunctively So that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually were never so good yet they being unequitably deriv'd upon us from their supreame judicatory in whose possession we are not so fully now as they were last yeare in ours we ought to abominate their designe as much as they might the like obtrusion of their Presbitery from hence without power there to rectifie it ever after For these Presbiterians with us grant That good and lawfull things may not be practiz'd under a power unlawfull as they say the Scots would be here However here I at last found who was my supream right Magistrate in the Kirk● sence but then I conceiv'd I was in a great snare because I saw the jus publicum of a Kingdome totally though secretly changed I saw all things of direct religion and whatsoever related collaterally to its security lodged there and by the Kirke prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in Scotland especially But because religion and its security draws in all humane concernments and that two supreame collaterall powers cannot stand in one and the same place in the same time for the same person but for contrary actions therefore I knew not whither of the two supreame powers the Ecclesiasticall or the Civill I should in this case throw away for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together and I stood in a miserable case betwixt a Jaylour and a Devill the Kirke giving me to the Devill if I obeyed the Civill power and the Civill power giving me to the Jaylour if I obey'd the Kirke which was to speake the truth the State of the whole Kingdome of Scotland last yeare betwixt the the Kirkes excommunication and the Parliaments Order which authoriz'd Duke Hamiltons expedition in Vindication of the Covenant here In which difference we have no reason but to like the effect however we may dislike such a cause here Wherefore to answer this ●scruple I positively say That in whatsoever is of Pact betwixt man and man or of policy in the Covenant I ought solely to follow the civill Magistrate and the Church here ought to follow the Magistrate likewise as a case relating to the disquits to the warres and to the recovering the peace of earthly Kingdomes If otherwise then the civil jurisdiction ought clearely to be managed by the Ecclesiastique which is stated so no where that I know of but in Romagna and Dutchy of Ferrara and the other places belonging to the Pope This I speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the Ministery as it containes it selfe in its own function no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might not ex Officio be deputed to excite others to vertue and sanctity of life But yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition avarice and severe passions as well as other men or
have not our Antagonists whether they would or no observ'd them in these cases of worldly rights and interests to have as oppositly yet as peremtorily differ'd one from another as people of any family ever did The Devill not being able to get the Text on his side by his wiles oft got the commentary so that we are to be excus'd if we hold many things in Church-men to be but as an Apohrypha at best which yet for esteem sake is alloted a place before anything else next after the genuine Text Having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences and to take off maskes not from the faces but from the consciences of these three and the multitude of other Scotch Casnists who have talkt so speciously for our Covenant Vindication of an Heirs just Title our submitting to it and joyning with others immediately least right suffer wrong one day I cannot I say but aske the same men plainly What difference in effect they find● betwixt the Titles and right of the Prince of Wales and of the n●w King of Scotland notwithstanding all their obligation of Covenant to submit to him as such It is not enough by Covenant to preserve an aery Title onely to a Prince and by the same Covenant to suspend all the rest of his solid power and right certain●ly his Royall commands notwithstanding all this talke are no more obey'd in Scotland now then the Episcopall commands of our Countryman the Bishop of C●alcedon are now obey'd in Turkey But what hinders him from exercising any Kingly right in Scotland as yet The Covenant which is not yet satisfied How is it then that some of our Presbyterians say that the same Covenant indispensably opens the doore to him here If the ●ing aske the Scots why they put the Law of the Covenant so to his obedience 〈◊〉 the first thing which determines all his other rights afterwards They can onely say that they swore it in his Fathers raigne and it is now eternall Though I censure nothing here yet I cannot but conclude-hence That they of themselves as well as our Parliament have made a Law above all other Lawes and more then a reformable Magna Charta For the Government of the Kingdome which may be exercised according to it without Kings and against Kings The first thing which was ever offer'd to him from the Kingdome of Scotland was an authority by far transcending his own viz. that of excommunication For as their late proceedings with him at the Hagu● shew hee was by that subtilty tryed whether he would refuse first to acknowledge Iames Graham alias Montrosse or that great power of the Churches by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards To backe this likewise the Commissioners of the Synode said p. 22 that they negotiated with him in a capacity altogether distinct from the Commissioners of Parliament as being persons commissioned by the Kirke which is commisioned with a Iusdivinum Our Bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction supremacy and unlesse these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world no one would believe that in such a poore Country and so much forme of Religion there could be such high passions of ambition Besides if it be a true rule That he who is the maker ought to be the interpreter of a Law then let all the world observe one thing That the Kirk having made the Covenant as the principle of all supream rights both of State and Religion then they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time as they de facto did not onely last yeare contrary to the interpretation of their owne Parliament but also for many yeares together have peremptorily prest it upon ours So that it makes a fundamentall change of Government there though differently from what our Parliament hath made here the jus publicum both of Religion and security of State with them lying in the Covenant and that lying in the brests of Churchmen chosen by one another and our's lying in the power of Laymen chosen by the People and judging by the Common Lawes of equity and necessity and of the word of God It were in vaine to say the Kirke onely recommends their interpretation to the State For last yeare they did it with a Penalty upon the Parliament their whole Army and the body of the people which obey'd them if it be a penalty to bee given to the Devill and to bee put into a State of eternall death Wherefore they there are or else none are anywhere the true judges of right who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment To conclude how practicable soever the Covenant was at first or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of Kingly Government which was actually made first of all by it and their Presbytery in Scotland yet it being originally but a Politicall or condition all Oath relating to our former Unions when Warre w● and to our cooperation under our respective Magistrates only not in a way contrary to the fifth Commandment and that all the Magistracy which we enjoy and by whom we are now fully possest if they have not laid it aside yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it and that it interprets not it selfe so that each private man is not made by it his owne Magistrate and that there is no penal Article in it obliging us private men to pursue a publique Warre upon the Magistrates or any other mens bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves who therefore can contrary to all this peremptorily warrant us now yea necessitate us to begin or assist to the desolation of warre and bloodshed upon it especially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tyed to it at all or no Further more how good so ever it was at first yea though that other Nation had not given it it 's mortall wound when they attempted to give us ours both in England and in Ireland which was the cause of this effect of change of Government here yet if when it was in force it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among our selves why might it not by our Magistrates order have been as well carried out of our Churches as the brazen Serpent was out of the Temple after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end If otherwise and that it must at all hazards be indirectly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct as hath been proved I shall desire any pious spirit to judge whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of Campanellas censure which he gave upon the Spanyards India Treasury that it was gotten in blood sailes home in a sea of blood and never rests till it be all laid out in