the enterprise Obsidionem Hierusalem distulit ratus ejusmodi civilibus discordiis facilius Judaeos consumptos deleri quam armis Romanorum and after a while assaulting the City he destroyed it I observe moreover in that Chapter of Jonas that the sunne came not first upon the Prophets head but the worm that dried up the gourd so also we must dry up our adversaries with discords and then set upon them with our Armies This Coriolanus meant when he appointed his souldiers to spoile the fields of the Plebeians but to leave the fields of the Senatours untouched which he did not do for any hatred to the people but out of a further reach by this means to foment their discords The importance of this the ancient Romans knew well who after the first warre in Sicily seeing the Carthagenians I may say their naturall enemies in a great streight through the revolt of the Cities of Africke and the rebellion of their own Army yet never for this made warre upon them which would rather have brought concord to their enemies then victory to themselves but letting them tire and weary themselves with their own discords they then set upon them so wearied and without shedding of blood made themselves Lords of all Sardinia with encrease of Tribute But in case they would not stay so long till the enemy might trie out himselfe they should then do wel to bring with them in their Army some person of the blood and that hath pretension in the state but yet so as to do it without forcing When Charles the eighth had intention to make warre upon Bajaset the great Turke because he knew how vain a thing it were to beleeve that a Kingdome in Religion in customes and in language different should receive him he therefore tooke with him the brother of Bajaset and the like did Situlces King of the Thracians and Osman Basha by the commandement of Amurath going to destroy the King of the Tartars took with him Islan brother of that King and it succeeded well whereupon as Argentone relates Lewis the eleventh stood in feare of the league only because they brought his brother along with them But if the discords be inveterate and the Citizens through them grown weak it is then alwaies time to assaile them and there can be no doubt of victory Thus Greece was easily overcome by any stranger that tooke this opportunity And thus much concerning discords of Citizens between themselves or of Cities that are under one Lord in which it is sufficiently shewed how a stranger ought to carry himselfe Now we will shew what course he ought to take with other Provinces or Cities that are in discord between themselves These Cities then are either of equall force or of unequall if of equall then ought he to foment both sides and thereby they comming at last to be unequall he shall then take part with the weaker side but yet so as not to weaken himselfe as Croesus in Justin teacheth us who ayding the Babylonians against Cyrus he so much weakned his own Army that after the taking of Babylon he also himselfe was easily overcome And therefore he saith Ibi fortuna prioris praelii that is of Babylon percussum jam Croesi exercitum nullo negotio fudit The matter therefore must be so carried that if the contrary side happen to be Conquerour yet you may be able to maintaine the warre your selfe if conquered it will then be easie for you to make your selfe Lord both of the one and the other For it is not fit when a man may have need of his money and his Forces in defence of himselfe that he should rashly wast them in the service of another Such was the counsell as Thucidides relates that Nicias gave the Athenians while he disswaded them from the warre in Sicily there being no discretion to uncloath 〈◊〉 selfe to cloath another Which is so true that it is written by the Holy Ghost in Ezechiel while speaking of the foure beasts he saith Sub 〈◊〉 autem pennae eorum rectae alterius ad alterum and this as S. Gregory interprets it intends to expresse the ayd that is due from a man to his neighbour It follows after 〈◊〉 duabus alis velabat corpus suum to shew that for ayding of others it is not fit to dismantle our selves To return to our purpose in that we spake of before that is what way is to be held in ayding the weaker side a better example cannot be given then that of Phillip King of Macedon who seeing the Cities of Greece at variance between themselves he fomented the weaker side and after he had wearied the one and the other he brought them both under his Dominion Philippus Rex Macedonum saith Justin libertati omnium insidiatus dum contentiones civitatum alit auxilium inferioribus ferendo victos pariter victoresque subiâ—… Regiam servitutem coegit According to this advice Ferdinand King of Spaine fomented so well the discord between Francis King of France and him of Aragon that weakning the one and oppressing the other he made himselfe Lord of the Kingdom of Naples without wasting of either souldiers or money a Kingdom gotten before by the King of France with so much blood This also many Writers attribute to the Venetians vvho calling Lewis the tvvelfth into Italy hoped by this means to make themselves Lords of many Cities in Lombardy and Romagna with this conceit Lewis il Moro called in Charles the eighth King of France but this man endangered himselfe unhappily and the other were not far from absolute ruine Upon occasion whereof I cannot omit to shew their errour who make doubt that a third man should enjoy the benefit of their victory and what remedy there is for it Secondly how it happened that Ludovico Sforza by raising discord between the King of France and them of Aragon lost his state when Philip by raising discord between the Graecians and also Ferdinand King of Spaine got so much by it Concerning the first there can no better counsell be given to two who striving together have a third looking on to set upon the winner then to perswade them to peace or else juridically to heare their differences but because this seldome or never hath place amongst Princes and warre oftentimes for many occasions either cannot or will not be avoyded therefore I cannot better deliver my opinion then by shewing the example of Metius who being upon the point of striking battell with Tullus Hostilius and knowing that which side soever was victor must needs not having to fight with sheep exceedingly weaken it selfe with losse of souldiers whereby the Thuscans who were equall in Forces to the one and the other and by this losse of men should remain the stronger might take occasion to draw the victory of the conquering side to themselves he invited Tullus Hostilius to a parlee and with these reasons perswaded him to put the fortune of the victory upon a few that not
without this course they were never able to live in peace So the Romans as long as the race of the Tarquins continued were never without warre And this is one of the causes I alledged why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar had not so good successe as the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus against the Tarquins because in this they destroyed not onely the line of the Tarquins but all those that were of the name where in that of Caesar they onely cut downe the tree but left the roote behind from which sprung up Augustus who receiving nourishment and ayd from those very men that had killed his unkle in a short time he grew to be so great a Tree that he crushed them to pieces that went about to cut him downe For this very cause in Aegypt in Cappadocia in Soria in Macedonia and in Bythinia they often changed their Kings because they tooke no care to extinguish the line of the former Lords but onely to get their places And therefore Bardanus in Tacitus is justly blamed who instead of extinguishing Gotarze the former Lord stood loosing his time in besieging the City But these and a thousand other examples which for brevity I omit it may be held for a maxime of State that whosoever gets a Kingdome from another he ought to root out the whole line of him that was Lord before But this rule cannot be thus left without some aspersion of impiety and therefore for resolution I think best to distinguish because if we speake of a Christian Prince that hath gotten the state of another who is enemy of the faith he may justly doâ—… as best pleaseth him by any way whatsoever to take them away that can pretend to the State yet not so neither unlesse he find them so obstinate in their â—…ect that there is no possible meanes to remove them from their errour and so much our Lord God himselfe by the mouth of the Prophet Samuel appointed Saul to do to Amalech 〈◊〉 ergo vade percute Amalech demolire Vniversa ejus non parcas ei non concupiscas ex rebus 〈◊〉 aliquid sed interfice a viro usque ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 atque Lactantem But if we speake of a Christian Prince that by force gets possession of a State from one of the same faith let him never goe about to destroy the line of him that possessed it before for besides that it is a thing unworthy of a Christian it seemes to me to be rather their invention who meaning to live wickedly would be glad to have no bridle for if a Prince shall carry himselfe lovingly towards his Subjects using them as children and not as servants he need not be afraid of any whomsoever For this cause the Senatours of Rome having driven out the Tarquins had more 〈◊〉 to governe the City as fathers then to extinguish the line of him that had been Lord which was indeed incomparably more for their good as in the second booke of the first Decad of Livy every one may see Rather many times it is better to bestow honours upon them from whom a state is taken and to leave them a part thereby to reteine the rest more securely So did Cyrus who having taken Lydia and dispossessed Craesus who was Lord of it before he left him at least a part of his patrimony and gave him a City to be his owne And indeed if he had done otherwise he might easily have lost all therefore Justin saith Craeso vita patrimonii partes urbs Barce concessa sunt in qua 〈◊〉 non Regiam vitam tamen proximam Majestati Regiae degeret And then shewes the benefit that comes by it where he saith Haec Clementia non minus Victori quam victo utilis fuit quippe ex Vniversa Gracia cognito quod illatum Craeso bellum esset auxilia veliâ—…t ad 〈◊〉 extinguendum incendium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Craesi 〈◊〉 apud omnes urbes erat ut passurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belluÌ„ Gracia fuerit si quid crudelius in Craesum consuluisset If the King of France had done thus when Ferdinand of Aragon would have yeelded up the Kingdome of Naples to him if he would have left him but Lord of Calabria perhaps he had not lost both the one and the other and in truth it had been his best way to have done so at least for so long time till he might have made himselfe sure and firme in the Kingdome of Naples and then for the other he might have taken it from him againe at any time So did David who tooke away halfe of the substance which Saul had given to Mephibosheth and gave it to his servant Siba for a doubt he had lest he should desire his fathers Kingdome This interpretation Procopius made of it when he said Vt substantiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ipsius dejiceret ne Regnum affectaret alias enim illum qui adversus Dominum suum mendacium dixerat quem punire potius debebat nequaquam participem cumeo fecisset Alexander the Great when he waged warre with Kings farre off from Macedonia he not onely when he had overcome them never sought to extinguish their line but which is more strange to them from whom he had taken a Kingdome he restored the same Kingdome againe A great act of Magnanimity and which may and ought to be used in the like case to that of Alexander Magnus that is when Countries farre remote from the Seate of the Kingdom and in customes Iawes habit and language very different are easily overcome and so much the rather when the warre is waged more for desire of glory then for getting of ground seeing it is alwaies better to seeke to hold that by a way of clemency which by a way of force can never be held But in case it be feared least leaving the former Prince in the Countries taken from him he should practise to make a revolution he may then have states given him to governe in other places So Cirus did who having overcome the Medes and deprived Astyages of his Kingdome he would not leave him in Media and yet would not deale hardly with him neither but he made him Governour of Hyrcania and although Justin say it was done because Astyages himselfe had no mind to returne to the Medes yet to my understanding it is more likely that Cyrus did it as fearing least he who had procured his nephews death to bring himselfe to the Kingdome being now deprived of it would never be quiet when any fit occasion should be offerd to him Another way there is which others have used and it is to keepe such about themselves and to hold them in esteeme of Kings so Herod the great had begun to doe with Aristobulus and with Hyrcanes but the cruelty of his nature made him fall at last to take the same course that others doe This counsell therefore was much better followed by David who leaving Sauls patrimony to Mephibosheth the sonne of Jonathan
manifest examples of many writers that lost their owne lives without any benefit to those of whom they writ by being themselves slaine and their bookes burnt while under wicked Princes they would publish their Histories of such persons and therefore he saith 〈◊〉 cum Aruleno Rustico Paetus Thrasea Herennio Senecioni 〈◊〉 Helvidius laudati 〈◊〉 Capitale fuisse no que in ipsos 〈◊〉 Authores sed in libros quoque saevitum But greater danger an Historian in curres if under a wicked Prince he dare write his history because either 〈◊〉 his vices he shewes himselfe a manifest slatterer and no wise Historian who without truth as Polybius saith is as unprofitable as a man without eyes or else writing the truth he shal in so doing make his owne grave But say he writes under a good Prince either he must relate the actions of the Prince himselfe or of his house if of himselfe living the Historian can never avoyd suspition and it is not enough to say that under such praise-worthy Princes there will be no need to part from truth because there are few men that doe not conceive their owne actions to be greater then they are or at least that desire not others should thinke them so whereupon when they find that an Historian relates them not in such a height as they conceive or desire that others should no doubt they will thinke he blames them as not sufficiently praising them Now if under a vertuous Prince they write the History of his family there growes another difficulty of great moment which is that a great part of the Cities and Provinces having beene sometime Commonwealths from Commonwealths become Kingdomes seldome without shedding the blood of the Citizens and oftentimes of the Princes the relating these things under a Prince now Lord of the City whether he be good or bad is dangerous first on the part of the Citizens who reading the death of their ancestours or their greatnesse in the time when it was a Commonwealth by the one they are stirred up to hate by the other to desire and taking into their consideration that greatnesse in which they were and those injuries which they suffered because they cannot revenge these nor regaine those but by the death of the Prince they are oftentimes drawne to make cruell conspiracies Secondly on the part of the Prince who in reading such Histories seeing continually before his eyes those Citizens whose fathers either killed or at least conspired against his ancestours seeing he cannot beleeve they should love him he will hardly be induced to love them knowing wel that things which are tolerated by force when occasion happens to remove that force will never be tolerated To this may be added another difficulty on the part of the Citizens who love not to heare the disgraces of their ancestours related in Histories and are thereby moved to indignation this Tacitus meant where he saith At multorum qui Tiberio regnante poenam vel infamiam subiere Posteri manent And oftentimes Tacitus himselfe forbeares to speake of such as he did of those who suffered disgraces under Nero of whom he saith Quos fato perfunctos ne nominatim tradam Majoribus eorum tribuendum puto Againe to relate the warres which these Princes or their Ancestours had with others how dangerous it is Crescentius Cordus may be an example who for praising Brutus and Cassius was forced miserably to end his life as the said Tacitus relates It is true this useth not to happen but under wicked Princes as Tiberius was For Augustus as the said Tacitus relates made rather a jest then tooke indignation at any such things and thus much concerning a Prince Now in writing Histories under a Commonwealth there appeare againe a thousand difficulties First if he make relation of their beginnings he shall make himselfe odious to all in generall and to every one in particular To all in generall because all things having but weake beginnings men like rather to heare the History of the Common-wealth in its virility then in the weaknesse of its infancy To particulars because hearing relation made of the beginnings of their Houses which commonly are but meane they cannot read such Histories with any patience at least not with liking and therefore in some Cities such writings have not been admitted This conceit Titus Livinâ—… expresseth to the life where he saith Et legentium plerosque speaking of himselfe who writ the beginning of Rome haud dubito quin primae Origines proximaque Originibus minus praebitura voluptatis sint festinantibus ad haec nova quibus jampridem praevalentis populi vires seipsas conficiunt Moreover if they write of warres not onely they incurre the same danger we spake of before under a Prince in too much praising those with whom the warre hath been held but besides in this kind it is easier to offend in a Commonwealth which consists of many then in a Kingdome which consisteth but of one Whereupon it seemes to be more easie to write the truth of one alone then of many but withall more dangerous because the hatred of private Citizens may be shunned but the hatred which comes from the publik person of the Prince and reacheth to life and goods are impossible to be shunned It is therefore dangerous to write under a Prince whether he be good or bad and whether the History be of the Princes own actions or of his ancestours and whether in forraine warre or in warre at home And it is dangerous likewise to write under Common-wealths not onely to write of their beginnings but in other times also It remaines to shew whether it be more easie to find Historians under a Kingdome or under a Common-wealth The Prince may be a tyrant and living the Common-wealth may be corrupt and continue and while it continues hardly will any Citizen out of love of his Countrey be drawne to disclose those things which ought to be kept secret and as little whilst a Tyrant lives will any man register his disorders for feare Whereupon not without cause the most wise Salomon in his Proverbs saith Nomen impiorum putrescet not Putrescit because in the time present his stinch is not smelt or to say better none will be so bold as to discover it and if in the one or the other an Historian be found so hardy as to write he will certainly flatter And therefore Tacitus saith Tiberii Caiique ac Neronis res florentibus ipsis ob metum falsae Also Historians take no care of those that come after but consider onely their owne interest and knowing how much trouble they endure that in such times can but live when they hold their peace they are out of heart for writing of Histories and though they should have a will to doe it yet they could have no meanes as not being informed of publike affaires which being done onely by the Prince and out of his Element he neither understands them nor meddles in them
whom it was imputed as a great fault that he would rather call to his ayd Philip King of Macedon then put his Cities into the hands of Cleomenes a Spartan Quod si omnino saith Plutarch Cleomenes injustus fuerit atque Tyrannicus tamen Heraclidarum genere patria 〈◊〉 suisse quidem iis qui rationem aliquam Graeciae Nobilitatis 〈◊〉 Spartanorum obscurissimum potius quam primum inter Macedonas Ducem deligendum fuisse Whereupon our Lord God meaning to give the man Regall power over the woman to the end it might be tolerated with more contentment made her of a ribbe of Adam And to conclude in Deuteronomy he commanded his people they should not choose a stranger to be their King But because this my opinion is full of difficulty seeing oftentimes a City desires to be governed rather by a stranger then by one of their owne Citizens it will be necessary to use distinction either it is the first time a Kingdome is erected or else they have been used to Regall power before if it be the first time they will then rather choose to serve a stranger then one of their own Citizens First because knowing the Citizens beginning they are apt to scorne him So it fell out with the Israelites the first time they had a King for being most desirous to see who it should be when they saw it was Saul they scorned him Num salvare nos poterit iste despexerunt eum Secondly it happens often by reason of factions that are in the City for such desire rather to be governed by a stranger as a man indifferent then by a Cittizen that is an enemy Seeing such a one comming to the government would certainly sill the City with blood and slaughter Whereupon Livy saith Cum pars quae domestico certamine inferior sit externo potius se applicet quam civi cedat A third reason is drawne from envy for an envious man endeavours alwaies to obscure the worthinesse of his Countreymen as lying more in envies way then a stranger whereof S. Hierome saith Propemodum naturale est semper cives civibus invidere invidia autem est tristitia de aliena excellentia ut est proprii boni diminutiva Bonum autem absentium non 〈◊〉 nostra quia non confert eis Ideo non invidemus bona autem praesentium conferunt bonis nostris comparatione excellentiae eorum ostenditur parvum esse bonum nostrum hoc est illud Diminui And of this we have the example of our Lord Christ who being persecuted by his Countreymen was invited by Abagarus a forraine Prince that would have made him in part King with him in his City A third reason may be this that Countreymen know a man from his infancy when there is yet no vertue in him and thereupon consider him but as such a one still where strangers that come not to know a man but in his perfection cannot nor know not how to consider him other then as such So the said S. Hierome saith Quia cives non considerant praesentia viri opera sed fragilis â—…ecordantur Infantiae It is therefore no marvell that the Florentines chose rather to be governed by a French man then by one of their owne Citizens Our Lord God knowing how difficult a thing it is to choose at the first time ones own Countreyman to be Prince In the old law to the end the Israelites having a desire to have a King and not yeelding one to another might not subject themselves to a stranger he made a law they should choose none to be their King but only an Israelite Non poteris alterius generis hominem in Regem facere quod non sit frater tuus But because he knew it would be a hard matter for them to agree upon the choyce at the first time he therefore made that election himselfe Eum constitues quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit de medio fratrum tuorum And when lastly he came to choose him to the end he might be lesse envied he tooke a course that causeth least envy and that was by Lot But if the people have been accustomed before to a Regall subjection in this case they will rather like to be governed by one of their own Countrey then a stranger and so much the more if some of his family have beene Governour before there being then no place for either envy feare or for equality It is therefore no marvell that Caesar was but ill beloved and was slaine and that 〈◊〉 lived quietly and had the love of all men seeing Caesar raised his House from equality and Augustus found it in superiority in which the Dictatour had left it whereupon when I consider how it happened that our Lord God would at the first time make a King by election and afterward would have it to goe by succession in David I cannot conceive a better reason than this that he knew after the first time the election of a King would be without difficulty In this particular let every one be of what opinion he please but for this other point I doe not thinke it will be denied me that all Cities and Provinces like better to be governed by a particular Prince that dwels amongst them then by any other how great soever he be For this cause it was that the Spaniards were not well pleased when Charles the fifth was made Emperour and were ready to rise because they feared he would leave dwelling in Spaine and make his residence in Germany This desire was the cause that the Persians to have a King in their owne Province set up Cyrus against Astyages who resided in Media and out of this desire the Brittaines covenanted with the King of France that his eldest sonne comming to the Crown his second sonne should be Duke of Brittaine whereof there can be no other reason but the desire to have a particular Prince that should dwell amongst them as being indeed of speciall benefit to the people First because living amongst them he spends those Revenues in the Country which he drawes from the Countrey Secondly because of the greater care the Prince hath of them and because of the peoples neernesse to their Lords eare to whom they can present their suites in their own persons without wasting themselves in journeys and lying at Innes Lastly because if the Prince being Lord of many Provinces reside in one of them the other must be faine to be governed by Deputies of that Province The Emperours of Rome residing in Italy governed all the Provinces by Italians a thing most distastfull to all the people because to one that is not grieved to be subject to a Prince that is a stranger yet it grieves him to be governed by men of a Province that is a stranger as many people that are content to be subject to the King of Bohemia yet refuse to be subject to the Kingdome of Bohemia And the King of France after many
a thing very profitable for States that stand in danger p. 179 Discourse twenty five That those men who possesse the State of another are but in a dangerous condition as long as any of the former Lords line remaine alive and what course is to be taken to free themselves from such danger p. 183 Discourse twenty six A Parallell betweene Tiberius and Salomon p. 189 Discourse twenty seven That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes in services of cruelty and tyranny p. 190 Discourse twenty eight That Princes ought not to reveale the secrets of their State and how it happens that oftentimes men are drawne to speake some things which ought to be concealed p. 198 Discourse twenty nine How Princes should make use of Counsell p. 204 Discourse thirty How Princes ought to make use of Magistrates and Officers p. 210 Discourse thirty one Why Tiberius made a shew he would not be Emperour and that to make Princes discover things they would have concealed is dangerous p. 219 Discourse thirty two What course a Prince should take to secure himselfe from Generals of Armies and what course Generals should take to secure themselves from the Prince and from a Common-wealth p. 329 Discourse thirty three Of Succession and Election p. 347 Discourse thirty foure Whether Tiberius did ill in causing Augustus his will to be read and why Augustus in the third place made many his heires that were his enemies p. 354 Discourse thirty five That corrupt Commonwealths have need of a Monarch to reform them p. 357 Discourse thirty six Why the City of Rome from a Regall power under Romulus recovered liberty under Tarquinius and from the Regall power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude p. 363 Discourse thirty seven That to elect a wicked successour â—…by to get glory to himselfe is a beastly course p. 371 Discourse thirty eight That a Prince should be both loved and feared p. 378 Discourse thirty nine Whether an Aristocracy or a Monarchy be the more profitable for a City p. 388 Discourse forty That it is a great help for attaining a Kingdome to have a wife of the Blood-Royall and in what danger a Prince is that hath none but daughters p. 408 Discourse forty one Whether it be better to refuse dignities or to seeke after them p. 425 Discourse forty two That it is easier to passe from one extreme to another than from an extreame to the middle p. 433 Discourse forty three That Germanicus could not carry himselfe in such sort as to keep Tiberius from suspecting him and that he refused the Empire for feare of death and not out of goodnesse p. 434 Discourse forty foure That it is a hard matter to settle the insurrection of an Army p. 442 Discourse forty five That what kind of affaires it is fit to carry their wives with them p. 444 Discourse forty six Whether Germanicus did well to grant so many things to the Army being in mutiny what other course he might have taken lastly that in diversity of times and upon diversity of occasions divers courses are to be taken p. 448. Discourse forty seven That Tiberius did well not to stirre from Rome p. 460 Discourse forty eight That to punish seditious Souldiers by the Souldiers own hands is very profitable and that Ministers for the most part in punishing exceed their limits p. 469 Discourse forty nine Whether an Army be apter to rebell that consists of one Nation onely or that which consists of many p. 475 Discourse fifty That to passe from one extreame to another is dangerous and how it happens that successours commonly take courses differing from their predecessours p. 477 Discourse fifty one What course is to be used in demanding peace and when it is fit time p. 482 Discourse fifty two With what cunning Tiberius introduced and augmented the Law of treason p. 491 Discourse fifty three Whether it be good that Officers should continue in their places and why this course was observed by Tiberius p. 497 Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habuere CHAP. I. Of the divers formes of Government that Rome had and how it happens that Cities for the most part have their beginning under Kings rather then any other forme of government The first Discourse THe Almighty God understanding and comprehending himselfe infinitely in as much as the understanding himselfe proceeding from himselfe returnes into himselfe joyneth together by an admirable circulation the beginning with the end The Angelicall spirits as they have a twofold contemplation so they cause a twofold motion For by contemplating of God their owne knowledge returning in an acknowledgement of its originall they move the Heavens circularly in a like motion to that of the first mover from East to West and by contemplating of themselves they cause another circular motion contrary to the former from West to East And seeing all mortall things are influenced by the motions and light of the Heavens It followes necessarily that they all follow the heavenly influences with moving in a circle What marvell then if the government of the City of Rome as here in few words is delivered by Tacitus have had its circular motion passing from a regall government begun by Romulus to a popular or free estate under Brutus and from that to an Aristocraticall government under Pompey Crassus and Caesar under Lepidus Anthonie and Augustus and then at last with a wonderfull circulation returning againe to a government Monarchicall as it was at first Whereupon the Prophet Ezekiel not without great mystery shewing us in his first vision four beasts which in the opinion of many are figures of the foure Empires of the World he sets before every one of them a wheele to intimate in what a circulation they are turned about And this circulation or alteration though I cannot say it is inalterable yet I may truely say It is so naturall that even Aristotle himselfe discoursing upon the passages of Rule and Dominion foresees and observes that as a Philosopher which Tacitus as an Historian relates here of Rome Et ob hoc forsan Rex ab initio repertus est quod difficile erat viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri praesertim cum tunc civitates parvae forent So Tacitus here Vrbem Romam a principio Râ—…ges habuere Aristotle goes on Sed cum postea contingeret ut plures pari virtute reperirentur non amplius tolerarunt Regem sed commune quiddam quaerentes respâ—…blicas constituere So Tacitus here Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit Aristotle proceeds Cum verò deteriores facti lucrum sibi quaererent ex gubernatione rerumpublicarum Paucorum hine potentiam exortam fuisse credendum est Honorabant enim Divitias So here we see from whence the power came which Pompey Crassus and Caesar had and from whence also the Triumvirat of Augustus Aristotle againe Ex his verò in Tyrannides transiere So Tacitus here Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere
at equality and much more at servitude which is so much harder to be endured as superiours in peace are harder to be dealt with Revocante Nobilitate saith Tacitus cur in pace durius servitium Having now divided Cities and Times It remaines that we divide the formes of States which as to our purpose are of three sorts Monarchy Optimacy and Popular The Common-wealth of the Optimates either hath under it many Cities and Kingdomes as Rome and Carthage had and at this day Venice hath or they have but some few Cities as the Athenians the Spartans and others or lastly they have but only one City as Pisa in times past and Lucca and many free Cities at this present The first forme of Common-wealth which is that which hath Kingdomes under it either it useth to wage warre with its own Armes as the Romans or with forraine Armes as the Carthaginians if it use and be able to wage warre with its own Forces then either we speake of warre farre off as of the Romans with the Carthaginians or of warre in their own state as of the Romans with the Thuscans If the case be of warre farre off waged with their own Forces this will be the Treacle of civill discords First because those who are likely to move them may under colour of honours be sent to the warres abroad and spirits that are warlike are willing enough of themselves to goe where there is fighting though without any such colour Thus it was with the Romans as Livy relates who sending forth the hottest spirits of their youth to the warres abroad they in the meane time remained quiet in Rome Consules educta ex urbe Juventute tranquilliorem caeteram turbam fecerunt And even by this way not onely all feare of civill discord will be taken away which onely proceeds from unquiet spirits but also all suspition of any rebellion in the subject Cities as well because they will be weakned both in men and money by levying Auxiliary souldiers as also because they will be kept in aw by an Army in the field But it must be here observed that they make not then too dangerous a warre where their whole Forces must be imployed for then the subject people will be apt to rebell as the Thuscanes who seeing the Romans busied in a warre with their whole Forces they then fell to rebell Now if we speake of a warre neere home either it is some slight warre or else some warre of moment If but a slight warre it ought to be nourished with all endeavour as the Romans did with the Genouese making use of that warre as of a Military schoole but if it be a warre of moment and neere the State it ought to be avoyded by all meanes possible The reason is because the Cities that are subject to a Common-wealth doe all with an ill will beare their yoak in confirmation whereof Tacitus saith Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant As long as Hanniball made his warre farre off from Rome although he obtained many victories yet not so much as any one Castle as Polybius relates rebelled against Rome but when he got his victory at Trasimene and by consequence not farre from Rome all at once rebelled and yet for all the overthrows they had had in Sicily in the firme Land and at Sea they never made the least signe of revolt The like happened to the Venetians after the overthrow they received at Geradada It is therefore no marvell that Agathocles being besieged in Syracusa and not able to endure the siege when by reason of his tyranny every one rebelled against him No marvell I say that not able to endure the warre in his own state he removed it to the Carthaginians in Affricke as knowing that Cities subject to Common-wealths doe with an evill will endure their yoke and his enterprise tooke effect as he desired These Commonwealths therefore by all means possible ought to shun a warre neere home But where the custome is to wage warre with forraine Armes there all kind of warre whether neere home or farre off is to be shunned Because mercenary Armes are insatiable licentious and for the most part either they never finish a warre or once finished they cannot be gotten away againe without destroying and making spoile in the Countrey Or else with mutinies put the Cities in danger It was a good invention which Glisco Generall of the Carthaginian Army in Africk used after the warre was ended with the Romans for knowing the ill condition of a mercenary Army he thought to send the souldiers home to Carthage by little and little in such sort that the first might be gotten home to their own houses before the others should recover the City a judicious conceit but which seldom takes effect because oftentimes the souldiers perceive it and will not be divided as it happened with the Switzers in times past and sometime though they be divided yet it hath no good issue as it happened to the Carthagenians whose Cities all at once rebelled and Carthage it selfe was not farre from loosing And in truth they then perceived how dangerous a thing it is to wage warre with mercenary forces whereupon for this cause when Scipio afterward came into Africk they knowing themselves to be no matches for the Romans to be able to wage warre at their owne home Suant plebem imbellem in urbe saith Livy Imbellem in agris esse mercede parari auxilia These Commonwealths therefore ought rather to keep themselves from discord by imploying their Cittizens in merchandising in governments and Offices and by not suffering the quiet spirits to grow turbulent northe turbulent to stay in Cities where the people ought to be kept without Armes Imitating herein the Carthagenians rather then the Romans Now if we come to speake of those Common wealths that have but few or but one City under them in this case they ought by all possible meanes to seek to preserve peace as the Switzers the Lucchesi and such others do being very obnoxious for such to become a prey to the more potent as it hath alwaies happened to the Athenians to the Lacedemonians and the Genouesi From hence it is that the King of France to preserve the Commonwealth of the Swizzers hath alwaies procured to quench that fire which some have endeavoured to kindle for their ruine And if any object that the Commonwealth of Rome when it was yet but little not only maintained it selfe but grew greater by the means of warre I answer that in that time the States in Italy were not great as now they are and from hence may be drawn a reason why the Athenians and the Lacedemonians were never able to get further then their first bounds without endangering their state and Rome was able to make it selfe Lord of a great part of the World and it is because the one were environed with two mighty adversaries the other with many but weake ones Lastly to give a
generall rule all those Common-wealths whose ordinances tend rather to conservation then augmentation ought to use any other means to keep themselves from discords at home rather then warre It remaines to speak of a Kingdome which is either setled and naturall or else dangerous and new if we speake of that which is naturall I account that to live in peace as well abroad as at home is both necessary and easie especially in our times wherein Cities and Kingdomes are without the least blemish of tyranny all governed by Princes just and pious and this the rather ought to be done because in peace the wits of men are cultivated their manners refined good Arts flourish merchandising is lesse dangerous and plenty of all things easily maintained And therefore in Esay it is said Conflabunt glaclios suos in vomeres which means nothing else but that peace causeth the earth to be manured and riches easily to be encreased Whereupon the Ancients feyned that the God of riches was nursed by peace Now to Kingdomes that are new and not well setled every thing is dangerous whether it be of peace or warre but warre perhaps lesse as bringing with it but one danger which is that the Army being in the hand of a Generall the Empire seemes to be in his power As Tiberius doubted that Germanicus potius vellet accipere quam expectare Imperium But then it brings with it many benefits not only in favour of the Prince but of the subjects also On the Princes behalfe because he by sending forth to the warres the most potent and stout spirits may himselfe in the meane time remaine secure at home And therefore King Ferdinand kept alwaies some little warre abroad to the end the Nobility should not mutiny in Spaine And Henry the second had counsell given him to keep the French busied in some warre to the end they might not mutiny in France And this rule ought alwaies to be observed where the people have not lost their stoutnesse of courage On the Subjects behalfe because while such stout spirits live in peace they are apt to seeke as having no other meanes their owne security by the death of the Citizens And this Tacitus meanes where in the first of his Histories he saith Sub Tyberio Caio Claudio tantum pauci adversa pertimuere Againe it is well that cruell men such as tyrants use to be to the end they may leave the Citizens in peace should have warre with strangers abroad upon whom to wreke their cruelty From whence it comes that this race of men is more cruell in their age then in their youth and therefore oftentimes in the holy Scripture are likened to Lyons which as Aristotle relates in their old age enter into Cities and make spoile of people and this proceeds saith he because thorough weaknesse of body and defect of teeth not being able in the fields to follow the chase after beasts they enter into Cities and prey upon men so tyrants when weakened with age they can no longer quench their thirst of blood upon enemies in warre they then for exercise of their cruelty fall upon their friends in peace So did Herod the great and many others of whom Histories are full But to returne to our purpose peace after warre is much more dangerous because leisure gives time to thinke thinking takes notice of subjection and stoutnesse gotten in warre breeds a desire to free themselves by any bad way whatsoever In regard of this Salomon comming to be in Peace after a long warre w ch his father had made many warlike expeditions as appeares in the Booke of Kings and to this it seemes David exhorts where in the Epithalamium he made he saith Aâ—…cingere gladio tuo super fâ—…ntur tuum potentissime Where it is to be noted that Faemur oftentimes is taken for pleasures as though he would say Couple Armes with pleasures stand not slumbering in idlenesse so many writers interpret it and perhaps in regard of this Augustus would never be without some little warre in Germany rather for these reasons quam cupidine proferendi Imperium vel istud ob praemium And Tyberius upon the same ground was well pleased that troubles should rise in the Easterne parts Caeterum saith Tacitus Tyberio haud ingratunt accidit turbari res orientis ut ea specie Germanioum suetis legionibus abstraheret novisque Provinciis impositum dolo simul casibus objectaret Lastly a Popular state ought alwaies to procure peace for if there be warre either the people goe forth to fight and then the Nobles in the mean time will have meanes to change the state or else the Noble men goe and then having an Army in their hand they are able to make alterations at their pleasure Whereupon Isocrates in his oration of peace saith that a popular state is strengthned by peace and by warre ruined But having shewed in this my discourse that to many Common-wealths it is not good to have warre to the end I may not dissent from that place in Aristotle alledged in the beginning I now say that Aristotle commends not feare as a thing fit alwaies but sometimes and doth not specifie what kind of feare it is â—…meanes For understanding whereof we must know that Commonwealths oftentimes are endangered by too much security as the City of Rome ranne headlong into hazzard for want of fearing Which useth to happen from two occasions one from the inveteratenesse of the danger the other from the greatnesse and power of them that are offended Rome at the time when it was freed from the tyranny of Tarquinius was not great and being neere to danger it stood in feare being grown suspicious partly for the fathers name called Superbus and partly for the sonnes house built higher then ordinary weak causes God knows But when the City was growne into greatnesse and forgot the danger by reason of inveteratenesse it then left fearing and afforded such beginnings that gave Caesar advantage to bring it in subjection So the Florentines extinguished the name of liberty in Pisa and used great diligence at the beginning to prevent rebellion as standing in feare as well for the freslmesse of the offence as for the smalnesse of their Forces but after some yeeres Florence being grown greater and the offence through time forgotten they began to leave fearing and as not fearing rebelled under Charles the eighth which was in a manner the ruine of Florence Seeing then when Cities are without feare they live without fore-sight it is profitable for Common-wealths as Aristotle in that text saith that some such accident should happen as may teach them the danger of security and therefore the Rachiensi as Polybius relates while they lived inconsiderately suspecting nothing they were upon the point of losing their City to the Slavonians but having repelled them it was afterward a great good unto them as that which made them stand in feare Vt per negligentâ—…m in periculo fuerant
I briefly say there is great difference betweene the ease that is in a City and the ease that is of souldiers in warre because the end of a City is to live in peace whereof the ease spoken of before is a companion but the chiefe end of souldiers at the warres is to fight to which ease is contrary and an enemy and so the souldier with ease and the Citizen by warre are deprived of their ends and consequently in short time runne into danger Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant suspecto Senatus Populique Imperio ob certamina Potentium avaritiam Magistratuum invalido legum auxilio quae vi ambitu postremo pecunia turbabantur That Cities subject to another City better like the government of a King than of a Commonwealth and that every City would gladly have their Lord to live amongst them The seventeenth Discourse COrnelius Tacitus in these words makes us know that the Provinces subject to the people of Rome liked better the government of a King than of a Commonwealth as it happens generally to all Cities that are subject to another So Guicciardine relates of Cremona that it liked better to be under the King of France than to be governed by the Common-wealth of Venice And hereof we have a manifest example in Pisa which being sold by Gabriel Maria Visconte to the Common-wealth of Florence there was scarce one Citizen that would tarry in it But more than in any other we may see the truth of this in the Lycians who having tried what it was to live under a King and under a Common-wealth they called the servitude of that in comparison of this liberty Neque miserabilis legatio Lyctorum qui crudelitatem Rhodiorum quibus ab Lucio Cornelio attributi erant quaerebantur fuisse sub ditione 〈◊〉 eam Regiam servitutem collatam cum praesenti statu pnaeelaram libertatem visam Non publico tantum se 〈◊〉 imperio sed singulos injustum pati servitium Of these points we will speake first in particular of Rome then in generall give the reasons Lastly we will shew that every City would we glad to be under a particular Prince and one that should dwell amongst them Concerning the first all those changes of State which come from a worse must needs be welcome from whence it is that after the expulsion of the Tarquins liberty was so pleasing Et ut laetior esset saith Livy proximi Regis superbia fecit That in our case the Commonwealth was corrupted even to the worst degree is sufficiently expressed by Tacitus in the foresaid words First by reason of the discord of the great ones one of which factions there was a necessity to follow and that overcome all then remained at the discretion of the other Secondly by occasion of the Magistrates who sought rather to satisfie their avarice with money than to take care for the executing of justice Thirdly because the laws had now no more place as being easily corrupted by force and mony Just cause therefore had the Provinces to be glad of the government of Augustus But because this liking of a subject City to be rather under a Prince than under a Commonwealth as we have said before is a common liking of all Provinces and Cities that are under another It will be necessary to search out the reason why it is so And for a first reason 〈◊〉 certaine politioian brings this because Commonwealths are more durable than Kingdomes and being more durable there is lesse hope to shake off their servitude and are therefore the more hated Secondly because Common-wealths having no other care but to make themselves greater and others lesse they endeavour only to weaken the subject Cities and to strengthen their own body a thing which Princes care not to doe and for this he brings the example of the Samnites who as long as they were of themselves maintained warre with the Romans a hundred yeeres a manifest signe they were then a strong people but afterwards falling in subjection to Rome they became most weake and of no force But because the first of these reasons is false and the second followes no lesse in Kingdomes than in Common-wealths with leave of so great a man I have conceived perhaps a better reason and it is because the Provinces and Cities having been at warre and by reason of the warre grown to hate one another and that hatred in processe of time become naturall as it was between the Romans and the Carthaginians between the Pisanes and the Florentines and others it happens that being overcome they are held in subjection by their naturall enemies which subjection is so much the more distastfull as being between persons that are equall and from hence it is that so gladly men seek to shake of the yoak So many times did Pisa so Spaine with the Romans who doubting the like of Greece as knowing by their continuall rebellions that they il brooked their subjection to the Commonwealth of Rome they destroyed many Cities and at last Corinth But if it happen that this Common-wealth fall into the hand of a Prince there is no doubt but the other Cities and Provinces will be glad a principall reason is because where these served and those ruled before with inequality now under a Prince they both serve equally and comming to be commanded by persons much their superiours the Dominion is so much lesse hated as the person is greater that commands and therefore we see that Pisa which under a Common-wealth was alwaies in rebellion now that it is under a Prince hath lived and doth live and is like to live in most quiet peace it is true indeed there concurres the graciousnesse of the Prince that sweetens all things Another manifest example we have in the Roman Histories and it is that Spaine as long as the City of Rome was a Commonwealth was continually in rebellion nor could ever be quieted till the said City came into the hand of a Prince under Augustus I omit the example of the Philistines who never left warring with the Israelites from the first day I may say they entered into the Land of Promise untill they were setled in a Regall government under David To come to the third head not onely Cities and Provinces cannot abide to be under the rule of a Commonwealth but neither doe they like to be under a Prince that is a stranger and that dwels not amongst them which Prince may either be of different customes and language as the King of Spaine to Naples and Milan or of the same customes and language but of divers Provinces as the King of France to Burgundy and Britaine or else of the same Province the same tongue and the same customes as many Princes of Italy to many Cities In the first case they are not well brooked but tolerated with an ill will First by reason of the difference of customes which is able to make a Prince odious though he
alluvione paulatim terra consumpta est quia surrepente paulatim infusione peccati terra cordis illius ad consumptionem defluxit A second cause is because in old age by reason of weaknesse the vertue of resisting feminine allurements failes which in youth by reason of vigour are easily resisted This cause Cajetan meanes when speaking of Salomon he saith Quamvis mulieres junctae fuerint Salomoni Iuveni non tamen diverterunt a Iuventute ad cultum Deorum sed in Senectute paulatim emollitus est animus ejus crescente amore deficiente virtute A third cause I would alledge my selfe and it is That all love is founded upon some interest either good or bad and seeing that of women can never be founded upon vertue by reason of the incapacity of that sex it happens oftentimes to be founded either upon beauty or upon profit For in women commonly there are two desires or to say better two affections one of rule the other of lust and when these faile then also their love ceaseth From hence it is that seeing an old man can never beleeve unlesse age hath taken away his braines that women can love him for beauty it follows necessarily he must beleeve they love him for profit of which if there be no hope neither can he hope they will ever love him And therefore when he knows he cannot satisfie their affection one way by reason of the weaknesse of his age he must of necessity seeke to satisfie it the other way and consequently agree to all their desires And therefore no marvell if Tacitus say that Augustus grown old was led away by women Concerning the second point before we come to examine which is the best age in a Prince for governing his people we must take notice that in men there are foure ages old age childhood youth and consistence or middle age Thus Hippocrates distinguisheth them which for the present shall passe without questioning the truth of the distinction Secondly it must be noted that I speake not of Princes that are by succession for they have their officers and Deputies by whom they may alwaies governe well but I speake of Princes that are by election and particularly in Kingdomes that stand in danger into which many by reason of age have fallen In this case it is not well that a Prince should be in his childhood whereupon our Lord God by the mouth of the Prophet Esay threatning the destruction of Hierusalem after saying Ecce enim Dominator Dominus exercituum auferet a Hierusalem a Juda validum fortem virum bellatorem omne robur panis omne robur aquae Judiceni Prophetam Ariolum senem he saith dabo pueros Principes eorum by whose government how great disorders were to grow is shewed in the processe of that Chapter and therefore Salomon in Ecclesiasticus cries out Vae tibi terra cujus Rex est puer The reason of this is because in a Governour there are foure things required the first is knowledge and prudence whereupon Salomon considering himselfe to be but a child prayed not to God for Riches or Honour nor yet for long life but for Wisdome to be able to judge rightly saying Ego autem sum puer parvulus ignorans egressum introitum meum Et servus tuus est in medio populi quem elegisti populi infiniti qui numerari supputari non potest prae multitudine Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile ut populum tuum judicare possit discernere inter bonum malum Whereupon S. Gregory makes a good observation that in holy Scripture Princes and Prophets are called Videntes Seers as those that have need of Prudence and Knowledge that being to lead the blind they be not blind themselves for then will Cities go to wrecke and easily be destroyed as Esay saith Omnes bestiae agri venite ad devorandum Vniversae bestiae 〈◊〉 speculatores ejus caeci omnes The second thing required in a Prince is fortitude to be able to bridle the people and to beare the weight of the Scepter And therefore Salomon in Ecclesiasticus saith Noli 〈◊〉 fieri Judex 〈◊〉 valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates ne fortè extimescas faciē Potentis ponas scandalum in 〈◊〉 tua And Job speaking of the burthen that lies upon Princes shoulders saith Sub quo curvantur qui portant orbem which S. Gregory upon that other place of Job Ecce Gigantes 〈◊〉 sub aquis expounds saying Gemero sub aquis meanes nothing else but to be oppressed with the weight of Subjects taking waters for people as the Angel in the Apocalyps delivers Aquae multae populi multi Whereupon not without great mystery our Lord God meaning to make Peter Prince of the people he called him first to walke upon the water Thirdly Princes ought more to regard the common good of their subjects then their owne private profit that they may not be like those of whom the Prophet Sophony speaketh Judices ejus lupi 〈◊〉 non relinquebant in Mane but like to the Apostle Paul who saith Non quaero quae vestra sunt sed vos Fourthly there is required Experience Qui non est tentatus quid scit saith Salomon in Ecclesiasticus Et qui non est expertus parva recognoscit And therefore the Ancients have a fable that Phaeton having taken upon him to guide the Horses of the Sunne was throwne downe headlong In asmuch then as a child through defect of age can neither have knowledge nor experience and thorough weaknesse of body can neither be strong nor constant and finally thorough time spent in pleasures will more regard his owne interest then the people there can be no doubt of his unfitnesse to govern others who without doubt is not well able to governe himselfe The other age contrary to this is old age in which as a thing most odious men commonly are subject to contempt Ipsa aetas Galbae saith Tacitus Irrisui fastidio erat And a little after Precarium sibi Imperium brevi transiturum But besides their being contemned oftentimes they governe ill because as Aristotle writes in his Politicks Habet etiam intellectus suam 〈◊〉 that the understanding also hath its old age seeing by weaknesse of naturall heate and want of radicall moysture they generate naughty blood from which consequently arise naughty spirits which passing to the Heart and from the Heart distributed to the senses makes them they can but ill 〈◊〉 their office And therefore in old men we see the senses are alwaies weakned as the Philosopher saith 〈◊〉 nostra intellectio ortum habet à sensu the understanding making use of the senses to understand by insomuch that they being grown old it may reasonably be said the understanding is growne old whereupon 〈◊〉 meaning to shew that Camillus though growne old was yet able to governe saith He had all his senses perfect Sed vegetum 〈◊〉 in
himselfe secure in his Kingdome he then committed the adultery with Bersabee and the slaughter of Vrias whereof S. Bernard speaking saith Sapiens David sapiens Salomon fuit sed blandientibus nimis secundis rebus alter ex parte alter ex toto desipuit Thirdly because a Prince in old age hath either gotten him a good name or a bad if a good then conceiving that whatsoever he doth can never take away the good name already gotten he easily runneth into vices if bad then despairing in so short a time as being now old to remove that bad name he thinkes it all one what he doth and thereupon contemning fame would be content the World might end with himselfe So did Herod the great who gave order that as soone as himselfe should be dead a great number of Noblemen that were then prisoners should be slaine And Nero was contented it should be thought that he grieved for nothing so much as that he had not the whole World in his hand inclosed in a glasse that he might cast it to the ground whensoever he should die But if a Prince be yong although he have gotten the name of a cruell man yet hoping in time he may redeeme it and get a better he will not easily plunge himselfe in vices Fourthly this is wont to happen when Princes are but of little judgment because as when of themselves they are prudent they alwaies governe better in the third age so when of themselves they want discretion they governe better in their youth then afterward seeing in that age it is no disgrace to suffer themselves to be guided by men of ability as was seene in Nero who in his youth was contented to be advised and to follow the counsell of Seneca Burrhus and Corbulo but comming to a riper age either they take a liberty no longer to regard the advice of good Counsellours or else they count it a shame to be a Prince upon props or lastly they are instigated by others thorough hate they beare to the greatnesse of those able Counsellours All these things concurred in Nero for first he rejected the reverence of his schoolmasters seque in omnes libidines effudit and then there wanted not instigatours who told him it was a shame Certe finitam Neronis pueritiam robur juventae adesse exueret Magistrum satis amplis Doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis. So as having no braine himselfe nor hearkning to them that had he came in a short time to utter ruine So the Emperour Constantinus Sestus was contented at first to be ruled by his mother Irenea but growing elder he cast her off and came to be starke naught And Rabbi Salomon saith that as long as Nathan the Prophet who was Salomons schoolmaster lived Salomon tooke no strange woman to be his wife and this opinion is followed by Abulensis Domi Res tranquillae eadem Magistratuum vocabula That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue although without authority is a matter of great moment The twentieth Discourse I Have alwaies heard it resolved that when a City changeth from being a Common-wealth to be a Kingdome it should doe well to leave if not the same authority yet at least the same Magistrates And the same I have found written in all Politician Authours and for authority they alledge this place of Tacitus Eadem Magistratuum vocabula where he shewes that Augustus changed all things in Rome but onely the name of Magistrates and they give this reason that seeing it is onely a bare name much in shew and little in substance the Prince can lose nothing of his owne Right by it and yet by this meanes he shall be sure to get the love of his people who are fedde with such vanity This opinion held written and observed of every one containes in it two things one that as to the Prince the leaving of Magistrates is of great profit the other that as to the subject it is a meere vanity and serves onely to puffe up the people Although this opinion be generall and entred in such sort into mens conceits that there seemes to be no contending against it yet it may be lawfull for me to deliver what I thinke of it seeing I seeke not to be believed by any other strength then by that of reason I say then I could never come to know that this leaving the name of Magistrates is any weaknesse but have alwaies accounted it a matter of great moment for proofe whereof we must know that as all other kinds of state so a Commonwealth also consists of two things that is of matter and of forme In a Monarchy the forme is the Prince and the City is the matter In a Commonwealth the forme is the Magistrate that rules and the thing that is ruled is the matter From hence it is that when these two things doe not meet and joyne together a City cannot be said to be free whereupon if it should be without any Prince and should withall be without any Magistrates it could not be called a Commonwealth The Armenians after the death of Ariobarzanes being unwilling to serve his successours remained without any Lord but having no forme of a Commonwealth they were never the more free Whereof Tacitus speaking shewes he knew that well which I said before where he saith Ariobarzano morte fortuita absumpto stirpem ejus hand toleravere tentatoque foeminae imperio cui nomen Erato eaque brevi pulsa incerti solutique magis sine Domino quam in libertate profugum Vononem in Regnum accipiunt If then the Prince taking away the matter which is the City shall leave the forme which are the Magistrates he shall give not onely a vaine contentment as those men say but also a great hope to recover liberty of which they should be out of hope if the Prince together with the authority should also take away the Magistrates seeing although they should be without a Prince yet they should be nere the neerer for being in liberty but rather would never be quiet untill they had a King againe as it fell out with the Armenians and if they should agree to have a Commonwealth it would never be durable as was seene in Florence after a driving out of Petrus de Medici and therefore the Romans had great fortune to find a forme made to their hands for the Kings being expulsed they had then nothing else to do but onely in their stead to make two Consuls This thing both Romulus and Tarquinius Caesar and Nero knew to be of great moment who endeavoured all they could to extinguish the Senate And indeed those Provinces that have been without Magistrates have never been able to come to liberty as was seen in the Assyrians and is at this day seen in the Persians and in the Turks and others For it is an easie matter for an image of waxe if it be broken to be renued againe so long as the forme by which it was framed
thousand impertinencies to free himselfe but being forced at last to give her to him the Scripture relates that he then began to fea re David exceedingly whereupon it is said Deditque ei Saul Micholl filiam suam and it followes Michol autem diligebat eum Saul caepit timere David The most wise Salomon who also knew this danger when Bersabee unadvisedly asked Abisac the Shunamite for Adoniah answered Quare postulas Abisac Shunamite Adoniae Postula ei Regnum and as he denyed to Adoniah his wife So Tiberius denied to Agrippina her husband whereof Tacitus speaking saith Caesar non ignarus quantum ex Repubitca peteretur ne tamen offensionis aut metus manifestus foret sine reponso quanquam Instantem reliquit Likewise the same Tiberius knew that when Seianus demanded Livia who had beene the wife of Drusus it was as much as to demand the Kingdome and therfore denyed her to him saying Falleris enim Seiane si te mansurum in 〈◊〉 Ordine putas Liviam quae Caio Caesari mox Druso nupta fuerat ea mente acturam ut cum equite Romano senesâ—…at It is no marvell also if â—…itellius shewed to be afraid of Dolobella as being in the same case Tiberius was with Asinius Gallus having taken her to wife who had beene his wife before Vitellius metu odio saith Tacitus quod Petroniam uxorem ejus mox Dolobella in matrintonium accepisset vocatum per epistolas vitata Flaminiae viae celebritate divertere Interamnam atque ibi Jnterfici Iussit And therefore Phalti shewed great Iudgement who when Micholl marryed before to David was given him by Saul yet he never touched her but as Rabbi Salomon saith laid a sword betweene Micholl and himselfe when he was in bed with her to keepe him from touching her and indeed it was well he did so seeing no sooner was Saul dead but that David not thinking himselfe King if his wife were married to another said to Abner Non videbis faciem meam antequam adduxeris Micholl filiam Saul This therfore is a special help for attaining a kingdom our Lord God although he be able of himselfe to accomplish whatsoever he pleaseth yet as willing to make use of second causes he caused David to the end he might more easily attaine the Crowne to which hee was designed Abaeterno and to which Samuel had anointed him to take to wife adaughter of Sauls And Salomon who was all wisedome and prudence shews it us himselfe and finally the most subtile Seianus having an intent to get the Empire knew this way to be if not necessary at least most profitable Thus my intention is proved by Examples but because there is more force in Reasons to move the understanding and therefore Philosophers never speak but they bring their reason I have therefore sought out one which I have found me thinkes in Aristotle in his Books of generation where speaking how Elements are transmuted hesaith In Elementis habentibus Symbolam qualitatem facilior est transitus As the Earth which is cold and dry is more converted into water which is cold and moist then into aire which is hot and moist as agreeing with that in one quality of cold and disagreeing with this in both So in our case the attaining to a Kingdome being in a private person a transmutation more difficult then that of the Elements it will more easily be attained where there is one symbolizing quality then where there is none He therefore is more likely to attaine the Empire who being himselfe a privat man shall have a wife of the blood Royall then he that both himselfe and his wife are of private estates A Second Reason omitting Philosophicall to come to a Politicall is that people bearing affection to their Prince more easily suffer themselves to be governed as long at there remaines in the Kingdome any spark of his blood Darius a man of exceeding great Judgement comming from a private man to be a Prince for confirming him in the Empire tooke to wife a daughter of Cyrus as knowing of how great importance it was to have a wife of that blood which had beene King before where of Iustin saith Principio igitur Regni Cyri Regis filiam Regalibus nuptiis Regnum firmaturus in matrimonium accepit ut non tam in extraneum translatum quam in familiam Cyri reversum videretur The like consideration had the sonnes of Tigranes and if with them it had not good successe this happened upon other occasion and therefore good cause had Tacitus to marvell where he saith Nec Tigrani diuturnum Jmperium neque liberis ejus quanquam sociatis more externo in matrimonium Regnumque This brought Demetrius to be King of Macedon that he had Fila to wife who was daughter to the old King Antipator From this passage now spoken off with good consequence comes in the second that a Prince is in great danger who hath none but daughters seeing if he marry them hee can never be secure that his sonne in law will not take the Kingdome from him for the facility we have shewed to be by this occasion To meet with this danger many have taken divers courses the first hath beene to marry them to meane men and such as may have no thought of comming to the Empire before the time because such a one seemes rather likely to be assistant to the Prince in his affaires seeing he may justly hope for more faithfulnesse from a Sonne in law then from strangers and need not make doubt of a person that is not of any Noble Lynage This conceit was in Augustus and Tacitus expresseth it in the Person of Tiberius At enim Augustus filiam suam Equiti Romano meditatus est Mirum hercule si cum in omnes Curas distraheretur Immensumque attolli provideret quem Conjunctione tali super alios extulisset Cajum Proculeium quosdam in sermonibus habuit Insigni tranquillitate vitae nullis Reipublicae negotiis permixtos This indeed would be no ill course so long as those persons of meane condition be not of a spirit to aspire to the Empire such as those named by Tiberius were in whom those words of Tacitus are to be considered Tranquillitate vitae as though he would say a man free from audacious haughty thoughâ—… and such may safely and without danger be advanced to honour Whereupon Aristotle in his Politicks meaning to teach what kind of men may safely be raised made great he saith 〈◊〉 si queÌ„ extollere oporteat non 〈◊〉 cum qui sit moribus 〈◊〉 hujusmodi homines aptissimi sunt ad invadondu circa 〈◊〉 And if Augustus gave her afterwards to Agrippa Ignobilem loco bonum Militia victorâ—… socium this happened because he could not choose but feare Agrippa whereupon he was forced either to put him to death a thing most scandalous not onely in a Christian but even in a Heathen or at least to put