â—yranizing over his Subjects If the Prince saith Bodin be an absolute Soveraigne as are the true Monarches of Spaine England c. where the Kings themselves have the Soveraignty without all doubt or question not divided with their Subjects in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the Subjects in particular nor all of them in generall to attempt anything either by way of fact or of justice against the honour life or dignity of the Soveraigne albeit that hee had committed all the wickednesse â—mpiety and cruelty that could be spoken for as to proceede against him by way of justice the Subjest hath uo such jurisdiction over his Soveraigne Prince of whom dependeth all power and authority to command Now if it be not lawfull for the Subject by way of justice to proceede against his Prince how should it then be lawfull to proceede against him by way of fact or force for question is not here what men are able to doe by strength and force but what they ought of right to doe the subject is not onely guilty of Treason in the highest degree who hath slaine his Soveraigne Prince but he also which hath appempted the same who hath given Counsell or consent thereto And then he goes on to prove the same by sundry examples taken out of Scripture and then saith he to answer vain objectiâ—ns were but idely to abuse both time and learning But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or noe is not with arguments to be refuted but with severe punishments so are they which call into question a thing so cleare and that by Bookâ—s publiquely imprinted that the Subjects may take up armes against their Prince being a Terant Howbeit the most learned Divines are cleare of opinion that it is not lawfull without especiall command from God And as for that which Calvin faith if there were at this time Magistrates appointed for the defence of thee people and to restraine the insolency of Kings as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia the Tribunes in Rome and the Demarches in Athens that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and cruelty He sheweth sufficiently that it was never lawfull in a right Monarchy for he speaketh but of the popular and Arâ—stocratique States of Common-weales We read also that the Protestant Princes of Germany before they entred into armes against Charles the Emperour demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull who frankly told them that it was not lawfull whatsoever Tiranny or impiety were pretended yet was he not therein of them beleeved So thereof ensued a most deadly and lamentable Warre the â—â—d whereof was most miserable drawing with it the rume and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany with exceeding slaughter of the Subjeâ—ts The Prince we may justly call the Father of the Countrey and ought to bee more deare unto every one then any Father Et nulla tanta impretas nullum tantum scelus est quod sit parricidio vindicandum I say therefore that the Subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soveraigne Prince how naughty and cruell soever he be Lawfull it is not to obey him in all things contrary unto the Lawes of God and nature to fly and hide our selves from him but yet to suffer stripes yea and death also rather then to attempt any thing against his life or honour This is the substance of that learned Protestants discourse which is worth your reading at large But alas all this discourse is besides the present businesse nothing is attempted against the life or honour of the Prince the taking up of Armes and shooting bullets at him is in defence of his Majesties person there are no expressions in this observatour nor yet in him that hath made observations upon a speech of King James with eight and twenty Queres nor in any other Pamphlets that licenciously slye about that doe at all touch the honour of the Kings Subjects may not resist saith Bodin and our best Divines without speciall command but ouâ— Brethren now have speciall instruction from the Spirit to doe what they doe or if they have not the Spirit assuring them that they may take armes against their Prince yet Master Cal. hath well distinguished that it is one thing to sight against a King another thing to fight against the lusts of a King Against the lusts of a King my beloved Brethren we may fight nay we ought to fight against them And our Observatour stands in defence of that distinction That levying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King but warre against his authory though not person is warre against the King But in truth are not all these shifting distinctions like a Shipmans hose that will fit an Jrish Rebell as well as an English I dare not speake my minde of that distinction the Observator maintaines but you shall heare what an honourable Chancellour of England hath long since said of it This is a dangerous distinction betweene the King and the Crowne and betweene the King and the Kingdome it reacheth too farre I wish every good Subject to beware of it It was never taught but either by traytours as in Spencers Bill in Edward the seconds time or by treasonable Papists as Harding in his confutation of the Apologie maintaineth that Kings have their authority by the positive Law of Nations and have no more power then the people have of whom they take their temporall jurisdiction and so Ficlerus Simanca and others of that crew by seditious sectaries and puritans as Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotus Penry Knox and such like in Calvins case it is reported that in the reigne of Ed. 2. the Spencers to cover the treason hatched in their hearâ—s invented this damnable and damned opinion that homage and oath of ligeance was more by reason of the Kings Crowne that is of his politique capacity then by reason of the person of the King upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequence 1. If the King doe not demean himself by reason in the right of his Crown his leiges are bound by oath to remove the King 2. Seeing the King could not be removed by suit of Law that ought to be done per aspertee 3. That his leiges be bound to govern in aid of him and in default of him All which were condemned by two Parliaments I will not say that this concernes the Observator or any body else let others judge I only say I am unsatisfied how we may lawfully use active resistance with our swords in our hands against a lawfull soveraign Prince though tyrannizing or if it might be done yet certainly not till after much sufferance and that destruction shall open its jawes ready to swallow us up and not upon imagenary feares and jealousies such as we have had now at lest twelve moneths past
not an absolute but an admirably well tempered Monarchy Now if you compare the 3 simple formes of Government Aâ—istotle will thus determine Harâ—â—â—â— optima est Regnum deterima Democratia In so cleere a truth the spirit of opposition could not force him to dissent from his Master Plato who having set downe those 3 simple formes of Government with three mixt and compounded thus delivers his judgment Vâ—iâ—â— dominatio bonis instructa legâ—bus sex illarum omnium optima est Gubernationem vero â—aâ—in quâ— non multi imperant mediam censâ—re dâ—bâ—mus caeterum multorum administrationâ—m â—â—â—ibus is rebus debilematque infirmâ—m And surely if this judgement be not right neare all the world are in error But nâ—w though simple Monarchy doe farre excced their Consâ—â—ar or popular Government yet is it not without its inconveniencies and therefore it may be so tempered and mixt as that it may still remaine Monarchy and yet have its inconveniencies restrayned avoyded as farforth as may be then will it of all others whether absolute or mixt become the most usefull and convenient forme of Government Now such and no other is the constitution of Government in England so well poysed and molded by the wisedome of our ancestors as that it gives to this Kingdome the conveniencies of all without the inconveniencies of any one as far forth as by humane prudence they may be prevented The supreame power therefore of making Laws whereby to governe and judge the people in time of peace as likewise the power of armies for preventing of invasions and insurrections rests in a King only immovably whereby he is sufficiently enabled to protect his people And againe as the King himselfe acknowledgeth those lawes by which he is to govern may not be made but by the Consent of the house of Peers and by the house of Commons chosen by the people all hâ—ving free votes and particular priviledges And that the Prince may not make use of his high and perpetuall power to the hurt â—f â—hoâ—e for whose good he hath it the house of Commons as an â—â—cellent conservâ—r of liberty is solely intrusted with the first propositions concerning the levies of mâ—â—y the sinewes of peâ—câ— aâ—â—â—â— and for the impeâ—ckiâ—g of thoâ—e who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiâ—usly gotten command of the King have violated that law which the King is bound when hâ— knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at the least not to serve him in the contrary And the Lords being trusted with a judâ—â—atory power are an excâ—llent skâ—â—ene and bank between the prince people to assist each â—gainst the incroachment of the other Now whether it be more safe for the supreame indisputable power after this manner to rest in the King or els to be in the Lords and Commons excluding the king that 's the question The â—bserâ—ator vrgeth these inconveniences that sâ—eme to remâ—iâ— in this regulated Monarchy so that it is at the kings pleasure when hâ— shal iudgâ— fit to cal parliamentâ— and being called by dissent hee my frustrate their proceedings and at his pleasure dissolve â—heir being If this be so how have they a power more than sufficient to restraine Tyrannie â—â—â—â—ly if these principles hold Parliaments will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a Government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other kingdome What â—â—mes doe we live in when the known principles of ancient Government shall be thus impudently railed at That it is left at the Kings just pleasure to call Parliaments upon which oâ—â—er rights depend is a truth so manifest that I am ashamed to alleadge any proofe of it that the King hath indisputable power of dissolving of Parliaments is equally manifest and acknowledged by the Act for not dissolving this present Parliament and that the King in his â—udgment dissenting may thereby quash their proceedings for as much as it is at this time denied I have formerly proved it But if this be so what is left to restraine Tyrannie Marry as much as conveniently may be For though it be at the Kings pleasure to call and dissolve Parliaments he is disabled to make any new Lawes or repeale the old how great need soâ—ver there be for it Nor may he raise Subsidies for his Warres or other occasions without 〈◊〉 in Parliament If impositions be otherwise indirectly laid upon the subject the ministers ought not to levy it or if it be levied experience teacheth that the King will be thereby the greater looser These and many other motives there are inforcing a King to call Parliaments and to comply with the just desires of his subiects And yet of late I must confesse we have had occasion to bewaile the too long intermission of Parliaments of which a reverend Iudge complaining gives us the probable reason At the last meeting in Parliament saith he either by ill choice of the members of that House or by the great increase of the number or by the ambitious humours of some Members of that House who aimed more at their owne â—â—ds and designes then the generall good of the Common-wealth things were so carried not â—â— was used in ancient time but so disastrously that it hath wrought such a disease of this course of Parliaments as we and all that love the Common-wealth have just cause to be sorry for it But now the fruits that have sprung from this error in Government are discovered the remembrance whereof will ever hereafter put Princes in mind of calling Parliaments And to secure this unto us His Maiestie hath now passed an Act for Trieninall Parliaments not dâ—â—â—olvable within the space of 50 dayes then which can there be a better assurance against Tirannie not destroying Monarchie it selfe Yet all this will not satisfie the Observator If the King shall have the disposing of the Militia or power of the kingdome according to the established laws and may so claime a share in the Legislative power as that the Lords and Commons may not without him make lawes and ordinances whensoever themselves shall think fit and necessary so to do or if at any time without presupposing a necessity he shal not according to his oath and office assent to what lawes and ordinances the Houses shall Vote though they go against his own Iudgment and Conscience there will be still a meanes left for the King to make himselfe a tyrant or an absolute Lord not limited by Law but disposing all things according to his lawlesâ—e wil and pleasure A power you say is left that hee may these but the Law trusts him presuming he wil not abuse it and that obiection that is against the presumption of the Law none should presume to make Something must be left if it cannot be restrained but that Monarchy will be destroyed or disabled to performe its office that restraint that you would put upon
Houses without the King represent the Universall Realm shall be considered anon passing that by I conceive that the Parliament truely so called is above the King taken solely for that it doth involve the King without whom they are not truely a Parliament The Parliament then thus considered is a whole compared with some part and the King but a part though the most excellent part of the whole Now every whole is greater then any part the Head though more excellent then all the other Members yet not more excellent then the whole Man whereof the Head is but a part But the King solely compared with the Parliament or rather the Houses of Parliament excluding or not involving the King is superiour and above them whether you consider them scorsim or conjunctim for taken conjunctim they make but a Body which though it be greater then then the Head in Bulk yet doth the Head excell in Vertue Excellence and Authority And although by vertue of representation they are the Body of the whole Kingdom yet is the King the Head of that Body and the Representative of God himself who I am sure is above the Body they represent It is a Principall undeniable Pax in parem non habet imperium multo minus in superiorâ—â—â— If then the Houses be above nay if but equall with the King He can have no Command over them But it is evident He hath Command over them He calls and commands them to assemble being assembled or united together He may command them to prorogue or adjourn for time or place upon which Command it is then their Duty to rise and remove and again at His pleasure He can dissolve them Although for this time His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to restrain Himself from the exercise of that Power yet the Power it self is still in Him as an Inheritance inseparable from His Crown The Representatives of the Kingdom either are Subjects or not That they are not Subjects by reason that they are assembled is absurd and so would not the Kings Protection due unto Subjects belong unto them If they are Subjects then doth the King remain their Soveraign and Superiour And indeed so far is their uniting and assembling in Parliament from diminishing the Kingly Soveraignty to which they were before all and every one Subject as that the Regall Majesty is thereby much more encreased and augmented Cromp. Jurisâ— 10. We are informed by Our Judges saith King H. 8. to His Parliament That We at no time stand so highly in Our Estate Royall as in the time of Parliament wherein We as Head and you as Members are conâ—oyned and knit together in one Body Politique If the Houses as representing the Universall Realm are above the King then they may judge Him punish or depose Him But they cannot judge Him 22 Edw. 3. 3. Le Roy per cux ne doit estre ajuge 3 Edw. 3. 19. Scrope Those which are Judges of Parliament are Judges of their Pâ—â—rs but the King hath no Peer within His Own Kingdom and therefore ought not to be judgedly them And for deposing a King or depriving Him of His Right and Authority or any necessary part thereof no Act of Parliament can prevail much lesse the Lords and Commons An Attainder by Parliament could not barre the title to the Crowne from descending on King H. 7. nor was an act of Parliament disabling King H. 6. to reassume the Government of his people of any force but without any repeale in it selfe frustrate and voyd 7. Rep. 14. Calvins case an act of Parliament cannot take away the Kings protection or the Subjects service which is due by the Law of nature 11. Rep. Sur de la wares Case William de la ware although disabled by act of Parliament was neverthelesse called by Q. Eliz. to sit as a Peere in Parliament for that it seemes the Queene could not be barred of the service and Counsell of any of her Subjects 2. H. 7. 6. A statute that the King by no non obstante shall dispence with it is void because it would take a necessary part of Governement out of the King If then no act of Parliament be of force to take away the government or any necessary part thereof from the King then surely is not any Ordinance of the Lord and Commons of force to doe it And consequently the Lords and Commons as representing the vniversall Realme cannot be above the King but inferior to him Before the King commanded them to assemble each particular and all of them were his Subjects and inferior to him If by assembling into one body and the vertue of representation they cease to be his Subjects and inferiors why doe they then in all their petitions and declarations or Answers proceeding from them not as particular men but as houses of Parliament united stile him Their gracious Soveraigne and themselves His Majesties most humble Subjects the Lords and Commons in Parliament Let our Observator judge whether these representatives have not ill discharged their duty to the Kingdome by debasing thus the underived Majestie so he calls it of the people by petitioning in so low and humble a forme him that is but their creature and in whom there is no Majestie but what is from them derived downe unto him for so the Obseruator conceives it But now to answer the Observators Argument which is thus There is nothing saith he more known or assented to then this that although the King be singulis major yet universis minor being below the people then in universali he must likewise be below the representatives of that universalitie I will not stand to question what necessary connexion these propositions have The people are above the King therefore their representatives are so The King of England is above the King of Spain doth the English Embassadour therefore take place of the King of Spain But admitting a necessary Connexion The people are above the King ergo the houses representing them Why then è converso The houses representing are not above the King ergo the people represented are not and so having proved the houses below the King I have already proved the King above the people yet a word more 'T is true as the Observator saith nothing is more known or assented to then this that the King solely is Minor universis the universalitie including the King For no part be it the head can exceed or be greater then the whole But againe if the King and universalitie bee contradistinguished nothing is more known or assented to then this That the King I speake of the King of England a Soveraign King not a Duke of Venice is not onely singulis major but major universis Nay most properly is the King above the people considered as an entire Congregation For chiefly as he is King he is above all others Now King relates to kingdome Rex to Regnum and Kingdome or Regnum denotes an
from Papists training under ground and conspiracies against the State discovered by a traytor lying in a diteh and which have bin wrought in us by weekly relations of horrible terrible strange newes from Denmarke France Spaine and from all places in Christendome excepting Amsterdam from thence no danger at all to be feared But what if a kingdome may not resist shall they not therefore have meanes to save themselves if a seduced King shall indeavour to lead them backe to popery or to bring them under an arbitrary rule may they not in good time foreseeing the danger arme themselves for defence and not suffer themselves to be led on to the ruine of their lives fortunes and religion For Religion surely no Subjects ought to depart from it at the pleasure or command of any Prince or Potentate how great or absolute soever his power be and for their lives and fortunes no Common-wealth may want a meanes of preservation Salus populi supremalex But I thinke the best way to preserve a Kingdome or people is not to allow them a power upon such suppositions to rise against the pleasure and command of their King or Governour Caligula in a suddaine fit of cruelty might wish that all his Subjects heads grew upon one mans shoulders that so at one blow he might cut them off But is it possible that after deliberation such an unnaturall wish should settle in the minde of any Tirant certainly t is neer bordering on impossibility that a King should seriously desire to destroy the lives and fortunes of all his Subjects with which his own Soveraignty will necessarily be destroyed or if he should endeavor to make them slaves and vassals to his arbitrary power what doth he else but change the good title of a King to that of a Tirant which before a lawfull Prince will ever doe he must be extreamly blinded with ambition and cruelty And if a King of England should affect it yet hath the Law disabled him to effect it his commands must all run in the right Channels of Justice and equity or by no particular officer ought to be obayed Nihil aliud potest Rex in terris cum sit Minister Dei et ejus Vicarius quam quod de jure potest it is then a very remote danger and almost impossible that can this way befall the Subject and yet seeing it is not altogether impossible a mischiefe I must acknowledge it is to be under such a possibility But on the other side if you gâ—ve way to the inconstant multitude upon pretence of saving themselves and the kingdome to rise against authority we shall every day have the government hazarded if not destroyed and in such case doth not even naturall prudence instruct us to live under a possible mischief then under a daily inconvenience this Doctrine of the peoples power to judge of danger against the commands of their Soveraigne and upon that to take up defensive armes if it should be admitted will be more pernicious to Kingly government out of Parliament then it will be to Parliaments themselves for as the people may preserve themselves against a wilfull seduced Prince that would destroy them so may they against an Ordinance of the Lords and Commons if they shall judge it to tend to the destruction of the Kingdome or subversion of Government the Charter of nature by its supreame Law intitles all to seeke their salety and against this it will be of little purpose for you to tell the people that next to renouncing God nothing is more pernitious then to forsake thier representatives when they shall judge their representatives forsake their trust and would leade them on to Anabaptisme or any other way to destruction The King is Judge of danger at least out of Parliament but if he will not see dangers or if he himselfe shall become a danger to the Kingdome the Kingdome may save it selfe In Parliament we will suppose the Lords and Commons are Judges of danger but if some driven away by force and the rest seduced by a Malignant party will not see dangers from Anabaptists Brownists c. or shall themselves become a danger to the State and setled government the people may save themselves from ruine t is so written in Natures Magna Charta cap. 1. Will not this cloak sit exceeding well upon the backe of Irish Rebels they judge their Religion restrained and ready to be destroyed by a Prince seduced by the advise of English Protestants and defence and maintainance of their Religion they take up armes let 's first lay this ground in England and then let a Doctor in Divinity or some seditious IMP walke up and downe under hand like the pestilence in the darke to infect the minds of silly men and make up a faction whether against King or Parliament thereupon what thinke you will become of Regall and Parliamentary power will not they both be made subject to the designes of such seditious Protestants as at any time shal be able with the glorious names of Liberty and selfe preservation to abuse and intoxicate the minds of the wavering multitude If the King being led away with an old error of Protestancy shall endeavour to extirpate the beleeving Brownist or orthodox Anabaptist may not the Brownists or Anabaptists judging their Religion to be true save themselves nay ought they not to catch at all advantages whereby they may deliver their blinded King and Kingdome from following after their owne destruction in an Antichrist way of Protestancy It was long siince suspected by the King and by many of his good Subjects that the ordinance of the Militia would be used to the overthrow of Government and destruction of the Realme and since that hath raised unto the Authors of it a sufficient strength to over master all opposition we see they have already adventured to root out Episcopacy together with Deanes and Chapters Archdeacons Chancelours and the ancient and honourable profession of Eclesiasticall and Imperiall Law besides a good part of the common Law overturned and in likelyhood the rest will not stay long by us And how farre this willfull rejection I say wilfull rejection not barely the want of Episcopacy is destructive to the very essence of a Church is much to be doubted After so good eâ—rnest given of their intentions I suppose a major part of the Realm are well satisfied that their Militia and the ordinances send to the destruction of the Realm if so then by this ground they may lawfully save themselves and oppose their destruction Admit this or forsake your principle And yet if it will do you any service I am content at present you take advantage of it I will admit the Kingdom if they see the King would destroy them may preserve themselves you will say â—f the people have power to preserve themselves against the danger a seduced K. would bring upon them then must they have power to judge of that danger when it is and
it by placing a superior power in the Lords Commons into whose command the King shal be but a meere Minister changes the government to popular or consular having lesse appearance of Monarchy in it then that of Venice wherâ— the Duke in the highest power of making lawes hath a concluding voice freely allowed him and yet is that government acknowledged to be Aristocraticall if not Democraticall If then the King should so abuse his power as to make himselâ—â— an absolute Monarch yet we are better to live under that then under an optimacie mixt with democracie How are Consular estates almost continually tossed vp and downe with the billâ—â—â—◠〈◊〉 surges of ambitious discontented factions what Republique could ever preserue it selfe froâ— being torne in peeces with intestine disentions or over runne with forragne invasion diâ— not Rome when it was a Republique any other while degenate into seditions diâ—cord and Civill warres with in the space of 500 yeares to which period it could not reach how many thinges and rechanges had they of their Gouernment vnder all which it 〈◊〉 came to flourish soe as vnder the sole Gournement of Iulius and Augustus And yet Râ—â—â— of all states haue best thriven vnder such popular Gouernment the other three empires Assirian Grecian and Persian grew to their greatnesse vnder Monarchy and were of lonâ—â—â— continuance then the Republique of Rome but I will not inlarge my selfe vpon soe coâ—â—â— a Theame where in all learned men agree and experience conformeth an Optimaâ—â—â—â— Repâ—â—lique vnlimited to be farre worse then vnlimited Soureigntie The Obsâ—ruator neuâ—rtheâ—â—â— stands vpâ—n defence of the contrary the King obiecting that the houses clayme an arbirâ—â—â—â— illimited power to vnsettle the security of all mens estates and that they are sedâ—â—ible 〈◊〉 may nay have abused this power To this the observator answereth That there is an Arbitâ—â—ry power in every state somewhâ—re t is true t is necessary every man hath absolute power ovâ—r himselfe but because no man can hate himselfe this power is not dâ—ngerous So every State haâ— aâ— arbitrary power over it selfe and there is no danger in it for the same reason if the state 〈◊〉 his to one man or feâ— thâ—râ— may be danger in it but the Parliament is neither onâ— or feâ— it is noe good consequence the Parliament doth abuse power because it may and againâ— The King challenges a greater power then Parliaments Is not this to preferre Democracy if not Anarchy before Monarchy Not onely supremâ— power regulated by Law is safer in many then in one or few but an arbitrary power is likewise in them without danger because as one man cannot hate himselfe so a state cannot hâ—â—â— it selfe But yet a state may hate one another some few may ambitiously seeke to overtoâ—â— the rest the rest may tumultuously rise against the few divisions may bâ—eake thâ—â— into peâ—ces and make them a prey for forreigne invasion and there wants a Sovereigne King to settâ—â— differences to suppresse tumults and invasions and yet no danger because no man can â—ate himselfe But what though arbitrary power in the people or their proxies the Parliment may be thus abused t is no good consequence therefore they do or will abuse it If it be not a good consequence against Parliaments then not against Kings that because they may abuse their power to make themselves absolute therefore they doe it or will doe it Again you tell us the King challenges a greater power then Parliaments you meane the Lords and Câ—â—mons and t is true he challenges a greater power then they have but not â— greater then they challenge or you give them for you say Every state hath an absolute arbitrary power and â—â— Parliament is indeed the state it selfe and so have an absolute arbitrary power a greater theâ— which I am sure neither King nor Tyrant can clayme and the King of England neâ—ther lawfully can nor doth claime so much He claimes a supreame power not absolute buâ— politicall regulated by law not arbitrary nor can he make Parliament ordinances or lawes binding to the kingdome in generall without them upon any pretended necessities but without him they make such The observator haâ—h another Argument to prove Domocracy or the Soveraiâ—ne power in a Committee to be better and more safe then in one The King asketh why not the King predominate rather then the Lords and Commons The observator answers We â—â—â— a maxime and it was groundâ—d upâ—n nature and never till this Parliament with-stood That a Committeâ— can have no private eâ—ds â—o mislâ—ad it no Parliament ever injured a whole kingâ—â—â—â— oâ— exercised any Tyranny nor is there â—â—y possibility how it should True it is a Committee or Corporation Metaphisically abstracted from those of whome it is compounded can have no private end as not being subject to any lust appetite or passion 〈◊〉 yet to death but the particulars compounding that body may have private or at least evill 〈◊〉 What doth the Observator thinke of the Councell of TRENT Could it ayme 〈◊〉 nothing but good cannot a Committee exercise Tyrannâ—e Dâ—d the vasâ—alls unto â—â—â—thage never suffer under that Committee would they not have chosen to groane under the oppressions of a Dionisius rather than under the intollerable exactions and Ordinances â—f that Tyranâ—zing Dame Did not Athens suffer under thirtie Tyrants who at first had the peoples consent to governe Did never any Parliament in Rich. 2d time abuse the â—ingdome Why then did one Parliament condemne another Was there not a Parliament sometimes branded with the name of Parliamentum insanum and hath there not bin â— Parliament termed Parliamentum Doctorum in quo jugulum Ecclesiae atrocius petebatur I speake not this to cast any the least blemish upon that thrice Honourable and never enough commended Counsell but onely to shew that by the fury and practise of some Members the whole body may possibly bee lead into error and injure the Common-wealth Some members may possibly combind themselves for alteration of Government in Church and State and if they can backe their designe which the force of an unruly multitude they may with that force and hypocrisie mixt together prevaile with the major part of the Houses and then having got an Act to bee indissolvable they may goe on with their designe making â—se of such schismaticall and seditious dispositions as the Common-wealth shall then abound with and abusing the rest of the people with imaginary feares and Iealousies from forraigne kingdomes and pretending an alteration of Government to be indeavoured a prelaticall popish malignant partie at home who have so farre seduced their King as that hee will not â—earken to the advise of his great Councell they may then upon pretence of prepelling such dangers make themselves Monsters of the Militia and strength of the Realme That â—one it is possible they may proceed to destroy the Hierarchie of Church and Monarchie in the State and then what will
Conventions will appeare by these ensuing proofes Com. 79. Although the Lords and Commons agree to a thing it is but as an Embrio or issue in the belly and yet unborne It were to bee wished these Embrio's â—id not at present too much trouble this part of the world Lamberts Archeion 271. The necessitie of the assent of all the three Estates in Parliament is such as without any one of them the rest doe but lose their labour 11. H. 7. 27. per Davers Le Roy est assentus ceo fait un Act de Parliament Polidore 185. Nihil ratum habetur nisi quod major pars utriusque concessus senserit idque rex comprobarit Cowell â—nter verbo prorog. The King may quash any Law 8. Rep. 20. b. Cromptons Iurisd. 8. 6. Institut 1 part 90. b. Institut 2. part 158. accord ' Sir Tho. Smyth at Republica Anglicana lib. 2. cap. 3. No Bill is an Act of Parliament Ordiâ—inaâ—ce or Edict of Law untill both the Houses severally have agreed unto it No nor then neither but the last day of that Parliament or Session the Prince commeth in person and declares his pleasure concerning their proceedings whereby the same may have perfect life and accomplishment by princely authority and so have the whole consent of the Realm those that the Prince doth â—â—ow be taken as perfect Lawes and Ordinances of the Realm of England and none other to those which the Prince liketh not he answereth Le Roy advisera and thâ—se be accounted utterly dashed and of none effect Bodin de Republica lib. 1. cap. 8. Albeit that in the Parliaments of England which have commonly been holden every third yeare there the Estates seeme to have every great libertie as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter yet so it is that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications and requests unto the King As in the Parliament of England holden in October 1566. When the Estates by a common consent had resolved as they gave the Queene to understand not to entreat of any thing untill they had first appointed who should succeed her in the Crowâ— shee gave them no other answer but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead All those resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking neither did she in that any thing that they required Now also the Estaies of England are never otherwise assembled no more then they are in this Realm of France or Spaine then by Parliament Writs and expresse commandments proceeding from the King which sheweth very well that the Estates have no power of themselves to determine command or decreâ— any thing seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselves neither being assembled depart without expresse commandment from the King Yet this may seeme one speciall thing that the Lawes made by the King of England at the request of the States cannot be againe repealed but by calling again of the States which is much used and ordinarily done as I understood by Master Dale the English Embassadour an honourable Gentleman and a man of good understanding who yet assured me that the King received or rejected the Law as seemed best unto himselfe and stuck not to dispose thereof at his pleasure and contrary to the will of the Estats I might adde many more but that by understanding men I should be laught at as holding a Candle to the Sun Let the Observator tell me which of all these doth not say fully as much as that which he saith at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subiects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as ever any Nation under Heaven suffered under Let him against all these and such others as I might adde alledge but one single opinion from the beginning of the world till 1640. that in publike Cases the Lords and Commons have any vertue and power without nay maugre the King to oblige the subiect in generall by any Law or Ordinance they shall make and I promise him upon that to turn Reformado Meane while I must think not the King but the Observator with one blow confounds all Parliaments for it doth not only cut off the head with which the vertue life and soule of that body expires but by the same reason it cuts off likewise the Lords from being any necessary part of the Parliament For if the Commons shall adiudge that the Militia for repelling danger ought to be put into such a way as dislikes the King and maior part of the Lords that 's in truth now the Case yet ought the House of Commons being virtually the whole kingdom to be obeyed by the people against the will and command of King and Lords and against the desire of the minor part perhaps by two Votes in the House of Commons If the maior part of the Lords shall be bâ—uited to bee Popishly affected or Malignant and thereupon their names shall be required that so the Rabble-rout may take a course with them by meanes whereof they are necessitated to absent themselves and by like seditious courses a considerable part if not the maior of the Commons shall be driven from Parliament if after this by the cunning practise of some few the Major part of Lords and Commons that shall be remaining shall adjudge such Assemblies not to have bin riotus and seditious and that therefore themselves have power as a free Parliament to provide for the safety of the Realme and shall therupon by or dinante require a Levy of Subsidies to be presently made throughout the Kingdome you will say the Subjects are bound in such case to lay along their necks and pay and is not this to subject us to as unbounded a regiment of meere will as any Nation under heaven ever suffered under This is more then ever the King pretended to he never claimed a power â—o make Lawes and lay taxes without the consent of Parliament he onely layes claime to a negative voice that they without him may not make any Lawes or charge his Subjects but that all be done by the joynt consent of him and his people and otherwise their proceedings without him to be vertulesse and of no force Against which so well knowne right let us see what worthy argument the Observator brings forth By the same reason saith he that Parliaments are thus vertulesse and void Courts upon the Kings desertion of them other Courts must needs be the like and then what remaines but that all our Laws rights and liberties be either no where at all determinable or else onely in the Kings brest He is very wary not to fall under the Kings determinations though as appeares before the â—nd why a King was set over Nations was to judge them and Bracton tels us That the King by his oath is obliged if he were able in person to judge his people And t is a known principle in the Lawes of England Rex presumitur habere
omnia jura in scrinio pecttoâ—s sui And yet as the government of this Kingdome is now setled the King cannot make void or vertulesse the setled Courts of Justice and thereby draw all things to a determination within his owne breast And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge to determine yet he hath a rule to follow and that 's the Law not his will which Law in respect of the King hath somewhat more then a directive force restrayning him and disabling him to goe against it so that he can doe no wrong The Lawes are made by the Kings power with the peoples or Parliaments assent which is a superiour power or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent to the Regall power alone and withâ—â—â—â— their assent And therefore the Regall power out of Parliament cannot change nor alâ—â—â— the Lawes and Ordinances made in Parliament but is bound by them as being made by a superiour power whence it is that Bracton every where affirmes the Law to be above the King solely And by this superiour power that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction assertained and therefere may not be altered by the Regall power alone and by the same reason the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament but is the Constitution of all Courts alike the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the Kings speciall Concurrence is not neeessary Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone are compleat and binding their assembling and departing is setled and doth not depend on the speciall pleasure of the Prince But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution the Kings speciall concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part Rex est capâ—t principium et finis Parliamenti Their assembling expects his speciall call their continuance depends on his will the Judgemements Arts and Ordinances made in Parliiament and concerning the Kingdome in generall are the Kings onely and without him frustrate and null Consider this good observator and then tel me if you did not endeavor grosly to abuse your reader by telling us that by the same reason the Parliament is not a Court compleâ— without the King the Common-pleas and all other Courts are not I confesse I have wondred to see it of late so often aâ—â—iâ—med That as the King cannot nor ought to declare by prâ—claimation or otherwise his disalowance of the acts judgments of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes Ordinances of the Lords Commons in Parliament being the highest Court Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia by vertue of an Ordinance by them made might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance and forewarne his Subjects not to be abused by it if the Observator can prove that the Lawes and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons are without and against the Kings pleasure of any more validitie that they are in themselves Lawes and Ordinances and not onely so called then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation or otherwise ought not to declare against them meane while let every man judge how well the observatour hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons mauger their King to make Lawes and Ordinances that shall bind the people in generall By which Ordinances the Militia the taking of Hull the Navy the Magazine the intercepting all mony and other provision that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appeare dutifull towards his Majesties commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust The Observator finding it more then difficult in a plain field to maintaine his cause endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity in this extremity the King neglecting the helme nay purposely stearing towards rocks and shelves It is the duty of his Parliament in this case to oppose and preserve him and his Kingdome from utter wrecke and ruine He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases without the King they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance but in danger that is when they please In the miast of our calamities we are sensible of none thankes be to God but what their Ordinances have occasioned the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power and make Ordinances to secure sâ—me Forts and settle the Militia or else two Kingdomes probably will be lost they doe accordingly the King proclaimes to the contrary in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 vertually the whole Kingdome if it be not the supreame Judicatory as well in maâ—â—â—â—â— of State as Law if their grounds of jealousie be vaine To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies if we thinke them to be but pretended by the cunning and practise of some few for accomplishing their designes and plots invented by some of their owne partie to be againe by them discovered yet must King and people submit to their judgement Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger to whom King and people are bound to submit If they are is it lesse then a mockery to bid us consider when as after consideration will we nill we we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare But yet at your bidding I le consider in this contrariety whether the Parliament pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled may not make use of their legislaiâ—e power yes if they have any such but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power without him and against him had they beene partners in that power some colour you might have had to have called it theirs but it seemes the power is solely the Kings they are onely to give an assent to the use of it Then you will I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory I thinke not the Parliamentiâ— supreame and above them both in matters of State and Law but againe I must consisider you say if the Lords and Cammons be not vertually the whole Kingdome why doe you put in the Lords whom at other times you can be content to spare The Lords Vote in respect of their Barronies derived from the Crowne the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent at least nine parts of the Kingdome neither doe nor may Vote in their election the Clergie in respect of their spirituall livingt may not nor the most substantiall Coppy-holders Farmours nor Lessees for yeers not inheritrixes Jointresses nor reversioners Heirs apparrent and men that live upon Interest are excluded and all that have not 40. s. per annum free hold Land which I imagine cannot be above a tenth part of the Kingdome Tell me good Sir you that
when not and if the people have power to Iudge of danger and defend themselves without and against their King then may they intrust that power unto some others for that all should assemble â—â— next to impossible and could not be without confusion a few thâ—refore may bee intrusted to judge for all and to direct the manner of their defence well It is admitted they may intrust this power with some few but that they have intrusted it with the Lords and Commons I must deny There is no colour to say it is intrusted with the Lords they judge only for themselves and if the King intended to alter the Government or Religion it is likelie he would create such as should assist his intentions and therefore it will be of little purpose to give the kingdome a power to judge of dangers and save it selfe unlesse they may doe it by the major part of their proxies alone both against King and Lords You put in the Lords only to glosse your actions for the present but by your principles the power must bee in the Commons onely if anywhere Now cleerely there is no such trust imparted to the Commons their trust is limited by the writ to advise with the King not to make Acts and Ordinances in any case against him Nor can I possibly see why the Coroners elected by the body of each Countie according to the Kings writ might not as reasonably claime this trust as the major part of the Commons alone unlesse we must therefore thinke it to bee the Commons right because they now pretend unto it The Observator tells us We may not imagine the Houses should be injurious no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole kingdome or exercise any Tyranny I 'le charge tirannie on none only I say if the now major part of Lords and Commons against the Kings pleasure and authenticke Proclamations have power to command the subiects in generall and to imprison kill and slay such as withstand their commands and obey his Maiesties Proclamations I would gladly bee instructed how this power is derived unto them either from King or people or whether we must think they above all other men were naturally borne unto it Meane while I like well the Observators note in honour of free Parliaments that never any such iniured a kingdome But yet such as have called themselves free Parliaments have injured King and kingdome this have the Lords and Commons done when they have left the head free in His Royall assent or disassent to such Bills as they had a minde to passe of which take one Example 15. E. 3. The Lords and Commons pressed the King to passe a Law derogatorie to his just prerogative that Parliament being ended and the kingdome representing it selfe againe the same yeare it was enacted Whereas in the last Parliament certaine Articles expressely contrary to the Lawes of England and the Prerogatives and Royall rights were pretended to be granted by manner of a Statute the King considering how that by the bond of his Oath he was bound to the defence of such Lawes and Prerogatives because the King never freely consented to the said pretended Statute It seemed good to the Earles Barons and other wise men that sithence the said statute did not of the Kings free-will proceed the same should be voyd It seemes at this time the King was not bound to passe whatsoever the Lords and Commons Voted to be for the good of the kingdome And his oath did tye him to seeke a restitution of his prerogative against such forced lawes so farre was it from tying him to passe all such lawes as the Houses should judge fit Questionlesse the King is bound by oath and office to passe all good and just lawes yet that part of the oath that hath beene urged doth not prove so much But the question is whether hee bee not free to judge what is a good and just Law and what not But must submit his understanding judgment and Conscience to the votes of Lords and Commons so that the sixe Articles for poperie passe them he is bound to passe it Queene Elizabeth was bounâ— to passe an Act abolishing popery because the Lords and Commons had Voted a Bill againâ—â— Protestancie Queene Mary was bound to passe that likewise So againe the King wishes all good subjects to put the case to themselves If the Papistâ— in Ireland should make themselves the major part of both Houses and pretending their Religion to bee in danger of extirpation by a Malignant party of Protestants and puritans should passe a Bill for setling the Militia in such as they should confide in is not the King bound to assent unto it Not in that case saith the Observator For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them and England as betwixt England and Wales though they meete not in one Parliament yet to sâ—â—â— purposes their Parliaments are not to be held severall Parliaments and therefore if Papistâ— were stronger and more in Parliament there yet would they want authority to over rule any thing voted and established before in England and they being the minor part of Ireland 〈◊〉 ENGLAND both ought to sit downe for that the major part will probability prevaile against them and in all suffrages the minor part that bloud may not bee shedâ— ought to 〈◊〉 downe Alack alack how doth the good man bestirre himselfe to bedge up a seeming answer unto this objection He supposeth England and Ireland to be one and the same dominion which is certainely false Statutes that are limitted to the Realme and Dominion of England do not extend to Ireland That there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales is conâ—radicted by himselfe acknowledging England and Ireland to be governed by severall Parliaments severall to most if not to all purposes T is true Ireland is united to the Imperiall Crowne of England and so is Scotland yet all three are distinct kingdomes He saith they want authoritie there to over rule any thing established before in England But Ireland will say the English Parliament wants authority to establish a Religion in Ireland Or admit the Irish Parliament hath not authoritie to over rule any thing established before in England yet the point that the King instanteth in that is the Militia of Ireland is not established by Parliamâ—nt in England why ought not the King then to assâ—nt to the disposall of it according as the Irish parliament shall desire or if he will not assent why may not the Irish of themselves dispose of it as now the English doe If we shall admit them to be one Dominion why then if the papists in Ireland the popish partie in England and their adherents the Episcopall party and the misnamed Malignant partie shall joyne in one desire against