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A14095 A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse Twisse, William, 1578?-1646. 1631 (1631) STC 24402; ESTC S118777 563,516 728

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judge there is no chang or alteration at all in God but only in men and in theire actions Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration your selfe proposed in the former chapter but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence that is the fruitfull Mother of all things and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation And yet that which you say here I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power But you have not discovered unto us if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children especially consideringe that will is found in the Father as well as in the Mother yea and love also if not in greater measure But I deny not but that God made the world out of love but out of love to whome to the creature Nothing lesse I should thinke as before I have shewed but rather out of love to himselfe as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe And greate reason God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things should be the supreame end of all things But let this passe Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous but very preposterous and unsound First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it and then a qualification or limitation thereof by way of exception unto a certayne time The proposition is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory but our temporall being also and the preservation therof For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any For they are merely gratuita dona and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne in bestowing it on whome he will and denyinge it to whome he will And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will and whome he will he hardneth But more then this as God was not bound to create any so neyther can any thing save his owne will binde him to preserve any thing in being But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men even take theire temporall being from them without any purpose ever to restore it and not only the being of theire bodyes but of theire soules also turning both into nothing Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent never so holy as Arminius confesseth But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this Now these are two the one because God hath created our natures Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this that God hath created other things as well as man Yet who will conclude herehence that God must needes preserve them and not exclude them from this fruite of his love Your other reason is because God cannot change and this is as weake as the former For like as God though at one time he gives us life another time takes life from us yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe like as in course of nature though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether in the heavens in the earth in the Sea in the states and Kingdoms of the World and in the bodyes of all creatures yet without any change at all in himselfe yea though he set an end to this visible World this can inferre no variablenesse in God so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells and so exclude them from all fruits of his love Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God Yet you have a third reason which is this Love is the nature of God as Creator You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good and what other sense you imply when you say Love is Gods nature as a Creator I discerne not You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love it is very incongruous to say that this love of God wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition and that is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill come to that hight as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour First touching your meaning in this then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning your meaning in briefe is this No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity Of this your opinion I have spoken often I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it And that is
Divine essence as it is without beginning so it is without end and nothing past with him nor nothing to come to him as it is with all creatures which are subject to motion in some kind or other if not of corruption yet of perfection at least capable of it if no such thing were yet as they come from nothing so they might returne to nothing But that God as he gave them theyr being so he continueth it As for God he receaveth not his being from anything no not from himselfe But is most necessary to exist and most necessary to continue without loosing of ought that is in himselfe no not so much as a thought nor receaving any thing into himselfe no not so much as a new thought or a new affection All which and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angells though not so much as unto us who allso have materiall motions as locall and alteration that tending to corruption In a word as mans existence is as it were an accident to his essence because the nature of a man is only of it selfe passively possible to exist and God can give existence to such a nature or make the humane nature to exist as he hath done so likewise to Angelicall natures existence is but an accident And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them so is continuance an accident to such existences In which respect every day and houre both man and Angell may be sayd to receave a new accident which before they had not But it is quite otherwise with God For as his existence is all one with his essence because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist so his continuance is no accident to his existence because it is necessary that God should be so be as to be without beginning and without end And therfore though our continuance be new to us as being an accident unto us and wrought by motions yet Gods continuance is no accident unto him For it is impossible he should not continue who is of necessary being But of this and of the indivisible nature of Gods continuance more hereafter I willingly confesse that because Angells were made of nothing therefore theyr continuance is meerly at the pleasure of God and have parts divisible in regard that God can set an end to them whensoever it pleaseth him But I know no cause to denie that they enjoy an entire self-fruition For though they have not all theyr continuance at once yet seing theyr continuance is no part of their essence which is a thing indivisible I see no reason why they should be denied entirely to enjoy themselfes Man growes to perfection in parts integrall though not in parts essentiall which perfection of parts integrall as it daily groweth so it makes him daily more fitt to performe the offices of nature and duties of his calling and so may be sayd not to enjoy himselfe intirely according to that perfection which belongeth unto him but by degrees But it is not so with Angells yet may they acquire something unto themselfes accidentally which before they had not God can acquire nothing His duration 't is true is indivisible For there is no prius nor posterius therein For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion I doe not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God as when you say he cannot gayne ought to day which yesterday he had not or loose to daye what yesterday he had For this in my judgement is incident to glorified creatures For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angells be at full without gayning any new or loosing any old Yet no doubt theyr duration notwithstanding shal be divisible God is not Perhaps you will say they loose the former dayes existence and gayne the following dayes existence And so we doe much more properly in this world but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence For to loose the former dayes existence and gayne the following dayes existence is but to loose our coexistence with the former day and gayne a coexistence with the day following Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration which I prove thus It is incident to God yet is he still the same in duration And that 't is incident to God I prove thus God himselfe was yesterday coexistent to yesterday and now he is not for if he were then yesterday should now exist which is not only untrue but impossible to be true for then time past should be present And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same●nes in duration is manifest for to coexist with some thing yesterday and not to day may arise from no variablenes from within but only from variablenes in something from without As namely therefore God doth not coexist to day with many things to day with which he did coexist yesterday is not because of any change in God but by reason of change in these outward things which had a being yesterday but to day have not In that which followes you manifestly betray your cause For that God hath such fulnes of joy and sweetnes of life that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetnes doth no way inferre that therefore the duration hereof cannot be added unto him and the continuance thereof Your comparison utterly overthrowes you For as in a bodie infinite though there cannot be a middle nor extreame yet there are parts without parts by waye of extension So in infinite life though it hath no extremes as being without beginning and without end yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before and parts comming after by way of succession And whereas you say that Natures capable of these differences have alwayes the one accomplished by the other is either without sense as if you meane it of the parts of time as if one were accomplished by the other For how I pray you is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past Or if in respect of natures subject to time which are perfected by time or rather in the course of time thus as it is sometimes true so sometimes it is notoriously false For as there is a time of growth in perfection so it is wel knowne that there is a time of diminution corruption also And I pray you how doth a mans dotage accomplish him either in soule or bodie And in the Kingdome of Heaven what accomplishment by time when our glorious condition shal be as full and perfect at the first as in the progresse for what space imaginable soever As for this state 't is well knowne that as there is a time of repayring and encreasing so there is a time of impayring and decaying And though perfection cannot be perfected yet it may be continued so it is
did this opinion growe common there Did that Kingdome consist of more Protestants then Papists Or amongst the Protestants was the number of Calvinists more then of Lutherans Speake playnly say the choosing of a Calvinist to be their King was the ruine of the State of the Provinces which were as members incorporate therinto say Calvinisme was the ruine of the upper the lower Palatinate And herupon let your Almanacke of Prognostications proceede be bolde to tell the States of the Lowe Countreys that this Tenet is a forerunner of their ruine allso unles they we foorthwith turne Arminians we are like to be lost fall into the handes of Papists But of what Papists Not such as Thomists the Dominicans the most learned Divines in the Church of Rome for they maynteyne that God determineth the will of Men Angells to every act of theirs whether good or evill as touching the substance of the act by influence generall over above allso unto every good gracious act such as faithe is repentance by influence speciall And as he dothe thus determine the wills of all his creatures so from everlasting he did decree thus to determine them Belike the Iesuites are they into whose handes we are like to fall unles with speede we turne Iesuits that so herafter we may comfort our selves as Themistocles did with Periissemus nisi periissemus we had bene undone if we had not bene undone that vtterly both body and soule Happy are the Lutheran Arminian party that they are acquainted with no such forerunner of their ruine They are like to holde their owne while they acknowledge a sweete disposition of the Allseeing and unerringe providence leave out All deorecing providence out of their Creede But let the Dominicans looke to it least their ruine be not at hand allso as well as ours For there is to be found such an oracle in some Mens writings that whosoever shall embrace the doctrine of Gods Alldecreeing providence let them knowe this opinion is the forerunner of ruine ito most floorishing States Kingdomes where it growes common or comes to full light And the experience of the course of these times especially in the ruine of the Palsgrave of so many Christian Provinces with him For certeinly 〈◊〉 no time or part of the world besides was any such experience to be founde so conveniently to serve your turne Is it not great pitie but that the Kinges majestie his Counsell both houses of Parliament should be acquainted with this mystery of State for why shoulde I doubt but that God will heare the affectionate prayers of his people in good time establishe a perfect vnion betweene the King his people In the meane time we will wayt upon the Lord who hath hid his face from the house of Iacob we will looke for him Yea we will give him no rest untill he restore Ierusalem the prayse of the world This I confesse is a way to supplant your Adversary opinions but of any power you have to confute them and therby to praevent the growthe of them I have founde litle evidence in other of your writings by the generall survey I have allready taken I have small hope to finde any great satisfaction in this But let us examine this point a little more narrowly You suppose that some in opposition to Arminius doe maynteyne that all thinges were so decreed by God before the Creation of the world that nothing since the Creation coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done and nothing can be amended that is emisse But I knowe none of any such opinion nay rather they whome I concenve you doe most ayme at doe directly teache the contrary We are willinge to professe with Austin that Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit velsinendo ut siat vel ipse faciendo Nor ought commeth to passe but that which the Allmighty will have to come to passe eyther by suffering it to come to passe or himselfe working it And with the Articles of Ireland confirmed by our State in the dayes of King Iames that God from all aeternitie did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to pusic Now whatsoever God willethe he willed eternally For in God there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change And supposing the will of God that such a thing shall come to passe eyther by his operation or by his permission it is impossible in sensu composit● in a compound sense that it shoulde not come to passe But this impossibility is not absolute but only secundum quid in respect of somewhat to witt of Gods will decreeing it is allwayes joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise in sensu diviso in a divided sense As for example it was absolutely possible that Christs bones shoulde be broken as well as any of the theeves bones that were ●rucified with him For bothe his bones were breakable the souldiours had power freewill to breake them as well as the others bones but supposinge the decree of God that Christs bones shoulde not be broken vpon this supposition I say it was impossible they shoulde be broken Nay further we say that unles thinges impossible to come to passe otherwise then God hathe decreed them upon supposition of Gods decree be notwithstanding absolutely possible to come to passe otherwise it were not possible for God to decree that some thinges shall come to passe contingently For to come to passe contingently is to come to passe in such sort as joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise Thus we say with Aquinas that the efficacious nature of Gods decree is the cause why contingent things come to passe contingently necessary thinges necessarily his wordes are these Cum voluntas divina sit efficacissima non solum sequitur quod si antea quae Deus vult fieri sed quod eo modo fiant quo Deus ea fieri vult Vult autem quaedam Deus sieri necessario quaedam contingenter ut fit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi Seing the will of God is most effectuall it followeth not only that those thinges come to passe which God will have come to passe but allso that they come to passe after the same manner that God will have them come to passe Now God will have somethinges come to passe necessarily somethinges contingently that there may be an order amongst thinges to the complete perfection of the Universe And accordingly God hath ordeyned all sorts of second causes bothe contingent causes to worke contingently as the willes of men Angells necessary causes to worke necessarily as fire in burninge the Sunne in giving light heavy things in mooving downewards light thinges in moovinge upwardes And as he hath ordeyned them to be such kindes of Agents thus distinct so he hathe ordeyned