a sinfull and unlawfull power Unlesse you may also say that we may lawfully engage our selves by oath and Covenant to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice and allowing that which is evill but for correcting and punishing of evill-doers Be not hastie to go out of his sight so do knaves who hate the light stand not in an evil thing Why for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him c. Would the Holy Ghost say ye must not dare to do evill and with-draw your selves preposterously from the Kings presence for he hath a power conferred on him that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors And therefore if ye transgresse be sure the King will punish you So then this manifestly holdeth out to us that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place of such a power in Kings which exerciseth good and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD is incumbent to the Kingly power to do But sure I am illimited Monarchy whose power is also to do evill can spare the malefactour and punish the righteous The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power that produceth contrary effects 3. The Holy Ghost subjoyneth Whose keepeth the commandment shal feel no evil thing Then this must be a just and lawfull commandment otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death Rom. 6. But sure we are this cannot be spoken concerning a boundlesse and arbitrary Regall power for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regall power so he speaketh of the effects thereof and of our obedience thereto And as we find he speaketh onely of good effects so he onely speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto which according to the oath of GOD and in conscience we are tyed to perform But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regall power so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects Secondly we establish the point from reason it self the Kingly power as it produceth good effects not onely in it self is the Ordinance of GOD but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad But as the Ordinance of GOD cannot be contraveened so it is laid on us as a necessary duty to subject our selves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD according to the prescript of GOD'S wil Rom. 13. So then in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened no more can the Kingly power be withstood but what it enacteth according to equity reason should absolutely be obeyed In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection not onely to Kings but also to all other Rulers Tit. 3. 1. Pet. 2. Kings and all Magistrats in this sense are called Gods GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth Ex. 4. and 22. Ps 82. feeders of the LORD'S people Ps 78. the shields of the Earth Ps 47. nursing Fathers of the Church Is 49 Captains over the LORD'S people 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD 1. Chr. 19 their judgment is the judgment of the LORD 2. Chr. 19 The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them Is 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power and to decline his authority for so there is a divine sentence in his lips his mouth transgresseth not in judgment his Throne is established by righteousnesse righteous lips are his delight and he loveth him that speaketh right his wrath is as messengers of death but in the light of his countenance is life and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion but his favour is as dew upon the grasse he sitteth in the Throne of judgment scattering away all evill with his eyes scattering the wicked and bringing the wheel over them So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy Yea his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon so that he who provoketh him to anger sineth against his own soul Prov. 19 and 20. Upon these grounds and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us to honour the King Proverb 24. and not to strike Princes for equity Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power as it is in it self and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth according to the LORD' 's good will and pleasure neither his power nor the just Acts thereof can be any more contraveened then the power of GOD and that which he commandeth to be performed for so the King's power is GOD'S power and what he doth is according to divine authority And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute for so as his power in such respects can not be contraveened in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient with a full and vast power according to Law and reason So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute not because he may do both justly and unjustly according to his pleasure but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes according to justice In this sense I confess Salustius his Author saith very well Impune quidvis facere id est Regem esse Indeed the King may do every thing that is just and equitable according to Law and Reason and deserveth not to be punished therfore This is the same which Solomon saith Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26 Albeit we may put such a favorable construction upon these words yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such Indeed I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion who saith concerning the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. l. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King Tanta est ejus celsitudo ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regno suo Curt. in consol 65. col 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf notab 3. repet L. un c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi Imperator omnia potest Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for fid in F. in 1 Constit C. col 2. Chass catal glor mun part 5. consid 24. All these go no other wayes saith our learned Country-man but thus The King can do all things which by Law he can do and that holdeth in him Id possumus quod jure possumus Lex Rex q. 26. ass 3. This is a very quick and noble glosse But for my self as I judge their meaning to be nothing such so I am indifferent whether it be so or not No question there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy beside the Nation of Royallists And those to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish we find
all men what I please Sueton. in Calig cap. 29. Thus he putteth a difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power And beside this even ordinary Heroes namely the founders of primary Colonies had an absolute power without al restriction Con. 2. Where also is shewed that Heroes in after-times as founders of after-Colonies had an absolute power though not so intense and uncircumscribed as founders of primary Colonies Such indeed had power to do all things though not to undo all things And so according to the rules of proportion as the after-Heroes were of lesse power then the former so the last of them had lesser power then any of them Aristotle saith That at last the power of Kings became exceedingly lessened This was after the flower of heroicism was quite faded This could not be at the first but hath come on by degrees After 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the erectors of primary Colonies had in-stepped 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which Aristotle saith was in ancient times i. e. in the times of the after-Heroes in and about the dayes of the founders of the secondary Colonies And then toward the close or in and about the middle time of Heroicism the Kingly power in some things became restricted as Aristotle saith And so he subjoyneth that at last it became exceedingly lessened Now you see that in reason no better construction can be put upon this fourth species of Monarchy assigned by Aristotle And for reverence of the man's memory I suppose that the third species of Royal power is taken by him both in an ordinary and extraordinary acceptation And he only illustrateth it as it is taken in an extraordinary sense because that way it is more material then the other way He passeth the illustration thereof as it is taken in an ordinary notion because so it is not only lesse material but also that way it is more clear then the other way Or I may say that Aristotle confoundeth these two notions together because comparitively aesymnetick Monarchy taken in an extraordinary notion may be called ordinary The reason of this is because men at least may be because of personal endowments more frequently called to govern in an absolute and ordinary way then for extraordinary Heroicism and such like Howsoever this I know that Aristotle reckoned-up no other kinds of Monarchy but such as have power to and do govern according to Law But these who are advanced to an illimited power because of personal endowments are not precisely called thereto to govern whether according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred beeause of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the specics and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 12. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the City and all the Publick matters whether at home or abroad Thus the man speaketh of a governing power But arbitrary power is a misgoverning-power He speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things But arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things It doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure
Answ About the place Rom. 13. Royallists amongst themselves do not agree Some are so impudent that they blush not to say by higher powers are only understood Kings But the contrary of this is true 1. Because the kingly power is not the higher power as if there were no power above it It is not absolute but limited as is already demonstrated 2. The King is not above all the people One of the best Kings we read of is but worth some thousands of the people David a matchlesse King at the most is called worth ten thousand 2 Sam. 18. So then though the kingly power secundum quid may be called the higher power yet simpliciter it is not The power of the people simply and absolutely is the higher power The authour of the Exercitation Conc. usurp pow by higher power understandeth no other then lawful and unusurped Magistracy And this man bringeth some Arguments but to no purpose to prove this ch 5 Which we take-up shortly into these two particulars 1. Usurped powers are not powers ordained of God The powers the Apostle speaketh of have their ordination from God 2. The powers the Apostle speaketh of may not be resisted under the pain of damnation and are appointed for the good of people Usurped powers are not so This man mistaketh the matter very far He will do well carefully to distinguish between the usurped power as it is usurped and as it is a power In the first notion it is not of God but of the Devil But sure I am in the second notion it is of God As it is a power it is a real beeing But who will deny that every thing effectively dependeth from God and is ordained by him A thing as it is in it self is good And so it cannot but be ordained by God approved of him Thus it carrieth along with it God's Image and species And sure I am God never hated his own Image in any of his creatures This is more deep then half-wit can draw It is handled by us at length curs Philosophico-theol disp 8. sect 29. I wonder if this Gentle-man will deny but Nebuchad nezzar's power which he had over the Nations was usurped The best title he had to them was his sword And yet the Lord owneth him in his undertakings commissionateth him to undertake and setteth-up his throne Jer. 43. What had he any right over the Jews but the lawlesse right of usurpation Yet Jeremiah many times exhorted them to subject their necks to him upon losse to themselves and disobedience to God And Ezekiel ch 17. threatneth them with destruction because of their denying obedience to him And I pray you what better right had Cyrus to the Kingdoms of the Nations then Nebuchad-nezzar And yet the Lord calleth him his shepherd and his anointed He promiseth to concur with him and help him in subduing the Nations Isa 44. and 45. Thus it is most evident that not only usurped powers as powers are ordained of God but also all lawful obedience is due to them Sure I am whileas the Apostle wrote this to the Romans they did live under the greatest of Tyrants Did not Nero reign then And yet the Apostle commandeth to give obedience to such and calleth their power an ordinance of God This man imagineth that C. Caesar and all his successours even unto Nero had lawful and sufficient calls to govern I shall not examine this by history sensibly perceiving the man's weaknesse in not adverting to the usurpation of Julius and Augustus I passe this and shortly tell him such vile Ethnicks as they had never right to govern as may be learned from what foregoeth But to make shorter work he shall do well to observe all usurped powers to be either Kingly Aristocratick or Popular I demand Whether or not usurped powers taken under such notions be Ordinances of God This he cannot deny Will he say that the Kingly or any other lawful power in abstracto is not of divine institution 'T is bad reasoning the Kingly power in it-self to be unlawful because it is in an usurper's hands Usurpation is accidental whether to the thing as King or to the Kingly power as it is in it self Tell me I pray you what Philosoph will admit a consequence a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per accidens ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se Will any conclude a thing to be evil in it-self because it is abused No verily It is foolishnesse to say the skin is not good because it is itchy I go forward And for the other particular I would have this Gentleman observing with me 1. Paul prescribeth the duty of the inferiour towards the superiour This he presseth by several arguments 2. He prescribeth the duty of the Magistrate and superiour towards the inferiour I confesse more expresly and largely he speaketh of the first then of the second for as he presseth the duty of the inferiour toward the superiour tacitly and by the way he interlaceth the duty of the superiour toward the inferiour Now albeit the Apostle presseth obedience upon the inferiour both toward good and bad tyrannous and non-tyrannous powers and Rulers yet hath he very great reason for him to exhort all Rulers and powers to exercise and administer justice Albeit it be the duty of the inferiour to give obedience to the usurped and tyrannous power yet it becomerh the Magistrate not to usurp nor tyrannize And so the one being incumbent to the inferiour and the other to the superiour the Apostle presseth upon both of them their duty No question both of them may and doe fail in their duty yet it doth become the Apostle to presse their duty upon both And in this that the Apostle saith the Magistrate is God's minister appointed by him for the good of the people in exercising judgment and righteousnesse it doth not follow that he only speaketh of lawful and un-usurped powers No verily But he tacitly herein disclaimeth such powers and prescribeth what should be the nature and power of Magistrats de jure and not what it is de facto And as it is the superiour's jus to rule in righteousnesse so it is the jus of the inferiour to give all lawful and due obedience whether to the usurped or non-usurped power So is proved already The reason that maketh this man so far misconstrue the Apostle's meaning is to cut-off allegeance from the usurped power and as he saith from the Commonwealth of England which he is not ashamed to call an usurped power But he beateth the aire To make short work of this we demand Whether or not the people of the Jews did lawfully give-up allegeance to the King of Babylon If they did lawfully ergo it is lawful to give-up allegeance to usurped power Sure I am Nebuchad-nezzar's power over the Jews was meer usurpation And therefore the Lord threatneth to punish the King of Assyria and destroy his Kingdom Is 10. If unlawfully ergo it was lawful for them to
essentially distinguisheth Melech a king from Sophet a Judge because the one is of an absolute power and the other is not he shal do well to advert that he lose not more this way then he gaineth for so he putteth the essentiall frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power But in our first argument against this we have shewed the incongruity and absurdity thereof Which afterward shall more appear from what is spoken as followeth Fourthly There can be no example alledged in the Book of God whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law We read not that ever the Sanhedrin or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminall faults as namely David and Solomon Def. Reg. cap. 5. Ans This argument is like the first Both of them speak much de facto but nothing de jure This is a very bad consequence The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them and did set-up such a King over them Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawfull and Kings de jure are not subject to Law Friend you break-off too soon Though I should grant you the Antecedent yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence you must prove the validity of their practice You count your reckoning too soon whileas you thus conclude There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement on any of their Kings who transgressed the Law and did violate it Ergo Kings are not subject to Law What if I should grant the Antecedent You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulnesse of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence Philosophs know though many Humanists do not that à facto ad jus non statim valet consequentia Aye they can tell you that argumentum negativum nihil concludit Well as I deny your consequence so I do not admit your Antecedent I illustrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture both ordinary and extraordinary Ordinary Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah and kill her 2 Kings 11. 2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against your purpose yet I pray you what can you say of that practice in killing Amasiah We have shewed elsewhere that such a thing was done in a Publick and legall way Extraordinary The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punishment why are they not also lyable to the greater according to their delinquency Magis minus non variant speciem Yea Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah 2 King 9. and withall he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab 2 King 10. O but you will say These practises of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary And then It is a very bad Argument The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit Ergo Ministers who have nothing but an ordinary spirit should not preach So it doth not follow The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto Ergo those who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto should not do so It may be you will say The People can have no ordinary call to act against their kings Be not mistaken 1 Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things whileas they are wanting So Samuel killed Agag because Saul the ordinary Judge was wanting in his duty 1 Sam. 15. 2 At least it followeth that the same thing which is done extraordinarily may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow 3 Dato uno oppositorum datur alterum And consequently seing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings there is also an ordinary call for doing it The reason of this is because esse extraordinariae vocationis is so called and is so in it-self because it standeth in opposition to esse ordinariae vocationis as we have shewed at length curs Philosophico-theolog disp 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings unlesse there be also an ordinary call for doing so 4 Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinfull and unlawfull or not If sinfull and unlawfull then neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be punished for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin But we have shewed already that Kings may be punished by vertue of an extraordinary call And consequently it is not a sin in it-self to punish delinquent Kings If lawfull and unsinfull I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawfull and honest may not lawfully be done by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in it self lawfull or not None I am sure will say that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawfull Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily is done sinfully Which to say is absurd And if you say that the exercise of them in it self is lawfull then it is lawfull in it self by vertue of an ordinary call to punish delinquent Kings But if there be any fault and escape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hindereth but the call in it self is lawfull and commendable for such things are meerly extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self And ab extrinseco ad intrinsecum non est sequela 5 Jehu and the Prophets had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings but what those may have in proceeding against them by vertue of an ordinary call They no otherwise proceeded against them by vertue of their extraordinary call but as it was for the good of the LORD's People and for executing Justice on their delinquency that others might learn not to offend But sure we are such grounds are competent to an ordinary call for proceeding against delinquent Kings And 't is an undoubted maxim Idem est jus ubi eadem est ratio juris Inst That example concerning Athaliah saith Salmasius deserveth not an answer for saith he she usurped the kingdom and killed the whole Royall Family And so there was lesse executed against her then she deserved And withall according to the Jewish Lawes it was not permitted to women to sway the Scepter and sit on the Throne for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee but a King over thee Def. Reg. cap. 4. Ans That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our
libido Regum pro legibus habebatur And aftervvard he speaketh how they vvere reformed by Solon and hovv Pisistratus and others vvho succeeded him did tyrannize over them Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians under Pisistratus reign albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs as under the yoke of bondage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported that Cleon and those who followed him destroyed the Commonwealth Great tyranny there indeed and arbitrariness of power Her de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly how that not onely Kings in after-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law but also as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings In Corinth the Kingly Government was also regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herac. de Pol. Corinth i. e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth taking to himself a guard and at last appointing to himself a Senate Now you must not think that this Senate had not power over Periander 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senat wherein the King hath a negative voice It is but at the most a cypher far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians Carthaginians c. 2. Because Periander in his Epistle to Solon advised at him what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him And Solon in his Epistle to him advised him to lay-down his lording power It is very easie to know what hath been the cause why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off for it is reported of him that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City This could not but irritate his subjects against him and make them conspire against his life See Herod lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Periand Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's He desired him to spare none whether friend or foe but cut all off Which he did indeed as Herodot reporteth But we must think that he advised with Solon after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel for Solon in his Epistle to him telleth him That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom was not to cut-off any but to lay-down his lording power over them This insinuateth that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel and had cut-off his subjects before either Solon wrote to him or he had advised with Solon And Heraclid saith in even-down terms That he was neither unjust nor violent hating all gross and scandalous vices and commanding all those to be drowned in the sea who were prostitute to such manner of wickedness This could not be in the time of his tyranny when he made havock of his people and of which Heraclid speaketh before he entereth a-talking any thing of his justice and reservedness Which is more then apparent to us that he became a just and moderat man leaving-off his tyranny and oppression upon Solon's counsel and advice And so we fear not to say that he did put power in the peoples hand adding a Councel to him for keeping him within the bounds of Law This we may learn from Heraclid who having spoken of his moderation and justice telleth us That he did constitute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Councel or Senate Verily we cannot think but it was Periander's wisdome and choice to follow Solon's counsel in giving liberty to the people and in priviledging them with a power over him to hedge-in his wayes by the rules of Law Aristotle saith that his lording over the people made them lay their heads together against him Pol. 5. cap. 10. And Solon counselled him to leave-off his lording power as the chief and only vvay of securing himself and conciliating the favour of the people Who can think that such a vvise man as he who is reckoned-up amongst the seven Sages vvould have despised the counsel of such a vvise man another of the Sages also Yea Chilo in his Epistle to Periander though in a satyrick way is little or nothing different from that vvhich Solon counselled him to And that Periander practised according to Solon's advice and counsel is clear by comparing it vvith vvhat Heraclid speaketh concerning Periander He had the vvise men his fellows in vvisdom in greater respect then to postpone any of their advices as is evident from his Epistle vvhich he vvrote to them Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Per. 3. Because it vvas Periander's express judgment that Popular Government was better then Monarchy Dio. La. ibid. Now this could not be while-as Periander delighted to lord and tyrannize over his people And so 't is more then probable that as he changed his judgment he likewise changed his practice These two go alwayes hand in hand together Wherefore to me it is more then evident that Periander gave his people power over him and willingly subjected himself to Law Regal Government amongst the Carthaginians in after-times was regulated and in all things subjected to Law But you will do well to consider with me these things 1. As Carthage was in its beginnings 2. As it was in after-ages In the first respect it cannot be denied but Regal Government in it was absolute Firstly Because Dido the first founder of Carthage was worshipped by the Carthaginians as a Goddess Secondly Because Dido by her own proper industry builded Carthage and made the Carthaginians a People Just lib. 18. Thirdly Because in the beginning Kingly Government was most in request And therefore Kingdoms in the beginning were governed by Kings So say Aristotle Justin and Salust Then men were little acquainted with the rules of Policy Which makes Aristotle say that Kingly Government in the beginning was established because it was then difficult and hard to find-out many men of wit and judgment to govern the Commonwealth Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. We shall therefore not judge it strange that Kings in the beginning of any Kingdom were absolute and of an arbitrary power People then had not policy and knew not how to exercise Law aright and to keep their Kings within the bounds thereof But according to the second respect we must think that there was a change in Court Then the Carthaginian Kings became subjected to Law It is therefore reported that Machaeus or as Orosius saith Mezeus vvas banished by the Carthaginians And finding that after he vvas by strength of hand released from his banishment he endeavoured to lord over them they accused him and executed judgment on him as on a malefactor and paracide both as a Rebel against his Country and as a murderer of his son Just lib. 18. Tell me not that Machaeus was not their King but the general Captain of their Army 1 Because his son Cartalo was by the Carthaginians trimmed-up in a Kingly attire instead of
in Rufus Henry 1. Steven Henry 2. and Richard 1. did remain purum putum Monarchicum the power of even-down and unmixed Monarchy And though saith he in the reigne of King John that power was lessened yet was there nothing derogated from the King's supremacy and absolutenesse remaining unviolated untill the perjured English rebels at this day have altered and diminished the just greatnesse of the King of England Def. reg cap. 8. Ans I admire that this man knoweth nothing but to rail on them whom he knoweth not Well I cast him over into GOD'S hands and fall to examine what he alledgeth Sure I am notwithstanding all his railing it cannot abide the touch-stone It is known to be a manifest lie which he alledgeth concerning the immediat successours of the Conquerour It is reported in even-down terms that these kings of whom Salmasius expresly speaketh esteemed Norman Laws established by the Conquerour too rigorous and unjust And therefore before they got the Crown they promised to the people to abrogate them and in place of them to establish the Laws of the Confessour Yea every-one of them promised more then another and to keep themselves within the bounds of Law to the very heart's desire of the people This was not only promised by themselves but also by others in their name And unlesse they had so promised they could never have gotten the Crown They got it upon the expectation of the accomplishment of their promise as the English Histories do abundantly storie And it cannot be denied but Henry 1. did give the Englishes a free Parliament and made it the government of the kingdom So that he is called the first king in England in whose time the power of Parliament was established And as for John it is very well known that because he did not stand to his oath and promise at his Coronation for establishing the ancient Laws of the kingdom but endeavoured to governe after the manner of the Conquerour in an arbitrary and loose way therefore the people rose-up in arms against him and dethroning him did set-up another in his room And whereas this man saith that the ancient Lawes of the kingdom did not derogate from the supremacy and absolutenesse of the king the contrary of that is already proved It seemeth strange to me that he is not ashamed to affirm that what Laws were established by Edward the Confessour and granted by King John were preserved inviolable to this day derogating nothing from the absolutenesse of John's successours Who knoweth not that the liberties of Magna Charta and de Foresta subject the King to Law And because that Henry 3. did not stand to the maintenance thereof after he had given his Oath at a Parliament at Oxford to maintain them inviolable therefore the People took up Arms against him till after many debates between them they caused him often to promise that they should be inviolably observed as well by him as by all other Thus they tied not only him but also his heirs to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom And because Edward 2. did act against these Laws following the counsel of Peter Gaveston and the two Spensers therefore he was imprisoned and dethroned after several conflicts between him and the People 'T is remarkable that the People refused to crown him till firstly he did put P. Gaveston from him And likewise Edward 5. was deposed after he had reigned two moneths and eleven dayes and was obscurely buried in the Tower of London Where then I pray you is the absoluteness of the King of England Inst 6. Vnder Edward 4. saith Salmasius it was enacted That the King might erect a publick Judgmet-seat by his Letters patent in any part of the kingdom he would Vnder Henry 7. it was enacted and declared That the King had a full power in all Causes in administring Justice to every one In the first year of Edward 6. a Statute was made declaring all authority both Spiritual and Temporal to be derived from the King Def. Reg. cap. 9. Answ I must needs say This hath more colour of probation then any thing the man as yet hath objected But notwithstanding this he will do well to observe this distinction 1. What is given to the King by way of complement and Court-expression 2. What is giving to him in reality and by way of action The truth is in the first notion there is as much ascribed to the King of England as if he had been indeed an absolute Prince On him you have these Court-Epithets The King of the Parliament The sovereign Lord of the Parliament Yea and the Parliament is called The Parliament of the King He is called The Original both of Spirituall and Temporal power having full power over all causes and persons and to erect Judicatories in any part of the kingdom where he pleaseth This is spoken But what then Examine the matter aright and you will find it but spoken What cannot Court-Parasites and flattering Councellors passe a fair compellation upon their Prince 'T is the least thing they can do to bring themselves in credit with him Read the Parliamentary Acts of Scotland and you will find just as much spoken if not more of the King of Scotland In Parl. 18. Jam. 6. Act. 1. 2. James 6. is called Sovereign Monarch absolute Prince Judge and Governour over all Estates Persons and Causes And yet who dare say but the King of Scotland according to the Law of the kingdom is a regulated and non-absolute Prince But according to the second notion let us examine the strength of these Epithets And so in the first place we fall a-discussing particularly these three Sanctions of which Salmasius speaketh The first saith That the King by his Letters patent may erect Court-Judicatories in any part of the Kingdom where he pleaseth This will never conclude that the King of England hath an absolute power This Act only speaketh of his power of calling inferiour Judicatories What is that to the purpose The King of England had power to call and dissolve the Parliament the highest Judicatory of the Land Yea Henry 1. did ordain and constitute the Parliament Yet notwithstanding that as is shewed already the King of England cannot be called absolute The King of Scotland hath power of giving-out Letters of Caption Parl. Jam. 2. chap. 12. Courts of Regalities are justified by the King's Justice chap. 26. And the Parliament petitioned the King to cause execute the Act anent the Establishment of Sessions for executing Justice chap. 65. The power of the Colledge of Justice is ratified and approved by the King Jam. 5. Parl. Edinb Mar. 17. 1532. But who will therefore call the King of Scotland an absolute King The second Sanction giveth the King full power over all persons and all causes But I pray you doth this give the King power over the Parliament and Laws No verily It only giveth the King power over all persons and estates separatim
Impune quae libet facere id est Regem esse But Memmius thereby endeavoureth to disswade the Romans to keep themselves by all means possible from the yoke of King Jugurtha hereby insinuating the dangerousnesse and inconveniency of Monarchy just so as Oâ—tanes did to the Persians But neither of them did allow this but taxed it as an unjust and hurtful power in Kings I must needs say Salmasius quoteth Memmius and Ottanes their words as the Devil quoted in tempting Christ Matth. 4. David's words Psa 91. v. 11. That which directly made against the Devil's temptation he held-out and only expressed that which he thought made for his purpose So doth Salmasius straight-forth in quoting the words of Ottanes and Memmius The thing that maketh against him he suppresseth and that which in shew maketh for him he expresseth SUBSECT 2. The rest of the Arguments for enforcing the second Assertion propounded and followed-forth HAving at length discussed all that Salmasius doth or can reply against our second Argument we make ready now to propound the rest of our Arguments whereby the King 's arbitrary power is dismissed And what further may be objected against our second Argument as indeed Royallists do we shall take it off by the way in prosecuting the rest of our Arguments And so by the way we shall meet with these Royallists who with Salmasius do directly militar against our second Argument Now Thirdly we make good our purpose from the power that the Kings of Israel and Judah had And for clearing this you shall be pleased to take notice of these Conclusions Conclus 1. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion and the People of GOD. For proof of this see 1 Sam. 13.14 15.22.23 c. 2 Sam. 21. 1 King 12.14.15.16.20.22 2 King 3.8.10.13.14.15.16.17.21.24 2 Chr. 10.11.12.18.21.22.24.25.26.27.28.33.36 Conclus 2. The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republick There is reason for this for such did reign against Law And why did they not also rule against Law And what can tyrannous Kings do but reduce the people to slavery Now it is known that the Kings of Israel for the most part were of this temper Many of them were cruel tyrants and vile usurpers Therefore is it said Rex neque judicat neque judicatur non dicit testimonium nec in ipsum dicitur In cod Sanh 11. This Maimonides expoundeth concerning the kings of Israel in Gemar tract de synedr cap. 11. And this I take to be very true concerning the usurping and tyrannous kings of Israel They did not judge because tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty They seek nothing but their own case and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion as the tyrant Cambyses did in seeking his german sister in marriage What Such hold will for Law They know nothing but Hoc volo sic jubeo sit pro ratione voluntas Juv. Satyr 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any They act will-way and not Law-way They were not judged because they did take power to themselves above all Law It cannot be denied but Salmastus concludeth well from 1 Sam. 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert that though this be true Rex judicat concerning the King of Israel according to God's institution the Law of the Nation and the practice of some of their Kings yet this is as true Rex non judicat concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings And it is very observable that Jannaeus whom they called Alexander all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews acted nothing according to Law but tyrannized over them Jos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22 But in Gem. tract de Syned cap. 11. it is said that because of Jannaeus it was enacted that the king should neither judge nor be judged And if it be true that it was enacted then then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius of which the Rabbinick writers speak but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man who did not govern law-way but will-way And as Alexander so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius Jos Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments had exemption and immunity from Law This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law 1. Multiplication of wives Whereof David had very many 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2 Murder upon the back of adultery 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver 2. Horses and Charets 1 Kin. 10. 2 Chron. 9. 3. Wives And 4 he fell into adultery 1. Kin. 11. And yet we read not that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the Sanhedrin And what I pray you could be the reason of this Not because the king de jure hath immunity from Law Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes We read nothing of that And you shall not make me believe that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion if you alleadge that the Sanhedrin which de jure as both already and afterward doth appear had power over them durst not for fear of their resistance execute judgment on them That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers which the Holy Ghost condemneth Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah And the people did so against Athaliah 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power that David and Solomon were spared Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them And why not also on David and Solomon They were all Kings alike And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death ten tribes declined the house of David because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke that therefore they did revolt from his son it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear
he did not protest against the power but whereas he should have disswaded the the people from seeking after it he tacitely perswadeth them thereto for how much more the excellency and goodnesse of a thing is pointed-out so much more it is desired-after And to say that Samuel did not disswade them therefrom but perswaded them thereto is to avouch that either he did argue against himself and militate against his own purpose or else that he acted contrary to his Commission from GOD. The LORD commanded him solemnly to protest and disswade them from their purpose He would have him to lay-out before their eyes the dangerousnesse of Kingly power to strike terrour in their hearts that they might forbear longer to desire it If you come to my hand and say that the Prophet in this place onely speaketh of unlawfull power or of the bad of a lawful power I obtain my desire I seek no more then that you say he speaketh here of the abuse and not the use of Kingly power And I trow the abuse of Kingly power is not the right but the wrong of it 2. Because the Prophet in describing the manner of the King setteth down acts of tyranny not of lawfull authority We take up the description it-self under a general and particular notion The generall Ye shall be his servants He shall beslave you and make you serve him according to his pleasure Which made Josephus say And that I may speak it in a word ye together with all yours shall serve the King no otherwaies then his own domestick servants Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. See plain language in Brent to this purpose hom 27. in 1 Sam. 8. The particular notion hath several parts in it Firstly in order to the King 's tyrannizing over the sons of the people He will take your sons c. As if he had said your King shall make you sonlesse He shall beslave them to his service imploying some in one office and some in another And in all these employments whether base or not neither ye nor your sons shall be holden as free-men but all the fruits of your labours shall turn-over into the King's privat advantage Whereupon Josephus himself bringeth-in Samuel speaking that he would declare to them who should be their king but adding that he would first shew them what things they would suffer under a king and with how great disadvantages they would live under him Therefore ye shall firstly know that he will take from you your children and he shall make some of them drivers of Chariots c. So that there shall be nothing which he shall not constrain them to do after the manner of bought slaves Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. In this Josephus much agreeth with these words in the original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which in their proper rigorous signification are rendered he will quite take-away your sons But we judge it not to be an Act of Regal power but of meer tyranny to denude the parent altogether of his child and the King to dispose of him at his pleasure For this Brent gallantly speaketh loc cit Secondly In order to the King 's away-taking of the daughters of the people He will take your daughters to be confectionaries and to be cooks and to be bakers As if he had said He shall not only make you sonlesse but daughterlesse also And as he will make slaves of the one so likewise of the other Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text And it proporteth a ravenous and cruel away-taking But hear Josephus Kings will make confectionaries of your daughters for their own use kitchen-women dressers of cloath and they shall compel them to do any other service which damsels for fear of strokes do perform Loc. cit Nay but Brent loc cit is more full and plain Thirdly in order to the King 's away-taking of their possessions And he will take your fields c. It may be you think that your sons and your daughters will be well taken-off your hands and though he should wrong them he will not wrong your selves Peradventure you imagine his tyranny will take a stand there Nay but I 'll tell you if he take-away your sons and daughters he will also take-away your substance And well know I if you get any courtesie at his hand ye'll have little reason to boast of it He will take the tenth from you Sure I am he will have so little respect to you to your children that serve him and to your pains in gathering riches together that what ye gain through the sweat of your brows he wil let it out to any base fellow in his Court and ye dare not say it is evil done If this be not an act of tyranny saith Piscator then had not God punished Ahab for taking-away Naboth's vineyard Ahab according to Law should have possessed it Schol. in 1 Sam. 8. See Josephus Brent loc cit Fourthly In order to his away-taking of the people's servants And he will take your men-servants and your maid-servants and your goodliest young-men and put them to his work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text His tyranny shall not end at your sons and daughters and at your possessions but he shall violently rob you of your servants And if he take not all of them be sure he will take the chiefest of them See plain Brent ibid. Fifthly In relation to his away-taking of their sheep He will take away the tenth of your sheep He will not leave you so much as a sheep's tail At least he will take the tenth of them 3. The consequent and event both of the general and particular part of the description is the effect of tyranny not of lawful authority Ye shall cry-out in that day because of your King whom ye shall have chosen you We are sure that the people would never cry-out for exercising the just and lawful Acts of Regal Authority Thereby justice is promoted and vice is punished Which is a blessing and not a bondage for people to make them cry-out in bitternesse of spirit Thus it is abundantly made good that Samuel here doth not describe the power but the tyranny of the King Now in-starteth another question Whether or not doth the Prophet in this place disswade the Jews from seeking a King as a King To which we answer affirmatively and prove it thus If the Prophet doth not disswade the people from seeking a King under the notion of a King then either because he only taxeth carnal confidence in them or arogancy and pride or precipitation only or else because they sought a King after the manner of the Nations But none of these Reasons whether conjunctly or severally are the adaequat object of the Prophet's disswasion Firstly Because it is said That Samuel was displeased because they sought a King The text is not But the thing displeased Samuel when they