a Prescription nor is there any arguing a Paritate rationis in such Cases and which have their force meerly from ancient and constant Usage It is a Rule at Common Law Ubi eadem est ratio ibi idem Jus But this Rule doth not hold in Customs and Prescriptions In the Case of Bayly and Stevens in Croke Jac. 1. fol. 198 it was held per Curiam that where Lands in Borough English descend to the youngest Son and he dies without Issue that the Land in such Case shall not go to the younger Brother without a particular Custom but the elder Brother shall have it for the usage had been in the one but not in the other Case yet these two Cases are very near of kin Now this Prerogative of dispensing with Acts of Parliament in the original use and exercise of it was but in very few Cases and those which more directly concern'd the King himself immediately in his Revenue or the like which were Cases of no great Consequence and such wherein the Law-Makers in making their Laws might be easily understood not to intend to abridge the King of his Power but to ease him rather of Labour and to put things into an ordinary course which yet the King might depart from if he were so minded and if he did accordingly signifie his Pleasure by granting an express Non Obstante the Act of Parliament to the contrary and making particular mention of the Act Unusquisque renunciare potest Juri pro se introducto Or in Cases where there is no disability impos'd upon a Person by the Act but only a pecuniary Penalty given to the King and forfeited by the Subject transgressing the Act where the King is Creditor poenoe it seems more reasonable that the King may dispense with the Penalty that will be due to himself And these and such like are the only Instances given in that great Case of 2 H. 7. But to dispense with an Act of Parliament made in a Case of the highest concernment to the Publick that can be wherein Religion and the Government are so deeply concern'd and where the King himself and the Parliament have thought fit to disable any Person to do to the contrary and so pronounc'd it and have put an incapacity upon Persons and adjudged the thing done to the contrary void this hath been of latter times and but of late found out and practis'd and is not warranted by any Prescription I shall cite some Resolutions to this purpose that the King cannot dispense with Disabilities and Incapacities imposed upon any Person by Act of Parliament The Lord Hobart's Reports fol. 75. in the Case of the King against the Bishop of Norwich Res. That if an Incumbent were guilty of Symony in obtaining a Benefice he was made incapable of that Benefice for ever by the words of the Statute of 31 Eliz. c. 6. Paragr 5. And the Case of Sir Arthur Ingram was cited who bought the Office of Cofferer he was holden by Egerton Lord Chancellor and Coke Chief Justice uncapable of that Office by force of the Statute of 5 E. 6. c. 16. tho' he had a Non Obstante and the reason there given is in these words For the Person being disabled by the Statute could not be enabled by the King And yet the Office of Cofferer is a special Service about the King's Person and his Treasure The Lord Chief Justice Vaughan in his Reports of the Case of Thomas and Sorrel fol. 354 355. gives this for the reason why the King cannot dispense with a Man to buy an Office contrary to the Statute of E. 6. nor with one Simoniacally presented to hold that Living or to be at any time after presented to it nor with any of the House of Commons not to take the Oath of Allegiance according to the Statute of 7 Jac. 1. c. 6. Because says he the Persons were made incapable to hold such Office or Living and a Person incapable is a dead Person and no Person at all to that wherein he is incapable And a Member of the House of Commons is by 7 Jac. Persona inhabilis 1. Inst. fol. 120. In the Case of the Simonist Sir E. C. says The Act so binds the King as that he cannot present him that the Law hath disabled for ever after to be presented to that Church The words of the Act be He shall be from thenceforth adjudged a disabled Person in Law to have or enjoy the same Benefice And the Party being disabled by the Act says Sir E. C. cannot be dispens'd withal by any Grant by a Non Obstante as it may be where any thing is prohibited sub modo as upon a Penalty given to the King. The Case of Sir John Bennet does not at all contradict these Authorities It is Croke Car. 55. Sir John Bennet by Sentence in the Star-Chamber was made incapable of any Office of Judicature for Bribery Res. by all the Judges and Barons that by the King's Pardon all Inabilities are discharg'd because the Sentence could not take the Office from him being Freehold over which the Court had no Power So that after so often declaring by several Acts of Parliament Grants and Patents made contrary to their Acts to be void and all Dispensations and Non Obstante's to the contrary of the Laws made by them to be void and inflicting Penalties upon such as should obtain those Grants and Non Obstante's or make use of them as appears by a multitude of Acts and all these too weak and all in vain by the Judges allowance of these Non Obstante's the Parliament had no other sence against these Non Obstante's but to fix a disability in the Persons and to make them uncapable of taking the benefit of such Grants and this hath held good till now but now they break through this too And as I observ'd in the Pope's Exercise of his Power of Dispensing that it was used with some moderation at first in Cases that seem'd to be of great necessity only but at last by degrees it grew to be intolerable and unlimited So the like may be observ'd in the use of this Prerogative 3. Instit. fol. 236 in the Chapter of Pardons by divers Acts of Parliament the King's Power of Granting Charters of Pardon hath been restrained as by 2 E. 3. c. 2. 10 E. 3. c. 2. 14 E. 3. c. 14. 13 R. 2 Stat. 2. c. 1. these are ancient Statutes It hath been conceiv'd says Sir E. C. which we will not question says he that the King may dispense with these Laws by a Non Obstante Yet Sir E. C. there declares That he found not any such Clauses of Non Oâ—stante to dispense with any of these Statutes but of late times This shews that it is a growing mischief and had not been anciently used as it ought to have been to make it a good Prescription and Prerogative I shall now examine the Authorities and Cases that are cited in defence
imports the King's Declaration and Resolution by advice of his great Council to employ none in Offices and Places of Trust but such as are most capable and fit and will most faithfully answer the great Ends for which they are so intrusted that is the preservation of the Protestant Religion which is the true English Interest And this agrees with the Rules of the Common Law That if an Office be granted to one that is Inidoneus the Grant is void though granted by the King himself Of this I have treated more largely in my Argument fol. 37. The Lord Chief Justice Herbert pag. 16. asks the Question Whether so many solemn Resolutions of all the Judges of England in the Exchequer-Chamber are not to be rely'd upon for Law And I answer That if they were ten times as many more yet they are not to be rely'd on against many express positive Acts of Parliament directly to the contrary For what words could the Parliament use more emphatical and express and more to the purpose than by saying That a Non-obstante or a Dispensation or a Grant of such a thing prohibited by that Law shall be absolutely void and ipso facto adjudged void and the person made uncapable to take And is not a Judgment in Parliament and by Act of Parliament of the highest Authority But says the Chief Justice fol. 16. the constant practice hath been to dispense with the Statute of Sheriffs I answer It hath also been a very frequent practice too for the King to make such persons Sheriffs as were none of the number nominated or chosen as aforesaid by the Chancellor Treasurer Judges and other great Officers and it passes for currant that he may so do though it be a vulgar Errour For it hath been resolv'd by all the twelve Judges to be an Errour in the King. See Sir Coke's 2 Instit. or Magna Charta fol. 559. and yet it is practis'd to this very day The Chief Justice pag. 18. seems to excuse Popish Recusants for not qualifying themselves for Offices by taking the Oaths and the Test c. for that no man says he hath it in his power to change his opinion in Religion as he pleaseth and therefore it is not their fault It is an Errour of the mind c. Answ. Here is no occasion taken to find fault with them for their Opinion let them keep their Religion still if they like it so well who hinders them This Act of 25 Car. 2. imposes no Penalty upon them for their Opinion But is there any necessity of their being in Offices Must they needs be Guardians of the Protestant Religion The Penalty upon them by this Act is not for their Opinion but for their presuming to undertake Offices and Trusts for which they are by King and Parliament adjudg'd and declar'd unfit Page 20 21. The Chief Justice Vaughan is brought in arguing for the Kings Power of Dispensing with Nominal Nusances as he is pleas'd to call and distinguish Nusances The word Nominal as there understood imports that though a Parliament declares any thing to be a Nusance as sometimes they do in Acts of Parliament to render them indispensable which yet in its proper nature would not otherwise be so conceiv'd to be that such a Nominal Nusance as he holds may however be dispens'd with by the King though regularly by Law the King may not dispense with any Nusance Answ. Shall any single or particular person though a Chief Justice presume to call that a meer Nominal Nusance which a Parliament by a solemn Act and Law have adjudg'd and declar'd to be a real Nusance Are we not all concluded by what a Law says This Arrogance is the Mischief now complain'd of The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 22. at the lower end says That from the abuse of a thing an Argument cannot be drawn against the thing it self I agree this is regularly true yet we have an Instance to the contrary in the Scripture in that point of the Brazen Serpent But in our Case the abuse doth arise from the very nature of the thing it self from the constitution of it For the King practises no more in dispensing than what these Resolutions of the Judges allow him to do by this pretended Prerogative The Errour is in the Foundation They have made his Power to be unlimitted either as to number of persons or as to the time how long the Dispensation shall continue Sir Edward Coke says and so the other Books That the King is the sole Judge of these Nec Metas Rerum nec Tempora Ponunt The Chief Justice Herbert fol. 24. cites two clear Concessions as he is pleas'd to call them of all the Commons of England in Parliament which he esteems much greater Authorities than the several Resolutions of all the twelve Judges But how far these are from Concessions will easily appear to an indifferent Reader They are no more than prudent and patient avoiding of Disputes with the several Kings And there are multitudes of the like in the old Parliament-Rolls It is but an humble clearing of themselves from any purpose in general to abridge the King of any of his Prerogatives which have always been touchy and tender things but it is no clear nor direct allowance of that dispensing there mention'd to be any such Prerogative in him However I am glad to see an House of Commons to be in so great request with the Judges It will be so at some times more than at others Yet I do not remember that in any Argument I have hitherto met with a Voteâ— or Order or Opinion of the House of Commons hath been cited for an Authority in Law before now Will the House of Peers allow of this Authority for Law It will be said That this is but the acknowledgment of Parties concern'd in Interest which is allowed for a good Testimony and strongest against themselves Answ. I do not like to have the King and his People to have divided Interests Prerogative and the Peoples Liberties should not be look'd upon as Opposites The Prerogative is given by Law to the King the better to enable him to protect and preserve the Subjects Rights Therefore it truly concerns the People to maintain Prerogative I could cite several Parliament-Records wherein the poor House of Commons have been forced to submit themselves and humbly beg pardon of the King for doing no more than their Duty meerly to avert his displeasure See the Case of Sir Thomas Haxey whom the King adjudg'd a Traytor for exhibiting a Bill to the Commons for the avoiding of the outrageous Expences of the King's House 20 R. 2. num 14 15 16 17 and 23. and the Commons were driven to discover his Name to the King and the whole House in a mournful manner craving pardon for their entertaining of that Bill No doubt as good an Authority against the Commons for so sawcily medling in a matter so sacred and so far above them Yet afterwards
evident that the King had no such Power or Prerogative of continuing Sheriffs in their Offices longer than a Year For under favour the Making of Sheriffs doth not nor never did belong to the King neither at the Common Law nor by any Act of Parliament so that all these Opinions and Resolutions are built upon a sandy Foundation and have but debile fundamentum and they take that for granted which is not a truth The Election of Sheriffs at the Common Law even from the very first Constitution of the Kingdom and by the Original Institution of the Government was in the Freeholders in the several Counties ever since there was any such Office as a Sheriff and ever since the Kingdom hath been divided into Shires that is in the time of the Saxons from whom we derive most of our Common Law and long after their time in the time of the Normans till being neglected by the Freeholders it came at length by an Act of Parliament made within the legal time of Memory to be taken from the Freeholders and the Power of Naming and Chusing Sheriffs every Year lodged in the hands of certain great Officers of State and so it continues to this day but neither is nor never was in the King. Mr. Lambard in his Book de Priscis Anglorum Legibus in his Lemma de Heretochiis fol. 147. says that those Heretochii were Ductores exercitus Here signifying an Army in the Saxon Tongue The same as in the Dialect of this present Age may be called Lord-Lieutenants or Deputy-Lieutenants The Law of King Edward which I take to be the Confessor speaks of these Heretochii in these words Isti vero viri Eligebantur per Commune Concilium pro Communi utilitate regni per provincias Patrias Universas per singulos Comitatus in pleno Folkmote sicut Vice-Comites Provinciarum Comitatuum Eligi debent This Law mentions this Election as an Use and Custom If the King did not make the Sheriff he could not continue him Sheriff if he could not make him for a Year he could not grant him the Office for longer than a Year the Sheriff had his Authority and Office from the Election not by Commission or Patent and that but for a Year Sir Edward Coke in his Second Institutes in his Exposition of the Statute of Westminster 1. Cap. 10. concerning the Election of the Coroners by the Freeholders which ever was so and so still continues says there is the same reason for Election of Sheriffs and so says he it anciently was by Writ directed to the Coroners In like manner were the Conservators of the Peace chosen in whose place the Justices of the Peace now succeed and so the Verderors of the Forrest are to this day These were great and high Liberties and did belong to the Freeholders from all antiquity and are strong Arguments to confute those late Authors that will by no means allow of a limitted Government but leave us under an Absolute and Arbitrary Power and who call our Laws and Liberties but the Concessions and Condescensions from the Regal and Absolute Power Sir Edward Coke discourses largely of these Elections in his Exposition of the Statute of Articuli super Chartas in his Second Institutes or Magna Charta fol. 558. By this Statute it is said the King hath granted to his People that they have the Election of their Sheriff in every County where the Sheriff is not of Fee if they will. Sir Edward Coke says by this Act that ancient Right the People that is the Freeholders had was restor'd to them and the words if they will import that they formerly had it but neglected it By a Statute made in the next King's Reign viz. 9 E. 2. styled The Statute of Sheriffs upon pretence that insufficient persons were commonly chosen for Sheriffs by that Act it is ordained that from thenceforth the Sheriffs shall be assigned by the Chancellor Treasurer Barons of the Exchequar and by the Justices And by the Statute of 14 E. 3. c. 7. some change is made of the persons that are to have the Election and the Day and Place of such Assigning of Sheriffs is prefix'd viz. yearly in the morrow of All-Souls and in the Exchequer By the Statute of 12 R. 2. c. 2. the Assigning of the Sheriff is put into the hands of more great Officers who are to be sworn to execute this Trust faithfully but it is not vested in the King all this while nor never was It is true that out of Reverence to the King these great Officers who had the Assigning of Sheriffs did afterwards use to name three persons out of which number they left it to the King to chuse one for every Shire But this was more out of deference to the King than out of any strict Obligation so to do and the Election made by the King was in Law to be accounted an Assignment by these great Officers Nor could the King chuse any other for Sheriff than one of those three so Assigned by those great Officers tho' it is sometimes otherwise practis'd And this hath been a Resolution of all the Judges of England and is mentioned in Sir Coke's Second Institutes fol. 559. it was in the 34th Year of Henry the Sixth and it is in these words viz. That the King did an Error when he made another person Sheriff of Lincolnshire then was chosen and presented to him by those great Officers after the effect of the Statute So that the right of Electing Sheriffs by those great Officers we see continued so lately as the latter end of King Henry the Sixth and I know of no Law since that hath alter'd it therefore we may conclude it is no Prerogative in the King. And we may further observe what plain Language all the Judges used in those days as to tell the King and the Lords of the Council that the King had erred in what he had done I observe this the rather that it may be some excuse to me for the plain Language I am forced to use in the Arguing upon this Subject The Lawyers are not always Courtiers nor will the Subject-matter bear Complements and Courtship Ornari res ipsa negat contenta doceri I cannot reconcile this Resolution of the twelve Judges given in the time of King Henry ths Sixth with that Opinion that is deliver'd in the Lord Dyer's Reports fol. 225. b. and it is but an Opinion 5 6 of Queen Elizabeth In the time of the Plague the Sheriffs were named and made without assembling the Judges ad Crastinum Animarum at the Exchequer according to the common usage but for the most part none was made but one of the two that remain'd in the Bill the last Year Tho' it was held says the Report that the Queen by her Prerogative might make a Sheriff without such Election by a Non Obstante aliquo Statuto in contrarium which crosses the Resolution I
necessitate pensata Upon the word Concessa I would gladly be satisfy'd when or by whom that Power was ever granted to the King where shall we find that Grant It is clear that whoever hath the entire Power of making a Law may justly dispense with that Law. And therefore Almighty God being the sole and supream Law-giver might dispense even with the Moral Law as he did with the sixth Commandment when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac and with the eighth Commandment when he commanded the Israelites to borrow the Jewels of the Aegyptians and to go away without restoring of them But it stands not with reason that he who hath but a share with others in the making of a Law as the King hath no more should have the power by himself alone to dispense with the Law unless that power were expresly intrusted with him by the rest of the Law-makers as sometimes hath been done Sir Edward Coke in his seventh Report in the Case of Paenal Statates fol. 36. towards the lower end does affirm that this Dispensing Power is committed to the King By All his Subiects So that it is not claimed Jure Divino but by Grant from the People But where to find any such Grant we know not I have as I conceive made it appear in my larger Argument p. 14. that the first Invention of Dispensations with Laws began by the Pope about the time of Innocent the Third and by our King Henry the Third in imitation and by encouragement from the Pope so that it was not by the Grant of the People but ever exclaimed against by all good men and generally by all the people and ever fenced against by a multitude of Acts of Parliament It is true the Dispensing with Laws hath ever since been practised and they began at first here in England to be used only in Cases where the King alone was concern'd in Statutes made for his own profit wherein he might have done what he pleas'd But it is but of latter times that they have been stretched to Cases that concern the whole Realm See my Argument fol. 13. Hence it evidently appears it cannot be a legal Prerogative in the King for that must ever be by Prescription and restrain'd to those Cases that have been used time immemorial and must not be extended to new Cases Now there hath been no such usage as will warrant the Dispensing with such an Act of Parliament as is now before us that of 25 Car. 2. c. 2. The Chief Justice Herbert from the Definition before recited and those two Authorities of Sir Edward Coke in his Case of Monopolies and that other of Penal Statutes frames an Argument to prove that the Dispensation granted to Sir Edward Hales was good in Law. Because a Dispensation is properly and only in case of a Malum Prohibitum he thence insers that the King can dispense in all Cases of Mala Prohibita Which is a wrong Inference and that which Logicians call Fallacia à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter Because he can dispense with some that therefore he can dispense with all is no good Consequence It appears by the late Chief Justice Vaughan's Reports in the Case of Thomas and Sorrel so often cited by the Chief Justice Vaughan's Rep. fol. 333. the fourth Paragraph that his Opinion is That the King cannot dispense with every Malum Prohibitum and he gives many Instances of such Mala Prohibita that are not dispensable fol. 342 and 334. parag 4. Therefore the Lord Chief Justice Herbert should as I conceive regularly first have given us the distinction of Mala Prohibita into such as are dispensable and such as are not dispensable and then have shewn that the Dispensation granted to Sir Edward Hales fell under the first part but that learned Reporter the chief Justice Vaughan so often cited by our now Lord Chief Justice in the aforesaid Case of Thomas and Sorrell fol. 332. the last Paragraph save one quarrels with the very distinction of Malum Prohibitum and Malum in se and says it is confounding From whence I would observe and from the whole Report in Thomas and and Sorrell's Case that the Notion of Dispensation is as yet but crude and undigested and not fully shaped and formed by the Judges The Pope was the Inventer of it Our Kings have borrowed it from them And the Judges from time to time have nursed and dressed it up and given it countenance And it is still upon the growth and encroaching till it hath almost subverted all Law and made the Regal Power Absolute if not Dissolute I must agree that our Books of late have run much upon a Distinction viz. Where the breach of a Penal Statute is to the particular damage of any person for which such person may have his Action against the Breaker of that Law there tho' it be but Malum Prohibitum yet the King cannot dispense with that Penal Law according to the Rule in Bracton Rex non potest gratiam facere cum injuriâ damno alterius As for instance There are several Statutes that prohibit one man from maintaining another's Suit though in a just Cause See Poulton de pace Regis Regni in his Chapt. of Maintenance fol. 55. Now it is held that the King cannot dispense with those Laws because it would be to the prejudice and damage of that particular person against whom the Suit is so maintain'd by another for there can be no maintenance but it is to the wrong of a particular person So of carrying a Distress out of the Hundred But there are many other Penal Laws where by the transgressing of them no Subject can have any particular damage and therefore no particular Action for the breach of them As upon the Statute that prohibits the Transportation of Wool under a Penalty By the breach of this Law that is by the Exportation of Wool no one particular man hath any damage more than every other man hath but it is only against the Publick Good. And the breach of such a Penal Law is punishable only at the King's Suit by Indictment or Presentment And the like where such a Penal Statute gives an Action Popular to him that will sue for the Penalty who hath no right to it more than any other till his Suit be commenced In these Cases it is commonly held that the King may dispense with such Penal Statutes as to some particular persons and for some limitted time whereof they make the King the sole Judge because as the reason is given in the Chief Justice Vaughan's Reports fol. 344. parag 2. Such offence wrongs none but the King. This is now the common receiv'd Opinion and Distinction And the breach of such kind of Penal Statutes are said to be only the King's damage in his publick capacity as Supream Governour and wronging none but himself Lord Vaugh. Rep. 342. parag 3. But if we will narrowly search into this
Distinction and weigh the Reasons so given we shall find it is without any just ground The damage done to the particular person in the Cases past in the first part of this distinction are meerly his own proper and peculiar damage and he is intituled to his particular Action for it in his own proper personal Right and therefore if he discharge and dispense with them it is no wrong to any other man. He may do what he will with his own But the Cases in the second part of this Distinction are where the King hath a right to the Suit and the offence and damage are said to be to him only But are they so as the former in his own personal right as his Lands and other Revenues are or are they to him but as a Trustee for the Publick for which reason he is called Creditor Poenae and may he therefore upon the like reason dispense with them or dispose of them as a Subject may do with his own particular Interests Again Shall a publick Damage and Injury to the whole Nation be more dispensable by the King than the loss of one private man fuit haec sapientia quondam Publica privatis secernere And therefore in my apprehension the King cannot in such Cases of Dispensations be truly said to wrong none but himself and it is not agreeable to the Definition before given Utilitate Compensata for the King wrongs the whole Realm by it Where if he grants a Dispensation with a Penal Law of the first sort of this distinction he only wrongs some particular persons The Cases and Authorities for Dispensations in our Books that were granted in ancient times will generally be found to be only where the Penal Statutes were made for the King 's own proper interest and benefit As his dispensing with the Statute of Mortmain For in such Cases it was to the King 's own loss only in Cases where the King might by Law have given away his Lands or Services So the King may in his Patent of Grant of Lands dispense with the Statutes that require there shall be mention of the true Values of them And by a Non-obstante to those Statutes which is now generally used the King does in effect declare that it is his pleasure to grant those Lands whatever the Value of them be more or less and the Statute does by express words save a liberty to the King in that Case The King is not a Trustee for others in such Cases nor can these Dispensations be said to be directly to the damage of the Publick And such Penal Laws as meerly concern the King 's own Revenue or Profit may justly be thought to be intended to be made only to put the King's matters into an ordinary method and course and so save the King a labour as the Lord Hobart says and so prevent the King 's being surpriz'd or mis-inform'd when Patents are gained from him and not design'd to tye the King's hands or to restrain his power as out of all doubt was done and intended by the Law-makers in our Act of 25 Car. 2. But in all the late Cases and Authorities which we meet with in our Books concerning Non-obstante's and Dispensations as in the time of King Henry the Seventh and so downward to this day we shall find them practising upon such Penal Statutes as meerly concern the Publick Good and Benefit and the Laws of such a nature by the breach of which the whole Nation suffers While some particular persons it may be by giving a large Fine or a yearly Sum obtain the favour to be dispens'd with and exempt from a Penal Law while all others continue to be bound by it As for Example Where a Statute forbids the Exportation of Wool or of Cloth undyed or undress'd under a Penalty such a Law is greatly for the Publick Good and it takes care that our own People shall have Employment and Maintenance Yet this is such a Law as according to the receiv'd Distinction the King may dispense with there being no particular damage to one man more than to another by breach of such a Law although it be a mighty damage to the whole Nation For by such a Dispensation the person so dispens'd with to Export such White Cloth undyed will have the sole Trade which before the making of that Penal Statute was equal and common to all I wish the House of Commons would enquire what vast Riches have been heretofore gotten by such as have obtain'd the Dispensations with this Penal Statute besides the Sums they paid to the Crown for them These are meer Monopolies In such a Case it may rightly be applied That Sin taketh occasion by the Law. It had been better for the Nation that such Laws were never made being no better observ'd for here again the Dispensation is neither Utilitate nor Necessitate pensata Look into the Case of Thomas and Sorrell and you will find few or no Cases of Dispensations cited out of our Books but of the time of King Henry the Seventh and much more of very late times so that the ill practice is still improving and stretching The Lord Chief Justice Herbert in the next place pag. 9. proceeds to mention the great Case of 2 Hen. 7. a Resolution of all the Judges in the Exchequer-Chamber upon the King 's dispensing with the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 8. That no man should be a Sheriff above one year This is the great Leading Case and Authority upon which the main stress is laid to justifie the Judgment given in Sir Edward Hales his Case I would avoid repeating what I have already so largely said to this Authority to which I must refer my Reader by which I hope it is most evidently made out that the King neither hath nor never had any just Right or Power to elect Sheriffs But the right of Electing was anciently and originally belonging to the Freeholders of the several Counties and since it was unjustly taken from them as they have ever been on the losing hand it hath been lodged in the great Officers of the Realm as the Lord Chancellor Lord Treasurer Lord Privy-Seal and the Judges c. as appears by the several Statutes And they are to make such Choice every year in the Exchequer on a day appointed by the Statute for that purpose So that the Sheriffs are by those Statutes to continue in their Offices for one year only And the King cannot hinder such Election Only by his Patent or Commission to the Sheriff hath he used to signifie to the Sheriff himself that is so chosen and to publish to all others who the person is that is so chosen This is all the use of the Patent but it is the proper Election of those great Officers that truly vests them in their Office And it does as clearly appear that when former Kings have dispens'd with a Sheriffs continuing in his Office for longer than one year contrary to the
custom to the observance of the same not as to the observance of the Laws of any foreign Prince Potentate or Prelate but as to the customed and ancient Laws of this Realm originally establish'd as Laws of the same by the said sufferance consents and Customs and none otherwise Upon the same ground it is that learned Hooker says that the lawful Power of making Laws to command whole Politick Societies of Men belongs so properly unto the same entire Societies that for any Prince or Potentate of what kind soever upon Earth I use his very words too to exercise the same of himself and not either by express Commission immediately and personally receiv'd from God or else by Authority derived at first from their consent upon whose persons they impose Laws it is no better than meer Tyranny King James the First in his before-mentioned Speech speaks much the same words Laws therefore says Hooker they are not which Publick Approbation hath not made so Approbation may be declar'd says he either by a personal Assent or by others by a Right deriv'd from them as in Parliaments This hath the more Authority being the Judgment in a Point of Religion not of an Historian or Lawyer but of a Reverend Divine and such an one as hath been so great a Champion for Authority and Government and for exact Conformity to Ecclesiastical Laws Some of our late Writers and Preachers have discours'd quite in another strain The Noble Author I just now cited calls the Laws Condescentions and Voluntary Abatements of the King 's Original Power supposing his Power at first was absolute Now that Preamble of that Statute which I just now read is directly contrary in the very word Original Another a certain Lawyer a Knight in a small but bold Treatise of his will by no means allow of any limitation of Power and holds it absurd to say a Government can be mixed or limited A certain Divine and Geographer in his History of the Life of a late Archbishop declares himself much of the same mind with both these and many others have trod since in their steps I therefore thought it very proper and seasonable to shew the Judgment in these Matters of an eminent Divine too a Person in all respects without exception and his Judgment is concurring with all the ancient Authors in our profession of the Common Law who being so learned and so ancient are therefore the most Competent Witnesses of our English Constitution That ancient Author of ours whose Book is stiled Fleta quia in Cartere Fletae de jure Anglicano conscripsit in the time of King Edward the First as learned Mr. Selden has noted in his Dissertatio ad Fletam c. 10. sect 2 3. This Author L. 1. c. 5. tells us Superiorem non habet Rex in Regno nisi Deum Legem Per Legem factus est Rex temperent Reges potentiam suam per Legem Non quod principi placet Legis habet potestatem Non quicquid de voluntate Regis sed quod magnatum suorum Consilio Regia authoritate prestante habita super hoc deliberatione tractatu recte fuerit diffinitum Bracton who was a Judge in the time of King Henry the Third but wrote his Book in the time of King Henry the Second stiles the Laws of England the ancient Judgments of the Just. And Briton Bishop of Hereford who publish'd his Book 5 Edw. 1. by the Command of that King and as written in the King's Name And Sir Gilbert de Thornton who was a Chief Justice in Edward the First 's time and reduced the Book of Bracton into a Compendium And Sir John Fortescu another Chief Justice and afterwards Chancelor in the time of Henry the Sixth writ all to the same effect and almost totidem verbis These Authors discourse altogether of the Imperia Legum as Livy calls it And Laws thus made by an universal consent must needs be most equal and have a far greater veneration paid them by all sorts of men The best men are but men and are sometimes transported with passion The Laws alone are they that always speak with all persons high or low in one and the same impartial voice The Law knows no favourites Hence it is that Aristotle most significantly and elegantly says That the Law is a Mind without Affection that is it binds all alike and dispences with none the greatest Flies are no more able to break through these Cobwebs than the smaller Imperatoria Majestas Legibus armata est says the Introduction to the Imperial Law These are the surest Arms and Guard about a Prince Baldus the great Lawyer says Digna vox est Majestate Regnantis Legibus alligatum principem se profiteri Sir Edward Cook in his 2 Inst. fol. 27. observes that the Nobility of England have ever had the Laws of England in great reverence as their best Birth-right and so says he have the Kings of England as their principal Royalty belonging to their Crown He there mentions our King Henry the First the Son of him that is stiled Conqueror He wrote to Pope Paschal in this manner Notum habeat sanctitas vestra quod me vivente auxiliante Deo dignitates usus Regni nostri Angliae non imminuentur Et si ego quod absit in tanta me dejectione ponerem Optimates mei totus Angliae populus id nullo modo pateretur And fol. 98. there is mention of the Letters which all the Nobility of England by assent of the Commonalty in the time of Edward the First wrote to Pope Boniface viz. Ad Observationem Defensionem consuetudinum Legum Paternarum ex Debito prestiti Sacramenti astringimur quae manutenebimus toto posse totisque viribus cum Dei auxilio defendemus Nec etiam permittimus aut aliquatenus permittemus tam insolita indebita prejudicialia alias in audita Dominum nostrum Regem etiam si vellet facere seu quomodo libet attemptare Sealed with the several Seals of Arms of 104 Earls and Barons And the Noble King Edward the First took no offence at the stout and resolute penning of this Letter but wrote himself to the Pope to the same effect And yet it contains in it a kind of a Non obstante to what the King should do by way of submission and compliance with the Pope Nor is a Just Law any restraint to a Just Liberty it rather frees us from a Captivity and Servitude viz. to that of our Wills and Passions It is true this obligation and binding of the Law is very uneasie to such Men as will be slaves to their Lusts and Appetites They cry out let us break these Bonds asunder and cast away these Cords from us but to such as are virtuous and just and pious the Laws are a Direction and Protection The Orator truly says Legum id circo omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus The true English of
other Clauses The History of the Reformation fol. 262. mentions the Draught of a Bill intended for an Act of Parliament concerning giving the King Power of Erecting many new Bishopricks by his Letters Patents upon which the Author of that History says that the Preamble and material parts of it were drawn by King H. 8. himself and the first Draught of it under his hand is still extant and this passed the Lords and was sent down to the Commons and this is the very same Parliament of 31 H. 8. when this terrible Law passed Sir Edw. Cook in his first Inst. fol. 99. defines a Dispensation thus Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxatio utilitate seu necessitate pensata So that great utility or necessity are at least pretended for the granting of them now publick utility and necessity are the true grounds and foundation of all Laws which I have already shewn bind all Men alike without respect of person But a Dispensation does untie that Knot or slackens and lets loose that Obligation as to some particular persons and in some cases and for some limited time at the will and pleasure of the Prince that exercises that Power It looks like a Dispensation which Naaman the Syrian obtained from the Prophet Elisha In this thing that is in one particular the Lord pardon thy servant to bow down himself in the house of Rimmon when his Master the King did so He calls it a Pardon but it rather was an Indulgence or Dispensation that he crav'd A Pardon is properly of an Offence already committed See Dr. Field Dean of Gloucester in his Treatise of the Church printed at Oxford 1628. fol. 475. what a Dispensation is viz. It is in respect of certain persons times places and conditions of men and things So that a Dispensation permitting the Law to retain her wonted Authority only freeth some particular person or persons at some times in some places and in some condition of things from the necessity of doing or leaving undone that which unless it be in consideration of such particular circumstances ought to be done A Dispensation is of a thing future to allow of a thing to be done that it may not be accompted for a Crime and makes the thing prohibited lawful to be done And thereupon the Chief Justice Vaughan in his Argument of the Case of Thomas and Sorrel seems to take it in its right Notion when he says a Dispensation obtain'd does Jus dare Tho' he quarrels with Sir Cook 's Definition of it and says it is Ignotum per Ignotius But under his favour if he dislik'd that he should have given us a better Carpere vel noli nostra c. 1. I know very well that there are some of late that do ground this Power upon the Soveraignty of the Prince as if to be Soveraign and to be Absolute and Solutus à Legibus were one and the same thing As if it were inconsistent for a Soveraign Prince to be bound to Law. A Prince may be a Soveraign i. e. no subordinate or subject Prince Rex est qui Regem Maxime not habeat and yet not absolute and unlimitted in Power It is a frequent Argument and often disputed in our Books what Law the King is bound to and where he is not included in the Law. 2. It hath been argued that because the Laws are the King's Laws that therefore the King may dispence with the Laws this Argument is of a vast extent in the consequence as that of the Soveraignty is But it is not the King alone that makes the Laws and tho' they are indeed his Laws per Eminentiam and Denominatio sumitur à majore yet others have an hand in the making our Laws and a Propriety and Interest in them when once they are made We shall be best instructed in the Use and Nature of a Dispensation if we give some Instances of particular Cases wherein Dispensations have been allowed good by our Judges against the Penalties of some particular Acts of Parliament For example By a certain Statute Gascoign Wines and other Foreign Goods were prohibited to be imported into this Kingdom but in English Ships under the penalty of forfeiting the Goods and it was a profitable Law for the encrease of our Navy and employment of our own Mariners wherein the strength and safety of the Kingdom is concerned This importing of Foreign Goods in Foreign Ships was the Malum but it was only Malum prohibitum that is it was no offence till the Law made it so It was not Malum in se. It was therefore resolv'd by all the Judges 2 R. 3. fol. 12. that the King might dispence with this Law Cum Clausula non obstante and might give License to some particular persons to import such Foreign Goods in Foreign Ships That which before this Act of Parliament was a common Liberty and Trade by occasion of this Law applying the Prerogative of dispensing to it was now engross'd into some few hands from whence a Revenue it 's likely was rais'd so that it might be said Sin took occasion by the Law. By the Statute of 17 R. 2. c. 5. no Aulnager or Weigher of Wool shall have any Lease for Life or Years of his Office and if any Charter or Letters Patents be made to the contrary the Statute says they shall be null and void so that the Makers of this Law did not allow of any Dispensing Power but provided against it which shews what Opinion a Parliament hath of Dispensations Yet it was resolv'd Dyer 303. that the King by a Non obstante might dispence with this Law. The Judges indeed were of that Judgment but the Parliament who are the supreamest Judges plainly appear to be of a contrary judgment By a Statute made 1 H. 4. he that petitions to the King for Lands c. in his Petition is to mention the Value of the thing c. or else the King's Letters Patents c. shall be of no effect and yet Letters Patents to the contrary are good with a Non obstante By the Statute of 33 H. 8. c. 24. for avoiding Partiality and Favour in administring Justice no man is to exercise the Office of a Judge of Assize in the County where he was born or dwells under 100 l. penalty and divers former Acts had been made to the same purpose as 8 R. 2. c. 2 c. yet this we know is frequently dispenc'd with by a special Non obstante so that these Statutes are seldom or never observ'd and are of little use So likewise is the Statute of 7 Ed. 6. c. 5. for Retailing of Wine according to the Resolution in the Case of Thomas and Sorrel These may suffice to shew what is meant by the Term Dispensation and what the Nature of a Non obstante is It is an Indulging of a Priviledge to some particular Person or to a Corporation allowing him or them to do a thing that is
been such a Power in the Crown the King would never have suffered himself to have been depriv'd of it and to have it dispos'd of into other hands by the Parliament and there would have been no need of passing such a Law the King himself alone could easily have transacted all this Matter provided for by this Act of Parliament had he had the sole Power It is true that the Lord Hobart in his Reports Fol. 146. mentioning this Act of Dispensations and taking Notice that by the express words of the Act all Dispensations c. shall be granted in Manner and Form as is prescribed by that Act and not otherwise yet he holds that the King is not thereby restrained but that his Power remains full and perfect as before and that he may still grant Dispensations as King for says he all Acts of Justice and Grace flow from him This and such like Statutes says the Lord Hobart were made to put things into ordinary form and to ease the King of Labour not to deprive him of Power This Opinion of his is grounded upon a presumption that the Power of Dispensing with Laws was always from the beginning a Prerogative inherent in the Crown not examining who was the first Author and the time when it first began and whence we borrowed the use and how there was a time within evident proof of credible and authentick Writers when Dispensations were not in use and so they are within the time of Memory in a Legal Construction and cannot be by Prescription And it is plain every Legal Prerogative must be so by Prescription that is used time out of Memory of Man and whereof there is no sufficient Writing to the contrary But I may appeal to any unbiass'd and equal Judgment upon the reading of this Act especially the Preamble of it whether this Act meerly intended to put things into an ordinary Form and to case the King of Labour or whether it was not to put an absolute stop to the former Practice and does not directly declare and determine where the true Power of Dispensing ever was and therein uses those exclusive words and not otherwise for those words are in the Preamble as well as in the Body of the Act. So that this Construction of the Lord Hobart's That still the King may Dispense alone by himself and that he might have done so by his Prerogative before the making of this Statute and may do so still notwithstanding this 〈◊〉 is directly against the very words of the Statute that says it shall not be otherwise then as the Statute directs and being in the Negative are the stronger And the three Instances or Cases cited by the Lord Hobart all out of Dyer do not come home to the Case of the King 's Granting Dispensations in other manner than the Statute of 25 H. 8. c. 21. hath directed which expresly enacts that they shall not be granted otherwise 1. His first Instance is out of Dyer 211 the Statute of 28 H. 8. c. 15. Appoints that the Commissioners for Tryal of Piracy shall be named by the Lord Chancellor now it happened there was no Lord Chancellor but a Lord Keeper and it was held that he might name the Commissioners by the meaning of this Statute as well as the Lord Chancellor This is under favour but a weak proof of the King's Power or Prerogative of varying from the Directions of an Act of Parliament or dispensing with the Rules prescrib'd by it for it is a meer imaginary variation the Lord Keeper ever having the same Power as the Lord Chancellor and it is not meerly so enacted but declar'd by the Act of 5 Eliz. c. 18. which proves it was Law before And yet some Judges held the Commissioners were not well named but that the Commission was void 2. The second Instance or Authority that the Lord Hobart uses to prove his Assertion that the words and not otherwise in the Statute of Dispensations doe not restrain the King's Power but that he may do otherwise is out of Dyer 225. That Queen Elizabeth might make Sheriffs without the Judges notwithstanding the Stat. of 9 E. 2. this I shall have occasion to examine and speak to more fully hereafter and therefore shall reserve it till then and doubt not to shew it is a mistake and it was done by the Queen in a case of necessity it being in the time of the Plague when the great Officers could not safely meet in the Exchequer as the Statutes require for the chusing of Sheriffs and the Term was held at Hertford and the Report says no Sheriff was named by the Queen for the most part but out of those Names that remained in the Bill for the former Year And the Book only says it was held the Queen might do it by her Prerogative 3. The last Instance that the Lord Hobart gives is out of Dyer 303. b. that the King may grant the Aulnagers Office without a Bill sealed by the Treasurer tho' the Statute of 31 H. 6. c. 5. says the Grant of that Office shall be void without a Bill seal'd by the Treasurer The Resolution of that Point is very obscurely reported but however take it at the strongest this is in a matter that concern'd the King's Revenue and where it may more reasonably be said by the King. May I not do what I will with my own And this Statute may easily be understood to be to put the granting of this Office into an ordinary form and to ease the King of Labour and not to restrain his Power If that may be said in any Case against the express words of a Statute it may be in a Case that concerns meerly his Revenue as this of the Aulneage was In the next place I shall shew that the stream of Dispensations did anciently run in this channel till afterwards it found out another course and that Dispensations with Laws were only in the same hands as had the Legislature that is in the King and Parliament in former times and this answers that Example that hath been used that Almighty God dispens'd with his own Law of the sixth Commandment when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac God was the great and only Legislator Now the King is not the sole Legislator I shall present you with a very full Precedent and Proof of the Power of Dispensing with Acts of Parliament to be no where else but where the very Legislative Power is And that the Kings have sometimes accepted it from them in some particular cases and for some limitted time and with divers restrictions which is a full acknowment that it belongs only to the Legislative Power to dispence with Laws The Commons for the great Affiance which they repose in the King granted that he by advice of his Lords might make such Toleration touching the Statute of Provisions as to him shall seem good until the next Parliament so as the Statute be repealed in no part thereof
So also as the Commons may disagree thereunto at the next Parliament with this Protestation too that this their Assent being indeed a Novelty these are the very words be taken for no example This is granted with abundance of caution and jealousie and proves it is not ancient The Commons do agree to the Power granted to the King for the Moderation of the Statutes touching Provisors in the last Parliament beseeching the King that the same may not license any Cardinal or Stranger to enjoy any Benefice within the Realm It was enacted by the Lords and Commons that Tydeman late Abbot of Beaulew and Elect of Landaf by the Pope's provision should enjoy the same Bishoprick notwithstanding any Act so always as this be taken for no example That the sale of Tin may be at Lostwithiel in Cornwal and shall not continue at Calais Notwithstanding the Council may grant License to Merchants to carry the same Tin to what parts they will as to them shall seem good Here the Power of Dispensing is delegated to the Council Upon the request of the Commons the King promiseth that he will not from thenceforth dispence with the Statute of Provisions to Benefices This implies that the King had practis'd it and we know who began the practice and who taught it to others and this Record shews it was without consent and was a cause of complaint and the King promises to reform it for the future But what signifies a Promise where a Law and an Oath is too weak to secure it this Promise doth not confer a new Right but is to reform an unjust Practice I shall use one Argument more against this exercise of the Power of Dispensing with Acts of Parliament as it hath of late been practis'd and that Argument shall be rais'd from the great Inconvenience and Mischief that will ensue upon it to the Kingdom it may occasion the infrequency of Parliaments by taking much of their power out of their hands Laws are many times made but probationers and temporary to the end that if upon experience of them they be found to be too severe or strict and to sit hard upon any persons that the Parliament at their next meeting may moderate or relax the severity or inconvenience that may arise by them But if there be another way allowed for the doing of this Work there will be the less need of a Parliament and so other Work that requires also their meeting may remain unremedied If we consider how frequently the Parliament ought to meet and and how often they did anciently meet we shall easily be convinc'd that the relaxing of a Law or giving remedy where the Law was upon experience found inconvenient was a work properly belonging unto them and there was no need of resorting to any other help for who should cure or reform a Law if any thing were amiss in it but the Law-makers See the Statute of 6 H. 8. c. 18. the Book of Statutes at large concerning Bristol Our Saxon King Alfred and his Wise Men that is the great Council of the Kingdom ordained that a Parliament twice a Year and oftner in time of Peace should meet in London Thus says that ancient Book stiled The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. sect 3. pag. 10. by 4 E. 3. c. 14. It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every Year once or more often if need be this does not abrogate not alter King Alfred's Law. By 36 E. 3. c. 10. many Laws had passed in that Parliament of 36 E. 3. which are there called Articles as anciently our Statutes were drawn into certain Articles and so passed as being Articles of Agreement betwixt the King and his Subjects as I had occasion to observe in the beginning of my Discourse and this Statute of 36 E. 3. provides that for maintenance of the said Articles and Statutes and redress of divers Mischiefs and Grievances which daily happen a Parliament shall be holden every Year as another time was ordained by a Statute referring to the Statute of the Fourth of this King. The Act of 16 Car. 2. c. 1. for repeal of the Triennial Act made 16 Car. 1. in the last Paragraph recites that by the ancient Laws and Statutes of this Realm made in the Reign of King Edward the Third Parliaments are to be held very often and this Act of 16 Car. 2. makes a new provision to the end as the words are there may be a frequent calling assembling and holding of Parliaments once in three Years at the least Now let us enquire what the proper Work of a Parliament is which the said Statute of 36 E. 3. mentions in part viz. for maintenance of the Articles and Statutes and redress of Mischiefs and Grievances that daily happen as that Statute recites Sir Tho. Smith who was principal Secretary of State in his Treatise de Republica Administratione Anglorum L. 2. c. 2. fol. 50 51. says this of the Parliament In Comitiis Parliamentariis posita est omnis augustae Absolutaeque potestat is vis veteres leges jubent esse irritas novas inducunt praesentibus modum constituunt There is the true dispensing power Incerti juris controversias Dirimunt Bracton writes of this High Court Habet Rex Curiam suam in concilio suo in Parliamentis suis ubi terminatoe sunt dubitationes Judiciorum novis injuriis emersis nova constituuntur remedia The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. pag. 9. says that Parliaments were instituted to hear and determine the Complaints of the wrongful Acts of those against whom the Subject otherwise could not have common Justice that is against great and powerful Delinquents Nihil prodest says Bracton Jura concedere nisi sit qui Jura tueatur So that there is need of a frequent resort to be had to the Law-mamakers not only to resolve difficulties of Judgments but to keep the power of Interpretation within its due bounds and the Law hath taken care for frequency of Parliaments Sir Francis Bacon in his Advancement of Learning gives this excellent Advice to Law-makers and to those to whom it belongs to defend the Laws Let not says he Praetorian Courts speaking of Courts of Equity have power to decree against express Statutes under pretence of Equity for says he if this should be permitted a Law interpreter that is a Judge would become a Law-maker and all Matters should depend upon Arbitrament that is upon an Arbitrary Power And Arbitrament would encroach upon and at last swallow up Law. The power of extending or supplying or moderating Laws little differs says he from the power of making them Courts of Equity sometimes under the pretence of mitigating the Rigor of the Laws and such is the Power of Dispensing relax the Strength and Sinews of Laws by drawing all to Arbitraments he was well able to judge of this having been Lord Chancelor And it is his 46th Aphorism That is the best Law which gives the least
of this Prerogative and Power of dispensing with a disability impos'd by Act of Parliament for I do not purposely dispute it in any other Case but as they are coincident with this The first that we meet with is that of 2 H. 7. fol. 6. and it was by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber The Case thus King Edward the Fourth granted the Office of Sheriff of a County to the Earl of Northumberland for the Life of the Earl and the Justices held the Patent good there being a Non Obstante in it to the Statutes Let us look into the Statutes that forbid a Sheriff to continue in his Office longer then one Year There had been several ancient Statutes made to that purpose but they all prov'd to be of little effect for Patents were still granted to hold the Office of a Sheriff for a longer time than one Year At length came the Stat. 23. H. 6. c. 8. which recites the former Statutes forbidding any Persons continuance in the Office of Sheriff above one Year and observing the great Oppressions and Abuses to the People that did arise from it and how that yet they were granted contrary to those Statutes This Statute therefore of 23 Hen. 6. ordains that those Statutes shall be duly observ'd And further ordains That if any occupy that Office contrary to those Statutes or to the effect or intent of any of them he shall forfeit two hundred Pound yearly as long as he occupieth contrary to any of those Statutes and that every Pardon granted of that Forfeiture shall be void and that all Patents made of the Office of Sheriff for Years or any longer time shall be void any Clause or word of Non Obstante in any wise put or to be put in such Patents notwithstanding and every such Person is thereby disabled to bear that Office. Nothing could be penn'd stronger than this Statute and it is a Law made by the Supream Legislative Power of the Nation and it expresses the former granting of Non Obstante's to be a great abuse and to be contrary to Law. Yet contrary to the express words and clear intent and meaning of this Statute did all the Judges resolve in 2 H. 7. That by a Non Obstante a Patent for a longer time than a Year should be good of the Sheriffs Office. The King and both Houses were of Opinion that they could make a Non Obstante in such Case void The Judges are of a contrary Opinion that a Non Obstante shall make void the Statute Here is an Inferiour Court over-ruling and controuling the Judgment of a Superiour Court. The Judges who are but Jura dicere contradict those who have the Power Jura dare as well as Jura dicere and of Correcting the Errors of the highest Court in Westminster and controuling their Judgments The Statute was a meer idle nugatory thing if it were not to restrain the granting of a Non Obstante if it did not that it did nothing The King himself alone if he had pleas'd could without any Act of Parliament have reform'd the Abuse by refusing to pass any such Patents for a Sheriffs continuing in his Office longer than a Year But the King was sensible of the Abuses and therefore willing to be restrained from passing any more such Patents and to avoid any importunity that might be used for the obtaining any such Patents and therefore consented that a Law should pass to make such Patents void And after all shall the King if he pleases still make the like Grants Why then the Act was of no manner of use and operates nothing and the Resolve of the Judges has made the Act a meer idle vain thing But the twelve Judges in 2 H. 7. have so resolv'd and the only use they would allow to all these Acts of Parliament is no more than this that if the King grant a Patent to one of the Sheriffs Office for more than one Year and there be no Non obstante in the Patent that then for want of a Non obstante the Patent should be void by those Acts of Parliament which otherwise would have been good had not those Acts made them void But how easie would it be for one that obtains such a Patent to get the Non obstante to be inserted and who would accept such a Patent without a Non obstante and to whom would the Non obstante be denied to whom such a Patent is granted the Lord Hobart in the Case of Needler against the Bishop of Winchester fol. 230. says it is denied to none and that it is in the power of the Attorney-General The Reasons given by the Judges in 2 H. 7. for that resolution are because the King had always used such a Prerogative of dispensing with the Acts of Parliament that required the true value of the Lands and the certainty of the Lands to be mentioned in his Grants of Lands and with the Acts concerning the shipping of Wool and pardoning of Murder without express mentioning of the Murder These Cases are nothing alike but of a trifling consideration in respect of the Act we have in hand of 25 Car. 2. And in these Cases the Penalty and Forfeitures are given to the King and they concern the King's profit only to dispence with them but in our Case the Safety of the Government salus populi and the maintaining of the true Religion establish'd by Law are all concern'd and so the Case is not alike And to compare this with those Cases is parvis componere magna This Opinion and Resolution of the Judges in 2 H. 7. has been the Foundation of all the like Opinions that have since that time been given of the King's Power of Dispensing with Disabilities and Incapacities impos'd by Acts of Parliament Upon what ground the Justices held the Patent of the Sheriff's Office good to the Earl of Northumberland for Life does not appear whether because it had formerly been an Office of Inheritance and so within the Exception in the Statute of 23 H. 6. or whether by virtue of a Non obstante to the Statutes as Ratclif only argues for the rest say nothing of the Non obstante Some Resolutions have been to the contrary of that of 2 H. 7. as in the Case that I cited of the King against the Bishop of Norwich in the Lord Hobart's Reports and the Case of Sir Arthur Ingram where it was adjudged that the King could not dispence with a Disability And the Book of 2 R. 3. fol. 11 12. concerning Waterford in Ireland is of the King's Power to dispence with an Act of Parliament where the Forfeiture is given only to the King so it comes not home to our Case This Resolution of the Judges in 2 H. 7. was the Precedent and leading Case to all the subsequent Opinions and was the Foundation of them and they all must stand and fall by it Now it will be very
now mentioned It is but an Opinion against a Solemn Resolution of all the twelve Judges I find that some who had transgress'd that Act of 23 H. 6. and had continued above one Year in that Office of Sheriff soon after the making of that Act did not think themselves secure against the Penalty of that Act by any Non obstante from the King but procur'd an Act of Parliament to indempnifie them for what they had done for by another Act made the 28th of the same King Henry the Sixth it is ordain'd that the Sheriffs for the Year then last past should be quit and discharged against the King and his People of the Penalties of the 200 l. which they incurr'd by the Statute of 23 H. 6. by Exercising the Office of Sheriff longer than a Year from the day next after the day of all All-Souls on which day by the Statute a new Election was to have been made I have one great Authority more and that is of an Act of Parliament too which in my judgment clearly proves against this Resolution of the twelve Judges in the time of 2 H. 7. that the King had no such Prerogative to dispence with the Sheriff's continuing in his Office longer then a Year But that the only dispensing Power was in the King and Parliament as I have affirm'd and in the King when any Special Act of Parliament shall for a time limitted enable him so to dispence And it is an Act in the time of a wise and powerful King who would not lose his Prerogative where he had right to it It is the Statute of 9 H. 5. c. 5. in the Statutes at large this Statute recites the Statute of 14 E. 3. whereby it was ordain'd that no Sheriff should continue in his Office above a Year And it recites further that whereas at the making of that Statute there were divers valiant and sufficient persons I suppose it is ill translated valiant and it should have been men of value in every County of England to exercise the said Office well towards the King and his People But by reason of divers Pestilences within the Realm and Wars without the Realm there was not now such sufficiency of such persons It is therefore ordained that the King by Authority of this Parliament of 9 H. 5. may make the Sheriffs through the Realm at his will until the end of four Years notwithstanding the said Statute made 14 E. 3. or any other Statute or Ordinance made to the contrary Here the King is entrusted with the Power and that but for a short time in the very Case of continuing Sheriffs in their Offices longer than a Year and that in a case of great and absolute necessity and this by a Special Act of Parliament which plainly shews he could not do it by any Prerogative he had of dispensing for then he would never have taken it under an Act of Parliament What ground therefore the Judges had in the second Year of Henry the Seventh to adjudge it to be a Prerogative in that King I cannot see and that Resolution is the leading Case to all the Opinions that have been delivered in the Point since that time and the Opinions still justifie themselves by that one first Resolve and cite that for their great Authority That Opinion seems to be delivered upon a sudden Question put to the Judges by the King's Council not argued nor deliberated on nor upon any Case that came Judicially before them and the Judges there take notice only of two ancient Statutes viz. 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. both which barely forbid the Sheriffs to continue longer than a Year in their Office but no Penalty is imposed and the Earl of Northumberland's Case had a Non Obstante in it only to these two Statutes as appears by the Abridgement of that Case by Patent's Case 109. So that they did but ad pauca respicere de facili pronunciare But they do not take the least notice of the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. which makes the disability nor do the Judges in that Case give that reason for their Judgment as Sir E. C. hath since found out to justifie it viz. His Prerogative inseparable c. Something may be observed from the time when that strange Resolution pass'd Judicis Officium est ut res ita tempora rerum querere It was in 2 Henry the Seventh in the beginning of the Reign of that King who stood high upon his Title and Power if we may believe a late Historian Mr. Buck. in his History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third who in his Second Book fol. 54. discourses likewise of King Henry the Seventh and his Title to the Crown says of him That he seemed to wave all other Titles and stuck to that of his Sword and Conquest and at his Coronation he caused Proclamation to be made with these Titles Henricus Rex Anglioe Jure divino Jure humano June belli c. Which yet the Barons could not agree to tho' the King peremptorily avowed he might justly assume it having as a Conquerour entred the Land fought for the Crown and won it The Barons answered says the Historian as peremptorily That he was beholding to them both for his Landing and Victory But the more they opposed it the more he insisted upon it Now that King that made his Title by Conquest might carve out to himself what Prerogatives he pleased And who durst dispute it with him And this probably might have some influence upon that Resolution of the Judges being so early after his Claim viz. 2 H. 7. But I find Sir E Coke a Chief Justice of great Learning and of as great Integrity taking up the same Opinion It is in the Reports that go by the Name of Sir Coke's 12 Rep. fol. 18. No Act says he can bind the King from any Prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his Person but that he may dispense with it by a Non Obstante as a Soveraign Power to Command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick-weal and he instances in that of a Sheriff and quotes the Resolution of the Judges of 2 H. 7. and urges that of Judges of Assize that they may go Judges of Assize in the Counties where they were born or did inhabit if the King dispense with it by a special Non Obstante But he gives another instance which I presume none in these days will subscribe to and if he mistook himself in this instance he may be supposed to mistake and err in all the rest Purveyance says he for the King and his Houshold is incident solely and inseparably to the Person of the King And for this Cause the Act of Parliament of Henry the Third de tallagio non concedendo which barrs the King wholly of Purveyance is says he void If this be Law what a Case are the Subjects in that have given a
Recompence by a Revenue of Inheritance in part of the Excise to the King in lieu of Purveyances It is sober Advice given by Learned Grotius in his Book De Jure Belli pacis 82. Let us not says he approve of all things tho' delivered by Authors of greatest Name for they often serve the Times or their Affections and bend the Rules as occasion requires This Resolution of all the Judges in the Second of Henry the Seventh is again cited in Calvin's Case in Sir Coke's Seventh Report and there a Reason is given to justifie that Resolution which is not so much as touch'd upon in the Report itself of 2 H. 7. but it has been studied and found out since that Resolution viz. That an Act cannot barr the King of such Service of his Subject which the Law of Nature did give him And this is the main Reason insisted on in the late Judgment given in Sir Hales's Case as I am informed which is the only Case that I find which came to be argued upon the very point yet it was but lightly spoken to for that of 2 H. 7. which is the first of the kind was not upon a Case that came Judicially before the Judges but was upon a Consultation only with the Judges and without Argument Nor in any other Authorities that I have cited grounded upon that Resolution of 2 H. 7. did the Point directly come in question Judicially And Calvin's Case is the first that I find which offers this special Reason viz. That no Act of Parliament can restrain the King from commanding the Service of his Subject but it is an inseparable Prerogative in the King and as Sir E. C. speaks in his 12 Rep. Tho' an Act makes the King's Patent void and tho' the King be restrained to grant a Non Obstante by the express words of the Act and tho' the Grantee is disabled by the Act to take the Office yet the King says Sir Edward Coke may by his Royal Soveraign Power of Commanding command a man by his Patent to serve him and the Weal-Publick in the Office of Sheriff for Years or for Life And this the King may do for such Causes as he in his Wisdom shall think meet and profitable for himself and the Common-weal of which he himself is solely Judge says Sir E. C. So tho' the King and Parliament have adjudged and declared by a Law such a person or such a sort of persons to be altogether unfit for such a Service or Office. As for Example They have adjudged Papists who own a Forreign Authority and Jurisdiction and who hold Doctrines destructive and contrary to the Religion Established in this Kingdom to be very unfit and uncapable of being entrusted with the maintaining of the Government and the Religion Established by Law in this Kingdom Yet according to late Opinions and Resolutions tho' the King himself by the Advice of his Great Council have so adjudged and declared yet he may do otherwise and he may employ a Papist to defend the Protestant Religion and he is the sole Judge of the fitness of Persons for his Service This is the Discourse this is the Argument and Reason used Will this Reason be allowed of shall the King be the sole Judge of the Persons fit to serve him in all Cases and is it an inseparable Power and Prerogative in the Person of the King I shall put a Case wherein the Judges depart from this Opinion and appear to be of another mind In the Lord Anderson's Reports the 2d Part 118. It is there said If an Office in the King's-Bench or Common-Pleas be void and the placing of the Officer belongs to the King if the King grant it to a person not able to execute it the Grant is void as 't is there held by many of the Justices And there a Case is cited out of 5 E. 4. rot 66. where one Tho. Wynter was placed by the King in the Office of Clerk of the Crown in the King's-Bench The Judges before the King himself did declare him to be Inhabilem ad Officium illud pro commodo Regis populi sui Exercendum and he was laid by and one Roger West at the commendation of the Judges was put in Will any man presume to say the person is unfit when the King who is the sole Judge of the fitness of persons to serve him hath adjudg'd him fit yes the Judges in a Case that concerns the Courts where they sit it seems will controul the King 's own judgment and judge the person inhabilis and hold the Grant void in such case To compare our present Case with this The King and Parliament by a Law have adjudged the Papists unfit to be entrusted with the Government and with the preserving of the Reform'd Religion but says the Judges if the King without the Parliament judge otherwise his judgment shall prevail why not as well in the case of an Office in the Courts at Westminster which does belong to the King to dispose of as in an Office that immediately concerns the Safety of the King and Kingdom and the great concernment of Religion So here is one Command of the Kings set up in opposition to another Command of the King. A Command of the King upon private advice or it may be possible gained from him by surprize by an importunity or an undue solicitation against a serious solemn deliberate Command of the King upon advice with his great Council and with the Consent of the whole Kingdom this is the very Case before us This is against all reason and against the Examples of the greatest wisest and most absolute of Kings and Princes who commanded their Judges to have no regard to any Commands of theirs that were contrary to Law. Vinius the Civilian in his Commentary on the Imperial Institutes fol. 16. gives this Rule Rescripta Principum contra Jus vel utilitatem publicam Elicita à Judicibus improbari etiam ipsorum Imperatorum constitutionibus jubentur Princeps non creditur says he aliquid velle contra utilitatem publicam concedere 21 H. 8. c. 13. sect 10 11 27. Dispensations for Pluralities contrary to Act are declared to be void Hob. 82 149 146 155. The King is never by Law supposed ill affected but abused and deceived for Eadem praesumitur mens Regis quae est Juris Grotius de Jure belli pacis 112 113. Amongst the Persians the King was Supreme yet he took an Oath at his entrance and it was not lawful for him to change certain Laws made after a particular form If the King Establish the Decree and Sign the Writing it may not be changed according to the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not as we read in the Book of Daniel 6 Dan. 8. 12 15. By the Act of 2 E. 3. c. 8. it is accorded and established that it shall not be commanded by the Great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or
and where it is a collateral Suit not depending upon that Record An Action against the Sheriff for an Escape of one taken in Execution this is a dependant Action and is grounded upon the Record of the Judgment given against the Party that escap'd The Sheriff cannot aver any thing against that Record and examine it over again nor can he take any advantage of Error or erroneous proceeding in obtaining that Judgment Saunders Rep. 2 part 101. So in an Action of Debt grounded upon a Judgment or in an Audita quaerela to be reliev'd upon a Judgment And so in our Case this Action of Debt for the 500 l. is grounded upon the Conviction which must stand for truth as long as it remains in force not avoided by Error or Attaint A Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment is a dependant Action In error the Plaintiff may not averr any thing against the Record Mullens versus Weldy Siderfin's 1st part 94. Error was sued in the Kings-Bench to reverse a Judgment given in the Palace-Court And the Plaintiff in Error assign'd for Error that the Duke of Ormond who is principal Judge of that Court by Patent was not there It was agreed by the Court that it might not be assign'd for Error for it was contrary to the Record But per Cur. in an Action of Trespass or false Imprisonment which says that Report are collateral Actions he may falsifie and assign that if he be taken upon such Judgment So if a man be indicted and convict of an Assault and Battery and afterwards the person so assaulted brings his Action for the Battery this hath no dependance upon the Indictment or Conviction for it may be sued though there were no Indictment but is a distinct and collateral Suit. The Indictment and Verdict is no Estoppel nor can so much as be given in Evidence as is held by the whole Court in the Case of Sampson versus Yardley and Tothill 19 Car. 2. B. R. Kebles's 2 part 384. The like in an Appeal of Murder Kebele's 2 part 223. Another Penalty upon the Offender against this Statute of 25 Car. 2. is That he shall be disabled to sue in any Action Now suppose a person convict at the Assizes sues an Action may not the Defendant in that Action take the advantage of that Disability and plead the Conviction As in Case of an Outlawry pleaded in Disability there need not be set forth all the proceedings in that Suit wherein the Plaintiff was outlawed but he may plead the Record of the Outlawry and rely upon it and it shall not be examin'd whether there was any just cause to sue him to the Outlawry or not The Indictment the Defendant's Plea to it and the Verdict upon it have determin'd the matter of Fact that the Defendant is guilty of the Offence against this Act of Parliament The Act it self hath pronounc'd the Judgment which consists of many particulars one whereof is That the Defendant shall forfest 500 l. to him that will sue for it And the Action of Debt for the 500 l. brought by the Plaintiff grounded upon all these is in the nature of an Execution And all these put together are not several and distinct Suits but in effect all but one Suit and Process one depending upon the other The second Point is Whether the Dispensation pleaded by the Defendant be a good Bar to the Action of Debt And this is properly called The Matter in Law and the great Point of the Case for which I refer the Reader to my Argument at large POSTSCRIPT BEING SOME Animadversions UPON A Book writ by Sir EDW. HERBERT Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas ENTITULED A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Hales's Case SINCE the finishing of my Argument about the Power of Dispensing with Paenal Statutes a Book came to my hands touching the same subject entituled A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Edward Hales his Case written by Sir Edward Herbert Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in vindication of himself And although I am of opinion that the substance of all the Arguments contained in the said Book are fully answered in my aforesaid Discourse yet I hold it necessary to make some Animadversions upon the said Book and to point out readily to the Reader the several Pages of my Discourse wherein the Arguments of the Chief Justice are more directly and particularly treated of and answered And there being great Reverence justly due to a Person that bears so high a Character as also to a Judgment given in that Superiour Court of the King's Bench and by advice of all but two of the rest of the Judges as I now hear some short Apology had need be used for that freedom I have taken to animadvert upon it being as I am but in a private station In short therefore I have not undertaken it out of any vain conceit of my own Abilities but out of a sincere desire to inform such as in the approaching Parliament are like to have this great Case in Judgment before them and some may possibly not be at leisure as I have been to study the Case the matter being of a mighty importance Nor have I entred the Lists upon any contentious humour or taking any advantage of the late Happy Change of publick Affairs I am I thank God more inclin'd to commiserate the Distress that may befal any persons by the change of the times it having been my own case so lately although they differ from me in Judgment or Interest I am very far from insulting over any whatever hard usage I my self have met with Nemo confidat nimiûm secundis Nemo desperet meliora lapsus My Apology is this 1. I was engaged in the Argument before the coming forth of this Book and it happening into my hands before my publishing of my Discourse I could not decline the observing something upon it without being suspected to have given up the Cause 2. The Lord Chief Justice himself hath by his Book given fresh occasion fairly to discuss the point again by declaring that he expects as we all do that it will receive a disquisition in Parliament 3. And as the Chief Justice hath endeavour'd with as much as can be said to give the World satisfaction in the justice and right of the Case to maintain the Judgment given so he is well known to be of that ingenuity and good temper and candour as willing to receive a satisfaction if any further Argument to the contrary may be so happy as to convince him The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 6. gives us the Definition of a Dispensation out of Sir Coke's 11th Report fol. 88. viz. Dispensatio mali prohibiti est de jure Domino Regi concessa propter impossibilitatem praevidendi de omnibus particularibus And again Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxacio utilitate ceu
several Statutes so forbidding it the King hath so done it by virtue not of his Prerogative but by a special Act of Parliament enabling him to do it for some extraordinary occasions and for some limitted time only See for this the Statute of 9 Hen. 5. cap. 5. in the Statutes at large and my larger Argument fol. 34. The truth is the Power of Dispensing is originally in the Legislators He only can dispense with a Law that can make a Law. The Power is equal and the Legislators can confer the same Power upon the King or any others for some convenient time c. as appears by the last Instance of the Sheriff and divers other like Cases mentioned in my foregoing Argument where I have also observ'd many other things upon that Resolution of 2 H. 7. concerning Sheriffs The Chief Justice Herbert supposes the Mischiefs recited in the Preamble of that Statute of 23 Hen. 6. cap. 8. concerning Sheriffs continuing in their Offices longer than one year to be equal if not greater as he judges than the Mischiefs recited in the Statute of 25 Car. 2. by Papists being in Offices And from thence I presume would infer that the Case of Sir Edward Hales is not so fatal in the consequence as the Case of a Sheriff I may appeal to any ordinary Judgment and to the sad Experience and Tryal we have so lately had and to the desperate Danger we were so lately in from which Almighty God by no less than a Miracle hath in great mercy deliver'd the Nation whether the Mischiefs that could any way possibly arise from the dispensing with the former I mean thâ— Statute concerning Sheriffs be comparable to the infinite Mischiefs arising from putting Papists into Office and intrusting them with our Religion and all our Civil Rights The Chief Justice upon those words of the Statute concerning Sheriffs viz. That no Non-obstante shall make them good infers that those words do shew that the Parliament which made that Act concerning Sheriffs was of opinion that had it not been for that Clause the King could otherwise have dispens'd with that Act by a Non-obstante Answ. This to me seems a strained Inference and that it is very far from shewing any such Opinion in that Parliament It rather signifies that had not the Parliament inserted that Clause into the Act the King might have done again as he had frequently practis'd before viz. granted Dispensations upon that Statute which ill practice they endeavour'd to prevent for the future not approving the practice nor owning the power of doing it Ex malis moribus bonae oriuntur Leges A good Law rather condemns a contrary practice before used I heartily desire my Reader as I have done in my foregoing larger Argument carefully to observe and examine of what sort and nature those several Cases are which the Resolution of the Case of 2 Hen. 7. urges to warrant that Resolution As those Cases concerning the true Value of Lands which the King grants and that concerning the shipping of Wool to a certain Staple c. and let the Reader judge how vast a difference there is between those Statutes in the nature and import and reason of them and this weighty important Statute now before us and how little that Resolution of 2 H. 7. can be warranted by the Cases there cited being of so inferiour and minute a Consideration in comparison of the principal Case It is true Sir Edward Coke if the twelfth Report which goes by his name be truly his hath since that Resolution given in 2 Hen. 7. found out new and different Reasons and Arguments which are not urged and therefore I presume never so much as thought on at that time by the twelve Judges who gave the Resolution in that Case of 2 Hen. 7. Thus says Sir E. Saundys in his Relation of the Religion used in the West parts of the World Those of the Roman Religion made their Greatness Wealth and Honour to be the very Rule by which to square out the Canons of their Faith and then did set Clerks on work to devise Arguments to maintain them Sir Edward Coke seems to justifie that Resolution concerning Sheriffs from this ground viz. That the King hath a Soveraign Power to command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick Weal And this is says he solely and inseparably annexed to his Person and that this Royal Power cannot be restrain'd by any Act of Parliament 12 Rep. fol. 18. That it is not solely annex'd to the King's person appears by the several Acts of Parliament which I have cited to this purpose in my larger Argument fol. 34. where the Power of Dispensing with some particular Acts was given to the King by the Parliament and by him accepted for some short time And the whole Parliament have in divers Cases themselves exercis'd this very Power Judge of the weight of the Reasons said to be given there by Sir Edward Coke by that one Instance of his in the Case he puts of Purveyance 12 Rep. fol. 19. which he says cannot be taken from the King no not by Act of Parliament Yet we have lived to see it lately taken away by Act of Parliament which in the Judgment of a Parliament which is of the highest Authority in Law may therefore be taken from the King. And is the King in truth restrain'd from commanding his Subjects to serve him for the Publick Weal either by those Statutes that disable Sheriffs to continue in their Offices longer than one year or by our Statute of 25 Car. 2. that disables Popish Recusants to bear publick Offices Because some very unfit uncapable and dangerous persons are disabled to bear Offices of Trust and Power and this by the King 's own consent to the Act and by the advice of the great Council the Parliament and indeed of the whole Realm Does the King by this which the Judges mis-call a Restraint want for choice of fit persons to serve in Offices Doth the Publick Weal suffer by this Restraint is it not rather preserv'd by it Hath not the King Protestant Subjects enow to bear Offices And are Popish Recusants who account Protestants Hereticks and to be rooted out and destroy'd and with whom they hold no Faith is to be kept and against whom they have been continually plotting Mischief are these the fittest to be intrusted with the Defence of the Protestant Religion and with our Lives and Estates which are all concern'd more or less in every Publick Office and Trust And are those persons the Papists that have a dependance upon the See of Rome and a Forreign Power fit to be intrusted with the power of the Nation with the Militia and the Sea-Ports Is not this to commit the Lamb to the custody of the Wolf This Act that disables Papists to bear Offices cannot be justly said to be a Restraint upon the King that expression sounds ill and takes the matter by the wrong handle It rather