when they did not give colour to a bad designe with a good success CHAP. XIX A very mean Prince may easily subsist succeeding a brave and valourous Prince but a mean one following a mean brings a State into great hazzard WHen we consider the valour and the manner of Romulus Numa and Tullus proceedings the first Roman Kings we shall find that Rome hit upon a very great fortune having the first King fierce and warlick the second peaceable and religious the third of like courage to Romulus and a lover of war rather then peace For in Rome it was necessary that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other Kings should betake themselves again to Romulus his valour otherwise that City would have become effeminate and been prey'd on by her neighbours Whence we may observe that the successor though not of so great valour as the predecessour is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before and enjoy the fruits of his labour but if it come to pass either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine So on the contrary if two of great valour successively follow one the other it is often seen they effect mighty things and eternize their names David was a man for armes for learning and judgement excellent and such was his valour that having overcome and subdued his neighbours he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes without any war and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue But he could not leave it now to Roboam his sonn who not resembling his Grandfather in vertue nor having the like good hap his father had with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom Bajazet the Turkish Sultan although he gave himself rather to peace then war yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomets labors who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a setled Kingdom easie to be continued by peace but if his sonn Selimus now raigning had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather that Kingdom had gone to wrack But we see this man like to outgoe his Grandfathers glory Whereupon I agree with these examples that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another unless it be such a one as France which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances And those are weak Princes that are not in the exercise of war And therefore I conclude with this discourse that such was Romulus his valour that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern Rome But him followed Tullus who by his courage recover'd Romu'us reputation after him came Ancus so endowed by nature that he knew how to use peace and support war And first he addrest himself in a peaceable way but presently when he knew that his neighbours thinking him esseminate undervalu'd him he consider'd that to maintain Rome he was to apply himself to the warres and rather follow Romulus his steps than Numas Hence let all Princes that hold a State take example that he that resembles Numa shall either keep it or lose it as the times prove and fortunes wheele turns but he that takes after Romulus arm'd as he with wisdom and force shall hold it in any case unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him And certainly we may well think if Rome had light upon a man for her third King who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation she could never afterwards or not without much adoe have taken root or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King CHAP. XX. Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous succession And therefore are their gains and increases great AFter Rome had banisht her Kings she was deliver'd of those dangers which as is before said she hazzarded a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls who came not to the government by inheritance or treachery or by extream ambition but by the voices of the Citizens and they were alwaies very worthy men whose vertue and fortune Rome enjoying could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness in but so many more years as she had been under her Kings For we see that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world as was Philip of Macedon and Alexander the great Which so much the rather ought a Republick do having the means to choose not only two successions but an infinite number of valorous Princes who follow one the other which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth CHAP. XXI What blame that Prince or Republick deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects THE Princes of these times and the modern Republicks who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own may be ashamed of themselves and consider by the example of Tullus that this defect is not for want of men fit for war but by their fault who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers For Tullus Rome having been forty years in peace found not when he succeeded in the Kingdom a man that had been ere at war Yet he intending to make war serv'd not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans nor of others train'd up in armes but advis'd as a very prudent man to make use of his own people And such was his vertue that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers Truer it is than any other truth if where men are there want soldiers it is the Princes fault not any other defect either of scituation or nature Whereof we have a very late example For every one knows how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France and took no other soldiers than his own people And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnisht with Captains and good Armies who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man and that Kingdom well govern'd which in time of peace neglected not military discipline Pelopidas and Epaminondas Thebans after they had set Thebes at liberty and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude and in the
within his dominions because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds that to keep the enemy off he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country And thereupon those States make some resistance upon the confines only which when the enemy hath past they have no kind of remedy left and they perceive not that this their manner of proceeding is quite contrary to all good order for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd and not the extremities thereof for it can live without those but if these be hurt it dyes but these States keep the heart disarm'd and arme their hands and feet What this disorder hath done at Florence hath been and is daily seen for when any Army posses the frontiers and enters near to the heart of the Country there is no further remedy Wee saw not long since the same proof of the Venetians and had not their City been begirt by the waters we should have seen an end of it Wee have not so often seen this tryal in France because it is so great a Kingdom that it hath few enemies mightier than it nevertheless when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd and the King himself and every one thought that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State The contraty befell the Romans for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome the more able he found the City to make resistance And it was evident when Hannibal came into Italy that after three defeats and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers they were not only able to sustain the enemy but to vanquish him All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart and made small account of the extremities for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome and the Latins and the other Townes their allyes in Italy and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Soldiers that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world And that this is true it appears by the question Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents after that great overthrow at Canna who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts were asked by Hanno whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace or if any Town of the Latins or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman and they denying the one and the other Hanno reply'd Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first We see therefore by this discourse and what wee have otherwhere said what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes and those of the ancients Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses and wonderfull great conquests for where men are but of small valour and resolution fortune shews much power and because shee is alwaies various therefore do Common-wealths and States change often and will alwaies change till at length some one stand up who is so much a lover of antiquitie as to regulate her that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun how great her power is CHAP. XXXI How dangerons a thing it is to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country MEthinks it is not out of purpose to treat among these other discourses how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history though this thing be out of his purpose quite When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army Alexander of Epirus his kinsman uncle came with certain troopes into Italy being cald upon by some outlawd Lucans who put him in hope that by their means he might become master of that whole Country Whereupon it came to pass that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance was slain by them their Citizens having promisd them their return into their Country if they slew him Therefore should it be consider'd how vain their words and promises are who are banished their Countries for in regard of their word it is to be thought that whensoever by other means than thine they can be restord to their Country they will forsake thee and cleave to others notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes that naturally they beleeve many things that are false and some things out of their own cunning they adde so that between what they think and what they say they think they put thee in such hopes that grounding thereupon thou art brought to a vain expence or to undertake somwhat that proves thy destruction I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of Alexander and only this other of Themistocles the Athenian who being outlawd fled to Darius in Asia where he promised him so much when he should invade Greece that Darius undertook the enterprise But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises either for shame or fear of punishment poisoned himself And if Themistocles a rare man committed this error what should we think but that they do much more erre who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men for otherwise he suffers either great shame or dammage by them And because it seldom comes to pass that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth or by intelligence that any one hath in them methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the Chapter following adding thereunto by how many waies the Romans got them CHAP. XXXII How many waies the Romans used to make themselves masters of townes THe Romans applying themselves all to the war did evermore make it with all advantage possible as well for the expence as for every thing else belonging thereto From hence it proceeded that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges thinking it a matter of great charges and incommodity that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage to take a town any way else then by siege Whereupon in such great and so many wars we have very few examples of sieges made by them The waies then whereby they got their townes were either by conquest or yeilding And this conquest was either by force or open violence or by force mingled with fraud Open violence was either by assault without beating the
get the Kingdome of Naples he divided it with the King of Spain and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy he brought in a competitor to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country and all that were ill affected to him might have otherwhere to make their recourse and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice King of his own he took him from thence to place another there that might afterward chace him thence It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary to desire to be of the getting hand and alwaies when men undertake it if they can effect it they shall be prais'd for it or at least not blam'd but when they are notable and yet will undertake it here lies the blame here is the error committed If France then was able with her own power to assail the Kingdome of Naples she might well have done it but not being able she should not have divided it and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians deserv'd some excuse thereby to set one foot in Italy yet this merits blame for not being excus'd by that necessity Lewis then committed these five faults extinguisht the feebler ones augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner came not thither himself to dwell there nor planted any colonies there which faults while he liv'd he could not but be the worse for yet all could not have gone so ill had he not committed the sixt to take from the Venetians their State for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy it had bin necessary to take them lower but having first taken those other courses he should never have given way to their destruction for while they had been strong they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy For the Venetians would never have given thoir consents thereto unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves and the others would never have taken it from France to give it them and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together And if any one should say that King Lewis yeelded Romania to Alexander and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain to avoid a war I answer with the reasons above alledged that one should never suffer any disorder to follow for avoiding of a war for that war is not sav'd but put off to thy disadvantage And if any others argue that the King had given his word to the Pope to do that exploit for him for dissolving of his marriage and for giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words how they ought to be kept King Lewis then lost Lombardy for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd who have possessed themselves of countries and desir'd to keep them Nor is this any strange thing but very ordinary and reasonable and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinal when Valentine for so ordinarily was Caesar Borgia Pope Alexanders son call'd made himself master of Romania for when the Cardinal said to me that the Italians understood not the feats of war I answered the Frenchmen understood not matters of State for had they been well vers'd therein they would never have suffer'd the Church to have grown to that greatness And by experience we have seen it that the power hereof in Italy and that of Spain also was caused by France and their own ruine proceeded from themselves From whence a general rule may be taken which never or very seldom fails That he that gives the means to another to become powerful ruines himself for that power is caused by him either with his industry or with his force and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant CHAP. IV. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexder rebelled not against Alexanders Successors after his death THe difficulties being consider'd which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new gotten some might marvaile how it came to pass that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years and having hardly possessed himself of it died whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it nor found they other difficulty in holding it than what arose among themselves through their own ambition I answer that all the Principalities whereof we have memory left us have been governed in two several manners either by a Prince and all the rest Vassals who as ministers by his favor and allowance do help to govern that Kingdom or by a Prince and by Barons who not by their Princes favor but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords and bare them a true natural affection Those States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals have their Prince ruling over them with more authority for in all his countrey there is none acknowledged for superior but himself and if they yeeld obedience to any one else it is but as to his minister and officer nor beare they him any particular good will The examples of these two different Governments now in our dayes are the Turk and the King of France The Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord and the rest are all his Vassals and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments he sends several thither and those he chops and changes as he pleases But the King of France is seated in the midst of a multitude of Lords who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects and being belov'd by them enjoy their preheminencies nor can the King take their States from them without danger He then that considers the one and the other of these two States shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State but when once it is subdu'd great facility to hold it The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him are because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him to be able to facilitate his enterprize which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid for for they being all his slaves and oblig'd to him can more hardly be corrupted and put case they were corrupted little profit could he get by it they not being able to draw after them any people for the reasons we have shewed whereupon he that assails the Turk must think to find him united and must rather relie upon his own forces than in the others disorders but when once he is overcome and broken in the field so that he cannot repair his armies there is nothing else to be
matters to himself and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality adornd and strengthnd it with good lawes good arms good friends and good examples as he shall have double shame that is born a Prince and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it And if we shall consider those Lords that in Italy have lost their States in our dayes as the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and others first we shall find in them a common defect touching their armes for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length Afterwards we shall see some of them that either shall have had the people for their enemies or be it they had the people to friend could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones for without such defects as these States are not lost which have so many nerves that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld Philip of Macedon not the father of Alexander the Great but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the Romanes and of Greece that assail'd him neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people and assure himself of the Nobles for many yeares he made the warre good against them and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities for having afterwards lost them let them not blame Fortune but their own sloth because they never having thought during the time of quiet that they could suffer a change which is the common fault of men while faire weather losts not to provide for the tempest when afterwards mischiefes came upon them thought rather upon flying from them than upon their defence and hop'd that the people weary of the vanquishers insolence would recall them which course when the others faile is good but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that for a man wou'd never go to fall beleeving another would come to take him up which may either not come to passe or if it does it is not for thy security because that defence of his is vile and depends nor upon thee but those defences only are good certaine and durable which depend upon thy owne selfe and thy owne vertues CHAP. XXV How great power Fortune hath in humane affaires and what meanes there is to resist it IT is not unknown unto me how that many have held opinion and still hold it that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune and by God that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them or rather that there is no remedy for them and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing but leave all to be governd by chance This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes by reason of the great alteration of things which we have of late seen and do every day see beyond all humane conjecture upon which I sometimes thinking am in some paret inclind to their opinion neverthelesse not to extingush quite our owne free will I think it may be true that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half or little lesse And I liken her to a precipitous torrent which when it rages over-flows the plaines overthrowes the trees and buildings removes the earth from one side and laies it on another every one flyes before it every one yeelds to the fury thereof as unable to withstand it and yet however it be thus when the times are calmer men are able to make provision against these excesses with banks and fences so that afterwards when it swels again it shall all passe smoothly along within its channell or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull In like manner befals it us with fortune which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her and thither turnes she all her forces where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her And if you shall consider Italy which is the seat of these changes and that which hath given them their motions you shall see it to be a plaine field without any trench or bank which had it been fenc'd with convenienent vertue as was Germany Spain or France this inundation would never heave causd these great alterations it hath or else would it not have reach'd to us and this shall suffice to have said touching the opposing of fortune in generall But restraining my selfe more to particulars I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long fince run over that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune runnes as her wheele turnes I beleeve also that he proves the fortunate man whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ for we see that men in the things that induce them to the end which every one propounds to himselfe as glory and riches proceed therein diversly some with respects others more bold and rashly one with violence and the other with cunning the one with patience th' other with its contrary and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto we see also two veby respective and wary men the one come to his purpose and th' other not and in like maner two equally prosper taking divers course the one being wary the other headstrong which proceeds from nothing else but from the quality of the times which agree or not with their proceedings From hence arises that which I said that two working diversly produce the same effects two equaly working the one attains his end the other not Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience times and affaires turne so favourably that the carriage of his businesse prove well he prospers but if the times and affaires chance he is ruind because he changes not his manner of proceeding not is there any man so wise that can frame himselfe hereunto as well because he cannot go out of the way from that whereunto Nature inclines him as also for that one having alwayes prosperd walking such a way cannot be perswaded to leave it and therefore the respective and wary man when it is fit time for him to use violence and force knows not how to put it in practice whereupon he is ruind but if he could change hi disposition with the times and the affaires he should not change his fortune Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions
than any mans which warn'd him to tel the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things which I profess not Yet it may be as some Philosophers will have it that the ayre being full of spirits who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men and advertise them by such like signes to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence But however it is we may find it true that alwaies after such strange accidents new and extraordinary chances befall countreys CHAP. LVII The Common people united are strong and vigorous but taken apart and separated vile and contemptible MAny Romans the countrey all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome were gone to dwell at Veyum contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate who to remedy this disorder commanded by their publique edicts that every one within a set time under a certain penalty should return to inhabite at Rome At which edicts at first they against whom they were directed scoffed but afterwards when the time drew near that they were to obey they all yielded their obedience And Titus Livius uses these words Of fierce that they were all in general each one out of his particular fear became obedient And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open than here in this Text it is shewed for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Princes decrees Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain not trusting to one another they hasten all to obedience so that it plainly appears that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him if it be good to take such order that it may still continue if ill to provide so that it cannot hurt him This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion than for the loss of their liberty or for the love of their Prince who is yet living For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure and have need of great remedies to restrain them Their other indispositions will be easy when they have not made choyce of any heads to whom they may have their recourse for on oneside there is not a more dreadfull thing than a dissolute multitude and without a head and on the other side there is nothing weaker then it for though they have their weapons in their hands yet will it be easy to reduce them provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home they begin then a little to doubt of themselves and to take a care for their safety either by flight or agreement Therefore a multitude up in armes desiring to escape these dangers is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them keep them united and provide for their defence as did the common people of Rome when after the death of Verginia they departed from Rome and for their own preservations they chose 20 Tribuns from among themselves which if they do not there allwaies befalls them that which Titus Livius saies in his above written discourse that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger they become weak and contemptible CHAP. LVIII The multitude is more wise and constant then a Prince THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude as well our Author Titus Livius as all other Historians do affirm for we find it often in the relations of mens actions that the multitude hath condemned some man to death whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus whom after they had condemn'd to death they much desir'd again And these are the words of the Author The people after that by his death they perceiv'd themselves free from danger wished him alive again And in another place when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of Hieronymus Hie 〈…〉 nephew he sayes This is the nature of the multitude that they are either slavish in their obedience or insolent in their auihority I know not whether herein I undertake not too hard a task so full of difficulties that I must either give it over with shame or continue it with blame having a desire to defend that which as I have said is accused by all writers But however it be I do not judge it nor ever will a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons without any intention to use either authority or force Therefore I say that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude all men in particular are guilty and especially Princes for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does And this we may easily know for there are and have bin many evil Princes and vertuous and discreet ones but a few I speak of Princes that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes nor those of Spavta nor those that in our daies are in France which Kingdom is order'd more by the laws than any other which in these times we have knowlege of And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself and discerne if he be like the multitude for in parallell with them we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes as they are and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them and we shall see they neither insolently domineere nor slavishly serve as the people of Rome which whilest the Republique continued uncorrupted never serv'd basely nor rul'd proudly but with their own customes and Magistrates held their own degree honorably And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull they did it as it appear'd in the example of Manlius and in that of the ten and others who went about to oppress them And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators and the Consuls for the common safety they did it likewise and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead it is no marvail for they desired his vertues which had bin such that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion and might be of force likewise to work the same
ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate Vitia erunt donec homines sed neque haec continua meliorum interventu pensantur Hist 4. I neede not alleadge others The troubles that fell upon the Roman Empire when they began to murder their Princes however bad may argue their part which was when Nero Otho Galba Vitellius successively were slaine Tacitus speaking of the story he writ of it sayes it was Opus plenum magnis casibus arroxpraelijs discors seditioni bus ipsa etiam pace saevum Hist 1. For they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by meanes of a Tyrants death for as Iulius Caesar said Kingdomes never change them without great combustions and states suffer worser michiefes by not enduring insolent princes For howbeit both particulars and the publique also smarts because of this disorder yet the life of the Prince is the very soule and bond of the Republique Rege incolumi mens omnibus una est Amisso rapere fidem sayes the Poet. This case hath bin argued by diverse at large and the onely remedy is thus concluded on The treacle of this venim is prayer and not vengeance the people oppressed shal lift up their heart to God as did the Israelites when tyrannis'd over by Pharaoh for the cruelties of bad Princes come not to passe by chance and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to God who sometimes for chastisement sometimes for try all permits them force to cure the peoples evill when as that of Kings requires the sword there is no man that will not say but that where the medicines mustbe stronger the more dangerous are the evills When a people is risen in tumult the follies which they commit are not so perillous nor is there such feare to be had of the present evill as of that which may befall it being possible some Tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion But during the time of mischievous Princes the contrary happens for the greatest feare is of the present evill and of the time to come there is hope men easily perswading themselves that his evill life may produce their liberty So that a man may see the difference between the one and the other the desperate feare of the one is of the present state of the other of the state into which it may fall The multitudes cruelties are exercis'd against those that they feare lest they should seize upon the common good The Princes against those that they feare lest they should seeke to recover their owne againe But the opinion against the people growes dayly for every one may freely speake evill of the people without feare even while they have the government in their hands A man speakes not evill of Princes but with many fears and jealousies Nor is it much out of purpose seeing the matter drawes me to it to argue in the Chapter following what Confederacies a man may best trust to either those that be made with a Republique or that are made with a Prince CHAP. LIX What Confederation or league is rather to be trusted either that which is made with a Republique or that is made with a Prince BEcause every day we have it that one Prince with another or one Republique with another make leagues and joyne friendship together and in like manner also confederacies are drawne and agreements made betweene a Republique and a Prince I thinke to examine which is the firmest league whereof a man should make surest account of either of that with a Republique or the other with a Prince And examining the whole I beleeve that in many cases they are alike and in some there is some difference and therefore that accords made by force shall not be truly kept thee neither by Prince nor commonwealth And I thinke that when feare comes upon them touching their state as well the one as the other rather then perish will breake their faith with thee and requite thee with unthankfulnesse Demetrius he that was ever termed the taker of cities had done exceeding much good to the Athenians it chanc'd afterwards that being routed by his enemies and seeking refuge in Athens as in a city that was his friend and much ingag'd to him he was not admitted into it Which griev'd him much more then the losse of his souldiers and army had done Pompey when his army was routed by Caesar in Thessaly fled into Egypt to Ptolomy who formerly had bin restor'd by him into his kingdome and was put to death by him Which things we see had the same occasions yet more humanity and lesse injury was us'd by the Republique then by the Prince Therefore where there is fear a man shal finde in effect the same faith And if there be any Commonwealth or Prince who to keepe their faith with thee expect while they ruine it may proceed also from the same occasion And as for a Prince it may well chance that he is allied to some powerfull Prince who though he then hath not the opportunity to defend him yet may he well hope that in time he may restore him into his state or else that having taken side with him as partisan he thinkes he cannot obtaine a faithfull and fair accord with his enemy Of this sort were those Princes of the Kingdome of Naples that tooke part with the French And for Republiques of this sort was Saguntum in Spaine which till it was ruin'd tooke part with the Romans and so was Florence for siding with the French in the yeare one thousand five hundred and twelve And I believe having summ'd up every thing that in these cases where the danger is urgent there is more assurance rather in the Republiques then in the Princes for though the Republiques were of the same minde and had the same intention as Princes had yet for that they move but slowly it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves then a Prince will and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he Confederacies are broken for profit Wherein Commonwealths are farre stricter in their observance of accords then Princes And we might bring many examples where even for a very small gaine a Prince hath broken his faith and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a Commonwealth as was the party Themistocles propounded to the Athenians to whom in an oration made them he said that he could advise them so that their country should gaine much advantage by it but them he might not tell it for feare of discovering it for by the discovery the opportunity of doing it would be taken away Whereupon the Athenians chose Aristides to whom he should communicate this secret and together with him consult upon it whom Themistocles shew'd how the whole navall army of all Greece was in their hands under their protection though intrusted them upon their faith so that it was in their power by the ruine thereof to make themselves Lords of all Greece
Whereupon Aristides told the people that Themistocles advice was exceeding profitable but very dishonest For which cause the people wholly resus'd it which Philip of Macedon would not have done nor those other Princes who seeke their owne gaine rather and have made more advantage by breaking their faith than by any way else Touching the breaking of agreements upon the not observance of some particulars therein I meane not to meddle with them being ordinary matters but I speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points Wherein by what we have said I beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the Princes and therefore may better bee trusted than they CHAP. LX. How the Consulship and every other Magistracie in Rome was given without respect of age IT appeares by order of the Story that the Commonwealth of Rome after that the Consulship came among the people bestowed it upon their Citizens without regard of yeares or bloud and indeed they never had respect to age but altogether aimed at vertue whether it were in young or old Which wee perceive by the testimonie of Valerius Corvinus who at 23. yeares of age was made Consul And the same Valerius speaking to his souldiers sayd That the Consulship was the reward of vertuc and not of bloud Which thing whether it were advisedly sayd or no might require much dispute And touching bloud this was yeelded to upon necessitie and this necessitie that was in Rome might be in every Citie that would doe the same things Rome did as otherwhere is sayd for toyle and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward nor can their hopes of obtaining reward bee taken from them without danger And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship and by this hope were they a while fed without having it at length that hope served not but there was a necessity to come to performance with them But the Citie that imployes not their people in any glorious action may treate the mafter their owne manner as other where it was argued But that which will take the same course Rome tooke must make this distinction And grant that it be so for that of time there is no reply nay rather it is necessary for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man it is likely the people being to make the choyce that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto And when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions it were a very great wrong that that Citie might not serve her selfe of him then but should be put off to expect till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull whereof in that age his country might have made good use as Rome did of Valerius Corvinus of Scipio and Pompey and many others that triumphed very young THE SECOND BOOKE THE PREFACE MEN do alwaies commend but not alwaies with reason the times of old and blame the present and they take part so much with things past that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them but those also which now being old they remember they have seen in their youth And when this their opinion is false as most commonly it is I perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error are divers And the first I take to be that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known of thoiâ— actions most commonly those things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times but whatsoever advances their credit glory is set out with magnificence For most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune that to make their victories glorious they not only augment what they have vertuously done but they so illustrate their enomies actions that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys either conquering or conquered have cause to admire those men and times and so consequently are forc'd exceedingly to praise and love them Besides this men hating things either for fear or envic two very powerfull causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed being they are not able to hurt nor can give occasion of envic But on the contrary part it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand and we see which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us and knowing in them together with the good many things worthy dislike hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much Inferior to matters of old although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation this I say not arguing touching the arts which are now brought to such perfection that the times cannot take from them nor add but little more glory to them but speaking of things belonging to means lives and manners whereof the proofes are not very evident I answer that this custome above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth because all humane things are continually in motion and either rise or fall As we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man the State mends much and is more and more amplified he that is then borne in that State and commends more the times of old than those moderne is much deceiv'd and the cause of his errour proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd But those that are afterwards born in that City or countrie whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence then erre nor And I devising with my selfe whence these things proceed I think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner and that in iâ— hath beene alwayes as much good as evill but that that good and evill does change from country to country as it appeares by that which is discover'd to us of those ancient kingdomes which alter'd from the one to the other by change of manners But the world continued the same There was onely this difference that where it first had plac'd its vertue in Assiria it afterwards remov'd it into Media then into persia in so much that at length it came into Italie and so to Rome And if after the Romane Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted nor where the world had retired all its vertue together yet we see it was spread abroad into severall Nations where men behav'd themselves very bravely and valouroufly as in the Kingdome of France the Kingdome of the Turks and that of the Soldan so now adayes in Germanie and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect which did great exploits and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world after they had destroyed the Easterne
years after they began to make war HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those who now a daies inlarge their dominions we have formerly discours'd enough and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly race to live with their own laws as well those that yeelded to them as subjects as those that came under their protection as associates And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire but tied them to some certain conditions which whiles they observ'd they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy and that they reduc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces Whereof the example is very clear for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua whether they sent him not through their own ambition but upon the Capuans intreaty who being they were at discord one with another judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them that might put them in order again and reunite them The Antiates also mov'd by their example and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them And T. Livius saies upon this occasion and upon this new way of ruling That now not only the Roman armes but their lawes also were in great repute We see therefore how much this course taken further'd the Romans advancement for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free or to be govern'd by their own Citizens are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not though it may bring some burden with it too rather than under that which they having every day in their view continually reproaches them with their slavery Besides this the Prince gains hereby another advantage that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies whereby they were to regulate those Cities there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away And that this is true besides ancient examples which we could alledge we have one of late memory in Italy for as it is well known Geneva having been several times possessed by the French that King did alwaies except at this present time send them a French Governor who under him should govern them For this present only but upon any intention of the Kings but it seem'd necessity so order'd it he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them gives the people most satisfaction would the rather alow of this latter Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty by how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to aske a Prerour of the Romans but had the Romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher they would presently have been in jealousie of them and started from them But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yeelded it self to the government of Florence It is as well known also what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans the Luckeses and the Seneses and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty as well as others do but because the Florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers but the others they treated as enemies This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them and the others struggle with all might and main as yet they do also not to come under them And doubtless had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours and not have alwaies scar'd them they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany But hereupon I advise not that armes and force are not to be us'd but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place where and when other meanes will not serve CHAP. XXII How erroneous many times the opinions of men are when they give their judgements touching great affaires HOw false oftentimes mens opinions are they well see who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations which many times unless they be determined of by able men are contrary to all truth And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths especially in peaceable times both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned such adwise is follow'd as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good This error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled if not well experienced in affaires the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible whereof in such a case men are perswaded These words are spoken upon that which Numicius the Pretour after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans perswaded them and upon that which few years since many beleeved when Francis the first King of France came to the Conquest of Milan which was defended by the Swissers Therefore I say that Lewis the Twelfth being dead and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdome of France and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the Switzers had of late possessed themselves by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement desired to have some aid in Italy which might further his undertakings so that besides the Venetians whom King Lewis had gain'd he tried the Florentines and Pope Leo the tenth thinking his enterprise much facilitated by having them to side with him because the King of Spains soldiers were in Lombardy and some of the Emperors forces in Verona Pope Leo yeelded not to the Kings desire but by those that counselled him he was perswaded as it was said to stand neuter showing him that herein consisted certain victory for it was nothing at all for the Churches good to have either mighty in Italy the King or the Swissers But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty it was fit to free it from the one and the other And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other divided
walls which was to beleagure a town round with an army for they environd it and combatted it on all parts and many times it prov'd so luckily to them that in one assault they took a town though a very vast one as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain Or when this assault served not they betook them to break down the walls with their rams and oher their warlike engines or else by some mine or vault they made whereby they enter'd the City by which way the took the City of Veium or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls they made towres of wood or cast up mountains of earth which leaned upon the wall on the outside whereby they might get to the hight of it Against these assaults they that defended the towns in the first case in regard of their being besing'd round rannne a more sudden hazard and had more doubtfull remedies for having need in every place of many defendants perchance either those that they had were not so many as could supply every place or change often to refresh them or if they could they were not all of equal courage to make resistance and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part all had bin lost Therefore it came to pass as I said that this way lit many times on good success But when it succeeded not at first they did not much more try that way because it was dangerous for the army for the City being able for so long a space to defend it self the army could not but grow weak and hardly be able to withstand any fally of the enemies from within and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby yet notwithstanding for once and that on the sudden they assayld that way As for the breaking down of the walls they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations and against their mines they made countermines and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand or with other engines among others this was one they fill'd divers vessels with feathers and set fire on them which being thus kindled they put into the Mine so that by the smoke and stink thereof the enemy was hindred of entring thereinto and if they assailâ—d them with towers of wood they sought to fire them And for the mounts of earth they commonly broke open the wall underneath whereupon the mount did lean drawing thence the earth into the town whereby they without did raise their mount so that however they brought the earth without being that they within carried it away the mount came to no great matter These waies of assailing cannot be continued long for they must either rise from the siege and seek by other means to make an end of the war as Seipio did when being entred into Affricke he assaulted Vtica but could not take it he rose thence with his whole camp and sought how to overthrow the Carthaginian armies or else they must turne again to the siege as they did at Veium Capua Carthage and Ierusalem and other like townes which they took by siege As for conquest by force and fraud as it befel Palepolis it chanced that the Romans by treating with the inhabitants took some towne But by his assailing the Romans and others tried many but prevail'd in few the reason is because every small impediment breakes the designe and impediments easily happen for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect and without much difficultie it is discovered as well through their infidelity to whom it is communicated as by the difficulty to put it in practise being they are to agreee with enemies with whom they cannot parly but under some other colour But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the ordering of it there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution for if either thou commest before the time appointed or after all is spoiled if any false alarme be given as was that of the geese in the Capitol if any usual order be broken every little error or affright taken spoiles the designe Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perilous things And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises being unexperienced in the scituation the countrey and the places whether they areled become astonished disheartned and confused upon every small accident shall happen And every shadow is of force to make them run away Nor ever was there any more happy in thefe fraudulent night plots then Aratus Sicioneus who was as base and cowardly in any action by day as he was of worth and spirit in these by night Which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck Many of these waies are put in practice few of them come to trial and very few take effect Touching the gaining of townes by yeelding they yeeld either of good will or by force this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity which compels them to fly unto thy protection as Capua did unto the Romans or through a desire to be wel governed being allur'd by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands as the Rodians the Massilians and other like cities did that gave themselves unto the Romans Touching surrendring up upon force proceeds either from a long siege as is formerly said or from a continual oppression of incursions pillagings and other hard usages which when a city desires to be freed from she yeelds her self Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routs and incursions and by gaining credit with them by gaining credit with them by means of agreements made as we have said otherwhere and upon that way they alwaies grounded though they tryd all but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable For in a siege there is length of time and expences in forcible assault doubt and danger and in conspiracies uncertainty And they saw that by the defeat of an enemies army sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day and to take by siege a town that was obstinate it cost them many years CHAP. XXXIII How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions I Think it fit for him that by reading of Livies story would make advantage thereof wel to consider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings and among other things that merite consideration his is one to see with what authority they sent forth their Consuls Dictators Commanders of armies which we see was very great and the Senate reserved thing else to themselves but a power to make new wars and to confirme peace but they referred every
them for their execution maugre the power of those that break them The executions whereof before the sacking of Rome by the French were notable the death of Brutus his sons the death of those of the Decemvirate that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne after the taking of Rome was the death of Manlius Capitolinus the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie the accusation of the Scipios which things being they were extraordinary remarkable whenosever any of them did chance caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule and when these began to fall out seldom then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught and become more dangerous and tumultuous for from one to another of such like executions there should not pass more than ten years time for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes and unless something chance which anew calls the punishment to memory and puts them in fear thereof there meer together so many delinquents that without danger they cannot be punished To this purpose they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the State otherwise it was hard to maintain it and they call'd reforming of the State to put that terror and fear in men which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations and speak ill of the present State and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds Also this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man without dependance on any law inciting thee to any execution yet are they of so great reputation and of such remarke that the good men desire to follow them and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects were Horatius Cocles Scevola Fabritius the two Decij Regulus Attilius and some others who by their rare and worthy examples in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome the corruptions multiplied for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen And though in Rome there arose the two Catoes yet such was the distance between him and them and between them from th' one to th' other and they remained so alone that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing and especially the last Cato who finding a great part of the City corrupted could not prevaile so by his example as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republicks But touching Religions wee see also these reformations are necessary by example of our Religion which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis and Saint Dominique it would have been quite defac'd for these by their poverty and their imitation of Christs life made a new impression thereof in mens minds which was quite blotted our thence and their new rules were so powerfull and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates and the heads of the Religion do not ruine it partly by their living in poverty and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people and preaching to them whereby they give them to understand that it is evill to speak evil against him that is evill and that it is good rather to live in obedience to them and if they are faulty to leave them to the chastisement of God And so they offend the most they can for they feare not the punishment they see not and beleeve not This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other Kingdom else Of which lawes and customes the Parliaments are the principal maintainers and especially that of Paris which restores them again to life whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm and that they condemn the King in their sentences and till this present it hath maintained it self by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished and they chance to multiply without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder or that Kingdom come to a dissolution Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government Sect Kingdom or Commonwealth that it be than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had and take a care that either the customes be good or the men good that they may rather work this effect that it be not left to some forraign force to do it For however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy as it prov'd to Rome yet is it so dangerous that it is in no case to be desir'd And to make it appear to any man how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness and wrought many good effects in that City I will come to the narration and discourse of them within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book and last part of this first decade And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable being the History sets them down at large we shall omit them nor speak of them otherwise unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage and here we will begin with Brutus Father of the Roman liberty CHAP. II. It is a very great part of wisdome sometime to seem a fool NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto which was to live in security and preserve his patrimony yet if we consider his manner of proceeding we may beleeve that he thus dissembled to the end he might be less observed have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings and free his Country upon any occasion offered And that he thought upon this it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle when he fained to fall down that he might kiss
doubted than the Royal blood which being once quite out there is none else left to be feard none of the others having any credit with the people And as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them so after it ought he not to fear them The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of France for it is easie to be enter'd by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom for there are alwaies some male-contents to be found and those that are glad of innovation Those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that State and to further thy victory which afterwards to make good to thee draws with it exceeding many difficulties as well with those that have ayded thee as those thou hast supprest Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will be be the ring-leaders of new changes and in case thou art not able to content these nor extinguish them thou losest that State whensoever the occasion is offerd Now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of Darius was thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly and drive him out of the field after which victory Darius being dead that State was left secure to Alexander for the reasons we treated of before and his successors had they continued in amity might have enjoy'd it at ease nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults than those they themselves stir'd up But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of France it is impossible to become master at such ease and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain France and Greece against the Romans by reason of the many Principalities those States had whereof while the memory lasted the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them but the memory of them being quite wip't out by the power and continuance of the Empire at length they enjoy'd it securely and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein and that because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent they acknowledg'd no other but the Romans By the consideration then of these things no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest as Pyrrhus and many others which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour but from the difference of the subject CHAP. V. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd which before they were conquer'd liv'd under their own Laws WHen those States that are conquered as it is said have been accustomed to live under their own Laws and in liberty there are three wayes for a man to hold them The first is to demolish all their strong places the other personally to goe and dwell there the third to suffer them to live under their own Laws drawing from them some tribute and creating the rein an Oligarchy that may continue it in thy service for that State being created by that Prince knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force who is like to doe all he can to maintain it and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens which hath been us'd before to live free than by any other way of keeping We have for example the Spartans and the Romans the Spartans held Athens and Thebes creating there an Oligarchy yet they lost it The Romans to be sure of Capua Carthage and Numantia dismantell'd them quite and so lost them not they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them leaving them free and letring them enjoy their own Laws and it prospered not with them so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under than by demolishments and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free and dismantells it not let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of libetry for refuge and the ancient orders it had which neither by length of time nor for any favours afforded them are ever forgotten and for any thing that can be done or order'd unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd that name is never forgotten nor those customes but presentâ—ly in every chance recourse is thither made as Pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince and that whole race is quite extirpated on one part being us'd to obey on the other not having their old Prince they agree not to make one from among themselves they know not how to live in liberty in such manner that they are much slower to take armes and with more facility may a Prince gaine them and secure himselfe of them But in Republiques there is more life in them more violent hatred more earnest desire of revenge nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them or suffer them to rest so that the safest way is either to ruine them or dwell among them CHAP. VI. Of new Principalities that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour LEt no man marvaile if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities both touching a Prince and touching a State I shall alledge very famous examples for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others and proceed in their actions by imitation and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd nor their vertues whose parterue thou set'st before thee attainâ—d unto a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons and imitate those that have been the most excellent to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto at least if may yeeld some savour thereof and doe as good Archers use who thinking the place they intend to hit too farre distant and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark not for to hit so high with their arrow but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at I say that in Principalities wholly new where there is a new Prince there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser And because this successe to become a Prince of a private man presupposes either vertue or fortune mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune hath maintain'd himselfe the better Moreover
to purge the minds of those people and to gain them wholly to himself he purpos'd to shew that if there was any cruelty used it proceeded not from any order of his but from the harsh disposition of his Officers Whereupon laying hold on him at this occasion he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at Cesena where he was left upon a gibbet with a bloody sword by his side the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people But to return from whence we have digressd I say that the Duke finding himself very strong and in part out of doubt of the present dangers because he was arm'd after his own manner and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces which because of their vicinity were able to annoy him he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest but the consideration of of France for he knew that the King who now though late was advis'd of his error would never suffer him and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances and to waver with France when the French came towards Naples against the Spaniards who then besieged Gagetta and his design was only to be out of their danger which had been effected for him had Pope Alexander lived And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate As for the future he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend and would endeavor to take that from him that Alexander had bestowed on him and he thought to provide for this foure waies First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had dispoyled whereby to take those occasions from the Pope Secondly by gaining 〈◊〉 the gentlemen of Rome whereby he might 〈◊〉 able with those to keep the Pope in some awe Thirdly to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be Fourthly by making of so large Conquests before the Popes death as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies Three of these fowre at Pope Alexanders death he had effected and the fourth 〈◊〉 had neare brought to a point For of those Lords he had stript he put to death as many as he could come at and very few escap'd him he gaind him the Roman Gentlemen and in the Colledge he had made a great faction And touching his new Conquest he had a designe to become Lord of Tuscany And he had possessed himself already of Perusia and Pombin and taken protection of Pisa and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to France which now he meant to hold no longer being the French were now driven out of the Kingdome of Naples by the Spaniards so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes he was then to leap into Pisa After this Lucca and Siena were presently to fall to him partly for envy to the Florentines and partly for fear The Florentines had no way to escape him all which had it succeeded with him as without question it had the very same year that Alexander dy'd he had made himself master of so great forces and such reputation that he would bave been able to have stood upon his own bottom without any dependance of fortune or resting upon others helps but only upon his own strength and valor But Alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword and left him setled only in the State of Romania with all his other designes in the ayre sick unto death between two very strong armies of his enemies and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage and he understood so well how men are to be gaind and how to be lost and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time that had he not had those armies upon his back or had been in health he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition and that the foundations he grounded upon were good it appeard in that Romania held for him above a moneth and he remained secure in Rome though even at deaths doore and however the Baglioni Vitelli and Orsini came into Rome yet found they none would take their parts against him And this he was able to have effected that if he could not have made him Pope whom he would he could have hindred him that he would not should be Pope But had he been in health when Alexander dy'd every thing had gone easily with him and he told me on that day that Julius the second was created Pope that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen in case his father chanc'd to dye and for every thing provided its remedy this onely excepted that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also Having then collected all the Dukes actions me thinks I could not well blame him but rather as I have here done set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an Empire For he being of great courage and having lofty designes could not carry himself otherwise and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexanders life and his own sickness Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality to secure himself of his enemies and gain him friends to overcome either by force or by cunning to make himself beloved or feared of his people be followed and reverenced by his soldiers to root out those that can or owe thee any hurt to change the ancient orders with new wayes to be severe and yet acceptable magnanimous and liberall to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery and create new to maintain to himself the armities of Kings and Princes so that they shall either with favor benefit thee or be wary how to offend thee cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of Julius the second wherein an evil choice was made for him for as it is said not being able to make a Pope to his mind he could have withheld any one from being Pope and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy whom he had ever done harme to or who having attaind the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear or hatred Those whom he had offended were among others he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula Colonna Sr. George and Ascanius all the others that were in possibility of the Popedome were such as might have feard him rather except the Cardinal of Roan and the Spaniards these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him the other because of the power they had having the Kingdome of France on their party
dangerous in the auxiliaries their valonr Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes and betaken himself to his owne and desired rather to loss with his owne than conquer with anothers accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes I will not doubt to alleadge Caesar Bargia and his actions This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes s bringing with him all French souldiers but afterwards not accounting those armes secure bent hinselfe to mercenaries judging lesse danger to be in those and tooke in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli which afterwards in the proof of them finding wavering unfaithful and dangerous he extinguishd and betook himselfe to his owne and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes confidering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation when he had the French men alone and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli but when he remaind with his own and stood of himselfe we shall find it was much augmented nor ever was it of grate esteeme but when every one saw that he wholly possessed his owne a mes I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the Siracusan being one of those I formerly nam'd This man as I said before being made general of the Siracusans forces knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings as our Italians are and finding no way either to hold or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces and afterwards waged warre with his owne men and none others I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose When David presented himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistims Champion Saul to encourage him clad him with his owne armes which David when he had them upon his back refus'd saying he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword In summe others armes either fall from thy shoulders or cumber or streighten thee Charls the seventh Father of Lewis the eleventh having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes and infantry Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry and began to take the Swissers to pay which errour follow'd by the others is as now indeed it appeares the cause of that Kingdomes dangers For having given reputation to the Swissers they have renderd all their own armes contemptible for this hath wholly ruind their foot and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers they think they are not able to overcome without them From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers and without them also against others they use not to adventure Therefore are the French armies mixt part more naries and part natives which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries and much inferiour to the natives and let the said example suffice for that for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable if Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind but men in their small wisdome begin a thing which then because it hath some favour of good discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder as I before said of the hâ—ctick feavers Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes but as they grow up is not truely wise and this is given but to few and if we consider the first ruine of the Romane Empire we shall find it was from taking the Goths first into their pay for from that beginning the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them I conclude then that without having armes of their owne no Principality can be secure or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune not having valour to shelter it in adversity And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men that nothing is so weak and unsetled as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces which are those that are composed of thy subjects or Citizens or servants all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary and the manner how to order those well is easie to find out if those orders above nam'd by me shall be but run over and if it shall be but consider'd how Philip Alexander the Great his Father and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly CHAP. XIV What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline A Prince then ought to have no other ayme nor other thought nor take any thing else for his proper art but warr and the orders and discipline thereof for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands and is of so great excellency that not only those that are borne Princes it maintains so but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity And it is seene by the contrary that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights than to the warres they have lost their States and the first cause that makes thee lose it is the neglect of that arte and the cause that makes thee gaine it is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte Francis Sforza by being a man at armes of a private man became Duke of Milan and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of Princes became private-men For among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee it causes thee to be contemnd which is one of those disgraces from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe as hereafter shall be sayd for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion and reason will not that he who is in armes should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls for there being disdaine in the one and suspicion in the other it is impossible these should ever well co-operate And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre besides the other infelicities belonging to him as is said cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers nor yet trust in them Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre which he may be able to doe two wayes the one practically and in his labours and recreations of his body the other theorically And touching the practick part he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well traind
directed by the examples of those two famous Romans Regulus and Posthumius I shall close this with the answer of Charles the fifth when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for his safe return from Wormes Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet Though truth be banisht out of the whole world yet should it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors beast CHAP. XIX That Princes should take a care not to incurre contempt or batred BUt because among the qualities whereof formerly mention is made I have spoken of those of most importance I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware as in part is abovesaid and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile and when ever he shall avoid this he shall fully have plaid his part and in the other disgrace he shall find no danger at all There is nothing makes him so odious as I said as his extortion of his subjects goods and abuse of their women from which he ought to forbear and so long as he wrongs not his whole people neither in their goods nor honors they live content and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some sew which many waies and easily too is restrain'd To be held various light effeminate faint-hearted unresolv'd these make him be contemnd and thought base which a Prince should shun like rocks and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity courage gravity and valor and that in all the private affairs of his subjects he orders it so that his word stand irrevocable and maintain himself in such repute that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself is much esteemed and against him who is so well esteemed hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects or by forreiners any invasion when once notice is taken of his worth and how much he is reverenced by his subjects For a Prince ought to have two fears the one from within in regard of his subjects the other from abroad in regard of his mighty neighbors from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends and alwayes he shall have good friends if he have good armes and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home when those abroad are firme in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them and however the forrein masters stand but ticklishly yet if he have taken such courses at home and liv'd as we have prescribed he shall never be able in case he forsake not himself to resist all possibility force and violence as I said Nabis the Spartan did but touching his subjects even when his affairs abroad are setled it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily from which a Prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion which it is necessary for him to compass as formerly we treated at large And one of the powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies is net to be hated nor dispised by the universality for alwaies he that conspires beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the subject but when he thinks it displeases them he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side are infinite By experience it is plain that many times plots have been laid but few of them have succeeded luckily for he that conspires cannot be alone nor can he take the company of any but of those who he beleeves are malecontents and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent thou givest him means to work his own content for by revealing thy treason he may well hope for all manner of favour so that seeing his gain certain of one side and on the other finding only doubt and danger either he had need be a rare friend or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince if he keeps his word with thee And to reduce this matter into short termes I say there is nothing but jealousie fear and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him but on the Princes part there is the majesty of the principality he laws the defences of his friends and the State which do so guard him that to all these things the peoples good wills being added it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe in this case he is also to feare afterwards having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited and therefore for this cause not being able to hope for any refuge Touching this matter many examples might be brought but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers Annibal Bentivolii grand Father of this Annibal who now lives that was Prince in Bolonia being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him none of his race being lest but this John who was then in swadling clouts presently the people rose upon this murder and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia which was so great that being there remain'd not any now Anniball was dead that was able to manage the State and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him and gave the government of their City to him which was rul'd by him untill John was of fit yeares to governe I conclude then that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons whiles he hath the people to friend but if they be his enemies and hate him he may well feare every thing and every one And well ordered States and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence not to cause their great men to fall into desperation and to content the people and so to maintaine them for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes is that of France and therein are found exceeding many good orders whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends of which the chiefe is the Parliament and the authority thereof for he that founded that Kingdome knowing the great mens ambition and insolence and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones grounded upon feare intending to secure them would not lay this care wholly upon the King but take this trouble from him which he might have with the great men in case he favourd the Commonalty or with the Commonalty in case he favourd the great men