strong walls and Parapets Bulwarkes Halfe-moones Horne-workes Ports Moots Ditches Rampiers and in some places Redouts and Sconces as in the Low-Countries and what J conceive to be more worthy of consideration and more to be looked into many places of importance in this Kingdome are in a manner without any Fortification at all or else so weakly maintained or ill composed that in time of warre especially with the French our overseeing neighbors they lye greatly according to the Nature and martiall Discipline of these dayes exposed to danger 6. For to instance Milford Haven is a place of that situation and convenience that a great Navie even the greatest almost for burden how soever for number may arrive there and being arrived land what numbers they shall be able without any their eminent or great danger there being no place of strength to molest or hinder them nor a people of any considerable power although they want no courage to resist them and may not an Army out of Spaine or France now more to be thought of not onely there land but also there fortifie themselves wasting and destroying the Countries of Pembroke-shire Carmarden-shire Glamorgan-shire and Cardigar shire before sufficient forces could be raised to resist them and enforce them to desist May not great powers likewise not onely spoyle us as before said but also invade the heart of the Kingdome from thence and that with much convenience to themselves and inconvenience to us for having so large and safe and Haven as is Milford-haven for their fleet if it should be by them well fortifyed and kept as that no doubt but they would doe might they not march along the Sea Coast through the plentifull Countries of Pembroke shire Carmarden-shire and Clamorgan-shire aforesaid and from thence into Monmouth shire Hereford shire and so farther according to their Potencie Which how dangerous it might prove God of his goodnesse defend it not onely to the ruine of those Countries but also disanimating of our people living in or about them to the incensing of Domesticall discontented factions if any such should be with other like Casualties I leave it to the Consideration of my Superiours 7 Moreover not Milford Haven onely lying upon large and commodious Seas and being likewise so situated as that it may annoy if once in the hands of a stranger Ireland as well as England and greatly disunite them or at leastwise molest their union not onely that I say but also to omit the mouth of the River of Carmarden Swanzey Cardiffe Newport and Chepstow or rather the mouth of the River of Wuy in Monmouth-shire the mouth of Severn Kingrode Mynhead and some other places in the Severn-Sea the I le of Sheppey in Kent the mouth of Thames and Tinmouth Castle have need in respect of future Casualties to be better looked unto and strengthened as likewise the towns of Poole Waymouth and Portland Iland in Dorset shire are in my small insight to be farre better fortifyed then they are For first Dorset shire is the nearest Country unto France Kent onely excepted of any part of England next it is by nature least strong as lying wholly upon the Sea having no difficult Cliffes or Rockes to incumber an enemy in landing Thirdly it lyeth in the midst of the Southerne Coast having Eastward Hamshire Sussex and Kent Westward Devonshire and Cornwall and Northward the body of the Kingdome so that if a potent enemy should stand there hee might direct his forces Eastward Westward or Northward according to his most advantage as for the Castles of Waymouth and Portland Iland they are not for strength considerable and yet who knoweth not but that that Iland and the land of the County make a large Bay sufficient to containe a great Navie where likewise they may ride at Anchor in reasonable safety unlesse the South or Southeast winds be extraordinarily stirring so that if that Iland let it seeme of what importance it please should be but taken and well fortifyed by the French besides the charge and hazzard of recovering it or blocking it up they might shrewdly annoy us having Normandy so neare 8 And for that I have intimated the French it may be thought either hate or aversion without fundamentall reason if I shew not some prudent or at leastwise probable cause of suspition in that Nation against us wherefore I have here briefly set down the particulars which I conceive of the French proceedings and greatnesse First therefore it is well knowne that France is the greatest most plentifull and populous Kingdome in Europe being at the least foure times bigger then England and having 5 times as many people The King thereof is now the most absolute Monarch Christian except the great Duke of Moscovie or Emperour of the Abessines whom we scarcely know so that the King of France his Sic volumus sic jubemus is in a manner a Law amongst the greatest part of his Subjects and thereby hee hath of late so augmented his Revenues that those of France alone exceed the Incoms of all the large Donions of Spaine and Portugall or at the least wise they equalize them besides France hath extended it selfe of late through Lorraine and in Artois and Alsatia Lording as it were over Savoy and Piemont the Marquisate of Montferrat and Dutchy of Mantua in Italy are likewise under the protection of France but that which of all things ought most to awake us is the French Conquest in Artois aforesaid so neare unto us and neerely concerning us as I take it the Proverbe is Tunc tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet And is not our neighbors house on fire in the Provinces of Flanders are not Arras Aires and Hesden by the French taken in for my part were St. Omers Graveling and Dunkerk by them likewise subdued I should account that house burntdown to the ground and were the French once but Masters of Flanders I would know whether according to reason of State they might not overmaster us if they should make warre upon us as 't is likely they would If it should be said and concluded that in such Case we would and should enter into a league both Defensive and Offensive with the Hollanders and by that meanes be enabled to oppose the French To this I answer that it is a question First whether or no the Hollanders would in such case breake their league defensive and offensive which they hold with the French to joyn compact with us for it may be very likely that they would not draw upon them so neere and powerfull an enemy besides they have of late beene ayded by the Fâ—ench since they have in a manner been quit by us Moreover France can live of it selfe without Holland but Holland can scarce live without France as having great store of Corne wine and salt and Canvas from thence besides 't is very likely that the Hollanders would be content to subsist and to inrich themselves by trade as doe the
TO THE HONOURABLE THE Knights Citizens and Burgesses now assembled in PARLIAMENT THE HUMBLE PROPOSITIONS OF WILLIAM BALL alias BENNET Gent. Concerning the Forts of this Kingdome With some other Considerations of State LONDON Printed by Barnard Allop for Thomas Bayly dwelling in the Middle-Row in Holborne neere unto Staple-Inne 1641. TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFVL Mr. SPEAKER RIGHT WORSHIPFVL YOur owne reall worth hath ever deserved those due Respects from mee which I have as obliged thereunto formerly tendred unto you Now the eminence of your Place may command me humble service which according to my ability I shall be ever ready as in duty bound to render at your pleasure In token whereof I have attempted to dedicate these Propositions chiefly to your Worship to whom they may most fitly have Relation as being a principall Member of the great and happy Representative Body of this most flourishing Kingdome now assembled in Parliament For the generall good and safety whereof I have exprest set forth these though meane yet my well-meaning Endeavours being over ready to eâ—dâ—avour 〈◊〉 as my much Honoured â—upeâ—â—ours shall pleâ—se 〈◊〉 command and direct mâ— â—nd Gâ—d 〈…〉 Whâ—se divine Providence and Gâ—odâ—esse I shall ever implore for the happy successe of all publick â—ffâ—ireâ— â—nd great Designes important to this Nation and remaine alwayes Your Worships Servant to command WILLIAM BALL alias BENNET TO THE HONOVRABLE THE Knights Citizens and Burgesses Now assembled in PARLIAMENT The humble Propositions of William Ball alias Bennet Gent. Concerning the Forts of this Kingdome with some other Considerations of STATE 1. FOrasmuch as all men as well Inferiours as Superiours are by the Lawes both of God and Nature as also by Constitutions Civill and Military grounded upon Reason and Honour bound to conserve as much as in them lyeth their native Country in which they receive the life of Men and enjoy the liberty of Free-men the most especiall benefits speaking morally of this Lower world every one therefore is not to hide his Talent in the ground but liberally to proffer for the generall good of his Country what store soever he possesseth or enjoyeth whether or no it be the endowment of Nature or Fortune so that persons in Authority are to procure their Countries well-fare by their well-ordered and discreet Commands and Government Souldiers by their valour and Discipline the rich by their wealth learned and experienced men by their knowledge and observation Inferiours by prompt obedience all by good-will To expose these assertions to approbation I conceive no Author need to be cited the Dictamen of reason averring them to be so wherefore I cannot doubt that much honoured Superiours to whose grave censure J submit these my Propositions will any way be offended that I have Dedicated to them these subsequent Considerations proceeding if not from sufficient reason yet from intire good-will so that if J have inserted any one clause that may give the least distaste I humbly intreat that quis enim succenset amanti Ovid Epist Her Helen c. may excuse it 2 THE most Politicke and martiall men have generally esteemed Forts and strong places the safety not onely of meane Provinces but even of the greatest and most puissant Kingdomes and Empires the defects and neglects whereof have many too many times beene the occasions or rather causes of most irreparable Disasters in greate and commanding Monarchies and Estates The Romane Empire invaded by the Persians Saracens Goths and Vandalls the Greeke Empire wholly subverted by the Turks Spaine over-runne by the Moores with other Countries were heretofore most lamentable Presidents of thraldome occasioned chiefly according to humane principles of State by noe having their frontiers ploces of importance strongly fortified But to instance provinces and s part more neere and notified unto us in these moderne times who knoweth not but that the small remnant of Hungaria the States of Venice and Holland the Islands of Sicily Sardinia Candy and Malta â— even all Italy are all principally conserved speaking of the instrumentall cause from forreigne subjection and tyranny by fort and strong places MOreover the most flourishing Kingdomes and Monarchies both Christian and Mahometan disdaine not but rather wholy endeavour to have the bounds and borders of their dominions if not extraordinarily yet sufficiently strengthned with fortifications and Garrisons both in peace and war so do the Roman or German Emperour and Great Turk notwithstanding of late the ordinary peace or Truce betweene them keepe the one the forts or rather Townes of Kamorra Rab c. the other of Strigonium Buda c. exactly maintained with all necessaries thereby wiesly preventing the sudden events of war if their enemies albeit they make shew of peace should upon any distast or occasion of advantage given them attempt an invasion For such places of strength although they are not always swords which sometimes they are to cut off an enemy yet are they ever Buâ—klers to defend a Countrie untill such time as either sufficient power can be aised to expell them or that reasonable conditions be obtained if so be that the enemy bee not inviucible in respect of number 4. Nor can J but commend in this point of fortifying to omit the Hollanders of all our neighbor nations most carefull the French and Spanish but especially the French who although they need not greatly feare or at leastwise tremble at any forraine Invasion from their neighbors by Sea which could impose the yoke of sujection upon them by reason of their great and united Land-forces they are able to make to expell and vanquish any such powers as could by shipping Gallies and the like enter into their continent yet have they on the Levant great Ocean Seas strong townes and Castles well furnished with good Garrisons and necessary provision for defence against a puissant Invader as to begin on the Levant in France Tolou Marseilles Narbon in Spain Barcelona Denia Alicante Cartagena de Levanto Malaga Gibraltar Cadiz the Groine St. Sebastians Fonte-Rabia and againe in France Baion Blois sur Garroun Broige Rochel quondam Brest St. Malos Mount St. Michael Grandvill Cherbourg Havre-de Grace Diepe Cales c so that the consideration of these aforenamed places of importance strongly erected and warily kept and repaired by those and other our neighbouring Nations have divers times moved me to ponder whether their care in maintaining such Fortifications or our confidence in omitting them and as it were quitting the charge thereof may be more commendable 5. First therefore not to flatter our selves J conceive that it must be granted that none of our best Sea-townes or Castles of Barwick Hull Yarmouth Harwich Sandon Dover Portsmouth Plimouth c. are as they now are contrived and strengthened to be compared with most of those in France and Spaine aforesaid For although the situation of some of ours may be as convenient as some of theirs yet our manner of fortifying is not to be equalized with theirs confidering their
Venetians and so to live at peace with their neighbors and to say that they would joyne with us meerly for Religions sake it may seeme so to a weake Opiniatist but never to an understanding Statist who well knoweth that Religion is many times the pretended but seldome the reall Cause of warre or leagues and as for the Hollanders J am of opinion that they will never enter into warre or league meerly for Religion 9 But grant that wee should enter into such a league with the Hollanders J conceive notwithstanding that France if it had but Flanders added to it would be superiour to them and us by land no whit inferiour by Sea for to say that the French in respect of their numbers both of horse and foote would not in such case as aforesaid be masters of the field were meerly to flatter our selves and they that are masters of the field will in time be masters of as many townes and forts as they can besiege and encompasse or block up by land if such townes cannot otherwise be succoured by Sea and it may be even of them also so that the Hollanders having their townes and Forts taken from them would be inforsed to breake their league with us and make their peace with the French and if it should farther be said that in such Case we would not onely make a league with the Hollanders but also with other Princes and States who should assist us J answer that this bare saying or supposition must not goe for a maxime For first it must be considered that all Nations are most inclinable to them that can stand them in most stead now great Brittaine for that it is an Iland can stand no Nation in any great stead for the invasion of France at leastwise by land and that chiefly because our shipping if we should be masters of the Seas could not transport over any great powers both of horse and foot especially of horse to make a considerable Conquest in so large a Continent as is France 10 Nor is it consequence to say that formerly we have made Conquests in France with a small power For 1. it must be considered that the Nature and Discipline of warre is greatly altered Secondly we then had a third part of France or rather more under our obedience having not now one foote within the maine Land Thirdly France had then many Homagers and Peeres that durst were able and did oppose the King so that by that meanes it was disunited whereas now there is none of any Potency that dare controle the King or his commands or if there be yet can they not but quickly be reduced into subjection or else expelled as Fugitives France being now wholly under obedience Fourthly it must likewise be considered that the Forts Ports and Citadels of France were not then so strong as now they are being now all for the Major part re-edified according to moderne Fortification Fiftly the Revenues of the Crown of France are far greater then ever they were as aforesaid the Revenues of Normandy alone equalizing now the revenues antient of the whole crown whereby the King of France is inabled to leavy and maintaine greater Armies to all this may be added our long ease a great Disease I feare by which wee are of late become unexpert to attempt any notable designes against so potent a Nation as is France 11 So that for the reasons alleadged we can not stand other Nations in any great stead for the Invasion of France and therefore 't is to be thought that the German Princes as many as can stand us in any stead would not decline from France which doth may availe them especially if the House of Austria fall to decay to incline to us who can availe them but little and the Portugals if they continue in a Kingdome independent from Spaine will in any occasion of great importance either wholly devote themselves to France for that it may assist them against the Castilians as likewise for Corne Canvas c. or else the Portugals will remaine Newtrals as for Spaine if they should lose Flanders they would find enough to doe to keepe themselves in safety on the other side of the Pyrenans and besides they will conceive it may be that for as much as we never throughly assisted them in their Countries of Flanders c. that therfore they were no way obliged afterwards to ingage themselves for us and besides Flanders once lost they were not able to doe us any great good no more were Italy Denmarke Poland and Swedeland in respect of their remotenesse and it is most probable also that those Nations would remaine as Newters betweene the French and us So that if France should gaine Flanders and then fall out with us 't is to be feared that the warre once turned upon us would come wholly to our shares to beare and make an end of and in such case I hope all will agree that it were very necessary that all our Ports and places of importance were strongly fortified and securely guarded and surely it can not be amisse to foresee and prevent inconveniences by times and indeed I conceive it now even high time to be looked unto for albeit that the French have not as yet wholy subdued Flanders yet are they in a reasonable forwardnesse possibility of gaining it but letting that passe to take the event of warre admit now the French should make a peace or Truce with the Spanish who by reason of their many and great troubles would 'tis very propable before all were lost in Flanders be glad to embrace Peace or Truce and forasmuch as the French are on the winning hand 't is very likely therefore that they would capitulate for their owne advantage let it therefore be supposed that it should be concluded betweene the French and Spanish in a present Truce that neither should ayd or assist the enemies of one another during the time of such peace or Truce which condition I beleeve the Spanyards would not refuse if it were urged because they would not have the Portugals Catalonians and such like aided against themselves if therefore such Truce as aforesaid were made between those two Nations suppose rhe French should even now turne their furies ambition upon us were it not then most requisite that all our Ports and places of Importance were securely guarded and strongly fortifyed 13 If it be said that we would be Masters of the Sea and by that meanes we should be able to divert any of the French forces and not suffer them to land J answer that first it is a question whether we could master the French at sea as they may be provided and I beleeve if the Hollanders being now in a league Defensive and offensive with them would joyn with them wee should bee deceived and it would be well for us to be equall with them but admit we should be equall or somewhat Superiour to the French at sea
what great security could be built upon that they may draw if they finde themselves too weak our ships of warre into one place by daring us and making shew of a Conflict with their ships â—nd yet with lesser vessels land an Army or forces in another place and there surprize some convenient Port Towne or Castle if not sufficiently fortifyed and strengthned to make resistance and how many times have weak places bin suddainly subdued to the great prejudice of the owners experience hath shewed to the ruine of many on the other side strong places if not betrayed or most negligently kept have many times foyled an enemy and secured a whole Province for no enemy except of an investible power will returne farre into anothers Country leaving a strong place behind him to which his enemies may assemble and joyne themselves against him to make head and if not fight with him afterwards yet cut off his succours and Convoyes by the helpe of such a place thereby by little and little weakning and disinabling him If it bee farther said that we need not feare an Invasion from France or any other Nation and consequently need not erect any strong Forts for that a puissant Army of above 20000. 30000. or 40000. at the most cannot be by shipping transported or landed in this Iland and as for such powers our trained or Military bands with other forces soon raised would be able to overthrow them I answer to this that 't is not good to put such a thing to hazzard for to omit the danger of Combines c. Although I grant our trained or Military bands to be a very good meanes I even the best we now have to preserve us and to suppresse an enemy yet forasmuch as they are used to fight in jest not in earnest they might be foyled by lesser powers of old souldiers such as now are the French throughly exercised in the warres of Germany Italy Spaine and the Low-Countries so that I conceive and conclude howsoever that our Ports and places of importance are notwithstanding of our Fleet trained Bands to be strongly secured 14 It may be some will say that there is no great feare that the French will at any time molest us but let such give me leave to tell them that I could wish it so as well as they and that all the world would if it might be live and continue in peace and unity nor doe J for my part accuse or say that the French will or have an intent to make warre upon us yet I verily beleeve J know that 1. The French in generall envy our Kings Title to France 2. That they beare unto us old and late Grudges for our I le of Rey's Voyage 3. That they desire to be the chiefe if they can the sole Regents in Christendome and therefore seeke wholly to disinvest the house of Austria that none should be able to oppose them 4. That they have set at variance the Princes of Germany and fomented the warres there to the ruine and in a manner Desolation thereof 5. That they have seized upon the Duke of Lorraines Country and other places not belonging to them 6. That they have reduced Savoy into the Nature of Vassallage and thereby opened a way into Italy 7. That they have animated the Rebellions of Catalonia and such like 8. That their Cardinall who is upon the matter their Dominus fac totum is a most politick Prelate c. Now thereefor if in zeale to my Country J doe but suspect the worst not insisting upon it vehemently I conceive I may be by all indifferent men excused Notwithstanding I request all especially my Superiours to pardon if I have inserted any thing amisse hoping that what I have written concerning Fortifications or the Fortifying Ports and other places of importance will worthily be taken into consideration For as 't is truely said that the Earth is Ponderibus librata suis So may it be as truely said that a Kingdome or Common-wealth is or ought to be by Justice and Warlike power equally balanced 1 IF it be objected that the Fortifying and maintaining of places of Importance will bee somewhat chargeable to the Kingdome I answer beeter some charge then no security or safety 2. If it be objected that Forts and strong places have divers times bin and may be yet the Nests of Rebels I answer that such Care Policy and Vigilancy may be used in placing and displacing Governours and Officers as that we may bee as well secured from such dangers as are the Spanish Dutch Venetian and of late the French with other Nations 3. If it be farther objected that strong places if once surprized by an enemy are with greater difficulty regained whereas weaker places are soone got againe I answer that stronger places likewise are better able to keepe out an enemy so that they cannot but by more difficulty be Conquered and weaker if they once come into the hands of an enemy will be by them made strong if they intend farther to invade so that the recovering of a weake place soone lost may cost as deare as of a stronger FINIS