shillings eight pence for the Admittance of a Copyholder in Fee-simple upon a Surrender made For this is not like to a voluntary Grant as when the Copyholder hath but an Estate for life and dieth Or if he hath an Estate in Fee-simple and committeth Felony there Arbitrio Dom. res estimari debet but when the Lord is compellable to admit him to whose use the Surrender is And when Cestui que use is admitted he shall be in by him who made the Surrender and the Lord is but an Instrument to present the same And therefore in such Case the value of two years for such an Admittance is unreasonable especially when the value of the Cottage and one acre of Pasture is a Rack at fifty three shillings by the year 5. It was resolved That the Surjoynder is no more then what the Law saith For in this Case in the Iudgment of the Law the Fine is unreasonable and therefore the same is but ex abundanti and now the Court ought to judge upon the whole speciall matter And for the Causes aforesaid Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And Coke chief Iustice said in this Case That where the usage of the Court of Admiralty is to amerce the Defendant for his default by his discretion as it appeareth in 19 H. 6. 7. That if the Amerciament be outrageous and excessive the same shall not bind the party and if it be excessive or not it shall be determined in the Court in which the Action shall be brought for the levying of it And the Writ of Account is against the Bayliff or Guardian Quod reddat ei rationabilem Computum de exitibus Manerii And the Law requireth a thing which is reasonable and no excesse or extremity in any thing II. Mich. 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. Porter and Rochesters Case THis Term Lewis and Rochester who dwelt in Essex within the The Statute of 23 H 8. of citing out of Dioces Dioces of London were sued for substraction of Tithes growing in B. within the County of Essex by Porter in the Court of the Arches of the Bishop of Canterbury in London And the Case was That the Archbishop of Canterbury hath a peculiar Iurisdiction of fourteen Parishes called a Deanry exempted from the Authority of the Bishop of London whereof the Parish of S. Mary de Arcubus is the Chief And the Court is called the Arches because the Court is holden there And a great question was moved If in the said Court of Arches holden in London within his Peculiar he might cite any dwelling in Essex for substraction of Tithes growing in Essex Or if he be prohibited by the Statute of the twenty third year of King Henry the eighth cap. 9. And after that the matter was well debated as well by Councell at the Bar as by Dr. Ferrard Dr. James and others in open Court and lastly by all the Iustices of the Common Pleas A Prohibition was granted to the Court of Arches And in this Case divers Points were resolved by the Court. 1. That all Acts of Parliament made by the King Lords and Commons of Parliament are parcell of the Laws of England and therefore shall be expounded by the Iudges of the Laws of England and not by the Civilians and Commonists although the Acts concern Ecclesiasticall and Spirituall Iurisdiction And therefore the Act of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. by which in effect it is enacted Quod nullus teneat doceat informet c. clam vel publice aliquam nefandam opinionem contrariam sidei Catholicae seu determinationi Ecclesiae sacro-sanctae nec de hujusmodi secta nephandis Doctrinis Conventiculas faciat And that in such Cases the Diocessan might arrest and imprison such Offender c. And in 10 H. 7. the Bishop of London commanded one to be imprisoned because that the Plaintiff said that he ought not to pay his Tithes to his Curat and the party so imprisoned brought an Action of False Imprisonment against those who arrested him by the commandment of the Bishop and there the matter is well argued What words are within the said Statute and what without the Statute So upon the same Statute it was resolved in 5 E. 4. in Keysars case in the Kings Bench which you may see in my Book of Presidents And so the Statutes of Articuli Cleri de Prohibitione regia De Circumspecte agatis of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. and all other Acts of Parliament concerning Spirituall Causes have alwaies been expounded by the Iudges of the Common Law as it was adjudged in Woods Case Pasch 29 Eliz. in my Notes fol. 22. So the Statute of 21 H. 8. cap. 13. hath been expounded by the Iudges of the Realm concerning Pluralities and the having of two Benefices Common Laws and Dispensations see 7 Eliz. Dyer 233. The Kings Courts shall adjudge of Dispensations and Commendams See also 17 Eliz. Dyer 251. 14 Eliz. Dyer 312. 15 Eliz. Dyer 327 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. and 347. 22 Eliz. Dyer 377. Construction of the Statute cap. 12. Smiths Case concerning Subscription which is a meer Spirituall thing Also it appeareth by 22 Eliz. Dyer 377. That for want of subscription the Church was alwaies void by the said Act of 23 Eliz. and yet the Civilians say that there ought to be a Sentence Declaratorie although that the Act maketh it void 2. It was resolved by Coke chief Iustice Warberton Daniel and Foster Iustices That the Archbishop of Canterbury is restrained by the Act of 23 H. 8. cap. 9. to cite any one out of his own Diocesse or his Peculiar Iurisdiction although that he holdeth his Court of Arches within London And first it was objected That the Title of the Act is An Act that no person shall be cited out of the Diocess where he or she dwelleth except in certain Cases And here the Archbishop doth not cite the said Party dwelling in Essex out of the Diocesse of London for he holdeth his Court of Arches within London 2. The Preamble of the Act is Where a great number of the Kings Subjects dwelling in divers Diocesses c. And here he doth not dwell in divers Diocesses 3. Far out of the Diocesse where such men c. dwell and here he doth not dwell far out c. 4. The body of the Act is No manner of person shall be cited before any Ordinance c. out of the Diocesse or peculiar Iurisdiction where the person shall be inhabiting c. And here he was not cited out of the Dioces of London To which it was answered and resolved That the same was prohibited by the said Act for divers Causes 1. As to all the said Objections One answer makes an end of them all For Diocesis dicitur distinctio vel divisio sive gubernatio quae divisa diversa est ab Ecclesia alterius Episcopatus Commissa Gubernatio in unius and is derived a Diâ— quod est duo electio id est
Iudg of the Prerogative Dr. James Dr. Martin and divers other Doctors of the Civil and Canon Law came attending upon them to the King to Whitehall the Thursday Friday and Saturday after Easter-Term in the Councel-Chamber where the Cheif Iustice and I my self Daniel Iudg of the Common-Pleas and Williams Iudg of the Kings-Bench by the command of the King attended also where the King being assisted with his Privy Councel all sitting at the Councel-Table spake as a most gracious good and excellent Soveraign to this effect As I would not suffer any novelty or Innovations in my Courts of Iustice Ecclesiastical and Temporal so I will not have any of the Laws which have had judicial allowances in the times of the Kings of England before him to be forgotten but to be put in execution And for as much as upon the contentions between the Ecclesiastical and Temporal Courts great trouble inconvenience and loss may arise to the subjects of both parts namely when the controversie ariseth upon the jurisdiction of my Courts of ordinary Iustice and because I am the head of Iustice immediately under God and knowing what hurt may grow to my Subjects of both sides when no private case but when the Iurisdictions of my Courts are drawn in question which in effect concerneth all my Subjects I thought that it stood with the Office of a King which God hath committed to me to hear the controversies between the Bishops and other of his Clergy and the Iudges of the Laws of England and to take Order that for the good and quiet of his Subjects that the one do not encroach upon the other but that every of them hold themselves within their natural and local jurisdiction without encroachment or usurpation the one upon the other And he said that the onely question then to be disputed was If a Parson or a Vicar of a Parish sueth one of his Parish in the Spiritual Court for Tythes in kinde or Lay-fee and the Defendant alledgeth a custom or prescription De modo Decâ—mandi if that custom or prescription De modo Decimandi shall be tryed and determined before the Iudg Ecclesiastical where the Suit is begun or a Prohibition lyeth to try the same by the common Law And the King directed that we who were Iudges should declare the reasons and causes of our proceedings and that he would hear the authorities in the Law which we had to warrant our proceedings in granting of Prohibition in cases of Modo Decimandi But the Archbishop of Canterbury kneeled before the King and desired him that he would hear him and others who are provided to speak in the case for the good of the Church of England and the Archbishop himself inveighed much against two things 1. That a Modus Decimandi should be tryed by a Iury because that they themselves claim more or less modum Decimandi so as in effect they were Tryors in their own cause or in the like cases 2. He inveighed much the precipitate and hasty Tryals by Iuries and after him Doctor Bennet Iudg of the Prerogative Court made a large Invection against Prohibitions in Causis Ecclesiasticis and that both Iurisdictions as well Ecclesiastical as Temporal were derived from the King and all that which he spake out of the Book which Dr. Ridley hath lately published I omit as impertinent and he made five Reasons why they should try Modum Decimandi And the first and principal Reason was out of the Register fo 58. quia non est consonans rationi quod cognitio accessarii in Curia Christianitatis impediatur ubi cognitio Causae principalis ad forum Ecclesiasticum noscitur pertinere And the principal cause is Right of Tythes and the Plea of Modo Decimandi sounds in satisfaction of Tythes and therefore the Conusance of the original cause scil the Right of Tythes appertaining to them the Conusance of the bar of Tythes which he said was but the accessary and as it were dependant upon it appertained also to them And whereas it is said in the Bishop of VVinchesters Case in the second part of my Reports and 8 E. 4. 14. that they would not accept of any Plea in discharge of Tythes in the Spiritual Court he said that they would allow such Pleas in the Spiritual Court and commonly had allowed them and therefore he said that that was the Mystery of iniquity founded upon a false and feigned foundation and humbly desired the reformation of that Error for they would allow Modum Decimandi being duly proved before them 2. There was great inconveniency that Lay-men should be Tryers of their own Customs if a Modus Decimandi should be tryed by Iurors for they shall be upon the matter Iurors in their own cause 3. That the custom of Modo Decimandi is of Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction and Conusance for it is a manner of Tything and all manner of Tything belongs to Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction and therefore he said that the Iudges in their Answer to certain Objections made by the Archbishop of Canterbury have confessed that suit may be had in Spiritual Courts pro modo Decimandi and therefore the same is of Ecclesiastical Conusance and by consequence it shall be tryed before the Ecclesiastical Iudges for if the Right of Tythes be of Ecclesiastical Conusance and the satisfaction also for them of the same Iurisdiction the same shall be tryed in the Ecclesiastical Court 4. In the Prohibitions of Modus Decimandi averment is taken That although the Plaintiff in the Prohibition offereth to prove Modum Decimandi the Ecclesiastical Court doth refuse to allow of it which was confessed to be a good cause of Prohibition But he said they would allow the Plea De Modo Decimandi in the Spiritual Court and therefore cessante causa cessabit effectus and no Prohibition shall lie in the Case 5. He said that he can shew many consultations granted in the cause De Modo Decimandi and a Consultation is of greater force then a Prohibition for Consultation as the word imports is made with the Court with consultation and deliveration And Bacon Solicitor-General being as it is said assigned with the Clergy by the King argued before the King and in effect said less then Doctor Bennet said before but he vouched 1 R. 3. 4. the Opinion of Hussey when the Original ought to begin in the Spiritual Court and afterwards a thing cometh in issue which is tryable in our Law yet it shall be tryed by their Law As if a man sueth for a Horse devised to him and the Defendant saith that the Devisor gave to him the said Horse the same shall be tryed there And the Register 57 and 58. If a man be condemned in Expences in the Spiritual Court for laying violent hands upon a Clark and afterwards the Defendant pays the costs and gets an Acquittance and yet the Plaintiff sueth him against his Acquittance for the Costs and he obtains a Prohibition for that Acquittances and Deeds
tenementorum per eundem B. dicto medio tempore percept sine dilatione haberi sacias Et qualiter hoc praeceptum nostrum fuerit execut constare facias c. in Octab. c. By which it appeareth That the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error shall have restitution against him who recovereth of all the mean Profits without any regard by them taken for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error cannot have any remedy against any stranger but only against him who is party to the Writ of Error and therefore the words of the said Writ command the Sheriff to enquire of the Issues and Profits generally between the Reversal and the Iudgment with all which he who recovers shall be charged and as the Law chargeth him with all the mean profits so the Law gives to him remedy notwithstanding the Reversal against all Trespassors in the interim for otherwise the Law should make a construction by relation to discharge them who are wrong doers and to charge him who recovers with the whole who peradventure hath good right and who entereth by the Iudgment of the Law which peradventure is reversed for want of form or negligence or ignorance of a Clark And therefore as to that purpose the Iudgment shall not be reversed ab initio by a Fiction of Law but as the truth was the same stands in force until it was reversed and therefore the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error after the Reversal shall have any Action of Trespass for a Trespass mean because he shall recover all the mean profits against him who recovered nor he recovereth after shall be barred of his Action of Trespass for a Trespass mean by reason that his recovery is reversed because he shall answer for all the mean profits to the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error and therewith agreeth Brian Chief Iustice 4 H. 7. 12. a. Note Reader If you would understand the true sence and Iudgment of the Law it is needful for you to know the true Entries of Iudgments and the Entries of all proceedings in Law and the manner and the matter of Writs of Execution of such Iudgments See Butler and Bakers Case in the third part of my Reports good matter concerning Relations So as it was resolved in the Case at Bar Although that to some intent the Reversal hath relation yet to bar the Wife of her Dower by Fiction of Law by the Fine with proclamations and five years past after the death of her Husband when in truth she had not cause of Action nor any right or title so long as the Attainder stood in force should be to do wrong by a Fiction of Law and to bar the Wife who was a meer stranger and who had not any means to have any Relief until the Attainder was reversed And as unto the other point or Objection that the Demandant on the Petition ought to have an Office found for her it was resolved that it needed not in this case because that the title of Dower stood with the Queens title and affirmed it otherwise if the title of the Demandant in the Petition had disaffirmed the Queens title also in this Case the Queen was not entituled by any Office that the Wife should be driven to traverse it c. for then she ought to have had an Office to finde her title But in Case of Dower although that Office had been found for the Queen which doth not disaffirm the title of Dower in such case the Wife shall have her Petition without Office because that Dower is favored in Law she claiming but onely for term of life and affirming the title of the Queen See the Sadlers Case in the fourth part of my Reports And the case which was put on the other side was utterly denyed by the Court for it was resolved That if a man seised of Lands in Fee taketh a Wife of eight years of age and alieneth his Lands and afterwards the Wife attaineth to the age of nine years and afterwards the Husband dyeth that the Wife shall be endowed For although at the time of the alienation the Wife was not dowable yet for as much as the marriage and seisin in Fee was before the alienation and the title of Dower is not consummate until the death of her Husband so as now there was marriage seisin of Fee age of nine years during the Coverture and the death of the Husband for that cause she shall be endowed For it is not requisite that the marriage seisin and age concur together all at one time but it is sufficient if they happen during the Coverture So if a man seised of Lands in Fee take a Wife and afterwards she elopes from her Husband now she is barrable of her Dower if during the Elopement the Husband alieneth and after the Wife is reconciled the Wife shall be endowed So if a man hath issue by his Wife and the issue dyeth and afterwards Land descendeth to the Wife or the Wife purchaseth Lands in Fee and dyeth without any other issue the Husband for the issue which he had before the Discent or purchase shall be Tenant by the curtesie for it is sufficient if he have issue and that the Wife be seised during the Coverture although that it be at several times But if a man taketh an Alien to Wife and afterwards he alieneth his Lands and afterwards she is made a Denizen she shall not be endowed for she was absolutely disabled by the Law and by her birth not capable of Dower but her capacity and ability began onely by her Denization but in the other case there was not any incapacity or disability in the person but onely a temporary Bar until such age or reconcilement which being accomplished the temporary Bar ceaseth As if a man seised of Lands in Fee taketh a Wife and afterwards the Wife is attainted of Felony and afterwards the Husband alieneth and afterwards the Wife is pardoned and afterwards the Husband dyeth the Wife shall be endowed for by her birth she was not uncapable but was lawfully by her marriage and seisin in Fee entituled to have Dower and therefore when the impediment is removed she shall be endowed VIII Trinit 44 Eliz. In the Kings-Bench Sprat and Heals Case JOhn Sprat Libelled in the Spiritual Court against Walter Heal for Tythes Covin substraction of Tythes the Defendant in the Spiritual Court pleaded that he had divided the Tythes from the nine parts and then the Plaintiff made addition to the Libel in the nature of a Replication scil That the Defendant divided the Tythes from the nine parts quod praedict the Plaintiff non fatetur sed prorsus diffitetur yet presently after this pretended division in fraudem legis he took and carryed away the same Tythes and converted them to his own use and the Plaintiff thereupon obtained sentence in the Spiritual Court and to recover the treble value according to the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. And thereupon Heal made a
to the President and Councel of York between Lock Plaintiff and Bell and others Defendants and that was a Replevyn in English was granted by the said President and Councel which I affirmed was utterly against Law For at the Common Law no Replevyn ought to be made but by Original Writ directed to the Sheriff And the Statute of Marlbridg cap. 21. and West 1. cap. 17. hath authorized the Sheriff upon Plaint made to him to make a Replevyn and all that appeareth by the said Statutes and by the Books of 29 E. 3. 21. 8 Eliz. Dyer 245. And the King neither by his Instructions had made the President and Councel Sheriffs nor could grant to them power to make a Replevyn against the Law nor against the said Acts of Parliament but the same ought to be made by the Sheriff And all that was affirmed by the Lord Chancellor for very good Law And I say that it might well be that we have granted other Prohibitions in other Cases of English Replevyns Another Prohibition I confess we have granted between Sir Bethel Knight now Sheriff of the County of York as Executor to one Stephenson who had made him and another his Executors and preferred an English Bill against Chambers and divers others in the nature of an Action upon the Case upon a Trover and Conversion in the life of the Testator of goods and Chattels to the value of 1000 l. and because the other Executor would not joyn with him although he was named in the Bill he had not any remedy at the Common Law he prayed remedy there in Equity and I say that the President and Councel have not any authority to proceed in that Case for divers causes 1. Because there is an express limitation in their Commission that they shall not hold plea between party and party c. unless both parties or one of them tanta paupertate sunt gravati that they cannot sue at the Common Law and in that case the Plaintiff was a Knight and Sheriff and a man of great ability 2. By that Suit the King was deceived of his Fine for he ought to have had 200 l. Fine because that the damages amounted to 4000 l. and that was one of the causes that the Sheriff began his Suit there and not at the Common Law another cause was that their Decrees which they take upon them are final and uncontroulable either by Error or any other remedy And yet the President is a Noble-man but not learned in the Law and those which are of the Councel there although that they have the countenance of Law yet they are not learned in the Law and nevertheless they take upon them final and uncontroulable Decrees in matters of great importance For if they may deny Relief to any at their pleasure without controulment so they may do it by their final Decrees without Error Appeal or other remedy which is not so in the Kings Courts where there are five Iudges for they can deny Iustice to none who hath Right nor give any Iudgment but the same is controulable by a Writ of Error c. And if we shall not grant Prohibitions in Cases where they hold Plea without authority then the subjects shall be wrongfully oppressed without Law and we denyed to do them Iustice And their ignorance in the Law appeared by their allowance of that Suit scil That the one Executor had no remedy by the Common Law because the other would not joyn in suit with him at the Common Law whereas every one learned in the Law knoweth that summons and severance lieth in any Suit brought as Executors and this also in that particular Case was affirmed by the Lord Chancellor and he much inveighed against Actions brought there upon Trover and Conversion and said that they could not be found in our ancient Books Another Prohibition I confess we have granted between the L. Wharton who by English Bill sued before the Counsel Banks Buttermere and others for fishing in his several Fishings in Darwent in the County of C. in the nature of an Action of Trespass at the Common Law to his damages of 200 l. and for the causes next before recited and because the same was meerly determinable at the Common Law we granted a Prohibition and that also was allowed by the Lord Chancellor And as to the case of Information upon the Riotous Rescous I having forgotten to speak to that the King himself asked what the Case was to whom I answered that the case was That one exhibited a Bill there in the nature of an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus against Watson who upon his Oath affirmed that he had satisfied the Plaintiff and that he owed him nothing and yet because the Defendant did not deny the Debt the Councel decreed the same against him and upon that Decree the Pursuivant was sent to arrest the said Watson who arrested him upon which the Rescous was made and because that the Suit was in the nature of an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus at the Common Law and the Defendant at the Common Law might have waged his Law of which the Defendant ought not to be barred by that English Bill quia beneficium juris nemini est auferendum the Prohibition was granted and that was affirmed also by the Lord Chancellor whereupon I concluded that if the principal cause doth not belong unto them all their proceedings was coram non Judice and then no Rescous could be done but the Lord Chancellor said that though the same cannot be a Rescous yet it was a Riot which might be punished there which I denyed unless it were by course of Law by force of a Commission of Oyer and Terminer and not by an English Bill but to give the King full satisfaction in that point the truth is the said Case was debated in Court and the Court inclined to grant a Prohibition in the said case but the same was stayed to be better advised upon so as no Prohibition was ever under Seal in the said Case Also I confess that we have granted divers Prohibitions to stay Suits there by English Bill upon penal Statutes for the manner of prosecution as well for the Action Proces c. as for the count is to be pursued and cannot be altered and therefore without question the Councel in such cases cannot hold Plea which was also affirmed by the Lord Chancellor And I said that it was resolved in the Reign of Queen Eliz. in Parots Case and now lately in the Case of the President and Councel of Wales That no Court of Equity can be erected at this day without Act of Parliament for the reasons and causes in the Report of the said Case of Parrot And the King was well satisfied with these reasons and causes of our proceedings who of his Grace gave me his Royall hand and I departed from thence in his favour And the surmise of the Number and that the Prohibition in the said Case
are to be determined in our Law he shall have a Consultation because that the principal belongeth to them 38 E. 3. 5. Right of Tythes between two spiritual persons shall be determined in the Ecclesiastical Court And 38 E. 3. 6. where the Right of Tythes comes in debate between two spiritual persons the one claiming the Tythes as of common Right within his Parish and the other claiming to be discharged by real composition the Ecclesiastical Court shall have Iurisdiction of it And the said Iudges made humble suit to the King That for as much as they perceived that the King in his Princely Wisdom did detest Innovations and Novelties that he would vouchsafe to suffer them with his gracious favor to inform him of one Innovation and Novelty which they conceived would tend to the hinderance of the good administration and execution of Iustice within his Realm Your Majesty for the great zeal which you have to Iustice and for the due administration thereof hath constituted and made fourteen Iudges to whom you have committed not onely the administration of Ordinary Iustice of the Realm but crimina laesae Majestatis touching your Royal person for the legal proceeding also in Parliament we are called by Writ to give to your Majesty and to the Lords of the Parliament our advice and counsel when we are required We two chief Iustices sit in the Star-Chamber and are oftentimes called into the Chancery Court of Wards and other High Courts of Iustice we in our Circuits do visit twice in the year your Realm and execute Iustice according to your Laws and if we who are your publique Iudges receive any diminution of such reverence and respect in our places which our predecessors had we shall not be able to do you such acceptable service as they did without having such reverence and respect as Iudges ought to have The state of this Question is not in statu deliberativo but in statu judiciali it is not disputed de bono but de vero non de Lege fienda sed de Lege lata not to frame or devise new Laws but to inform your Majesty what your Law of England is and therefore it was never seen before that when the Question is of the Law that your Iudges of the Law have been made Disputants with him who is inferior to them who day by day plead before them at their several Courts at Westminster and although we are not afraid to dispute with Mr. Bennet and Mr. Bacon yet this example being primae impressionis and your Majesty detesting Novelties and innovations we leave it to your Grace and Princely consideration whether your Majesty will permit our answering in hoc statu judiciali upon your publique Iudges of the Realm But in Obedience to your Majesties command We with your Majesties gracious favor in most humble manner will inform your Majesty touching the said Question which we and our predecessors before us have oftentimes adjudged upon judicial proceedings in your Courts of Iustice at Westminster which Iudgments cannot be reversed or examined for any Error in Law if not by a Writ of Error in a more high and supream Court of Iustice upon legal and judicial proceedings and that is the ancient Law of England as appeareth by the Statute of 4 H. 4. cap. 22. And we being commanded to proceed all that which was said by us the Iudges was to this effect That the Tryal De Modo Decimandi ought to be by the Common Law by a Iury of twelve men it appeareth in three manners First by the Common Law Secondly by Acts of Parliament And lastly by infinite judgments and judicial proceedings long times past without any impeachment or interruption But first it is to see What is a Modus Decimandi Modus Decimandi is when Lands Tenements or Hereditaments have been given to the Parson and his successors or an annual certain sum or other profit always time out of minde to the Parson and his successors in full satisfaction and discharge of all the Tythes in kinde in such a place and such manner of Tything is now confessed by the other party to be a good bar of Tythes in kinde I. That Modus Decimandi shall be tryed by the Common Law that is that all satisfactions given in discharge of Tythes shall be tryed by the Common Law and therefore put that which is the most common case That the Lord of the Mannor of Dale prescribes to give to the Parson 40 s. yearly in full satisfaction and discharge of all Tythes growing and renewing within the Mannor of Dale at the Feast of Easter The Parson sueth the Lord of the Mannor of Dale for his Tythes of his Mannor in kinde and he in Bar prescribes in manner ut supra The Question is if the Lord of the Mannor of Dale may upon that have a Prohibition for if the Prohibition lyeth then the Spiritual Court ought not to try it for the end of the Prohibition is That they do not try that which belongs to the Tryal of the Common Law the words of the Prohibition being that they would draw the same ad aliud examen First the Law of England is divided into Common-Law Statute-Law and Customs of England and therefore the Customs of England are to be tryed by the Tryal which the Law of England doth appoint Secondly Prescriptions by the Law of the Holy Church and by the Common Law differ in the times of limitation and therefore Prescriptions and Customs of England shall be tryed by the Common Law See 20 H. 6. fo 17. 19 E. 3. Jurisdiction 28. The Bishop of Winchester brought a Writ of Annuity against the Archdeacon of Surry and declared how that he and his successors were seised by the hands of the Defendant by title of Prescription and the Defendant demanded Iudgment if the Court would hold Iurisdiction being between spiritual persons c. Stone Iustice Be assured that upon title of prescription we will here hold Iurisdiction and upon that Wilby chief Iustice gave the Rule Answer Vpon which it follows that if a Modus Decimandi which is an annual sum for Tythes by prescription comes in debate between spiritual persons that the same shall be tryed here For the Rule of the Book is general scil upon title of prescription we will hold Iurisdiction and that is fortified with an Asseveration Know assuredly as if he should say that it is so certain that it is without question 32 E. 3. Jurisd 26. There was a Vicar who had onely Tythes and Oblations and an Abbot claimed an Annuity or Pension of him by prescription and it was adjudged that the same prescription although it was betwixt spiritual persons should be tryed by the Common Law Vide 22 H. 6. 46. and 47. A prescription that an Abby time out of minde had found a Chaplain in his Chappel to say Divine Service and to minister Sacraments tryed at the Common Law 3. See the Record of 25 H. 3. cited
delivered to the party without difficulty if the Ecclesiastical Iudg when the cause which depends before him is meer Ecclesiastical denyeth the Libel a Prohibition lieth because that he doth against the Statute and yet no Prohibition by any express words is given by the Statute And upon the same Statute the Case was in 4 E. 4. 37. Pierce Peckam took Letters of Administration of the Goods of Rose Brown of the Bishop of London and afterwards T. T. sued to Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury That because the said Rose Brown had Goods within his Diocess he prayed Letters of Administration to be committed to him upon which the Bishop granted him Letters of Administration and afterwards T. T. libelled in the Spiritual Court of the Archbishop in the Arches against Pierce Peckam to whom the Bishop of London had committed Letters of Administration to repeal the same and Pierce Peckam according to the said Statute prayed a Copy of the Libel exhibited against him and could not have it and thereupon he sued a Prohibition and upon that an Attachment And there Catesby Serjeant moved the Court that a Prohibition did not lie for two causes 1. That the Statute gives that the Libel shall be delivered but doth not say that the Plea in the Spiritual Court shall surcease by Prohibition 2. The Statute is not intended of matter meer spiritual as that case is to try the Prerogative and the Liberty of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London in committing of Administrations And there Danby Chief Iustice If you will not deliver the Libel according to the Statute you do wrong which wrong is a temporal matter and punishable at the Common Law and therefore in this case the party shall have a special Prohibition out of this Court reciting the matter and the Statute aforesaid commanding them to surcease until he had the Copy of the Libel delivered unto him which case is a stronger case then the case at the Bar for that Statute is in the Affirmative and the said Act of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. is in the Negative scil That no Suit shall be for any Tythes of any Land in kinde where there is Modus Decimandi for that is the effect of the said Act as to that point And always after the said Act in every Term in the whole Reigns of King E. 6. Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth until this day Prohibitions have been granted in Causa Modi Decimandi and Iudgments given upon many of them and all the same without question made to the contrary And accordingly all the Iudges resolved in 7 E. 6. Dyer 79. Et contemporanea expositio est optima fortissima in lege a communi observantia non est recedendum minime mutanda sunt quae certam habuerunt interpretationem And as to the first Objection That the Plea of Modus Decimandi is but accessary unto the Right of Tythes it was resolved that the same was of no force for three causes 1. In this case admitting that there is Modus Decimandi then by the Custom and by the Act of 2 E. 6. and the other Acts the Tythes in kinde are extinct and discharged for one and the same Land cannot be subject to two manner of Tythes but the Modus Decimandi is all the Tythe with which the Land is chargeable As if a Horse or other thing valuable be given in satisfaction of the Duty the Duty is extinct and gone and it shall be intended that the Modus Decimandi began at the first by real composition by which the Lands were discharged of the Tythes and a yearly sum in satisfaction of them assigned to the Parson c. So as in this case there is neither Principal nor Accessary but an Identity of the same thing 2. The Statute of 2 E. 6. being a Prohibition in it self and that in the Negative If the Ecclesiastical Iudg doth against it a Prohibition lieth as it appeareth clearly before 3. Although that the Rule be general yet it appeareth by the Register it self that a Modus Decimandi is out of it for there is a Prohibition in Causa Modi Decimandi when Lands are given in satisfaction of the Tythes As to the second Objection it was answered and resolved That that was from or out of the Question for status Quaestionis non est deliberativus sed judicialis what was fit and convenient but what the Law is and yet it was said It shall be more inconvenient to have an Ecclesiastical Iudg who is not sworn to do Iustice to give sentence in a case between a man of the Clergy and a Lay-man then for twelve men sworn to give their Verdict upon hearing of Witnesses viva voce before an indifferent Iudg who is sworn to do Right and Iustice to both parties But convenient or inconvenient is not the Question Also they have in the Spiritual Court such infinite exceptions to Witnesses that it is at the Will of the Iudg with which party he shall give his sentence As to the third Objection it was answered and resolved First That satisfactio pecuniaria of it self is Temporal But for as much as the Parson hath not remedy pro Modo Decimandi at the Common Law the Parson by force of the Acts cited before might sue pro Modo Decimandi in the Ecclesiastical Court but that doth not prove That if he sueth for Tythes in kinde which are utterly extinct and the Land discharged of them that upon the Plea de Modo Decimandi that a Prohibition should not lie for that without all question appeareth by all that which before hath been said that a Prohibition doth lie See also 12 H. 7. 24. b. Where the original cause is Spiritual and they proceed upon a Temporal a Prohibition lieth See 39 E. 3. 22 E. 4. Consultation That Right of Tythes which is meerly Ecclesiastical yet if the question ariseth of the limits of a Parish a Prohibition lieth and this case of the limits of a Parish was granted by the Lord Chancellor and not denyed by the other side As to the Objection That an Averment is taken of the refusal of the Plea de Modo Decimandi it was answered and resolved That the same is of no force for divers causes 1. It is onely to inforce the contempt 2. If the Spiritual Court ought to have the Tryal de Modo Decimandi then the refusal of acceptance of such a Plea should give cause of Appeal and not of Prohibition as if an Excommunication Divorce Heresie Simony c. be pleaded there and the Plea refused the same gives no cause of Prohibition as if they deny any Plea meer spiritual Appeal and no Prohibition lieth 3. From the begining of the Law no Issue was ever taken upon the refusal of the plea in Causa Modi Decimandi nor any Consultation ever granted to them because they did not refuse but allowed the plea. 4. The refusal is no part of the matter issuable or material in
the plea for the same is no part of the suggestion which onely is the substance of the plea and therefore the Modus Decimandi is proved by two Witnesses according to the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. and not the refusal which proveth that the Modus Decimandi is onely the matter of the suggestion and not the refusal 5. All the said five matters of Discharge of Tythes mentioned in the said Branch of the Act of 2 E. 6. being contained within a suggestion ought to be proved by two Witnesses and so have been always from the time of the making of the said Act and therefore the Statute of 2 E. 6. clearly intended that Prohibitions should be granted in such causes 6. Although that they would allow bona fide de Modo Decimandi without refusal yet if the Parson sueth there for Tythes in kinde when the Modus is proved the same being expresly prohibited by the Act of 2 E. 6. a Prohibition lieth although the Modus be spiritual as appeareth by the said Book of 4 E. 4. 37. and other the Cases aforesaid And afterwards in the third day of debate of this case before his gracious Majesty Dr. Bennet and Dr. Martin had reserved divers consultations granted in Causa Modi Decimandi thinking that those would make a great impression in the Opinion of the King and thereupon they said That Consultations were the Iudgments of Courts had upon deliberation whereas Prohibitions were onely granted upon surmises And they shewed four Presidents One where three joyntly sued a Prohibition in the case of Modo Decimandi and the Consultation saith Pro eo quod suggestio materiaque in eodem contenta minus sufficiens in Lege existit c. 2. Another in Causa Modo Decimandi to be payd to the Parson or Vicar 3. Where the Parson sued for Tythes in kinde and the Defendant alledged Modus Decimandi to be payd to the Vicar The fourth where the Parson libelled for Tythe Wool and the Defendant alledged a custom to reap corn and to make it into sheaves and to set forth the tenth sheaf at his charges and likewise of Hay to sever it from the nine cocks at his charge in full satisfaction of the Tythes of the Corn Hay and Wool To which I answered and humbly desired the Kings Majesty to observe that these have been reserved for the last and center point of their proof And by them your Majesty shall observe these things 1. That the Kings Courts do them Iustice when with their consciences and oaths they can 2. That all the said Cases are clear in the Iudgment of those who are learned in the Laws that Consultation ought by the Law to be granted For as unto the first president the case upon their own shewing appeareth to be Three persons joyned in one Prohibition for three several parcels of Land each of which had a several manner of Tything and for that cause they could not joyn when their interests were several and therefore a Consultation was granted As to the second president The manner of Tything was alledged to be payd to the Parson or Vicar which was altogether uncertain As to the third president The Modus never came in debate but whether the Tythes did belong to the Parson or Vicar which being betwixt two spiritual persons the Ecclesiastical Court shall have Iurisdiction and therewith agreeth 38 E. 3. 6. cited before by Bacon and also there the Prior was of the Order of the Cistertians for if the Tythes originally belonged to the Parson any recompence for them shall not bar the Parson As unto the last president the same was upon the matter of a Custom of a Modus Decimandi for Wool for to pay the Tythe of Corn or Hay in kinde in satisfaction of Corn Hay and Wool cannot be a satisfaction for the Wool for the other two were due of common right And all this appeareth in the Consultations themselves which they shew but understand not To which the Bishop of London said that the words of the Consultation were Quod suggestio praedicta materiaque in eadem contenta minus sufficiens in Lege existet c. so as materia cannot be referred to form and therefore it ought to extend to the Modus Decimandi To which I answered That when the matter is insufficiently or uncertainly alledged the matter it self faileth for matter ought to be alledged in a good sentence and although the matter be in truth sufficient yet if it were insufficiently alledged the plea wanteth matter And the Lord Treasurer said openly to them that he admired that they would alledg such things which made more against them then any thing which had been said And when the King relied upon the said Prohibition in the Register when Land is given in discharge of Tythes the Lord Chancellor said that that was not like to this case for there by the gift of the Land in discharge of Tythes the Tythes were actually discharged but in the case De Modo Decimandi an annual sum is payd for the Tythes and the Land remains charged with the Tythes but ought to be discharged by plea de Modo Decimandi All which was utterly denyed by me for the Land was as absolutely discharged of the Tythes in casu de Modo Decimandi when an annual sum ought to be payd as where Land is given For all the Records and presidents of Prohibition in such cases are That such a sum had been always c. payd in plenam contentationem satisfactionem exonerationem omnium singularium Decimarum c. And although that the sum be not payd yet the Parson cannot sue for Tythes in kind but for the mony for as it hath been said before the Custom and the said Acts of Parliament where there is a lawful manner of Tything hath discharged the Lands from Tythes in kinde and prohibited that no suit shall be for them And although that now as it hath been said the Parsons c. may sue in the Spiritual Court pro Modo Decimandi yet without question at the first the annual payment of mony was as Temporal as annual profits of Lands were All which the King heard with much patience And the Lord Chancellor answered not to that which I had answered him in c. And after that his most excellent Majesty with all his Councel had for three days together heard the allegations on both sides He said That he would maintain the Law of England and that his Iudges should have as great respect from all his Subjects as their predecessors had had And for the matter he said That for any thing that had been said on the part of the Clergy that he was not satisfied and advised us his Iudges to confer amongst our selves and that nothing be encroached upon the Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction and that they keep themselves within their lawful Iurisdiction without unjust vexation and molestation done to his Subjects and without delay or hindering
of them to the use of himself for the term of his life and after to the use of his eldest sonne and to such a woman which he shall marry and to the heirs males of the body of the son and afterwards the father dieth and after the son taketh a wife and dieth if the wife shall take an Estate for life and the doubt was because the wife of the son was not within the Considerations and the use was limited to one who was capable scil the son and to another who was not capable and therefore the son should take an estate in tail executed But it was resolved by the said two chief Iustices and chief Baron That the Wife should take well enough and as to the first Reason they resolved That the Wife was within the consideration for the consideration was for the advancement of his posterity and without a Wife the Son cannot have posterity also when the Wife of the Son is sure of a Ioynture the same is for the advancement of the Son for thereby he shall have the better marriage And as to the second it was resolved That the Estate of the Son shall support the use to the Defendant and when the contingent happeneth the Estate of the Son shall be changed according to the limitation scil to the Son and the woman and the Heirs of the body of the Son And so it was resolved in the Kings-Bench by Popham chief Iustice and the whole Court of the Kings-Bench in the Reign of Queen Eliz. in Sheffields Case for both points XVIII Trinit 7 Jacobi Regis In the Court of Wards Sparies Case JOhn Spary seised in fee in the right of his Wife of Lands holden of the Crown by Knights service had issue by her and 22 Decemb. anno 9 Eliz. aliened to Edward Lord Stafford the Wife dyed the issue of full age the Lands continue in the hands of the Alienee or his Assigns and ten years after the death of the Father and twelve years after the death of the Mother Office is found 7 Jacobi finding all the special matter after the death of the Mother the Question was Whether the mean profits are to be answered to the King and it was resolved by the said two chief Iustices and the chief Baron That the King should not have the mean profits because that the Alienee was in by title and until Entry the Heir hath no remedy for the mean profits but that the King might seise and make Livery because that the Entry of the Heir is lawful by the Statute of 32 H. 8. XIX Trinit 7 Jacobi Regis In the Court of Wards IT was found by force of a Mandamus at Kendal in the County of VVestmerland the 21 of December 6 Jacobi Regis That George Earl of Cumberland long before his death was seised in tayl to him and to the Heirs males of his body of the Castles and Mannors of Browham Appleby c. the Remainder to Sir Ingram Clifford with divers Remainders over in tayl the Remainder to the right Heirs of Henry Earl of Cumberland Father of the said George and that the said George Earl so seised by Fine and Recovery conveyed them to the use of himself and Margaret his Wife for their lives for the Ioynture of the said Margaret and afterwards to the Heirs males of the body of George Earl of Cumberland and for want of such issue to the use of Francis now Earl of Cumberland and to the Heirs males of his body begotten and for want of such issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said George and afterwards by another Indenture conveyed the Fee-simple to Francis Earl By force of which and of the Statute of uses they were seised accordingly and afterwards 30 Octob. anno 3 Jacobi the said George Earl of Cumberland dyed without Heir male of his body lawfully begotten and further found that Margaret Countess of Cumberland that now is was alive and took the profits of the premisses from the death of the said George Earl of Cumberland until the taking of that inquisition and further found the other points of the Writ And first it was objected that here was no dying seised found by Office and therefore the Office shall be insufficient But as to that it was answerod and resolved That by this Office the King was not entitled by the common Law for then a dying seised or at first a dying the day of his death was necessary But this Office is to be maintained upon the Statute of 32 and 34 H. 8. by force of which no dying seised is requisite but rather the contrary scil If the Land be as this case is conveyed to the Wife c. And so it was resolved in Vincents case anno 23 Eliz. where all the Land holden in Capite was conveyed to the younger Son and yet the eldest Son was in Ward notwithstanding that nothing descended The second Objection was It doth not appear that the Estate of the Wife continued in her until the death of the Earl for the Husband and Wife had aliened the same to another and then no primer seisin shall be as it is agreed in Binghams case As to that it was answered and resolved That the Office was sufficient prima facie for the King because it is a thing collateral and no point of the Writ and if any such alienation be which shall not be intended then the same shall come in of the other part of the Alienee by a Monstrans de droit and the case at Bar is a stronger case because it is found that the said Countess took the profits of the premisses from the death of George the Earl until the finding of the Office XX. Trinity Term 7 Jacobi In the Court of Wards Wills Case HEnry Wills being seised of the fourth part of the Mannor of Wryland in the County of Devon holden of Queen Elizabeth in Socage-tenure in capite of the said fourth part enfeoffed Zachary Irish and others and their Heirs to the use of the said Henry for the term of his life and afterwards to the use of Thomas Wills his second son in tayl and afterwards to the use of Richard Wills his youngest son in tayl and for default of such issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said Henry and afterwards the said Henry so seised as abovesaid dyed thereof seised William Wills being his Son and Heir of full age Thomas the second son entered as into his Remainder All this matter is found by Office and the question was If the King ought to have primer seisin in this case and that Livery or Ouster le main shall be sued in this case by the Statutes of 32 and 34 H. 8. And it was resolved by the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron that not if in this case by the common Law no Livery or Ouster le main shall be sued and that was agreed by them all by the experience and course of the
Court. See 21 Eliz. Dyer 362. If Tenant in Socage dyeth seised in possession his Heir within the age of fourteen years he shall not sue Livery but shall have an Ouster le main una cum exitibus but otherwise it is if the Heir be of the age of fourteen years which is his full age for Socage and therewith agreeth 4 Eliz. Dyer 213. And two presidents were shewed which were decreed in the same Court by the advice of the Iustices Assistants to the Court. One in Trinity Term 16 Eliz. Thomas Stavely the Father enfeoffed William Strelley and Thomas Law of the Mannor of Ryndly in the County of Nottingham upon condition that they re-enfeoff the Feoffor and his Wife for their lives the remainder to Thomas Stavely son and heir apparent of tho Feoffor in Fee which Mannor was holden of Queen Elizabeth in Socage in capite and upon consideration of the saving in the Statute of 32 H. 8. next after the clause concerning Tenure in Socage in chief it was resolved That no Livery or Ouster le main should be sued in such case and the reason was because that the precedent clause giveth liberty to him who holdeth in Socage in chief to make disposition of it either by act executed or by Will at his free will and pleasure and before the said act no Livery or Ouster le main should be sued in such case and the words of the Saving are Saving c. to the King c. all his Right c. of primer seisin and relief c. for Tenure in Socage or of the nature of Tenure in Socage in chief as heretofore hath been used and accustomed But there was no use or custom before the Act that the King should have any primer seisin or relief in such case and the words subsequent in the said Saving depend upon the former words and do not give any primer seisin or relief where none was before Another president was in Pasc 37 Eliz. in the Book of Orders fo 444. where the case was that William Allet was seised of certain Lands in Pitsey called Lundsey holden of the Queen in Socage in chief and by Deed covenanted to stand seised to the use of his Wife for life and afterwards to the use of Richard his younger son in Fee and dyed his Heir of full age and all that was found by Office and it was resolved ut supra That no Livery or Ouster le main should be sued in that case but the doubt in the case at Bar was because that Henry the Feoffor had a Reversion in Fee which descended to the said VVilliam his eldest son XXI Trinity Term anno 7 Jacobi Regis The Case of the Admiralty A Bill was preferred in the Star-Chamber against Sir Richard Hawkins Vice Admiral of the County of Devon and was charged that one William Hull and others were notorious Pirats upon the High Seas and shewed in certain what Piracy they had committed the said Sir Richard Hawkins knowing the same did them receive abet and comfort within the body of the County and for bribes and rewards suffered them to be discharged And what offence that was the Court referred to the consideration of the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron who heard Councel of both sides divers days at Serjeants Inn. And first it was by them resolved that by the Common Law the Admirals ought not to meddle with any thing done within the Realm but onely with things done upon the Sea and that appeareth fully by the Statute of 13 R. 2. cap. 5. by which it appeareth that such was the Common Law in the time of King Edw. the third and therewith agreeth the Statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 11. and the Statute of 15 H. 2. cap. 3. That because the Admirals and their Deputies encroach to themselves divers Iurisdictions and Franchises more then they ought to have Be it enacted that all Contracts Pleas and Complaints and all other things arising within the bodies of the Counties as well by Land as by Water as also of Wreck of the Sea the Admiral Court shall not have any conusance power or jurisdiction c. Nevertheless of the death of a man and of Mayheme done in great Ships being in the main stream of great Rivers onely below the Bridges nigh to the Sea and not in other places of the same Rivers and to arrest Ships in the great Flotes for the great Voyage of the King and of his Realm and by the Statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 6. the Admirals of the King of England have done and used reasonably according to the ancient Law and Custom upon the main Sea See the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 5. And all this appeareth to be by the common Law and with that agreeth Stamford fo 51. And if a man be killed or slain within the Arms of the Sea where a man may see from the one part of the Land to the other the Coroner shall enquire of it and not the Admiral because that the Country may well know it and he voucheth 8 E. 2. Coron 399. So saith Stamford the same proves that by the common Law before the Statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 11. the Admiral shall not have Iurisdiction unless upon the High Sea See Pla. Com. 37. 6. If the Marshal holdeth Plea out of the Verge or the Admiral within the body of the County the same is voyd See 2 R. 3. 12. 30 H. 6. 6. by Prisoit 2. It was resolved that the said Statutes are to be intended of a power to hold Plea and not of a power to award execution scil de jurisdictione tenendi placiti non de jurisdictione exequendi For notwithstanding the said Statutes the Iudg of the Admiralty may do execution within the body of the County and therefore in 19 H. 6. 7. the case was W. T. at Southwark affirmed a Plaint of Trespass in the Court of Admiralty before the Steward of the Earl of Huntington against J. B. of a Trespass done upon the High Sea upon which issued a Citation to cite the said J. B. to appear before the Steward aforesaid at the common day then next ensuing directed to P. who served the said Citation at which day the said J. B. made default and the usage of the Court is that if the Defendant maketh default he shall be amerced by the discretion of the Steward to the use of the Plaintiff The which J. B. for his default aforesaid was amerced to twenty marks whereupon command was made to the said P. as Minister of the Court aforesaid to take the goods of the said J. B. to make agreement with the beforesaid W. T. by force of which he for the said twenty marks took five Cows and an hundred sheep in execution for the mony aforesaid in the County of Leicester And there it is holden by Newton and the whole Court that the Statutes restrain the power of the Court of Admiralty to hold Plea of a thing done
within the body of the County but they do not restrain the execution of the same Court to be served upon the Land for it may be that the party hath not any thing upon the Sea and then it is reason to have it upon the Land and if such a Defendant have nothing wherewithall to make agreement they of the Court have power to take the body of such a Defendant upon the Land in execution In which case these points were observed 1. Although that the Court of Admiralty is not a Court of Record because they proceed there according to the Civil Law see Brook Error 77. acc yet by custom of the Court they may amerce the Defendant for his default by their discretion 2. That they may make execution for the same of the goods of the Defendant in corpore Comitatus and if he hath not goods then they may arrest the body of the Defendant within the body of the County But the great Question between them was If a man committeth See this point resolved 8 Eli. Dyer per curiam which is omitted out of the printed Book Piracy upon the Sea and one knowing thereof receiveth and comforteth the Defendant within the body of the County if the Admiral and other the Commissioners by force of the Act of 28 H. 8. cap. 16. may proceed by Indictment and conviction against the Receiver and Abettor in as much as the offence of the Accessary hath his begining within the body of the County And it was resolved by them that such a Receiver and Abettor by the common Law could not be indicted or convicted because that the common Law cannot take conusance of the original Offence because that is done out of the Iurisdiction of the common Law and by consequence where the common Law cannot punish the principal the same shall not punish any one as accessary to such a principal And therefore Coke chief Iustice reported to them a Case which was in Suffolk in anno 28 Eliz. where Butler and others upon the Sea next to the Town of Laystaft in Suffolk robbed divers of the Queens subjects and spoyled them of their goods which goods they brought into Norfolk and there they were apprehended and there brought before me then a Iustice of the Peace within the same County whom I examined and in the end they confessed a cruel and barbarous Piracy and that those goods which then they had with them were part of the goods which they had robbed from the Queens subjects upon the High Sea and I was of opinion that in that case it could not be Felony punishable by the common Law because that the original act scil the taking of them was not any offence whereof the common Law taketh knowledg and by consequence the bringing of them into a County could not make the same Felony punishable by our Law and it is not like where one stealeth goods in one County and brings them into another there he may be indicted of Felony in any of the Counties because that the original act was Felony whereof the common Law taketh knowledg and yet notwithstanding I committed them to the Gaol until the coming of the Iustices of Assises And at the next Assises the Opinion of Wray chief Iustice and Periam Iustices of Assise was That for as much as the common Law doth not take notice of the original Offence the bringing of the goods stoln upon the Sea into a County did not make the same punishable at the common Law and thereupon they were committed to Sir Robert Southwell then Vice-Admiral of the said Counties and this in effect agrees with Lacies case which see in my Reports cited in Binghams case in the 2 Reports 93. and in Constables case C. 5. Reports 107. See the Piracy was Felony the Book of 40 Assis 25. by Schard where a Master or Captain of a Ship together with some Englishmen robbed the Kings sujects upon the High Seas where he saith that it was Felony in the Norman Captain and Treason in the Englishmen his companions and the reason of the said case was because the Normans were not then under the Obedience and Allegiance of the King of England for King John lost Normandy and for that cause Piracy was but Felony in the Norman but in the English who were under the Obedience and Allegiance of the King of England the same was adjudged Treason which is to be understood of Pettit Treason which was High Treason before and therefore in that case the Pirates being apprehended the Norman Captain was hanged and the English men were hanged and drawn as appeareth by the same Book see Stamford 10. And some objected and were of opinion That Treasons done out of the Realm might have bin determined by the common Law but truly the same could not be punishable but onely by the Civil Law before the Admiral or by Act of Parliament as all Foreign Treasons and Felonies were by the common Law and therefore where it is declared by the Statute of 25 E. 3. That adherence to the Enemies of the King within England or elsewhere is Treason the same shall be tryed by the common Law but where it is done out of the Realm the Offendor shall not be attainted but by Parliament until the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 2. although that there are Opinions in some Books to the contrary see 5 R. 2. Quare impedit c. XXII Trinit 7 Jacobi Regis In the Common-Pleas Pettus and Godsalves Case IN a Fine levyed Trinity Term anno quinto of this King between John Pettus Esq Plaintiff and Roger Godsalve and others Deforceants of the Mannor of Castre with the appurtenances c. in the County of Norfolk where in the third proclamation upon the Foot of the same Fine the said proclamation is said to have been made in the sixth year of the King that now is which ought to have been anno quinto of the King and whereas upon the Foot of the same Fine the fourth proclamation is altogether left out because upon the view of the proclamations upon Dorsis upon Record not finis ejusdem Termini per Justiciarias remaining with the Chyrographer and the Book of the said Chyrography in which the said proclamations were first entered it appeareth that the said proclamations were rightly and duly made therefore it was adjudged that the Errors or defects aforesaid should be amended and made to agree as well with the proclamation upon Record of the said Fine and Entry of the said Book as with the other proclamations in Dorsis super pedes aliorum finium of the same Term and this was done upon the motion of Haughton Serjeant at Law XXIII Mich. 7 Jacobi In the Court of Wards Sammes Case JOhn Sammes being seised of Grany Mead by Copy of Court Roll of the Mannor of Tollesham the great of which Sir Thomas Beckingham c. and held the same of the King by Knights service in capite Sir Thomas by
certain Lands in Hetherset and Windham in Norfolk and doth not say in two parts in three parts to be divided and yet it was good as well in the Declaration as in the Writ for without question the Writ is good de duabus partibus generally and so is the Register See 4 E. 3. 162. 2 E. 3. 31. 2 Assis 1. 10 Assis 12. 10 E. 3. 511. 11 Ass 21. 11 E. 3. Bre. 478. 9 H. 6. 36. 17 E. 4. 46. 19 E. 3. Bre. 244. And upon all the said Books it appeareth that by the intendment and construction of the Law when any parts are demanded without shewing in how many parts the whole is divided that there remains but one part not divided As if two parts are demanded there remains a third part and when three parts are divided three remains a fourth part c. But when any demand is of other parts in other form there he ought to shew the same specialty as if one demandeth three parts of five parts or four parts of six c. And according to this difference it was so resolved in Jourdens Case in the Kings-Bench and accordingly Iudgment was given in this Term in the Case at Bar. XXVI Mich. 7 Jacobi Regis In the Common-Pleas Muttons Case AN Action upon the Case was brought against Mutton for calling of the Plaintiff Sorcerer and Inchantor who pleaded Not-guilty and it was found against him to the damages of 6 d. And it was holden by the whole Court in the Common-Pleas that no Action lieth for the said words for Sortilegium est rei futuri per sortes exploratio Et Sortilegus sive Sortilegista est qui per sortes futura praenunciat Inchauntry est verbis aut rebus adjunctis aliquid praeter naturam moliri whereof the Poet saith Carminibus Circes socios mutavit Ulyssis See 45 E. 3. 17. One was taken in Southwark with the Head and Visage of a Dead man and with a Book of Sorcery in his Mail and he was brought into the Kings-Bench before Knevet Iustice but no Indictment was framed against him for which the Clarks made him swear that he should never after commit any Sorcery and he was sent to prison and the Head and the Book were burned at Tuthill at the charges of the Prisoner And the ancient Law was as it appeareth by Britton that those who were attainted of Sorcery were burned but the Law is not such at this day but he who is convicted of such imposture and deceit shall be fined and imprisoned And it was said that it was adjudged That if one calleth another Witch that an Action will not lie for it is too general Et dicitur Latine Venefica But if one saith She is a Witch and hath bewitched such a one to death an Action upon the Case lieth if in truth he be dead Conjuration is derived of these words Con and juro Et propria dicitur quando multi in alicujus pernitiem jurant And in the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 16. it is taken for Invocation of any evil and wicked Spirits i. est conjurare verbis conceptis aliquos malos iniquos spiritus the same is made Felony But Witchcraft Inchantment Charm or Sorcery is not felony if not by them any person be killed or dyeth So that Conjuration est verbis conceptis compellere malos iniquos spiritus aliquod facere vel dicere c. But a Witch who works any thing by any evil spirit doth not make any Conjuration or Invocation by any powerful names of the Devil but the wicked spirit comes to her familiarly and therefore is called a Familiar But if a man be called a Conjurer or a Witch he shall not have any Action upon the Case unless that he saith That he is a Conjurer of the Devil or of any evil or wicked spirit or that one is a Witch and that she hath bewitched any one to death as is before said And note that the first Statute which was made against Conjuration Witchcraft Sorcery and Inchantment was the Act of 33 H. 8. cap. 8. and by it they were Felony in certain cases special but that Act was repealed by the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. XXVII Mich. Term 7 Jacobi Regis In the Court of Wards Sir Allen Percies Case SIr John Fitz and Bridget his Wife being Tenants for life of a Tenement called Ramshams the remainder to Sir John Fitz in tail the remainder to Bridget in tail the Reversion to Sir John and his Heirs Sir John and Bridget his Wife by Indenture demised the said Tenement to William Sprey for divers years yet to come except all Trees of Timber Oaks and Ashes and liberty to carry them away rendering Rent and afterwards Sir John dyed having issue Mary his daughter now the Wife of Sir Allen Percy Knight and afterwards the said William Sprey demised the same Tenement to Sir Allen for seven years The Question was Whether Sir Allen having the immediate inheritance in the right of his Wife expoctant upon the Estate for the life of Bridget and also having the possession by the said Demise might cut down the Timber Trees Oaks and Ashes And it was objected that he might well do it for it was resolved in Saunders Case in the fifth part of my Reports fo 12. That if Lessee for years or for life assigns over his term or Estate unto another excepting the Mines or the Trees or the Clay c. that the exception is voyd because that he cannot except that which he cannot lawfully take and which doth not belong unto him by the Law But it was answered and resolved by the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron That in the Case at Bar the Exception was good without question because that he who hath the Inheritance joyns in the Lease with the Lessee for life And it was further resolved That if Tenant for life Leaseth for years excepting the Timber Trees the same is lawfully and wisely done for otherwise if the Lessee or Assignee cutteth down the Trees the Tenant for life should be punished in Waste and should not have any remedy against the Lessee for years and also if he demiseth the Land without exception he who hath the immediate Estate of Inheritance by the assent of the Lessee may cut down all the Timber Trees which when the term ended all should be wasted and then the Tenant for life should not have the Boots which the Law giveth him nor the pawnage and other profits of the said Trees which he lawfully might take But when Tenant for life upon his Lease excepteth the Trees if they be cut down by the Lessor the Lessee or Assignee shall have an Action of Trespass Quare vi armis and shall recover damages according to his loss And this case is not like to the said case of Saunders which was affirmed to be good Law for there the Lessee assigned over his whole interest and therefore could not except the Mines
Tenements were holden of the King in capite for this cause the suing of the Writ shall conclude the Heir onely which sueth the Livery and after his death the Iurors in a new Writ of Diem clausit extremum are at large as before is said And if that Iury finde falsly in a Tenure of the King also the Lord of whom the Land is holden may traverse that Office Or if Land be holden of the King c. in Socage the Heir may traverse the last Office for by that he is grieved onely and he shall not be driven to traverse the first Office and when the Father sueth Livery and dyeth the conclusion is executed and past as before is said And note that there is a special Livery but that proceeds of the Grace of the King and is not the Suit of the Heir and the King may grant it either at full age before aetate probanda c. or to the Heir within age as it appeareth in 21 E. 3. 40. And that is general and shall not comprehend any Tenure as the general Livery doth and therefore it is not any estoppel without question And at the Common Law a special Livery might have been granted before any Office found but now by the Statute of 33 H 8. cap. 22. it is provided That no person or persons having Lands or Tenements above the yearly value of 20 l. shall have or sue any Livery before inquisition or Office found before the Escheator or other Commission But by an express clause in the same Act Livery may be made of the Lands and Tenements comprized or not comprized in such Office so that if Office be found of any parcel it is sufficient And if the Land in the Office doth exceed 20 l. then the Heir may sue a general Livery after Office thereof found as is aforesaid but if the Land doth not exceed 5 l. by the year then a general Livery may be sued without Office by Warrant of the Master of the Wards c. See 23 Eliz. Dyer 177. That the Queen ex debito Justitiae is not bound at this day after the said Act of 33 H 8 to grant a special Livery but it is at her election to grant a special Livery or to drive the Heir to a general Livery It was also resolved in this Case That the Office of 35 H. 8. was not traversable for his own Traverse shall prove that the King had cause to have Wardship by reason of Ward And when the King cometh to the possession by a false Office or other means upon a pretence of right where in truth he hath no right if it appeareth that the King hath any other right or interest to have the Land there none shall traverse the Office or Title of the King because that the Iudgment in the Traverse is Ideo consideratum est quod manus Domini Regis a possessione amoveantur c. which ought not to be when it appeareth to the Court that the King hath right or interest to have the Land and to hold the same accordingly See 4 H. 4. fo 33. in the Earl of Kents Case c. XXIX Mich. 7 Jacobi Regis NOte The Priviledg Order or Custom of Parliament either Parliament of the Vpper House or of the House of Commons belongs to the determination or decision onely of the Court of Parliament and this appeareth by two notable Presidents The one at the Parliament holden in the 27 year of King Henry the sixth There was a Controversie moved in the Vpper House between the Earls of Arundel and of Devonshire for their seats places and preheminences of the same to be had in the Kings presence as well in the High Court of Parliament as in his Councels and elsewhere The King by the advice of the Lords spiritual and temporal committed the same to certain Lords of Parliament who for that they had not leisure to examine the same it pleased the King by the advice of the Lords at his Parliament in anno 27 of his Reign That the Iudges of the Land should hear see and examine the Title c. and to report what they conceive herein The Iudges made report as followeth That this matter viz. of Honor and precedency between the two Earls Lords of Parliament was a matter of Parliament and belonged to the Kings Highness and the Lords spiritual and temporal in Parliament by them to be decided and determined yet being there so commanded they shewed what they found upon examination and their Opinions thereupon Another Parliament in 31 H. 6. which Parliament begun the sixth of March and after it had continued sometime it was prorogued until the fourteenth of February and afterwards in Michaelmas Term anno 31 H. 6. Thomas Thorp the Speaker of the Commons House at the Suit of the Duke of Buckingham was condemned in the Exchequer in 1000 l. damages for a Trespass done to him The 14 of February the Commons moved in the Vpper House That their Speaker might be set at liberty to exercise his place The Lords refer this Case to the Iudges and Fortescue and Prisoit the two chief Iustices in the name of all the Iudges after sad consideration and mature deliberation had amongst them answered and said That they ought not to answer to this question for it hath not been used aforetime That the Iustices should in any wise determine the Priviledg of this High Court of Parliament for it is so high and mighty in its nature that it may make Laws and that that is Law it may make no Law and the determination and knowledg of that Priviledg belongeth to the Lords of the Parliament and not to the Iustices But as for proceedings in the lower Courts in such cases they delivered their Opinions And in 12 E. 4. 2. in Sir John Pastons case it is holden that every Court shall determine and decide the Priviledges and Customs of the same Court c. XXX Hillary Term 7 Jacobi Regis In the Star-Chamber Heyward and Sir Iohn Whitbrokes Case IN the Case between Heyward and Sir John Whitbroke in the Star-Chamber the Defendant was convicted of divers Misdemeanors and Fine and Imprisonment imposed upon him and damages to the Plaintiff and it was moved that a special Proces might be made out of that Court to levy the said damages upon the Goods and Lands of the Defendant and it was referred to the two chief Iustices whether any such Proces might be made who this Term moved the Case to the chief Baron and to the other Iudges and Barons and it was unanimously resolved by them That no such Proces could or ought to be made neither for the damages nor for the costs given to the Plaintiff for the Court hath not any power or Iurisdiction to do it but onely to keep the Defendant in prison until he pay them For for the Fine due to the King the Court of Star-Chamber cannot make forth any Proces for the levying of the