as we here Imagine the Two main Mischiefs are These The Iniquity of the end or the Disorder of the Means The Former may in some Measure be Prevented by an Oath to deal Vprightly but the Grand Failing was in the Election The Latter may be Regulated by such a Clearness of Rule and Method together with such a Strictness in the Observation of That Rule that both Every man may know his Duty and no man dare to Transgress it But Concerning the Subject Matter now of their Consultations There lies the Peril when they come to reach at Affairs Forreign to their Cognisance The Hazard is This step by step They Eneroach upon the Soveraign Claiming a Right to One Encroachment from the President of another So that Meeting with an unwary Prince they Steal away his Prerogative by Inches and when perchance His Successor comes to Resume his Right That Pilfery is call'd the Liberty of the Subject and There 's a Quarrel started betwixt the King and his Subjects Then comes the Doctrine in Play That Kings are Chosen for the Good of the People and that the Discharge of that Trust and Care is the Condition of his Royalty The very Truth is All Government may be Tyranny A King has not the Means of Governing if he has not the Power of Tyrannizing Here 's the short of the Matter We are certainly Destroy'd without a Government and we may be Destroy'd with One So that in Prudence we are rather to choose the Hazard of a Tyranny than the Certainty of being worry'd by One-another Without more words The Vulgar End of Government is to keep the Multitude from Cutting One-anothers Throats which they have ever found to be the Consequence of Casting off their Governours When Popular Conventions have once found This Trick of gaining Ground upon the Soveraign they catch their Princes commonly as they do their Horses with a Sieve and a Bridle a Subsidy and a Perpetual Parliament If They 'll take the Bit they shall have Oats But These are the Dictates of Ignorance and Malice for such is the Mutual Tye and Interest of Correspondency betwixt a Monarch and his People that Neither of them can be Safe or Happy without the Safety and Felicity of the Other The best way to prevent the Ill Consequence of the Peoples Deputies acting beyond their Orb is Clearly and Particularly to State Those Reserves of the Prerogative with which they are not to Meddle And likewise to set forth the Metes and Bounds of their own Priviledges which They themselves are not to Transgress FINIS The Matter oâ— Sedition The Causes of it The Remedy Contempt more fatal to Kings than hatred Poverty breeds Sediâ—on A numerous Nobility causeth poverty Fears and Jealousies The dangers of Libels Sir F. B. The Rise of the late War The first Tumult against the Service-book The Covenanters Usurp the Supream Authority The Institution of the Scottish Covenant The promoters of it Hist. Indep Appendix pag. 14. The Covenant a Rebellious Vow A Plea for Treason The Usurpations of the Covenanters A Pacification with the Scots Their Infidelity They enter England The influence of the Scotish Army and the City-tumults upon the Long Parliament The two Houses usurp the Militia The Rebellion begins at Hull The Kings defence of himself Voted a War against his Parliament Teasonous Prositions of the two Houses Deposing Propositions of Iune 2. Che Cause of the War was Ambition The Rabble were the Pillars of the Cause Religion the pretence Their Zeal agaidst Popery The Method of the Reformation Rebellion divides God and the King Scandal Emproved and Invented The late King was betray'd by presbyterians in his Counsel A Dear peace the cause of a long War Tria priciipia The Method of Treason Rebellion begins in Confusion and ends in Order The English follow the Scottish pattern The prologue to the late War Loyalty persecuted Rebellion rewarded The King goes for Scotland His Welcome at his Return The King Affronted by Tumults first And Then for complaining of them The Presbyterians ruin'd by their own Arguments England a Free-State Quarrels with the Dutch The Long Parliament dissolved Barebones Parliament Their Acts. Their Zeal Their Dissolution The corruption of a Conventicle is the General of a Protector Cromwell Installed and Sworn Protector A Councell of one and Twenty Cromwells Masteries The Foundation of Cromwels Greatness Cromwels Character Cromwell Jelous of his Counsell And of his Army Oliver erects Major-Generals and then fools them The Persecution of the Cavaliers Cromwels Test of the House The Recognition Cromwels design upon St. Domingo Disastrous Blake makes amends at Tunis His Success against the Plate-Fleet near the Bay of Cadiz Addresses Oliver's Kindred stood his Friends The Petition and Advice to Declare his Successor Oliver's Other House privy-Council Revenue Cavaliers incapable of Office Cromwell Installed Protector Olivers Other House Enraged the Commons Thenew Peers The Commons pick a Quarrell with the Other House Olivers heart-breaking cross He Fools the City of London Addresses Barbarous Cruelties Cromwells Death Olivers Maximet Richard Recognized upon condition Each of the Three Parties Enemy to the Other Two The Army Ruffles the House The House Opposes the Army Richard dissolves his Parliament And is laid aside himself The Army acknowledge their backslidings And invite the old Parliament to sit again The Rump The Armies Petition The Faction flies high The Rump and the Army Clash The Rump thrown out The Army settles a Committee of Safety General M. Secures Scotland Hewsons Insolence toward the City Hazelrigg seizes Portsmouth The Rump sits again Lambert and his Party submit The City refuse to Levy Monies The Rump offended with the City The Secluded Members re-admitted Cromwel's Rise to the Soveraignty What hindred his Establishment He wâ—â—l Generally Hated The war with Spain was an Oversight A Standing Army dangerous The Rise of Cromwels Standing Army Exact Collect. Pag. 44. Ibid. The Consequences of the House of Commons Guard The Effects of a Standing Army Note Exit The Rump All Factious unite against the King They divide And Subdivide The Effects of a Military Government The English Impatient of Slavery This was calculated for 1662. It seems to be the Interest of France to maintain a Standing Army A Guard both Sutable and necessary about the Person of a King The Maries of France abus'd the Confidence of their Masters Pepin the Son of a Powerfull Subject deposed his Prince and sets up Himself The State of France The effects of a Standing Army in France A Standing Army more hazardous in England than in France Alterations of Customs dangerous Our Saxon Kings kept no Standing Army Nor Edmond Ironside Nor William the Conquerour Nor William Rufus Nor Hen. 3. Edw. 1. Edw. nor Ric. 2. Nor the Henries 4 5 6 7. Nor Hen. 8. Edw. 6. Queen Mary nor Q. Eliz. Nor K. James nor Charles the MARTYR Expedients to prevent or disappoint Dangers A Standing Army destructive to the Government
not only the Stroke of Violence but the very Thought of it and a fit Circumstance of Majesty The Influence of This Force went not far nor in Truth the Royalty of their first Race of Kings much farther whos 's either Lenity or Aversness to Business of State gave their Great Counsellours the means to Vsurp and Transferr Their Authority which Confidence they abused to the Supplanting of their Masters Complaints Suits References Addresses must be made forsooth to the Majors not to the Kings They undertake the Disposition of Monies and Offices the Menage of Treaties and Alliances They Grant Revoke at Pleasure Briefly from 632. to 750. France was rather under a Majoralty then a Monarchy and Then Pope Zachary having first Absolv'd the French of their Oath of Obedience the Race of Chilperic is Laid By Himself the Fourth of that Name formally Degraded and Cast into a Monastery by Decree of Parliament and Pepin Install'd in his Stead Thus did the Son of the Last Great Subject make himself the First of the Second Race of Kings of which in requital for too much said upon the Former I shall say nothing at all Nor much more upon this Subject save only that Charles the VII and his Successour Lewis the XI Laid the first firm Foundation of the Military Power to which Charles the VIII Francis the I. c. have since furnish'd their Additionals and Superstructures to make the Tyranny compleat 'T is Truth the Splendor and Profusion of the Court and Camp is Dazling and Prodigious they swim in Pleasures and Plenty but he that turns his Eye toward those Miserable Animals the Peasants that with their Blood and Sweat Feed and Support that Luxe and Vanity with hardly bread for their own Mouths will find it much a different Prospect the great Enhansers of the Charge claiming Exemption from the burthen of it He that would see the Glory of the One Part and the Slavery of the Other needs only read L'EST AT de la FRANCE of 1661. Treating of the Officers of the Crown Honours Governments Taxes Gabelles c. He shall there find the Venality of Officers and Their Rates the Privileges of the Nobility and Their Encrochments Who are Exempt from Payments or rather that the Country-man Payes for All. To make an end let him also observe the Power and Partiallity of their Supereminent Parliament of Paris The Book I mention is of undeniable Authority wherein Account is given of at the least Eight Millions English arising from Three Taxes only and for the sole behoof and Entertainment of the Souldery their Tailles Taillon and Subsistance Beside their Aides an Imposition upon all sorts of Merchandise Salt Excepted which must needs by a Vast Income and their Gabelle upon Salt that brings in near Two Millions more Not to insist upon Casualties and infinite other Inventions for squeezing which they practise The Plough maintains the Army Take notice that this Reflection was Calculated for the State of France in 1661. Give them their Due their Noblesse are Brave and Accomplish'd Men and the Brunt of all Hazzards lies totally upon Them but scarce in Nature is there a more abject Commonalty and to conclude Such is their Condition that without War they cannot Live if not Abroad they are sure to have it at Home Let it be Noted too the Taxes follow'd their Army not their Army the Taxes for 't is One thing to Levy Money to Raise Guards and Another thing to Levy Guards to Raise Money the One appearing to be done by Consent the Other by Force I use Guards and Army promiscuously as only taking a Guard for a small Army and an Army for a stronger Guard If a Standing Army subjects France to so many Inconveniences whereof History is full where the Strength lies in the Nobility How much more Hazzardous was it to England where the Welfare of the whole depended upon the Affections and Interest of the Middle-rated People Especially under an Vsurper that was driven to uphold himself upon the daily Consumption of the Nation and a Body that becomes every day Weaker than Other must not expect to be long-liv'd So much for the Inconvenience of Cromwell's Standing Army as to the Situation of England together with a View of the Effects of it in France We 'l now consider what Welcome it was like to find upon the Point of Experience or Custom Alteration of Customs is a work of Hazzard even in Bad Customs but to change Customs under which a Nation has been happy for Innovations which upon Experience they have found Fatal to them is matter of great Peril to the Vndertaker But I look upon Oliver's Case as I do upon a Proposition of such or such a Mate at Chesse where there are severral ways to come within One on 't and None to Hit it The Devil and Fortune had a mind to Puzzle him He Prefers his Pawns Transposes Shifts his Officers but all will not do He still wants either Men or Money if he Disbands he has too few of the One if he holds up he has too little of the Other Such in Truth was this Tyrants Exigence that he was forc'd to That which the Lawful Possessors of the English Crown would never venture upon No nor the Vsurpers neither before our Blessed Reformers of 1641. But Where will those People stay That thorough God and Majesty make way Our Saxon Kings contented themselves with a Law What Arms every man of Estate should find and a Mulct upon such as did Detractare Militiae Edmond Ironside after his Duel with Camillus the Dane and a Composition to divide the English and Danish Kingdoms betwixt them and their Heirs kept no Army on foot to Guard the Agreement Neither did the Danes who after his Death Treacherously Seiz'd the Kingdom to maintain their Conquest William the Conquerour that subdu'd both English and Danes thought himself safe enough in creating Tenures by Knights-Service and permitting Proprieties though at that time under such Jealousies that he took divers of his English Prisoners into Normandy with him for fear of a Commotion in his Absence William Rufus and after Him his Brother Henry the First tho' the Vsurpers of the Senior Right of their Elder Brother Robert set up his Rest upon the same Terms And so did Henry the II after a long Contest with King Stephen and notwithstanding the unruliness of most of his Sons Henry III and then Edward I after the Barons Warrs Employ'd no Standing Army to secure themselves neither did Edward or Richard the Second notwithstanding a Potent Faction of the Nobility bandying against the Latter of them Neither did the Henries IV V and VI in the Grand Schism of York and Lancaster ever approve of it Nor Henry VII as Wise and Iealous as any of his Predecessours If any thing could have warranted the Adventure methinks the Topsie-turvy and Brouillery which Henry the VIII
Power if they receive a Check they become so for their Malice Whence it comes to pass that we see few Seditions without a Malecontent of This Quality in the Head of them These are a sort of People of whom a Prince cannot be too wary But we are here to provide against the Ambition of a Person Rais'd by Favour not Aspiring and from such a One the Peril is greater by reason of the means he has both to compass his Ends and to Disguise them Sir Francis Bacon proposes the Mating of One Ambitious Person with Another and in Extremities the Puzzling of him with an Enterchange of Favours and Disgraces that he may not know what to Expect Courses no doubt advisable to put an Insolent Favourite to a stand if it may be as Safe to Disoblige him without Disarming him but that depends much upon the Complexion of the Person according as he is Bold or Fearful There is not any thing which more Fortifies and Establishes a Monarch than the Disposal of all Offices and Charges of Trust by his particular Choice and Direction without the Interpose of any Publike Recommendation Nor can he Transfer That Care to his Great Counsellor without a great share of his Power And here 's the Difference the One way they are the Honourable Dependencies of the Prince and the Other way they are the suspected Creatures of the Favourite who by This Indulgence makes One Party at Present and Another in Expectation A Wariness in This Particular breaks the Neck of his Design It is good also for a Prince Fairly and Publikely to Refuse him some Requests and where the Suit is too bold to Check Him for Others That the World may see that there are Some things which he cannot obtain and Others which he must not Dare to Ask. Whereas if He carries all without Reserve the Majesty of the Soveraign is lost in the Power of the Favourite The Advice of King Charles the Martyr to His Sacred Majesty now in Being shall put an End to This Point Never repose so much upon any mans single Counsel Fidelity and Discretion in managing Affairs of the First Magnitude that is Matters of Religion and Iustice as to Create in your self or others a Diffidence of your own Iudgment which is likely to be always more Constant and Impartiall to the Interests of the Crown and Kingdom than any mans This may suffice to Prevent a dangerous Over-greatness But if it be found Necessary to Crush it as in case of a bold and manifest Transgression of Duty and Violation of Law Something like an English Parliament does it best and much better to be promoted by the People than by the Soveraign A Second Danger is when a Prime Minister employs his Credit to uphold a Faction and it is the more Dangerous by the hardness to know what it is As whether it be Ambition Corruption Popularity Or in fine some other Secret Interest It may be they have need of One-another Nothing can be more perillous then This Correspondence when a proper Instrument has the manage of it Oh how he Detests the Faction But yet Truly in such and such Cases and for such and such Persons and upon This or That Nick of Time if Matters were Order'd So and So. And Then the Insolence of a Schism is Palliated with the Simplicity of a Scruple And for such Cases as will bear no other Plea is found out the Colour of an Indisputable Necessity Not to prosecute the several Artifices by which some Truths are Disguised others Suppress'd Those Suits Promoted These Complaints Smother'd And finally by which both Men and Things are quite misrepresented Kings cannot possibly see all Things with their own Eyes nor hear all Things with their own Ears so that they must commit many great Trusts to their Ministers The Hazard then is Great when the Confident of the Monarch is the Advocate for the Enemies of the State But above all if he be Surly and Imperious to the Try'd Servants of the Crown That looks like a Design to Introduce one Party to Betray the Prince and to Discourage or disable Another from serving him We are here upon a Supposition That a Master may be mistaken in a Servant and that a Servant may abuse his Credit with his Master In case This be What Remedy Supposing the Favourite still in Credit we must Imagine the Soveraign still in the Mistake and therefore not expect a Remedy as to the Person but rather fetch Relief from some General Rules of Government which shall neither disoblige the Favourite if he be Honest nor expose the Prince if He be Other But this is better done at the Beginning of a Kings Reign than in the Middle of it better upon Iudgment of State than Vrgency of Occasion The certain Help is a fit Choice of Officers and Servants Especially in such Places as have Numerous Dependencies for otherwise Three or Four Persons Leaven the Court half a Dozen more the Souldiery and in Conclusion a great Favourite with a few select Instruments of his own making may at his Pleasure seize the Government This was the Rise of the Second Race of Kings in France Yet God forbid that Princes should make Themselves and their Privadoes miserable by Eternal Causeless and Vnquenchable Iealousies That Kings should be Debarr'd That Blessing and Relief without which Life's a Plague and Royalty a Burthen That is the Vse and Comfort of a Friend to whom as the Oraculous St. Albans He may Impart his Griefs Ioys Fears Hopes Suspicions Counsels and whatsoever lies upon his Heart to oppress it in a kind of Civill Shrift or Confession and from whence with the same Author he may reap Peace of affections and support of Iudgment Nay take the Subject's Interest in too what can be more Desirable then for a Prince to have a Watchfull Wise Faithfull Counsellour and the People a Firm Prudent Patriote in the same Noble Person Accursed be the man that envies either Yet Here 's a Line still drawn betwixt Majesty and Kindness which the One cannot pass without Diminution nor the Other transgress without Presumption In fine the Right of Placing or Displacing Officers lies on the Kings side of the Chalk and falls under the Head of Reward or Punishment King Iames in the second Book of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 delivers Excellent Advises to Prince Henry concerning the Choice of Servants First See that they be of a Good Fame and without Blemish Next See that they be Indued with such honest Qualities as are meet for such Offices as ye ordain them to serve in that your Iudgment may be known in Employing every man according to his Guifts Thirdly I charge you according to my Fatherly Authority to preferr Specially to your Service so many as have truely served Me and are able for it For if the Haters of your Parents cannot Love you it follows of