and the power of some Citizens to increase too much Who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military Commands and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds nor could the Laws curb them did totally subvert that Government insomuch as it was said of Caesar that he would not have any Superior to him in the City and of Pompey that he would have no Equal And Cato had wont to say that Caesars immoderate greatness had enforc'd Pompey likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service to the end that the one might counterpoise the other So grant one inconveâ—ience others will easily follow And as too great eminencie in any Citizen although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick ought to be suspected so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the Carthaginians had without falling upon violent courses which in stead of Physick proves poison to that State The House of Medici began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in Florence by means of old Cosmo's great wealth it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of Lorenzo and so by little and little getting to a great height of power which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country but would assume unto it self the superiority of that Government So as when the Florentines were too late aware thereof they could not moderate that too immease greatness for the continued power of that Family wherein there had been excellent men for worth and eminent degrees and dignities purchased by them both in their own Country and elswhere had got them so many to side partially with them as their own Faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them The like happens also in some States wherein there is not so express a form of a Commonwealth but a supreme Prince yet also many particular Lords of great authority In such States the too much greatness of Bâ—rons hath oft-times proved too pernicious For there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater and they having means to do so where their power is not limited by the Laws and Customs of the State they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their degree to equal their authority to that of the King himself and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof in the present troubles of France which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom and the better to foment and sustain their parties and to perfect their designs they had recourse to forein forces and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some Prinâ—es to have an eye upon such whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected and to allay thâ—s their greatness by not admitting them into chief imployments by taking away or lessening their Priviledges and Immunities and by lessening their authority and universal favor by other means according as occasions have counselled Consalvâ— a great and famous Commander in the former age had done excellent service to King Ferdinandâ— and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards as having by his own worth gotten and preserved the Kingdom of Naples he was taken off from all imployment and brought back into Spain to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition That prudent Prince was moved thereunto as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up and who was so followed and applaâ—ded both by the common people and the Nobility could not but be to be suspected So as he knew it was requisite for his own security and the like of his Dominions not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way first by Periander to Thrasybalus and after by Tarquiâ— the proud to his Son Sâ—xtâ—â— are very observable to wit to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies oâ— ears of corn whereby they would infer that he who will rule in safety must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others for what concerns any Civil Power which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical Siâ—es yet wheâ— it is used with discretion and wisdom hath another aspect for all particular interests ought to give way where the publick good and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State which is of aâ—much greater concornment is in question But when this may be done by any ordinary way as by Law and Custom as it was among the Athenians and other antient people then this remedie proved the more just and secure There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law then Ambition for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force but rather the maladie increasing by length of time it makes men as it were franticâ— so as the ambitious man covets all things and is not satisfied with any thing having neither mean nor bridle Honors Dignities Preferments how great soever they be serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher then for water to quench it insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one Now to this almost natural and ordinary defect of humanity and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States as it is of it self incorrigible 〈◊〉 will prove a wholesome cure and which the Atheniâ—ns in particular 〈◊〉 their Commonwealth stood in need of For as Greece did in that Age abound 〈◊〉 men who were really valiant so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly conâ—â—â—isnated by an immoderate desire of glory and haughtinesâ— The Laws of canvassing and all other provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitless for every little sparkle that remains of this fire though it be covered over with ashes may cause great Combustions It seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition then totally to rid the City or State of such men as are desirous to exceed all others Plato said that men
the diversity of success in these two Commonwealths hath sprung from this diversity of institutions and from so many accidents and not from any one reason as was said at the beginning but in this diversity both of them have their praises and all those perfectâ—ons and felicity which is grantable to humane affairs Rome was Mistress of the World but could not long enjoy this greatness and prosperity nor yet with the quiet of her Citizens But Venice though of much meaner Precincts and condition hath preserved her self as an onely example in her liberty for so many Ages free from all domestick troubles and with the miraculous union and concord of her Citizens The Second DISCOURSE Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was oppugned by the Florentines I Have often not without some to me appearing reason wondred that some Historians should so much blame the Commonwealth of Venice for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa against the Florentines whereby they may seem to reproach the counsels of those wise and stout Senators who had then the managing of publick affairs in their hands for those very things for which other Princes and States have been by other Writers much celebrated He who will know the truth of such judgements must take unto himself more particular and inward considerations for it often-times falls out that looking into the very pith and marrow of business the clean contrary is found to what did first appear and the face of things do seem to alter Such actions may then be measured either by the ordinary reasons of justice and equity else by the reasons of State which are the more proper If you consider 〈◊〉 action of the Commonwealth according to the first measure what is it that 〈…〉 consciences of these so â—eruplous meâ— to take upon ones self 〈…〉 a pioâ—â— action and beâ—itting great and generous Princes and how miserable was the condition of the poor Pisans how much it did deserve to be imbraced and favored both out of compassion and justice is demonstrated to omit for the present other particulars by what was done at the same time by Charls the Eight King of France whilst he was in Italy and by the so many favors afforded to the cause of Pisa by all the chief of his Court Charls had promised the Florentines to keep the City of Pisa under their Dominion being obliged unto them for their readiness in receiving them into his State and for having afforded them all assistance and accommodation yet did the afflictions of the Pisans appear to be so grievous as he was moved more by compassion then by his own interest or by his promise made to the Florentines A forein Prince used this charity to the Pisans with whom he nor his Kingdom had never held any friendship or confederacie his interests being not only separate from but contrary to their welfare And shall it be thought a strange and irrational thing that the Commonwealth of Venice which had had the Pisans for their friends and associates in divers enterprises and who kept still friendship and commerce with that City from whence also some of the noblest Families of the Commonwealth draw their original and whose cause for the same respects was straitly annex'd unto their own should interest herself in behalf of the Pisans to comfort them in their great affliction Nor ought the Commonwealth of Venice to use greater respect to the Florentines then they had used towards her against whose designs they had so opposed themselves in the Wars formerly made against the Dukes of Milan and Ferrara assisting their Enemies both with men and monies as they were thought to be the chief hinderance why the business undertaken by the Commonwealth with great hopes of good success had no better an end The Venetians were thereunto likewise moved by the example of others For if the Duke of Milan the Genoeses the Lucheses and those of Sienna had assisted the Pisans as much as they were able how could the Venetians whose Forces in Italy were much superior to theirs stand idly looking upon the Pisans miseries and upon the prosperity and greatness of the Florentines whereby the common troubles of Italy were augmented since they alone adhered to the French faction But let us consider a little more particularly the cause which was undertaken to be defended by protecting the Pisans and what it was that they did endeavour Certainly nothing but the recovery of their antient liberty whereof they were bereaved either by their several misfortunes and by the violence of others or at least as they said to reduce themselves to a less severe government then that of the Florentines under whose dominion being faâ—n but a little before and the City of Pisa being sold at a low rate by the Visâ—onti the Pisans pretended first by the favor of Charls the Eight King of France and afterwards by the like of Maximilian the Emperor to be returned to their former liberty The former having used his power and the other his antiâ—nt pretences of the Empire to put them into that condition And grant that respect were to be had to the possession which the Florentines had of that City which notwithstanding was but of later times the Florentines were likewise to have released the Haven of Ligoâ—n to the Gâ—noeses from whom they had taken it by violence The Venetians did not perswade the Pisans to forgo their obedience to the Florentines as Lodovick Sfoza had formerly done for they minded 〈◊〉 the appeasing of the commotions of Italy then the raising of more they did not free them from the bond of obedience to the Florentines as did the Emperor and the King of France because they 〈◊〉 such an action did not belong unto them they were not the first that did 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 of that City as the Genoeses and those of Sienna had done because they had no intention to advantage themselves by the discord and ruine of others But the City having already totally rejected the obedience of the Florentines being thereof â—â—eed by the authority of other puissant Princes and assisted by other more petty Princes to maintain their liberties the Venetians being requested and conjur'd by the Pisans when they saw them ready to fall into the depth of misery if not assisted by them and that their ruine would draw along with it great prejudice to the peace and liberty of all Italy they at last took upon them their protection and defence And I herein say nothing but what is most true and confirm'd by the testimony of those who have written upon the passages of those times But let us consider other more particular accidents and more weighty respects Charls the Eight King of France was at that time pass'd into Italy to get the Kingdom of Naples an undertaking wherein he had prosperous success which was an ill
omen to Italy All the other Princes of Italy opposed him afterwards in his designs instructed by the fall of the King of Arragon to have an eye to their own danger except only the Florentines who still continued in adhering to the French the counsel of the most poâ—ent Citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wise So as the French preparing to return with mighty Forces into Italy they had friendship with none nor had they any other receptacle save with the Florentines with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them assisted with men and monies Pisa was at the same time straitly beleaguer'd by the Florentines and had she not been succor'd by the Venetians all her other aids were so weak as she must speedily have faln into the Florentines hands who being freed of the expence and trouble of that Siege would be more powerful and more ready to assist the French and to facilitate the enterprises which they were to attempt in Italy Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be just honest and laudable to take upon them the defence of the safety and liberty of Italy against the French how can those actions be blamed which did tend as it is seen necessarily thereunto by keeping foreign Forces afar off and by bereaving them of their â—riends assistance The affairs of the King of France did at this time ebb and flow but for the most part ebb in the Kingdom of Naples Great were the King of Arragons hopes of recovering the State being therein assisted powerfully by the same Venetians The King of France though his Forces were in a readiness was doubtful whether he should come into Italy or no. So as at such a conjuncture of time every least thing which tended either to the augmenting or lessening of his hopes was of great moment Pope Alexander moved by these respects did much press the Venetian Senate to be resolute in assisting the Pisans whilst he himself was somewhat doubtful and 〈◊〉 The Venetian Senate had the Florentines in good esteem and laying aside the memory of what was past would have had them for their friends if they would have separated themselves from the French who were then the 〈◊〉 Enemy and have entred into that Confederacâ—e whereinto all the rest of the Princes of Italy were entred and by whom they had many fair offers made them particularly to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of their State if they would put on a generous 〈…〉 those Forts which as 〈◊〉 Towns for their fidelity â—ere held by French garrisons and do this by Force of Arms not by Treaty 〈◊〉 Agreement But if these things could not be listned unto out of a 〈…〉 such a resolution that they might keep the Florentines busied about Pisa and the French from those succors whereby the troubles and dangers of Italy were increased But I find that these transactions have been diversly interpreted and the Senate blamed who did not aim at succouring the oppressed Pisans not at the common safety of Italy but at their own thirst of bringing the City of Pisa under their Dominion To this it is answered that where the actions are evident no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto nor ought the secrets of hearts to be searched which is reserved to a more excellent power then what humane discourse can arrive unto it is certain that the defence of Pisa which was oft-times denied them was at last undertaken by the Venetians when they being forsaken by all others they were necessitated for the aforesaid reasons so to do The Pisans offered to put themselves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth and to set up her colours in their City the Venetians would not yeeld hereunto nor accept of this large offer but the Pisan Ambassadors were sent back with many thanks for their affection and were heard in what they desired though in a differing manner for the Commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth which she did for many years with such fervencie and general consent sparing neither expence labor nor danger as she could hardly have done more in her own defence they sent both Foot and Horse several times to the Pisans under their best Commanders as also moneys and victuals and shipping to accommodate the City with all things necessary and to free them from the siege of the Florentines by Sea Yet to give a greater testimony of what their minds and intentions were in this when it was propounded to put the City of Pisa into Caesars hands and to remit the right of their cause to him the Venetians did not onely not oppose it but counseled them so to do desirous that this controversie might be ended whilst their faith and the common interests were preserved safe and when there was yet some opinion that the Florentines allured by this advantage and hope might have adhered unto the league but on the one side in progress of time the Florentines obdurate resolution was discovered of governing themselves by Counsels apart from the rest of the Italians and on the other the deep deceits of Lâ—dâ—wick Sforza who under the shadow of procureing peace and quiet growing jealous of the greatness which the Venetians might aâ—â—ive at by the acquisition of Pisa and calculating other mens by his own did in reality endeavor to secure himself from this his imaginary fear by hindring the Venetians from pursuing that enterprise to the which not long before he had exhorted them The Venetian Senate was inforced to maintain the cause which they had undertaken to keep from breaking their faith unto the Pisans and to free themselves from the infamy and repute of weak advice to which they should be subject as if they had condescended for fear of Lâ—dâ—wicks Forces or else as not knowing his cunning when it was already known to all men that the endeavor of agreement with the Pisans which was agitated under the name of the Collegues was managed onely by him and according to his will and interests But say I pray is this the onely enterprise wherein the sincerity and candidness of the Commonwealth is to be known in just things and such as do concern the common good of Italy How often hath she maintained Wars to the end that there might be a right and an Italian Governor in the Dukedom of Milan which cannot be denied since the effects thereof be so apparâ—nt as she would not lay down Arms before she had compast this her intent as she did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of Bâ—lâ—guia the year 1529. in which year by means of the Venetian Senate Maximilian Sforza was restored unto his State to whom the Dukedom of Milan did of right belong and their endâ— in the business concerning Pisa may likewise be discovered since when the agreement was come unto the Venetians had no respect to their own advantage but
friendship with Caesar which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King their Friend and Confederate the State of Milan little mindful of such a service as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes conspires her ruine and tuâ—ns those Arms against her which through their friendship were grown so powerful in Italy What should move him thereunto Not desire of revenge for there appeared no injury Not any fear of his own affairs for he had found them already very constant unto them No self-interest for he ought to have been jealous of Caesars greatness who had been his perpetual Enemy and to have wished well unto the Venetians who had been his antient Friends But what shall I say of the rest Had not Caesar the like obligations to the Venetians as the King of France had which should have kept him from such a confederacie Nay had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary The injuries which the French had done to the Empire the King of France his particular hatred to him the high aspiring thoughts of that King pernicious to the dignity of the Empire and to the German liberty Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the French so be ought rather to have obviated their power then have help'd to advance it But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of Ferdinand King of Spain so unusual and so harmful to himself by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in peace and quiet For which cause the greatness of the French their fidelity and natural desire of novelty ought to have been â—â—spected by him yet he assented to the increase of their power and of his own danger But how did those generous thoughts which Pope Iulius the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of Italy correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transaâ—pine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth which was confest by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of Italy and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation What safety could the Apostolick Sea expect by increasing the power of those Princes in Italy who were great of themselves whom he feared and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of Rome must depend These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators or of any other men how wise soever Nor was the immensity of the danger less nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War The King of France his Forces were of themselves very powerful that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before and become more formidable by the possession which the French had got of the Dukedom of Milan which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the Coâ—fines of the Common-wealth And though Caesars Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable yet were they increased by the fame he gave out that he led his Army into Italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people and got them to joyn their Forces with his Moreover the King of Spains Naval preparation was in particular to be feared to prevent the which those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed which should all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces became the more dreadful And though the other petty Princes forces were but small yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great and the Kings of England Poland and Hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them and to declare enmity to the Venetians If then the Venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once what could have been said unto them Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good For as an object of immensurable force does not move but corrupt the sense so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue but rather to disorder and to confound her Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels as from a thing that was in her own power that she was not worth much or that she did any thing unworthy of herself of her fame or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring What did she resolve to yield up of free-will What noise what complaints were heard which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words which could not be ended but with Arms The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them that the King was upon his march in Arms against the Commonwealth was onely that that War was intimated them from the King when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him but that they would not be wanting to their own defence being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces and through the right of their cause The effects were answerable to their words for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts veteran Soldiers mustered in all places in so great numbers and so qualified as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all that neither that Age nor any other for many years before had seen such an Army of meer Italians in Italy Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in other things do praise these proceedings being forced so
Hen Do Cary Baro de Leppington Comes Monmouthenâ—is et honble Ord Balniâ— Eques Politick DISCOURSES Written in ITALIAN BY PAOLO PARUTA A Noble VENETIAN Cavalier and Procurator of St. MARK Whereunto is added A short SOLILOQUY In which the AUTHOR briefly examines the whole Course of his Life Rendred into ENGLISH By the Right Honorable HENRY EARL of MONMOVTH LONDON Printed for H. Moseley and are to be sold at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Church-yard 1657 THE CONTENTS Of the Several DISCOURSES The First BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHat was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot pag. 1. II. What success the Roman affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his victorious Army into Italy 18 III. Whether was the better and more laudable advice That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans against King Pyrrhus Or that of the Romans in refusing their offer 23 IV. Which of the two famous Roman Commanders Quintus Fabiâ—s Maximus or P. Scipio Africanus brought more of 〈…〉 the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War 29 V. Whether war being to be made against the Romans Hannibals counsel was good to carry it into Italy 34 VI. Whether it was well done by the Romans to carry the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whilst Hannibal waged War with them in Italy 39 VII Whether the destruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick 45 VIII Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquinâ— first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri 50 IX Which is the safer way to be taken to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth that which was held by Cato or that which was pursued by Caesar. 55 X. To what Age of the City of Rome the greatest praise and merit is to be given for the prosperity and greatness whereto she arrived 59 XI How the Roman Empire though it fell oftentimes into the hands of base and wicked mâ—n was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the Reign of many Emperors and how it came to be finally destroyed 67 XII Why the Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove victorious at last 78 XIII Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Librty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors 85 XIV Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her liberty 93 XV. Whether Ostracism used by the Athenians be a just thing or no and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Commonwealth 104 The Second BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHy the Commonwealth of Venice hath not so for enlarged her Prâ—cincts as did the Roman Commonwealth 111 II. Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was appâ—gneâ— by the Florentineâ— 1â—3 III. That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War after the routing of the Venetian Army in the actioâ— of Giaradada 131 IV. Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charlâ— the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains 140 V. Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises 146 VI. Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients 156 VII What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times 164 VIII Whether Citadels and Strong-holds much used by our modern Princes be commodious and of true safety to a State or no. 168 IX Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no and his counsel safe of driving Foreign Nations out of Italy by the help of other Transalpine Forces 179 X. Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth and by his Commanders of not parting from the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it deserve praise or blame 185 A TABLE Of all the more notable Things contained in the present Politick Discourses A. ADrian the Emperor why he resolved to go on progress over all his States and to visit every part thereof Pag. 71-91 Where he set the bounds of his Empire ibid. Agesilaus though he were King in Sparta was obedient to the Laws of the Country 48 Alcibiades by too much desire of glory ruined his Country 10. Had higher thoughts then the rest of the Greek Commanders 95 Alexander the Great the greatness of his enterprises 19. His Militia 20-83 An Indian Gymnosophist shews him how in a large Kingdom insurrections fall out 71. How far he extended his Empire and in how little time 157. and how 159. His artifices and laudable way for opening the way more easily to his great atchievements and greater glory 162 Ambition precipitated Rome into very grievous disorders 15-16-51 When discovered makes men distastefull 58. It and Fear raise in Princes minds a desire of innovation 164. The important mischief of it if once gotten into mens hearts 106. How it is to be cured in States-men ibid. An Army keeping the field how greatly beneficial 169 Armies maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts taken only out of Italy 64 Arragonian Kings of Naples what they did for fear of the French forces 138 Artillery of what use in warâ—â— 160. That in their stead the Antients had miraculous Engines called Tormenta 173 Assaulting the Enemy in his own State how advantagious 34 Attalaricus King of the Goths descends into Italy 76. is afterwards entertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid. Attila content to lose the day so the Roman Commander might be slain in the battel 89 Athens why she soon lost her liberty 5-13-54 Athenians of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Too hard for the rest in Sea-forces ibid. Hinder'd by the Spartans from taking in Sicily and from assaulting Persia 95. Why they could not enlarge their Dominion 98 Augustus Caesar in many places enlarged the Empire 68. Remained sole Lord of the whole World 71. Reduced it all to Peace though he was troubled with some Insurrections 7â— See Octavianus B. BAttails subject to divers unexpected accidents 31 When they are to be adventured upon 192 Brutus Junius Br. how he stirr'd up the people to Liberty 51. Why he condemned his own sons to death 52 Brutus Marcus Br. why he could not preserve the
liberty of Rome recover'd by Caesars death 51. That he endeavored it when 't was too late 53 C. CArthaginians why they came to aid the Romans against Pyrrhus 23 For a long time friends to the Romans ibid. Should rather have been afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were stronger at Sea then they 36. Often subdued 45 Catâ— Major causing sigs to be brought from Carthage into the Senate-house gives counsel that that City should be destroyed 45. How such counsel might be useful 49 Cato Uticensis what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and the People 55. Did many times prevail against Caesar ibid. Founded his greatness upon nobler courses 57. What demonstrations he received from the People of their singular favour to him 58. Because his manners were not suitable to the form of that Republick he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmost 59 Charls the Great having freed Italy from the slavery of the Northern Barbarians made his son Pipin King of Italy 183 Charls the Eighth King of France his passage into Italy for the conquest of Naples 140. At his return assaulted by the Italian Princes and whether they were well advis'd in it discoursed upon at large ibid. Charls the Fifth Emperor compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with Francis the First King of France and his famous expeditions 157. Why his enterprises against the Kingdom of France proved vain 158. Why he shunn'd hazarding a set battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fell to him 165. Whether he was well advised in not parting from before the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come to assault it 185 A City well ordered how it should be qualified 10. For preserving of unity among the Citizens whether the courses which Caesar took or those used by Cato were more available 5â— When it is grown to a great height 't is a hard matter to order it aright 14. That which aspires to a large Dominion must have two things 1â—1 What is most necessary for its long continuance especially such a one as is cast into the form of a Republick 104 Of how great importance the situation is 114 Citizens of singular quality banish'd from Athens for ten years 3 104 To make them vertuous three things necessary 7. By what means they may acquire greatness 56. That quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the State and how it may be preserved ibid. 121 A Citizen very potent how to be corrected that he disturb not the common Quiet 95 Cleomenes King of Sparta accounted the riches of the Persians not worth the trouble they would stand his Soldiery 98 Colonies when first used by the Romans and how beneficial to them 63 172 Of the Venetians why sent into Candy ibid. Constantine the Great divided the Empire between his three Sons 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Constantinople 71 Constantine son to the above-named what part of the Empire fell to his share 67 Consalvo Ferrante why kept under by King Ferdinand 106 Consuls of what authority in Rome 2-4-5 Customs how profitable good ones are to Cities 10 D. DAlmatians with much difficulty subdued by the Venetians 119 Decemvirate held the form of a Republick 50. Why Rome was able to free herself from its tyrannie 51. Why driven out from thence 52 Docius Emperor of Constantinople routed by the Goths flieth and is drown'd in a Fen 75 Discords sprung up in Rome from War not from Peace 48 Dictator upon what occasions chosen by the Romans 12. Of what relief to Rome and who was the first 62. Esteemed necessary in times of great danger and what his dignity was 86 E. EDucation good how useful to a City or State 9 Elephants imployed by Pyrrhus in his wars against the Romans 26 Emperors of Rome favour'd assisted and maintained by the Soldiers and the People 69-72-73 Thirty at one time assum'd that title 70. Why some were chosen to be their Companions in their lives and their Successors after their deaths 72. When those of Caesars race ended ibid. Which were slain by the Soldiers for desiring to reduce them to good discipline 73 Empire of the Romans when it began 68. When it began to decline 6â— The causes of its declination and ruine 71. When it was void of worthy men and valiant Commanders 89. became tributary to the Goths 76 Equality or parity of goods why observed in Sparta 3. Of all the Citizens in government is not good 6. What equality is convenient for a Common-wealth that it may last long 104 Event the surest way to know what is likely to follow 19. That War is far more subject to divers unexpected events then any other actions of ours 31 That it is the master of Fools 38. Not the event of things but the advice wherewith they were done makes them either praise-worthy or blameable 132 F. FAbius Maximus his action and worth 29 c. Deserved to be praised not only for Prudence but for Courage 31. Feared by Hannibal ibid. overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror ibid. Why he took a contrary course to that of Scipio's 33 Fame and Reputation of great importance in all our actions but especially in War 85 Ferdinand King brother to Charls the Fifth why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour then to pull upon himself the Turks forces 196 Ferdinand King of Spain why he kept under Consalvo 106. Not just in his league with the Venetians 152 Florence why she could not keep herself in a firm state of Government free from civil dissentions 54 The Florentines succoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies hindred the Venetians in those enterprises 124. Not well thought of and indeed hated by the Italian Princes for the correspondence which they held with the French 128. How their Fortresses put them to much trouble and damage when they were seised upon by the French brought in by their King Charls the Eighth 171 Forts or Fortresses of how great furtherance to a State 148. The doubts for which it may seem they are not available 168. Other more certain and no less grievous 171. Why called i ceppi della Toscana ibid. Arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of Forts 172. How to be rightly disposed and regulated 176. The defence and praise of rearing Forts ibid. The doubts and arguments against them resolved ibid. Fortune what is to be understood by that name 18 The Fortune of the Romans overborn by Hannibal 41. Why she easily rose up again changing for the better 45. When she proved cross they still kept the same minds 48 Fortune very cross to the Venetians 106 France the Romans put sore to it ere they could take it in 48. Whence the late troubles and discords arose 106 The French oftentimes assaulted Rome 61-63 How timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in
Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievements in Italy nor to stay long there 166 Francesco Foscari Duke of Venice said That the Republick could not much increase in power unless she made some enterprises by Land 115 Francis the First King of France how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes 152. For endowments of the mind and other qualities most eminent ibid. Though his fortune gave way to that of Charls the Fifth whom yet he put to much trouble 157. Why his furious endeavor to assault Spain prov'd bootless 159. and as much in vain his enterprises in Italy 161 G. GEnoeses conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians 118 The Goths famous for the destruction of the Empire and of many Provinces 76 Their original and why they fell down into Italy ibid. Other actions of theirs under divers Commanders 77. They also took pay under the Emperors ibid. Government how the quality of every one may be known 1-2 What the right Form of it is ibid. What it was in Rome 2. What in Sparta ibid. What in Venice 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State 2 The Form of the Government is as it were the soul of the State 131 From a Popular government men come to Tyrannie 54. The Change thereof in Rome occasioned so much the sooner the end of her Empire 90 and of the corruption of her Militia 92 Greece why the Romans strove to keep her from falling into Philips hands 45 Had a general Council called the Amphictiones like the Diets of Germany 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth 93 Not being at unity in herself could not compass any great atchievements abroad 95. By reason of her dissentions could not make use of her victories against the Persians 97. minded Arts more then Arms ibid. Whence her victories against the Persians proceeded 98. How she came to fall into the hands of the Macedonians 100. then of another Philip 101 lastly of the Romans ibid. Why after the death of Alexander she could not recover her liberty 100. For the same reasons having afterwards the Empire of Constantinople she could not preserve herself in that dignity 103 How highly her Soldiers were esteemed by Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ibid. 104 Guido Ubeldo Duke of Urbin why he would allow of no Forts in his Dominions 170-171 H. HAnnibal upon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 34 What reasons should have removed him from that resolution 35 Honorius the Emperor his cowardise and simple saying 77 Hungary whence so called 77. The occasion of the Wars for her between the House of Austria and the Turks 195 I. ITaly how much she abounded in Soldiers 84. The Romans meetly out of their own Citizens and of their other Territories in Italy were furnish'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 62. Was long obedient to the Western Emperors yet withdrew herself from under their command and submitted to Lords of her own 184 Italy through her own Princes fault at present under the Command of Strangers 140. Her late Quietness and Peace and from what causes 164 When it began 165. How it may be continued 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Teath in great misery for thirty years 182 Italian Princes whether they were well advised in setting upon Charls the Eight King of France at his departing out of Italy 140 Iugurth with a bitter saying taxed the extreme grippleness and avarice of the Romans 13 Iulius Caesar what fierce people he conquer'd in France 91. Why it was difficult and troublesome for him to tame them 159. He would always charge his Enemy first 187 K. KIngdoms large and ample why apt and subject to Insurrections 72 L. LAws what benefit they bring 17. They ought to be confirmed by good Customs 11. Their aim ought to be to take away the abuse of things not the things themselves 109 Leagues or Confederacies why they are made their force and power 146 Made by the Christians against the Infidels 147-151-156-191 Which are the firmest 147. The defects which they may and use to have 148 For what causes they are made 154. How and when men may with reason expect benefit by them 154. Why they are no better esteemed ibid. That famous one of Cambray against the Venetians why made how soon dissolved and how unjust it was 154-155 Leonidas his famous victory against the Persians 98 Lewis the Twelfth King of France his nature and qualities of minde 135 Why he conspired against the Venetians and how injuriously 132 135 Lodowick Sforza Duke of Milain how fearful he shewed himself upon the League between the French and the Venetians 139. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy and then to his own great damage repents himself of it 140 Lycurgus why his Laws proved good 11. Had many means to help him in the setling of his Laws 12. Ordered his Republick so that it should not much increase its Dominions 47 M. MAgistracies the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 3 They ought to be of limited authority and for a short time 5 Malta why it preserved it self against the assaults of Bolyman 175 Marius by what ways he began his greatness 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth 10-47 His discreet carriage in the enterprise against the Cimbri which were come down into Italy 194 Medici how that Family got the superiority in Florence and kept it 105 The Militia of the Greeks or Macedonians what it was 21. Of the Carthaginians mercenary and incommodious 39. Of the Romans proved very profitable to the Commonwealth by being in the hands of many ibid. Well understood and practised by the Romans 38-49-61-80 Afterward grew corrupted and abject 69-73-74-75 Of the Turks how numerous well order'd and in continual Pay 186-193-195-196 Of the Christians much inferior to that of the Turks 186. Naval cannot of it self much enlarge the Dominion of a State 113. The Forces thereof are increased and maintained by those of the Land 114 N. NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choise of our actions 58 Nicolo Orsino Count of Pitioliano like Fabius Maximus and not like him 135 Nobles why aâ— first of little authority in Rome 2. Opposing the Communalty and hated by it 4. Authors of the destruction of Tyrannies 12 O. OCtavianus why easily entertained by the Army after Caesars death 52 P. PEace how it remains of it self being brought into States 164. How in these last times it is established in the minds of the Italian Potentates 165 How Peace Concord and Unity amongst Citizens ought to be preserved by Laws 121 Plutarch prefers Lycurgus before Numa 11 Pompey set up by the Senate to take down Caesar 47. His triumphs ibid. After the war with Mithridates quitted the
that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors whom by reason of the said Armies all Provinces were to obey there being no Militia like to that of the Romans or which could resist them or withdraw themselves from their yoke But great was the diversity in all things almost in all Ages for the height of Empire was arrived at by several ways Some got it by Inheritance as Tiberius Caligula Nero and in the following Constantinus Constantius and many others some though very few were câ—â—sen by the Senate many by the Emperors themselves who in their life-time chose some one for their Companions and Successor in the Empire calling him Caesar to whom after the former Emperors death the Title of Emperor and of Augustus was given But their number were most who got the Empire through favor of the Solâ—iery wherein one and the same respect did not always prevail but many much different considerations regard sometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former Emperors sometimes to worth and to some singular action of War sometimes to favor which Commanders knew some way or other how to come by from their Armies and sometimes to some other such like things Whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition but even of divers Nations were made Emperors of Rome Trajan and Theodotius were Spainards â—robus Giovinianus and Valentinus Hungariaâ—s Dicclesian a Dalmarian Cato a Slavonian and some others But that which made the difference greater was that this Empire as it was diversly gotten so was it diversly administred By some so tyrannically as there is no so infamous and wicked vice whereof you find not shameful examples in the lives of Tibeâ—us Caligula Nero Commodus Caracalla Heliogabolus and other of those Emperors whereas the Empire was governed by some others with such Wisdom and Justice as no more perfect Regal Government can almost be imagined And what excellent vertue not to speak of Augustus was there to be desired in Vespatian Titus Trajan Adrian Antoninus Marcus Aurelius Alexander Severus and such like Whence it was that there having been good and bad Emperors in divers Ages as much of Dignity Authority and Power as this Empire lost through the bad Government of those wicked Princes it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of these good and vertuous Princes And this may be alledged for the first reason why the Empire was able to preserve it self for so long a space of years For being for a while run into many disorders sâ—ch as were introduced by the baseness and negligence of other their Predecessors were by the worth of generous Princes amended and returned to their first channel The Romans antient and confirmed use of good military orders did likewise help well towards this Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy persons yet finding the usual Armies already raised and ready for any enterprise they were able by means of their Commanders to wage war successfully and to quiet such rising and rebellions as continually arose in so great an Empire Thus Tiberius did not onely return France which had rebelled to obedience but subjugated Comagena and Cappadocia and driving out their Kings reduced them to Provinces Nero drove the Parthians out of Armenia and placed King Tigranes there making that Kingdom Tributory to the Empire Claudius did not onely reduce Mauritania which by means of her Commanders made insurrection against the Empire but did himself in person pass with his Army into England to appease the Risings of that Island and yet these Princes were not thought to have of themselves any great worth in them These and some other such like causes may perhaps be alleadged why this Empire could maintain it self in that greatness to which it was arrived But to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after as a thing very strange of it self as also for many other notable consequences to wit to the causes of its declining and ruine Three may in my opinion be chiefly alleadged The immeasurable greatness of the Empire the simplicity and wickedness of those who governed it and the corruption of customs which were far different from those with which it was first founded and wherein it grew great Humane imperfection is the cause why mans vertue as it is not onely finite and bounded but weak â—â—d brittle so hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded but circumscribed within no very large limits which were it otherwise it would loose it self in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to escape safe And of this to omit the examples of many other of our actions we will onely consider for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand That his worth must be exceeding great who is to rule and command over others Phylosophers have affirmed That such a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth as he doth in Dignity and Power nay that his worth and vertue ought to weâ—gh against that of all those that he will rule over But let us pass by these supreme Eminences which are rather to be desired then ever hoped to be found 'T is very certain that it is very hard to govern an Empire well and the greater it is the greater is the difficulty of governing it Wherefore Lycurgus a very wise Legislator knowing that the quiet of a City and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition and with a certain Form of Government ought to be the true cause of ordaining good Laws would of his own election so dispose of his Spartans and of the orders of that Commonwealth as she should not be able much to enlarge her Confines But on the contrary Rome as all the constitutions of the City and the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the Common-wealth so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace not onely by reason of foreign Forces but not by occasion of discord between the Citizens The bounds of her Empire grew to be almost immense and she marcht with her Forces to the utmost parts of the Earth subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous Nations But at last not having almost any foreign Enemies to fight with her Citizens begun to make use of their Armies which had conquered other Nations in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves till at last the worth and fortune of Caesar prevailed so as Augustus remained sole Lord of the World and Tiberius who succeeded him entered peaceably into so great an Empire wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers train'd up in a perpetual Militia and by reason of Civil Wars accustomed to live very licentiously The greatest acquisitions of the largest and farthest distant Provinces were very lately made there having been above 1700 Cities taken by two onely Commanders Caesar and Pompey and powerful Nations vanquished So as it behoved to
wherewith the City of Rome began to be infected not when she was governed by Emperors but whilst she was ruled by her Citizens in Civil Government And if it be objected that this did not hinder her from giving the greatest testimony of her valor in War since in the last Age of the Commonwealth when these vices and corruptions were rifest among the Citizens Military Discipline did flourish most and greatest actions were done It cannot then be said that neither the corruption of manners in the times of Emperors did destroy the Empire nor that the integrity thereof could have longer preserved the power of the Commonwealth But so much the less for that the Empire did not fall to ruine though it was sufficiently agitated by home-disorders in such sort as that either the Subjects did vindicate their Liberty or the Commanders of Armies divide the Empire amongst them as did Alexanders Commanders after his death but the roman Commonwealth though it was oft-times thrust at by such commotions was still notwithstanding able to subsist and to raise it self up again when it began to fall But barbarous and foreign Forces overthrew it at last with whom the famous Commanders in the time of the Commonwealth not having had any occasion to tâ—y their worth it cannot be said what would have succeeded upon such an occasion if the Government of the Commonwealth had continued till that time It is likely that the disorders and factions increasing much more whereof so many pâ—stiferoâ—s seeds had been sowed in all the Orders of the City the City and Territoâ—ies belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker and the more exposed to the injuries of foreiners would have been the easilier opprest if she had been to have withstood the terrible shock of these fierce and wild Northern Nations which the Emperors Forces did notwithstanding long resist insomuch as the Roman Empire maintained it self for the space of two hundred years after it was molested by these sorts of people nay it maintained it self in dignity and majesty for about siâ—ty years after it was shrewdly shaken till in the time of the Emperor Leo the First Rome and Italy being totally abandoned the name and power of the Western Empire did totally terminate It may therefore be thought a gallant and well-advised action that the Emperors did so long temporise and keep the Arms of these so powerful Nations from the more inward parts of their State of Italy and chiefly of Rome herself like so much venom from their hearts with which if they should have tryed the fortune of War hazarding one Battel or more as upon other occasions those antient Roman Commanders had done they might peradventure have brought the Empire sooner to its ruine since they had to do with a very warlike people and whose condition was such as they must either die or overcome And certainly they had done worse if they had therein trusted and relied upon Fortune since they could have gotten nothing by the victory when they should have won it were it not the saving of themselves for the present against those Armies who might have been succeeded by others of the same Nations and so the War to have been renewed more hotly and direfully then before out of a desire to revenge the death of their friends whereas the loss of a Battel or two on the Romans side might have drawn along with it the ruine of a most noble Empire It was then fortunate for the Common-wealth of Rome that she met not with these people in such necessity and danger for if that had befaln her which hapned in the time of Emperors that Fame might peradventure have been obscured which she was happy in of being glorious and victorious in all Wars and the course of her so many prosperous successes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end Yet if we will look on the other side we may peradventure meet with other no less prevalent reasons which peradventure perswade us to the contrary Experience shews us how good the Orders were wherewith the Commonwealth was founded to make great acquisitions But it is a general rule That States are preserved by walking in the same ways wherein they were founded for every thing is preserved and maintained by alike things and are corrupted by the contraries If the Roman Arms governed by her own Citizens with Civil authority were sufficient to reduce so many States and Kingdoms under the power of the Commonwealth what reason have we to believe that they should not still be as able to preserve what they had gotten which is more easily done The baseness and carelesness of many of those Emperors did doubtlesly open the way to the Empires ruine for they oftentimes suffered those Northern people to settle themselves in divers Provinces of the Empire Alaricus was permitted by Honorius to inhabit with his Goths in France and soon after becoming his Colleagues they likewise obtained some Cities in Spain from him Valentinianus granted likewise Servis and Bulgaria to other Goths and before these Gallus had bought peace of the Goths so as becoming more bold and insolent they made themselves masters of Thrace Thessaly and of Macedonia Thus the very Emperors themselves having through their pusillanimity suffered mischief to increase at home and these their fierce Enemies to grow powerful they could not afterwards drive them out of those places which they had possest themselves of nor keep them long out of Italy This would not have been suffered by the generosity of the Roman Commanders and Citizens who when they were in a much worse condition would by no means agree with King Pyrrhus who had assailed Italy unless he would leave them and return to his own Kingdom And that they might draw Hannibal out of Italy they betook themselves to molest the Carthaginians in Spain and in Africa after they had for so many years generously withstood their Forces And whilst that State continued in the form of a Commonwealth as if Liberty had infused noble and generous thoughts into them the City of Rome was an example to all the world of all sorts of vertue chiefly of Magnanimâ—ty in undertaking great enterprises and of Fortitude and Constancie in managing them and in bringing them to a happy end But when the Commonwealth was â—uin'd and a new sort of Government brought in that antient Roman worth went astray by little and little till at last it was quite lost So as the ensuing Ages gave as many examples of ignorance and baseness in the very Emperors themselves and in others who were of greatest degree and authority in that Empire Hence then it was that the good and antient Customs being corrupted both in Civil government and chiefly in the Militia the State being reduced to great faintness and growing old had not strength enough to govern it self when it met with stout opposition The Roman Empire was brought to so miserable a condition when it was set upon by the
Potentate at that time all entire and whole not having suffered any thing by this thunder of War which had only overrun their Terra firma their Treasure but little diminished from what it was at the begining of this War which continued afterwards and was maintained for the space of many years The City of Venice placed by her miraculous situation in compleat safety all attempts which could be made against it being to prove rash and vain as the effects proved afterwards A great Train of Artillery and of all things requisite for War a quiet People and obedient at the beck of their Nobility and a constant and resolute mind in all the Nobles to demonstrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their Country But that which followed afterwards in their defence of the City of Padua against the Forces of all the Princes of the League will suffice to prove that the Commonwealth was not so weak either in Counsel or in Power as to have recourse to thâ—â— last extremity of making that Ciâ—y tributary which had maintained her first freedom for above the space of a thousand years Say I beseech you was not the Commonwealth powerful by Sea and sufficiently valued by all other Potentates before she had any State in Terra firma Nay she was oft-times seen to neglect occasions which were offered of making acquisitious in Terra firma thinking her self safe and powerful enough without them What was it then which could move them to make themselves Servants and Subjects who had no reason to doubt not onely their liberty but nor their chiefest most antient and most proper Dominion which was that of the Sea for the preservation whereof as affairs stood then they had no reason to make such haste to Caesar for friendship Who can with reason blame the advice as the condition of things went then of giving and yeelding that up to Maximilian which could not as then be kept from him to wit some of those Cities in Terra firma which he pretended right unto since some agreement ensuing with him by such concessions and injuries ceasing on that part the way might be opened to straiter and more particular and advantagious conventions with the same Caesar who was naturally desirous of novelties whereby the Fortune of the Commonwealth was again to be raised up And this counsel tried afterwards with others had good success when they joyned in a new confederacy with the same French against Maximilian who scorning their frâ—endship would not listen to their propositions These were the counsels these the actions of the Venetians from whence some would take occasion to detract from the praise and dignity of their Commonwealth and particularly from the excellency of their Government But we may better know how injuriously this blemish is laid upon them if we will examine how other Princes and States did behave themselves when they were in like adversity which I do not alleage as taxing any one but to shew the usual course of affairs by the example of others Observe what art the King of Aragon used to preserve his State when Charls the Eighth King of France came against them in hostile manner Alphonso who possest the Kingdom having tried the extremity of fear before the danger grew near out of the meer report of the French Forces departed from Naples leaving all things at six and sevens whilst their Army was yet in Rome and Alphonso the Son who had boasted that he would defend himself and to that purpose had mustered a great many Soldiers retired with them into the narrow passes of the Kingdom without making any triall either of his fortune or of his valor and yeelding rather to the Fame then to the Forces of the Enemy suffered them to take free and quiet possession of that most noble Kingdom But Frederick of Aragon who was reinvested in his State by the favor of the people and by the assistance of other Princes with which the Venetians did readily joyn what use did he make of other mens labors and of his own fortune Soon after the Kingdom of Naples was assaulted by Lodowick King of France and by Ferdinando King of Spain at which assault being much discouraged he would not lâ— sten to the advice of his Commanders who advised him to keep the field but made some slender provisions for the Towns and soon after thinking more how to escape then how to defend himself he fled into Ischia and went from thence into France and put himself into the power of the same King his Enemy contenting himself rather to live a private man in peace and safety then to reign in trouble and danger But what shall we â—ay of the French who boast so much of their valor and glory in War How easily when they met with the first misfortune did they suffer themselves to be bereft of all they had before so happily acquired in the Kingdom of Naples And that so hastily as it seemed that they had freely yeeled up the possession of so many and so noble Cities to the victors the Spainards by agreement and as it were in reward for the day which they had won Nor is this the onely example since we have seen the same French who were faln with such fervency with their Forces into Italy and had with miraculous prosperity recovered the State of Milan but a little before resolve suddenly to forgo all that they had won and to retreat to beyond the Mountains after the roâ—â— which they had received from the Swizzers at Novara the succour which they met withal by the way as they fled not being able to make them halt Who was more famous then for dexterity of wit for the managing of weighty affairs then Lodorica Sforza Duke of Milan yet when a great deluge of War came upon him what use could he make of all his Artifices Could he shew that constancy and generosity which he had many times before publickly boasted of The onely news of the league made against him by Lodowick King of France and by the Venetians did so astonish him as losing all understanding and leaving his Affairs unprovided for he resolved at very first upon what ought to have been his last and most desperate advice to fly into Germany foregoing the defence of that State which being once lost he did afterwards in vain seek to recover But in this point I may help my self in looking a little more backward and trying whether the gallantry of the antients so much commended did produce other effects then those that I have spoken of The Romans who conquered the whole world met sometimes with adverse fortune wherein let us see how they behaved themselves for he is very timerous who is not bold and generous in prosperous affairs In what peril and hazard did Brennusâ— Prince and Commander of the Galli Senones put the City of Rome after the defeat given to the Roman Army under the unfortunate conduct of the Fabii no
man thought of making any defence but sought how to save himself and the best things he had in the Capitol their houses and walls were abandoned and the very gates left open to the Enemy by the Roman Soldiers who fled into the City to save themselves and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth which was preserved for greater things sent Carius Camillus to succour it the rising glory of the Romans had even then been exstâ—â—ct But what shall we say of things that happened afterwards when their Fame grew greater Did not the Romans lose possession of all Italy after the rout given them by Hannibal at Cannae Did not the Cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where And did not they themselves give over all hopes of defending them the resolutions taken by the Souldiers shewed what the â—â—ight what the fear of the conquered was For some whilst they were yet in their own houses rendred themselves prisoners to the Conquerors others withdrew to the Sea side intending if they could have the benefit of shipping to go to some other Prince and seek out a new Country But with what despair the Citizens of Rome were possest when they heard the news of this misfortune in how great confusion all their Orders were may be conceived by what Livy relates who undertook not onely to write the History of the Commonwealth but to celebrate with perpetual praise the fame and merit of her Citizens And it was credibly belâ—eved for as much as we hear that those valiant men unaccustomed to know what fear was were strucken with such amazement as if Hannibal had known as well how to make use of victory as he did to overcome the so great and so long continued fortune of Rome had not onely been hereby interrupted but totally supprest And these very selfâ—same Carthaginians who had so long and so stoâ—â—â—y conteâ—â—ed for glory with their rival the Commonwealth of Rome when they tasted of adverse fortune went astray from their former generosity and suffered themselves to be born down by extremity of despair for after the defeat which they had received by Sea by the Romans they inclined to yeeld up unto them the Islands of Sicily and Sardiâ—ia and to make themselves 〈◊〉 for ever to the Senate and people of Rome and afterward being overcome in Battel by Scipio Affricanus they fell to find 〈◊〉 But why do I instance in so many examples Are not these sufficient to prove that the valiantest and wisest men are strangely teâ—â—ified at great and unexpected misfortunes and that when Armies are lost which are the instruments whereby States preserve themselves from the evils of War good Counsels must cease as not able to keep off other greater evils which do usually follow after that a Battel is lost Therefore out of the above-mentioned reasons and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents every one may be cleerly satisfied that the misfortune which the State of Venice underwent by reason of the ill-fought Battel of Giaradada ought not to detract any thing from her other praises For her subsequent actions by which with singular constancie and generosity she recovered what she had lost render her by the joint consent of all men truly glorious The Fourth DISCOURSE Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charls the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains AMongst those things of sad remembrance to Italy the passage of Charls the Eight King of France to the Conquest of the Kingdom of Naples may be numbred amongst the saddest and most recent For ever since that time the Transalpine Nations have had a power in Italy and the greatness of the Italian name which began at that time to be raised up again with hopes of greater glory all the parts of Italy being under the command of our Italian Princes return'd to such a declination by this blow as it could never since recover its pristine majesty But that which most afflicts the minds of those who are any ways generous is to think that this most noble Country fell into such misfortunes through the fault of her own men and that the Italian Princes to satisfie their own disordinate desires and immoderate ambition did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of Italy and little valuing the truer and greater dangers they stood basely looking on and suffer'd this their common Country to be rent in peeces by Foreiners The French Forces did at this time pass into Italy by which she had not for a long time been molested being called in by Lodovick Sforza and maintained by other Italians But ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counsel being touched by the danger more at hand by rearon of the French-mens great felicity which as it might have been foreseen further off so was it not now so easily to be remedied They therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the safety of Italy and to oppose King Charls his designs So as after the acquisition of Naples as he would return into France by the same way which he had come in with his Army which was notwithstanding much less numerous in men he was opposed by the Army of the confederate Princes as he came to the banks of Tarus who meant to hinder his passage and to fight his Army For a little before the Pope the King of the Romans the King of Spain the Commonwealth of Venice and the Duke of Milan had joined in confederacie to this purpose the Venetians havâ—ng been the first moâ—ioners thereof and express Ambassadors from all the aforesaid Princes had met in Venice where the League was concluded and published This resolution was at those times generally commended as being geâ—erous and suiting with the honor of Italy But notwithstanding there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein For they appear to be attended with that wisdom without which no action though perchance it may have good success deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men The taking up of Arms to drive the French out of Italy was doubtless a resolution as much to be commenped in the Italian Princes as some of them were blamed for calling of them in and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice But how these Arms were to be made use of against them and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away and to stop their passage and force both the French and themselvâ—s to come to a Battel is somwhat a difficult case
have sent at that time more men into Italy and Monsieur d'Orleans would not have had any occasion to have possest himself of Nevara which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the Colleagues and particularly to the business of Naples For part of those Forces which were promised and intended to assist Ferdinand in the recovery of the Kingdom marched to the recovery of Novara out of desire whereof Lodowick Sforza did at last draw himself out of the league Whence it appears that it was rather revenge or vain-glory then any just reason which the Princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy that moved them to resolve upon fighting the French Army But let us now consider more particularly what of advantage what of good the Colleagues might have got if they had had the better of that Battel The best which they could hope for for all these their pains and dangers could be nothing else but the routing of those Forces which were not likely to make War any more in Italy and the Italians had as then no reason to think of any Transalpine Affairs It may be the person of the King who was then in the Army might peradventure be considerable if he had faln into the power of the Colleagues But both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger and say he had been taken prisoner he might have found many waies how to eseape And say althings had faln out according to the wish of the Colleagues what would the Italians have gotten by having so great a Prisoner but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of Foreiners which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers That warlike Nation which was at this time more then at any other devoted to their King would not have sat down by such an indignity such an injury without revenging it with their own Forces and by drawing other Transalpine Nations who wished not well to the glory of Italy especially in Military Affairs to joyn with them Let us see an example of this in what followed the next Age after where we shall find that the imprisonment of King Francis though taken by so great a Prince as was Charls the Fifth to whom none of the Princes of the League no not the whole League it self was to be compared produced nothing but longer and more heavy Wars which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered But on the contrary let us imagine into what ruine Italy would have faln if the Army of the League had been routed and defeated the Enemy being in the State of Milan wherein are so many and so noble Cities for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot then those which were to hazard themselves in that Battel and to raise another Army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies and so victorious would be a business of some time and very hard to do if not impossible And if the very name of the French and the fame of their Forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them and so easie the conquest of so noble a Kingdom what mischief had they not reason to expect if by the discomfeiture of that Army the Forces not onely as formerly of the Kings of Aragon should have been beaten of whole Italy and also such forein Forces as could be ready to afford any succor for in that Army were all the Soldiers that the King of Spain had in Italy So as there was not any State which upon such an accident could promise it self security Affairs then standing upon this foot who can praise the advice taken by the confederates of fighting the French But on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor wisdom and maturity of the Italians in this action to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them it is very likely that the flourishing condition and prosperity of Charls King of France began at that time to make him be hated and suspected not onely by all the Italian Princes but also not very acceptable to the King of 〈◊〉 insomuch as he who had called him into Italy did already repent his rash advice and he who did not withstand him blamed himself for his slackness and irresolution so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that King and to curb his prosperity and his thoughts of further achievements If then the King had been suffered to return without any let safe and triumphant into his Kingdom was it not to be feared that the French not content with their having got the Kingdom of Naples would pass over the Mountains the next year again with greater Forces to what danger would the Dukedom of Milan and Tuscany have been exposed upon which States it was known that the French had set their minds neither would they have spared the rest if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further And if the Italians should have seemed but to doubt their beating those Soldiers who were but the remainder of an Army which had first past the Mountains and â—ad left a good part of their Forces in several Garrisons in the Kingdom of Naples many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents what hopes had they to withstand their entire and much greater Forces with which they were to return the next year on this side the Mountains to new enterprises Nor had they any reason to despair of victory since the Colleagues had an Army for number of men much greaâ—er then the Enemy commanded by experienced and valiant Officers well provided both of Curasiers and Light horse well disposed to all actions and which were to fight with people opprest with fear and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves especially the advantage considered which the assaiâ—aâ—ts for the most part have It was further considered that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded or to cool the courage of other men since the French had not onely not met with any occasion of fighting but had not so much as seen the face of an Enemy since the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter for that it was unexpected they being accustomed to find all passages open not needing to make their way by the sword Nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves by beating a victorious Army and a warlike Nation the person of so great a King being also in that Army wherefore in such a case the French-mens courage was rather to fail then to avial them And it was to be beleeved that the Enemies to that Crown would the sonner appear against them as the Emperor Maximilian Henry King of England and that Ferdinand King of Spain would continue the more firm to the Italian confederacie Then what courage or what hope of succour would those
French-men have who were left behind for the defence of the Kingdom of Naples and the City of Novara which though it were back'd with the Kings men who to this purpose kept his Army a long time together after the Battel was reduced to so great streights by the Colleagues as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to Sforza would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victoâ—y Neither would this have been an occasion of dissention as afterwards it was amongst the Colleagues and which bereft them of the chiefest advantage which that confederacie could hope for These are the Considerations which we may conceive did move those Princes to resolve upon following the French Army and to join battel with it But that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason is that the Battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice but happened party out of necessity both Armies being already drawn very near and partly upon a resolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place But the Princes of the Leagues truest intention was to necessitate the King of France when he should see so great a preparation for War to be made against him to hasten his departure the more and to enforce him to draw so many more of his men from the Kâ—ngdom of Naples that so he might make his passage the surer And that the Kingdom not having sufficient Garisons to defend it might the more easily fall into the power of the Aragoneses for whom the same Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by Sea to assault it Nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past that the States of Italy were free from the insolencies of the French unless the Prâ—nces of Italy should either put themselves into a posture of War or if they should keep their Forces far distant from the way whereby the King was to return for France since in his former passage to the enterprise of Naples though he was more necessitated to make hast and haâ— greater need of making himself Friends more by favor then by force he had notwithstanding used strange novelties in Tuscany which the Florentines did much â—esent And who could have ascertained that he would not do the lâ—ke in his return in all other parts where meeting with no obstacle he might meet with opportunity of pleasing himself or procuring any thing of advantage The Colleagues seeking to provide for these mischiefs rather to shun new inconveniencies then endeavor to repair their past losses they thought it the best course that their Army should follow that of the Kings so to keep him in perpetual jealousie and suspition and hinder him if he should make any attempt hoping likewise as they had like to have done that this was the way to make the King come to some good agreement with them which had been often endeavored and not without hopes of good success even when the Camps were very near together But the Colleagues incited either by the Armies being so near together by the desire of glory or hope of victory or perchance being inforc'd so to do as it usually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to straight passages they fought the French the Commanders of the Leaguâ—s Army were then to have considered that they had more reason to hope for victorie then to fear loss in that daies fight as the effect did in part prove it being the common opinion that had not their own men been put into great disorder by their own light-horse who fell too soon to pillage the Enemies Camp they would have had a full and glorious victory But though the business should have succeeded otherwise they knew the state of affairs to be such as the victory oâ— the Kings behalf could not occasion them those great mischiefs which upon such an occasion have been considered the Kings Forces not being so great when most entire much less being much weakened by the conflict as could prove very formidable Such like events may teach us not to attempt such things in which it is hard to resolve and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful nor to bring our selves to such a condition as the necessity of putting on another resolve bereaves us of choice Nor will it be a less useful precept for Princes to have a great care and to be very well advised in chusing their Commanders which are to have the chief imployment in great enterprises for if their nature and customs be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the Prince it is in vain to give them any Instructions or Commissions for oft-times a resolution is to be put on upon the main concern wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatsoever strict command which the Commonwealth of Venice had experience of particularly in this daies fight in the Marquis of Mantua and some years after with much more danger and damage in Bartholomiâ— d' Alviano at the Battel of Giaradada in both which personages natural ardor and too vehement a desire of glory prevailed over the Senates wise and moderate counsels The Fifth DISCOURSE Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises AMongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty State Affairs and of War enterprises one and a chief one is that of Leagues and Confederacies in which divers Potentates do joyn either out of some particular design of their own or for their better securitie or to abate the power of others And the weakness of Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions in these latter times then we have heard of formerly So as now adaies as also in some later times past when any great enterprise is debated upon recourse is forthwith had to Leagues by means and vertue whereof it is usually thought that greater ends may be compassed then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State and chiefly to curb and keep under those Forces which do threaten whole Christendom with most danger and damage Those who speak in the behalf of these Leagues and who heighten the hopes thereof use these or the like reasons First because reason natures self doth teach us that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers makes the motion the greater and more powerful and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone is easily found amongst many There is hardâ—y any one so weak or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune who may not be some help to another by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others This is the cause why in humane actions and especially in such as are of the nobler sort the perfectest are those which are most compounded The best
not able of themselves to do any notable action so as one Nation or one Prince not being able to overcome another and all of them wanting the excellencie of good Orders he who hath at any time endeavored to advance himself by some design hath been forced to have recourse to the advantage of Leagues of which Italy since by reason of the declination of the Western Empire she hath been divided into so many members and Scignories hath in particular afforded many examples which may serve to teach whatsoever belongs to these Leagues whereof we do not read of any great good effect which hath ensued at last or at least which have continued long in their first prosperity for their Forces though powerful enough of themselves when met withal by contrary respects and wearied in their first attempts have soon gone but lamely off And he who shall well consider such particulars as are most necessary in great undertakings will easily see how badly they do correspond in Leagues Deliberations would be wise and mature but not slow and unseasonable execution would be speedy and bold counsels are oft-times to be taken upon unexpected accidents the end of all ought to be one and the same though the Offices Degrees and Authorities be different the respect and aim one and the same whereunto all resolutions do tend to wit the safety glory and the greatness of that Prince or State for whom the War is made the reward and honor one and the same and alike the loss and shame so as the possibility of haveing means to lay the fault on another do not retard the doing of what is â—itting These are things which have alwaies been hard and rare to be found yet they may the more easily be met withal in an enterprise which is undertaken by one onely wise Prince or by one well governed Commonwealth But in Leagues all things run counter byass to these important affairs It is not alwaies generositie but fear which makes a Prince take up Arms which likewise makes others joyn with him who otherwise do much differ from him in desires and interest but that brunt being over and every one being in their former particular and more natural condition he who dreads War bends to idleness and willingly takes all occasions to change War for Peace and he who was become a friend by reason of some contingencie not out of any good will discovering his real affection upon some other occasion or by reason of some change returns to be not onely as formerly an Enemy but more inveterate then before so as these Ties of Common interests being soon loosened either by particular interest or by some other affection hatred confusion and disorder doth thereupon ensue The Moralists â—ay That friendship cannot long continue between those where one and the same thing is not interchangeably given and received and that therefore true friendship is onely found where the end is not that which is advantagâ—ous or delightful because equal correspondencie is not usually there but what is honest which alwaies is and does still continue the same on all behalfs In the Friendship or Leagues of Princes every one hath his own conveniencie and particular benefit for his aimed at end and then the like of others onely so far as by accident it may square with his But it commonly falls out that what makes for one makes against another so as the â—ame things cannot please all wherefore a thousand accidents do easiry cause diversity of opinions contentions and breaches so as hardly any League hath been able to preserve it self any long time It is also usually seen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many and therefore in Leagues which are fastned together but with weak Ties whilst one doth either trust upon anothers provisions or is ill satisfied with others omissions men neglect their own daties and study more to pick a hole in anothers coat then to mind his own business The ignomiâ—y which may inâ—ue upon such defaults and the loss of reputation which use to be great incitements to a noble mind are not so much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together because the way lies fair to excuse ones self by laying the fault upon another or at least the fault is lessened by others being sharers therein Thus that common benefit which is so magnified and cried up and which ought to be their onely object is found onely in a certain fancied Idea and in a potentia remota or in a vain and useless appearance whilst none endeavor to reduce it to its true essential and perfect being by laying aside their own proper and peculiar advantage and by directing his actions to the common good of his Colleagues So as he who shall duly consider what the first intention is of making a League and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards and to what ends it is directed will by many evident examples find it quickly so transformed as though it meet not with any external forces it easily dissolves and moulders away of it self Leagues made by Christians against the Turks have oft-times in particular met with these impediments and difficulties the League between Pope Alexander the Sixt and the three most powerful Kingdoms of Europe the Kingdoms of Spain Fance and Portugal and the Commonwealth of Venice was stipulated with great hopes and noble intentions the Venetian and French Fleet came into the Archipelagâ— where they had some prosperous success but the forces of the other Colleagues were in vain expected the first year and it ended the second year before it had fully effected any thing by reason of the discords which arose between the Crowns of France and Spain which were occasioned by the division of Naples so as these Princes turned their Arms each upon other which were intended against the Infidels The league made between Pope Paul the Third the Emperor Charls the Fift and the Commonwealth of Venice against Sultan Soliman likewise ended almost as soon as it was begun and it is too well known as being of rescent memory what occasions of victories were thereby lost and out of what respects But what greater thing could be expected from any League then from that which God blest with the famous victory at the Curzâ—laâ—â— Islands Yet how slight a matter was able to reâ—â—â—d the glorious atchievements which were with reason to be expected from thence when a slight suspition of the Spainards that the States of Flanders might be molested by the French by reason of the going of the Duke of Alanson the Kings Brother towards those parts was sufficient to keep back the Fleet which was destied for so great affair in the Levant and to make the best season of the year pass over without any advantage whereupon all other things â—ell into great disorders and the League was quickly â—erminated Neither can this natural motion of Leagues be so stopt by any means or
all their efficacie since they fail in their chiefest and surest ground-work when the truest conjunction fails which is that of Princes minds thoughts and designs whence conformable actions and such as are of great efficacie and worth do arise Almost all the People of Greece join'd together to defend themselves against Xerxes his Forces a mighty King of Persia who came to assault them with an innumerable Army and they got that famous Victory by Sea at Salamis which furnish'd them at the same time with prosperous successes at Land where they put the same King to flight And Greece was preserved at that time by vertue of that League from so great a danger against which it appeared almost impossible that she could defend herself So likewise in these latter times the Pope and Philip King of Spain join'd with the Commonwealth of Venice in defence of the Kingdom of Cyprus to whom that Kingdom as part of her Territories did chiefly belong when it was assaulted by powerful Turkish Forces and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy they bore away that famous and singular Victory which will be celebrated in all Ages the Turkish Forces were routed and shattered at Sea and their honor and courage lessened But when all this was done what other thing did the victorious Grecians answerable to the hopâ—s which were expected from that their so greaâ— Victory the whole fruit whereof at their reurn home ended in the dividing of the booty So also the Christian League by Sea did not only spend the rest of that Autumn a fit time for any enterprise which they could have undertaken after the honor they had won in the aforesaid Victory in dividing the prey and in other matters of small moment but also spent all the next enâ—uing Spring and Summer idly without being able so much as to keep together so to keep the Enemy from recruiting to the great notable and woful example of what we are now in treaty of and to shew that the Forces of Leagues are weak though made between potent Princes The purchase which is got or which is hoped for cannot be so equally divided and agreed upon but that some of the Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater share then the rest and every increase bâ— it â—â—'r so little doth easily cause jealousie or at least envy in the rest Almost all the Potentates of Europe convened together in the famous League of Cambray against the Commonwealth of Venice allured by the hopes of being able to divide her noble rich and flourishing State which was so much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate Princes to make them endeavor by their joynt Forces to suppress the Commonwealth and bereave her of all her riches But as soon as the Colleagues first design began to discover themselves and begot jealousies and suspition amongst them insomuch as the very same Princes who had conspired together to ruine the Commonwealth did soon assist and succor her being become bitterer Enemies one to another and amongst themselves each others greatness becoming formidable and hateful to their companions then they had been before out of the same reason to the Venetians against whom they had joyntly taken up Arms. It was not hard though not very reasonable for Lodowick King of France and Ferdinand King of Spain being blinded with the same desire of enlarging their Territories to joyn together in driving the Aragonians from out the Kingdom of Naples but afterwards they did as easily disagree touching the dividing of what they had got So as the League might help to bereave others of that Kingdom but other Forces were requisite for the appropriation of it to ones self and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the Militia and of good counsel was likewise required Leagues use likewise to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms against one new Prince who is yet but weak and not well setled in his State as was seen by the example of the League made by the Princes of Italy against the Scalligers and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants for Leagues being of some validity in their beginning and not meeting with any stout resistance may at the very first effort have ruined the Enemy against whom such Legues were made but when they have to do with a Potentate of esteem though he be inferior of himself to the power of the Colleagues they have not produced any great effects as may be known by divers confederacies made by the Princes of Italy against the Commonwealth of Venice against which as being become formidable to them all though all Italy hath more then once taken up Arms yet she hath been able to defend herself against such forces for the first Efforts being withstood the rest proved less difficult by reason of the usual weakness which Leagues are soon reduced unto And it might have succeeded so with her likewise in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of Cambray had not Alviano with his unseasonable resolution of immaturely hastning on the the Battel drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth which she might easily have escaped by temporising and the League have been dissolved thereupon as it was not long after Now by reassuming all these considerations these general and true Conclusions may be thereout asserted that Leagues may prove beneficial either when they aim simply at defence and at the maintaining of Peace by the reputation of such an union or when one that is not able to defend himself by his own particular Forces is actually assaulted by one that is more powerful then he and whom he is not able to resist of himself For if no other good be got by such unions yet the business is spun out the longer and there may be a way sound out to deviate imminent ruine by diversion But he who will conside too much upon such Unions or be less diligent in negotiating those Affairs which of himself he is not able to do will soon finde he is deceived nay if he be not the more cautious and circumspect he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend as to his formally declared enemies Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a meer and voluntary election of increasing Territories is very uncertain and falacious yet may prove good if many who be strong and powerful joyn against one that is weak but at last the fire is greater which breaks out amongst the Colleagues themselves then that which they carried home to another mans house But that a State which is already grown great and powerful may be opprest by the strength of Leagues unless it begin first to totter by reason of its internal disorders from what the experience of so many past passages teacheth and from reason which is corroborated by custom is a thing which no man ought to promise to himself unless he delight in flattering himself with vain and prejudical
Holds as now it is she might not peradventure have run so great a misfortune she had not so soon lost so many and so noble Cities as she did but it may be alleadged on the contrary that if in that evil Crisis of affairs wherein she was brought to such adversity she had had so many important Forts as now she hath and that they had faln into the power of the Enemy she would not certainly have so soon recovered her losses and restored herself into her pristine power and greatness as she did We likewise see the State of Milan which fell so often into the power of the French it staid not long under their Dominioâ— for not finding any strong and Royal Forts wherein they could make any safe abode nor having time to erect any by reason of their continual Wars or for want of monies the defenders of that State did often times prevail and every accident either of the change of the peoples minds or of their Enemies increase of Forces were sufficient to drive them out Which would not have happened if they had but once been Masters of any strong Holds from whence they could not have been expel'd without a long and hard siege Guide Ubaldâ— D. of Urbin a Prince but of small Territories but very wise and well experienced in War moved by these respects after he had recovered his State which was formerly taken from him by Duke Valentine he resolved to slight all the strong Holds that were there knowing that they could not at first preserve his State unto him and when hee should lose it they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater When Charls the Eighth King of France going to win the Kingdom of Naples past through Tuscany the Forts which the Florentines had built for their own securitie were the very things whereby they were most indamaged and these falling into the power of the French whose Forces they thought they were not able to withstand they put the Florentines to vast expence and made them undergo great slavery out of a desire of recovering them Whereas if that State had laâ—n open the King who was bound upon other enterprises passing forward would no waies have troubled the affairs of that Commonwealth The like and almost out of the like respect did afterward befall Duke Cosimo when the Emperor Charls the Fifth would keep some Castles belonging to that State in his own power which should otherwise have been left free to Cosimo and which was the occasion of that saying Chele fortezza sonoi ceppi della Toscana That strong Holds are the fetters of Tuscany These are the greatest mischiefs which strong Holds use to bring with them but there are others not altogether so grievous but more certain and irreparable For who can deny but that the excessive charge which Princes are at not onely in building Fortresses but more in muniting and guarding them doth sufficiently exhaust the publick Exchequer and necessitate the disbursing of such moneys in times of peace as ought to be kept for the more urgent occasions of War And certainly he who could see what vast sums the Commonwealth of Venice hath spent for some late years past in making and muniting so many Forts both by Sea and Land would be very much astonished and would confess that so great a mass of treasure would â—beâ— sufficient to provide for any War how great soever and to withstand for a good while any potent Enemy It may peradventure likewise be said and not untruly that whilst a Prince reposes much confidence in being able to maintain his State by means of these strong Holds and by the assistance of a few Soldiers he is not so careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the Miliâ—ia which are notwithstanding real and secure foundations of a State The Lacedemonians would not therefore suffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall because they beleeved that by the thoughts of such securitie their Citizens would become more careless and negligent in managing their Arms by sole means whereof they thought that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off Which that wise man would likewise infer who said That the walls which ought to secure a City should be made of iron not of stone And a Spartan being demanded by an Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens answered That he thought they were very handsome for a City which was to be inhabited by women inferring that it is not necessarie nor honorable for able valiant men to secure themselves from their Enemies by such means It is likewise usually seen that a Prince who thinks he shall be able to curb his Subjects to govâ—rn them and rule them as he pleaseth by means of Bulwarks and Castles and that therefore he needs not the love of his Subjects is much less mindful of those things which become a good Prince and which purchase affectâ—on Yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth most preserve unto him or bereave him of his State and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient as is of late seen in Flanders which so many Fortresses and Armies hath not in so long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligitâ—mate Prince And it may generally be observed that such Governments as have lasted longest have been preserved not by the advantage of strong Holds whereof some have not had any but by vertue of a good Militia and of the Subjects love The Romans were accustomed when they had won any new Country to send new Inhabitants thither who being placed either in the antient Cities or in others built by themselves they called Roman Colonies and by these mens valor as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People of Rome out of remembrance of their desert and in gratitude for the good which they had received they easily kept the new Subjects in loyalty to the Commowealth and the Countries which they had won by their Arms in obedience The which being moved thereunto by the same respects the Venetians did likewise in Candia sending many of their own Gentlemen thither to make Colonies and to defend and maintain that Island But the Turks in a very violent manner but answerable to the custom of their Government do almost totally destroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Countries chiefly the richest and the most noble from whom they take their lâ—nds and possessions and give the revenues thereof to be made use of by the Soldâ—ery making Timari thereof as they term it which are Pays or Revenues assigned over to the Soldiers upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horse by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot who seâ—ving for Garrisons for the safety of the new acquired Country are notwithstanding always ready to serve in any other place
of Thirty years when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth she seemed to have some hopes of quiet and of enjoying some better condition after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes the State of Milan being at the devotion of Francis King of France and the Emperor Charls the Fifth being possest of the Kingdom of Naples which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars so as the one could not exceed the other and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in Italy and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations In this posture of Affairs Pope Leo who had often negotiated with several Princes about the business of Arms and had endeavored as he said the liberty of Italy and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of Milan in the Government of the Sforza's was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued and particularly that the Church should be berest of two noble Cities Parma and Piacenza which were become members of the State of Milan Therefore with a haughty and generous mind he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet before some present troubles so to shun other molestations and dangers which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace in future if not to himself at least to the Church And knowing that he should not be able either of himself nor by joining with other Italians to drive forein Potentates out of Italy he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers with design as he said that when some of them should be forced to forgo Italy it might be the easier to expel the rest Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution it may seem to merit praise by all men as to the intention but as for the means he took to compass it it is not so easily to be agreed upon for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto for some of which this action may seem to be as wise as glorious and if we will reflect upon other some there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein then of security and hopes That all Transalpinâ—rs might be driven out of Italy was a thing desired and not without cause by all Italians and which ought to be his chiâ—fest care and endeavor who had such Territories degree and authority in that Province as Leo had The antient dignity of the Italian honor seemed to appear in the Popâ—s majesty and in the splendor of the Court of Rome â—ut as for the effecting of this business it did planly appear that all the power of the Italian Potâ—ntates was too weak since two great Princes and warlike Nations had foâ— many past years though with various fortune got footing there and still kept their possession so as their power could suffer no disturbance but must be confirmed and consolidated and must become more formidable to the Church and to all the Italian Princes unless it were by some of the same forein Nations If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes when Italy by reason of a long Peace did flourish most were not sufficient to stop the French Forces which were then but new in those parts and but meanly assisted what reason was there to believe that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and digniâ—y after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars and having lost two of her noblest Members Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel as it were to this fire of War as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea if they should joâ—n with Caesar or with the King of France might be troublesom and dangerous yet might it be beneficial or at least hopeful since it might so fall out that the fortune of War being various and subject to unexpected chances some good effect might ensuâ— thereupon for the liberty of Italy the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her growing much the weaker or else by their growing weary of the work and by their tuâ—ning themselves to some other undertaking Whereas on the contrary to suffer them to settle there and to get in time greater authority over the people and more love to the States which they had gotten was a certain and irreparable ruine and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were postest by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes But the fear lest both these Princes who were grown so powerful in Italy might join together against the Territories of the Church or those of other Italian Princes to divide them amongst themselves as had happened not many years before when the Emperor Maximilian and Lewis the Twelfth King of France who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetians might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality and to side with the one or the other of these Princes Leo knew that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations more particularly to the French who were alwaies jealous of his cunning so as great emulation growing in them both and a desire of commanding over all Italy and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province as the one could not much exceed the other nor make any new acquisition it was with reason to be feared that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of Italy Nor was Leo's Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others and chiefly since the French knew that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in Italy as well for the common affairs as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of Parma and Piacensa which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor Iulius So as the Churches State and that of the Florentines which was under the same Popes protection and government grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men for the Venetians