Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
prove even the destroyers 〈◊〉 it And is not salus â—…uli now concerned and the whole Kiâ—…gdome in danger and to use his owne words though with more reall intention no way to escape this imminent perill but by tearing oâ—… these men from the Prince who endeavour to rent the King from his people and utterly to destroy both Aâ—…ter all this large and darke discourse hee concludes by way of advise and what is that why wholesome counsell I warrant you Let them saith he rely upon their Governours who have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 esâ—…ecially iâ—… they have given them great and late sigâ—…es of their 〈◊〉 to and care of 〈◊〉 this is the most 〈◊〉 way of safety I marry sir thiâ—… is good doctrine indeed because 〈◊〉 will hazzard his fortune which iâ—… greater must I therefore expose mine to ruine which is lesse but stay hath any one individuall a greater portion than the publike or mâ—…re to loose than the body politicke if so we will intrust our store with him and runne the hazzard if otherwise you will give us leave to secuâ—…e the greatâ—…r and more considerable portion Aâ—…d under the Aâ—…thors favour t is no probable way of safety â—…r a man to 〈◊〉 himselfe witâ—… his enemie I but thâ—…n heare what he saith immediately after the precedent words if 〈◊〉 should miscary saith he which they can have no reason to suspect they would perish with a great deale of diâ—…cretion The Law of God of Nature of Nations and the Municipall Law of the Land doe all inab'e a man to maintaine his life and fortunes though by force and violence And can it then be thought that a whole Kingdome and people should bee bound under I know not what divine obligation to yeeld themselves as a pray to the malice of their enemies T is not the bond of Governours that can challenge a submission to things unlawfâ—…ll and for that cause that I am not bound to obey it were unnaturall if I mighâ—… not defend and therefore with the Authors favour it were high sin and indiscretion for me to loose my life when I might save it It seemes 〈◊〉 all to me that any Nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet tyranny and support slavery The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just Monarchâ—… That is true I but what if a just Monarch shall degenerate into a tyrant then I perceive you will allow that the inconveniences of Tyranny conclude somewhat I but saith the author It is so far from being unnaturall that any nation should be bound to contribute its power to that end that some have made it their choice others their refuge What to be made slaves most unreasonable most unnaturall All creatures much more man doe by nature desire liberty T is that we were all borne to and as he doth oppugne nature so hee waves part of his right and inheritance that consents to thralldome No temporall blessing next to life greater than an ample freedome No greater misery than a vile and sordid slavery I but whâ—…t if the Authors position hold true that some Nations have so far degenerated as to exchange a Palace for a Prison though perchance that by force too as the State of Rome Turkey and France must their examples be precidents for us or is it any whit the lesse unnaturall because they doe it I but the Author saith There may bee reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery as if in danger of a potent enemy they could hire none on gentler conditions to undertake their defence or if reduced to extreme want they had not wherewith to sustaine themselves they may very probably like Esau â—…asse away their 〈◊〉 right 〈◊〉 and he gives you an instance of both these of the fiâ—…st the 〈◊〉 to the Children of Israel and of the last the Egyptians to Pharaoh T is an old and true saying that necessity hath no law the law of nature bindes every man to defend and maintaine his libertie but necessity may untie this bond for it is better to be though miserable then not to be at all But now to conclude from a case of necessity to a case out of necessity is no good reasoning To say that to save my life I may part with my liberty and therefore like Esau with his birth-right I may passe it away for a messe of pottage this is a most foolish and unreasonable argument To conclude this freedome as it is a great mercy so it ought of temporall blessings next to our lives to receive the greatest estimate the slavery of the body is the 〈◊〉 to the thraldome of conscience and if we foolishly surrender up this the other will not be long after From the word trust used by his Majestie he gathers the King doth admit his interest iâ—… the Câ—…owne in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No ground for this collection for there may be a trust and that is so much the greater if free from condition Under the Authors favour the collection is very naturall for as I have shewen before every trust implyeth a condition that the party intrusted faithfully discharge and execute that trust that is reposed in him and did not the King accept his crowne upon the same condition Besideâ—… â—…ll osfices of trust and confidence or that concerne the administration of justice as Lawyers well know carry a long with them a tacit condition and thâ—… office of a King hath those qualifications in the most sâ—…perlative degree of any other and therefore must of necessity be conditionate But the Author saith That this is true in some sense and his Majestie hath alwayes acknowledged he is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the Subject yet we must not so understand it as if the right to his Kingdom were so conditionate that it werâ—… capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant It can never be thought with any candid and fâ—…ire interpretation that the Observators intention was that the King might for breach of this condition forfeit his crowne for it is cleare that the not executing of a trust doth not forfeit the estate or interest intrusted besides t is regularly true in our law that that which is not grantable is not forfeitable but the crown is not grantable eâ—…go c. â—…ut that which most confirms me in this is that the Observator hath in â—…art declared his judgement against the opinion oâ—… deposing Prinâ—…es which I concâ—…ive he would not have done had he thought the crown forfeitable all that he intends if I may be thought fit to be his expositer is as I suppose but this that he would not have Kings have an absolute and unquestionable power so that their exorbitancy might not though with greater happinesse to the Common wealth be regulated by a Parliament As for the word elegerit whether it be future or past it skils not much If he â—…ake notice of
might enact any new lawes or abrogate the old without his Majesties consent Nay â—…ove they not frequently prosessed the contrary why then what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an Aristocraticall Government O yes for they have voted and published it to the world that the power of declaring law 〈◊〉 Paul amento in case of any publike concernment doth refide in them and that though the King neither doth nor will consent yet he is obliged by their Votes And is this any greater power or priviledge than every other inferiour Court hath or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised by declaring law in dubious points of Statâ—…s and erroneous judgements And is their ancient undoubted and unquestionable right now become a power Aristocraticall T is strange that the times should so vary the case and that long enjoyment or possession which doth usually confirme and strengthen a mans right should be a meanes to take it away But before I passe this over let me tell the Author that it is a most idle scandalous and false aspersion and if I do in all this wrong him let hee himself judge upon his owne inference which is this that the defending and maintaining of the ancient â—…ight and government is a labouring for an introducting of a new and if he chance to blush as he well may at his own inconsequent reasoning let him mend it hereaâ—…ter I but saith he I dare say that all Histories and Records except of such Parliaments which deposed their King which the Observâ—…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did cannot produce an example of this nature that the two Howses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power I have before plainly evidenced it Kut I pray heare his reason why this power as to some respects may not be greater than the King Because saith he since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving of the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater than his owne if they had ever made claime to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute This is in plaine termes to say that a power that is but temporary cannot be greater than that which is continuing and unalterable a strange fallacy why if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉 whom we know hath a power very extensive shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferiour to others of lesse qualitie and esteeme because dissolvable at the Kings pleasure Or if the King conferre the dignitie and Office of Lord Keeper to another by committing of the seale unto his custody is he therefore not superiour to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his Majesties will and discretion an absurditie to thinke it Before this power be challinged it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty That it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himselfe For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty I shall not question the truth of it though I have searched the Statutes and I cannot find any such clause But admitting it to be so did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura as the Kings negative voyce certainly not The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can doe nothing no not so much as declare what the common law is without his Majesties consent or whether it be boun ed and limited So that this great and most supreame Court may not be like a body without a soule or a numberlesse cypher And for thaâ—… of the Statute that he may deny their petitions can you thence deduce that he may deny their rights their right of declaring law in caâ—…e of publike concernment is not involved within the narrow compasse of a petition To the most absolute â—…mpire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sâ—…nse to suppose a King that is in his â—…its who â—…ll not provide for the safety of his people nay who will not part with some of his right rather than they should perish because in their destruction he looseth all I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak severall languages one thing to us another to his Majesty if it were not so the setling of the Militia by his Parliament by reason of the abuse of that trust to the endangering of the Kingdom by â—…he advise of ill affected counsellors would not have caâ—…sed this great combustion I but then the Author saith This doth not prove a King should part with his rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger Nor can it be thought reaâ—…onable if that a Parliament and in that a whole kingdome can use pretences Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange 〈◊〉 would be received â—…rom invisible spies Strange that a Parliament should fancy and invent nâ—…series to themselves and should thus frighten the publike with Phantasmes or Chimaeraes I hope thâ—… Author will prove it by experience that it is not so easie a mâ—…tter to deceive a whole Common wealâ—…h I saith he and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so ofâ—…n the silly people were to be frighted More strange yet that ambition and covetousnesse should at once possesse a whole Parliament and that a whole Common-wealth should be accounted but a silly people so easie to be wrought upon I hope this disparagement to the publike will work an answerable acceptance to the people Since all naturall power is in those who obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme sucâ—… a contract before their owne preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature For example sayes the Author an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary tryall of law and to suffer if it should se fall out tâ—…ough under an undeserved sentence In this case bee that doth not make resistance and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se and a rebell to nature And he puts other examples of the like nature as that of the Martyrs â—…nd of our saviour Christ and demands our thoughts of â—…hem whether they were selfe murtherers or no What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered to justifie any individuall opposition and infringment of contract or to make
not countermand their judgements and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therefore 〈◊〉 â—…nd Coâ—…rs of the King therefore it holds in Parliaments a â—…tiori I but saith the Author the 〈◊〉 why the King cannot countermand their judgement is because they 〈◊〉 his person and â—…is consent is by law involved in â—…at by law they do for that the act of a delegated power is his act and there would be no end if he should undoe what be hath done But saith hee in Paâ—…ament the Lords 〈◊〉 in a personall capacity and the House of Commoâ—…s as representing the body of the Kiâ—…me and therefore the cases doe not agree Under correction of the Author I shall make the case parallel notwithstanding this objection I do agree that in all acts of publique 〈◊〉 which â—…e but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only I hope it will not offend any one to say that they are Ministers to the Common-Wealth as in case of making and consenting to new Lawes or repealing of the old or the like there the Loâ—…ds sit in a personall capacity and the Commons as represeâ—…ting the body of the Kingdome But in all acts that are judiciall as in case of reversing of 〈◊〉 judgements or of declaring or explayning the law of the Land there they represent the person of the King for that he is â—…ons Iustitiae the fountaine of justice and noâ—…e câ—…n 〈◊〉 such a power without it be first delegated to them by the King and therefore in such a case their judgements doe â—…ly involve the judgement of the King and do oblige him as strongly as the 〈◊〉 oâ—… dâ—…terminations of the Judges Now none can deâ—…y their declaring of the law in case of the Militia to be a judiciall act therefore the consequence is cleare that the King is justly bound by it I but further he saith The judges sweare they will not assent to any thing 〈◊〉 may turne the King in damage or 〈◊〉 by any manner way or coloâ—… 18. E. 3. And do not the Parlâ—…ent â—…o the same by their oath of supremacy and their late Proteâ—…tion If you seriously examine them you will finde that their obligation is the same And now I hope the Aâ—…thor will make good his 〈◊〉 to mee who said that when I could make these thâ—…nges agree to the two Houses I should conclude from the Judges sentence to their votes wherefore I doe 〈◊〉 that there being the sâ—…e reason there oâ—…ght to be the same Laâ—… I but for a further answere seing his former will not hold saith the Author in matters of law there lyes an appeale to them a writ of errour being brought as to the highest Court not so in matters of State Beâ—…ause whilst they 〈◊〉 sentence according to known Lawes the State is no way indangered thereby but if they challenge to themselvs a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of State they may when they please overthrow our lawes The counties which 〈◊〉 them looke upon them as judges â—…ot Politiâ—…s T is not impossible they should be both and whatsoever the judgement of the Coâ—…ties were that intrusted them certaine I am that he is not fit to occupie a place in that great Assembly that is not at least in some reasonable measure so qualified that whilst the 〈◊〉 and other Sages skilled 〈◊〉 that profession are within guiding and directing of his great Ship 〈◊〉 to â—…aw men experienced in the Politiques may sit at Sterne to secure it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 invasion and civill combustion And whâ—…n the Author can produce so able a 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 so much ingaged in the welfarre of the Kindome and so void of selfe respect then will we upoâ—… his request deâ—…ert our Parliament untill then I hope all faithfull and true hearted people will adhereunto them For that empty shadow and vaine dreame of a possibiliâ—… of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 the Law it is a wonder to me that any 〈◊〉 mans sancie should so abuse it selfe To 〈◊〉 the Authors language upon himselfe Can it be conceived that men in their wits who 〈◊〉 all that they have by the benefit of the Law and no doubt have as great a portion to lose 〈◊〉 others should exâ—…te that which is the principall evidence of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of life or 〈◊〉 and so pinne themselves and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon unknowne 〈◊〉 t is extreame madnesse and folly to thinke it Wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing but what is publiquelâ—… advantagious When the King 〈◊〉 they doe not otherwise hee will 〈◊〉 willingly sollow their 〈◊〉 I dare confidently affirme that no antiquity or Records wâ—… 〈◊〉 are aâ—…le to 〈◊〉 one example of this nature where the Kings single conceipt or 〈◊〉 is opposed 〈◊〉 that oâ—… hâ—… whole Parliament But it canâ—… be expâ—… that they should 〈◊〉 while that the King by such malignant Coâ—…nsell is kept aâ—… so great a dâ—…st 〈◊〉 By such Counsâ—…ll and 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Kâ—…ng liâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such a consâ—…nt in which his is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all 〈◊〉 doth not limit but take it away Doth this 〈◊〉 which doth â—…citely 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 more 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his power than that of their 〈◊〉 oâ—… 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 sai h hee doth not 〈◊〉 to have to 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 old or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them Neither doe they without his 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so would he Aâ—…thor ingenioâ—…sly acknowledge if that he were not so much 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 and prejudice But happily hee doth not understand the difference bâ—…tweene constituting new or repealing the old Lawes and declaring or expounding the Lawes in being how did Ship-money destroy our propriety saith he but by this very consequence What a grosse mistake is this Because the Kiâ—…gs judgement is involved in that of his Parliaments and of his Judges according to law must it therefore follow thâ—…t the whole Kingdome should be obliged by his Majesties determination against Law Or because legally we coulâ—… not be divested of our property without our consâ—…nt must not therâ—…fore the King be bound by the judgement of his Parliament which doth tacitly include his consâ—…nt I but saith hee Ejus est velle qui potest nolle He onely haâ—â— freedome of consent or disagreement that may at his election do either 'T is true But this must be understood of an actuall consent or disâ—…greement and not of an implied For in Corporations or bodies politique whâ—…re the Major part carriâ—…s it will you say that the residue are not bound because that they had not â—…lection to â—…ssent or dissent as the case falls out to be This were a way to open a gappâ—… to all disorder and confusion So the Kings consent is included in that of his Judges and yâ—…t I hope you will not say that the King there had freedome of dissenting which is the
what are they I but he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 This is but your bare assertion which is nâ—…t to be credited before the Paâ—…liament But if it had beene so that they had beene turned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sayes the same law would have justified this act as well as the 〈◊〉 So it would had the primer seisin of their estates beene of the like conâ—…equence and concernmeâ—…t â—…o the publike But he sayes since not only the Countrey about but the inhabitants within the towne have suffered in their estates and liberties If any have suffered without they may thank the unlawfâ—…ll assaults of others if within their unfaithfulnesse to the Common wealth Or if they clâ—…ymed any interest in it to themselves So much the lesse reason to 〈◊〉 on it if he cannot so much as pretend title to it T is sufficient if the common Wealth clayme an interest in it though he doth not Or have 〈◊〉 the king utterly denying his right for the future If any law can be produced to justifie the taking away the kings goods 〈◊〉 a time the 〈◊〉 will be cleared If any law or evidence can be produced to justifie the towne of Hull to be the Kings goods otherwise than with reference to the common wealth for the good of which he is intrusted with it then happily the case may not be so evident Or have made any other â—…se of their possession but meerely to prevent civill warre There is not any way more likely to create a civill 〈◊〉 than indeavours to prevent it by illegall courses Uery just if you could demonstrate any illegall courses that have beene taken If the Parliament the shutting of the King out of Hull was not their act if the Act of the substitute be not the Act of him that doth authorize him then I understaud no law be not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe The King exclâ—…ded it is not T is certaine but if he exclude himselfe then it is If it be not like supreame judicature as well in matters of State as matters of law Till new lawes be enacted the subject cannot justifie any act but what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the old This is an unquestionable truth if the Author doe not corrupt it by this false glosse and interpretation he must know t is one thing to declare the common law another to â—…act a new law the subject may justifie an act by the authority of Parliament without his Majesties consent in the former not so in the latter If it be not the great Counsell of the kingdome as well as of the king to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica 〈◊〉 the brand of treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the remedies prove worse than the disease Very right but circumstances may vary a case And that may and ought to be legall at one time that neiâ—…her will nor can be so at another And in extraordinary cases extraordinary provisions may bee made and ought not to beâ—… brâ—…nded with injustice or breach of Law Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just cause to take away a 〈◊〉 money and said he did first desire him to deliver it Cleare law and the cases will no way vary if the Author can prove that the King hath as absolute a property in the towne of Hull as any man hath in his money Or if their grounds of 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 vaine It is against all equitie to dâ—…e a wrong because there is a 〈◊〉 of suffering it Right but I hope you will prove now that there is a wrong done and not argue this by way of admission Besides it is against all reason that a whole Kingdome should be put to suffer a wrong out of a meere possibilitie of doing one Or if the 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 kingdome can be coâ—…ted vaine Too large an expression much the greater paâ—…t of the kingdome apprehend unjust grounds of jealousies Very good is not this the Doctrine of division that I impeach our Auâ—…hor to be guilty of before The Parliament have formerly beene esteemed the representative body of the whoâ—… Kingdome But belike now â—…is otherwise they have I know not how lost this honour and priviledge or it is unjustly taken from them In the easing us of these many preâ—…ures which lay so heavin upon he Kingdome 〈◊〉 which we and our whole posterity are eternally ingaged unto them there they did represent us and their actions for our benefiâ—… had an influence upon the whole Kingdome But if they tell us through their vigilancy and great care of us that we are like to be reduced to a worse condition through the malicious counsâ—…ll of those men that wrought our former miseries if not timely prevenâ—…ed there they sit in a parsonall capacity only and we are not bound to believe that we 〈◊〉 in danger because they say so No alaâ—… they are a seditious factious and inconsidâ—…rable number who intend to raise tâ—…ir own fortunes upon vâ—…ine 〈◊〉 of danger out of the publike d stractionâ—… O the wit and power of 〈◊〉 that should thus work upon men to renounce their unde standing neglect their duty and incurre the publike ruine upon a meere possibility tha they may be seduced by the Parliament But t is very mâ—…ch â—…at the Author should dare to affirme â—…ha much the greater part of the Kingdome apprehâ—…nd no ground of jealousie bâ—…like he hath travailed the wâ—…ole Kingdom over and examined men by the Poles and takâ—…n every ones suffrage and so upon the to â—…l cast up on every side is able to render you this account or otherwise hee could never make good his assertion Oâ—… if they clâ—…yme any such right of judging of dangers and preventing of them without the Kings Consent as ordinary and perpetuall As ofâ—…en as they have a mind to make use of such a right t is easie â—…or them to call the case extraordinary and pretend publike dangâ—…rs If it shall be suffered that their soleâ—…ne judgements and determinations which are of so great waight and credit that they ought to awe us to a beliefe of them shall be blasted with the scandall of vaine and pretendâ—…d how can it possibly be â—…hat there should fall out any case 〈◊〉 I but the event ought to be Judge and he sayes they will never be câ—…nfuted by that if not now for certainly apparent dangâ—…s did never lesse appâ—…e Admirably ingenious were it not a pure contradiction for doubâ—…lesse if apparent dangers they must be seene But let me tell you that the issue or event is no certaine de ermiâ—… of an imminent danger a provident care
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended
A REPLY TO THE ANSWER Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses By J. M. LONDON Printed for Matthew Walbancke Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator which was pâ—…inted aâ—…Oxford no place more fit to entertaine such cavils by his 〈◊〉 Command too good a Patron to be thus abused Begins his disâ—…urse by way of Preface and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority were it not a losse of time he has been to profuse prodigall of it in his Book he doth well to spare it in the Preface for that he sees t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no For I take it to be very cleare and evident that the Kings of Israel were of Divine instiâ—…tion But that Royall Authority should bee unto us or the sâ—…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power that I deny 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution it must of necessity be that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings and the execution of other power were sinne and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to aâ—…rt Againe were they of Divine right they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places and that they have not for as it is well known in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority in some lesse And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries Why then if they bee of humane institution it must be agreed that no King hath at thiâ—… day any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority And hence the consequence is just that Kings are bound by thâ—…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto But then he goes on anâ—… tels us that power or governement was oâ—…yned of God for the good of mankind which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society not onely for wrath but for conscience sake With this limitation the Author saith true we must submitt to the Laweâ—… of society where they doe not oppose the Law of God otherwise not for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience And he saâ—…es we must submit not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors but 〈◊〉 whilst we dâ—…e suffer under some accidentall abuses I but what if those abusâ—… provâ—…â—…o be wilfull I know that is the Authors meaning though he will not expresse it for if his opinion miâ—…ht passe as Orthodox the cases would be all one I and what if thâ—…se abuses strike at our Religion at our lives libeâ—…ies and estates at all that God hath entrusted us with and made us happy in must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once a most strange Doctrine Well let him Preach it at Oxford to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign But let us know that good subjects may preserve these yet not be the lesse but the more dutifull to their King Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God well to passe this because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after those that maintaine this error misery will bee this portion here and a just judgement hereafter But he tels us that we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establâ—…shed policy unlesse by compâ—…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences bâ—…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning for the whole sâ—…ope of his Booke speakes as mâ—…ch that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Tyâ—…ant and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law and if this fall out as too commonly it doth yet wee must patiently doe or sâ—…ffer what ever though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience is imposed upon us and which is more wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe and why so for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy A most strange and unnaturall assertâ—…on was it ever heard or can it bee imagined that a people should contract to their owne ruine there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey and if he swerve from that this dissolâ—…es the contract and gives the people pâ—…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves And if this were not Law what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy He hath made bad premiâ—…es and worse conclusion for marke what he has dâ—…uced from thence Hence saith he it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contraâ—… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretâ—…ce soever withoâ—…t manifâ—…st breach of Divine Ordinance and violation of publique saâ—…th resume that authority which they have placed in another This by the way power according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 was primarily in the people a truth ingeniously acknowledged but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 they have by contract divestâ—…d themselves of that power how is that made good why thus they chose one to be King over them and contracted to obey him what in omnibus 〈◊〉 in all his commissions nothing lesse for that might be to disodey God and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man judge you I but they have given him an absolute Authority and made him supreme and therefore not to be qâ—…stioned by â—…ny inferiour pâ—…wer and if this were true his Majesties counsell who too 〈◊〉 malâ—…ne â—…he haâ—…pinesse of King and peopâ—… and would worke oâ—… their owne 〈◊〉 desâ—…gnes by the ruine of boâ—…h wâ—…ld never have advised hâ—…s Majâ—…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declaratâ—…ons that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law in trust for the well governâ—…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committâ—…d to his charge And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him for whose sake the convâ—…yance in trâ—…st was made nâ—…t of him who is the party intrusted So likewâ—…se every trust doth implâ—… a conditâ—…on that the party doe dâ—…ly perfâ—…rme and discharge thâ—… tâ—…st or if hâ—…e doe not that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe Thâ—…s
to overthrow Monarchy yes if our Author may be judge Was ever imputation of so great guilt layed upon any man upon such shallow grounds Well since he failes here suspends your judgement but a while he may make good his charge hereafter That Dominion which is usurped and not just yet whilest it remaines Dominion and till it be legally againe devested refers to God as to its Author and Donor as much as that which is hereditary To which our Author saith that usurpation and unjust Dominion can give no right to the possessor Can it any way by the most scrutenous understanding be collected from the Observators words that usurpation gaines a right what probability can there be of this inference If this could be made good Lawes would be but Cyphers and unlawfull force upon any mans interest the best meanes of living so that he who could steale most would be the true proprietor of most and the strongest prove the richest men But doth not the Observator expresly say that that Dominion which is usurped is not just if so what needes this Cavill O yes for he saith that it is a flat contradiction to say that God is the Author and Donor of Dominion usurped and not just as well as of that which is hereditary and what is his reason why for that God being Lord proprietary of all his donation transferrs a full right to him â—…n whom he bestowes it and this deede of gift being knowne it is not lawfull to indeavour a recovery and therfore God cannot be the Author and Donor of that dominion which is usurped and not just for that such a Dominion doth not intitle a man to a full right because the lawfull proprietor may regaine it by Conquest as justice permitts and so reestablish himselfe in his Dominion Yet under favour this is no contradiction for doth or can the revolution or Maeander of time produce any change or alteration either in King or State that God is not the Author of the evill of sin man alone is the father of for that sinne is inconsistent with that absolute purity and holinesse that is in God but the evill of punishment that is Gods Is there any evill in the City that I have not done saith the Lord And if God for the sinne of the King or people or both shall permit a stranger to usurpe upon the dominion of the King and to entrench upon his Soveraignty is it any contradiction to say that God is as much the Author and Donor of this Dominion that is thus gained by usurpation as he is of that which is hereditary doubtlesse not for God is onely the confirmer man the creator or institutor of both And though God as absolute Soveraigne and Proprietor can transferre a full right in any thing unto whom he pleaseth yet it doth not follow that hee will alwaies so doe For as sinne may divorce a King from his Kingdome or a people from Gods blessing for a time so true and unfained repentance may through Gods mercy reestablish and unite them againe together When our Author had said as before that where God is the Donor of Dominion that there it is not lawfull to ir â—…eavor a Recovery He further adds that this was the case of Rehoboam who aftâ—… the desect of Ten Tribes raised an Army out of Iudah the Tribe of Benjamin in hopes to reduce them to obedience But was warned by Shemaiah the man of God not to fight against his brethren not because it was unlawfull in it selfe or the successe unprobable but for that this was from the Lord I shall not dare to defend a peoples revolting from their King though their burden be great and their yoake heavie as here Israels from Rehoâ—…oam who when they could not obtaine an ease or discharge of their pressures which they had suffered under his father Salomon answered the King saying what portlon have wee in David neither have we inheritance in the Son of Iesse here they disavowed their King and not long after have made Ieroboam King in his stead for my part I do not beleeve this to be a warrantable Act in Israel And I conceive that Israel taking up of Armes to reduce them to obedience was lawfull and that he might have proceeded and have expected a good successe upon his indeavour had hee not had an expresse command from God to the contrary But now on the other side I will not justifie Rehoboam in forsaking the Councell of the sage old men who as grave wise counsellers that seeke the good of the publique not their owne advised the King that if he would bee a servant unto this people and serve them and answer them and speake good words to them then they would be his servants for ever here you may learne the Office of good Kings and their Counsellers but the King as most Kings use rejecting such rigid counsell betooke him to his young men and consulted with them asked them what Counsell they would give him t is easie to judge what the effect of their Counsell would be and they answer him thus shalt thou say unto them my little finger shall be thicker then my fathers loynes in stead of an ease of their present miseries he promises them that he will augment them for the future no question this was a great sinne in Rehoboam and I am confident had not Israel revolted they might have justified before God the taking up of Armes against these Malignant Counsellors for the restoring and reducing of their ancient Rights and Liberties Kings must serve their people by protecting and defending of them according to Law and right as also by easing of them of all unlawfull pressures if they expect that their people should serve them in love and obedience The Authour goes on and saith Though force be not Law yet is after conquest a people resigne their right in part or in whole by a subsequent Act of consent they are obliged to stand to those conditions which they made perchance out of a probable seare of harder usage Who will oppose this our Author needed not to have laboured for instances to make this good oâ—… to have shewed us the strong obligation that the Law of God and man doe impose upon such compacts and agreements for no doubt men ought to bee faiâ—…ull in the discharge of their ingagements though it be to their owne prejudice besides as wee say in Law he that disseises or disposseâ—…es another of his â—…reehold or other interest hath a right against all men except the disseisee or the party so dispossessed so without question it is in case of Dominion or Royalty hee that gaines a Kingdome by Conquest 〈◊〉 absolute King against all men except the rightfull Soveraigne and therefore as our Law is well knowne he may obliterate and utterly extirpate and abolish their old Lawes and rights and create introduct new which is one strong
in whatsoever is meant by the word protection is the King therefore boâ—…nd to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command I wonder how you can now apprehend this word protect under so large a notion or is it possible were you not resolved to cavill that these words should give you ground for it certainly if my reason faile me not politicall happinesse hath reference only to the body politike and that is not capable of any advancement to any hoâ—…our office or power and to take the words in other sense were to make them impossible for can it be thought or expected that his Majestie should be bound to advance all his Subjects to places of honor or power since if all should be in authority they might command themselvs there would be none left to obey The sence of the Observator is plainely this that the King by this word protect is not only to intend a shielding us from all evill but likewise a promoting of the commoâ—…wealth to all kinde of politicall happinesse by endeavouring to inrich not impoverish his Kingdom by maintaining peace and establishing good and wholesome laws amongst his people and by putting of such in place of power and authority that may see the due execution of the same Though all single 〈◊〉 ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole State ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore saith the Author the greatest happinesse of a Prince that 〈◊〉 was able and his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capeable of doing any courtesie VVhen he hath done all he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant Whatsoever hath beene or could be attributed to any Prince in point of grace or humble acknowledgement that we ascribe unto our gracious Soveraigne with all humilitie and we shall alwayes account it our happinesse to have a Prince not only able but willing to engage his people by his grace and goodnesse But must it therefore be thought to be a dishonour or derogation from his gracious and publike favours to say that hee doth but fungi officio discharge his office or duty according as the law of God and man obligeth him certainly had Rhehoboams Sages thought that their Councell had carryed the least badge of irreverence or disrespect to their Prince they would not have advised him in such rough and unacceptable language that if he would be a servant to that people and serve them c. that then they would be his servants for ever Good Princes have acknowledged themselves servants to the common wealth And t is the councell of young men only that suggest the contrary But it is a certaine position that that Prince will never discharge his trust aright that sacrifices too much to his Royaltie Here the Author may see that other ages have beene guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect as this Sycophantean Coâ—…tier is pleased to stile it to Princes Againe he saith That if all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace Then they truly are so for no obligation can lye upon any man to believe things â—…therwise than they are T is true things that are simply good or simply evil cannot be varied by circumstances and therefore no obligation may constrain a man to believe them otherwise But that which is not in it selfe good or bad but varies according to its severall object in such case for one and the same act to produce good to one and ill to another is no novelty and here the application denominates the action So in this case one and the same action may be matter of grace to one and yet but matter of dâ—…ty to another As when a Iudge doth Justice to a man as to him t is grace and favour but with reference to the law tâ—…s but his dutie I but he saith That this ground destroyes the power of beneâ—…nce in a Priâ—…ce and the duty of gratitude in subjects Under favour nothing lesse for as it is his Maâ—…esties office and duty by all meanes of grace and favour as also by justice and right to endeavour the happinesse of the common Wealth so it is our duty by all meanes of humble acknowledgement to bee gratefull t is a great mercy for to have a Prince that will governe his people according to Law and right And it were a great judgement for the people not to bee thankfull The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought â—…ee to thinke that peâ—…sht to him which is gained to the people By the same Argument the people may share all that be hath and he is â—…ound to believe that be hath lost nothing All that the observator here drives at is but this that the Kings strength and riches aâ—…e imbarked in the happinesse and prosperity of hâ—…s people and therefore that it is not their debilitating or impoverishing that will any way 〈◊〉 or enrich his Majestie but the contrary Blest be the King in his portion may it increase to nonplus Arithmeticke and his dayes time But yet let him know that the misery or happinesse of his people are by way of râ—…flection made his Is King anâ—… people have severall â—…ghts saith the Author what law is there which binds the King suo jâ—…re cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his No doâ—…bt the King and people have severall rights happy State when they doe not intrench upon each other but in this they vaâ—…y the King for the most part is seized or possâ—…ssed in jure 〈◊〉 and the people in their owne right so that the King hath nâ—… that 〈◊〉 of property that the people hath And no doubt the King at first as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Author received his demesnes from his people as a recompence of his care to whom they owed their securitie and therefore if it were law for 〈◊〉 no question the people might most colourably justifie an incroachment Aâ—… the King by the Law of God and man is bound to doe justice and to protect and deâ—… his people and therefore if he have any right or priviledge that is inconsistent wiâ—…h these he is obliged suo jure cedere But againe doth any one goe about to take away the Kings right or to divest any property of his Nay rather doe they not in defect of his 〈◊〉 and in his right imploy and mannage them according to the trust reposed in him or if they did doe it ought not the King rather to loose his right
writt and their oathes they are bound to preserve and defend and therefore clearely not out of their â—…gnizance for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so farre forget himselfe as to think that authorâ—…ty of any moment when he doth produce the Record I will then give him an answer So that I take this as an undeniable position that where the King doth duely execute the trust reposed in him there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act and the Parliament in such caâ—…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction Bâ—…t if on the coâ—…trary the King infring his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom there the Parliament may are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing oâ—… the King 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 will not passe over thâ—…s râ—…le thus for saith he if quod omnes tangit ab 〈◊〉 opprobâ—…ri debet with what equity then may the Clergie who are a considerable part of this Kingdome be excluded Why yes by the same eqâ—…ity that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth exclâ—…de them from being Farmers that those who have devoted themselves soly to Gods service might not miscere se secularibus negotijs incumber themsâ—…lves with secular affaires for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function 'T was neâ—…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousnesse so possessed the Clergie and temporall jurisdiction was dispensed by Ecclesiasticall persons And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines they â—…arved their flocke and made them more like wolves than Sheepe and Heathens than Christians I wish they would not desire temporall preâ—…erment but keepe themselves as they ought in their proper Spheare ponder on this that it is no small happines to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 molestations that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God The Author saith that the King tells them their writt may direct them to know their power which is to counsell not to command I wish with all my heart that he and his associates could pleade as cleare a conscience from this as his Parliament can though certainely they may make a more colourable pretence to it than the Cavalliers if begging and intreating with all the submissivenesse that possibly can be be a commanding then are the Parliament highly guilty if it otherwise not Againe saith the Author the writt runnes super dubijs negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri So that the cleare meaning is their advise is not law except the Royall assent established it into an Act. If the Authour please but to advise with the learned he will finde that tractare is of a more large signication than to treat of or debate onely But was it ever said that their advise should be Law without the Regall assent They have power to declare what the law of the land is in case of publique concernement as now but it was never so much as thought on that they could make a new law or alter the old without his Majesty We must distinguish betweene the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law and the making of a new law the one they may doe without his Majesties consent the other they cannot 'T is alleadged that the King callâ—…th them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Queene Elizabeth but for proposing they might advise the Qâ—…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to doe to mâ—…ddle with To which the Observator answereth a meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law 'T is true saith the Author but when grounded upon Authority I pray where is it and no way excepted against by those who have beene alwaies earnest defendors of their priviledges it may bee reckoned among sound presidents Happily there was never the like occasion to except against iâ—… as having never beene urged how then could it be answered I am confident that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments But pray heare the Parliament and as you ought so rest satisfied who say that some Presidents ought not to be rules this you must agree to for that some are not lawfull But furthey they say that no presidents can bee bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament because some ought not to be followed and all may â—…all short and be different from the case in question The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when be withdraweth himselfâ—… to bee rightly named a Parlâ—…ament or to have any power of any Court and consequenâ—…ly to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsely imposed on his Majesty his answers and massages speakes the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Had it not beene doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage or at least have deniâ—…d them that acceptance that his Majestiâ—…s Messages do dâ—…serve I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oâ—…her name and style would have beene found out for doth he not in these very Mâ—…ssages call thâ—…m an inconsiderable number and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the likâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the stiles of a Parliament and for thâ—…ir powâ—…r if they can doe nothing wiâ—…hout his Mâ—…jesties consent and that not to be obtained neither what are they more thâ—…n a Cipher or a meere convâ—…ntion of private men And is this a falsity But our Authours language shâ—…ll not provoke to a retaliation The King doth assert that because the law hath trusted him with a Pâ—…erogative to discontinue Pâ—…aments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in 〈◊〉 of Law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by his writt 〈◊〉 is grosse 〈◊〉 saith the Authour Howevâ—…r I am sure the language is grosâ—…e I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author but this I am certaine of that his Mâ—…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and â—…lection thereby which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedome and power therein But why is it false because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdome hee acâ—… he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writts T is not to be 〈◊〉 â—…hat whâ—…n the people granted this Prerogative to his Majestie that they would give him so vast a power as to make him the sole Judge of the necessitie of a Parliâ—…ment for if so upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellers be the Kingdome in never so imminent never so appaâ—…ent danger it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament certainly this was never the intention of this trust
in the North 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King could be 〈◊〉 wisely or faithfully advised by any other Couâ—…t oâ—… 〈◊〉 his single 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all advise whatsoever t were not only vaine but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 Kingdome should be troubled to make elections and that the 〈◊〉 eâ—… 〈◊〉 attend the publike 〈◊〉 The King never refused to advise with them What a 〈◊〉 falsitie is this No doubt the Author can 〈◊〉 London from Yorke And the Commission of Array from the Miâ—… But then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 us that the â—…all but not the onely forme of the Kings answere to such 〈◊〉 as they were not 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 L'Roy 〈◊〉 proves that after the advise of this his great 〈◊〉 he is yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 further with persons or 〈◊〉 as his owne 〈◊〉 shall thinke 〈◊〉 Master Crompton in his 〈◊〉 of Couâ—…ts â—…ells us â—…at when the King did consâ—… a Bill then he endorsed it L'Koy volt the King will hâ—… it so is â—…e did not â—…gree then he indorsed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which as he â—…es was an absoluâ—… denyall why â—…hen no ground for this inâ—…erence that the King was at election to advisâ—… further with any other Coâ—…ll 〈◊〉 if it were so this proves de facto that thâ—… King hath had this powr but doâ—…h no way 〈◊〉 thâ—… Obs rvators reason how that if this might be permitted 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 to call Parliaments â—…sides they are the most supreame Councell in England and therefore according 〈◊〉 the rule of Law in â—…he presence of this Counsâ—…ll all infâ—…riour Councâ—…ls ought to cease Againe what they councell or detâ—…rmine is done in a legall and judiciall way and therefore not to bee 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 extra judiciall advice whaâ—…ever No nor by 〈◊〉 judgâ—…ment of any other Court but a subsequent Parliamâ—…nt And the Observator adds this as a reason why the Kings judgement onely ought not to bee 〈◊〉 for saith he the many eyes of so many chiefe Gentlemen out of all parts see more than sewer The same reason saith the Author which denys a liâ—…y of dâ—…ing to the King that is such a number who see more because they are more may deny it to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so 〈◊〉 King and Lords are voted out of Parliament What a poore evasion is this and contrary to common sense that this reason should deny a liberty of dislenting to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons for that they are much the major part of the Parliament and to that Hoâ—…se too in comparison 〈◊〉 the people For the first he may aswell argue that the major part of the Judges in the Kings Bench should binde the minor in the common Pleas or 〈◊〉 versá and as soone maintaine it for though both the Houses make but one Court yet they are so distinct that each doth officiate in its proper Spheare and the conclusions of the one cannot bind the other and for the lattâ—…r that the peoples judgement because the greater number should sway the House of Commons Hâ—…e may aswell reason that though I give away my â—…t yet the property is not altered and as soone prove it When hee can make 〈◊〉 pâ—…ople to represent the House of Commons not the House of Commons the people then shall the peoples judgâ—…ment for majority carry it Vntill then we must as wee are 〈◊〉 by our election submit to their determinations Besides four hundred choice grave and solid men may 〈◊〉 and discover as much as fâ—…ure hunâ—…d thousand 'T is no 〈◊〉 of number but 〈◊〉 qualification not the plurality of eyes bâ—… the 〈◊〉 that sees most yâ—…t as one good 〈◊〉 mâ—…y seâ—… more than many bad ones so iâ—… must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many good ones must 〈◊〉 that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Au 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sheweth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is noâ—… gâ—…lly truâ—… iâ—… it be 〈◊〉 true it is 〈◊〉 For 〈◊〉 he I dâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost any Paâ—…ent man hee will 〈◊〉 us upon the 〈◊〉 of a Bill 〈◊〉 one 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Houâ—…e hath found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and urged more exceptions than 〈◊〉 hunâ—… would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eâ—… This possibly may be but the str ng probability is on the oâ—…r fiâ—…le 〈◊〉 câ—…ally one may seâ—…â—…ore than 〈◊〉 â—…ndred is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eiâ—…her probable or 〈◊〉 that it will be 〈◊〉 For my part I shall never waive a propable certainty for a meere 〈◊〉 nor in â—…quall judgemenâ—…s preferre an Vnite before a Pluralitie Thâ—…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay whole Parliaâ—… 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Null â—…y succeeding Paâ—…liaments and instances in many I shall not indeavour to maintaine an infallibility in a 〈◊〉 nor did I ever beleive considering them to be bâ—…t â—…n that they could not 〈◊〉 in judgement aswell as others But for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 to an 〈◊〉 to say that which ha h beene may be and therefore it 〈◊〉 is sâ—…ch a peece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—… I never 〈◊〉 oâ—… The â—…w 〈◊〉 ends 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 needs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Coâ—…lls moâ—…e 〈◊〉 impeâ—…all and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ceâ—… 〈◊〉 mâ—…y 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as any other private Subject What may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 casually meâ—… from the severall Counties strangers to each other the most 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 men for wisedome and mannâ—…rs and propably of the best forâ—…nes intrusâ—…d with the publique have as many bye and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as soone infring their 〈◊〉 as any 〈◊〉 suâ—…iect When ever the 〈◊〉 makes this good I will sacrifice my reason to his will aâ—…d bâ—…ve all to be sound Doctrine which he preaches They are strangly transported with the love of a popâ—… state who can so 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 as to force themselves to thinke the members of it may not be extreamely subâ—…ect to amâ—…ition covetousnesse batred and affection And they are as strongly ravishâ—… wiâ—… the love of Moâ—…rchy who can belâ—…ive that all these may not sway the Scepâ—…er and rule the King to the oppressing anâ—… iâ—…aving of his Subjects But what doâ—…h the Author count this a popular State I never learned before that whâ—…re the people had one principâ—…ll Governor over them as a King that that should be a Democracy Doubtlesse he is noâ—… well read in the Politiques or if he be he doth much wrong himselfe and dishonour his King so grosly to mistake a Monarchy for a Democracy Then hee instances in the Bishop of Durhams case by which he saith Wee are told in the 3. cap. of the second Parliament held 1. Mariae how that that Bâ—…prick was dâ—…lved in a forme Parâ—…ament 7. Ed. 6. Which was compassed and brought to passe by the â—…nister labour great 〈◊〉 and corrupt meanes of certaine ambitâ—…s persons then being in 〈◊〉 â—…ather to iâ—…rich themselves and their friends with a great part oâ—… the possessions of 〈◊〉 saâ—…d â—…shopprick than upon just occasion
his Majesty for the ordering of the Militia according to their advise â—…or the better security of his people and His Majestiâ—…s negative returne unto them before they according to their duty undertooke in his Majestiâ—…s and his people behalâ—…e the trust and maâ—…age of the same And now it must be in their power to command men 〈◊〉 horses seise on all the Ammunition send for what supples of money they thinke necessary for the repelling those dangers This is but a consequence of the other it were but in vaine to lay a foundation if they had not power â—…o raise the Structure I but here wee are fallen backe againe into what we so much complained of Arbitrary poweâ—… 'T is much that one who pretends to be Mâ—…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity which justice requireth should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law as not being within the intention of it for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule is a prosecution of an arbitrary power The manage of a businesse in case of necessity neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule neithâ—…r that to be stileâ—… Arbitrary which necessitâ—… makes lawsull Was not this the very case of Ship-money there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity and none so compelent a judge of this as the King and therefore for the securing of the people money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel for will it therefore follow that because the King cannot upon no pretence whatsoever take away the Subjects propâ—…rty without their consent that the Parliamâ—…ent may not take it with their conâ—…ent Most inconsequent The Parliament represent the people which the King doth not And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 â—…he people whâ—…ch the Kings cannot But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money which he saith will hold in our case It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason that it was better for the Kingdome though it were in reall danger in arena 〈◊〉 capere to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it wâ—…s able by a suddaine defence than that the King should prâ—…vide such a remedy which would be so easily so â—…quently abused upon every preâ—…ence of dâ—…nger to pâ—…event such an evill which could extremly seldome oâ—… almost never hapâ—…en for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So 〈◊〉 â—…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old waâ—… and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion upon I know not what vaine pretences I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parliâ—…ment O the power and vertue of this great Assembly that can so Metamorphize men as to makâ—… thâ—…m spâ—…ak accoâ—…ding to the dictate of reasâ—…n not affâ—…ction But for his Argument the ground of the obâ—…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money was the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy upon eveâ—…y pretence of danger which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it And when our Aâ—…thor can make it good as he hâ—…th strongly 〈◊〉 but much failed in it that a Communitâ—… maâ—… have those many private ends to mislead it that a King may then shâ—…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel untill then we must â—…ell him thâ—…t there is â—…oure hundrâ—…d to one against him I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir Iâ—…hn Ho hams act Treason be not contrary to the cleareâ—…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason and the â—…trongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defind himselfe by force if 〈◊〉 though by the force of his Majestrate or his owne 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not without all confidence by flâ—…ght Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him Did his Majesty drive him into Hull No But his Mejesty would have driven him out he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament for the securing of him and his people And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence yet having got it by a lawfull authority he may defend himselfe and it against any assault by the same power Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors was their resistance a just defence Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre His conclusion is very just For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull if their resistance were a warrantable defence But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him that the cases are more different then a Papist and a Protâ—…stant they agree in somewhat the cases in nothing for they had neither lawfull cause nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance as Sir Iohn Hotham had Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor But enough of this in a case so manifest He may as soone convince a man of common sense that black and white are the same colour as that these cases runne parallel Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is a great difference betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe and offending his King His feaâ—…es are over witty if they will not permit him to thinke himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security Without question he that may defend may offend for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe if I may not offend my enemy What a sensles thing and void of reason is it to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act but stand like so many stocks immoveable what is this but opposiâ—…um in objecto a flâ—…t contradiction or a taking up of Armes in iest to make me capable of losing my life in earnest If this were all we could doe the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends would be â—…his by Tyranny and oppression to ingage the people in this imaginary defensive warre thereby to disarme them and force obedience to their unjust desires or slay them with their owne weapons But to passe this If a King shall take up armes
hath a right of dissenting Confest out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us out of our owne confession why was it ever denyed that the Kings consent wâ—…s not necessary to the making of new lawes or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old Nay hath it not beâ—…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases that if he will dissent as hee may nothing can be donâ—… without him why then a fortiori he shall have a nâ—…gative power where the alteration of thâ—… forme of Government is propoundâ—…d But he must understand that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them without his Majesties consent for that that is a power incident to this great Court as well as others inferiour and in such case the King hath no negative voyce â—…xcept both King and people Heâ—…e saith hee a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and King If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words I le râ—…nounce my understanding All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us is but this that the changing of the auncient established forme of our Government is Casus omissus out of their Commission and therefore not to be accompliâ—…ed by them without the consent of both King and people 〈◊〉 doth not say that the Collective body may doe it without the consent of the 〈◊〉 Lords and Commons This happily might be a predominant power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary for the introducting of a new frame of Government Now how this should be a transferring of a power to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and king I must confesse I apprehend not therefore the construction is either very forraigne or my capacitie extreame dull If the King be an affecter of true liberty he hath in Parliament a power as â—…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike dâ—…resses He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King yet in effect they had the same thing for in any immiâ—…nt dangers necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator which as he sayes had absolute power over them and to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence he saith we may make the truest judgement what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power And may this happy glo rious succesefull and never sufficiently to be encomiasted Government continue without the least interruption amongst us untill time hath spent its last period and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation That the Parliament and Court should be at varience t is no news there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy bâ—…twixt them The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people nor they the oppression and publique disservice of the Court the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty But I nâ—…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament or could any way ballance with that doubâ—…lesse they are not equâ—…ll competitors the Parliament represâ—…nt the publique and those counsellors themselves onely the one studies to augment the Common wealth the other their owne wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe and treacherous to hâ—…s countrey that can be so transported with words as to renounce the Parliament for my part I shall lay it down as one of the Articles of my beleife that the Counsell of â—…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament evidently consonant thereunto good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 câ—…nnot reasonably be supposed the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not giâ—… the most faithfull advise adds thereâ—…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations unreasonably complaine they are denied liberty of conscience and 〈◊〉 out of their owne undeâ—…standings I appeale to any mans judgment whether any thing can be â—…ged for the authority of a Lay councell that it 〈◊〉 to inâ—…orce a submission of judgment and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable thereâ—…o which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall And yet theâ—…e he saith it would go hard but a man would find some answer as easily he mighâ—… wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies we may with very little alâ—…eraton apply to civill counsells I confeâ—…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine than a Lawyer but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession 〈◊〉 give me â—…ave a little that our Author may not passe uâ—…nswered to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular Now with the favour of the Author if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not there is a wide 〈◊〉 as to our case betweâ—…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells For I take this for a â—…rtaine and cleare truth in dâ—…vinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever be it of never so great ability or eminency 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations for thâ—…t the conscience of a man is if I may so speake out of their jurisdiction t is God alone that hath power over that Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse one man esteemeth one day above another another estâ—…emeth every day alike let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men Againe ver. 14 there is nothing saith he uncleane of it selfe but â—…o 〈◊〉 that
Paramount in every mans private property and so if occasion require may call for a part for the preservation of the whole and upon such termes he is unwise that will not freely disburse it yet it doth not therfore follow that this is seized by the same right that the Forts Castles are which are meerely for the publike defence and security For the Kingdom hath a peculiar proper interest in the one which it hath not in the other And though necessity may justly demand both for the Publique safety yet it is the proper worke and office of the one not soof the other That there is an Arbitrary power in every state somewhere t is true t is necessary no inconveniencefollows upon it If he mean by arbitrary a lagistative power this is granted yet not to part but the wholebody But what if one part do desert the other and refuse to concurre with hâ—…m must that 〈◊〉 still and do nothing But hee sayes this speakes not to the case for still they give us a certaine rule to live by And do not the Parliament do the same No law can be all equity nor all equity Law for so the one would confound and destroy the other but there must be a certaine rule upon which to make this equitable construction Why now I appeale to any one that knowâ—… any thing of the justice of their proceedings whether that they have not often laid downe this as an unquâ—…ionable position that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole ordering of the 〈◊〉 of the Forts Castles and Magazine throughout the Kingdome why then hâ—…re is your certaine rule to live by onely they make this equitable qualification of it and I must say that it were no just law if it would not admit of this construction that in case where 〈◊〉 Kingdome is in imminent danger of for reigne invasion or civill combustion and that the King seduced by evill and Malignant Counsellours will not receive their advise and Counsell for the securing of the same in such caâ—… they who are intrusted with the publike may seize the Forts and Magazine and 〈◊〉 the Militia for his Maâ—…esties and his peoples safety and preservation And doth this any whit destroy the rule Nay rather doth it not mainetaine and support it I but he saith that he is to justifie there is such a Paramount Law which shall make other lawes truely Oracles that is capable of contrary meanings so that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thiâ—…g because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law a weeke after he shall be justly punished too for noâ—… doing of the same thing because he hath disobeyed the equity of the law This I shall justifie and yet let me tell the Author that this is no forcing or stâ—…ayning the lawes to contrary meaning but onely a Declaration of the true intention of them The Statuâ—…e de frangentibus prisenam doth enaâ—…t that it shall be felony for a prisoner to breake prison the prison by accident is set on fire tâ—…e prisoners may in such case break prison for the salvation of their lives and are no felons and yet this is against the expresse letter of the Statute and shall wee in such case say that this is a contrary meaning to the law No wee may not t is cleerely agreeable with the intention of it Agaâ—…ne the sole power of ordering of the Militia doth by the law reside in the King and if in time of peace and securâ—…ty the King duely discharging of his trust any one shall dare to execute any other Commission and by vertue of that shall traine muster or discipline any 〈◊〉 his Majesties subâ—…ects without his authority there hee is justly punishable as offending against the letter of the law But now on the other side if in time of publique distraction and feare of invasion from abroad or of civill and intestine combustion within the King shall refuse to hearken to the Counsell of his Parliament and shall listen to such advise as being followed mâ—…y prove the utter ruine and destruction of the Common-wealth In such case if they shall take upon them for to order the Militia for the securing of his Majesty and people and shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commissions to that purpose those that in sâ—…ch case shall disobey may be punished for not submitting to the equity of the law And yet still this is no contradiction or contrary â—…eaning to the law but an eqâ—…itable just â—…planation according to the intâ—…ntion of it And if this will not give the Author satifaction for my part I thinke nothing will I but then he cites us Aristotle which saith Those lawes are with greatest prudence 〈◊〉 shed which dâ—…fine most cases and which leave nothing which possibly may be determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breast of the judge And the Author gives the reason of it for that to leave an ample and large construction according to equity unto Iudges may be a meanes to satisfie corrupt ends T was a wise saying of Aristotle and no doubt t is a very admirable rule and direction for all legistative powers to make such lawes that might be their owne exposâ—…ours and that might if it were possible extend to all cases â—…hat so the selfe respect or corrupted judgement of their interpreters might not through the dubious ample or various sense of them be satisfied But since it is impossible for them so 〈◊〉 sorsee and inlarge the law but they must of necessity lâ—…ave some câ—…ses unprovided for and some incertaine which must râ—…st upon the judgement of the Iudges of it How doth it any way oppose law or reason where there is not for all cases an exact provision to allow a favourable and 〈◊〉 construction But then covertly 〈◊〉 to the condition of our times he tells us a large Story of the 〈◊〉 in Germany and of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens what a 〈◊〉 and large power they had got into their hands 〈◊〉 by insinuating themselves into the hearts of the people and how they did abuse that power by injustice and oppression and so concludes that upon proportionable grounds and principles such mischeifâ—…s being then may be againe Could the Author have made a worse compâ—…rison 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would was ever greatâ—…r dishonour or indignity cast upon a Parliament upon such 〈◊〉 such groundlesse and inconsequent reasons and arguments The Anabaptists they abused Germany the thirty Tyrants Athens and therefore thâ—… Parliament do England the rest of His booke shewes this to be his meaning though hee conclude with a may be though he had not regarded his own credit and reputatiâ—…n yet hâ—…e should have had some respect to the honour and fame of his Countrâ—…y and have studied a better resemblance though he had not raised a better conclusion The bad actions or impostures of some are not infallible presidents for others to be judged by But to advertise the Author that he do not for the
fraudes holy salsehoods and religious untruth stood the Church of Rome c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine whether this policy worke not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falsehoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth for he is revolted againe into his pretences deceipts and falsehoods And I wish from my very heart that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man and such as he is than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived I but then the Observator sayes It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in law to be done by force not onely when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this workes on the minde as strongly as the other on the body I but with the Authors favour this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera such as they use to bugbearâ—… Children withall It remaines then we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults I marry Sir here is onâ—… of the imaginary Spiriâ—…s that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men Doubtlâ—…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare were it true which I much question to a resolved and setled judgement neither doth the law tâ—…ke hold of any such feare as thiâ—… is I but then he goes on whether that they were not poasted with directions to thâ—…ir perticular lodgings I here you have another of these Hobgoblins and deformed Images more fit to fray children with than men Because if that were true they were directed to their Chambers and never intended as the event cleares it to approach them therefore they complied or were silent and so that faction prevailed I but he goes yet further whether the way to the House were not set with clamarous multitudes that they must passe through the middest of them whilâ—…st they insorme them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur it is their bâ—…sinesse that is there transacted have recourse thi her with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament and how thingâ—… succeed for their good but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Assâ—…mblies and clamorous multitudes For their inquiring what their names were and which sâ—…de they tooke certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 and that can be no cause to make me dread a man because he knowes my name No nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 if I am conscious to my self that they are such as are just and honourable â—…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted that is as like to be true as that they shoâ—…ld vote what they had informed them For the other two of absence and accident he sayes they may be reduced to this I t is no wondâ—…r many stay away since they must be absent even whilest thâ—…y are there If their wills were absent by being a verse from the publique good whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers better in such case their rome than their company The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom pâ—…blique affaires shâ—…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the â—…eason why each man preserves his owne right bâ—…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies No but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them I but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament one may manâ—…ge a trust well and yet no dishoâ—…â—…hat a whole Kingdom may doâ—… it better With equall reason sayes he they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops 〈◊〉 Sherâ—…ffes 〈◊〉 c. and dispose of all the preserments of England For thâ—… Bishops thouâ—…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us that they have been very bad yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be that they likewise should be nominated by the great counsell for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons But now for the Sheriffes Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred for the nominating of these as for the other for though they may be corrupt in their way yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests no danger to the publike The truth of it is this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the heaâ—… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Staâ—…e who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike have and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it Was not then their reqâ—…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence who by their sedulous care honest and direct counsell and which is above all by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future But to passe this had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to hâ—…s people If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie and 〈◊〉 himselfe of
〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 it and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 as the whole body of the 〈◊〉 To 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but then by the rule of contraries to dissent 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉 is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses and this you do 〈◊〉 allow Why now the onely judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands is the Parliament and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉 wherefore it is your duty and mine 〈◊〉 wee will oppose our judgements to theirs which will be extreame arrogancy to believe they are so however what their awefull authority will not do their reason ought But he sayes upon pretence of distresse to takâ—… illegall courses is as if thâ—…y should perswade us we are not in 〈◊〉 and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery Right but in case of apparent and imminent danger as now if the great Physitian of the common-wealth shall neglect his patient it may by all lawfâ—…ll and legall courses as it doth now indeavour its owne preservation Thâ—…y represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State Very true if the King do not desert them but if he do then they represent the whole State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions onely and when leave cannot sâ—…asonably be â—…ad and when Competent accuse appeare not â—…n the impeachment If by suspitions be meant onely a bare not confiding in this injustce cannot be sufficient ground No nor if by suspitions is meant a labouring for an Arbitrary power for which there is no ground and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty this is as insufficient â—… cause of impeachment as the other But upon Articles drawne and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused parties are at liberty they may be meddled with True if competent 〈◊〉 appeare in the impeachment then they may be arrested and deteined to appeare before the Parliament but there ought to be no other prosâ—…cution in any other Court or way than in Parliament whereby they may be deprived of a member without their consent I but sayes hee if the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence shoâ—…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for tryall of treason For the first no doubt where they are not able to give consent there they have not power to dissent And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause the accusers appeare to be competent and the cause of impeachment legall and just t were to much presumption and confidence in us for to believe them so confident as not to be willing to give way for a legall tryall 5. That the Soveâ—…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no Negative voyce This power is not claymed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdome from ruine in case where the King is so seduced and that he preserres dangerous men and prosecuâ—…s his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be Kings as long as they please and when they are weary of 〈◊〉 the kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King and Parliament if he had pleased That is they will as of right they ought represent the whole State the King deserting of them so that they may be enabled to preserve the kingdome from ruine and when that shall be out of danger then shall his Majestie freely enjoy his negative according to law and right To save it from ruine the law hath better provided for the peoples safety by prohibitâ—…ng all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever 〈◊〉 As illegall executions of power such as the Commission of Array are not to be justified So legall such as the Militia are not to be condenmed And in case where the King is seduced that is when â—…e is not so wise as he should be because he doth not thinke as they do and refuses to satisfie the humors and interests of some I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be No such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author But this I may say had not his Majesty waived the faâ—…full advise of his Parliament who seek nothing but the peace and happinesse of him and his people and satisfied the humours and interests of others who ayme at nothing more than the ruine of both these sâ—…d disasters had not fallen upon us And preferres this seemes to be the cause of all preferments do noâ—… goe the right way true for none but Commissioners of Array do now happe preferments dangerous men that is such as desire he should governe according to the known lawes of the land were we before the Parliament governed according to the known lawes of the land they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power And prosecuâ—…es his loyallâ—… Subjects that is is driven from London to Yorke where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people No he paâ—…ed from London or if you please that I may speake truth was seduced by malignant Counsell to make so unhappy a change And I wish from my very soule that his sacred person were not more deceived by such than his people are by the Parliament 6. That leavying of forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not levying war against the King but war against his authority though not person is war against the King If this were noâ—… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdome could not save both but must stand and looke on It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himselfe and kingdome he can neither be willing not able T is not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will but a King seduced may and uponRep. â—…reacherous and unworthy advise for raigne aid will not be wanting to do that which domâ—…stick cannot 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected This is mâ—…st 〈◊〉 but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded But it doth with any faire and candid reading and interpretation For when the Parliament saith that all Presidents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings for that the presidents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed These might well have beene omitted as being more fully handled in the booke But least hee should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer FINIS Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 1 King 12. Verse 8. Verse 7. Verse 8. 9. Verse 10. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 Râ—…p Obser. Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. â—…ep Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ans. Rep. Rom. 13 â—… Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Râ—…p Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. 〈◊〉 Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5 〈◊〉 14. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obser. Aâ—…s Râ—… Obser. Ans. Rep. That was a Pâ—…pular 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Dr. Ferne Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Rep. Obsâ—…r Ans. Mâ—…t 27. 19 Rep. 〈◊〉 18. Obsor Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Obs. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obâ—… Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Oâ—… Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep Oâ—…s Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Oâ—…s Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obseâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. 〈◊〉 Obs Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Obs. Ans. Rep.