she was oft-times assaulted by them and many of her parts possest by them and the Empire it self was endangered by their Forces And of late years since the passage of Charls the Eighth though they had proved variety of fortune yet kept they still the same resolution of waging war in Italy and of keeping footing in this Province not being frighted from this resolution by any misfortune how great soever but being once beaten back they returned with great fury to seek out novelties and at this very time that we now speak of they were possest of the Dutchy of Milan Therefore to secure himself from the French it was not sufficient to drive them once out of Italy for the Forces of that large Kingdom being still very powerful and they being alwaies prepared for novelty their desire bore them chiefly thereunto where it had done formerly so as Italy remained still exposed to new incursions and subject to the miseries of War Therefore this intention of Pope Leo's of keeping the French long out of Italy could not peradventure have been compassed but in a long process of time and with much variety of success no not though Italy had been all of a peece and in greater power and prosperitie then she then was Whereas at this time the Commonwealth of Venice being now returned to great power was joined in confederacie with the King of France by vertue of antient Capitulations nor was it to be hoped for that out of any uncertain hopes and of long expectation she should easily forgo such a friendship And as for other Princes they were but weak and their ends not constant nor conformable And on the other side Caesar was very bare of monies and had many other irons in the fire so as the greatest weight and care of managing this War was likely to fall unto the Popes share wherein if he should slacken never so little all that had been done would have been to no effect and those places which by reason of this confederacie with the Church were taken from the French would quickly and easily have faln into their hands again But say that Charls had been able to have imploted all his Forces about this business the greater they had been the greater share would he have pretended in the business and the less able had the Pope or any others been to oppose his Forces Charls the Great a Prince of excellent worth freed Italy from the slavish yoke of the Northern Barbarians driving the Lombards from thence who had had the chief command there for Three hundred years but he would therefore make the greatest advantage thereof unto himself creating his Son Pipin King of Italy nor ought any of Charls his promises to be thought sufficient to shun such a danger to which it was known he was much more moved out of a fervent desire to draw the Pope into this confederacie of excluding the King of France then that he had any waies quitied his desire to the Dukedom of Milan What reason was there then to beleeve that when Caesar should be become more powerful in Italy and should have driven out the French he should likewise be expell'd from thence when his Territories and Authority should be there the greater It is rather to be beleeved that by his increase of power Italy should be in a worse condition and the danger thereof the more for whilst these two Princes stood upon equal terms and with an invererate mind did counterpoise one another the other States were the more secure it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others should increase or be heightned by the ruine of any of the Princes of Italy but he that should be assaulted by one was sure to be assisted by the other so as Leo ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjuncture of affairs to have kept these scales even by his neutrality for whilst the business stood thus it behoved the very Enemies of the Italians to value their Friendship for their own good and for the preservation of their States It is not easie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of Italy that the Pope should continue in his neutrality or by his joining with some one of these forein Princes who at that time had so great an influence upon Italy the success being to depend upon many very much differing accidents for since humane wisdom is not able to provide against them all she cannot find any secure way which leads to that destin'd end Let us say then still keeping our selves within some general rules in the first place that to join in friendship and confederacie with a more powerful Pâ—ince and one who is a near neighbor when the increase of power is intended by this conjunction is never to be done without danger nor ought such a resoluâ—ion ever be taken but out of great necessity especially not by such Princes who are not so weak as they need a leaning stock not to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune Now Leo had no such reason to forgo the little quiet which he had then purchast by plunging into a Sea of Leagues and Confederacies which are very hard to be laid fast hold of with Princes of great powerl desirous of glory who pretend the same things and between whom War is not so easily ended as it is reassumed The Churches Patrimonie was sufficiently secured by the majesty of Religion by Pontifical power by the moneys which by many waies she may be supplied with and by her Dominions being at this time much inlarged by Iulius the second So as Leo's intention is to be praised for having his thoughts so carefully bent upon the Libertie of Italy It is likewise to be desired that he had had either more judgement or temper to know and chuse an opportune time and a sitting occasion and yet it is likewise a general rule that to wait for the advantage of Time when Affairs are upon great strieghts do usually bring notable advantages and sometimes by new and unexpected waies Italy was long under the obedience of the Western Emperors If at that time when their power and authority was so great the Popes would have call'd in forein Forces and made use of them to reduce the Government of Italy under the Churches power or else into the hands of some other Italian Princes Italy would in the first place have certainly been given in prey to the insolencie of foreign Soldiers and at last she would peradventure have been brought to a worse condition But by temporising such occasions arose as the Church increased her Dominions by certain lawful Donations without the shedding of blood and all Italy remained subject to her own proper and particular Lords and the Western Emperors being long vex'd and troubled by the Wars of Germany were forced to forgo the affairs of Italy Moreover though Caesar's fortune and power was then very great yet was it
Hen Do Cary Baro de Leppington Comes Monmouthenâ—is et honble Ord Balniâ— Eques Politick DISCOURSES Written in ITALIAN BY PAOLO PARUTA A Noble VENETIAN Cavalier and Procurator of St. MARK Whereunto is added A short SOLILOQUY In which the AUTHOR briefly examines the whole Course of his Life Rendred into ENGLISH By the Right Honorable HENRY EARL of MONMOVTH LONDON Printed for H. Moseley and are to be sold at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Church-yard 1657 THE CONTENTS Of the Several DISCOURSES The First BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHat was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot pag. 1. II. What success the Roman affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his victorious Army into Italy 18 III. Whether was the better and more laudable advice That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans against King Pyrrhus Or that of the Romans in refusing their offer 23 IV. Which of the two famous Roman Commanders Quintus Fabiâ—s Maximus or P. Scipio Africanus brought more of 〈…〉 the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War 29 V. Whether war being to be made against the Romans Hannibals counsel was good to carry it into Italy 34 VI. Whether it was well done by the Romans to carry the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whilst Hannibal waged War with them in Italy 39 VII Whether the destruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick 45 VIII Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquinâ— first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri 50 IX Which is the safer way to be taken to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth that which was held by Cato or that which was pursued by Caesar. 55 X. To what Age of the City of Rome the greatest praise and merit is to be given for the prosperity and greatness whereto she arrived 59 XI How the Roman Empire though it fell oftentimes into the hands of base and wicked mâ—n was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the Reign of many Emperors and how it came to be finally destroyed 67 XII Why the Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove victorious at last 78 XIII Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Librty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors 85 XIV Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her liberty 93 XV. Whether Ostracism used by the Athenians be a just thing or no and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Commonwealth 104 The Second BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHy the Commonwealth of Venice hath not so for enlarged her Prâ—cincts as did the Roman Commonwealth 111 II. Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was appâ—gneâ— by the Florentineâ— 1â—3 III. That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War after the routing of the Venetian Army in the actioâ— of Giaradada 131 IV. Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charlâ— the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains 140 V. Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises 146 VI. Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients 156 VII What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times 164 VIII Whether Citadels and Strong-holds much used by our modern Princes be commodious and of true safety to a State or no. 168 IX Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no and his counsel safe of driving Foreign Nations out of Italy by the help of other Transalpine Forces 179 X. Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth and by his Commanders of not parting from the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it deserve praise or blame 185 A TABLE Of all the more notable Things contained in the present Politick Discourses A. ADrian the Emperor why he resolved to go on progress over all his States and to visit every part thereof Pag. 71-91 Where he set the bounds of his Empire ibid. Agesilaus though he were King in Sparta was obedient to the Laws of the Country 48 Alcibiades by too much desire of glory ruined his Country 10. Had higher thoughts then the rest of the Greek Commanders 95 Alexander the Great the greatness of his enterprises 19. His Militia 20-83 An Indian Gymnosophist shews him how in a large Kingdom insurrections fall out 71. How far he extended his Empire and in how little time 157. and how 159. His artifices and laudable way for opening the way more easily to his great atchievements and greater glory 162 Ambition precipitated Rome into very grievous disorders 15-16-51 When discovered makes men distastefull 58. It and Fear raise in Princes minds a desire of innovation 164. The important mischief of it if once gotten into mens hearts 106. How it is to be cured in States-men ibid. An Army keeping the field how greatly beneficial 169 Armies maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts taken only out of Italy 64 Arragonian Kings of Naples what they did for fear of the French forces 138 Artillery of what use in warâ—â— 160. That in their stead the Antients had miraculous Engines called Tormenta 173 Assaulting the Enemy in his own State how advantagious 34 Attalaricus King of the Goths descends into Italy 76. is afterwards entertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid. Attila content to lose the day so the Roman Commander might be slain in the battel 89 Athens why she soon lost her liberty 5-13-54 Athenians of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Too hard for the rest in Sea-forces ibid. Hinder'd by the Spartans from taking in Sicily and from assaulting Persia 95. Why they could not enlarge their Dominion 98 Augustus Caesar in many places enlarged the Empire 68. Remained sole Lord of the whole World 71. Reduced it all to Peace though he was troubled with some Insurrections 7â— See Octavianus B. BAttails subject to divers unexpected accidents 31 When they are to be adventured upon 192 Brutus Junius Br. how he stirr'd up the people to Liberty 51. Why he condemned his own sons to death 52 Brutus Marcus Br. why he could not preserve the
Army 51. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities 65. The laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the Romans and facilitated his enterprises 163 The People of Rome of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How from the beginning it was of great power and increased it more and more 15 Loving liberty how it came to lose it 51. Sought by seditions to obtain from the Senate all things though never so unjust 52 The People That to curb it Severity prevails more then Meekness 16. That out of its natural fickleness it useth to favour a Forein Prince and by seditions and violent attempts to plot against the present Power 170 A Prince shall do well and wisely to have a care that no Subject of his grow to be suspected for his greatness 106. Must not for his own relief make use of Forein aids that he may be too strong for his Native forces 103 Princes what sort of Militia it is best for them to make use of in their expeditions and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of War and the choice of Commanders 145. Those of Italy have used to imploy foreign Commanders and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122 See more in States R. REpublicks how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known 18. How at last they grow to be Tyrannies 54. That a State deserves not the name of a Commonwealth or Republick where the Decrees of the People and not the Laws carry all the command 6. For the long preservation and quietness of them nothing more necessary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Dominion 112 Rome was a mixt but imperfect Commonwealth and why 3-11 Was too Popular 3. Why it could not free it self from many disorders 14 How long it held its greatness 68. When and how she might have freed herself from her many bad qualities and defects ibid. How she abounded in Soldiers and Commanders 39-64-74-80 How she made way for Monarchy 39. She scatter'd her corruptions amongst the Nobles and the Communalty 50. That those Citizens proved worst oppressors to her whom for the meer conservation of her Liberty she had too much exalted 51 Her first second and third Age 59. Her first seven Kings of what considerable benefit they were to her 60. At what time she deserved the praise of good Government 61 Romans why they refused the Carthaginians aid against Pyrrhus 26. Refused to have peace with Pyrrhus ibid. For what causes chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not so much present dangers as future 45. Out of one War they still framed another 46 Why they were invincible according to Polybius 78. The two pretences under which they made their most notorious acquisitions 161. How by Colonies they kept their new Subjects in loyalty and obedience 173 Romulus a man fierce ambitious and desirous to enlarge his Estate train'd up the People according to his genius 113 S. SCipio Africanus his worth and actions 29-33 Why he took a course differing from that of Fabius 33. His passage into Sicily of what benefit it was 35 Scipio Nafica when Carthage was taken disswaded the Senate from destroying that City 46. Whether that counsel of his were founded upon good reason ibid. The Senate of Rome what number it consisted of and when first instituted 14 Its authority 4. The generous answer she gave to the Ambassadors of Pyrrhus 26-89 Little esteemed of by Julius Caesar 46. Subject to corruptions 50. Severity in what sort of Commonwealth it doth good 57. Was very great in Cato ibid. Sylla brought into Rome licentious living 51. Increased the Order of the Senators to counterpoise the Communalty Gave honors and riches to his Favorites ibid. Soldan of Caire how and why he lost all his Kingdom in a short time 160 Solyman parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mind and fortune 157. His great atchievements 158. Why he made no great progress in Hungary 159. nor at Corfu against the Venetians ibid. Why he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms 196 Sparta a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11 That authority which the Kings had there not prejudicial to it 48. Many worthy men flourished in it by reason of the form of its government 58 For want of money could not enlarge her Empire 82 Spartans when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the rest in Land forces ibid. Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls 171 States whence their divers changes come 53. How men grow desirous of their change 72. Are augmented and preserved by the same things which gave them their beginning and corrupted by the contrary 73. Where they have been ruin'd by intestine discords the over-great height of some of their own hath been the cause 105. That they have their beginning increase stay declination and ruine 86 Sâ—ilico a Barbarian and by nation a Hun called to the command of the Roman Army betrays the Empire 89 T. THebans much esteemed of for the discipline of their Soldiers called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas famous Commanders of theirs ibid. Themistocles what his advice was and his Naval victory against the Persians 99 Tiberius Gracchus slain by the Nobles of Rome without any revenge from the People 17 Tribuneship in Rome of how great power and its insolence 6. Called Sacrosanctus 52 Triumph in Rome when first instituted and to whom first granted 62 Turks their assistance refused by the Venetians and yet sued for by other Christian Princes 136. Why they cannot so suddenly nor easily do any signal enterprises by Land 161. Are accustomed for their own security to destroy the inhabitants of such places as they take in especially those of the better and richer sort 172. Their chiefest strength consists in their Cavalry 187 Their Law promiseth everlasting reward in heaven to every one that loseth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194 V. VAlerius Publicola why in reforming the government of Rome he yielded many things to the People 14-15 That he might have order'd the City better ibid. Venice in time brought her Government to perfection 12. How she hath been able to preserve her Liberty thus long 54. What her Government is ibid. When it began 77-116 Her Founders lovers of Peace and of an intent and end differing from that of the Founders of Rome ibid. Her greatest and most difficult attempts have been either in their own Defence or for Religion or in Assistance of others 115. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations she at her first beginning underwent 117. Why she made use of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders 121. That for having accustomed to imploy Foreign Commanders she hath not been able by reason of their disloyalty to prosecute such Enterprises of hers as had been
thought expedient to come to peace with Alaricus King of the Goths leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay to make use of them in other undertakings For the Goths being kept in continual pay by some former Emperors amongst other Soldiers which served the Empire and being of themselves conversant in many Wars they were become a valiant People and had learn'd the Roman discipline though not the corruption which overthrew it in the Roman Camp Which though it might be good for the present occasions it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards For though by this Peace Theodosius was safe from any fear of this Nation whilst he governed together with Gratianus and also afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himself he being a person of singular worth and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the Soldiers yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag and the Empire falling into the hands of his two sons Arcâ—dius and Honorius who succeeded their Father whilst they were but young and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required many of those who commanded under Theodosius in several parts rebelled who were all of them cryed up Emperors by those Armies wherein they commanded by which occasions being invited the Goths did not only return to rise up in Arms against the Empire but also other Northern Nations who did then inhabit Germany as the Alani Franks and Vandals took up Arms and did at one and the same time assault the States of the Empire in several parts many of them marching more particularly towards Italy and against the very City of Rome which after divers passages remained in prey to these Barbarians the antient Roman worth being so decayed as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City which was the Queen of the World And the Emperor Honorius a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel whilst Italy and other Countries were wasted with War and the very City of Rome was reduced to the utmost extremity remained in Ravenna an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity and of the ruine of his State in so base and stupid a manner as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces which being miserably torn in pieces were falling into the power of the Barbarians answered That he could live without them After the ruine of Rome these victorious Barbarians past into France and into Spain where being recruited with other people of their own Nations and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen they had leisure to fix themselves there and to take possession of those noble Provinces the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished they setled themselves there and did long govern those Dominions and others of them passing into Africa and having won large Territories did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms But on the other part other People called the Huns fell into Pannonia called now by their names Hungaria and possessing themselves likewise thereof fixt their abode and dominion there So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them Insomuch that when Attila marched with a furious Army to destroy Italy the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage the Romans were forced to take King Theodoricus with a good number of his Goths into their pay by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline the greater and almost fatal ruines of Italy began whereinto when these cruel Barbarians entred they put all to fire and sword bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities Which according to the natural order of all things mortal wherein Corruptio unius est generatio alterius gave occasion to the birth of the City of Venice whereunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse and saved themselves The Twelveth DISCOURSE Why thâ— Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove Victorious at last HE who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the Romans will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration Their prosperity was certainly very great but proceeding as it is to be beleeved from their worth and from certain and ordinary causes The People of Rome made more Wars then ever any Potentate hath been known to do but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is that their success in all of them was prosperous And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome yet still in the conclusion of every War the Victories sided with them It will then be worth the while to seek out the truest or at least the most truth-like causes thereof by reasoning thereupon The City of Rome waged continual Wars from the first foundation thereof till Augustus his time which was for above Seven hundred years The gates of that famous Temple of Ianus which were never to be shut but in time of Peace stood always open unless it were once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius nor was there almost any Nation known in those daies with whom the City of Rome hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth That Commonwealth in so many and so long contentions of War was likewise sometimes favored sometimes frowned upon by fortune so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger yet still she prevailed at last and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies Long and heavy was the dispute which in her very beginning she had with so many people of Italy and chiefly with those that were nearest who singly by themselves and joyntly with others did conspire against the Romans and did by all their best endeavors seek how to keep the powea of the Empire low which was ordained as was afterwards seen to the height of all greatness Nor was the Commonwealth of Rome secure from the efforts of foreign Nations nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the French who assailed her with great Forces that they might totally subdue her and possess themselves of her Territories as they had done of so many other parts of Italy The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces even in the beginning of her greatness with other Kings till beginning with the first Carthaginian Wars to wage War further from her Confines she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign
Potentate at that time all entire and whole not having suffered any thing by this thunder of War which had only overrun their Terra firma their Treasure but little diminished from what it was at the begining of this War which continued afterwards and was maintained for the space of many years The City of Venice placed by her miraculous situation in compleat safety all attempts which could be made against it being to prove rash and vain as the effects proved afterwards A great Train of Artillery and of all things requisite for War a quiet People and obedient at the beck of their Nobility and a constant and resolute mind in all the Nobles to demonstrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their Country But that which followed afterwards in their defence of the City of Padua against the Forces of all the Princes of the League will suffice to prove that the Commonwealth was not so weak either in Counsel or in Power as to have recourse to thâ—â— last extremity of making that Ciâ—y tributary which had maintained her first freedom for above the space of a thousand years Say I beseech you was not the Commonwealth powerful by Sea and sufficiently valued by all other Potentates before she had any State in Terra firma Nay she was oft-times seen to neglect occasions which were offered of making acquisitious in Terra firma thinking her self safe and powerful enough without them What was it then which could move them to make themselves Servants and Subjects who had no reason to doubt not onely their liberty but nor their chiefest most antient and most proper Dominion which was that of the Sea for the preservation whereof as affairs stood then they had no reason to make such haste to Caesar for friendship Who can with reason blame the advice as the condition of things went then of giving and yeelding that up to Maximilian which could not as then be kept from him to wit some of those Cities in Terra firma which he pretended right unto since some agreement ensuing with him by such concessions and injuries ceasing on that part the way might be opened to straiter and more particular and advantagious conventions with the same Caesar who was naturally desirous of novelties whereby the Fortune of the Commonwealth was again to be raised up And this counsel tried afterwards with others had good success when they joyned in a new confederacy with the same French against Maximilian who scorning their frâ—endship would not listen to their propositions These were the counsels these the actions of the Venetians from whence some would take occasion to detract from the praise and dignity of their Commonwealth and particularly from the excellency of their Government But we may better know how injuriously this blemish is laid upon them if we will examine how other Princes and States did behave themselves when they were in like adversity which I do not alleage as taxing any one but to shew the usual course of affairs by the example of others Observe what art the King of Aragon used to preserve his State when Charls the Eighth King of France came against them in hostile manner Alphonso who possest the Kingdom having tried the extremity of fear before the danger grew near out of the meer report of the French Forces departed from Naples leaving all things at six and sevens whilst their Army was yet in Rome and Alphonso the Son who had boasted that he would defend himself and to that purpose had mustered a great many Soldiers retired with them into the narrow passes of the Kingdom without making any triall either of his fortune or of his valor and yeelding rather to the Fame then to the Forces of the Enemy suffered them to take free and quiet possession of that most noble Kingdom But Frederick of Aragon who was reinvested in his State by the favor of the people and by the assistance of other Princes with which the Venetians did readily joyn what use did he make of other mens labors and of his own fortune Soon after the Kingdom of Naples was assaulted by Lodowick King of France and by Ferdinando King of Spain at which assault being much discouraged he would not lâ— sten to the advice of his Commanders who advised him to keep the field but made some slender provisions for the Towns and soon after thinking more how to escape then how to defend himself he fled into Ischia and went from thence into France and put himself into the power of the same King his Enemy contenting himself rather to live a private man in peace and safety then to reign in trouble and danger But what shall we â—ay of the French who boast so much of their valor and glory in War How easily when they met with the first misfortune did they suffer themselves to be bereft of all they had before so happily acquired in the Kingdom of Naples And that so hastily as it seemed that they had freely yeeled up the possession of so many and so noble Cities to the victors the Spainards by agreement and as it were in reward for the day which they had won Nor is this the onely example since we have seen the same French who were faln with such fervency with their Forces into Italy and had with miraculous prosperity recovered the State of Milan but a little before resolve suddenly to forgo all that they had won and to retreat to beyond the Mountains after the roâ—â— which they had received from the Swizzers at Novara the succour which they met withal by the way as they fled not being able to make them halt Who was more famous then for dexterity of wit for the managing of weighty affairs then Lodorica Sforza Duke of Milan yet when a great deluge of War came upon him what use could he make of all his Artifices Could he shew that constancy and generosity which he had many times before publickly boasted of The onely news of the league made against him by Lodowick King of France and by the Venetians did so astonish him as losing all understanding and leaving his Affairs unprovided for he resolved at very first upon what ought to have been his last and most desperate advice to fly into Germany foregoing the defence of that State which being once lost he did afterwards in vain seek to recover But in this point I may help my self in looking a little more backward and trying whether the gallantry of the antients so much commended did produce other effects then those that I have spoken of The Romans who conquered the whole world met sometimes with adverse fortune wherein let us see how they behaved themselves for he is very timerous who is not bold and generous in prosperous affairs In what peril and hazard did Brennusâ— Prince and Commander of the Galli Senones put the City of Rome after the defeat given to the Roman Army under the unfortunate conduct of the Fabii no
French-men have who were left behind for the defence of the Kingdom of Naples and the City of Novara which though it were back'd with the Kings men who to this purpose kept his Army a long time together after the Battel was reduced to so great streights by the Colleagues as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to Sforza would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victoâ—y Neither would this have been an occasion of dissention as afterwards it was amongst the Colleagues and which bereft them of the chiefest advantage which that confederacie could hope for These are the Considerations which we may conceive did move those Princes to resolve upon following the French Army and to join battel with it But that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason is that the Battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice but happened party out of necessity both Armies being already drawn very near and partly upon a resolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place But the Princes of the Leagues truest intention was to necessitate the King of France when he should see so great a preparation for War to be made against him to hasten his departure the more and to enforce him to draw so many more of his men from the Kâ—ngdom of Naples that so he might make his passage the surer And that the Kingdom not having sufficient Garisons to defend it might the more easily fall into the power of the Aragoneses for whom the same Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by Sea to assault it Nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past that the States of Italy were free from the insolencies of the French unless the Prâ—nces of Italy should either put themselves into a posture of War or if they should keep their Forces far distant from the way whereby the King was to return for France since in his former passage to the enterprise of Naples though he was more necessitated to make hast and haâ— greater need of making himself Friends more by favor then by force he had notwithstanding used strange novelties in Tuscany which the Florentines did much â—esent And who could have ascertained that he would not do the lâ—ke in his return in all other parts where meeting with no obstacle he might meet with opportunity of pleasing himself or procuring any thing of advantage The Colleagues seeking to provide for these mischiefs rather to shun new inconveniencies then endeavor to repair their past losses they thought it the best course that their Army should follow that of the Kings so to keep him in perpetual jealousie and suspition and hinder him if he should make any attempt hoping likewise as they had like to have done that this was the way to make the King come to some good agreement with them which had been often endeavored and not without hopes of good success even when the Camps were very near together But the Colleagues incited either by the Armies being so near together by the desire of glory or hope of victory or perchance being inforc'd so to do as it usually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to straight passages they fought the French the Commanders of the Leaguâ—s Army were then to have considered that they had more reason to hope for victorie then to fear loss in that daies fight as the effect did in part prove it being the common opinion that had not their own men been put into great disorder by their own light-horse who fell too soon to pillage the Enemies Camp they would have had a full and glorious victory But though the business should have succeeded otherwise they knew the state of affairs to be such as the victory oâ— the Kings behalf could not occasion them those great mischiefs which upon such an occasion have been considered the Kings Forces not being so great when most entire much less being much weakened by the conflict as could prove very formidable Such like events may teach us not to attempt such things in which it is hard to resolve and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful nor to bring our selves to such a condition as the necessity of putting on another resolve bereaves us of choice Nor will it be a less useful precept for Princes to have a great care and to be very well advised in chusing their Commanders which are to have the chief imployment in great enterprises for if their nature and customs be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the Prince it is in vain to give them any Instructions or Commissions for oft-times a resolution is to be put on upon the main concern wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatsoever strict command which the Commonwealth of Venice had experience of particularly in this daies fight in the Marquis of Mantua and some years after with much more danger and damage in Bartholomiâ— d' Alviano at the Battel of Giaradada in both which personages natural ardor and too vehement a desire of glory prevailed over the Senates wise and moderate counsels The Fifth DISCOURSE Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises AMongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty State Affairs and of War enterprises one and a chief one is that of Leagues and Confederacies in which divers Potentates do joyn either out of some particular design of their own or for their better securitie or to abate the power of others And the weakness of Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions in these latter times then we have heard of formerly So as now adaies as also in some later times past when any great enterprise is debated upon recourse is forthwith had to Leagues by means and vertue whereof it is usually thought that greater ends may be compassed then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State and chiefly to curb and keep under those Forces which do threaten whole Christendom with most danger and damage Those who speak in the behalf of these Leagues and who heighten the hopes thereof use these or the like reasons First because reason natures self doth teach us that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers makes the motion the greater and more powerful and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone is easily found amongst many There is hardâ—y any one so weak or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune who may not be some help to another by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others This is the cause why in humane actions and especially in such as are of the nobler sort the perfectest are those which are most compounded The best
liberty of Rome recover'd by Caesars death 51. That he endeavored it when 't was too late 53 C. CArthaginians why they came to aid the Romans against Pyrrhus 23 For a long time friends to the Romans ibid. Should rather have been afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were stronger at Sea then they 36. Often subdued 45 Catâ— Major causing sigs to be brought from Carthage into the Senate-house gives counsel that that City should be destroyed 45. How such counsel might be useful 49 Cato Uticensis what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and the People 55. Did many times prevail against Caesar ibid. Founded his greatness upon nobler courses 57. What demonstrations he received from the People of their singular favour to him 58. Because his manners were not suitable to the form of that Republick he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmost 59 Charls the Great having freed Italy from the slavery of the Northern Barbarians made his son Pipin King of Italy 183 Charls the Eighth King of France his passage into Italy for the conquest of Naples 140. At his return assaulted by the Italian Princes and whether they were well advis'd in it discoursed upon at large ibid. Charls the Fifth Emperor compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with Francis the First King of France and his famous expeditions 157. Why his enterprises against the Kingdom of France proved vain 158. Why he shunn'd hazarding a set battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fell to him 165. Whether he was well advised in not parting from before the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come to assault it 185 A City well ordered how it should be qualified 10. For preserving of unity among the Citizens whether the courses which Caesar took or those used by Cato were more available 5â— When it is grown to a great height 't is a hard matter to order it aright 14. That which aspires to a large Dominion must have two things 1â—1 What is most necessary for its long continuance especially such a one as is cast into the form of a Republick 104 Of how great importance the situation is 114 Citizens of singular quality banish'd from Athens for ten years 3 104 To make them vertuous three things necessary 7. By what means they may acquire greatness 56. That quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the State and how it may be preserved ibid. 121 A Citizen very potent how to be corrected that he disturb not the common Quiet 95 Cleomenes King of Sparta accounted the riches of the Persians not worth the trouble they would stand his Soldiery 98 Colonies when first used by the Romans and how beneficial to them 63 172 Of the Venetians why sent into Candy ibid. Constantine the Great divided the Empire between his three Sons 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Constantinople 71 Constantine son to the above-named what part of the Empire fell to his share 67 Consalvo Ferrante why kept under by King Ferdinand 106 Consuls of what authority in Rome 2-4-5 Customs how profitable good ones are to Cities 10 D. DAlmatians with much difficulty subdued by the Venetians 119 Decemvirate held the form of a Republick 50. Why Rome was able to free herself from its tyrannie 51. Why driven out from thence 52 Docius Emperor of Constantinople routed by the Goths flieth and is drown'd in a Fen 75 Discords sprung up in Rome from War not from Peace 48 Dictator upon what occasions chosen by the Romans 12. Of what relief to Rome and who was the first 62. Esteemed necessary in times of great danger and what his dignity was 86 E. EDucation good how useful to a City or State 9 Elephants imployed by Pyrrhus in his wars against the Romans 26 Emperors of Rome favour'd assisted and maintained by the Soldiers and the People 69-72-73 Thirty at one time assum'd that title 70. Why some were chosen to be their Companions in their lives and their Successors after their deaths 72. When those of Caesars race ended ibid. Which were slain by the Soldiers for desiring to reduce them to good discipline 73 Empire of the Romans when it began 68. When it began to decline 6â— The causes of its declination and ruine 71. When it was void of worthy men and valiant Commanders 89. became tributary to the Goths 76 Equality or parity of goods why observed in Sparta 3. Of all the Citizens in government is not good 6. What equality is convenient for a Common-wealth that it may last long 104 Event the surest way to know what is likely to follow 19. That War is far more subject to divers unexpected events then any other actions of ours 31 That it is the master of Fools 38. Not the event of things but the advice wherewith they were done makes them either praise-worthy or blameable 132 F. FAbius Maximus his action and worth 29 c. Deserved to be praised not only for Prudence but for Courage 31. Feared by Hannibal ibid. overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror ibid. Why he took a contrary course to that of Scipio's 33 Fame and Reputation of great importance in all our actions but especially in War 85 Ferdinand King brother to Charls the Fifth why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour then to pull upon himself the Turks forces 196 Ferdinand King of Spain why he kept under Consalvo 106. Not just in his league with the Venetians 152 Florence why she could not keep herself in a firm state of Government free from civil dissentions 54 The Florentines succoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies hindred the Venetians in those enterprises 124. Not well thought of and indeed hated by the Italian Princes for the correspondence which they held with the French 128. How their Fortresses put them to much trouble and damage when they were seised upon by the French brought in by their King Charls the Eighth 171 Forts or Fortresses of how great furtherance to a State 148. The doubts for which it may seem they are not available 168. Other more certain and no less grievous 171. Why called i ceppi della Toscana ibid. Arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of Forts 172. How to be rightly disposed and regulated 176. The defence and praise of rearing Forts ibid. The doubts and arguments against them resolved ibid. Fortune what is to be understood by that name 18 The Fortune of the Romans overborn by Hannibal 41. Why she easily rose up again changing for the better 45. When she proved cross they still kept the same minds 48 Fortune very cross to the Venetians 106 France the Romans put sore to it ere they could take it in 48. Whence the late troubles and discords arose 106 The French oftentimes assaulted Rome 61-63 How timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in
well begun ibid. Venetians what course they took to free themselves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces 43. That the practice of Merchandising is not to be blamed in them 116. Some of their illustrious and famous Princes ibid. What title their Dukes assumed for the taking in of Constantinople 118 How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been ibid. That had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders the State of Milan had been theirs 121. Their weighty and glorious enterprises by Sea and Land against the Saracens for the Emperors of Constantinople and against the Genoeses 129. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy 130 Why almost all Christian Princes entred into a League against them 132-180 How discreetly they have continued Neutrals in the discords of Princes that thereupon Peace might follow in these latter times 167. Why they sent into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry 172 Vertue what two vertues are necessary for him that proposeth great matters to himself and aspireth after glory 88 Vertuous To make men vertuous three things are needful 11 W. WAR brought home to the Enemies own doors how advantagious 28 When it ought to be carried on with protracting of time 31. War and not Peace was the cause of Romes ruine 46. It is subject to divers successes and chances more then any other action of ours 31-183-185 Wars made by the Romans after the subduing of Carthage 48. Made and maintained by them in many places at once 65. Particulars most necessary for them 149. The manner of Wars now used is the chiefest cause why the enterprises of modern Princes prove not equal to those of the Antients 148 The end of the second Table ERRATA Pag. lin 4-45 AFter not read only 5-7 Dele not 8-17 For licence read licentiousness 10-27 For temperance read temper 11-38 For them read those 15-25 Before what insert do ib. 48 Dele more 19-19 For of read and for and read of 25-38 Dele only 26 ult After obedience insert iâ— 35-26 After â—ighting read they 37-43 After these insert rather 38-14 After of Insert all this 39-12 Before the insert to 43 pen. After as insert if 53-12 After 〈◊〉 insert the less 55-31 After not insert only 60-3 After not insert only 73-17 Dele and the first Pag. lin 74-27 Before Goths insert great valor of the ibid. 31 For Commanders read Soldiers 82-50 For Rhodosius read Rhodanus 89-30 For Soldiers read Commanders 112-30 For where read were 113-48 Dele then by 116-20 For a read the. 124-7 For them into his read him into thâ—â— 126-34 After mens insert thoughts 152-25 Before Pope insert with Francis King of France 157-5 After if insert we 158-45 For sadly read easily 159-26 For Corâ—â—r read Corfâ— ibid. 29 For Corfee read Corfâ— 176-47 After thereof insert more 199-2 Before not insert it ibid. 3 Dele it 20â— 19 Dele be THE FIRST BOOK The First DISCOURSE What was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot THere are many who reflecting upon the Greatness of the Commonwealth of Rome wonder at her so many prosperities by which she flourished a long time and at last obtained the mastery of all other Monarchies And thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of Arms and management in Peace do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation and what blame-worthy and to be avoided But certainly these men seem not to know to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended For that is not simply the greatness of an Empire to which she at the beginning riseth by Fortune and which is increased by Injustice but that may well be said to be the true Form of Government by which people living in peace and union may work righteously and obtain Civil felicity He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth without suffering his eyes to be dazeled wiâ—h the splendor of the Roman greatness let him consider them nakedly as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchased them and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men which are more to be observed for the amendment of present Governments by their example then for imitation out of hopes of attaining any true praise or apparent good But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City then the Form of Government by which as by the soul thereof every good act is produced so of all other observations which may be had of the City of Rome there is not any more worthy or of more use then to examine what was the truest Form of her Government that we may afterwards see whether she might have been beâ—ter ordered in Civil affairs then she was without disordering her Militia and whether she could keep together the People armed and obedient to the Laws To know then what the condition of her Government was and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it as hath been thought by some men following the Rule which Philosophy teacheth us which says that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people and according to other accidents we must examine what that State was in it self and then what proportion it held with that City But because it would be too difficult a business to assign any certain condition unto her which may equally correspond to all times she not having so punctually observed one and the same Form continually but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a Popular State we must have our eys most fixt upon that Age wheâ—ein the glory of that Commonwealth did most flourish not so bearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times as may conduce to our purpose He who would diligently consider all the parts of the Republick will find not only so much diversity but even contrariety in them as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properest Form of Government For if respect be had to the great Authority of Consuls especially in Armies we may not without reason believe that that City under the name of a Commonwealth was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom since that Form of Magistracie did use such Authoâ—ity in managing of Arms in concluding Peace and in agreeing differences between potent Kings as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of those thing with more absolute power differing from Monarchy only in this that they kept this Authority but for a
Commonwealth of Venice hath gotten an excellent Government but was not at first governed by those Laws which she now is But diversity of Occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her Citizens who adding new Orders to the old have brought her to such a height of perfection Which might the easilier be done because that City was free-born and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end to wit to Peace and Concord and to the Union of her Citizens But on the contrary other modern Republicks the Cities wherein such Governments were formed having been formerly long accustomed to obey Emperors since they got their Liberty by many Accidents they knew not as not being well acquainted therewith how to use it by reason of the Citizens various dispositions of mind So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government they in process of time return'd under the command of one These Considerations being applied to the City of Rome will prove that the prudence of her Citizens though they were very wise and valiant men was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth but they might have amended many great disorders in her which did much shorten her life For he who will consider the conditions of the people of Rome will find them to be such as no Form of Government could better agree with them then a Popular State for they were all warlike men bred up even from the very first foundation of the City in the exercise of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongst these which may have a certain similitude to an Aristocratical State when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws partake every man more or less of that Government according to their worth For Military discipline hath a certain species of Vertue though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a City yet this Government is very seldom met with and though it want the true and proper Form is commonly called by the usual name of a Commonwealth So as though at first the City of Rome leaned much thereunto in a short time the People had a great share therein who not knowing how to moderate themselves made it grow licentious But he who will look back even to her first beginning will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the City For the Peoples power and liberty was great not only after the driving out of the Tarquins but even when it was commanded by Kings that City seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the Form of a Commonwealth then of a Kingdom For after the death of Romulus the People being powerful as having the weapons in their hand and as being the first Founders of that City usurped the authority of choosing Kings who on the contrary side that they might the better confirm themselves in their new Kingdom endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the People and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals as appeared in Horatius his case who being condemned by the Magistrates for his Sisters death appealed to the People and was by them freed In favor of them likewise the City was divided into Centuries with a certain Order of a very small Tax according to which the Degrees of the Militia and the Authority of the Publick Courts things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State were to be distributed To boot with these Laws the great number of Citizens which did even then arise to One hundred and thirty thousand made the Peoples party very powerful as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the Commonwealth without receiving any pay for their pains But the Nobility was a long time very weak and in but little esteem For the first Founders of the City being Shepherds and all of the same condition there was no distinction of degree amongst them save what was soon after brought in 〈◊〉 Romulus who choosing the Senate out of all that former number that they might be assistant to the King in providing for things requisite for the State by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the People in this new City from the rest who gave the rise to the Roman Nobility But even this Order was very weak for it was at first instituted by Romulus but of a small number of men and though others were afterwards added thereunto yet till such time as the City got her liberty 〈◊〉 never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators nay even these were much lessened by the cruelty of Tarquinius Superbus and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoise of Regal power So as when the City put herself into Liberty there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of Optimati in this case did Publius Valerius find the City of Rome after the driving out of the Tarquins when he through Brutus his death remaâ—ning sole Consul was to constitute Laws and new mould the Commonwealth Wherefore desirous to introduce a State differing from the former under the name of Liberty it behoved him not to lessen but to encrease the Authority of the People For else they would not have indured it and by fiding with the Tarquins they might easily have confounded that Government and reduced the City again under the power of Kings For which reason also Brutus though he was first created Consul not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well established perswaded his Colleague Tarquinius Collatinus that to give satisfaction to the People to whom the name of Tarquin was become odious and suspitious to lay down his Consulship By these Reasons it appears that Valerius was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People as were the Appeals from the Consuls The order that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of Magistracy without the Peoples approbation the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the Consuls commands which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep Moreover he eased the poor of many grievances and made many other very Popular Laws whence he purchased the name of Publicola But which 't is understood that in ordering of the Commonwealth respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times yet if we shall consider other Accidents we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity for the new Legislator was not Prince as was Licurgus but possest a place of Magistracy for a short time the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known and not much valued So as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a Popular
whilst he was abroad in the Juâ—urthan War was created Consul and made chief Commander against the Cimbrians though he ought not in his absence and in time of contumacy to have been chosen to that Magistracy Caesar after having commanded the Roman Armies five years when he was sent to wage War in France had his place of command cont nued unto him for five years longer and not herewithal content but being accustomed to rule he asked leave of the Senate to keep abroad and to continue in the Army which when the Senate would not give way unto they too late opposed his desire he being grown so powerful by reason of his continuation in military command as he valued not the Senates Authority nor the being declared an enemy to the Commonwealth But if we will consider the beginning of Civil Discords how and where the siding began which insected the minds of the Citizens with pestiferous corruption we shall find that this happened not in time of Peace in Cities or by reason of Civil Affairs but in the Camp amongst Weapons and when the Commonwealth was bufied in weighty Wars For Marius being drunk with the desire of military glory and not being able to endure that it should be taken from him or diminished by Sylla as he imagined it might happen by reason of Syllas happy success in the Jugurthan War wherein having taken Iuguâ—tha alive he had the glory to have put an end to that War He began to think of establshing yet more greatness in himself by making many of the Order of Cavaliers and of the people partial to him and impudently corrupting the Citizens first with moneys and afterwards with open force of Arms making the Magistracy and command of the war be conferred and resolved upon in him as he did in the Consulship and Proconsulship against Mithridates The Nobility being afrighted at this mans greatness by reason of his authority and reputation with the Soldiers they mightily encreased Sylla's power who was an enemy to Marius till at last they came to taking up Arms and shedding of civil blood But who knows not that Caesar moved thereunto more out of a desire of his own greatness then out of his alliance with Marius raised and maintained his Fraction in Rome and that his power encreased not in Peace and in the Market-place but in War and in the Camp So for the same reason for which Sylla was advanced a little before it behoved the Senate to confer more greatness upon Pompey then became the condition of civil Government so as the whole City was divided and with those arms by which though taken up and made use of against enemies the first occasion of contention among private Citizens was given the very Commonwealth must be wounded which stood in the midst between them so as her vitâ—l spirit of liberty being taken away her throat was cut by those whom she had most favoured But whence did the so many other corruptions of those times arise save from the so many prosperous successes of war by which the Citizens being much enriched and made proud could not betake themselves to live parcimoniously and with civil equality And it is said of Caesar that he corrupted the people of Rome by moneys which he had got in the War so to make them confer places of Magistracy as he listed upon such as were his friends and partial to him Out of these respects the wise Legislator Lycurgus intending to lay the foundation of a long lasting Government in Sparta though he introduced Military exercises to the end that the Citizens might be able to defend their Country yet he ordered the City so as it could not much increase its power by any Forgein War But the Commonwealth of Rome not being ordered for peace could never find out not enjoy a peaceful condition How is it then given out that peace and idleness was the ruine of that City How should she beleeve that her Arms should remain idle if she would have the whole world for her enemy as Mariâ— said to Mithidates that who would not recieve Law from the Romans must make themselves more powerful then they So as the counsel which Scipio gave to his Romans of not utterly destroying Carthage might be good in another respect for the preservation thereof might encrease that glory to their Commonwealth which many of her valiant Citizens seemed greatly desirous of to wit to have easily pardoned their enemies when they should have humbled themselves as the Carthaginians had then done haveing not onely with great humility begged peace of the Senate by their Ambassadors but given many of their chief Citizens for hostages to Scipio and great store of Arms to secure the Romans that they would keep their Articles And truly the destruction of that noble City did differ from the usual generosity of the Romans who had wont after Victory to grâ—â—t the Cities and Kingdoms to those very enemies with whom they had fought making both King and People in all parts or Tribuâ—ory or Confederate to the Senate and People of Rome But I see no reason at all why they should forbear the rooting out of these the Romans antient enemies for fear lest they should be undone with idleness and that civil discords should thereupon ensue How many years were there between the second and third Carthaginian war and yet when was the Commonwealth of Rome free from Foreign war though these her Enemies did not appear to be so The last Carthaginian war being hardly ended did not they wage war in Spain with the Numantines for the space of fourteen years And yet in these times the bounds of the Roman Empire may be said to have been very narrow in respect of what they were afterwards France which then was Mistress of more Provinces then now she is was not as yet subdued nay the difficulty and length of that War bringing along with it the prorogation of Command since Caesar commanded the Armies for ten years together did much increase those disorders which did at last prove the ruine of the Commonwealth But how much did Pompey enlarge the bounds of the Roman Empire in Asia over how many conquered Kings and Provinces did he triumph Armenia Cappadocia Media Iberia Syria Arabia Phaenicia and other Nations were reduced under the Romans power by this sole Commander It will seem strange and yet it is related by authentical Writers that nine hundred Cities were made subject and tributary to the Roman Empire by Pompey and almost as many more by Caesar And he who will consider it well shall find that the Roman Commanders did flourish most and were most cryed up after the destruction of Carthage Rome wanted then neither means nor will to exercise her Arms not to mention so many Wars which were all of them famous if not for the greatness of acquisition at least for other weighty accidents and if not for their strength yet for the wisdom of the Enemy That of Tigranes
That whatsoever hath had a beginning must have an end will not satisfie our inquisitive understandings Empires as all other earthly things have their beginning increase perfection declination and last ruine and destruction all of them ordained and disposed of by certain causes And though they may be seen to vary according to the variety of Accidents that is not notwithstanding Chance which appears to us to be so when we cannot penetrate into the true causes of things In the beginning the Roman Empire was governed in the form of a Common-wealth her first Founders having begun to enlarge her Dominion amongst her neighboring people She continued in this her infancie as I may call it many years till the times of those famous Scipio's who brought Spain and Africa under her dominion But afterwards in the ensuing Age wherein Caesar Pompey and so many other famous Commanders did flourish she mounted to the height of her greatness and glory Neither did Augustus Caesar degenerate from the worth of them though the Form of Government was changed but he likewise did much increase the Empires Confines in the Eastern parts amongst the Indians and other exterior Nations and establish'd excellent Orders both Civil and Military in the Empire But this Monarchy may be said to staâ—d at a stay at this time being constituted in a Throne of Majesty reverenced and obeyed by all Nations and in this condition she preserved herself for well nigh three hundred years wherein though many and great Wars were made by the so many Emperors who governed in those days yet were they rather made for the preservation then for the enlarging of the Empires confines For there was not almost any of the barbarous and far distant Nations as well of the East as of the West which those Emperors were not forc'd to vanquish and overcome several times and reduce them to the obedience of the Empire from which they had rebelled And if any one did enlarge the Empire in furthest remote parts as did the Emperor Trajan in Armenia India and some others in other Regions and Provinces it was notwithstanding at the same time lessened in other parts by new Rebellions But in Galienus his time who was the thirty fourth Emperor the Empires supreme greatness began to decline For though she received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of Arcadius and Honorius which was above a hundred years after yet in this intervening time the Empire being in her decaying age grew weak yet sustein'd herself and like a Tree whose root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd could not be easily eradicated so as though she were oftentimes shrewdly shaken by Armies of sundry Nations yet was she able to resume her strength and keep herself on foot Thus stood the Roman Empire then wherein many miraculous things offer themselves to our consideration and invite us to seek out the true occasion thereof For on one side it appears a strange thing that an Empire arrived at such a height of greatness when she once began to decline hasted so fast to her ruine there not being any other Potentate left in the World which was able to counterpoise her power yea which did not obey her as subjugated by her Armies having also so many Soldiers to defend her desirous for their own advantage to preserve the Empire But on the other side he who shall consider into the hands of how many base and wicked men this so great Empire fell he may very well wonder how so violent a thing could endure for so many Ages and how a Dominion governed by so many Tyrants could pass from hand to hand through the series of so many Emperors whereof there were above five hundred between Caesars time and that of Arcadius and Honorius in whose days the Roman Empire began visibly to fall by the taking of Rome by the ruine of Italy and of other Provinces belonging to the Empire And yet 't is known that the Persian Monarchy which was of so great esteem amongst the antient Kingdoms was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of Princes given to idleness and pleasure and was by Alexander carried to another Nation whereof there are many examples seen almost in every Age. Let us then say that another violence helped very much to sustain this violence of such a force is the union of alike things Thus did the corrupt Customs of the People and Militia of Rome help to maintain the State and Power of these Tyrannous Princes For since People lived in Rome with much licentiousness and were enteâ—tained with many Pastimes and publick Shews made by the Emperors wherein those appeared to be most splendid who were most overgrown with vice as were Caligula and Nero who did not only make the wonted sports of Hunting and of Comedies be often represented with more then usual magnificence but introdâ—ced new Shews as Naval battels Chariots drawn by Camels and Elephants and permitted all licentiousness to the Soldiery no man desired to change condition and the Pretorian Soldiers enjoying all things of use and priviledg neer unto the City did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men And when such Princes grew tedious to them they put them to death proclaiming a new Emperor and receiving from the new Prince many gifts in reward of their wickedness And the disorder grew so great as sometimes the Empire of the World was by the Soldiers sold by Outcry to who would give most for it and at low rates as it fell out in the time of Didius-Iulianus Nor was the authority of the Senate able to correct this so great inconvenience as well for that being trodden under foot by force it was grown very weak as also for that the antient Roman generosity was wanting in them So as the Senate having resolved after the death of Caligula to free the City and Empire from the like Tyranny and to restore her to her liberty they could not be constant iu their resolution but being abased by fear submitted soon to the obedience of Claudius of Caesars linage and accepted of him for their Emperor as soon as he was cry'd up by the Pretorian Soldiers The like to which happened afterwards in many Emperors those being confirmed by the Senate which were chosen by the Army This licence was diversly used by the Soldiers themselves For the Pretorian Bands and that Army wherein the Emperor was at the time of his death pretended a particular priviledg in the choice of the new Emperor Yet Emperors were so often cry'd up by other Armies also which were in several Provinces of the Empire as all of them desirous in Galienus his time to usurp this authority there were thirty two who at one and the same time made use of the name and title of Roman Emperor So as it seems it may be truly said that the Roman Empire was preserved not in respect to unity or to the same form of Government but only in respect of
that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors whom by reason of the said Armies all Provinces were to obey there being no Militia like to that of the Romans or which could resist them or withdraw themselves from their yoke But great was the diversity in all things almost in all Ages for the height of Empire was arrived at by several ways Some got it by Inheritance as Tiberius Caligula Nero and in the following Constantinus Constantius and many others some though very few were câ—â—sen by the Senate many by the Emperors themselves who in their life-time chose some one for their Companions and Successor in the Empire calling him Caesar to whom after the former Emperors death the Title of Emperor and of Augustus was given But their number were most who got the Empire through favor of the Solâ—iery wherein one and the same respect did not always prevail but many much different considerations regard sometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former Emperors sometimes to worth and to some singular action of War sometimes to favor which Commanders knew some way or other how to come by from their Armies and sometimes to some other such like things Whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition but even of divers Nations were made Emperors of Rome Trajan and Theodotius were Spainards â—robus Giovinianus and Valentinus Hungariaâ—s Dicclesian a Dalmarian Cato a Slavonian and some others But that which made the difference greater was that this Empire as it was diversly gotten so was it diversly administred By some so tyrannically as there is no so infamous and wicked vice whereof you find not shameful examples in the lives of Tibeâ—us Caligula Nero Commodus Caracalla Heliogabolus and other of those Emperors whereas the Empire was governed by some others with such Wisdom and Justice as no more perfect Regal Government can almost be imagined And what excellent vertue not to speak of Augustus was there to be desired in Vespatian Titus Trajan Adrian Antoninus Marcus Aurelius Alexander Severus and such like Whence it was that there having been good and bad Emperors in divers Ages as much of Dignity Authority and Power as this Empire lost through the bad Government of those wicked Princes it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of these good and vertuous Princes And this may be alledged for the first reason why the Empire was able to preserve it self for so long a space of years For being for a while run into many disorders sâ—ch as were introduced by the baseness and negligence of other their Predecessors were by the worth of generous Princes amended and returned to their first channel The Romans antient and confirmed use of good military orders did likewise help well towards this Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy persons yet finding the usual Armies already raised and ready for any enterprise they were able by means of their Commanders to wage war successfully and to quiet such rising and rebellions as continually arose in so great an Empire Thus Tiberius did not onely return France which had rebelled to obedience but subjugated Comagena and Cappadocia and driving out their Kings reduced them to Provinces Nero drove the Parthians out of Armenia and placed King Tigranes there making that Kingdom Tributory to the Empire Claudius did not onely reduce Mauritania which by means of her Commanders made insurrection against the Empire but did himself in person pass with his Army into England to appease the Risings of that Island and yet these Princes were not thought to have of themselves any great worth in them These and some other such like causes may perhaps be alleadged why this Empire could maintain it self in that greatness to which it was arrived But to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after as a thing very strange of it self as also for many other notable consequences to wit to the causes of its declining and ruine Three may in my opinion be chiefly alleadged The immeasurable greatness of the Empire the simplicity and wickedness of those who governed it and the corruption of customs which were far different from those with which it was first founded and wherein it grew great Humane imperfection is the cause why mans vertue as it is not onely finite and bounded but weak â—â—d brittle so hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded but circumscribed within no very large limits which were it otherwise it would loose it self in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to escape safe And of this to omit the examples of many other of our actions we will onely consider for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand That his worth must be exceeding great who is to rule and command over others Phylosophers have affirmed That such a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth as he doth in Dignity and Power nay that his worth and vertue ought to weâ—gh against that of all those that he will rule over But let us pass by these supreme Eminences which are rather to be desired then ever hoped to be found 'T is very certain that it is very hard to govern an Empire well and the greater it is the greater is the difficulty of governing it Wherefore Lycurgus a very wise Legislator knowing that the quiet of a City and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition and with a certain Form of Government ought to be the true cause of ordaining good Laws would of his own election so dispose of his Spartans and of the orders of that Commonwealth as she should not be able much to enlarge her Confines But on the contrary Rome as all the constitutions of the City and the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the Common-wealth so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace not onely by reason of foreign Forces but not by occasion of discord between the Citizens The bounds of her Empire grew to be almost immense and she marcht with her Forces to the utmost parts of the Earth subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous Nations But at last not having almost any foreign Enemies to fight with her Citizens begun to make use of their Armies which had conquered other Nations in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves till at last the worth and fortune of Caesar prevailed so as Augustus remained sole Lord of the World and Tiberius who succeeded him entered peaceably into so great an Empire wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers train'd up in a perpetual Militia and by reason of Civil Wars accustomed to live very licentiously The greatest acquisitions of the largest and farthest distant Provinces were very lately made there having been above 1700 Cities taken by two onely Commanders Caesar and Pompey and powerful Nations vanquished So as it behoved to
keep a great number of Soldiers in those Garisons to keep the people in obedience which were in pares farthest distant from the Senate of the Empire But the very same thing which was introduced to provide against those dangers was cause of others by reason of the Authority which the Armies had already usurped and out of hopes afforded to the Commanders of attaining this supreme dignity by being by the Soldiers cried up Emperors Wherefore one onely man though of never so much worth not being able to supply all places and provide for so many things as so great an Empire stood in need of and less able to correct the disorders which in so many States as civil humors in members farthest distant from the heart did daily more and more encrease the Empire must needs be continually â—ext both by foreign Nations and by its own Soldiers so as it was hardly ever free from such troubles nor was War sooner ended in one place but it broke forth in another nay for the most part divers Roman Armies fought in several places at one and the same time each of them endeavoring to sustain him whom they had chosen to be their Emperor Therefore Adrian to remedy so many disorders in the Empire which he thought did onely arise by reason of the Emperors being so far off and the largeness of the Confines resolved not to keep his certain abode in Rome but spending his whole time in travelling to visit all the parts of his Dominions to keep his Subjects in their duties and knowing how hard a thing this would be to do and almost impossible in so large Confines he resolved to shorten them in the Eastern parts making the River Euphrates the utmost boundeur of the Emire and restâ—ring all the people of the higher Provinces to their Liberty even to India who being by his successors reduced under the obedience of the Empire and many rebellions ensuing thereupon and much difficulty not onely in the further distâ—nâ— parts bâ—t even in those that were nearest at hand Constantine the Great knowing that these evils could not otherwise be helpâ— but by carrying the seat of the Empire nearer those parts chose the City of Byzantium to be the place which being rebuilt by him took from him the name of Constantinople And hence it is that the Indian Gymnosophist being desirous to shew Alexander the Great that whilâ—t being born away with a desire of Rule in far distant Regions he was gone so far from his own Kingdom as he gave it occasion of rebelling against him made a hard and stiff Oxe-hide be laid upon the ground and walking upon the utmost skirts thereof shewed him that when the part that was trod upon gave way to the foot another part rose up And that so it befell many great Princes who whilst they seek to keep one part of their States low and quiet the rest which they keep far from rise up in rebellion Hence it was that many Emperors not only such as were unfit for Government but even the wisest and most valiant knowing and confessing themselves to be opprest by the weight of so great a mass câ—ose others who in their liâ—e-times were to be their Coadjutors in Government and who should succeed them after their deaths in the Empire which was seldom quietly possest by one alone the Armies of far distant Provinces reâ—â—sing oft-times to obey those who were chosen to succeed in the Empire by other Armies though they were with all solemnity allowed and accepted of by the Senâ—te as befell Galba who being created Emperor by the Spanish Army was not accepted of nor obeyed by the German Army The like befell many others so as sometimes it was not well known who was the true Emperor And certainly tallâ—inâ—es of the greatâ—st height of this Empire it may be known that no one man though of never so great worth was able to govern it in peace and quiet And even Augustus himselâ— made trial of many Insurrections in Spain Germany and in the Eastern pâ—â—ts amongst the â—cythians and Parthians though at lâ—st through his sinâ—ular worth and great good fortune the whole World being reduced to an universal Peace he was able to shut up that famous Temple of Ianus which was kept always open afterward his Successors having always occasion to modest themselvs with war So as the saâ—ing is made true that Suis ipsa Roma viribus ruit But his her ruine was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of those into whose hanâ—s tâ—e Empire often fell For through their fault the internal causes of the States corruption were either occasioned or much increased since by their ignorance baseness avarâ—câ— cruelty lust and other enormous vices they drew on contempt and injury the first and chief roots of all change of Government For by contempt the Subjects take occasion to rebel and chiefly the richest and noblest and from injury comes hatred and desire of change of Government And it was the greaâ—er misfortune for this Empire in all other respects more fortunate then all other Empires that in those very times wherein there was greatest need of a continued succession of wise and generous Princes to confirm the State which by vertue of the great Augustus was reduced from War and past disorders into Peace and good Government should after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and base Emperors Tiberius Caligula and Nero from whose enormous vices those chief evils arose to the Provinces of that Empire which we but now mentioned the contempt of that supreme dignity both amongst For in and her own Soldiers The former by rebelling strove to free themselves from their obedience the other through insolence bereâ—t them of Empire and life Haâ—red and desire of change arose likewise in the Senate which was deprived of its authority and particularly in those who were offended or had any thing of generosity in them Hence â—t was that soon after to wit in â—ero's time Caesars linage ended and thaâ— the Soldiers accustomed to much licentiousness under such Princes usurp'd the authoriâ—y of making Emperors as they did in Galba after Nero's death in Otho after Galba and so in many others His worth who commanded in chief and his good fortune who was to succeed in the Empire was sometimes able to make a Successor but not to take this authority totally from the Soldiery through confidence of whose favor many aspired though by bad means to usurp the Empire and amidst these contentions the Empire must needs be divided shatter'd and weakened From this root another disorder arose which was cause of many heinous mischiefs to wit the general corruption of Customs in all the Orders of the City of Rome For Subjects following as usually they do their Princes inclinations and exercises men began to give themselves over to an idle life and Vertue being neither nourished nor at first maintained still languished more and more so as the Art of Commanding failing
recieved so sore and so irreparable blows from the Barbarians it was brought to such weakness in the Eastern parts by reason of the many great disorders which were in the Head and in all the Members which were now become incureable â—s it was not able to sustain the force of the fierce and warlike Northern Nations And beginning once to fall when its worth was but little it could not get up again as it had done at other times Now if we will apply these more general considerations to some particular chances of this Empire the true cause of its declination will the more easily be known The Affairs of the Empire were almost at all times greatly molested by divers of the Northern People many of which were never reduced to the obedience of the Empire some of which had not been known till they took up Arms but of all the rest the Goths proved the most famous for the ruine of the Empire and for the so many calamities of Italy and of many other Nations and he who shall consider their beginnings and their progress must needs wonder very much and through confusion lose the discourse of humane wisdom To think how this barbarous people and so far remote from our Regions and unknown by them insomuch as at this day their original is not by Authors agreed upon without or Kingdom or Military Discipline falling down tumultuously at first to possess themselves of other mens Countries should soon become so powerful and formidable as that they should overcome the Romans who had overcome the world Who could have imagined that a new and unknown people were to come from forth the utmost Northern parts to destroy so vast an Empire by which so many powerful Kings and famous warlike Nations were subjected The most general opinion is That these men who destroyed the Empire came from Scythia into Europe where they were possest of many large Regions differing amongst themselves in name and habitation those who lived more towards the East being called Estern-Goths and others more Western-Goths But they were thought to be but new Inhabitants of that Country into which they were first come from certain Islands in the Sarmatian Ocean and that being worsted by some of their neighboring people after many contestations had with them their Country being moreover of two smal a circuit for their abounding numbers they betook themselves to seek out new seats and other habitations And thus they passed over very many times in very great numbers into the Provinces belonging to the Empire possessing and indamaging many Countries The things a little before mentioned being the cause why these evils and the greater ruines which ensued were not remedied For the Empire being of a very vast extent was continually troubled with sundry commotions in sundry parts The Princes who commanded were of little worth and the former antient valor and discipline was no longer found in their Armies which were given over to licentiousness Hence it was that whenin the time of Philip the first of that name but in order the Nine and twentieth Roman Emperor the Goths fixt themselves in Mysia and Thrace such forces were not sent against these novelties as might appease them and quell the then but small strength of these tumultuous people For there being no loyalty in the Commanders nor valor in the Soldiers those who were sent by the Empeor against such enemies intended their own particular interest more then the service of the Empire Insomuch as Macrinus and Decius being sent the one after the other to be chief of the enterprise made themselves be cried up Emperors by the Army having first permitted much licentiousness in the Soldiers that they might win their good will And when the same Decius was truly possest of the Empire after the death of Macrinus and of Philip also joyning battel with the Goths he found the effects of nourishing sedition in Armies and in winking at their disobedience and at the non-performance of their military duuties for his Army was routed and put to flight by the Goths and he seeking to save himself by running away was drowned in a marrish ground And when after these losses the Empire ought to have been restored and the honor thereof vindicated by the Successor with new Forces Gallus who had obtained this supream dignity by the Souldiers rashness and who was a poorly spirited man and had come by the Empire by indirect means That he might enjoy his leasure time in Rome which he leudly spent he was easily perswaded to make a shameful peace with the Goths not onely permitting them to â—arry in the Provinces which they were possessed of but obliging himself to pay them a certain sum of money yearly Thus the City of Rome which was Mistress of the whole World became tributary to a Barbarous people who knew not till then what belong'd to Imperial dignity to Wealth nor to Military glory This base Agreement gave a great blow to the reputation of the Roman Empire so as in Galienus his time who soon after succeeded in the Empire so many mutinies and insurrections arose as Italy it self was hardly kept in obedience and the Goths grew so insolent as breaking the Peace which they had made with the Gauls they took many Cities in Bythinia in Thrace and in Macedonia By which prosperous successes others of the Goths being encouraged who had tarried all this while at home where they lived in narrow precincts they sent to the Emperor Valens to demand abode in the Provinces of the Empire with whom fear prevailing more then the antient honor of the Empire and the Roman generosity gave way to their request allotting Bulgaria and Servia for these new Inhabitants to live in suffering the Northern Nations thus to get footing and to increase in strength which had always been the greatest Enemies to the Empire and from whom the Emperors had received such injuries and shame These easie acquisitions and the hopes of greater matters made Alaricus King of the Goths march not long after with a numerous Army from his own Kingdom towards Italy demanding that a place of residence might be allowed him by the Emperor Honorius in France and receiving a denial did in his fury do greater mischief But the same Emperor Valens soon felt the harm of this his ill-taken advice For the same Goths increasing through the baseness and negligence of others and the Huns Alani and other Northern people conspiring together with them they besieged the City of Constantinople and other noble Cities were endangered which made Gratianus choose Theodosius for his Companion in the Empire for the great repute which was had of his valor though he were a Spaniard by Nation But though he behaved himself gallantly against these Enemies and wan some brave victories yet since they had already got great strength and were governed in obedience under their valiant Masters and Commanders and for that the Empire was still busied in other Wars it was
and the power of some Citizens to increase too much Who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military Commands and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds nor could the Laws curb them did totally subvert that Government insomuch as it was said of Caesar that he would not have any Superior to him in the City and of Pompey that he would have no Equal And Cato had wont to say that Caesars immoderate greatness had enforc'd Pompey likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service to the end that the one might counterpoise the other So grant one inconveâ—ience others will easily follow And as too great eminencie in any Citizen although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick ought to be suspected so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the Carthaginians had without falling upon violent courses which in stead of Physick proves poison to that State The House of Medici began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in Florence by means of old Cosmo's great wealth it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of Lorenzo and so by little and little getting to a great height of power which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country but would assume unto it self the superiority of that Government So as when the Florentines were too late aware thereof they could not moderate that too immease greatness for the continued power of that Family wherein there had been excellent men for worth and eminent degrees and dignities purchased by them both in their own Country and elswhere had got them so many to side partially with them as their own Faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them The like happens also in some States wherein there is not so express a form of a Commonwealth but a supreme Prince yet also many particular Lords of great authority In such States the too much greatness of Bâ—rons hath oft-times proved too pernicious For there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater and they having means to do so where their power is not limited by the Laws and Customs of the State they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their degree to equal their authority to that of the King himself and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof in the present troubles of France which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom and the better to foment and sustain their parties and to perfect their designs they had recourse to forein forces and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some Prinâ—es to have an eye upon such whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected and to allay thâ—s their greatness by not admitting them into chief imployments by taking away or lessening their Priviledges and Immunities and by lessening their authority and universal favor by other means according as occasions have counselled Consalvâ— a great and famous Commander in the former age had done excellent service to King Ferdinandâ— and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards as having by his own worth gotten and preserved the Kingdom of Naples he was taken off from all imployment and brought back into Spain to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition That prudent Prince was moved thereunto as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up and who was so followed and applaâ—ded both by the common people and the Nobility could not but be to be suspected So as he knew it was requisite for his own security and the like of his Dominions not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way first by Periander to Thrasybalus and after by Tarquiâ— the proud to his Son Sâ—xtâ—â— are very observable to wit to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies oâ— ears of corn whereby they would infer that he who will rule in safety must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others for what concerns any Civil Power which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical Siâ—es yet wheâ— it is used with discretion and wisdom hath another aspect for all particular interests ought to give way where the publick good and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State which is of aâ—much greater concornment is in question But when this may be done by any ordinary way as by Law and Custom as it was among the Athenians and other antient people then this remedie proved the more just and secure There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law then Ambition for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force but rather the maladie increasing by length of time it makes men as it were franticâ— so as the ambitious man covets all things and is not satisfied with any thing having neither mean nor bridle Honors Dignities Preferments how great soever they be serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher then for water to quench it insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one Now to this almost natural and ordinary defect of humanity and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States as it is of it self incorrigible 〈◊〉 will prove a wholesome cure and which the Atheniâ—ns in particular 〈◊〉 their Commonwealth stood in need of For as Greece did in that Age abound 〈◊〉 men who were really valiant so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly conâ—â—â—isnated by an immoderate desire of glory and haughtinesâ— The Laws of canvassing and all other provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitless for every little sparkle that remains of this fire though it be covered over with ashes may cause great Combustions It seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition then totally to rid the City or State of such men as are desirous to exceed all others Plato said that men
Men but amongst bruit Beasts yea even amongst Vegetables Then since this Equality is not to be found amongst Men it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a Government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal For in conferring of honors or pâ—eferments in a City or State a Geometrical not an Arithmetical proportion must be observed It is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed He who is richer then another may be serviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick He who hath many Clients and Friends may by his power and authority dispose 〈◊〉 Peoples minds to believe â—ell and act well in the Cities occasions and affairs He who is advanced above others in glory must have deâ—erâ—â—d it well of the Commonwealth by some noble action and 〈◊〉 confirâ—t himself therein by some other like action And he Who is â—â—â—re generally given to any Vertue be it or Warlike or Civil is always 〈◊〉 then others to serve his Country and Prince upon all occasions So as to drive 〈◊〉 men as these out of the City is no better then to cut that member from the body which is loveliest and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto Such an Instiâ—uâ—ion then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments And the examples alleadged of Thrasâ—â—alâ—â— and Tarquin are examples of Tyranâ—â— who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominionr were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men and endeavor to be quit of thâ—â— for their greater security But a just Prince must not imiteate such examples â—ay even in a Politick Government these Proceedings would be pernicious For he who will thereby preserve himself must change the Form of the whole Government and reduce it to a Despoâ—ical and servile condition with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie as it hath done to the Turks in these later times and formerly in some other Nations wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount without any respect to the good of the Subject and more according to will then to Law Nor is it true that the power of Citizens or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom proves alwas harmful it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State But this may be ill uâ—ed as many other things are the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City would ruine it not bring it to perfection Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things not the things themselves when they are not simply and in themselves evil And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated and their continuing is their military Commands moderated by a shorter time Caesar could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army and in the same Province Nor had they needed to have raised Pompey to such a height to oppose Caesars greatness But when when they had let it run on too long to declare him an Enemy to his Country and drive him out of Italy proved a violent remedy and mortal to the Common-wealth Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended by the banishment of so many Citizens who being become too great are for suspition drives out of their Country of securing themselves from their power rather Injury added to Ambition serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State to râ—ise some revolt in it for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd is rather increased then diminished We have infinite examples in all Ages of those who being driven by banishment out of a City or State have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto For though it cannot be denied but that the â—o great power of Citizens in a City or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom begets suspition and is dangerous and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State yet some other remedy thâ—◠〈◊〉 may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do 〈…〉 For that is only to suffer a â—ore to grow old and to gangrene that they 〈…〉 wards forcâ—d to 〈…〉 or sword to heal it In a well-govern'd State 〈…〉 be had and caâ—â— taken both by the Law it self and by the Prince who rules is chief therein not to suffer any one to grow to too 〈…〉 And if any 〈◊〉 do arrive at such a condition as he begins too far to overtop the reâ—â— the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away and of his ploting thoughts so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties or disturb the publick peace Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same imployments and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place such things ought not to be left in their power which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughâ—â— to the prejudice of the publick good which may be done under a pretence of honor so as the Princes may not be noted for injustice nor can the particular persâ—nages account it as an injury done them If any one do abound in riches let him have expensive imployments that he may lessen that wealth which made him appear more eminent then others If he be of too great authority in the Court or amongst the People as having had the management of important affairs along time send him to some place of Magistracie or other imployment a far off and change him often from place to place If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him give him hard and difficult imployments wherein if he succeed not well his reputation will soon grow less with the people who judge by the events But if such a one appear too much ambitious and be so as many men are seen to be out of a certain vain-glory but without any malice of heart he may be contented and kept quiet by confering honors upon him of glorious appearance but little profit But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended and of better blood then others fâ—r many several respects meet often times in them to make them great and powerful yet even against these remedies may be found without
test the Wars proved very heavy unto them which they were forc'd to 〈…〉 did not joyn against them because they saw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth the way would be laid open to her for much greateâ— matters in Italy whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almost gotten was impeded Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land partly by reason of her self and partly through other various accidents which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises For the Eastern Emperors being Masters of Greece and of other States and Countries wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength as became their State But afterwards when that Empire began to decline she began to increase and flourish gloriously and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie as was seen when the Venetians went in companie of the French to the business of the Levant and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of Constantinople of which acquisition the Commonwealth had so great a share as that their Dukes did then assume the title of Signoridella quarta parte é Mezza di tutto L' Imperio della Romania And soon after with the like prosperous success they did by sundry means reduce many Islands and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command But this course of glorie and victorie by War was much slackened by the original Customs and Orders of the City as has been said which related more to Peace and Merchant affairs then to War Insomuch as the Venetians seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions rather for the better accomodation of their Navigation and Traffick then for any occasion of other enterprises Their business did therefore infinitely increase at this time insomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the Levant whither the Venetian Ships and Merchants did not flock Nay a great number of men of that Nation did usually remain in those Cities through whose hands the most precious Merchandise of those Countries past to the great advantage of the City and of her private Citizens So as the Genoeses plying the same places at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them as well for the profit of merchandizing as for the expertness and glory of Sea affairs till at last they came to open and cruel War which kept the Commonwealth so busied and perplexed by disturbing Navigation and even private affairs as for a long while they had no leasure to undertake other enterprises though they had met with opportuity for it and that they had been thereunto disposed For the Venetians having sundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune insomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf not more for Empire then for the safety of the City Thus whilst the Commonwealth spent her best years partly in these private affairs and merchandizing business partly in the so long and troublesome Wars against the Genoeses another Power arose in the Levant much greater and more formidable then was the Grecian Empire For the Ottaman Lords beginning by divers accidents but chiefly by reason of the discords among Christians to make notable and successful progress in their rising Empire grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land but also by Sea having reduced the City of Constantinople into their hands a very fit place for Sea enterprises whereby the Commonwealth of Venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing their Dominion by Sea having so great and powerful an â—nemy to near at hand but even what they had already got was exposed to hazard so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie she had more reason to think upon her own defence then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to inlarge her Confines whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with for at the very first she was to overcome the Dalmatians a Nation not onely very valiant but of a quick wit given to sedition and desirous of novelties Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these may be conceived by this that the Commonwealth of Rome having so many and so far distant Nations yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon Dalmatia which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of Qctavius Augustus but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less which had to contend with such Enemies and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her State and fortune Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Common-wealth of Rome had her happy beginnings and made the first progress to her Empire Which we shall find to differ much and to be free of the so many difficulties which the Venetians met with Rome had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince for the Assyrians had then the Monarchie whose confines did not extend beyond Asia and after the concourse of many years it was carried by Cyrus amongst the Persians with whom it remained for about Two hundred years till it was destroyed by Alexander of Macedon who though he made greater conquests and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off yet dying young in the height of his Victories he could not get into Europe nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince And by his death he having left no issue either legitimate or illegitimate behind him that Monarchie was soon destroyed and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed with which severally the Romans did afterwards much to their advantage make War So as Asia having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire the Provinces of Europe were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof and those that were further from thence as was Italy less then the rest But Greece which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues was divided into many several Peopledoms who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraigntie of that very
omen to Italy All the other Princes of Italy opposed him afterwards in his designs instructed by the fall of the King of Arragon to have an eye to their own danger except only the Florentines who still continued in adhering to the French the counsel of the most poâ—ent Citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wise So as the French preparing to return with mighty Forces into Italy they had friendship with none nor had they any other receptacle save with the Florentines with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them assisted with men and monies Pisa was at the same time straitly beleaguer'd by the Florentines and had she not been succor'd by the Venetians all her other aids were so weak as she must speedily have faln into the Florentines hands who being freed of the expence and trouble of that Siege would be more powerful and more ready to assist the French and to facilitate the enterprises which they were to attempt in Italy Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be just honest and laudable to take upon them the defence of the safety and liberty of Italy against the French how can those actions be blamed which did tend as it is seen necessarily thereunto by keeping foreign Forces afar off and by bereaving them of their â—riends assistance The affairs of the King of France did at this time ebb and flow but for the most part ebb in the Kingdom of Naples Great were the King of Arragons hopes of recovering the State being therein assisted powerfully by the same Venetians The King of France though his Forces were in a readiness was doubtful whether he should come into Italy or no. So as at such a conjuncture of time every least thing which tended either to the augmenting or lessening of his hopes was of great moment Pope Alexander moved by these respects did much press the Venetian Senate to be resolute in assisting the Pisans whilst he himself was somewhat doubtful and 〈◊〉 The Venetian Senate had the Florentines in good esteem and laying aside the memory of what was past would have had them for their friends if they would have separated themselves from the French who were then the 〈◊〉 Enemy and have entred into that Confederacâ—e whereinto all the rest of the Princes of Italy were entred and by whom they had many fair offers made them particularly to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of their State if they would put on a generous 〈…〉 those Forts which as 〈◊〉 Towns for their fidelity â—ere held by French garrisons and do this by Force of Arms not by Treaty 〈◊〉 Agreement But if these things could not be listned unto out of a 〈…〉 such a resolution that they might keep the Florentines busied about Pisa and the French from those succors whereby the troubles and dangers of Italy were increased But I find that these transactions have been diversly interpreted and the Senate blamed who did not aim at succouring the oppressed Pisans not at the common safety of Italy but at their own thirst of bringing the City of Pisa under their Dominion To this it is answered that where the actions are evident no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto nor ought the secrets of hearts to be searched which is reserved to a more excellent power then what humane discourse can arrive unto it is certain that the defence of Pisa which was oft-times denied them was at last undertaken by the Venetians when they being forsaken by all others they were necessitated for the aforesaid reasons so to do The Pisans offered to put themselves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth and to set up her colours in their City the Venetians would not yeeld hereunto nor accept of this large offer but the Pisan Ambassadors were sent back with many thanks for their affection and were heard in what they desired though in a differing manner for the Commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth which she did for many years with such fervencie and general consent sparing neither expence labor nor danger as she could hardly have done more in her own defence they sent both Foot and Horse several times to the Pisans under their best Commanders as also moneys and victuals and shipping to accommodate the City with all things necessary and to free them from the siege of the Florentines by Sea Yet to give a greater testimony of what their minds and intentions were in this when it was propounded to put the City of Pisa into Caesars hands and to remit the right of their cause to him the Venetians did not onely not oppose it but counseled them so to do desirous that this controversie might be ended whilst their faith and the common interests were preserved safe and when there was yet some opinion that the Florentines allured by this advantage and hope might have adhered unto the league but on the one side in progress of time the Florentines obdurate resolution was discovered of governing themselves by Counsels apart from the rest of the Italians and on the other the deep deceits of Lâ—dâ—wick Sforza who under the shadow of procureing peace and quiet growing jealous of the greatness which the Venetians might aâ—â—ive at by the acquisition of Pisa and calculating other mens by his own did in reality endeavor to secure himself from this his imaginary fear by hindring the Venetians from pursuing that enterprise to the which not long before he had exhorted them The Venetian Senate was inforced to maintain the cause which they had undertaken to keep from breaking their faith unto the Pisans and to free themselves from the infamy and repute of weak advice to which they should be subject as if they had condescended for fear of Lâ—dâ—wicks Forces or else as not knowing his cunning when it was already known to all men that the endeavor of agreement with the Pisans which was agitated under the name of the Collegues was managed onely by him and according to his will and interests But say I pray is this the onely enterprise wherein the sincerity and candidness of the Commonwealth is to be known in just things and such as do concern the common good of Italy How often hath she maintained Wars to the end that there might be a right and an Italian Governor in the Dukedom of Milan which cannot be denied since the effects thereof be so apparâ—nt as she would not lay down Arms before she had compast this her intent as she did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of Bâ—lâ—guia the year 1529. in which year by means of the Venetian Senate Maximilian Sforza was restored unto his State to whom the Dukedom of Milan did of right belong and their endâ— in the business concerning Pisa may likewise be discovered since when the agreement was come unto the Venetians had no respect to their own advantage but
friendship with Caesar which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King their Friend and Confederate the State of Milan little mindful of such a service as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes conspires her ruine and tuâ—ns those Arms against her which through their friendship were grown so powerful in Italy What should move him thereunto Not desire of revenge for there appeared no injury Not any fear of his own affairs for he had found them already very constant unto them No self-interest for he ought to have been jealous of Caesars greatness who had been his perpetual Enemy and to have wished well unto the Venetians who had been his antient Friends But what shall I say of the rest Had not Caesar the like obligations to the Venetians as the King of France had which should have kept him from such a confederacie Nay had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary The injuries which the French had done to the Empire the King of France his particular hatred to him the high aspiring thoughts of that King pernicious to the dignity of the Empire and to the German liberty Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the French so be ought rather to have obviated their power then have help'd to advance it But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of Ferdinand King of Spain so unusual and so harmful to himself by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in peace and quiet For which cause the greatness of the French their fidelity and natural desire of novelty ought to have been â—â—spected by him yet he assented to the increase of their power and of his own danger But how did those generous thoughts which Pope Iulius the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of Italy correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transaâ—pine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth which was confest by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of Italy and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation What safety could the Apostolick Sea expect by increasing the power of those Princes in Italy who were great of themselves whom he feared and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of Rome must depend These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators or of any other men how wise soever Nor was the immensity of the danger less nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War The King of France his Forces were of themselves very powerful that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before and become more formidable by the possession which the French had got of the Dukedom of Milan which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the Coâ—fines of the Common-wealth And though Caesars Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable yet were they increased by the fame he gave out that he led his Army into Italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people and got them to joyn their Forces with his Moreover the King of Spains Naval preparation was in particular to be feared to prevent the which those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed which should all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces became the more dreadful And though the other petty Princes forces were but small yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great and the Kings of England Poland and Hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them and to declare enmity to the Venetians If then the Venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once what could have been said unto them Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good For as an object of immensurable force does not move but corrupt the sense so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue but rather to disorder and to confound her Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels as from a thing that was in her own power that she was not worth much or that she did any thing unworthy of herself of her fame or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring What did she resolve to yield up of free-will What noise what complaints were heard which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words which could not be ended but with Arms The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them that the King was upon his march in Arms against the Commonwealth was onely that that War was intimated them from the King when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him but that they would not be wanting to their own defence being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces and through the right of their cause The effects were answerable to their words for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts veteran Soldiers mustered in all places in so great numbers and so qualified as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all that neither that Age nor any other for many years before had seen such an Army of meer Italians in Italy Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in other things do praise these proceedings being forced so
man thought of making any defence but sought how to save himself and the best things he had in the Capitol their houses and walls were abandoned and the very gates left open to the Enemy by the Roman Soldiers who fled into the City to save themselves and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth which was preserved for greater things sent Carius Camillus to succour it the rising glory of the Romans had even then been exstâ—â—ct But what shall we say of things that happened afterwards when their Fame grew greater Did not the Romans lose possession of all Italy after the rout given them by Hannibal at Cannae Did not the Cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where And did not they themselves give over all hopes of defending them the resolutions taken by the Souldiers shewed what the â—â—ight what the fear of the conquered was For some whilst they were yet in their own houses rendred themselves prisoners to the Conquerors others withdrew to the Sea side intending if they could have the benefit of shipping to go to some other Prince and seek out a new Country But with what despair the Citizens of Rome were possest when they heard the news of this misfortune in how great confusion all their Orders were may be conceived by what Livy relates who undertook not onely to write the History of the Commonwealth but to celebrate with perpetual praise the fame and merit of her Citizens And it was credibly belâ—eved for as much as we hear that those valiant men unaccustomed to know what fear was were strucken with such amazement as if Hannibal had known as well how to make use of victory as he did to overcome the so great and so long continued fortune of Rome had not onely been hereby interrupted but totally supprest And these very selfâ—same Carthaginians who had so long and so stoâ—â—â—y conteâ—â—ed for glory with their rival the Commonwealth of Rome when they tasted of adverse fortune went astray from their former generosity and suffered themselves to be born down by extremity of despair for after the defeat which they had received by Sea by the Romans they inclined to yeeld up unto them the Islands of Sicily and Sardiâ—ia and to make themselves 〈◊〉 for ever to the Senate and people of Rome and afterward being overcome in Battel by Scipio Affricanus they fell to find 〈◊〉 But why do I instance in so many examples Are not these sufficient to prove that the valiantest and wisest men are strangely teâ—â—ified at great and unexpected misfortunes and that when Armies are lost which are the instruments whereby States preserve themselves from the evils of War good Counsels must cease as not able to keep off other greater evils which do usually follow after that a Battel is lost Therefore out of the above-mentioned reasons and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents every one may be cleerly satisfied that the misfortune which the State of Venice underwent by reason of the ill-fought Battel of Giaradada ought not to detract any thing from her other praises For her subsequent actions by which with singular constancie and generosity she recovered what she had lost render her by the joint consent of all men truly glorious The Fourth DISCOURSE Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charls the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains AMongst those things of sad remembrance to Italy the passage of Charls the Eight King of France to the Conquest of the Kingdom of Naples may be numbred amongst the saddest and most recent For ever since that time the Transalpine Nations have had a power in Italy and the greatness of the Italian name which began at that time to be raised up again with hopes of greater glory all the parts of Italy being under the command of our Italian Princes return'd to such a declination by this blow as it could never since recover its pristine majesty But that which most afflicts the minds of those who are any ways generous is to think that this most noble Country fell into such misfortunes through the fault of her own men and that the Italian Princes to satisfie their own disordinate desires and immoderate ambition did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of Italy and little valuing the truer and greater dangers they stood basely looking on and suffer'd this their common Country to be rent in peeces by Foreiners The French Forces did at this time pass into Italy by which she had not for a long time been molested being called in by Lodovick Sforza and maintained by other Italians But ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counsel being touched by the danger more at hand by rearon of the French-mens great felicity which as it might have been foreseen further off so was it not now so easily to be remedied They therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the safety of Italy and to oppose King Charls his designs So as after the acquisition of Naples as he would return into France by the same way which he had come in with his Army which was notwithstanding much less numerous in men he was opposed by the Army of the confederate Princes as he came to the banks of Tarus who meant to hinder his passage and to fight his Army For a little before the Pope the King of the Romans the King of Spain the Commonwealth of Venice and the Duke of Milan had joined in confederacie to this purpose the Venetians havâ—ng been the first moâ—ioners thereof and express Ambassadors from all the aforesaid Princes had met in Venice where the League was concluded and published This resolution was at those times generally commended as being geâ—erous and suiting with the honor of Italy But notwithstanding there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein For they appear to be attended with that wisdom without which no action though perchance it may have good success deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men The taking up of Arms to drive the French out of Italy was doubtless a resolution as much to be commenped in the Italian Princes as some of them were blamed for calling of them in and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice But how these Arms were to be made use of against them and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away and to stop their passage and force both the French and themselvâ—s to come to a Battel is somwhat a difficult case
and which may admit of divers considerations It is an antient and approved proverb That a Bridg of Gold ought to be made for an Enemy that flies And this is grounded upon solid reasons for no Battel can be fought without much hazard and uncertainty of success since there may happen many unthought of accidents wherein the use of wisdom is excluded Therefore where to join battel is to be thought a good advice the condition of affairs must be such as that a man be not necessitated thereunto but makes it his choice and comes to it with greater hopes of overcoming then fear of being worsted and likewise the advantage must be more that is to be expected from the Victory then the prejudice which depends upon the loss thereof By thus measuring the carriage of these affairs by these rules we may the better know what judgment to give thereof If we consider the state of affairs before the Armies drew near there appears no necessity of fighting at that time For the King of France led his men back over the Mountains to their own homes without prejudice or injury to any one so as the meeting him to stop his passage and give him battel proceeded from election and from the determinate counsel of the Princes that were Confederates against him But what the end of the combat was like to be and how the business was ballanced might be guess'd at by many particulars before a stroke was struck The King of France led along with him an Army consisting of French and Switzers the former excellent for the Horse-Militia and the latter excellently well disciplin'd in Foot-service So as the Italian Militia was confess'd by all men to be far inferior to both these for they had wholly lost all their antient excellent institutions and had wanted true discipline for many years being by Foremers bereft of their antient military glory But the much different impressions which were in the Soldiers themselves was of great importance upon this occasion The French were haughty and puffed up by their success at Naples they slighted the Enemy their very name seeming to have infused so much terror into all the Italians as that neither Princes nor People had dared to oppose them but afforded them free and safe passage every where On the contrary the Italians accustomed only to such Wars as were made in Italy wherein little valor was shewen and less discipline without almost any loss of blood as if it were for meer shew and sport were to fear the unusual encounter with the French and to boot with their valor to apprehend their prosperity which had made the way so easie to them to so great and so noble an acquisition The Kings party was likewise favored by the Kings own presence and the danger which his own person was in which occasioned no small daring in the French Soldiery some being thereunto stirr'd up by their natural love to their King others by hopes of reward and others for fear of punishment But of all things else the diversity of the cause ought to be of greatest moment For the French had no hopes of safety save what lay in their Arms being in an Enemies Country the way in their return home very difficult by reason of the craggy Mountains though they should meet with no impediment by the Enemy the Army of the Colleagues suffered not under the like necessity for being at its own home it might be sure upon any adverse fortune to have safe receptacle in every City Moreover the Italians were incited to fight onely out of a desire of honor or of revenge and this was much more in the Princes and Commanders then in the common Soldier which things being well considered might by reason of what is the usual issue of such actions cause rather doubt then hope of victory if they should come to a day of Battel or at least might make it appear that businesses were so equally balanced and so doubtful as where there was no inforcing necessity to pursue a business so full of danger was not worth the while We must now consider the advantage as also the disadvantage which might happen upon the good or bad success of the battel which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncertain yet out of the aforesaid respects it was now both those in extremity We will say that the then chief moving cause was to drive the French Army out of Italy and to restore those of Aragon to their Kingdom out of which they were driven by K. Charls The confederate Princes might in all liklihood have compast this their intention by other more safe and more secure means For what disturbance might they meet withal in the enterprise which they were to endeavor against the French in the very Kingdom of Naples from that Army which hasted to pass over the Mountains and was to dissolve of it self And say that those people should be routed and defeated should therefore the Kingdom of Naples be disposed of according to the pleasure of the Italian Victors No certainly for the King had already left strong Garisons there of his best Soldiers to secure it The victory could not be so great and favorable for the Italians but that they must have lost some of their men so as if they had a mind to attempt any thing upon the affairs of Naples it had been better for them to have gone with all their Forces upon that enterprise then to give battel to those who did not any waies oppose their design since when they should have overcome them they were to go with that Army lessened by the Battel and wearied with marching to the main business of taking the Kingdom of Naples where the things offered at by Ferdinand would have had easier success if he had entred the Kingdom with greater Forces and as he was willingly received by the City of Naples whither he might come at first with those few men he had so would the rest of the Cities willingly have revolted from the French and have put themselves under the obedience of Ferdinand if they had seen he had Forces sufficient to defend himself and to make good their rebellion But say that the Colleagues would have secured themselves yet better from the French to the end that their intentions upon the Kingdom of Naples might not be hindred or diverted had it not been better for them to go with the Army of the league to find out Monsieur d' Orleans who at the same time had possest himself of the City of Novara to drive him out of Italy together with those of his party who had setled themselves there then to follow those who did of themselves that which was most desired by the league to wit hasten back over the mountains Nay it may be further said that unless the French should be necessitated as seeing their King in danger as also that Army which was pursued by the Italians they would not peradventure
have sent at that time more men into Italy and Monsieur d'Orleans would not have had any occasion to have possest himself of Nevara which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the Colleagues and particularly to the business of Naples For part of those Forces which were promised and intended to assist Ferdinand in the recovery of the Kingdom marched to the recovery of Novara out of desire whereof Lodowick Sforza did at last draw himself out of the league Whence it appears that it was rather revenge or vain-glory then any just reason which the Princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy that moved them to resolve upon fighting the French Army But let us now consider more particularly what of advantage what of good the Colleagues might have got if they had had the better of that Battel The best which they could hope for for all these their pains and dangers could be nothing else but the routing of those Forces which were not likely to make War any more in Italy and the Italians had as then no reason to think of any Transalpine Affairs It may be the person of the King who was then in the Army might peradventure be considerable if he had faln into the power of the Colleagues But both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger and say he had been taken prisoner he might have found many waies how to eseape And say althings had faln out according to the wish of the Colleagues what would the Italians have gotten by having so great a Prisoner but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of Foreiners which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers That warlike Nation which was at this time more then at any other devoted to their King would not have sat down by such an indignity such an injury without revenging it with their own Forces and by drawing other Transalpine Nations who wished not well to the glory of Italy especially in Military Affairs to joyn with them Let us see an example of this in what followed the next Age after where we shall find that the imprisonment of King Francis though taken by so great a Prince as was Charls the Fifth to whom none of the Princes of the League no not the whole League it self was to be compared produced nothing but longer and more heavy Wars which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered But on the contrary let us imagine into what ruine Italy would have faln if the Army of the League had been routed and defeated the Enemy being in the State of Milan wherein are so many and so noble Cities for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot then those which were to hazard themselves in that Battel and to raise another Army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies and so victorious would be a business of some time and very hard to do if not impossible And if the very name of the French and the fame of their Forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them and so easie the conquest of so noble a Kingdom what mischief had they not reason to expect if by the discomfeiture of that Army the Forces not onely as formerly of the Kings of Aragon should have been beaten of whole Italy and also such forein Forces as could be ready to afford any succor for in that Army were all the Soldiers that the King of Spain had in Italy So as there was not any State which upon such an accident could promise it self security Affairs then standing upon this foot who can praise the advice taken by the confederates of fighting the French But on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor wisdom and maturity of the Italians in this action to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them it is very likely that the flourishing condition and prosperity of Charls King of France began at that time to make him be hated and suspected not onely by all the Italian Princes but also not very acceptable to the King of 〈◊〉 insomuch as he who had called him into Italy did already repent his rash advice and he who did not withstand him blamed himself for his slackness and irresolution so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that King and to curb his prosperity and his thoughts of further achievements If then the King had been suffered to return without any let safe and triumphant into his Kingdom was it not to be feared that the French not content with their having got the Kingdom of Naples would pass over the Mountains the next year again with greater Forces to what danger would the Dukedom of Milan and Tuscany have been exposed upon which States it was known that the French had set their minds neither would they have spared the rest if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further And if the Italians should have seemed but to doubt their beating those Soldiers who were but the remainder of an Army which had first past the Mountains and â—ad left a good part of their Forces in several Garrisons in the Kingdom of Naples many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents what hopes had they to withstand their entire and much greater Forces with which they were to return the next year on this side the Mountains to new enterprises Nor had they any reason to despair of victory since the Colleagues had an Army for number of men much greaâ—er then the Enemy commanded by experienced and valiant Officers well provided both of Curasiers and Light horse well disposed to all actions and which were to fight with people opprest with fear and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves especially the advantage considered which the assaiâ—aâ—ts for the most part have It was further considered that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded or to cool the courage of other men since the French had not onely not met with any occasion of fighting but had not so much as seen the face of an Enemy since the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter for that it was unexpected they being accustomed to find all passages open not needing to make their way by the sword Nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves by beating a victorious Army and a warlike Nation the person of so great a King being also in that Army wherefore in such a case the French-mens courage was rather to fail then to avial them And it was to be beleeved that the Enemies to that Crown would the sonner appear against them as the Emperor Maximilian Henry King of England and that Ferdinand King of Spain would continue the more firm to the Italian confederacie Then what courage or what hope of succour would those
all their efficacie since they fail in their chiefest and surest ground-work when the truest conjunction fails which is that of Princes minds thoughts and designs whence conformable actions and such as are of great efficacie and worth do arise Almost all the People of Greece join'd together to defend themselves against Xerxes his Forces a mighty King of Persia who came to assault them with an innumerable Army and they got that famous Victory by Sea at Salamis which furnish'd them at the same time with prosperous successes at Land where they put the same King to flight And Greece was preserved at that time by vertue of that League from so great a danger against which it appeared almost impossible that she could defend herself So likewise in these latter times the Pope and Philip King of Spain join'd with the Commonwealth of Venice in defence of the Kingdom of Cyprus to whom that Kingdom as part of her Territories did chiefly belong when it was assaulted by powerful Turkish Forces and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy they bore away that famous and singular Victory which will be celebrated in all Ages the Turkish Forces were routed and shattered at Sea and their honor and courage lessened But when all this was done what other thing did the victorious Grecians answerable to the hopâ—s which were expected from that their so greaâ— Victory the whole fruit whereof at their reurn home ended in the dividing of the booty So also the Christian League by Sea did not only spend the rest of that Autumn a fit time for any enterprise which they could have undertaken after the honor they had won in the aforesaid Victory in dividing the prey and in other matters of small moment but also spent all the next enâ—uing Spring and Summer idly without being able so much as to keep together so to keep the Enemy from recruiting to the great notable and woful example of what we are now in treaty of and to shew that the Forces of Leagues are weak though made between potent Princes The purchase which is got or which is hoped for cannot be so equally divided and agreed upon but that some of the Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater share then the rest and every increase bâ— it â—â—'r so little doth easily cause jealousie or at least envy in the rest Almost all the Potentates of Europe convened together in the famous League of Cambray against the Commonwealth of Venice allured by the hopes of being able to divide her noble rich and flourishing State which was so much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate Princes to make them endeavor by their joynt Forces to suppress the Commonwealth and bereave her of all her riches But as soon as the Colleagues first design began to discover themselves and begot jealousies and suspition amongst them insomuch as the very same Princes who had conspired together to ruine the Commonwealth did soon assist and succor her being become bitterer Enemies one to another and amongst themselves each others greatness becoming formidable and hateful to their companions then they had been before out of the same reason to the Venetians against whom they had joyntly taken up Arms. It was not hard though not very reasonable for Lodowick King of France and Ferdinand King of Spain being blinded with the same desire of enlarging their Territories to joyn together in driving the Aragonians from out the Kingdom of Naples but afterwards they did as easily disagree touching the dividing of what they had got So as the League might help to bereave others of that Kingdom but other Forces were requisite for the appropriation of it to ones self and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the Militia and of good counsel was likewise required Leagues use likewise to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms against one new Prince who is yet but weak and not well setled in his State as was seen by the example of the League made by the Princes of Italy against the Scalligers and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants for Leagues being of some validity in their beginning and not meeting with any stout resistance may at the very first effort have ruined the Enemy against whom such Legues were made but when they have to do with a Potentate of esteem though he be inferior of himself to the power of the Colleagues they have not produced any great effects as may be known by divers confederacies made by the Princes of Italy against the Commonwealth of Venice against which as being become formidable to them all though all Italy hath more then once taken up Arms yet she hath been able to defend herself against such forces for the first Efforts being withstood the rest proved less difficult by reason of the usual weakness which Leagues are soon reduced unto And it might have succeeded so with her likewise in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of Cambray had not Alviano with his unseasonable resolution of immaturely hastning on the the Battel drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth which she might easily have escaped by temporising and the League have been dissolved thereupon as it was not long after Now by reassuming all these considerations these general and true Conclusions may be thereout asserted that Leagues may prove beneficial either when they aim simply at defence and at the maintaining of Peace by the reputation of such an union or when one that is not able to defend himself by his own particular Forces is actually assaulted by one that is more powerful then he and whom he is not able to resist of himself For if no other good be got by such unions yet the business is spun out the longer and there may be a way sound out to deviate imminent ruine by diversion But he who will conside too much upon such Unions or be less diligent in negotiating those Affairs which of himself he is not able to do will soon finde he is deceived nay if he be not the more cautious and circumspect he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend as to his formally declared enemies Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a meer and voluntary election of increasing Territories is very uncertain and falacious yet may prove good if many who be strong and powerful joyn against one that is weak but at last the fire is greater which breaks out amongst the Colleagues themselves then that which they carried home to another mans house But that a State which is already grown great and powerful may be opprest by the strength of Leagues unless it begin first to totter by reason of its internal disorders from what the experience of so many past passages teacheth and from reason which is corroborated by custom is a thing which no man ought to promise to himself unless he delight in flattering himself with vain and prejudical
mans Country with an Army intending to possess himself thereof must first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them since his victuals may be thereby hindred and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed Moreover to be â—aster of the field leave the Cities and strong Holds unreduced would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies which being founded only upon the Forces of a field-Army when that should be worsted all things formerly won must of necessity fall of themselves Hence it is that since much time must be spent in lying before a Fort or Citadel and that many men are requisite to take it and all this often-times in vain the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficulty are not so soon nor so sadly compast as they were by the Antients who met not with such obstacles And how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong Holds whereof we see many clear examples in the actions of the aforementioned Princes The Emperor Charls made War several times with numerous Armies against the King of France propounding great matters unto himself which proved all but vain at last by his having met with strong Cities well munited such as required much time and labor to take them wherefore though his success in War was sometimes prosperous yet it came so late as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby as was seen when after much time spenâ— and mâ—ny men lost before the Fort of St. Desir which was seaâ—ed in the midst of France whither he was fortunately advanced though he reduced it to his own power yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the Enemy as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquisition that he might fall upon another Enterprise The same and for the same cause befell Francis King of France who having sent his Son the Dolphin with powerful Forces to the Pyrenean Mountains to the end that he might break into Spain promising himself easier success therein by an unexpected assault and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of Caesars Dominions with other Armies The Dolphin being at the very first to take Perpignano a Fort placed upon those Frontiers he there met with such and with so many difficulties as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those Forces from penâ—trating any further Solyman being entred with a powerful Army into Hungarie intending to pass into Austria wasted so much time in expugning the strong Hold of Buda as it proved the safety of that Country and chiefly of Vienna before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security so as the City being of it self very renable it may be said that she did not onely save her self but by the preservation thereof all Austria and other Provinces of Germany were preserved then and several times since So likewise in the War which was made by the same Solyman against the Venetians though he was come thither himself in person with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land yet his Forces being repulst by the Fort of Câ—rfir which was forcibly but in vain attempted by the Turks he was forced to withdraw from before it whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong Hold both the Island of Câ—rfee and other places belonging to that State must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation By reason then of these difficulties and such occasions the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action then those of former daies When Alexander had overcome in Battel Darius the powerful King of Persia he soon made himself Master of his whole Kingdom and passing further into the Country even to the ocean Sea he found the way so opeâ— as the onely difficulty he met withal was the overcoming of those Fortresses of Rivers and Seas which nature had furnished the Country with Insomuch as those who writ his actions speak but of two strong Holds of any importance about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the Indians in his victorious over-running so many Countries But Pompey made such way in following Mithridates and in planting Trophies of victories in all places whereby he past in so many Eastern Provinces amongst people that he had rather march'd over then over-come as it may be easily conceived that he mâ—â— no where with any impediments by strong Holds which were able to stop the course of his victorious Forces Caesar found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of Europe with whom he was to fight but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified Cities yet in the space of Ten years he compleated so many victories as he subjugated There hundred several sorts of People It these though great Princes and most valiant Commanders had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort certainly their atchievements would have been fewer and their glory not so much cry'd up This was manifestly known by the example of other Ages For it may be observed that the so great progresses of War have been made chiefly in the Eastern parts where at all times peradventure by reason of the largeness of the Country the use of strong Holds hath been least had so as not only Alexander the Great and Pomâ—ey both of them more famous then all other Commanders but some of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains subjugated spacious Countries in a short time And in later times Selymus the Great Turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the Soldan of Caire's Empire For having had the better in many Battels and not meeting with any strong Hold to withstand him the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the Turks who were Victors and Masters of the Field But such acquisitions as they are very easie to be made so are they but seldom peacefully possest which was the cause why the Roman Emperors could never so govern those furthest Eastern parts but that either by the Inhabitants themselves or by their neighboring Kings â—umults were continually raised So as it behoved them to subjugate the same Provinces several times But if these difficulties of winning Forts and strong Holds did retard the course of Victories certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern Princes and Commanders but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry as great discipline cunning constancie and sufferance is discovered in this sort of Militia and as such acquisitions
though Charls the Fift by the unexpected death of Francisco Sforza did at last reduce that State to his Dominion Hence it was also that Charls and Solyman greatly fearing to encounter each other did very much shun the having to do together and to hazard that glory to the uncertain events of War which they had â—â—th so much labor arrived at And this was the cause why Charls though he was a bold and valiant Prince when his Brother Ferdinand was in great danger by reason of Solymans Forces resolved importunately to pass into Africa for being resolute that he would not march against Solymans Forces nor contend with them he would witness to the world that it was neither labor nor danger that kept him from turning to the defence of Hungary and Austria which were then assaulted by the Turks but because he esteemed the business of Africa very necessary And when a greater necessity wrought it so that they were to take up Arms one against the other and that numerous Armies had taken the field yet they kept still aloof off the fear and apprehension which each had of the others power and fortune being alike so as at last so great an accumulation of Soldiers disbanded neither party having seen the face of an Enemy whilst Charls would not give way that his Army should go from before the walls of Vienna to go find out the Enemy not would Solyman advance further to meet him though he had at first publickly given out that he went from Constantinople to fight with Charls the Emperor before his own doors So as you may clearly see that it was the counterpoise of these two great Princes of one and the same Age which kept their Forces confined within certain bounds which for their valor and other respects might have carried the Trophies of victory into the furthest remote Countries Now on the other side let us examine the condition of Times and Potentates with whom those famous Commanders of old had to wage War Alâ—xâ—nder the Great found the Kingdom of Persia wherein he successfully made his first expeditions for extent of Empire very rich and powerful but wherein was an ill disciplined Militia and commanded by unexperienced Leaders and men of no valor wherefore exceeding the Persians in worth and discipline though he came short of them in numbers he may be said to have been better then they for matter of War and therefore willingly imbraced all occasions of joyning Pattel with them And for what concerns the Eastern Kings and Nations which he afterwards brought under his power who knows not how unfit they were for War of themselves weak not joyned in confederacie for common defence nor sustained by strong holds nor by the strength of a well ordered Militia Insomuch as the greatest glory that can be attributed to Alexander is for the generosity of his mind which moved him to venter upon so many enterprises in desert and almost unknown Countries rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight and brought them to an end The same almost may be observed by the things done in the Eastern parts by Pâ—â—pey the Great It is true that Caesar met with greater difficulties in the things he did in France and in Spain for he waged War with people who knew how to manage their Arms and who were till then thought unvanquishable wherefore he spent more time there Yet these Provinces were divided into many Kings and Popularities none of which were very strong of themselves nor were they very secure by the assistance of others to make them able to resist an Army of veteran and excellently well disciplined Soldiers as was that which was commanded by Caesar So as it seems we may with reason conclude that if these cried up Commanders had met with powerful and valiant Armies able to be compared with theirs and that these had been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great Commanders their fames would certainly have been less not would they have so easily have assubjected so many Countries and erected their Trophies of victories in so many Regions as they did But besides all these considerations we may perhaps with reason weigh the arts and waies which these anâ—ient Warriers made use of to boot with what belonged to the Militia to make their acqusitions and glory the greater for he who shall consider their actions may therein discern so inflamed a desire of praise and glory as it seems this was the onely thing which they propounded to themselves for reward of all their labor and danger and for the end of all their undertakings for they have left many noble examples behind tâ—em not onely of military valor but of equity clemencie temperance and of other glorious vertues which â—ssisted them very much in winning favor and affection with the people and likewise the love of many of those very Princes who were overcome by them Thus we read of Alexander that he confirmed their Kingdomâ— to many Indian Kings whom he overcame and did incâ—ease them to some others and being contented with obedience from them and recâ—iving such things as were necessary for his voyage he seemed rather to aspire after the glory of new acquisitions then to reap any advantage by what he had already won But Pompey not like a victorious Chieâ—tain in War but rather like a Friend and Arbiâ—rator composed the differences between those Princes of the East restored the antient Lords to their Kingdoms and gave new States to such others as did deserve them Insomuch as it was from his lib ralâ—ty that Pharâ—â—ces was to acknowledge the Kingdom of Bosphorus Antiochus that of Sileâ—tia Tygranes the Kingdom of Armenia Ariobarzanes that of Cappadocia Diotarus the liâ—e of Galitia and did onely reduce such Countries into Provinces and made them imâ—edia ely subject to the Senate and People of Rome wherein he found no legitimate Lords and Masters as it fell out in Syriâ— Iudea and some other Regions It was by reasâ—on of these procâ—edings that many People and Prâ—nces did voluntarily submit to the Empire of Alexander and of the Romans Wherefore Darius when he was overcome by Alexander admâ—â—ing his great Continencie and Humanitâ—e prayed the gods that if the fail of that Empire was destined the glory and succession of the Kingdom of â—ersia might fall upon Alexander All â—istories are fâ—ll of such examples of worth and vertue in things done by the Romans But now adaies Princes and Commanders do but little mind the imitation of these men and wage War not out of a desire of glory as did those magnanimous Artients but onely out of revenge and cruelty or else to turn all the fruit and benefit of Victory upon themselves leaving nothing safe nor intire to the conquered Whence it ensues that they who fears these extreams desperately resolve to do their utmost and hazard all rather then to submit themselves to the power and discretion of those on whom they 〈◊〉 their
with such expence and with the loss of so many men only to retain and keep some Territories This was the tree from which the boughs or sprouts could not be so fast cut off but that one War soon succeeded another wherewith Italy was long perplex'd till in the year 1529. the Princes being tyred and the People ruin'd agreement was made in that famous Meeting at Bolognia in which so sound foundations of the peace and quiet of Italy were laid as they may almost be said to have continued till now with fair hopes of longer continuance For though fâ—r thus many years there have been some commotiens in Italy made both by her own Inhabitants and by Foreiners yet in respect of the calamities she underwent in those former Ages they may rather be termed uprores then wars This condition of affairs and of affectionâ— being changed and the materials being removed by which the fire of war was fed Italy remained in great tranquility Soon after this introduction of Peace the Statâ— of Milan by the immaâ—ure death of Francisco Sfâ—rza who left no issue behind â—im fell into the power of Charls the Emperor and afterwards into his son Philip's in which Princes no such respect concurr'd as lately have been mentioned whereby the peace of Italy might be troubled as it had been before For these Princes by reason of their other great possessions being peacefully Masters of so fair and noble a part of Italy as is the Kingdom of Naples and Dukedom of Milan they had no reason to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs either out of any apprehension of their own businesses or out of a desire to enjoy what appertained to others They were treed from fear not onely by the friendship solemnly established and ratified by the other Portentâ—tes of Italy but much more by their own power and greatness and thâ— knowledge that to intreach upon one might easily move all the rest and afford occasion of bringing â—orein Forces into Italy whereby to disturb â—heir own setled possession of so large and nobe a share â—hereof kept thâ—m from dreaming upon the possessing of other mens estates So likewise the Commonwealth of Venice was at this time in such a condition as being only to covet peace she might hope to injoy it safely because she was neither so great nor powerful as to hope after new acquisitions being counterpoised by greater Forces in Italy who upon the least discovery in her of taking up Arms would oppose her and not suffer hâ—r to increase to their prejudice neither was she yet so weak as she might dread being easiâ—y opprest by others so as to secure herself from such a danger she might be constrained to think upon novelties or to procure new friends The Câ—uâ—ch Territories being secured no less by the reverence due to religion then by force of Arms remained safe and quiet nor had the Popes any reason either to fear their own affairs not yet to desire a greater temporal â—state for having recovered many Cities which the Church had formerly lost discords being ceased and the faction wherewâ—th she had been troubled beâ—ng almost eâ—â—inguished and the authority of the Barons of Rome being moderated that holy See was in a condition of as great dignitie and safety as she had been at any time before and Duke Cosâ—o de Medici Duke of Florence being allied to the favor and friendship of a potent Prince wherein he was very fortunate was safe enough and being likewise a new Prince in â—uscany he was to think as he wisely did rather how to setle himself well in his noble Dominon then to dream of becoming the Author of new Wars and of increasing his State Hence it was that the Forces of these greater Potenrates being ballanced and theit thoughts tempered all occasions of making any great change or alteration of States in her was taken away such as had hapned in the former Ages through the commotions of the very Princes of Italy As for such dangers as might happen from abroad Italy was at this time secured by various accidents If wâ— shall first consider the Empire from whence her greatest troubles had often tâ—mies come those Emperors knew very well by what had succeeded to Charls in the Imperial dignity that they had not Forces sufficient wherewith to betake themselves to forein enterprises out of any particular interest or ambition without the help of Germany which was but little inclined to increase their power and authority But though the moderate minds of those Princes which was alwaâ—es inclined to Justice and Equity must be greatly praised the eminent danger their States lay in by reason of the Turks Forces was above all other things able to keep them from thinking of molesting other mens States which Turks being so near and so powerful neighbors have kept them busied and molested and in a condition of thinking rather how to secure their own affairs then to increase their fortune by new acquisiâ—ons not onely when they were forced to take up Arms for the defence of Hungary and Austria but even in time of peace and greatest security The French I must confess have been more intent to trouble the peace of Italy on which they had a long time set their minds out of a desire to get some footing there But though the Forces of that flourishing and powerful Kingdom were very formidable before these Civil Discords yet experience hath shewed that their attempts when they have had none to receive and to uphold them in Italy have caused more dread then damage for their Armies being to be furnished with all necessaries from a far off they have been overcome by weaker â—orces and oft-times by their own wants Therefore because in these later times when they past over the Mountains they were not conâ—ederate as formerly they had been with any great Potentate in Italy therefore have they been able to â—arry there but a while nor have they made the noise of their Trumpets be heard a far off though they havenever let 〈◊〉 any occasion out of a desire of Novelty and glory so as all those who have at any time been ill satisfied by the Imperiâ—lists and then by the Spainards have been easily received into friendship with them This was the defence of Sieâ—na imbraced a City opprest by the severe Government of Caesars Officers Thus were the Ferneâ—s taken into protection to keep them in their possession of Parma and Piacenza out of which the Emperor would have driven them Thus was the Prince of Salerno listned unto who by his favor and the insurrection of the people furthered the hopes of great acquisitions in the Kingdom of Naples Thus Paul the Fourth met with good correspondencie in Henry King of France as soon as he discovered himself to be ill affected towards Caesar and that he would take up Arms against him for he hoped to attain those things by the friendship and conjunction of a powerful Prince and one who according
Holds as now it is she might not peradventure have run so great a misfortune she had not so soon lost so many and so noble Cities as she did but it may be alleadged on the contrary that if in that evil Crisis of affairs wherein she was brought to such adversity she had had so many important Forts as now she hath and that they had faln into the power of the Enemy she would not certainly have so soon recovered her losses and restored herself into her pristine power and greatness as she did We likewise see the State of Milan which fell so often into the power of the French it staid not long under their Dominioâ— for not finding any strong and Royal Forts wherein they could make any safe abode nor having time to erect any by reason of their continual Wars or for want of monies the defenders of that State did often times prevail and every accident either of the change of the peoples minds or of their Enemies increase of Forces were sufficient to drive them out Which would not have happened if they had but once been Masters of any strong Holds from whence they could not have been expel'd without a long and hard siege Guide Ubaldâ— D. of Urbin a Prince but of small Territories but very wise and well experienced in War moved by these respects after he had recovered his State which was formerly taken from him by Duke Valentine he resolved to slight all the strong Holds that were there knowing that they could not at first preserve his State unto him and when hee should lose it they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater When Charls the Eighth King of France going to win the Kingdom of Naples past through Tuscany the Forts which the Florentines had built for their own securitie were the very things whereby they were most indamaged and these falling into the power of the French whose Forces they thought they were not able to withstand they put the Florentines to vast expence and made them undergo great slavery out of a desire of recovering them Whereas if that State had laâ—n open the King who was bound upon other enterprises passing forward would no waies have troubled the affairs of that Commonwealth The like and almost out of the like respect did afterward befall Duke Cosimo when the Emperor Charls the Fifth would keep some Castles belonging to that State in his own power which should otherwise have been left free to Cosimo and which was the occasion of that saying Chele fortezza sonoi ceppi della Toscana That strong Holds are the fetters of Tuscany These are the greatest mischiefs which strong Holds use to bring with them but there are others not altogether so grievous but more certain and irreparable For who can deny but that the excessive charge which Princes are at not onely in building Fortresses but more in muniting and guarding them doth sufficiently exhaust the publick Exchequer and necessitate the disbursing of such moneys in times of peace as ought to be kept for the more urgent occasions of War And certainly he who could see what vast sums the Commonwealth of Venice hath spent for some late years past in making and muniting so many Forts both by Sea and Land would be very much astonished and would confess that so great a mass of treasure would â—beâ— sufficient to provide for any War how great soever and to withstand for a good while any potent Enemy It may peradventure likewise be said and not untruly that whilst a Prince reposes much confidence in being able to maintain his State by means of these strong Holds and by the assistance of a few Soldiers he is not so careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the Miliâ—ia which are notwithstanding real and secure foundations of a State The Lacedemonians would not therefore suffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall because they beleeved that by the thoughts of such securitie their Citizens would become more careless and negligent in managing their Arms by sole means whereof they thought that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off Which that wise man would likewise infer who said That the walls which ought to secure a City should be made of iron not of stone And a Spartan being demanded by an Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens answered That he thought they were very handsome for a City which was to be inhabited by women inferring that it is not necessarie nor honorable for able valiant men to secure themselves from their Enemies by such means It is likewise usually seen that a Prince who thinks he shall be able to curb his Subjects to govâ—rn them and rule them as he pleaseth by means of Bulwarks and Castles and that therefore he needs not the love of his Subjects is much less mindful of those things which become a good Prince and which purchase affectâ—on Yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth most preserve unto him or bereave him of his State and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient as is of late seen in Flanders which so many Fortresses and Armies hath not in so long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligitâ—mate Prince And it may generally be observed that such Governments as have lasted longest have been preserved not by the advantage of strong Holds whereof some have not had any but by vertue of a good Militia and of the Subjects love The Romans were accustomed when they had won any new Country to send new Inhabitants thither who being placed either in the antient Cities or in others built by themselves they called Roman Colonies and by these mens valor as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People of Rome out of remembrance of their desert and in gratitude for the good which they had received they easily kept the new Subjects in loyalty to the Commowealth and the Countries which they had won by their Arms in obedience The which being moved thereunto by the same respects the Venetians did likewise in Candia sending many of their own Gentlemen thither to make Colonies and to defend and maintain that Island But the Turks in a very violent manner but answerable to the custom of their Government do almost totally destroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Countries chiefly the richest and the most noble from whom they take their lâ—nds and possessions and give the revenues thereof to be made use of by the Soldâ—ery making Timari thereof as they term it which are Pays or Revenues assigned over to the Soldiers upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horse by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot who seâ—ving for Garrisons for the safety of the new acquired Country are notwithstanding always ready to serve in any other place
in all other defences howsoever attempted Wherefore then by seeking for such perfection in Forts as is not found in other things shall we by the loss of that advantage which may be thereby received and is often received leave the State in the hands of Chance and to the discretion of him who doth design to assault it Nor ought it to be said that strong Holds should be despised and the whole safety of the State be placed in the Militia as in a thing of firmer foundation because it is not every Prince that can alwaies keep an Army in pay nor would this be sufficient to keep a State from unexpected assaults which hath many several Confines Moreover he who placeth all his hopes of securing his State in Armies and in openly fighting his Enemies must oftentimes as it hath been said hazard all to Fortune and put himself upon the danger of a thousand accidents and unless Field-forces be back'd by strong Holds and equal to those of the Enemy who doth assault them they must remain idle and of no use For not being able to withstand the shock what can they do else but retreat and suffer him who shall be stronger to make himself Master of the whole Country whereas by the help of Fortresses a few are able to resist many and to gain time the only true remedy of him who is the weaker and who is to resist and withstand the Forces of one that is more powerful Nor ought the example of the Spartans be of any validity to perswade the contrary who would not secure their Cities with Walls or any other Fortifications because having only to do with other people of Greece who were weaker then they they thought themselves safe without such helps and that by doing so they purchased more praise and reputation But when they were to wage war with the Persians and Macedonians who were powerful Enemies even they sought to put themselves in a posture of defence by having recourse to narrow passages and to keep off the Enemy assisting the natural situations of the places by Fortifications Moreover the Syartans had but small Teritories and but a few places to guard and were much given to the Militia so as they who will reap advantage by following their counsels must be Lords of Cities all the inhabitants whereof must be Soldiers and all of them desirous to preserve the State as were the Spartans But the reason why the Duke of Urbin did slight some of his Forts was peradventure because he knew himself too weak to defend them and besides because he thought it better not to invite others to wage war with him either out of a jealousie of them or out of a desire to make themselves masters of them he being to consider all Forces as they related to his or if he would make use of other mens assistance he must depend upon them And for what concerts the strong Holds of Tuscany it may be said in the first place that it was the imprudencie of Pietro de Medici not the Castles which did trouble and disorder the Florentines And secondly that it may be Duke Cosimo would not so easily have gotten Caesar to have confirmed him in the possession of that State had it not been that he might thereby secure himself of his faith in that new Dominion But the accidents which may occur are so many as it is impossible to comprehend every particular under one and the same rule And is it not a vain thiâ—g to affirm that strong Holds ought not to be made use of because if it so fall out as the State which wants them be lost it may be the more easily recovered For that is no more then to expose a mans self to mortal wounds out of hopes that when he is hurt he may find a cure And what Prince can assure himself that though he hath been negligent in muniting his State with Forts his Enemy when he shall have made himself Master of his State will not fortifie such seats as he shall find commodious for his safety But if it be said that a Prince grows wicked covetous and cruel towards his Subjects through his too much confiding in strong Holds it is noâ— easily to discern that these so far remote affairs have any thing to do with the vices of the mind and if they ought to be taken into such consideration the reason would reach no further then to Castles and Citadels but in greater and more important Fortifications the Prince is so much the more bound to preserve the love and loyaltie of his Subjects in that he stands in the more need of them for the safety of the City thus fortified for if it should fall into the Enemies hands by the peoples rebellion the loss would be the greater But it may be the consideration of expence which that Prince puts himself unto who builds many strong Holds may seem to bear more weight with it then any of the rest whereas his chief care ought to be to accumulate treasure in time of peace against Wars shall happen to which it may be answered That States cannot be preserved without charges and expence and that if a Prince should go about to procure the like securitie to himself by his Militia as he doth by his strong Holds he must be at infinite more expence and such as none but great Kingdoms and Empires are able to undergo But if a Prince proceed therein with such temper and judgement as hath been spoken of and which is also requisite in all things else he can incur no danger by Fortifications of running into those disorders and necessities which many careless men and such as know not how to govern do fall We will then conclude that Fortifications are very useful in all States but chiefly in small ones and those more then any others which have many Confines and powerful neighbors for such States have need of good guards and have not wherewith to keep Armies perpetually on foot as the Turks do in these times nor to make Desarts as do the Persians nor to institute Colonies in several parts as was the custom of the antient Romans and if the Commonwealth of Venice did imitate them therein it was but once and with more desire to the self-inhabitants of the Island of Candia at her devotion then to defend it from forein Forces But now that the Turks power is grown so formidable it would be altogether unuseful and not of any moment without strong Holds and a well paid Militia therefore the care and study which Princes take more in these latter times then they did formerly in Fortification must needs be praised by whosoever considers things with a right judgment The Ninth DISCOURSE Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no and his counsel safe of driving forein Nations out of Italy by the help of other Transalpine Forces ITaly had been molested with Wars by forein Nations almost continually for the space
of Thirty years when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth she seemed to have some hopes of quiet and of enjoying some better condition after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes the State of Milan being at the devotion of Francis King of France and the Emperor Charls the Fifth being possest of the Kingdom of Naples which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars so as the one could not exceed the other and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in Italy and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations In this posture of Affairs Pope Leo who had often negotiated with several Princes about the business of Arms and had endeavored as he said the liberty of Italy and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of Milan in the Government of the Sforza's was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued and particularly that the Church should be berest of two noble Cities Parma and Piacenza which were become members of the State of Milan Therefore with a haughty and generous mind he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet before some present troubles so to shun other molestations and dangers which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace in future if not to himself at least to the Church And knowing that he should not be able either of himself nor by joining with other Italians to drive forein Potentates out of Italy he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers with design as he said that when some of them should be forced to forgo Italy it might be the easier to expel the rest Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution it may seem to merit praise by all men as to the intention but as for the means he took to compass it it is not so easily to be agreed upon for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto for some of which this action may seem to be as wise as glorious and if we will reflect upon other some there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein then of security and hopes That all Transalpinâ—rs might be driven out of Italy was a thing desired and not without cause by all Italians and which ought to be his chiâ—fest care and endeavor who had such Territories degree and authority in that Province as Leo had The antient dignity of the Italian honor seemed to appear in the Popâ—s majesty and in the splendor of the Court of Rome â—ut as for the effecting of this business it did planly appear that all the power of the Italian Potâ—ntates was too weak since two great Princes and warlike Nations had foâ— many past years though with various fortune got footing there and still kept their possession so as their power could suffer no disturbance but must be confirmed and consolidated and must become more formidable to the Church and to all the Italian Princes unless it were by some of the same forein Nations If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes when Italy by reason of a long Peace did flourish most were not sufficient to stop the French Forces which were then but new in those parts and but meanly assisted what reason was there to believe that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and digniâ—y after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars and having lost two of her noblest Members Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel as it were to this fire of War as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea if they should joâ—n with Caesar or with the King of France might be troublesom and dangerous yet might it be beneficial or at least hopeful since it might so fall out that the fortune of War being various and subject to unexpected chances some good effect might ensuâ— thereupon for the liberty of Italy the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her growing much the weaker or else by their growing weary of the work and by their tuâ—ning themselves to some other undertaking Whereas on the contrary to suffer them to settle there and to get in time greater authority over the people and more love to the States which they had gotten was a certain and irreparable ruine and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were postest by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes But the fear lest both these Princes who were grown so powerful in Italy might join together against the Territories of the Church or those of other Italian Princes to divide them amongst themselves as had happened not many years before when the Emperor Maximilian and Lewis the Twelfth King of France who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetians might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality and to side with the one or the other of these Princes Leo knew that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations more particularly to the French who were alwaies jealous of his cunning so as great emulation growing in them both and a desire of commanding over all Italy and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province as the one could not much exceed the other nor make any new acquisition it was with reason to be feared that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of Italy Nor was Leo's Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others and chiefly since the French knew that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in Italy as well for the common affairs as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of Parma and Piacensa which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor Iulius So as the Churches State and that of the Florentines which was under the same Popes protection and government grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men for the Venetians
and facilitate their undertakings then did the reputation of their victory Amidst so great amazement and astonishment nothing was left unattempted by Luigi Gritti and Christofero Moro who were the Provedatori del Campo to uphold the Commonwealths fading fortune They betook themselves to rally the remainder of the Army they comforted the Captains and Soldiers with hope of better success they intreated the Nobility and people of Brescia and of other Cities that being mindful of their Loyalties and of other things done in service to the Commonwealth in former Wars had with Philip Maria Visconte they would be like themselves and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the Venetians and abhorring the severe Transalpine Dominion they would with one onely inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs But they were all so possest with a Panick fear as no entreaties nor reason could be listned unto those who had escaped the Battel were unfit either for strength or valor to attempt any thing against the Enemy no disposition to defence was found in the City no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder there were but few Forts at that time in the State and those few of no condition of holding out long What was then to be done to whom was any recourse to be had If all Princes and Countries were become Enemies who were to be trusted If all memory of former benefits were laid aside so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged how could new men be raised and provisions made for a new War The armed Enemy was already at the gates nay even within their houses threatning assured ruine What was to be done in such a general dispait but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand And as sometimes it falls out in greatest Tempests that the skill and labor of the Marriners being overcome by the malignity of the weather they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the Sea carries it So in cases of greatest danger into which States do sometimes fall he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad till the fury of those tempests being past over the Commonwealth though born down yet not quite sunk may rise again and make way for her pristine greatness The Army being then to retreat and the loss of the City drawing other losses after it as one stone that gives against another it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes so to preserve them from sacking and plunder which they must have undergone if they should maintain their loyalties and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion if they should submit to the Enemy Such a resolution might appear willing and therefore less generous but it was really necessary prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things but which might prove useful in the future At first sight it appeared to proceed from rashness and fear and yet it proceeded from wisdom from charity and in respect to the good of the State and of the Subjects The piety nor prudence of the Senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times to be used for withstanding so many enemies wherefore the Venetians did magnanimously refuse those helps and assistances which were offered them by the Turks though but little before as some writers affirm they had been very much sought unto by other Christian Princes as by Frederick of Aragon and Lodovicâ—â— Sforza for the defence of their Dominions and not long after by the Emperor Maximilian to be made use of against the Venetians but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring Princes nor the desire of recovering what was lost prevail with those most wise and religious men but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the Infidels immaculate neither would the reason of State if well-understood considered in the example of others suffer them so to do and especially in the unfortunate success of the Emperors of Constantinople who having unadvisedly call'd in to their assistance the Ottoman Princes who were much more powerful then they had drawn a greater ruine upon themselves which proved the occasion of the fall of that Empire But being unwilling notwithstanding to give over all hopes of accommodating the afflicted condition of affairs with some ease the Senate resolved to have recourse to the Pope and to Caesar though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies to treat of some Agreement They were moved much hereunto by the respect and reverence due to that holy See and the pious and religious apprehension they had of Ecclesiastical censures to which they were subject and they trusted more in prevailing with Caesar then with the King of France For what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him who being first bound to the Common-wealth by obligation and confederacie had spurn'd at all those respects out of meer desire of novelties To these then they granted all that they pretended unto for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of France his greatness they knew some way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune But how is it possible to pass over here in silence another thing not at all differing from this by which such base aspersions have been endeavored to be cast upon the Venetians since by this our present discourse we go about to vindicate them by searching into the truth We read in Guicchiardine a Modern and to give him his due in many things an excellent Historian an Oration published by him in the name of Antonio Iustiniano sent by the Commonwealth to Caesar wherein it is said that the Venetians begging pardon at Caesars hand with much subjection and servility of mind did offer to submit the Commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the Empire and to acknowledg to hold their liberty lives and livelihood from him with some other base unworthy expressions not only not true but not likely to be so For first it is very certain that Iustinian being sent Ambassador to Maximilian and finding him at Trent was never admitted to have audience peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates and making of them jealous Then it is most certain that the Senate gave no such Commission And let him who will not believe it listen but to reason and then he will be perswaded to the contrary The Commonwealth had then lost all her Territories by Land but at the same time she enjoyed all her State by Sea wherein were not only one or two Cities but divers Provinces and noble Kingdoms their Naval accoutrements were very great and equal if not superior to those of whatsoever