or Record the Prince in being hath onely a Right from Possession and can never create himself a Title by the continuation of his own Injustice or command any of his Subjects to fight against this true Heir since they are to obey this Vsurper p. 72. or his Heirs onely in such things as tend to their own preservation and not to the destruction of the true Governour By which Principle the Author at once renders the Titles of all the Crowns in Europe disputable and all Allegiance uncertain and questionable by their Subjects as I shall shew in several instances as I shall prove from Histories of unquestionable credit I shall begin with our own Country England If therefore as the Author will have it p. 69. the Usurper is onely then to be taken for the true Heir when the knowledge of the right Heir is lost by all the Subjects it will follow that all the Kings and Queens that reigned in England until the coming in of K. James were Usurpers for the Right of Succession to the Crown of England could not be obtained by Conquest alone And I suppose this Authour does not allow it to be bequeathable by Will as long as the right Heir was in being and could be known from authentick Histories and Traditions Now the Right of the Crown by Descent belonging after the death of Edward the Confessor to Edgar Atheling his Cousen he dying without Issue the Right fell to Mawd his Sister who married Malcolm III Buchanan de Rebus Scoticus lib. 7. King of Scotland and though her Daughter Mawd was married to Henry the first King of England from whom all our Kings are descended yet the Right was not in her but in Edgar King of Scotland her Brother from whom all the Kings of Scotland to King James were descended It is true the Kings of Scotland were too wise ever to set up this Title because they knew the Norman Race were quietly possessed of the Throne and had been admitted and confirmed for lawful Kings by many great Councils or Assemblies of the Clergy Nobility and People yet did not this absolve the People who might very well retain the traditional knowledge of this right Heir For divine Right never dies nor can be lost or taken away or barr'd by Prescription So that all Laws which were made to confirm the Crown either to Henry I. or any of his Descendants were absolutely void and unlawful by our Authors principles and so likewise all Wars made against the King of Scotland in person were absolutely sinful and unlawful since according to this Authors principle the command of an Usurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the destruction of the person of the true Governour So by the same Principle all Laws made in France about the Succession of the Crown are absolutely void and it would be a mortal sin in the French Nation to resist any King of England of this Line if he should make War in person upon the French King then in being since according to the ancient Laws of Descent in that Kingdom he is true Heir of the Crown of France Nor can the French here plead ignorance since there is scarce a Peasant there but knows our King stiles himself King of France and quarters the Arms of that Kingdom and so ought to understand the justness of his Title So likewise in Spain Mariana de Rebus Hisp lib. 13 cap. 7. all the Kings of Castile are likewise by this Rule Usurpers since the time of Sancho III who succeeded to the Crown after the death of Alphonso V his Father who had bequeathed it to Alphonso and Ferdinand de la Cerda his Grandsons by Ferdinand his eldest Son who died before him Yet notwithstanding this Testament and their Right as representing their Father the elder Brother Sancho their Uncle was admitted as King by the Estates of Castile and his Descendants hold that Kingdom by no better Right to this day Nor is this a thing stale or forgotten for the Dukes of Medina Coeli on whom by Marriage of the Heiress of the House de la Cerda the right descends do constantly put in their Claim upon the death of every King of Spain and the answer is The place is full Nor can those of this Author's opinion plead possession or the several Laws that have been made to confirm the Crown to the first Usurpers and their Descendants for it will be replied out of this Author p. 70. That the right Heir having the Fatherly Power in him and so having his Authority from God no inferiour Power can make any Law of Prescription against him and Nullum tempus ocurrit Regi And this were to make the Crown elective and disposable according to the Will of the Estates or People I shall now return to the Author's distinction and shew that his distinguishing the Laws or Commands of Usurpers into indifferent or not indifferent signifies nothing for suppose that an Usurper as several have been in England and other Kingdoms either dares not or thinks it not for his interest to alter the form of the Government but is contented for his own safety to govern upon the same Terms his Predecessors did and so will not raise any Money or make new Laws without the consent of the Estates whom he summons for that purpose Now they must either obey his Writs of Summons or they must not if they do not obey them he will perhaps be encouraged to take their Goods by force perhaps by a standing Army which he may have ready in pay and then say it is long of their own stubbornness who would not give it him freely when they might have done it and they shall likewise be without these good Laws the Author supposes he may make but if they meet he will not let them sit unless they first by some Oath or Recognition acknowledge his Title to be good and own him as their lawful Prince Now what shall they do in this case they must either lose their Liberties and alter the form of the Government or acknowledge him to the prejudice of their lawful Prince But if the Laws are once made and they appear evidently for the good of the Commonwealth they then are no longer indifferent since all private Interests are to give place to the publick Good of the Commonwealth since in the instance before given of the Father of a Family 's being driven out of doors by a Robber no doubt but every Member of the Family ought to obey this Rogue in case the house should be on fire or ready to fall and he would take upon him to give orders for the quenching or securing it from falling for they did this not to own his Authority but from the obligation they owe to their Father or Master who would have done the same had he been at home So to obey Laws made by an Usurper that tend to the apparent benefit of the Commonwealth is not
no more to be said And as for the places out of St. Paul and Peter it not being my designe to write Divinity-Lectures I shall refer the Reader to the learned Commentators onely I shall take notice that his Assertion That these Apostles wrote their Epistles when the name of the Authority and People of Rome was still in being though the Emperours had usurped a Military Power and yet though the Government was for a long time in most things in the Senate and People of Rome yet for all this neither of the two Apostles take notice of any such Popular Government and our Saviour himself divides all between God and Caesar and â—llows nothing to the People All which though but a Negative Argument against Popular Government and â—o not conclusive yet the foundation of it is not true For though in Rome there remained a shadow of the Power in the Senate yet it was onely in such cases as â—he then Emperours committed to their judgment as â—he Kings of France do now make use of the Parliament of Paris onely to ease themselves of divers troublesome Causes or to take off the odium from themselves as in the condemnation of Sejanus and divers other Conspirators against them and yet they reserved the last Appeal to themselves in Cases both Civil and Capital as may be observed in St. Paul's appeal to Caesar and it is certain that the Roman Emperours in those times put men to death as often as they had a mind to it by their own power made what Edicts they pleased and appointed Proconsuls and Governours of Provinces as often as they saw it convenient and had all Money coined with their Image or Superscription and received and disposed of all Tributes publick Taxes And yet this Author doubts whether Tiberius Claudius or Nero were absolute Monarchs when they had all the Prerogatives that a Monarch could have I come now to the Author's Observations on Aristotle's Politicks It will be easie to prove that he makes use of him in all places that make for his Hypothesis but takes no notice of those that make against it a usual course among Writers especially in Politicks or Divinity Nor does he onely do this but likewise oftentimes perverts Aristotle's sence to make it subservient to his own of which I shall produce these instances In his first Quotation p. 3. he renders these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the eldest in every house is King Whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not here signifie to be an absolute Monarch but to govern as a Master of a Family or chief Ruler a power faâ— short of that of an absolute Monarch And so Lambinus hath rendered it in his Version So likewise he hath misplaced these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes them to come in as a reason of what he says before concerning a perfect Monarchy whereas this sentence precedes the former and there are three or four sentences between them and therefore it cannot serve for a Consequent where it is really an Antecedent Nor is this sentence truely rendered by the Author For a King according to Law makes no kind of Government whereas he should have said No distinct species of Government for so are these last words to be rendered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or else he would make Aristotle contradict himself if after he had spoke so much in other * Vid. 3 Pol. c. 14. Speaking of the ancient Heroical Kingdoms places of a King according to Law he should make it no kind of Government at all So likewise p. 4. he misrenders these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That of all Governments Monarchy is the best and a Popular State the worst Whereas any one but meanly skill'd in Greek knows that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not signifie Monarchy but Kingship and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not a Popular Estate but an Aristocratical Commonwealth and in the same Chapter put in opposition to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I shall not trouble my self to inquire whether Aristotle distinguishes well between an Aristocracy and an Oligarchy or between an Oligarchy and a Democracy or whether he do well to exclude Artificers from any Vote in the Government These I shall leave to be defended by those that are greater admirers of him than my self onely I will see that if I can he have fair play and not that sence put upon him that he never meant And therefore I shall turn over to p. 12. where he quotes another place out of Aristotle's fourth Book cap. 13. That the first Commonwealth among the Grecians after Kingdoms was made of those that waged War From whence he would infer That the Grecians after they left off to be governed by Kings fell to be governed by an Army So that any Nation or Kingdom that is not charged with the keeping of a King must perpetually be at the charge of paying and keeping of an Army Which though it happened true during the corrupt Oligarchy of the Rump which was â—ut an armed Faction contrary to the sense of this Nation yet is not a necessary Consequent of all Commonwealths Neither is it the Author's sence in this place as may appear by what he says before and what â—ollows these words That he meant no such thing a standing Army in constant Pay being a thing unknown among the Greek Commonwealths where every Freeman served in person as a Horseman or on foot according to his ability as any that reads those Histories may easily observe and a Guard of Strangers or a constant standing Army was ever held the Body of Tyranny as it still continues in all absolute Monarâ—hies from France to China But to return to Aristle in the place before cited by the Author where speaking just before of the Government of the Maleans and other Greek Commonwealths he says That their Government consisted not onely of those Footmen that bore Arms but of those that had served in the Army And then follows these words quoted by the Author 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not well rendered by those that waged War since they should rather be rendered by those that went to the Wars this Force not being to defend them from their own Citizens but Neighbours with whom they were still at Wars for it appears that not onely those had a share in the Government who were actually in Arms but those also that had served in the Army for Aristotle says immediately after That their Strength consisted chiefly at first of Horsemen and that as the Common-wealths increased in the strength and number of them that were of ability or substance to bear Arms the Administration of the Commonwealth was communicated to more From whence it appears that as also at first among the Romans they onely had a Voice in their Councils or Assemblies who were able to maintain themselves in the Wars at their own charge As amongst us none have a
place more which the Author does not quote fairly Anarchy of a limited Monarchy p. 294. where Aristotle reckoning up the several sorts of Monarchies The last says he is the Heroick which flourished in Heroical times to whom the People did * The Greek word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their own accord willingly obey and they were paternal and †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which confutes the Author's fancy that a King according to Law makes no kind of Government legal And then reckoning up the occasions reasons of their Obedience he concludes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And these were chosen Kings by the consent of those that were willing Lambinus renders it à voluntariis and left the Kingdom so obtained to their Children Which whole sentence is omitted by the Author because it makes against his Hypothesis and proves that the most ancient Kingdoms began by Election of the People So true is that excellent Simile of the elder Dr. Don's That Sentences of good Authors whilst they remain in their proper place like the hairs of an Horses tail concenter in one root of strength and ornament but pulled out one by one serve only to make Snares And indeed he hath made use of Aristotle as Lawyers do of their Adversaries Evidence where it makes for them they allow it and make use of it but where it is against them it is false or signifies nothing I shall now cursorily look over the rest of this Discourse where p. 23. though it be true what Aristotle says That the People must act as a Monarch and become as one Person before it can govern So after they are so united into one Senate or Council it is no good Argument to say That the whole Multitude does not govern where the major part onely rules because many of the Multitude that are so assembled are so far from having any part in the Government that they themselves are governed against and often contrary to their wills those people to contract it being the major part in one Vote that are perhaps of another opinion in another and so every change of business begets a new major part For though it is true every individual person does not actually agree to every Vote yet implicitly he does since at the first institution of the Government the first Compact was That the agreement of the major part should conclude the whole Assembly and whoever either then would not or now refuses to be so concluded is still in the state of Nature in respect of all the rest and is not to be lookt upon as a Member of that Commonwealth but as an Enemy and a Covenant-breaker I shall not quarrel with the Author if he hold that Monarchy does most conduce to the main ends of Government Religion towards God and Peace towards men since I agree with him that absolute Monarchy if a man could be sure the Monarch would still continue prudent and just were the best sort of Government for mankind Onely I cannot but smile to finde the Author p. 27. so much admire the high respect the great Turk pays the Mufti or chief Bishop as he calls him where by the by I never heard the Turkish Church-Government was Episcopal before yet every printed Relation can tell us that this wonderful Reverence is but a meer piece of Pageantry the Idol being of his own making and whom he again unmakes at his pleasure a sort of Ordination I suppose the Author would not allow to those of an indelible Character It is true indeed what the Author affirms p. 29. That Rome being in any desperate condition was still forced to flie to Monarchy chusing a Dictator with absolute Power Yet this was onely as a General in time of War or some great civil Commotion being very near it where it must be confest that the absolute power of one is best at such times which needed a speedy Remedy And argues no more the Romans good opinion of Monarchy than it does any mans approbation of Martial Law which though perhaps the best that can be used in War it will not therefore follow that it were to be chosen in times of Peace no more than because Brandy may do a man good when he is sick in his stomach therefore he ought to drink it constantly So that as one benefit of the Dictatorship was the help it gave them upon an Extremity so the next happiness they wisht for after that was over was that the Dictator would lay down his Office again And the People of Rome were never more tyrannized over and opprest than when these Dictators held their Power by force contrary to their Institution and longer than there was need of them as may be seen in the Examples of Sylla and Caesar But the Consuls though they had in many things especially in calling the Senate and in commanding the Army a Kingly power yet it was not absolute but was liable to be questioned by the Senate and People as any man that reads the Roman History may observe See the Oration of Valerius in Dionysius Halicarnassaeus lib. 7. upon the difference between the Senate and People I shall not now stay to dispute whether the People of Rome did well or ill in expelling Tarquin but besides his personal faults he was never their lawful King having ascended the Throne by the murder of his Father-in-Law Servius Tullius and kept it by the power of a standing Army without the due Election of the Senate and People which was contrary to the Institution of that Kingdom which was Elective The Author p. 32. makes a great difficulty to grant the Roman Commonwealth to be Popular It is true it was not so absolutely but was mixt with an Aristocracy in the Government of the Senate and with Regal power in the Authority of the Consuls yet it is plain the supreme Power remained in the Body of the People And though by the unequal division of the Centuries it is true the greater part of the common People were seldom admitted to vote being concluded by the major part of the first 97 Centuries who consisted of the better and richer men yet this inequality begot the Tributa Comitia which with the Author 's good leave was more absolute than the former Coâ—itia Centuriata For Dion Halicarnas lib. 9. relating â—he original of these Tributa Comitia and how they â—iffered from the other says That the latter were transâ—cted in one day without any Auspicia and could make 〈◊〉 Law at once without any precedent Senatus Consulâ—um which the Curiata Comitia could not And â—hough it is true that the power of making War and Peace and creating of Magistrates remained in the Comitia Curiata yet the judging of great and capital Crimes and of altering and making Laws remained â—n the Tributa Comitia as may be observed in the â—anishment of Coriolanus and other punishments by â—hem inflicted and all Appeals were to this Assembly Yet
any reservation or restriction and as for the last clause where the King Swears to observe and protect justas Leges consuetudines which he translates upright Laws and customes this word justas in this place is not put restrictively as any man may see that considers the sense of the words but only by way of Epithite supposing that the People would not chuse any laws to be observed but those that are just and upright but the Author omits here quas populus Elegerit as a sentence that does not at all please him though it be in all the Copies of the old Coronation Oaths of our Kings and he may as well deny that they tooke any other clause as this yet since the Author himself gives us an interpretation of these words in his Freeholders inquest pag. 62. which will by his own showing make these clauses justas Leges consuetudines not to extend to all laws and customes in general but those quas vulgus elegerit that is as he there interprets it the Customes which the vulgar shall chuse and it is the vulgus or common people only who chuse customes common usage time out of mind creates a custome no where can so common a usage be found as among the vulgar c. If a custome be common through the whole Kingdom it is all one with the common law in England which is said to be common custome that in plain terms to maintain the customes which the vulgar shall chuse is the common Laws of England so that in the Authours own sense it shall not signifie such Laws which the King himself hath already chosen and establisht but only those which the people have chosen and in this sense perhaps it was part of the Oath of Richard II. to abolish all evil unjust Laws that is evil vulgar customes and to abolish them whenever they should be offred him by bill But I do not read that any King or Queen since Richard II. took that clause he mentions and perhaps King Richard took it in the Authours sense and found such interpreters to his mind and that made him prove such a King as he was to endeavour to destroy all the Laws and liberties of this Nation burning and cancelling the Records of Parliament and indeed there was no need of any if it be true which he did not stick to affirme that the Laws of of England were only to be found in his head or his breast but the Authour though he grants for it were undutiful to contradict so wise a King as King James that a King Governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King and degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to rule contrary to his Laws yet will by no means have this King counted a Tyrant But I will not trouble my self about trifles much less maintaine that the Lords or Commons had any Authority to use King Richard as they did since it is a contradiction that any power should Judge that on which it depends and who dieing that is immediatly dissolved since our Kings have ever been trusted with the Prerogative of calling and dissolving Parliaments and certainly they can never be supposed to let them sit to depose themselves And of this opinion was Bracton lib. 1. cap. 8. Si autem ab eo petatur cum breve non currat contra ipsum Locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat emendat quod si non fecerit satis sufficit ei ad paenam quod Dominum expectet ultorem But to return where we left off if it be granted that Kings do Swear to observe all the laws of their Kingdomes yet this Author is so good a casuist that he can as easily absolve their Consciences as the Pope himself For says he Patriarch p. 97. no man can think it reason that Kings should be more bound by their voluntary Oaths then Common persons are by theirs now if aprivate man make a contract either with or without an Oath he is no farther bound then the equity and justice of the contract ties him for a man may have relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise if either deceit or Errour or force or fear induced him thereunto Or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance and since the Laws in many cases give the King a Prerogative above common Persons I see no reason why he should be denyed that Priviledg which the meanest of his Subjects doth enjoy I know not to what end the Author writ this Paragrph unless it were to make the world beleive that when when Kings take their Coronation Oaths they do it not freely but only are drawn in by the Bishops or over-awed by the great Lords that they do not understand what they do and so are meerly choused or frighted into it by Fraud or Force A very fine excuse for a Prince for so solemn an action and which he hath had time enough to consider of and advise with his own Conscience whether he may take it or no That he can be said to be induced by Fear or Force who was a lawful King before and only uses this ceremony to let his Subjects see the reallity of his intentions towards them And that nothing shall prevail with him to break his Oath which he hath made before God That he will preserve those Laws and rights of his Subjects which he does not grant but find them in possession of But as for this relief against an unreasonable or unjust promise as the Author terms it If by those words he means a promise or grant that may tend to some damage or inconvenience of the Promiser or Grantor to some right or Jurisdiction that the Grantor might have enjoyed had it not been granted away either by his Ancestors or himself If the Promise were full and perfect or the grant not obtained either by fear force or Fraud all Civilians and Divines hold that the Promiser or Grantor is obliged to the Promise and cannot take away the thing granted though it were in his power so to do For David makes it part of the Character of the upright man Psal XV. 4. and who shall dwell in Gods Tabernacle that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not But our Author hath found a way to set all men loose from their Oaths or contracts if they be any thing grievous or hurtful in the performance that is if the Promiser or Grantor think it so and Kings must have at least as much and in most cases a greater Prerogative than common Persons ' It was a thousand pitties this Author was not Confessor to King H. III. He might then have saved him the sending to Rome for a dispensation of his Oath for the observance of Magna charta which he had made before in Parliament at Oxford Anno Regni 21. and taught him and all Princes else a nearer way to be freed from their Coronation Oaths if ever they find them uneafie
pleases because I have obliged my self to it by compact and I am obliged to follow this Mans will because he can enjoyn me thus by his supreme Authority But supreme and absolute are not one and the same thing for that denotes the absense of a Superiour or an Equal in the same order or degree but this a faculty of exerciseing any right by a Man 's own Judgment and Will but what if there be added a Commissary clause that if he shall do otherwise he shall forfeit his Kingdom as the Arogonians of Old after the King had sworn to their Priviledges did promise him Obedience in this manner Vid Hotomani Frarcogallia C. 12. We who are of as great Power as thou do Create thee our King and Lord on this condition that thou observe our Laws and Priviledges if otherwise not Here it is certain that an absolute King cannot be He to whom the Kingdom is thus committed under a Commissary Clause or Condition but that this King may have for all this a regal Power though limited I see no reason to the contrary for although we grant a Temporary Authority cannot be acknowledged for Supreme because it depends upon a potestative condition and which can never be in the Princes power Yet a King of this sort above-mention'd is not therefore subject to the power of the People with whom the cognizance is whether he keep his Oath or not for besides that such a Commissary Clause is wont to comprehend only such plain things which are evident to any Mans sences and so are not liable to dispute So that this power of taking cognizance does not at all suppose any Jurisdiction by which the Actions of the King as a Subject may be judged but is nothing else than a bare Declaration whereby any Man takes notice that his manifest right is violated by another See Grotius Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 16. And Baecler upon him who are both of the same Opinion Grotius indeed in the same place speaks more obscurely when he says That the Obligation arising from the promises of Kings does either fall upon the exercise of the act or also directly upon the very power of it if he act contrary to promises of the former sort the act may be called unjust and yet be valid if against those of the latter it is also void as if he should have said Sometimes a King promises not to use part of his Supreme Authority but after acertain manner and sometimes he plainly renounces some part thereof concerning which there are two things to be observed first that also some acts may be void which are performed contrary to an Obligation of the former sorts as for example if a King swear not to impose any Taxes without the consent of the Estates I suppose that such Taxes which the King shall Levy by his own will alone to bevoid Secondly That in the latter form the parts of the supreme power are divided But that the Nature of limited Kingdoms may more thoroughly be understood it is to be observed that the affairs which occur in Governning a Common-wealth are of two kinds for of some of them it may be agreed beforehand because whenever they happen they are still but of the same Nature but of others a certain Judgment cannot be made but at the time present whether they are beneficial to the Publick or not for that those circumstances which accompany them cannot be forseen Yet concerning both that People may provide that he to whom they have commited this limited Kingdom should not depart from the Common good in the former whilst it prescribes perpetual Laws or Conditions which the King should be obliged to observe in the latter whilst he is obliged to consult the assembly of his People or Nobility Thus the People being satisfied of the truth of their Religion and what sort of Ecclesiastical Government or Ceremonies do best suit their Genius so it is in Sweden may condition with the King upon his Inauguration that he shall not change any thing in Religious matters by his sole Authority So every Body being sensible how often Justice would be injured if Sentence should always be given by the sole Judgment of the Prince ex aequo hono without any written or known Laws and that Passion VI. Tacit An. L. 13. 4. 2. Interest or unskilfulness would have too great a sway for avoiding this inconvenience the people may oblige their King that either he shall compose a Body of just Laws or observe those that are already extant and also that Judgment be given according to those Laws in certain Courts or Colledges of Justice and that none but the most weighty Causes should come before the King by way of Appeal This is likewise the Law of Sweden So likewise since it is well known how easily Riches obtained by the Labour of others may be squandered away by Luxury or Ambition therefore the Subjects Goods should not lie at their Princes mercy to sustain their Lusts Some Nations have wisely assigned a certain Revenue to their Prince such as they supposed necessary for the constant Charges of the Common-wealth but if greater expences were necessary they would have those referred to the Assembly of Estates And since also some Kings are more desirous than they ought to be of Military Glory and running themselves into unnecessary Wars may put themselves and their Kingdoms in hazard therefore some of them have been so cautious that in the conferring the regal Dignity they have imposed this necessity upon their Kings that if they would make offensive Wars upon their Neighbours they should first advise with their great Council and so likewise it might be ordained concerning other matters which the People judged necessary for the Common-wealth lest that if an absolute power of ordering those things were left to the Prince the common good of the People would perhaps be less considered And since the people would not leave to this limited King an absolute power in those Acts which are thus excepted but that an Assembly either of the whole people or of those that represent them divided into their several Orders it is further to be observed that the power of this Council or Assembly is not alike every where For in some places the King himself though every where absolute may have appointed a Council or Senate without whose approbation he will not have his decrees to be valid Which Senate without doubt will only have the Authority of Councellors and though they may question the Kings Grants or Decrees and reject those which they judg inconvenient for the Common-wealth yet they do not this by any inherent Right but by a power granted them from the King himself Who would this way prevent his decreeing any thing through hast imprudence or the perswasion of Flatterers that might prove hurtful to his State to which may be referred what Plutarch mentions in his Apothegms ' That the Aegyptian Kings
Sons reign we find the Procurators of the Nobility and People of England declare in the Council of Lyons quod universitas Regni nunquam i.e. Patres nobilium vel ipsi never consented or would ever consent to the tribute unjustly extorted by the Court of Rome At which protestation his Holyness was so confounded that our Author tells us he never lift up his Eyes or had a word to reply And every Monarch hath as absolute a Propriety in his Kingdom as Noah had in the World as our Author supposes I know no reason why the King may not bequeath his Crown to which of his Sons he pleases no matter whether lawfully begot or not since Princes are above all Terms or positive Laws or he may divide it among them as Noah did the World to his three Sons So that upon these grounds the Testament of Henry VIII whereby he disinherited the Line of Scotland and that of Edward VI. whereby he excluded his Sisters from the Crown should have been valid but the Loyal Subjects of England beleived that neither of those Kings could disinherit the right Heir of the Crown by their Testaments alone but acknowledge them in the persons of Queen Mary and King James notwithstanding those pretended Wills I have been the larger upon this Subject that men that do not much consider nor are versed in these matters may see the absurd wicked consequences of this notion of an absolute Propriety and Dominion to be inseperable from Monarchy So that I doubt not but even those very men who love a smatch of arbitrary Government because it best suits with their tempers or interests cannot away with it unmixt when it comes to exert all its Prerogatives Thus some men think Musk and Ambergreece mixt whith other Ingredients makes an agreeable Perfume which if held to their noses in the Cod or whole Lump they are so far from thinking a good smell that they loath it I shall not affirm with Grotius That the Empire which is exercised by Kings doth not cease to be the Empire of the People For I suppose the People have passed over all their present interest in it to the Prince and his heirs and as long as that line lasts they have nothing to do with it and consequently cannot set up another Family over them and so on the other side the King hath no such absolute Property as that he can alter the succession otherwise than the fundamental laws of the Monarchy did first appoint which were made by consent of all the Estates and without which they cannot be altered nor is there any fear of a contradiction as the Author supposes That the Succession must either hinder the right of Alienation which is in the People or the alienation must destroy the right of succession which must attend upon elected Kings For we own no right of alienation in the People as long as there is a lawful Heir remaining and succeeding in his right to whom the Crown was first legally setled nor yet does therefore the succession diminish the right which the People had at first but that it may arise and take place again if the King should die without known heirs Having done with his observations upon Grotius Chap. VI. I am now come to his Anarchy of a limited or mixt Monarchy in which though I shall not undertake to maintain all which our Author if whom he writes against hath laid down in this treatise since many things in that it treats were written according to Irene's notions during the late Warrs yet I hope I may be able to shew that this Doctrine of a limited Monarchy is not but of Yesterâ—lay as our Author will have it But that all the learned men in the laws and constitutions of these Northern Kingdoms have held it to be no such damnable Doctrine but that the contrary would introduce â—ll Tyranny and Arbitrary Government among them which is at this day practiced in the Eastern parts of the world But it seems the Author allows 260. that there may be a mixt Government but not a mixt Monarchy because the word Monarchy is compounded of two Greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one alone and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Govern or Rule and therefore Monarchy being the Government of one man alone cannot admit of any limitation or mixture But what if one should say that all this is nothing but wrangling about words since why may not he be called a Monarch who hath the Supreme though not the only Power in a Common-wealth if the custom of that Country allow it him though his Power be limited or mixt as well as for the Romanes to call their Monarch but Imperator or General or for the Florentines or Russians to call their Monarch great Duke Since it is not the names but the exercise of the power that creates the difference Nor is it any more a Bull or contradiction than to call that which I now write out of an Inkhorn though perhaps it is made either of Glass or Mettal So the first Monarch being absolute the Title of Monarch may now be by eustom well enough applyed to those that are not absolutely so but to pass by such Grammar niceties I shall endeavour to vindicate the writer of this Treatise of Monarchy whom the Author calls Mr. Hunton from giveing an Idea of a Government which is nothing but meer Anarchy and Fiction and that there hath been and yet is such a kind of Government as a limited Kingship which if the Author is so dogged as he will not allow it the name of a Monarchy we cannot help it let his Friends give it a more proper name if they please As for what he will prove out of that Authors words that every Monarch even his limited Monarch must have the Supreme Power of the state in himself so that his Power must no way be limitted by any power above his For then he were no Monarch but a subordinate Magistrate is true yet I do not see that the Author contradicts himself as the observatour will have him when he tells us in the same Page That in a moderate or limited Monarchy the supreme power must be restrained by some law according to which this power was given and by direction of which this power must act So that he will have his Supreme Power not limited and yet restrained Is not a restraint a limitation and if restrained how is it Supreme and if restrained by some law is not the Power of that law and of them that made it above his Supreme Power and if by the direction of such law only he must Govern where is the Legislative Power which is the cheif of supreme Powers when the law must rule and govern the Monarch and not the Monarch the law he hath then at best but a gubernative or executive Power and so proceeds to quote this Authors own words at large if his Authority transcends his bounds and if it command
to pay his debts although the Creditor hath no right to exact this of him by way of any authority thereby vested in himself otherways it were necessary that every one who owed another any thing must presently come under his power therefore the Debtor must be compelled by the Creditor to pay his debt either by the assistance of some Judge which cannot be supposed between the King and People or if they live in a natural liberty by force But if we should allow this way of compulsion to the People it will follow that both the King and the People do still live in a natural liberty or meer state of nature that is that the Commonwealth is dissolved Yet we will grant Grotius this that in all civil constitutions there is nothing absolutely free from some inconveniencies therefore because of the inconveniencies that arise from this divided Soveraignty it does not presently follow that there can be no such Government or that it must presently fall to an absolute Anarchy for right is not to be measured from what pleases either this or that Author but from his or their will from whom this right at first began So likewise on the other side it must be granted that if such division of the Supreme Authority hath been instituted by any People that people have not constituted a Regular government but a politick body subject to perpetual distempers Therefore supposing the most that can be required that the King in a limited Monarchy is he who alone gives the Essence and Authority to the Laws though he can make no other than what are offered him in the Assembly of his Estates yet if all Magistrates that put these Laws in execution are subordinate to him and depend upon him this takes away that inconvenience this Author objects against limited Monarchs For he is truely Supreme since he makes the laws and is the Fountain of all power in his Dominions neither does this derogate from the Supremacy of his Power that he is obliged either by original contract or by after promise or condescent not to make any laws or to levy any mony or taxes from his Subjects but what they shall offer him in the Assembly of his Estates For since all laws that are made in a Monarchy are but the declaration of the Monarchs will and that he being but one man cannot declare his will Physically to the sences of all his Subjects but requires some politick form or manner of signifying this will to all that are to obey it which is various according to the several Customs and constitutions of divers Kingdoms therefore as in Monarchies where there are no use of Letters Laws can be no otherwise made or promulgated but by signifying the Monarchs will to the subordinate Magistrates by word of mouth by such Officers as must be supposed to bring some sufficient token that they come immediately from them and are sufficiently instructed in the matter he will have observed as a law which form can depend upon nothing but Custom or the common consent of the People to admit that for Law which shall be so promulgated since they have no infallible certainty but that the Messenger may be sent by some body else that hath a mind to make alterations in the State without the Princes knowledge or else that the Messenger may mistake the Princes meaning and report the law wrong So likewise in Kingdoms where laws are put into writing there must be some form or rule agreed upon both of making and promulgating Laws So likewise in those we call limited Monarchies the Custom or form is not to admit any thing for a Law or the authentick will of the Prince but what his Subjects have offered to him drawn up into form and which he hath passed into a Law by some token of consent before instituted in the presence of the general Assembly of the Estates of his Kingdom which course is absolutely the best both for the Prince and People For since the end of all laws as of Government it self are the good of the people so it is not likely that the Subjects having the drawing up of the Laws will offer any to the Prince that they are not absolutely perswaded are for the benefit of the Commonwealth nor can that be any prejudice to the Prince's power since no law can be made unless he give it the stamp of his Royal Authority Therefore though Forms are not essential to the declareing of the will of a private man in the state of nature yet they must be in respect of that of such a Prince since the power of the former is natural and can influence only those that hear him but that of a Prince is artificial or political as proceeding from compact and is to command even those that never saw him or are like to come into his presence it is requisite that the ways of declaring his will be made so certain that the Subjects may have no reason to doubt of it therefore there can no way be found out which can more certainly assure all the Subjects both of the benefit and Authority of the Laws than when a Prince voluntarily in a general Assembly of all the Estates of his Kingdom either by pronouncing of words or by touching the Bills offered him with his royal Scepter or any such like Ceremony declares he will have those Bills or Writings promulgated and observed as his Laws or declared Will which being once done in such a solemn and publick manner takes away all suspition that the Prince was not well advised when he made them or wrought upon by the flateries or insinuations of Women or Favourites Circumstances which being wanting in absolute Monarchies where the Prince's Edicts are perhaps either given out in hast or at second hand to those who never see him by Eunuchs or Officers who taking the Monarch at some advantage and makes him pass Commands which perhaps he does not remember or repents of the next day whereas in such a limited Monarchy a Prince does not only appear with greater Splendor and Authority when in the face of his Subjects he exercises the highest Act of Soveraignty in making laws but likewise assures them that he acts with an absolute freedom when having a liberty to deny he yet grants the desires of his Subjects yet so establishes them for Laws that they cannot be altered without their consents and by the same means by which they were first made which being supposed may serve to answer an Objection that some may make that if this way of passing of Laws or the Princes declaring his will after this manner be but a matter of form or Circumstance why may not this Monarch alter it at his pleasure and declare for the future for example that all laws shall be by him passed in his privy Council and then being openly proclamed and Copies recorded in all Courts of Justice shall be of the same Authority as if they had been passed