infamous death 12. Division in Religion albeit Monarchy be not preached downe does destroy ☞ it as it appears in France Germany and Poland c. for it divides mens minds and therefore both their bodies and fortunes and armes and both parties hate the King The evill because he favours the good and the good because he does not extinguish the evill Obser. Here Grotius the great est advocate and favouror of toleration that lived in our age opposes the Fryar and affirms That there does not upon difference in opinions seem so much hazard of divulsion as he calls it of minds or animosity amongst men if the Magistrate would compell the Ministry to forbear mutuall and publique railings and resutations one of another and if by a publique Law of State every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own religion as it is in Japan and Poland which liberty the reformed Churches of France being abridged of Tumults and Warrs were occasioned by it 13. A Monarchy also failes by its own vastnesse and bulk for which reason it cannot well be governed by One and he is therefore faine to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burthen who afterwards will admitt no superiours and so share the government as we have often seen it fall out in the Roman Empire The Remedy for this is to keep an Empire within its own bounds lest the commanders and governors being at too great a distance usurpe the Dominion As the Monarch of Japan is a great example of this who never sets foot beyond his sixty six Kingdomes and the King of China can * claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe by walls and Rocks Woods and Seas Another remedy for this disease is for a Prince to keep the Wives and Children of Governors and Provincialls abroad at home with him as pledges and engage them by Oath to Fidelity and Allegiance c. which in part the King of Spain observes 14. Sometimes a Kingdom 's lost for want of provisions because it has no fruitfull soyle about it This is the condition of Genoa and Venice and therefore they provide against this mischief by Merchants and Factors and exchangers of commodities by Granaries Munitions c. 15. A Monarchy may also fall by Pestilence against which * the King of the Abassines has provided a movable City and so removes his Seat at pleasure for the benefit of wholesomer Ayre which thing the Tartars now and heretofore the Veientes observed nay the very Birds do the same But with us there be Officers for health purposely appointed which the Author calls Magistratus Sanitatis like our Masters of the Pest houses 16. A Monarchy likewise is ruined by invasion of forraign Princes that over-power the right owner as the King of Persia was by Alexander of Macedon and the Sultan of AEgypt by Selemus the great Turk The best remedy against this is the love of the subjects to their Prince their gallantry on his behalfe next is to procure a strong ready Militia and to enter into league with many Princes that may over-power the Rivall of his Crown as the Macchabees did with the Romans being affraid of Antiochus and the Venetian with the French when they fear'd the Spaniard Neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of as the Spaniard does betwixt the Turk and Persian ths Abassine and Muscovite Polack and Transilvanian all around c. and amongst the Nobles of France which is his Rivall When the Nobility grow too rich and potent as the Nobles of Iapan and often those of Naples and the French likewise and the German Peers they have destroyed the Monarchy under which they lived defining every one to live for himselfe The remedy for this is to cut off Entailes of Land Honours The Author means in the words Ne feuda transeant ad Haeredes that they be not established as the Turk does Next is to levell their Forts and strong holds with the ground or garrison them with the Princes own souldiery and then under pretence of advancing to humble the Nobles 18. A Kingdome may be lost too by the treachery of a Kings owne Souldiers as it happened to Antiochus The remedy against this is to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning and divide them and to fortifie thy selfe with a strong guard of thy best friends whom thou must oblige with perpetuall favours and benefits as the Turk does his Janizaries 19. A Crown may be lost by the suddain incuâ—sion of Barbarous people The remedy against this is to oppose wisdome and religion to barbarous folly So Pope Leo opposed Attilla and Jaddus the high Priest in Hierusalom clad in his Priestly Robes met and adored and so pacified Alexander the great 20. A man may lose his Kingdome too for want of Souldiery of his owne and by entertaining too many Auxiliaries and Mercenary men which was the ruine of Lodovick Sforza Duke of Millaine c. The Remedy of this is to have a choice Militia of thine owne alwaies in readinesse to arme and unite thine own men but to disarme and dissipate the strangers For this reason also it is expedient that none of any Family but the first-born inherit any estate and let the rest be made Souldiers or else do as the Turk does keep Schooles or Colledges of Cloistered boyes to be trained up in Military Discipline which shall know no other Father but the Monarch 21. Sometimes a Kingdome is lost after a Victory by the insolency of the Conquering Army or after a truce or league as it happened to Carthage after the first punick warre under Hamilcar The remedy for this is on a sudden to divide the Army into distant quarters and not to be embodyed till the Generall commands 22. A Kingdome may bet lost for want of present pay for the Souldiery when the Warre is on foot as it fell out to Maximilian of Austria Publique treasuries are the best remedy against this Besides the Rich at such a pinch are to be compeli'd by Religion be meanes sure Anathema's and Terrors of Ecommunication and other Penalties to throw all their Money and Plate into the Publique Treasury For so neither can they rebell and hereby is the Kingdome confirm'd and Established which was usuall at Rome and Venice And it is lawfull too in extreamity to melt down Consecrate Church Plate and to make the very Souldiers themselves part with their Gold to this publique purpose but to sweeten them with fair hopes and the Pillage of the Field Thus did Caeser in the beginning of the Civill Warre and thus did Henry the third I take it King of France the Frer advises too to make leaden Coin if need be to be currant as long as the War shall last as the Venetians have done 23. Kingdomes are lost too by the Luxury of the conquering Army that
does breake and effeminate it self by the spoiles and delicates of Conquer'd Provinces as it fell out to the Lombards Goths Huns and Gaules who possessing themselves of Southern Kingdomes full of delights and pleasures They quickly lost both their strength and Empire Which happen'd also to all Kings of Naples by reason of the soft delicacies of Air and Soyle Josuah found out a good remedy for this who would not quite extinguish all the Natives of Canaan that his People might still have some body whereon to whet and exercise their Valour So Scipio Nasica advis'd the Romanes not quite to destroy Carthage lest Rome should grow effeminate by losing her Rivall 24. By joyning in Commerce and Traffique c. with two potent Princes Thus came the Raguscan to serve the Turk and thus the Genoesse to be under the Spaniard But the Wise Venetian prevented this For he would never put to Sea with the Spaniard neither would he ever Traffique with him nor hold any thing by way of Tenure or Homage in the King of S'pains Dominions as the Genoesse and others do 25. Heavy Taxes and Impositions often lose Kingdomes and enrage the People into Mutinies and Rebellion as it hapned in Israel under Rehoboam and the Duke of Alva in Flanders 26. The Cruelty of Provincialls may be the losse of a Kingdom which rule by pride and Avarice This the Axe must cure as Goesar Borgia did by Orcus of Cesena Punishments must ever be exacted by the sword Tributes by the tongue the Militia by both 27. A Crown gain'd may be lost if the Issue Royall find friends to help them to their right as in the case of Ioas who was establish'd in his Throne by the high Priest against Athaliah and her usurpation c. 28. A Kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and Potent men as the Tarquins were Erected by Brutus and Lucretius and the Magi of Persia by Darius and his Complices Hidden Vertue in any man is a dangerous thing especially if it be afraid of the Prince that rules for it will at last break out to the Princes loss if not Ruine as it did in Brutus and his confederate Valour and Light must be ever set high on a Candlestick Smother'd Fire may do and indeed ever does most mischief Observat. How dangerous it was for Tiberius to advance Seianus himselfe a well born Person to so great Honor the Frince perceived and remedied but not without hazard Therefore both hee from that time forward and others took a course to cast Honors upon meaner Persons and those but Temporary Animad. This observation becomes a man born in a popular state But God himself seems to make it a curse when the Honorable person is overtop'd by mean fellowes Isa. 3.1 2. 3. The conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a King c. is Inevitable as that of Adad against the * King of Edom and Pausanias against Philip of Macedon and Frier Clement against Henry the third of France A conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided Therefore Probity and the Peoples love when all is done is the strongest Guard a Prince can have 26. Lastly a Kingdome may be lost when the Subject are wasted by Warre and so through want of Defendants it lies open to Invasion as now saies the Author Spaine does Enfranchizing or Endenization is the onely cure for this disease by admitting Forreigners into your Freedome as the Romans did the Latines and so fill up your number CHAP. XII Of the fall and change of Republiques where many Govern c. 1. TO take off the dissentions between Peers and People the Author would have them all participate of Honors as at this time it is amongst the Biscainers Or as amongst the Jewes that one Family chosen out of all the rest should rule Observat. 'T is expedient that betwixt the Peers and the Plebeians there should be a middle sort and degree of Persons as a Seminary of Nobility such as were the Knights and Gentlemen of Rome for this degree is a kinde of tye or Ligament of both the other 2. The Peeres contend with the people usually about honours Offices Tributes and Matrymonie and Lands and the like and if the Nobility get the day the Republique is ruin'd for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people and thence comes their downfall But if the people gain the day the matter 's worse then before for either the Nobles are driven into banishment or else they call in strangers and so the people become a prey to every crafty Citizen or forreign potentate or valiant Commander If once the Nobles mix and couple themselves with the Plebians to the end they may partake of the government with them they grow vile and despicable both together and so the common-wealth falls to ground as it alwaies happened in the Florentine republique and divers times in that of Genoa The remedy is if the People of a middle Size betwixt the Nobles and the pelting Plebeian get the upper hand and share Magistracies and honours now and then and Lands and Provinces also By such contentions Rome flourished and grew great and yet granted the honour of Victories and the credit of them to the Commons but Florence perished under them 3. A republique is often destroyed when Lawes are made to the advantage of great ones and pressure of the people 4. When the Powers in being usurpe Anthority over the people and keep guards for their defence as the Decemviri did at Rome and the Thirty Tyrants at Athens 5. The Luxury of the Nobles and their neglect of Armes and Arts makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes and so makes a republique sink into a base Democracy 6. When a Patrician grows too rich or potent and Emulations grow rife about priority then the republique 's lost So Sylla when he had subdued Marius and Cesar when Crassus was slaine and Pompey conquered who were then Rivalls in the Empire carried all before them and were Tyrants at pleasure 7. Correspondency with some forraign Prince of any person in power may ruine a republique 8. When any fawning Poplicola in a time of Famin or other occasion endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage and by such arts gets the power into his own clutches these must be lookt to and suppressed as Metius was in Rome c. and Manlius c. which King David neglecting in Absosom run the hazard of his life and Crown 9. A Republique falls to ground oft-times because it wants a Militia when the people Patritians mutually fear one another and thereupon call in forraign Commanders which is usuall in Venice Which commanders after some signal Victory obtained either themselves seize upon the common wealth as Sforza did at Millain * and Bartholomew Coline might have done at Venice or else they betray it to forraign Princes as Malatesta did Florence 10. The faction of Citizens
farre as it is agreeable to Nature it is invariable but as it serves present necessities it may and sometimes ought to be altered God himselfe also gave a Positive Law which is immutable where it containes the Law of Nature where our necessities onely mutable as the Law of Moses in the Decalogue remains in full force for ever but not in the forbidding of Swines-flesh which was made on purpose to * avoid Leprosie Yet ☞ No man can alter Lawes but he that made them or he that is Created his substitute for that very purpose Observator Note This observation cannot refer to any thing in the Antecedent Paragraph Nature is the work of Reason without us Humane Reason is the work of Nature within us The will of man is of its own Nature mutable but Reason Immutable except improperly namely when the matter about which which she is conversant is mutable 6. Politique Reason which some call the Reason of State and of old was the same with Equity does transgresse the strict Letter of the Law but not the sence and scope of it becauses it does not abrogate or interpret c. any thing but for a greater good as in the case of Fabius Vitulanus to whom the Roman Senate granted his life which was forfeited to the Law and Horace that slew the three Curatis * in the quarrell of the Roman Empire But the Reason of State as it is now adaies is nothing else but a devise of Tyrants that carries the face of Equity supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse not onely their owne but even the Lawes of God either to gaine or maintain their petty Dominions But The difference between Reason of State and Equity is this For Equity respects the Publique Good and Truth but Reason of State looks upon onely the private and seeming good of the Power in being Now since Machiavel was found to play Achitophel the name being confessedly impious Princes began that they might cover the shame of it to call it the Reason of good Government Which names though given by a knavish Godfather may bear an honest meaning As for example Cleonymus put to death the Ephori of Lacedamon by a right reason of State but so does not the Great Turk his Brethren because although he seem to do it for the Common good yet being it is against the Law of God and some other way might bee found out to prevent their aspiring to the Throne the fact is Barbarous and unreasonable 7. A good Prince wants not this Reason of State because his owne goodnesse is a perpetuall shield unto him and if any rise up against him all the People stand for him as for David whom his rebellious Son had deprived of his Kingdom But a thousand thousand Machiavillian Arts cannot protect a wicked Prince because cause he is both Odious to the People and to God the King of all the World Now hee that jarrs with God the Prime Cause does foolishly depend upon second causes as it happen'd to Caesar * Borgia who under themost wary and provident Discipline and Mastership of Machiavell lost both his life and Fortune Thus are Machiavillians alwaies taken in their owne snare for want of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge and by conceiting that by their owne Wisdome they can Fathome and foresee all things 10. Those Lawes are best which are 1. short 2. easie 3. few and 4. fitted to the Manners or Genius of the People and the Publique good Tyrannical Lawes 02 are Many and those obscure difficult like so many snares that serve the turnes of some one or few but not at all accommodated either to the Manners or advantage of the Publique 9. Where Lawes are often changed they are the forerunners of the instant raine of a Republique as Florence found it therefore by sad experience Observator Lawes belonging to Governments ought not to be alter'd unlesse necessity compell nor yet others but where the profit is very evident and very Great 10. Where there are more Laws to * punish then to direct or instruct it is a sign of an ill tempered Government 11. The Acts of Laws are to command what is good to restrain what is evill and to tollerate things indifferent 12. Reward and Punishment are the two 2 spurrs of the Law to prick men forward to observation of them Observat. No Law can stand without punishment of the transgressors of and where no punishment is expressed there it is Arbitrary otherwise it were rather a Counsellthen a Law but whether a Reason ought to be annexed to every Law it cannot universally be defined Saleucus and Charondas and Plato too follow'd this course being to make Laws for Free People they thought good to use perswasions Where as Seneca having an eye upon his * own Times affirmes A Law with a Preface to be a foolish thing being a Law should command and not perswade and Dio Chrysostome compares Custome to a King but Law to a Tyrant in that Custome gives Law to men willing to receive it but Law binds the unwilling also 13. The three Guardians or Keepers of Laws are 1. Honour 2. Love 3. Fear Hee that secures not his Law by these three is either a weak or Ignorant Lawgiver or elsea Tyrant c. 14. Where a thing which once was good becomes hurtfull it is to be forbidden Where an Evill thing does prosit the Publique if it be Evill of Punishment and not Evill of Offence it is to be Commanded Where in its own Nature indifferent as it falls out Good or Evill to the Republique it is to be according Commanded or Forbidden 15. The Laws of men make rather good Citizens then simply good men Yet Princes and Rulers ought to be simply good because they are the * Light and the Law of others 16. The Law ought to make and ordain Equality as the Nurse of the Common-wealth but not a Levelling for as the Observator saies excellently such strings make no Harmony but an Equality opposite to that destructive * consiming inequality which is fatall to Common-wealths For example Extrem Poverty makes Theeves Insidious Perjur'd Ignorant and Instruments of Rich wicked men On the contrary very Rich men are Proud Luxurious Unlearn'd Contumelious and I may adde out of * Aristotle Injurious too Very crasty men are commonly given to change Very stupid are voluntarily servants or slaves Onely moderatemen are Stable in their place and stations where they live The Florentine Republique was ever the most unstable by reason of the subtlety of their wits The Venetian the most firm and stable of all by reason of a Mediocrity and allay of Dullnesse 17. A good Custome is a second Law which does more preserve a Common-wealth then the Law it self Five Customes made Rome the Princesse of Republiques as Cato in Salust witnesseth 1. Publique Wealth 2. Private Poverty 3. Just Government abroad 4. Freedome of speech at home 5. Unliablenesse to fears or
make exchanges of Inhabitants by mutuall transplantations So the Romans to secure their Empire carried Colonies over into Germany that by their example the Germanes unaccustomed to Romane Lawes might be the better acquainted with and subject to them Observator The Trans-Rhine which are the true and proper Germanes for the much greatest part were never Conquer'd by the Romans but retain'd sans mixture their own Language and Manners till under Lotharius they â—oluntarily submitted to the Romane Yoak You shall find more Germane Families in Italy then Roman Families in Germany 2. Colonies are best made up of Citizens bred up in the Metropolis of the Kingdome or in the Neighbouring Towns for example either of Romans or Latines and because so many be planted as will be able to defend the Province and any Enemy whatever 3. If Colonies be sent from a Free-State it is good to build their Cities on the tops of the Hills for defence of their Liberty if from a Monarch better in the Plain 4. That Cities may wax great 't is expedient they be Situate either upon the Banks of Rivers or neare the Sea-shore and in a Plain Where necessaries for life are easiest to be had commerce with strangers is most convenient But for the Defence of Liberty and Lawes and the Non-impayring of Valour they are more commodiously seated upon Mountaines and Rocks Withall great respect is to be had to the wholesomnesse of Water and Air and Winds and the Prospect to the severall Quarters of the Heavens 5. Planters of Colonies are to be divided into 1. Governors as Priests and Judges 2. Protectors as Soul-diers and Commanders 3. Artizans and such as * feed the Republique As Husbandmen Shepherds and the like Observator Nothing hinders but he that Vses Husbandry may also follow a Trade either by himselfe or his Wife Rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a Plantation do often faile in the Practique Plaines bear most Corn Mountaines most Wool Hence c. came Chaffering and Exchanging and Merchandizing and stamping of Goynes c. and for want of Souldery hereupon were Forts and Guns invented CHAP. VII Of the instruments to gain keep Kingdomes c. TO gain keep and govern Kingdomes there are three principal l instruments The 1. Tongue 2. Sword 3. Treasure 1. For the Tongue t is the instrument of Religion and Prudence That is of the Goods of the Minde 2. The sword is the proper Instrument of the Body and its Goods 3. Treasure is more the Instrument of Fortunes and Estates which serves the Body and Minde onely Secondarily but the true Instruments are the Tongue and the Sword 2. They that use the sword only founding their power upon that those quickly lose their dominion as Tamberlaine Attila and Brennus and most of the Northern nations The Jesuites in Japan gaine first soules then Kingdomes to Spaine and the Papacy by their tongues There be that gaine Dominion by crying up some new sect built upon some specious colour of truth by sowing discord betwixt the old Religion the new Sect which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude But such Dominion is of it selfe not very long liv'd Ring-leaders of Heresies although commonly they gain much they keep little as for example John of Leydon Dulcinus Theudas Observat. John of Leydon was an ignorant fellow a person of of no worth at all who through the hatred against the Priests of his time whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men gathered together a rabble of the basest people They that use well the sword and tongue do lay the foundations of durable Dominion but then the sword must be just and the tongue veracious Thus did Moses build the Empire of the Jews namely in veracity and justice which impious Machiavell never took into consideration p. 147. The Law of Moises survived the Empire of the Jews but Mahomets Laws shall sink with his Empire Thus fell the laws of Alexander with his person and power Thus Numa's Belus and Minos Pythagoras and Zamolxis his lawes are extinct even for want of justice and veracity He that knows not how to give lawes to those he conquers doth quickly lose the Kingdome he has gain'd Thus Charles the fifth lost Tunis and Germany which he had wonne for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of Lawes and Colonies This misfortune often befell King Pirrhus but not so the Romans Observ. He had need be a very wise man that can give lawes to men of a different Religion that shal be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them as it appears by the Romans in Jewry who did the utmost of their endeavour with all their skill strived to establish the state and tranquility of that untractable people by lawes conforme to their tempers and humors as the excellent orations of King Agrippa and Josephus made to their Countrymen the Jews do witnesse 5. he that defends his Dominions by sword and tongue preserves them better and more safely then he that makes use but of onely one For 6. Men of Arts are usually oppressed by Men of Armes Thus Saturn being a Priest as antient Kings were left his Kingdome to Jupiter and Perseus the Warriour dethron'd Atlas the Scholler and Astrologer Thus was Pythagoras supported by souldiers * and the Pope till such time as he felt the use of his weapons was often made a prey to his enemies and many times good man to his friends Observator Here the thrice worthy Grotius notes well upon this late passage concerning the Bishop of Rome that the benigne aspects of opportunity made way for that power which the Pope now enjoyes as for instance the Christian World split into many petty Kingdomes Italy torn in pieces and sluggish withall an age too dull to apprehend the meaning of that Artifice in due time and diverse other causes which you may find in Guicciardin and Machiavell 7. He that uses only Armes for the defence of his Empire and neglects witt and eloquence makes but a paper building rules but weakly and this is the reason why the Emperor of Germany prevailes no more having a people of different perswasions in Religion to rule over and usually such Princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts Hence came it that the Popes did so frequently make and un-make Emperors at their pleasure Therefore as Salust observes did the Romans wisely ever exercise both mind and body together For He that exerciseth both makes his Empire last longest as the King of the Turkes and Abassines and the Dake of Muscovy Fabulous Philosophy affirms as much whiles it gives Pallas the Goddesse of wisdome a Book and a Spear to make her invincible but to Mars only Arnour who as the Poets sings was therefore often Conquered Hence was it that 9. The Northern Nations that fell like swarms
but the Germanes were hindred by their own Discords and Germany hindred France and France Spain just as the Persian and Tartar keep the Turk from being Emperor of the World 18. Charles the great and Constantine declared themselves Defenders of the Pope but Henry and Frederick enemies for under Frederick those pernicious factions of Guelfes Gibellines that is Imperialists and Pontificians arose in Italy Julian the Apostat endeavoured to make Gentilisme and Judaisme aemulate one the other and vie for the Mastery but perished under the attempt The Mahometan Sect has many defects in it First because if their armes faile they fall 2. Because it admitts not of divers Princes 3. Because in many things it opposes God And. 4. Because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics The Duke of Muscovy a Country assailed by no man defends himselfeby his scituation and schisme and stands rather by the discords of Christendome then upon his own bottom as indeed the Turk himselfe partly doth Charles the fifth was a man that bid fairest for the Universall Monarchy When Constantius countenunced the Arians and Julian Paganisme the Pope was not a man in power had no dominion then Here therefore then is an error or fallacy of no cause put for a cause Here in this Paragraph the fryar seems to dream of the return of a Golden age of Innocence under one I know not what Monarch of all as Adam was at first and seems to point at the Spaniard for the man the Observator suspects some poison here but I think there is much more vanity then venome 20. That the world may be governed by one man the Empire of Augustus does partly prove it That the Spaniard does rule the 2 Hemisphears by Religion which is the very soule of an Empire and Dominion being all in the whole and wholly in every part 21. If the World were governed by one man as Alexander said by one Sun warres would cease and Pestilence by communication of Arts and Medicines and by transmigration from infected into wholesome ayre By the same transmigrations might Inundations and fire be avoided so famine likewise might be averted by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy Countries c. Animad. These are but the fumes fancies of an idle braine doting upon the Spanish interest and the Papall and so I dismisse them proceeding to CHAP. IX Of the second cause of gaining and governing Kingdomes which is prudence A Monarchy is fitter to gain a Common-wealth then to conserve Dominion Monarchy is sooner depraved then many Rulers Grotius confesses then a few as Oligarchy which I undèrstand not neither of them gives their reason nor I my assent The Observator adds For duration no Common-wealth in the world is worth the naming but the Venetian and yet the Egyptian Assyrian and French Kingdomes have lasted longer then that Some are Kings 1. By Nature Rationall as it were Kings of wisdome as Socrates and Cato 2. By Fortitude as Domitian and Vitcllius 3. By both as Alexander Augustus and David 4. More by Nature then Fortune as Scipio and Hannibal 5. More by Fortune then Nature as Tiberius Galba 3. Prudence the second cause of Dominion does properly belong to those that are truely Kings and to such next under God is Dominion due which prudence is directly opposite to Craft or Subtlety which is proper only to Machiavels Tyrant Prudence is consonant to God that is to eternall wisdome Craft agrees to nothing but a mans own will and pleasure that is acts all Arbitrarily Prudence is magnanimous Craft base yet proud Prudence alwaies advances wise and valiant men and puts them in place of power and trust Craft depresses and destroyes them that she may rule over Bastard-Subjects when the Legitimate are cut off Prudence treasures up riches for the good of mens souls and that their numbers may encrease Craft aymes at money and strong holds and rejoyces in the Diminution and lessening of her subjects Prudence even in losing conquers Craft by conquering is a loser Prudence is mercifull Craft is cruell Prudence is that of principall men and Chieftaines such as Cesar craft belongs to servile persons such as Davus Prudence has an eye to the Stern but Craft to the Oare Prudence makes Lawes for every mans good but Craft only for her own Prudence punishes and gains good-will by it and makes subjects the better Craft punishes and becomes odious and the people the worse for 't It is proper to magnanimity and valour to gain Dominions as to Cesar and Charles the fifth but to justice and temperance to preserve them as to the Venetians and he that is adorned with all vertues is fit for both as Augustus 5. He that acquires Dominions must have such a Prudence as is magnanimous stout liberall just c. but somewhat inclining to pride boldnesse prodigality but severity mixt with it c. He that keepes and preserves Dominions must have the same prudence but inclining to Pusillanimity to fear Tenacity and some Licentiousnesse c. 6. Hee that gaines a Kingdome different from him in Religion must either Translate the Seat of his Empire thither as the Turk did into Constantinople or else Translate the Inhabitants into an other Region as Nebuchadnezzar did the Jewes into Babylon and plant new Colonies in the Metropolitane Cities of the Conquer'd Province which shall be of thine own Religion and Laws place new Preachers there change Laws and bring down the chief of the People as Cyrus did in Lydia and the Spaniniard in America But if they will buckle to thy Religion thou maist make them Artists and Mechanicks serviceable to thy Colony if not doom them to slavery and Transplant them farre enough be sure from thy seat Imperiall But if they embrace the same Religion with thee as the Neapolitanes with the Spaniards treat them gently receive them into Common friendship and change not their Customes nor Polirie but by degrees let the Supreme Judges be made out of thine own men the inferiour out of theirs If they did violently oppose thine entrance Levell the Peers with the People but if they did receive the as friends Transplant them out of their Native soyle and drill them with Honors Rewards and Promotions but be sure let not the chief heads be left behind for they will either grow insolent upon Familiarity and render thee odious to the People or else they will rebell By these defects Pyrrhus and Charles the fifth lost all the Provinces they had gain'd on a suddain But beware lest by Calumnies and fraud you depresse any man for by that meanes you only prepare Ruine and Conspiracies against your self and so alienate their Affections that upon the least occasion they will rebell against you 7. He that invades an others Kingdome must not stick at the mischiefs following viz. To strike at the Head change Lawes pull down Forts and Castles Extinguish the Blood-Royall or Translate it Animad. This savours
of Machiavel whom the Fryer so much detests or which is worse of the Jesuit 8. A Prince should be known to do no evill except that of punishment and that too such as the People wish as to Fleece Usurers and ravenous Magistrates to banish Superfluous and effeminate Arts doom the sluggish to the Oare to punish Adultery Pride and all Enormous sins and sinners 9. The People are kept in obedience by plenty of Provisions Souldiers by good Pay Nobles by Honors 10. For the advance and encrease of Republiques and Kingdomes these Rules following are to be observed 1. All persons must take upon them those Functions and callings for which Nature has fitted them 2. Magistrates are to be chosen rather by Nature then Fortune 3. The greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse and the Common before the Private 4. Let there be a free Community of Goods of Knowledge and of Religion 5. Foment the Emulations of aspiring to Honors by Vertue 6. Preferre ever Divine things before Humane 7. Let every man learn this Logick viz. That God is Ergo He is wise and good Ergo He has a tender care over us Ergo he is just And we are his Children and therefore after death will reward or punish us If this be not so Ergo God is not just not good Ergo neither is he God The contrary whereof All Nature the Fabrick of the Universe and its severall Parts and the use Order and function of cach Particle of it do wonderfully and loudly proclaim As also his revealing himselfe to his Saints on Earth Angells and Devills and Policies and all Sciences in the World confessing it CHAP. X. Of the third Cause c. viz. Occasion THE occasions of acquiring Dominion are innumerable But the chief are I. Thine own Valour and Numbers and the Imbecillity of thine Enemies and their Associates 2. The Division of the Province to be surprized into petty Kings or jarring Republiques but especially into various Seots and Schisms 3. But most of all if any man call thee in for his Protectour 4. If the Rulers Son be in his Minority 5. If the Ruler be hated of his People 6. If the People be covetous of change 7. If the Nobles or Patricians may be bought and sold as those of Rome were in Jugurths daies 8. If there be any Interregnum c. 9. All grosse and Enormous sins and Vices are so many Inlets and doors for a Conqueror to come in by as Idolatry and Anthropophagie above the rest CHAP. XI Of the Decay Downfall and Change of Monarchies and the cause and remedies thereof ALL Monarchy dies or sinks at least either 1. Through want of Vertue in him that succeeds in it so the Assyrian Monarchy ended in Sardanapalus Or 2. For want of a Successor which evill Augustus prevented by adopting Sons to succeed him 3. By Division or Discord of many successors so the Romane Monarchy under Constantius became a Dyarchy under Constantine and Constance and afterwards in Arcadius and Honorius and the Spanish Monarchy was Rivall'd by Alonzo Ferdinand and Sanctius The Turk prevents this mischief by killing his Brethren but the King of China by banishing them into some Mountain which the King of the Abassines does likewise 4. Because the Kings Son is young and contemptible as the Son of Scanderbeg and Antiochus and Alexander the Great and the last Duke save one of the line of Sforza Duke of Millaine who all being Minors and Pupills were commited to Guardian Kinsmen or Tutors or strangers and so were either murther'd or deposed 5. The Election of a King if it be made by Souldiers is dangerous and Schismaticall because they are easily carried from one to another in their affections For Souldiers are naturally a dull kind of People and value them most who pay them best at present not at all considering the Publique good as it happen'd in the times of Galba Vitellius Vespasian and Otho in the Romane state and under Omri in Israel with very much dammage to the Publique 6. Election also made by all the People is dangerous for they understand not the deep designes of hidden and disguised Tyrants but are distracted and carried away with smooth Orators whithersoever they please to lead them Besides the People are ever at odds with one another and alwaies changing opinions Hereupon Florence by such Popular Elections sustained a world of dammage and prejudice Neither does the Populacy confide in their Nobles but call in strangers to pacifie their Tunmults So the Florentines call'd in the Commander of Athens by whom they were more devour'd then before The remedy is if onely the heads of Families be summon'd to Election but this is a weak one 7. Elections are best made by a prudent Senate out of the body of the Senate it self as the Pope out of the Conclave of Cardinalls 8. If an Election suffer a Schism in it or Fracture viz. an Interregnum or as they cal it a Vacant See the Empire may go to wrack and therefore the Germane Emperor doth make choice of his Successor before his death as also the King of Fez before he dies advances one of his own Sons into his Throne Observat. It often falls out otherwise for the Romane Emperour of time dies and appoints no Successor and the Polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that Kingdom 9. The best is not alwaies elected but he whom the dying King loves best as Solomon chose Rehoboam Observat. The odd number over does best in Elections and therfore the King of Bohemia was superadded to the six old Electors of Germany 10. A Monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise by the insolency and pravity of a mans Children as in Tarquin the proud or of his wife who often hates the best deserving men as Sophia the Wife of Justinian the Emperor hated Narses the Gallant Eunuch who therefore call'd in the Lombards into Italy to the hazard of the whole Empire ☞ 11. Monarchy may be in danger also and be ruin'd by the Authority of some Prophet or bold Popular Preacher that dares cry it down The instance here is made in Samuel and the Pope which is an handsome comparison indeed Here the Fryer draws the Curtain and laies open the whole scene of the Popes Encroachments upon Temporall Princes which part I leave the Fryer to Act by himself and thither referre the Reader only he tells us pag. 198. that never any Prince prosper'd that opposed his Holinesse but fell at last as Frederick of Swevia Roger Guiscand c. Yet Some Princes call'd a councell against Julius the second and Pope Eugenius the fourth All Clergy-men under the Papacy love the Pope in their heart Princes only for preferment Armed Religion was alwaies Invincible Vid. animad supr. It is better for a Prince to yeeld to the Priest as Theodosius did to Ambrose then to treat him ill as Eudoxa did Chrysoctome For he was confirmed in his Throne whereas she dyed an
that bear affection to some faction of strangers ruine a republique so all the republiques of Italy split themselves into Guelfes and Gibellins or which was worst of all into Neuters whereupon dire and dismall slaughters and times ensued A Republique must never be Neutrall because it must necessarily be a prey to the Conqueror not being supported either by friends or enemies Nec amicis nec inimicis fota Lat. 11. A Republique falls when the People confide not in the Nobility nor the Nobility in them and therefore they call in a forraign Umpire that will devour them both as Florence call'd in King Robert * the Duke of Athens The remedy is to commit the Vmpirage of the quarrell not to strangers but to religious men Priests that are Natives as Moises did by Gods command and as the Observator well notes The old Gauls did to the Druides and oft times both they and the Germans to godly and grave Matrons But this latter is a crude observation 12. Changes of Republique are innumerable as their causes are Read the Florentine History for that City ran through all varieties of change and in opposition to that the Roman CHAP. XIII Of the Fate and change of Popular or Democratique state c. 1. A Democracy or Popular State assuredly goes to wrack when Ignorant Plebeians rule that canno agree amongst themselves and determine all things ☞ by chance or affection 2. Popular elections are ever attended with jarring and noise of the multitude and obstreperous rabble 3. In the Senate or Parliaments of Popular States he that has the smoothest tongue is likeliest to cheat the people and make himselfe be elected rules in chief though he be the veriest Knave in the Pack 4. It marres a Popular State when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique Offices and the wealthier sort grow Tyrannous by their riches It is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice as the Florentines used to do for this is a symptome of dissention amongst the Natives and oft brings ruine with it yet has it been practised else-where of late but with like successe 5. This Paragraph about provisions and supplying the publick necessities by Corn c. is treated of in the precedent Chapter 6. The next Barre of a Democratique State is the Generall that fights their Battails abroad and returnes home a King as well as a Conqueror as Sforza returned to Millain and Cesar to Rome c. Observ. The Romans provided excellently against this mischief they had ever at hand good store of sitt and able men for the conduct of any Warre and ever and anone changed their Commanders whereby they both secured their liberty and by emulation provok'd them to vertue and valour 7. An other Engine to batter down Democracy is a Publique Benefactor that has got Power into his hands and pretends himself in hazard of his life by Conspirators and thereupon desires a kind of Life Guard for the safety of his Person against his accusers those he would accuse and so being thus well provided hee invades the Throne if I may so say and dubbs himself King so did Pisistratus at Athens To prevent this The People must commit themselves to the care and Providence of wise and religious men reposing all trust and confidence in them For by not believing Solon the Philosopher who discover'd to them the design of Pisistratus the Athenians lost their Liberty 8. A Common wealth may fall by the approach of suddain and unexpected dangers the Common people being dull heavy in deliberations So the Romanes lost Saguntum whilst they slowly consulted how to get it and the Venetians Cyprus whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it In this case a Dictator must must speedily be pitch'd upon to Rule and dispatch every thing as himself sees most Expedient without Counsell or controll of any man Necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none but the best and ablest man for that service as the Practice of the Romanes in that case does witnesse 9. A Popular State may miscarry too by some wealthy Citizen who does favour and foster Poets and Oratours and Preachers Grammarians and all sorts of men that have Eloquence or wit and by his riches keeps an Academy in his own house of men that can Blazon Trumpet forth his praises and worth to the People c. Thus became Cosmo Medices Dake of Florence Let no man that sets his wits and tongue to sale have any pare in any Senate or Parliament Greece quite lost her self by the Liberty of Orations so did Germany and France by sermons and the Switzers too late provided a remedy against this disease The Last Paragraph concerning the danger of change All Change be it never so little of the Antient state of things in a Commonwealth or Kingdome is either a Sign or Cause or Con-Cause or Preparation to an Universall change of minds and by consequence of all the Republique or Princedome revolting from its own Principles As new meates and new Exercise beget a new habit of Body So Darius by affecting to wear a Macedonian sword did foretell that his Kingdome should be ruin'd by the armes of Macedon Therefore the change even of old Fashions in Apparell of Banquets and Marriages and of womens behaviour and of old Discipline and the Pravity and corruption of youth as Censorinus notes new Lawes and Tributes ought ever to be avoided for they either suddenly or totally destroy a Kingdom Whereupon the Venetian will not change so much as his old Originall Garbe in his cloths for as Solomon saies Hee that failes in the least things shall by degrees come to nought The COROLLARIE and Conclusion It is Probitie and Pietie that preserves a King and People and not the unlearned Craft and subtlety of Machiavell For all Vertue and Power derives its Originall from Hun who is the Essentiall Power and Wisdom of his Father that Governs all things To whom be all Glory FINIS Aphor. 1. Max. 1. Addit * He was a Dubs equall to a King {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} * Grotius favours Toleration Corruptions Externall Add. Venice subject to Oblimation Addit An Excellent Gradation Conclusion thereupon * Victrii Domini De c. * Animadvers. They are like to make but sorrie servants and instruments that are weak bath in body and mind * Valor Lat. * Observator * Lat. Optimis nascuntur * Volentis 1 Yhe Divine Law 2 Law Naturall Qua est Ars Dei Ejusdemque Directrix 3 Law of Nations 4 Positive Law * Lepram non alendam Lat. * In the behalf of or rather for the Empire * Casar Valentine Borgia Lat. * Punitive quam Instructive * Under Nero * Aliorum Lux Lex * Inequalitas Consumptrix Lat. * Rhetor * Primus Impetus Major quam Virorum Secundus minor quam Paeminarum Flor. * Addictè Despoticè * Perversus L. * Perito Cunning * Iam Eruditis A body Politique how actuteda * Spiritus sing I at Pro rata * Nutritios Reip. L. * Of Croton◠Dux Lat. * Vicarium c. Papam * The Lat. is ambiguous Add. Cruciatus Lat. Franceruns Franks Condemnationes Lat. * or possess * Civitatem portat idem L. * He means Ehud Eglon. lud. 3.6.20.21 * or Colion * or Generall Dux