Interpreters Perhaps this cursory Paraphrase upon the words such as it is may contribute something towards that end as it seemeth unto me they expresse thus much Set the examples of antient Prophets and holy men before your eyes If ye suffer adversity imitate their patience If in all things you cannot attain to that perfection yet thus far at least except ye be extreme negligent you may goe with ease above all things take heed lest too impatient of your grief or too much transported with your joy ye break forth into rash oathes to the dishonour of God and shame of Christian conversation But rather contain your selves whether troubled or rejoycing within the bounds of modesty mingle not heaven and earthâ— let not all things be filled with your oathes and clamours if you affirm orderly a thing let it be with calmnesse and a meer affirmation or negation But if either of these passions be more impetuous and strive to overflow the narrow channels of your bosomes it will be your wisdomes to let it forth unto the glory of God Doe you demand by what means I will tell you Is any amongst you afflicted Let not his impatience break forth into oathes and blasphemies the floodgates of wrath but rather let him pray and humbly implore God that he would vouchsafe him patience till his heavy hand be removed Is any merry Let him not bellow it forth in Oathes like a Bacchanalian but rather sing it in Hymnes and Psalmes unto the praise of God who hath made his cup to overflow and crowned him with happy dayes If any man admit not this latitude unto the Apostles words let him use his own judgement I have onely expressed that which I think probable and give no man Law But to return if I have digressed it is certain that the words of James altogether condemn that evill custome which is now grown amongst high and low men of all sorts inveterate It would cost me many leaves to sum up that which hath been declared against this impious use by holy Fathers ancient Doctors of all Nations Hebrews Greeks Latines yea even Heathens of many take a few Sirach the wisest of the Hebrews Accustome not thy mouth to swearing As a servant that is continually beaten shall not be without a blew mark so he that sweareth and nameth God continually shall not be faultlesse A man that useth much swearing shall be filled with iniquity Amongst the Greeks Eusebius the Heathen Philosopher Many saith he exhort men to swear the truth but I am of opinion that men ought not easily to swear at all Amongst the Latines Augustine Beware of oathes as much as you may because it were better not to swear though a truth not that it is sin to swear truth but that it is a most grievous one to swear falsehood into which he may the sooner fall who accustometh himself to swearing And in another place a false oath is destructive and even a true one dangerous But what need is there of other testimonies seeing this dayly and unnecessary use of swearing is so positively forbidden as scarse any thing more in holy Scriptures by Christ himself But I say unto you swear not at all and by his Apostle St. James in the place cited Above all things swear not SECT XII THe third conclusion An oath ought not to be made but upon a just weighty and necessary occasion An oath is of those things which are neither evill in themselves as murther sacriledge perjury and all other vices be nor of those which are desirable of themselves as deeds of Charity Justice Obedience and all other vertues but of such as are good only because necessary by Hypothesis and for their end and not desirable but in order unto that end of which sort are all those which are ordained for the redresse of some defect as Physick For as a medicine was not invented for it self but for health and as there would be no use thereof if mens bodies were not obnoxious unto diseases Honour the Physitian for necessity sake so an oath is instituted for the confirmation of faith amongst men nor would be of any use if mankinde were not alasse too subject unto ignorance and perfidy which perhaps was our Saviours meaning by those words Matth. 5. 37. cometh of evill Wherefore as the use of Physick where it seemeth not necessary to the preservation of life and health is to be avoided so oathes are likewise to be avoided where necessary preservation of humane society and confirmation of faith seem not to require them That admonition of Epictetus as all the rest of that Stoick is wholesome Avoid an oath if you can wholly if not as much you may An oath is a sacred thing but by how much the more sacred by so much the more dangerous if unduely taken As medicines of the greatest vertue and efficacy are the more hurtfull unto the body if rashly and unskilfully administred The use of assertory oathes is necessary in Common-wealths especially in Courts of Justice for the investigation of truth in matter of particular fact whereunto belong oathes witnesses Compurgators c. In extrajudiciall and private businesses it is not so frequent yet it may be sometimes necessary to wit where it concerneth a man very much to be believed and he cannot be believed except he swear The promissory oath is of no use in Justice but of very great in extrajudicials both publique and private First publique to keep subjects in allegiance unto their Princes for the confirmation of Leagues and Contracts of Kings and Common-wealths for the observation of Laws and Statutes and consequently honor order and peace of politique bodies and Societies for the faithfull administration of publique Offices and the like And also private as the Antients often used it for establishment of Contracts performance of Conditions between buyer and seller payment of debts restitution loans profits trusts c. But in most matters of private concernment other wayes may be taken with lesse scruple of Conscience and better assurance against the perfidy of wicked men as Pawns Feoffees Bonds Witnesses and other judiciall obligations And where such may be conveniently used it is best to abstain altogether from oathes lest by frequent swearing and upon slight occasions the too familiar use of a thing so sacred degenerate into contempt or whilest we practise swearing we learn perjury Augustine saith truly Except a man have tryed he cannot know how hard a thing it is to shake off the custome of swearing and not to doe that rashly which sometimes he must doe necessarily SECT XIII THe fourth Conclusion It is a grievous sin unduly to exact an oath Now he exacteth unduly First who compelleth another to take an oath which is neither ordained by the Law nor received by custome nor established by undenyed prescription without Intermission Secondly who exacteth an oath evidently repugnant or which seemeth by that sense which the words bear according to their use in
who confound me if I do it not that I will do this or that But ordinarily either this or that part is omitted and oathes are more succinctly given as by those examples in holy Scripture where God is introduced swearing after the manner of men is sufficiently manifest There you may finde God swearing sometime by a simple attestation without any execration as in these As I live saith the Lord I have worn by my self by my holinesse c. sometimes without any attestation by an execration only but that too for the honour and reverence of so great a Majesty and after the manner of men almost suppressing by an Aposiopesis words of ill omen elliptically and diminutely uttered as in that of the Psalme I sware in my wrath if they enter into my rest This in the mean time seemeth certain that every promissory oath under what forme soever conceived brief or large so it be an oath and no mere Asseveration or Obtestation virtually containeth both that is to say Attestation and Execration For in an oath both Execration supposeth Attestation as athing before it in nature and Attestation interreth Execration as its necessary consequent That of Plutarch is â—â—thy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Every Oath concudeth with a curse of perjurie And thus much for the nature of a Promissory Oath SECT XI IT remains that in the last place I adde something of the nature and force of Obligation Of obligation Lawyers say much and with prolixity enough they define it to be a Bond of Law whereby a man is bound to pay that which he oweth Which definition will be no leste fit to explain those things which are internall and appertain unto the Court of Conscience then those which are externall and appertain to the Court of Judicature whether in Church or in Common-wealth if the terme of Law be not restrained to that which is humane and positive only but so extended as it take in also universal Law divine and naturall Now since every obligatory Bond as may be gathered from the definition derives it self from some Law as the Law is twofold the one part divine and naturall the other civill and humane so the bond or obligation arising from thence is also twofold to wit the naturall Bond which obligeth naturally and in foro externo by the vertue of divine Law and the civill Bond which obligeth civilly and in foro externo by vertue of humane Law Some call that the obligation of equity this the obligation of justice whether properly or improperly I dispute not for where we agree in the thing to what purpose were it to contend about the terms But whereas they adde a third kind of Obligation compounded of the former two that certainly is not very convenient or at the least not necessary For if a man be bound to the performance of the same duty as for example to feed his aged parents both by naturall Law and Civill this would be no new species of obligation mixed of the other two but rather two obligations conjoyned both in the subject and object in the subject for as much as they binde the same person and in the object forasmuch as they binde unto the same duty and yet naturally and originally distinct The reason is manifest for thiâ—gs cannot by their mixture produce a new species without some reall immutation of themselves Whence Aristotle defines Mistion Misoibilium alteratorum unionem For in all mistion there must be alteration and every alteration is a reall mutation as appears in the generation of mixed bodies out of the four elements not entire but broken and altered But where a new obligation is added unto a former one as in this case the civill to the naturall no reall mutation is made of either But the former obligation remains in the same state it was in before the accession of the new and latter But I will not stay upon these subtleties In the matter of oathes we consider the Morâ—ll or Naturall obligation only or at the least especially the other the Civiâ—l we leave to Lawyers SECT XII BEsides that distinction of obligation which ariseth from its Originall in relation unto the Law whence it deriveth there is yet another taken from the Object in relation unto the Debt to be paid at which obligation aimeth and whereunto it is carryed Now debts are twofold Debitum officii according unto which every man is bound by the precept of the Law to act and Debitum supplicii according to which every man is bound by the decree of the Law to suffer if he neglect his duty In the former sense we say that the mutuall exercise of Charity is a debt because the Law of God enjoynes it according to that Rom. 13. 8. Owe no man any thing but to lov one another In the latter sense we say that sins are debts as in the Lords Prayer Forgive us our debts and that externall death is a debt according to that Rom. 6. 23. The wages of sin is death Neverthelesse it 's to be observed that the latter debt is contracted by non-payment of the former So that if a man fully disingage his debitum officiâ—â— by obeying what the Law commandeth he remaineth not bound debito supplicâ—i to suffer that which the Law denounceth To this twofold debt anâ—wereth a twofold obligation of the very same denomination to wit obligation ad officium to the performance of duty and obligation ad supplicium to the sufferance of punishment or according to the usuall terms which comes all to one obligation to guilt and obligation to punishment But so as the former be in the intention of the Law as it is in its own nature chief and preferred before the latter for it is the part of a Tyrant not of the Law otherwise to inflict punishment then in relation to guilâ— and that speech of the Apostle is true even in this sense though perhaps more rightly to be understood in another The Law is not made for a righteous man The Law therefore intendeth primarily directly perse and simply to oblige unto duty and obedience But unto chastisement and punishment it obligeth only secondarily indirectly consequently and ex hypothesi that is to say supposing the neglect or contempt of duâ—y The Apoâ—tle seemeth to have joyned both these obligations together in Rom. 13. where he spâ—aks of the subjection due unto the Soveraign power Yâ—â— must needs saith he be subject not only for wrath but also for conscrence sake from which words I gather three things of concernment to my present intention The first is that we may be bound by a double bond to the performance of one and the same thing by the bond of duty and the bond of punishment for this is implyed in the words of conscience and wrath The second that the conscience of duty ought with all good men to be valued and preferred before the fear of punishment The third that the obligation of conscience ariseth
nothing is Vain hope And to the present point he who promiseth any thing to come certainly to passe taketh the name of God for the confirmation of truth which neverthelesse comes all to nothing that either not intended or not performed which he promised the same directly and to the letter taketh the name of God in vain violateth Gods Commandement and is guilty of the hainous crime of perjury And thus you have a sufficient confirmation of the first Hypothesis concerning the Simplicity of oathes SECT VIII THE second followes which is of kin to this and appertaineth to the right interpretation of an oath briefly it is this The obligation of an oath is stricti juris I understand here jus strictum not in that sense wherein it occurreth so often amongst Lawyers for the rigour of the Law which is opposed to equity to wit by which judgement is turned into wormwood and which is for the most part so interwoven with injury that it is almost become a proverb Summum jus summa injuria But somewhat more mildly for so just an interpretation of the Law and so circumscribed to her bounds that the words of the Law be not stretched farther then is fit by way of complacence or favour to any party or forced to serve any mans turn or profit In a word strictum jus is here so taken as may not exclude the interpretation of Law tempered with equity but excludeth the interpretation of the Law corrupted with favour Now seeing to interpret is nothing else but to expound a thing wherein there lyeth some ambiguity or obscurity it is to be understood that a threefold interpretation or exposition may be given of the same thing Rigid Favourable Just Rigid and favourable are the extremes and as most extremes be vicious And as there is for the most part a certain coincidence of extremes but so unhappy an one seeing they recede both waies from the medium that they ever meet in that which is ill and for the most part in that which iâ— worst too rigid and too favourable an interpretation of the Law meet in this that each of them by an unjust acceptation of persons offereth in a manner violence unto the Law wracking it with too subtle an exposition to the ease of one party and grievance of the other but with this difference that he who is animated with hatred to the parties presseth the more rigid interpretation and he who is led with affection followeth the more favourable But a mean between both and just interpretation is that which without respect of persons investigateâ—h the true and genuine sense of the Law out of naturall equity and justice and the words themselves as far as they agree with equity and justice And this if out of the words it may sufficiently appear is in all cases exactly to be followed But because it may happen and often happeneth that controversies arise about the proper and naturall sense of Lawes and other matters which need interpretations where for the dubiousnesse of the thing a just interpretation is not to be had of necessity we must allow unto this mediocrity as I may call it her prudentiall Latitude As the Ethicks say that the mediocrity of vertue consisteth not in an indivisible point or Arithmeticall proportion but in a Geometricall In a Law therefore which is doubtfull now a stricter now a milder interpretation according to the nature of the thing in question supplieth the place of a just interpretation whereof the strict being remoter from the favourable comes nearer to the rigid and the milde being nearer to the favourable declines the more from the rigid As in the Morals that vertue which is the mean between Covetousnes and Prodigality the more remote it be from either extreme is called Liberality or Frugality There are therefore some things so ordained by nature that they require as due the allowance of a milder interpretation to wit such an one as may not be bound up in the straightnesse of words but left more at liberty to use Cicero's term cum quodam laxamento such for example is res testamentaria in our Law So by the rule of charity the words and deeds of others especially of Princes Parents and other rulers the writings also of pious and learned men unlesse there lie very just cause of suspicion to the contrary are to be handled with a milde interpretation according to the usuall saying Doubtfull things are to be interpreted in the better sense But there are divers other matters as Priviledges Deeds of contracts about debt and most of those things which binde legally and amongst them Oathes in which when question is made of the true sense it is much better and more sutable unto the nature of the thing to use the stricter then the milder interpretation Sâ—CT IX WHen I say therefore that an oath is stricti juris that must be thus understood the sense of an oath where it is sufficiently manifest in the words is exactly to be stood unto but where the sense is doubtfull we must take diligent heed lest we be too indulgent unto our selves and our own affections or yeeld unto our selves too free and loose a license of interpretation whereby we may become exempt from the bond of the oath in which we are bound as also that for our own interest and profit sake we impose not upon the oath which we have taken or any part thereof other sense then that which any other pious and prudent man who being unconcerned in the businesse is of aâ—freer judgement may easily gather out of the words themselves The reason is twofold one in respect of others to wit for the fear of scandall lest a weaker brother led by our example think it lawfull for him to do as he seeth we have done though he be ignorant of those subtilties by which alone we use to absolve our selvâ—s from the crime of perjury Another in respect of our selves for fear of perjury of which hainous crime we become without question guilty if that milder interpretation which encouraged us unto the oath chance to deceive us And this râ—ason is founded upon the most generall and profitable rule which in doubtfull matters commands the choice of the safer part But where the words of the oath proposed according to the common and obvious sense of them seem to contain some unlawfull thing it is safer not to swear then by a looser interpretation so to work them unto our sense that we may more securely swear unto them it being apparent that this kinde of oath may be refused without danger of perjury but not apparent that it may be taken without fear or danger of the same SECT X. NEverthelesse heed is to be taken on the other side lest this strict interpretation whereof we speak degenerate into the rigid one For that which the Lawyers say of Priviledges holds generally in things of like nature and especially in Oathes that they are neither too strictly
for the violation of his faith Now this kinde of oath obligeth the party swearing if he cannot make all good to make good all he can and if great damage happen unto the other through non-performance of his oath to apply a remâ—dy to it at the least in part by some other benefit as opportunity may enable him especially if the obstacle hapned by his negligence want of prudence or other fault committed And so much for the first doubt SECT VI. THe second about an oath of a necessary thing followes By a necessary thing I understand that which lyeth upon us in respect of our duty by vertue of divine precept and even without an oath in such manner as if we do not though without an oath perform the same in due time and place we become guilty of sin such are to feed our needy parents to pay our debts and the like Whereunto belong those oathes required from the subject of allegiance to the King and of acknowledgement and defence of his royall supremacy which are taken in conceived words by such as are admitted unto the Magistracy or any publick office to the end they may faithfully performe the duty of the same Of the obligation of this kinde of oath there can be no controverâ—ie for unto those things whereunto we are bound even without an oath certainly we are much more obliged by an oath to wit the new obligation of an oath being added unto that before by a precept Wherefore we will stay no longer upon this doubt SECT VII THe third doubt is concerning an oath of an unlawfull thing I call that an unlawfull thing which cannot be done without sin forasmuch as it is contrary unto some divine precept all sin being averse unto the Law of God Now this kinde of oath is so unlawfull that not only the party swearing but he also by whose authority counsell or other means a man is compelled or inveigled so to swear committeth sin But of the party compelling I shall perhaps speak hereafter in the mean time the party so swearing committeth sin whether he intend to do as he sweareth or intend it not If he intend to do it he sinneth in willing an unlawfull thing and so sweareth not in justice if he intend it not he sinneth in lying and so sweareth not in truth But whether he intend it or not it is certain that he is in no wise obliged It cometh indeed very often to passe so contemptuous are men of the Majesty of God that through â—impatience of revenge fear of danger hope of profit importunity of friends a kinde of awe or complacence or some other occasion many are induced whilest they indulge too much unto their own affections to promise in the presence of God the performance of such things as they either at the present know certainly to be unlawfull or at least afterwards when they are free from their depraved affections easily perceive impossible without sin to be accomplished and yet such is the perversenesse of humane judgement bewitched with the tricks and delusions of that skilfull artificer in this art the Devill that you shall see many whom you cannot by any duty of conscience compell unto a good action neverthelesse so violently carryed by the religion of an oath unto wicked actions that what they have unlawfully sworn they think themselves through a most pernicious errour obliged by the bond of their oath irresistibly to accomplish But it hath been shewn before in our fifth Hypothesis and confirmed by manifest reasons that of an unlawfull thing as unlawfull there can be no obligation and that evill can receive no validity from an oath SECT VIII WHich that it may be the better understood and applyed unto the particular cases seeing that all unlawfull things are not of the same kinde and degree I think that it will be fit that I speak somewhat more distinctly of this matter Whatsoever therefore is unlawfull is unlawfull either ex se or ex accidente again that which is unlawfull ex se is so either primarily or secondarily things unlawfull ex se primarid and in the highest degree are such as are forbidden by God unto all mankinde whatsoever is against the sacred Law of God comprehended in the two Tables of the Decalogue whatsoever is repugnant either to our piety in the worship of God or brotherly charity in the works of justice and mercy is after this manner unlawfull And concerning a thing in this first manner unlawfull is the first Case As if a man should swear that he would sacrifice unto I dols or adore the image of the blessed Virgin which are sins of Commission or if he should swear never to be present at divine ordinances or hear holy Sermons or participate of the Lords Supper or sanctifie the Lords Day which are sins of omission against the precepts of the first Table Or if a man should swear to kill his father or cast his new born child out of doors or meet an adulteresse at an appointed place and hour to accompany others in theft robbery fraud or any the like crimes which are sins of commission Or if he should swear not to relieve his aged and needy father to give almes unto the poor not to pay his debts c. which are sins of omission against the precepts of the second Table In these and such like things simply and universally unlawfull the forementioned Hypothesis by the consent of all is likewise simply and universally of force and vigour to wit that there can be no obligation in such a vow promise oath either in its self or otherwise acquired Pacta quae turpem causam continent non sunt observanda say the Lawyers Nay though it were a grievous sin to vow swear bargain or otherwise to promise a thing generally unlawfull yet is the sin in performing the promise much greater which whosoever doth maketh himself guilty of a double crime one of the same kinde with the fact considered in its self put the case it be theft or murder another of violated religion through irreverence and abuse of the divine Name forasmuch as an evill thing is established as far as lyeth in his power by his authority SECT IX THe second Case is of a thing unlawfull ex se secundarid that is not in its own nature unlawfull to all but to some only according to the condition of their persons as they are members of some community or according to their particular vocation For it is unlawful and that ex se not ex accidente only for such as are members of any Politique body to doe any thing repugnant to the Laws of their Community which nevertheless as forbidden by God is not primarily immediately and in specie unlawfull but secondarily mediately and in genere by vertue of the general Divine Mandate which enjoyneâ—h obedience unto rules in all lawfull and honest things It is also in the same degree very near and upon the same gâ—ound unlawfull for such
deliberate nor he who is not his own man but in the power of another make a stedfast and effectuall promise SECT II. WHerefore the first doubt is How far the oath of a person not indued with the faculty of judgement obligeth Which defect seeing it may arise from divers causes divers cases are therefore contained under this head The first is of Children so soon as they attain unto the use of reason which at what time of their age it may happen is not nor do I think can be defined seeing some are sooner and some later ripe The Civil Laws of the Romans and the municipall of most Nations pitch upon certain years under which they admit not children either to take assertory oaths or to be compelled unto promissory such amongst us is the age of 16. he who is younger is neither admitted to be a witnesse in judgement nor required to take the oath of Allâ—giance nay if he have taken an oath it is nul in Law this is right at the Bar of Justice not at the Bar of Conscience Children should be taught from their tender age by their parents and pupils by their Tutors early to understand and duly weigh the power and efficacy of an Oath the guilt and punishment of perjury that they may beware the wicked custome of the one and horrid crime of the other For it can hardly be imagined of what necessary or lawfull use the oathes of children should be they being both unfit to judge and not in their own power unlesse parents in whose power they are should require it at their hands for the faithâ—ull performance of some commands As fame reports Han ball about the ninth year of his age to have been set by his Father Amilcar before the Altar during the time of Sacrifice and there bound by oath to be a perpetuall enemy to the Romane name But oh shame what is become of Domestick Discipline amongst Christians Children scarse able to speak are heard in every street tearing the sacred and dreadfull name of God with profane lips and oathes both without fear and punishment seasoned with the abominable stench of which vice like new vessels it will hardly out when the cask becometh aged and rotten But I would not be carryed away with the tide of grief and indignation I return to the point and say that oathes of children before they attain to years as we call them of discretion or know what deceit is through defect of judgement are neither lawfull nor obligatory But so soon as they are capable of deceit and can in some though small measure understand what the nature and force of an oath is which happeneth for the most partâ— about the seventh year of their age and earlier in many forward wits or such in whom malice supplyeth age the oath of a childe though it be absolutely unlawfull unlesse that one case if a parent require it may be excepted being taken obligeth if there be in it no other impediment The reason is because an act in its own nature obligatory such as is the act of swearing proceedeth from a minde indued in some sorâ— with the faculty of judging SECT III. THe second case is of the oathes of mad men and the third of fooles to whom the vice of unseasonable belching forth of oathes even when they think least upon it is familiar which although we may and God who is most mercifull and expecteth not an harvest where he sowed not perhaps will forbear to impute unto them for sin because it proceedeth from invincible error yet most certain it is of every oath and pronounced by our Saviour that it cometh of evill from the instigation of the Devill and common corruption of mans heart through which all the children of Adam are inflexible unto good and wax unto all kinde of wickednesse to make a doubt whether such oathes be lawfull or unlawfull were vain and uselesse For to weigh whether things be lawfull or unlawfull belongeth to such only as can in some measure judge whether done or to be done they agree with their rule the Law of God and right reason which Law it were in vain to plead unto such as are destitute of that faculty and void of understanding Certainly he who requireth reason of a mad man is mad with reason This kinde of oath therefore as much as it is the act of a distracted person is in no wise binding except otherwise frantick he enjoy his reason by lucid intervals in which case it bindeth no lesse during the time he so enjoyeth the use of his reason then one made by a man of sound and reposed judgement SECT IV. THe fourth and fifth cases are of oathes made by men who are drunk or in rage promising or threatning something which in sobriety and cool bloud they would not have promised or threatned The reason of doubt is that whereas some judgement at the least of a deliberate minde is requisite to make an oath obligatory Drunkennesse and wrath which are but short fits of madnesse so perturb the judgement and for a time take away the use of reason that till the one have slept and the other reposed his minde neither seemeth much to differ from a mad man But of these oathes this in the first place is certain that neither kinde can be excused of sin but whether drunkennesse or the vehemency of anger aggravate the sin which is the act of swearing or rather extenuate it all are not agreed nor seemeth it possible to answer simply and sufficiently unto this probleme by a single affirmation seeing judgement in the point dependeth very much upon circumstances But be it as it will the question is not to this purpose The nature of the doubt sheweth it to be unfit that a drunken or angry man should swear at all because during that distemper he cannot swear in judgâ—ment but must necessarily blab out whatsoever his wine or passion which are immoderate Counsellors shall perswade and which in cool bloud and sober he would give any thing were unsaid or unsworn neverthelesse we must distinguish of obligation For first the thing whereunto he swears is either unlawfull or lawfull and honest If unlawfull as it happeneth for the most part especially in oathes which fall vehemently from angry men blinded with eagernesse of revenge it is evident that they oblige not for it hath been sufficiently demonstrated that an unlawâ—ull thing is not obligatory Wherefore it was pâ—udently advisâ—d of Abigail and piously followed by David when animated by the unworthy reproach of an ungratefull man he had sworn the destruction of Nabal and his whole family in that he dispensed with his oath and withheld his hand from bloud But if the thing sworn be lawfull as that often is which drunkards ostentatiously promise then we must look Secondly what and how great the excesse of drunkennesse was whether in a degree to hinder only or perturb the use of reason or utterly to deprive of understanding and
but to give it upon lewd conditions unlawfull Thirdly I say that which is promised upon dishonest unlawfull conditions the conditions performed ought to be fulfilled at least if the thing be lawfull If a man promise a sum of money unto another for adultery false witnesse or any other wicked exploit he is bound when the other hath performed the conditions to stand to his promise and pay the money So Judah rightly understood himself obliged to send the Kid unto Thamar his daughter in law as the promised price of her Whoredome The reason is that although the bargain were yet the thing promised in that bargain is not unlawfull Wherefore it ought not to have been done but being done it is valid And by what hath been said it is sufficiently clear that an unlawfull oath of a lawfull thing may be obligatory SECT XV. THe second doubt reflecteth upon the Intention of the party swearing That Intention I mean not which aimeth objectively at the matter of the oath or thing promised whereby we enquire what the party swearing intended by this promise in what sense and how he obliged himself For of such intention we have already spoken when we discoursed upon the sense and interpretation of an oath but that intention is here understood which aimeth objectively at the act of swearing whereby we enquire whether he intended to swear or to oblige himself or not Upon which Scholastique dispute very much but more subtilly then profitably I shall contract as much of them as is usefull into a narrow room The first Case is when a man through evill custome heedlesly aboundeth with unnecessary oathes I say first that this kinde of swearing is most certainly a very grievous sin not only Originally and in respect of the Cause because it floweth from a depraved habit but also formally and in respect of the Act for asmuch as an act in it self sacred is rashly exercised not in Judgement and without reverence Secondly I say that such oathes if the act of swearing through the impetuosity of the minde were altogether inconsiderate are not obligatory But if any deliberation of minde were present though small they are in part obligatory The reason of either member of this assertion is because deliberation of minde is required to make any humane act binding and the measure of the obligation ariseth from the measure of the deliberation SECT XVI THe second Case is when in Honour or Complement for so Cafuists speak a man giddily sweareth in a matter of small moment For example if one contending with another and pâ—essing him by way of respect unto precedence should swear as it often happeneth not to stir out of the dore sit at the Table or touch the cup till the other were first out or fet or had begun Nay since commonly the persons so striving both swear the same thing if such oathes were obligatory one of them must needs be foresworne because of necessity one must doe that which each sware he would not doe First I say as before that an oath of this kinde is rash and not without sin because without judgement Secondly that it is neverthelesse in it self obligatory except the act were altogether void of deliberation But thirdly that such obligation may either be stopped or taken away in such manner as who doth otherwise then he hath sworn may avoid Perjury That is to say the obligation may be stopped if it be understood with a tacite condition or exception in this sense If it please you or if the thing be left unto me I will not stir till you goe first It may also be taken away because seeing it proceeded from consideration of the place due unto the other that other receding from his right the obligation ceaseth as God willing when I come to the solution of the bond shall more plainly appeat SECT XVII THe third Case is whether a man doubtfull whether he have sworn or no be bound by by his oath Some think he is not bound from the rule of the Law In doubtfull cases possession is the better title But seeing this rule is of force in things appertaining only unto commutative Justice as if the Heir of Caius should doubt whether the goods of the deceased bequeathed unto him by will were lawfully gotten some and more truly perhaps think he is bound unlesse he can clear his doubt The reason is because of doubtfull things the safer is to be chosen and certainly it is more safe to think himself obliged then not obliged because by that error he exposeth himself at the most but to temporall inconvenience by this unto the danger of perjury SECT XVIII THe fourth case whether man willing to swear yet intending not to oblige himself be neverthelesse obliged Most of the Scholasticks and Casuists they especially who were before Cajetan deny him to be obliged and Ovids Cydippe defendeth herself from perjury at this ward It is the minde with which we sweare And I had no such meaning there But the opinion of Cajetan and his followers is sounder who hold the party deliberately swearing to be bound whether he intend to oblige himself or not For the act of swearing is both in it self obligatory and proceeded from a deliberate minde Therefore obligation unlesse it be otherwise impeded must necessarily follow Wherefore seeing that obligation floweth necessarily and naturally from an oath it is not in the power of man to hinder or remove it for the nature of things stated no man can hinder their necessary effects Were it not ridiculous if he who hath signed and sealed a bond shal plead that he had no intention thereby to oblige himself Nay would he not be obliged notwithstanding that plea He therefore who taketh an oath is as much obliged by the act of swearing whatsoever he intended or professe he intended For he who intended the cause is presumed also to intend the necessary effect of that cause And thus the goodnesse of God directing and your patience accompanying me at length I have finished this difficult and scattering dispute concerning the Bond of an Oath the other part of this Treatise which concerneth the Solution of the Bond I shall shortly by Gods help deliver in one Lecture The seventh Lecture Of the Solution of the Bond of an Oath and of the use and abuse of Oathes containing five Cases and so many Conclusions Summary 1 What truth is required in a promissory oath 2 What the solution of the Bond is 3 Whether an oath may be dispensed withall 4 The Popes power of dispensing with oathes examined 5 Whether an oath may be commuted 6 The Superior may invalidate the oath of his Subject 7 The matter of an oath ceasing the obligation ceaseth 8 An oath may be released by him unto whom it is made 9 It is not unlawfull to swear 10 The custome of swearing in ordinary â—discourse evill 11 A man ought not to swear without necessity 12 Cautions in oathes required by others 13 An