their particular lodgings whether the way to the house were not so beset with clamarous multitudes that they must passe thorough the midst of them whilst they inform them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take The other two may be reduced to those It is no wonder many stay away since they must be absent even whilst they are there The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom publique affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell could the King conceive this dishonourable for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights because he takes all the rest of mankind for deadly enemies Can he with honour confesse himselfe unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him with equall reason they may challenge to themselves the nomination of all Bishops Ministers Sheriffs Justices c and dispose of all the Preferments in England The substance of the request seemes to be no more but this that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments c What an affected mistake is this He is ashamed to call it by the true name and therefore styles that advice which is properly command if it be not in His power to reject their counsell seem it never so unreasonable If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommēdation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majesty and devesting himselfe of power If this will content them they shall have as much power as He grants to His Courtiers Counsellors are not names of authority they are the Princes eares His eyes this relation is neare enough He sees and heares by them yet they must not passe their bounds they must be like to the outward senses still and make a bare representation the office of reason is peculiar to him to passe judgement thereon Their information is not alwayes faithfull he may consult reason and by the benefit of that correct their errour misrepresenting an object as crooked which in it selfe is streight If not out of duty to their King and a just sense of His honour yet out of love to themselves and a naturall care of their own safety Subjects are bound in all legall wayes to expresse their dislike of this proposition For they must expect to suffer all those evills which Faction can produce and what happinesse can be hoped for in a Kingdome divided in it selfe This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowells which would first break out in the Countyes electing and divide the familyes of the gentry by irreconcileable hatred For it cannot be imagined but that power will bandy against power and relations against relations to put Sons or Kinsmen into that roade which only leads unto preferment Nor would the flames be quenched but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses as being pent in a narrow room to which the insolency of some attaining offices to which they are not equall the shame and discontents of others repulsed and the ambition of all would adde continuall fuell But the greatest misery of all is were their corruptions never so high we could have but slender hopes of redresse Since the prevayling party jealous of their own honour would easily maintain the reputation of their choice and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at another He that cannot think it probable that out of private ends they should so farre neglect justice and honour let him only examine whether in some Parliaments most known offendours and active instruments in the peoples misery by striking in with the prevailing side have not been more safe then innocency could have made them There are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such J am most studious of Certainly it were to be desired we might enjoy the benefits of power and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof But since this cannot be fully provided for because the same hand which is enabled to protect may injure the aimes of wisest States have been not so much to take away the power because then they should be likely to suffer under a weak Protector as the will of oppression The most probable means to effect this is after a certain rule is agreed upon and Lawes are established to acquaint a governor what he ought to doe in performance of that trust committed to him so to order his interests that to advance the peoples good shall be for the Princes advantage Subjects will have great reason to promise to themselves a full happinesse from the faithfull discharge of his Regall office to which he is so strongly tyed by those bonds of justice and profit This the wisdom of our Ancestors hath provided for in a high degree and so temper'd this governement that both King and people will be joyntly happy or joyntly miserable The severall goods of each forme are here united we have great Democraticall advantages and yet may avoyd the evills of a popular State as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legall tryall we have the good of Aristocracy counsell of the best experienced such as have studied nations and men nor yet are we acquainted with the disease of it faction amongst the Nobility The Counsell of many is profitable but the resolve of one is necessary Since they looking upon one another as equalls would be very apt to quarrell for when one contradicts what another hath advised the debate between them seems to be which is the wiser man Their discourses are like so many pleadings for honour and we know what issue such suites would come to when the thing in controversy is so highly valued if there were not a judge to determine And this is the benefit of Monarchy which is so restrained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny For how should this enter in The old lawes the security of our libertyes cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent but grant an illegall violent Government should break in upon us by what meanes could it be maintained The King can have no supply of money without the House of Commons and without these sinewes his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reines which should govern that provoked beast the multitude But He may take it by force He cannot doe it in person and it is not to be imagined any considerable number of His people will be active in their owne
swallow up the Subjects right or the Subjects right the Kings just prerogative No dissolution ought to be of rule convayed by the consent of societyes into such and such hands but by the same power by which it had it's constitution This J grant being rightly understood but because the sense may be easily mistaken J shall enlarge my selfe upon it It is most agreeable to reason that the same power should by equall right abrogate as it did at first constitute For it is not possible any body should lay a necessary obligation upon it selfe to doe thus when it had liberty to doe otherwise except in relation to some other person to whom I may part with that right I had without possibility of recalling it And this either by actuall donation so when I have given away my money J cannot challenge it as due on my repentance or by promise which is an earnest of my performance In these cases J cannot use my liberty because it would be to the injury of another according to that rule grounded on great equity Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam L nemo D. de reg jur In a popular state there is but one simple power and therefore the people upon consent may establish an Aristocracy or Monarchy when they please But in the other two where the authority is placed in the hands of a few or of one there are two parties in the contract and therefore even the whole people have not any power of dissolving this government unlesse this one or those few will voluntarily resigne up their power into those hands from which they received it and that such resignation be not to the injury of a third party It were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should aime at any thing but it's own good in the first and last place No question rule and subjection divided paternall powers finding it necessary to yeeld to one Regall and instead of many to submit to one common father did spring from reason directing man-kind to its greatest convenience Therefore the people ayming chiefly at their own good yet perceiving this was not to be attained except they had a common protector to administer justice equally amongst them they found it necessary in a higher degree to provide for his good in recompense of their security and out of their particular estates to grant to him honourable demaines to whose care and justice they owed the peaceable possession of all So the good of either is mutually involved and that the people may be happy they must first provide for the happinesse of their ruler What followes I shall think unworthy any answer He breaks out into a most scandalous and false invective against the late government That the subject groaned under some grievances cannot be denied and we owe to the goodnesse of his Majestie that we are free even from the feare of them for the future J speak sincerely what I think though the wit of malice should set before us the most exact table of all our sufferings let it not impose upon us what we never felt and compare us to any other nation of the Christian world we in our worst times were least unhappy Because we have no reason to be in love with any evils I shall not endeavour to excuse them by comparison with our present miseries Though neither be desirable yet we are too sensible which we have justest reason to complain of I hope under this word protect the King intends not onely to shield us from all kinde of evill but to promote us also to all kinde of Politicall happinesse according to his utmost de voyre I never before did apprehend in the word Protect this large notion we may expect all happinesse from His goodnesse we cannot challenge it from His duty How should we conceave that the Prince is obliged by oath to take care for his people in such a degree as the most affectionate mother never yet took for her dearest children If it were so then all his Majesties Royall ancestors who did not provide for their people in such a high degree of happinesse as he by the advise of this present Parliament hath done were perjured as having all taken the oath to Protect Every particular subject hath a just title and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word Protection Is the King therefore bound to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command Though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole state ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore the greatest happinesse of a Prince that he was able his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesie When he hath done all that he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant I am confident never any age was guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect to Princes as is shewne in this book If all single persons ought to look upon the late bills passed by the King as matters of Grace then they truly are so for no obligation can lay upon a man to believe things otherwise then they are This ground destroyes the power of beneficence in a Prince and the duty of gratitude in Subjects We should think it very hard if we who are but subjects should be dealt with by the same rule All owe a duty to their King to their country yet upon extraordinary services we beleive we deserve well of both The example of the House of Commons will better instruct him who have severall times presented their thanks and humble acknowledgment of his Majesties gracious favours and have likewise received thanks from most Counties in the Kingdome for procuring those bills so beneficiall to the subject and yet surely the trust reposed in them by those that chose them and the end for which they met did no lesse oblige them in point of duty to doe whatsoever might conduce to the generall good of the Kingdome The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought he to think that perisht to him which is gained to the people By the same argument the people may share all that he hath and he is bound to believe he has lost nothing If King and people have severall rights what law is there which binds the King suo jure cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his And if they have not but the interests of King and people be either altogether one and the same or so inseparably united as they cannot be severed then it
Respublica let the brand of Treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the Remedy should prove the greatest disease Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just excuse to take away a mans money and say he did first desire him to deliver it Or if their grounds of jealousy were meerly vaine It is against all equity to doe wrong because there is a possibility of suffering it no man can have a full security and therefore we must arme our selves against uncertain feares not by injuries but a wary innocence Or if the jealousy of a whole Kingdom can be counted vaine Too large an expression much the greater part of the Kingdom apprehend no just grounds of jealousies Though the mindes of many were a long time unsetled being daily disturbed by suggestitons of plots at home and invasions from abroad yet if we duly weigh the businesse such fears ought not to be valued If forty severall men reporte the same thing yet if upon examination thirty nine of them say they had it from the other man this in Law makes but one witnesse so the fears of many thousands if grounded upon informations and those informations come from very few who can no way evidence the probability of such reports they ought not to be regarded they will vanish into nothing Or if they claime any such right of judging of dangers and preventing them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetuall As often as they have a mind to make use of such a right 't is easy for them to call the case extraordinary and pretend a publike danger For my part I know not how they can ever be confuted if not now For certainly apparent dangers did never lesse appeare It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had been frighted with secret plots and conceald designes The King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand That is if He had not come to get in He had not been shut out if He would have stayed away he would not have denyed Him entrance Or by coming without any such considerable forces Let His forces be great he was not to give Law to his Prince but neither is it likely he would have admitted Him then for you confesse a little above He offered to enter Hull with twenty horse only unarmed The Scots in England took New-castle but by private authority yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The King and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an Act of oblivion He flourishes at large upon the example of Richard the second he means Edw. 2. misled by Spencer It doth not follow because one King hearkned to evill counsell therefore all must be denied the liberty to hearken to good Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the Scales and ballancing their reputations At length yet there is some little hopes he may prove a convert since he doth almost promise to suspend his judgement till he may have full satisfaction from His Majesties Narration which in due time will more fully informe him An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withoutsome means and what this means shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted then not to perceive what is so obvious Deny the King a negative and the thing is done The power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publique consent and how publique consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious Tyranny amongst us is not discernable It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs For though their power depend upon a publique consent in the election yet not so after they are met together The necessities of the time made His Majesty grant that this Parliament should not be dissolved without their consent but they may now challenge it as their right if the King be bound to confirme what they vote necessary or expedient But it cannot be and his reason is the Kingdom would not obey them In truth a very probable thing I beleeve they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdom His Majesty expresses His just indignation that they He imputes it not to the Houses though this Author still involve them but to the contrivers penners of the Declaration should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him He returnes answer this cannot be collected from those words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty because it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroning of any King of England What was there affirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of Free in it If the â— of Hen. 4. Were indeed not Free why were Statutes cited out of it The authors of those quotations must be presumed to accompt it so The King is offended at their franck expressions disguised under the charge of a malignant party The sense of his answer is this they have no other way to cleere themselves for there being faults somewhere not to lay them upon others were to take them upon themselves His Majesty hath proposed a very good way which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency and that is not alwaies to accuse but sometimes to prove The King demands justice for tumults and high indignities offered and complaines of a prohibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke to hinder the processe against a Riot according to Law His answer is equall justice could not be obtained against the Court-Cavaleeres His Majesty never protected them from legall tryall it was free for them to have proved what they could against them The Kingsaies it being granted by them that their priviledges doe not extend to Treason Felony or breach of the Peace so as to exempt the Members from all manner of tryall yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their tryall that the cause must first be brough before them and their consent asked before you can proceed then their Priviledges extend as farre in these as in the most unquestioned cases because no priviledge exempts them from all manner of tryall the House being acquainted and
is usurped and not just yet whilst it remaines dominion and till it be legally againe devested refers to God as to it's author and donor as much as that which is haereditary Usurpation unjust dominion can give no right to the possessor he that looses a kingdome by force may recover it by the same title So Athalia in the seventh yeare of her raigne was slaine by the command of Iehoida and Joash anointed King 2. King 11. and restored to his right He must againe answer him selfe pag. 3. he tells us Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes c. for meere force cannot alter the course of nature or frustrate the tenour of law and if it could there were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due liberty then the Prince might to subvert the same And 't is a shamefull stupidity in any man to think that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and lawes of which the conquerour and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury then they which put them to such conflicts Is it not a cleare contradiction to say that God is the author and Donor of Dominion usurped and not just as well as of that which is haereditary Certainly God being Lord Proprietary of all his donation transfers a full right to him on whom he bestowes it This deed of guift being knowne it is not lawfull to endeavour a recovery This was the case of Rehoboam who after the defection of ten tribes raised an army out of Judah and the tribe of Benjamin in hopes to reduce them to obedience But he was warned by Shemajah the man of God not to fight against his brethren not because it was unlawfull in it selfe or the successe improbable but for that this was from the Lord. 2. Kin. 12. As this was not setting aside that extraordinary consideration unlawfull So neither was it as he is pleased to terme it a ridiculous attempt to indeavour to reduce ten tribes by the strength of two For he had raised an army consisting of one hundred and fourescore thousand chosen men v. 21. which were warriers And it may probably be collected from the muster roll which Ioab brought in to David where the men of Iudah were 500000 2. Sam. 24.9 that those two tribes were able to furnish an army strong enough to bid all Jsraell battell Besides as he had lost them only by harsh language so he might hope to regain them by faire promises It may be not unworthy our observation what good consequences did attend the defection of these ten tribes Did they not presently fall away from the true God as well as their King and were they not shortly after led into captivity This we must observe though force be not law yet if after conquest a people resigne their right in part or in whole by a subsequent act of consent they are obliged to stand to those conditions which they made perchance out of a probable feare of harder usage For the law of God generally L. si mulier D. quod me t. cau and the civill law in this case makes the Act binding That covenants should not be violated will appeare by the revenge God took in behalfe of the Gibeonites The children of Israell suffered three yeares famine and after this seven of Sauls sonnes were hanged to make an atonement for this breach of promise Notwithstanding the Gibeonites had overreached the Children of Jsraell by craft yet they having sworne were bound to performe their oath unto the Lord. Doli exceptio could not take of this obligation That they were deceived gave no right to them to imitate what they condemned and to deceive againe Thus we see what speciall care God takes to preserve the faith of contracts He will returne abundantly what any mans honesty costs him and therefore it is great reason he that sweareth to his neighbour should not disappoint him though it be to his own hindrance After some generall truths he comes to this issue The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor This inference most weak the quite contrary may clearly be concluded The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it follows he which hath all their power I may adde his own particular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The truth is he is now the only fountaine of all power and justice But he offers us a proofe for if the people be the true efficient cause of power it is a rule in nature Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Strange that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast of Monarchy He will be unwilling to follow the consequence of it He hath an estate which no question he would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich and himselfe richer For Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale I believe rather then part with his meanes he will finde an answer to his own argument By the same reason one that entreth into his service because he hath made him his master shall conclude himselfe the better man and challenge power over him For Quicquid â—fficit tale est magis tale But because to prove his reasoning absurd is not fully to answer I will shew the ground of this fallacy The axiome is true ante effectum productum not alwaies after So a sparke firing a City was once more fire then the houses nor so after the whole towne is become one flame or else thus it is true in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is inherent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation devest themselves of power or wealth Because a thing can not retaine a fullnesse after it hath emptied it selfe Jf the King be universis minor then the people have placed a King not over but under them and they doe â—ll to petition when they might command they may require it from the Prince their Subject Hence it appeares that at the founding of authorities when the consent of societies convaies rule into such and such hands it may ordain what conditions and prefix what bounds it pleases This is most true and therefore J shall easily grant the name King to signifie a person invested with different power according to the varietie of lawes in severall nations His Majesty doth most freely acknowledge and will constantly maintain what ever rights the law doth give us yet He is not bound to betray his own The truth is we should be equally miserable under either extreme if the Kings prerogative should
We knew how to obey when such seditious fellowes out of their Pulpits did dare to strike even at the highest and with more boldnesse because with lesse danger as meaning to fight with other mens hands If the King could be more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court or if His single judgment were to be preferd before all advice whatsoever it were not onely vaine but extreamly inconvenient that the whole Kingdome should be troubled to make elections and that the parties elected should attend the publike businesse There are other Ends besides this for which they are called together yet this is one main end as appears by the Kings writ and therefore He never refused to advise with them The usuall but not the onely forme of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to passe which I beleeve was never objected to any Prince before to His Majesty le Roy s' avisera proves that after the advice of this His great Councell He is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions as His owne wisdome shall think meet But this Author will by no meanes take notice that the use of Counsell is to perswade not to compell as if a man in a businesse of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many friends and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one if it appeare more proportionable to the end he aymes at Not so because the many eyes of so many choise Gentlemen out of all parts see more then fewer This Argument I beleeve will conclude too much and therefore nothing at all For the same reason which denyes a liberty of dissenting to the King that is such a number who see more because they are more may deny it to the House of Pears in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so both King and Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament Besides experience shews this rule is not generally true for I dare say if we ask almost any Parliament man he will tell us upon the reading of a Bill sometimes one man in the House hath found more faults and urged more just exceptions then three hundred would have been able to espy There have been Parliaments wherein Acts have been made to remedy former mistakes Nay whole Parliaments have been repeal'd and declared Null by succeeding Parliaments so 21. Rich. 2. cap. 12. does voyd and disanull all the Statutes made in a former Parliament held 11. Rich. 2. so 1. Hen. 4. cap. 3. repeales this whole Parliament of 21. Rich. 2. So 39. Hen. 6. In a Statute made at Westminster We find a totall repeal of a Parliament held at Coventry the yeare before as made against all good faith and conscience c the Acts and Statutes laboured by the conspiracy procurement and excitation of some ill disposed Persons for the introduction and accomplishment of their rancour and inordinate Covetise So 49. Hen. 6. A Parliament held at Westminster is made Null in regard diverse matters had there been treated and wrought by the laboured exhortation of Persons not fearing God nor willing to be under the rule of any earthly Prince but inclined of sensuall appetite to have the whole governance of the Realme under their owne power and domination These are the testimonies that one great Councell bestowes upon another I could urge the same Arguments in the very same words onely â—â—anging a Lay-councell into an Ecclesiasticall Councell and upon equall necessity require the King to assent to what ever they shall vote I make no doubt the Author will in this case give him leave to make his conscience his guide and if he doe he will think his Arguments deserve no further answer The few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their counsells more faithfull impartiall and religious then any other Certainly they may have as many as any other private Subject and that this Kingdome hath seldome heretofore suffered under the prosecution of private interest is to be imputed to the excellent policy which he endeavours to overthrow They are strangely transported with the love of a popular state who can so overrule their understandings as to force themselves to think the members of it may not be extreamly subject to ambition which would easily prompt them to alter the good old wayes of bestowing Offices and collating Honours to covetousnesse which would tempt them to draw the determination of causes out of the ordinary Courts of Iustice to hatred which would make them prosecute their enimies with bitter violence and upon the least suspition of a fault to punish them first by imprisonments and to prove them guilty at leasure to affection which would make them shield their friends from being questioned though their corruptions were notorious to all the world The Bishop of Durham his case speaks home to the businesse we are told in the 3. c. of the 2. Parliament held 1. Mar. how the Bishoprick of Durham was dissolved in a former Parliament 7. Edw. 6. which was compassed and brought to passe by the sinister labour great malice and corrupt means of certain ambitious persons then being in Authority rather for to enrich themselves and their friends with a great part of the possessions of the said Bishoprick then upon just occasion or Godly zeale Let the world judge whether this Age may not be subject to the same temptation and whether a desire to share the means of the Church may not have as strong operations as formerly Nothing more common in the Roman story then the bribing of the Senate This made Jugurtha cry out who by his guifts governed their Parliament O Vrbem venalem maturè perituram si emptorem invenerit Had it been our unhappinesse to have lived in a popular state except they are altered from what Histories deliver them we should have found injustice a trade and that the most compendious way to wealth was to buy no land but of the Judges Tacitus gives us a full character of what we might well feare When the government of Rome was changed into a Monarchy under Augustus the Provinces were very well contented Suspecto Senatûs populique imperio obcertamen Potentium avaritiam Magistratuum invalido legum auxilio quae vi ambitu postremò pecuniâ turbabantur They must evidently have more private ends then the King who may be mislead upon wantonnesse but they must struggle with solid temptations desire of riches desire of honours there being an emptinesse in them whereas He is full and satisfied Si violandum est Jus regni causâ violandum est the greatest motive that can be a hope to share in Soveraignty the Parliament to rule the King and they to rule the Parliament We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the Country but never any till now betwixt the representatives and the body of the Kingdom represented How
committed so many outrages and such high injustice that Theramenes one of their own body one of the thirty professed his publique dislike of those proceedings Then was he accused as a Traitor to them and though it was a priviledge of the three thousand that none of them should suffer death by the sentence of the thirty but according to accustomed processe and tryall yet Critias wip't his name out of that number and so reduced him to their tryall Theramenes pleads for himselfe they ought to look upon his as a common case their names might as easily be blotted out he advises them to be very wary in making such a president which might ruine them and their posterity The issue was this Particular men being over-awed by their fears thought it their wisest way to hold their peace since if they should speak in his behalfe there was little hopes to redeeme him but great probability to ruine themselves So they chose rather to expose themselves to those future inconveniences which possibly might not come upon them then hazard a present danger By this advantage the Tyrants prevailed and condemned him to dye The things taken from the King at Hull were Armes which are of more danger then other kind of chattels By the same Law all that part of the Kingdom which is not confided in may be disarmed nay why may not their mony be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it The Subject is in a miserable condition that is lyable to be undone as often as they please to be fearfull It is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings Armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize what ever else belongs unto His Majesty The Law of this Kingdom hath only intrusted the Prince with Armes so that the Subject ought not to be arraied trained and mustered but by His Commission But some determination must be supream and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the discretion of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meer discretion No necessity of either For in cases of this nature which he confesses to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary Law The case of Ireland as it is laid down by His Majesty is unanswerable and therefore he is forced to extreme shifts being unable to say any thing materiall and yet unwilling to hold his peace England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them as betwixt England and Wales If this were so Irish Barons would be English Peeres and English Peeres would have a right to vote in Irish Parliaments Besides all lawes here enacted would stand in full force in Ireland as they doe in the Kings dominion of Wales Though the major part should vote a thing yet if it be disliked here they would want authority to over-rule the thing so voted For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major is that blood may not be shed for in probability the major part will prevaile This is a good reason for such a contract that the minor part should subscribe but after such agreement in States justice laies an obligation on them so to doe upon his grounds if the lesser part in Parliament though never so few can make it appeare the greater part of the Kingdom are of their opinion the major part ought to subscribe to the minor Nay if at any time the major part of Ireland joyning with the minor part of England make a major of the whole then the major part in our Parliament must sit downe He takes no notice of the other case suppose the malignant party should be a major part of both Houses which His Majesty shewes how very probably it might have been and were there a new election it is not impossible the Counties should send up the greater part of such men as he calls malignant would he think the King bound to consent to all such alterations as they should propose Some scattering reasons are laid down concerning the Militia which are but repetitions of what I have formerly answered A Faction is said to have prevailed upon a major part by cunning force absence or accident He argues thus against it if by cunning we must suppose the King's party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty The reason why they are over-borne may be this not because they have lesse Law but more Honesty which will not permit them to maintain a good cause by ill meanes We all know in how great stead those piae fraudes holy falshoods and religious untruths stood the Church of Rome though there were such who laid down better reasons for the contrary opinions yet truth prevailed slowly and with a few only because the minds of most were craftily prepossest with prejudice against it begotten and nourished by fained stories The dispute proceeded upon very unequall termes for the Roman party gave themselves the liberty of taking all advantages whereas their adversaries were forced to betray a good cause out of meer ingenuity they had none of their side who could lye We ought to examine whether this policy work not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falshoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be reipublicae salutares which have so strong an influence on the understandings of many that they can submit to the votes of some who have insinuated themselves into their affections against the cleer reasons of others whom they have been taught causelesly to suspect How easy is it to deceive by giving in false informations of dangers from abroad If some more scrupulous then to be abused and led away by light reports inquire after the hand that they may judge of the probability of the intelligence according to the faith and credit of the relator they must be satisfied with this the informer desires his name should be concealed Pour l'eviterâ—le tiltre d'espion It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in Law to be done by force not only when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfy the passion and humor of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this works on the mind as strongly as the other on the body And therefore Seneca tells us stating this point of freedom vim majorem metum excipio quibus adhibitis electio perit and Cicero nec quicquam aequitati tam infestum est quà m convocati homines armati It remaines then we examine whether the names of many gentlemen were not openly read in tumults whether they were not posted with directions to